7.1. Partnerships in Security and Defence (Alison Weston and Frédéric Maduraud

7.1. PARTNERSHIPS IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

by Alison Weston and Frédéric Maduraud

European Union/EUFOR ALTHEA

The EU and its partners can mutually benefit from each other‘s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

Common challenges call for the responsibility for addressing them to be shared. The European Union Global Strategy states that ‘the EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships’.

Partnerships on security and defence are both an essential instrument for enhancing EU security and are of practical relevance for EU partners’ security. Beyond this, EU partnerships can also be seen to have a positive impact on: (i) the consolidation of the multilateral rule-based order; (ii) regional security; (iii) reform in partner countries as regards the development of good governance structures, including democratic accountability; (iv) respect for the rule of law; and (v) the participation of partner countries and the EU in multinational cooperation as members of the wider international community.

The CSDP has been an open project from the outset. A comprehensive approach means not only drawing on all of the EU’s strengths, but also working with international and regional organisations,

EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY

‘The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Coresponsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order. In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings.’

such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the African Union, as well as with non-EU countries. The EU and these partners can mutually benefit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities, thereby bringing them closer to one another.

The increasingly challenging security environment and the efforts made over the last few years to overhaul EU policy in the area of security and defence, in particular following the presentation of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016, highlight the need to review the EU’s partnership framework in this area. The EU has responded to pressing demands from a number of partners to revisit, and in some cases enhance, its relations with them in these fields by offering guidance (in particular in the Council Conclusions of May 2017 and June 2018), stressing the need for a more strategic approach to partnerships. The new High Representative, Josep Borell, identified building security and defence partnerships as one of his key priorities for his mandate.

The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, have common values and face similar threats and challenges (left to right: Josep Borrell, Charles Michel, Ursula von der Leyen, Jens Stoltenberg). Europeans must deal with the world as it is, not as they wish it to be. That means relearning the language of power and combining the EU’s and its partners’ resources in a way that maximises their geopolitical impact. There are multiple crises surrounding Europe where the EU urgently needs to step up its operational engagement both jointly with its partners and where other synergies can be found. The world is witnessing the return of geo-strategic competition between major powers, in particular the US, China and Russia, in a multi-polar world. In this context, many third countries see value in enhancing their engagement with the EU. EU citizens also want a Europe which protects them in a context that is becoming increasingly challenging both within EU’s borders and abroad. Moreover, dealing with new security challenges and emerging threats goes beyond what we understand as traditional defence. Hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, foreign interference, disinformation, vulnerable critical infrastructures and challenges linked to space, climate change The Council has stressed the need to work towards a more strategic approach on partnerships on se- and disruptive technologies – including artificial curity and defence, building on present practice intelligence – are areas where the EU needs more and learning from past experiences. decisive and effective engagement.

US State Department 2018

European Union

EU-UN cooperation in the field is essential for mission accomplishment.

I. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FORA

1. EU-UN cooperation in crisis management and peacekeeping is constantly developing. It adds value to both organisations and is focused on bringing operational benefits to efforts on the ground. Cooperation in Mali and the Central African Republic are good examples of the EU and the UN coordinating support for national security and defence sectors, with EU missions deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations. EU bridging operations have also been conducted to support UN peacekeeping missions, such as the EUFOR RCA operation in the Central African Republic. 13 of the EU’s 17 CSDP missions and operations have been deployed alongside UN peacekeeping operations: in Mali, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans. EU cooperation with the UN on peacekeeping places the EU’s CSDP missions within a broader political and operational framework, making them more effective and efficient and enabling the EU to play its role in supporting effective multilateralism. In addition to cooperation on the ground, there is also regular dialogue between the two organisations on planning, strategic reviews and the implementation of mandates.

Operational cooperation is accompanied by multiannual initiatives through which the UN and the EU continue to strengthen their partnership. In 2019, the two organisations identified new priorities for the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management for the period 2019-2021. Building on the priorities from the previous period, 2015-20181, the key principles and priorities have been updated in line with recent developments within both the UN and the EU and in international security (conflict prevention; sustaining peace; youth, peace and security; the nexus between security and the environment). The scope has been extended beyond peacekeeping to look more broadly at peace operations and crisis management. Eight priority areas2 have been identified (three of which are new), and under each priority specific actions are outlined. The overall focus is on improving efficiency, capitalising on comparative advantages and enhancing complementarities, synergies and reciprocity.

The partnership also involves regular high-level dialogue, including the biannual EU-UN Steering Committee on Crisis Management, regular meetings between ambassadors from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the UN Security Council, the participation of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Oper-

1 The 2015-2018 priorities included rapid response, security sector reform, information and analysis exchange, and support for the African Peace and Security Architecture. 2 The eight priorities are: 1) women, peace and security (new); 2) strengthening cooperation between missions and operations in the field; 3) transitions (new); 4) facilitating EU Member States’ contributions and support to UN peace operations and the UN Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative; 5) conflict prevention in peace operations and support for political processes and solutions (new); 6) cooperation on policing, the rule of law, and security sector reform (SSR); 7) cooperation with and support for African peace operations; and 8) training and capacity building.

EU cooperation with ASEAN countries.

European Union

ations in high-level meetings of the EU Member States (e.g. informal meetings of defence ministers meetings, PSC) and an annual visit by the High Representative to the UN Security Council.

2. The EU and NATO are key partners in security and defence. In the current strategic context, characterised by the return of ‘power politics’, transatlantic cooperation – Europe and North America standing together – remains important. For the EU, this is a mutually reinforcing equation.

The first element of this equation is that a stronger NATO can contribute to making the EU stronger too. In their London Declaration of December 2020, Allied leaders reaffirmed their unity, solidarity and cohesion. This is of fundamental importance for European citizens and, more broadly, for the defence of Europe.

The second element is that a stronger EU also makes NATO stronger. EU defence initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) will deliver more capabilities not only by spending more, but also by spending better, together. This will enhance the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) and therefore European security more broadly. In view of the principle of a single set of forces, these efforts also reinforce the European pillar of NATO and support the development of interoperable capabilities by Member States, in full coherence with NATO’s requirement that those capabilities be potentially available for NATO operations. All in all, the EU’s defence efforts are strengthening NATO and contributing to transatlantic security and burden-sharing.

EU-NATO cooperation, which constitutes an integral pillar of the EU´s work on defence, remains a key political priority for the new EU leadership.

The EU has already put in place a very close cooperation agenda, building on the framework established by the two Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018 and the ensuing 74 common actions. EU-NATO cooperation covers a broad range of areas, such as:

• countering hybrid threats; • operational cooperation (including at sea and on migration); • cybersecurity and cyber defence; • defence capabilities, industry, research and exercises; • building partners’ defence and security capacities; • political dialogue. These actions continue to build upon the key principles that underpin and guide EU-NATO cooperation, namely openness and transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, and full respect for the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State. In the past couple of years, much has been achieved and an unprecedented level of cooperation has been reached. In view of the multitude of challenges faced by these two organisations, it remains important that the EU and NATO continue their collaboration.

3. Regarding multilateral cooperation, the Eastern Partnership Panel on CSDP, launched in 2013, complements bilateral relations and allows all six Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to be involved in numerous workshops, seminars, field visits and other training activities. Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine remain the most active partners and contribute regularly to CSDP missions and operations.

All CSDP training activities are organised in cooperation with the national authorities of partner countries and are financially supported by the EU (under the European Neighbourhood Instrument). Since 2013, the EEAS’s CSDP Crisis Response structures, together with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and EU Member States, have conducted more than 30 different CSDP activities for Eastern partners, including outreach events in Kyiv, Tbilisi, Chisinau, Minsk and Yerevan. In addition, all partner countries take advantage of the regular training and education events organised by the ESDC.

In the short and medium term, the EU and its partners are looking for opportunities to expand cooperation in the field of security. Cooperation with the EaP countries at both regional and bilateral level focuses on the implementation of targets set in the EaP 20 Deliverables for 2020, with emphasis on CSDP, through activities aimed to develop those countries’ resilience to security threats, including hybrid threats and disasters. Developing cooperation and capabilities is a key part of all EaP governments’ approaches to tackling hybrid threats, cybersecurity, strategic communication and protection of the critical infrastructure.

4. Partnerships with regional organisations

also play a critical role. For example, the EU’s partnership with the African Union (AU) and African actors in peace and security and crisis management was put on a strategic footing by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, signed in 2007, which made peace and security a priority across the eight thematic partnerships to be developed in a comprehensive manner between the EU and Africa. EU support for capacity building for peace and security in Africa, under various instruments and policy areas, has gradually increased over the last few years. This includes both longer-term structural support and support of a more timebound nature. Activities may be financed under the general budget of the Union, by the EDF or bilaterally by EU Member States. CSDP activities in Africa are the main EU defence and security tools for cooperation with African security and defence forces, be it within national forces or in close coordination with UN or AU contingents. Civilian and military missions in the Sahel, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa cooperate with African forces on a daily basis.

In May 2018, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Peace, Security and Governance was signed between the African Union and the European Union. The MoU foresees strengthened cooperation throughout the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention to crisis management and governance. It also commits both parties to

European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia

EU Naval Force warships FS Siroco and FGS Hessen conducted a joint counter-piracy exercise with two Chinese Navy ships, CNS Yancheng and CNS Taihu.

taking practical steps towards a more coordinated approach in order to ensure effective multilateralism, including building a stronger partnership with the UN to address peace and security and other related challenges. Discussions are ongoing on implementation.

5. The EU has expressed its willingness to step up cooperation with its Asian partners, setting itself the objective, in the Council Conclusions of May 2018, of enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia. This has resulted in new momentum in bilateral engagement, as evidenced by the conclusion in October 2019 of a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with Vietnam, the first ASEAN country to conclude such an agreement with the EU and only the second in Asia (after the Republic of Korea).

This commitment also translates into multilateral activities. EU-ASEAN cooperation is wide-ranging and encompasses many areas. In 2020, the EU and ASEAN agreed to upgrade their relationship to a Strategic Partnership. As practical steps towards closer cooperation, the EU aims to obtain the status of observer of the activities of certain Expert Working Groups under the ADMM Plus format and to join the East Asia Summit. An EU-ASEAN Work Plan to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime has been adopted for the second time, covering the period 2018-2020. The EU and ASEAN have also agreed to increase the involvement of ASEAN member states in CSDP missions by taking forward bilateral FPAs. Both parties continue to enhance political and security dialogue and cooperation, including at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in an ever-widening range of non-traditional security fields. In 2019, the EU co-chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on maritime security and counter-terrorism and actively participated in others (cyber, non-proliferation and disaster relief). Its offer to co-chair the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime for the period 2019-22 was approved by the ARF Ministerial Meeting on 2 August 2019 in Bangkok.

European Union/EUFOR RCA

Georgia has been contributing to the EU-led CSDP operation with 156 military at the peak of its deployment.

II. EU PARTNERSHIPS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

Since 2017, the Council has stressed the need to work towards a more strategic approach on partnerships on security and defence, building on present practice and learning from past experience. This new approach is guided by the following objectives: • improving EU and partners’ security by developing common strategic interests on security and defence objectives; • translating this into actual support for the EU’s and its partners’ shared objectives and notably contributions to EU (CSDP) missions and operations;

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Art. 21: ‘The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles […]. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.’ • increasing international legitimacy and acknowledging the EU’s and its partners’ role as security providers, as well as the EU’s global strategic role; • securing the effective implementation of partnerships by promoting inclusiveness, buy-in and mutual accountability between the EU and its partners. The EU has therefore started developing more comprehensive CSDP partnerships with third countries. These partnerships go beyond crisis management and participation in EU CSDP missions and operations to also address multifaceted challenges such as hybrid threats, climate security, strategic communications, disinformation, foreign interference, maritime security, counter-terrorism, capability development, maritime security and capacity building.

These partnerships are organised around three key areas of cooperation: • enhancing dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues in a manner tailored to address the concerns of both the EU and the partner country, and using to the extent possible existing fora of cooperation in the area of security and defence;

• facilitating the participation of third country partners in CSDP missions and operations; • reinforcing mutual support between the EU and its partners, including through EU CSDP missions and operations and capacity-building support programmes.

For example, the EU concludes FPAs with selected partner countries to facilitate their contributions to CSDP missions and operations. As of today, 20 such agreements have been signed, and 12 partners current participate in 10 of the 17 established CSDP missions and operations. Beyond cooperation in the framework of CSDP missions and operations, the EU organises bilateral dialogues on a regular basis with more than 20 countries, covering a broad range of security- and defence-related topics. In addition, the EU invested more than EUR 900 million in assistance programmes with priority partner countries in 2017 alone. On countering hybrid threats, a programme survey aiming to identify vulnerabilities and build resilience has been proposed to all six Western Balkan partners, as well as to countries in the broader neighbourhood such as Georgia, Moldova and Jordan.

The EU has also taken steps to enhance its capabilities on the ground to engage in security and defence issues with partners, through the deployment of specialised experts to selected EU Delegations. To date, the EU has deployed 18 counter-terrorism advisers and is in the process of deploying the first wave of uniformed military advisers to EU Delegations to the US and Canada, China, Serbia (mandate to be progressively expanded to all Western Balkans), Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kenya. This initiative will allow the further development of EU partnerships on security and defence by engaging with the defence and security authorities of third States, reinforcing the profile of the EU as a security actor, enhancing coordination with Member States locally and providing support to Member States that have no defence or security advisers in situ. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 14 NOVEMBER 2016

‘The Council is committed to strengthening the Union’s ability to act as a security provider and to enhance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an essential part of the Union’s external action. This will enhance its global strategic role and its capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible.’

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 25 JUNE 2018

‘Recalls its conclusions of 18 May 2017 and stresses the importance of enhancing cooperation with partners, both with third countries and other international organisations. In this context, the Council invites the relevant preparatory bodies to take work forward and to present concrete recommendations in due time on the basis of the recent proposals made by the High Representative to develop a more strategic approach for EU Partnerships on security and defence with third countries. The Council underlines that partnerships between the EU and third countries should be of mutual benefit and should contribute to strengthening the EU’s security and defence efforts, while fully respecting the EU’s institutional framework and its decision-making autonomy.’

NEXT STEPS

Under the guidance of the new High Representative, work will continue to implement the Council Conclusions of 25 June 2018: ‘the Council invites the relevant preparatory bodies to take work forward and to present concrete recommendations in due time on the basis of the recent proposals made by the High Representative to develop a more strategic approach for EU Partnerships on security and defence with third countries.’

In the post-Brexit scenario, creating the conditions needed for a close and solid cooperation with the UK on security and defence matters will also be a priority.