4.2. Counter-Terrorism and the CSDP (Birgit Löser

4.2. COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE CSDP

by Birgit Löser

European Union/EUCAP SAHEL Niger

CSDP is perfectly suited to helping countries' authorities cope with growing threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU internal security, including migration issues (same root causes).

Since 2001 civilian CSDP missions have been developing as important tools of the EU common foreign and security policy, operating with post-conflict and conflict-prevention mandates in a variety of countries and regions abroad. Whilst these missions are generally well documented and analysed, there is one angle few have considered to date, which is the link with the EU’s counter-terrorism (CT) efforts that have also been an important part of the EU’s external and security policy dimension. It appears that, even within the EU institutions, there has been little if any interaction between the relevant bodies, which is striking given the similarities in aims, objectives, and geographical priorities; nor has there been any coordination between respective approaches, despite the great potential for synergies.

This article seeks to analyse these similarities in greater detail, with a view to making the case for more interaction and coordination between the two EU external policy instruments, which would enhance the much sought-after ‘comprehensive’, or ‘integrated’, approach that the newly adopted EU Global Strategy advocates. The article also argues in favour of much stronger investment in CSDP, specifically with a view to addressing more systematically the CT requirements in third countries when there is a link to Europe’s security.

SIMILARITIES

The first similarity is the shared objective of enhancing the rule of law: civilian CSDP missions with a capacity-building mandate usually focus on mentoring, monitoring, advising and training for the host country’s police and judiciary. They help countries with weak law-enforcement institutions to adapt their national legislation,

European Union/EUCAP SAHEL Niger

EUCAP Sahel Niger is so far the only mission that explicitly refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate.

they assist them with security sector reform, and they contribute to improving related inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and enhancing the performance of the state apparatus and relevant personnel. Typical of this is the civilian nature of the efforts: civilian CSDP uses civilian expertise from Member States’ active police and judiciary personnel to carry out tasks relating to enhancing the rule of law in third countries.

The EU approach to CT is based on the rule of law, in so far as terrorist acts are criminalised and thus investigated, prosecuted and the perpetrators sentenced in accordance with the rule of law and international standards. Ever since the first EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism in 2001, and following the adoption of the EU CT strategy in 2005, the EU’s external CT action has continuously advocated this civilian approach. The EU has been an active contributor to various landmark resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE) that seek to criminalise terrorist acts and to strengthen the police and judicial systems dealing with terror. The EU was a founding member of the Global Counter terrorism Forum (GCTF), which is a civilian platform for politicians and practitioners involved in CT. The EU continues to proactively shape its numerous policy initiatives, best practice documents, advocacy and coordination of capacity-building in countries in need. In 2016 the EU contributed around EUR 224 million to CT/P-CVE (Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism) assistance programmes in partner countries and EUR 175 million to CT/P-CVErelated assistance programmes, making a total of around EUR 400 million of capacity-building in relation to the rule of law abroad.

European Union/EUCAP Nestor

The fact that civilian CSDP missions use active service personnel means that they can draw on state-of-the-art best practice and policy.

Another similarity is the proactive bringing of international standards and best practice to partner countries: the use of international standards is a recurrent feature in the planning documents for civilian CSDP missions. The fact that civilian CSDP missions use active service personnel means that they can draw on the state-of-the-art best practice and policy of their sending countries when helping to reform local services and local legislation.

Another important dimension of the EU’s external CT action is advocacy and diplomacy, for example through the numerous CT political dialogues held with a variety of countries and regional organisations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Union (AU). The EU also takes and active part in the GCTF (which includes co-chairing one of its working groups) as well as sponsoring numerous workshops and seminars on CT- and CVE-related topics in priority countries and regions. The network of CT experts deployed in various EU delegations since 2015 also contributes to the mainstreaming and promotion of globally agreed standards and policies.

Looking at the geographical focus of civilian CSDP and EU external CT efforts, there seems to be far less overlap than might be expected considering that in many regions terrorism is the root cause of instability or, conversely, it is likely to arise where the state apparatus is weak and conflict endemic. Some more detailed examples are: • Western Balkans: EULEX Kosovo, which is focusing on police reform and capacity-building: CT expert deployed since the end of 2016 to cover the entire region and help coordinate a major initiative in the Western Balkans to address CT and radicalisation; • Pakistan: no CSDP mission but considerable

CT engagement, including deployment of a

CT expert and a major programme currently in the pipeline (CT STRIVE); • Afghanistan: significant CSDP effort (EUP-

OL Afghanistan, soon closing), but currently no CT expert; • Middle East: Iraq CSDP mission now closed, but CT expert deployed since 2015 helping to coordinate a number of key assistance projects including intelligence services capacity-building;

• Palestine: a CSDP mission focusing on police reform and capacity-building, but no CT expert deployed; • Lebanon and Jordan: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance efforts and CT experts deployed since 2015; • Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco: no CSDP mission, but considerable CT assistance for Tunisia (Algeria and Morocco still pending), and CT experts deployed since 2015; • Sahel: two civilian CSDP missions ongoing, all in the field of Security Sector Reform; two

CT experts deployed (Chad and Nigeria), with a number of CT-related assistance programmes ongoing. The overview shows that there is currently almost no coordination between the two instruments. To put this in more positive terms, the instruments avoid duplication and thus complement each other. However, this is to assume that the decision is deliberate. The reality is that there is no coordination when an instrument is decided on, or at least that this has not been happening enough.

Nevertheless, there are examples in the past where counter-terrorism considerations have played a role in the design and inception of a civilian CSDP mission:

The first was the AMIS Support Mission (2005-2006), which supported the command and control operations of the first ever AU-led peacekeeping mission to counter the effects of the militant groups laying waste to Darfur, which at the time were not categorised as ‘terrorists’.

Some years later (in 2012), the EUAVSEC mission in South Sudan was clearly conceived in the context of the perceived threats posed by weak security at Juba airport , where the main risk was its potential use by terrorists to hijack planes. The newly established landlocked state of South Sudan was then heavily reliant on massive air transport to support state-building, and its only international airport was a lifeline.

EUCAP Nestor, which was planned and set up in parallel (in 2012), was to help counter the increasing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and its links to piracy groups operating in the Indian Ocean. Whilst this was clearly the context, the mandate of the mission ultimately focused on helping build effective coast guards for the countries in the region, without a specific reference to terrorism.

EUCAP Niger, planned and set up later in 2012, is so far the only mission that explicitly refers to counter-terrorism as part of its mandate, which includes mentoring, advice and training for local security services in legislative and other matters.

EUBAM Libya, planned in 2013, fell short of explicitly referring to terrorism, albeit terrorism was again part of the context at the time.

CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER INTERACTION AND COORDINATION

The above explanations of linkages (or non-linkages) between CSDP and CT so far clearly show two things. On the one hand, the link does not have to be explicit: aims and objectives where the emphasis is on (re-establishing) the rule of law serve the same purpose, be this through civilian CSDP or through the EU’s classical external CT efforts such as dialogues or European Commission-financed assistance programmes. On the other hand, there is clearly scope for civilian CSDP missions to be used more specifically to achieve external CT objectives.

The changing global environment in fact points to a need to redouble the EU’s efforts in this area, given the following main factors.

First, territorial gains in Iraq and Syria will sooner or later lead to a situation where remaining Da’esh fighters will move to ‘safe havens’, including in Yemen or Somalia, but also in Sudan, Libya and the wider Sahel.

The CSDP is well established in the Sahel, mainly through the two EUCAP Sahel missions (Mali and Niger), and possibly soon a new mission in Libya that is currently being planned. All three missions could easily see their mandates

adapted to more explicitly help the respective host countries cope with the growing threat posed by terrorism. The same applies to EUCAP Nestor on the eastern coast of Africa. Tasks would for instance include adapting national legislation to international standards (e.g. UNSC resolutions and conventions), mentoring and training in relation to CT cases in the courts, enhancement of CT threat assessments, information exchange and evidence collection, etc.

Ongoing discussions about the ‘regionalisation’ of the civilian CSDP missions in the Sahel through the deployment of CSDP experts in all Sahel EU delegations also create an ideal opportunity for synergies between CT experts already in the field and Commission-funded projects that either directly or indirectly pursue the same objectives as the CSDP.

Current planning of a possible new civilian CSDP mission for Libya likewise provides an ideal opportunity to combine efforts, as the aim of this new mission would be not just to help law enforcement agencies address terrorism and radicalisation, but also to tackle the links to migration – in full recognition of the fact that terror and migration have the same root causes and require similar measures by state authorities.

This is achievable and warranted, perhaps even more so now in view of the possible diminution of US engagement in these regions, which is the second main factor to consider in this context.

In summary, it seems that some opportunities could certainly arise to establish more systematic links between the CSDP and CT, with more targeted and specifically CT-related mandates for civilian CSDP missions. This would meld the work already done by other EU services on external CT measures/capacity-building with the CSDP-specific methodology of ‘hands-on’ mentoring and advice/training.

Despite these positive considerations, there is still one major challenge to the ideas outlined in this article, and that concerns the issue of resources: the civilian CSDP relies on the secondment of active service personnel from EU Member States. Security and judiciary services are already under severe strain given the heightened threat to the European mainland.

Making additional resources available for enhanced civilian CSDP missions would be very difficult, if not impossible, without a major policy shift making the links between internal and external security more explicit.

CONCLUSIONS

There can be no doubt that there is in principle scope for the civilian CSDP to consider aspects of terrorism more specifically in the definition of mandates, since the civilian CSDP is perfectly suited to helping countries’ authorities cope with growing threats that are ultimately linked to our own EU internal security, including migration issues (same root causes).

But it is not enough to ensure good policing or the rule of law. It is necessary to address more specific aspects of counter-terrorism in order to deal effectively with the phenomenon: this means CT-related information exchange, adapting national legislation to international standards, developing CT-specific best practices for law enforcement and the judiciary (see GCTF work), etc.

These are less familiar areas for current EU CSDP structures, but this can easily be addressed so as to ensure that future CSDP mandates include, subject to available resources, targeted objectives and tasks relevant to CT.

Clearly this would be in the interest of the EU and in line with the prerogatives of the recently adopted global security strategy for the European Union, which calls for a more integrated approach using EU external instruments to address both internal and external security needs.