An Independent Assessment of the Beloit Police Department by Hillard Heintze

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Reform and Renewal An Independent Assessment of the Beloit Police Department

July 29, 2015 FINAL REPORT

Protecting What Matters

July 29, 2015 Ms. Lori S. Curtis Luther City Manager City of Beloit 100 State Street Beloit, Wisconsin 53511 Dear Ms. Luther: We are pleased to inform you that the Hillard Heintze team has completed its independent assessment of the Beloit Police Department and are happy to present you with our final report. Our primary finding is that the City of Beloit is currently confronting an acute need for reform across almost the full breadth of its capabilities, resources and core processes. City leaders need to initiate immediate and wide-ranging changes to many areas in order to place the Department on a par with best practices in policing among peer agencies across the State of Wisconsin and the nation. These areas relate directly and indirectly to leadership and supervision; organization and administration; patrol operations; internal affairs; discipline; general and special investigations; policies and procedures; training; technology; and community-oriented policing and engagement. Although change â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both structural and organizational â&#x20AC;&#x201C; needs to occur, we are confident that the City, community of Beloit and police officers are eager to embrace these reforms and the plan for progress that our team has developed, leading to a bright future for the Department. If this new vision for the Department is implemented and championed by the new leadership, we believe many of the recommendations we make in this report can be realized within a few years. Sincerely, HILLARD HEINTZE LLC

Arnette F. Heintze Chief Executive Officer

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 7 KEY FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................... 13 Finding #1: An Acute Need for Change ............................................................................................... 13 FInding #2: Four Areas of Competency and Strength ......................................................................... 13 Finding #3: A Strategic Plan for the Department is Essential .............................................................. 14 Finding #4: The Case for Much Stronger Leadership, Accountability and Supervision ....................... 15 Finding #5: Communication by Leadership Is Ineffective and Often Non-‐Existent ............................. 18 Finding #6: Patrol Operations Are Undermined by Many Challenges ................................................ 20 Finding 7: The Department’s Discipline Process Lacks Accountability and Transparency .................. 21 Finding #8: The Detective Bureau Requires a Major Overhaul ........................................................... 22 Finding #9: Management of Special Operations Reflects Favoritism ................................................. 24 Finding #10: A Prioritized Focus on Policies Will Yield Department-‐Wide Impacts ............................ 25 Finding #11: Many Training Issues Must Be Addressed to Improve BPD Performance ...................... 26 Finding #12: Technology Challenges Abound ..................................................................................... 27 Finding #13: Community-‐Oriented Policing Needs to Become a Higher Priority ............................... 27 Finding #14: Tapping the Value of Intelligence-‐Led Policing Will Pay Strong Dividends .................... 29 Finding #15: Changes to Hiring, Promotion and Special Assignments Will Help Drive Reform .......... 30 OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT: SCOPE, AUTHORITY AND OPERATIONAL FOOTPRINT .................... 31 1 | LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION: THE BRIDGES BETWEEN VISION AND OUTCOMES .................... 33 The Leadership Crisis .......................................................................................................................... 33 Management and Accountability ........................................................................................................ 34 Professional Conduct and Behavior .................................................................................................... 38 Communication between BPD and the Community ........................................................................... 41 Collaboration and Sharing .................................................................................................................. 41 2 | PATROL: THE FRONT LINE OF POLICING ...................................................................................... 45 A Singular Focus on the Beat Management Plan ................................................................................ 45 Insufficient Recognition and Low Levels of Initiative .......................................................................... 47

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Supporting Patrol’s Relationship to the Community .......................................................................... 47 Performance Evaluation Criteria and Consistency .............................................................................. 48 Calls for Service Issues and Coverage ................................................................................................. 48 3 | INTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE BELLWETHER OF AGENCY PERFORMANCE ............................................ 51 Internal Affairs Workload, Case Review and Procedures ................................................................... 51 The Benefits of an Early Intervention System ..................................................................................... 53 Complaint Process, Investigation and Notification ............................................................................. 54 4 | DISCIPLINE: THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVITY AND CONSISTENCY ....................................................... 61 Guidelines for Consistency, Appropriateness and Timeliness of Discipline ........................................ 61 Objectivity in the Application of Discipline ......................................................................................... 62 Discipline Avoidance ........................................................................................................................... 63 Transparency and Fairness in Disciplinary Review Panel Processes ................................................... 64 The Discipline Matrix as a Best Practice Tool ..................................................................................... 64 5 | INVESTIGATIONS: A CORE DEPARTMENTAL FOCUS ..................................................................... 67 Investigations Workload, Case Review and Procedures ..................................................................... 67 Outcome Follow-‐Up, CIS and Crime Solving ....................................................................................... 75 Report Quality, Timeliness and Management Review ........................................................................ 76 Internal Information Sharing and Unit Coordination .......................................................................... 77 6 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS: TACTICAL RESPONSE AND EXPERTISE ...................................................... 81 Overview of Special Operations .......................................................................................................... 81 Concerns Raised by SWAT and Crisis Negotiation Personnel ............................................................. 82 The High Costs of SWAT and the Need for Cost Analysis .................................................................... 82 Scope and Frequency of SWAT Deployment ...................................................................................... 83 Collaboration across Specialized Functions ........................................................................................ 84 Standard Procedures and Operational Plans within Specialized Units ............................................... 85 7 | POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: THE RULES THAT GOVERN AND GUIDE THE BPD ............................ 87 Policy Updates, Review and Dissemination ........................................................................................ 87 Collaboration and Cooperation .......................................................................................................... 87

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8 | TRAINING: THE LIFEBLOOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND BIAS-‐FREE POLICING ............................... 91 Newly Developed and Revised Department Policies .......................................................................... 91 Training for Department Personnel .................................................................................................... 91 Training for Specialized Units and General Investigations Personnel ................................................. 92 Evaluation and Oversight .................................................................................................................... 93 9 | TECHNOLOGY: THE VALUE OF AUTOMATION, EFFICIENCY AND COMMUNICATION ..................... 95 IT Support and the Role of the City’s IT Team .................................................................................... 96 IT Systems and Where Partnership Can Provide Value ....................................................................... 96 Information Sharing and its Benefits .................................................................................................. 97 10 | COMMUNITY-‐ORIENTED POLICING: WORKING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST ................. 99 Leadership’s Community Outreach and Engagement ........................................................................ 99 Strategy and Implementation of Community Policing Initiatives ..................................................... 100 The Department’s Relationship with the Community ...................................................................... 101 Crime Analysis and Intelligence-‐Led Policing .................................................................................... 101 11 | ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: FROM STAFFING TO SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS .............. 105 Organizational Staffing and Supervision ........................................................................................... 105 A Highly Effective Civilian Workforce ................................................................................................ 105 Hiring, Promotions and Special Assignment Processes .................................................................... 106 APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................................... 113 Appendix A: Beat Management Guide and Example Plans .............................................................. 113 Appendix B: Chief Jacob’s Response Letter To the “In Memory Of 23” Facebook Post ................... 126 Appendix C: Facebook Post by Retired BPD Officer Regarding “In Memory Of 23” Decal Removal 126 Appendix D: Job Descriptions for Chief of Police and Deputy Chief of Police .................................. 128 Appendix E: Disciplinary Tracking Log ............................................................................................... 136 Appendix F: Hiring Matrix ................................................................................................................. 144 ENDNOTES ........................................................................................................................................ 151

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

REFORM AND RENEWAL

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY STRATEGIC CONTEXT: THE DRIVERS OF CONCERN By a vote of 6-‐0 with one council member absent, the Beloit City Council approved hiring Hillard Heintze to do an independent study of the Beloit Police Department at a special city council meeting on Tuesday, February 24, 2015. This meeting came about because personnel, including officers and civilians from the Beloit Police Department, and community residents came forward to express their concern to City Council members and City officials about the leadership in the Department. Their concerns were related to the overall low morale of a large majority of the Department personnel, which was affecting the operations of the Department and the daily policing activities by officers. The former City Manager indicated that these issues were “magnified” by the increase in violence in Beloit. There were eight homicides in 2014 and one in January 2015, and community residents were concerned about: the increase in homicides, if or how they were being addressed by BPD, the communication or lack thereof by the Department, and if the Department was performing at its best. Based on these concerns, it was determined that a holistic management review of the organization, without a focus on any single individual, would be conducted to examine leadership, management, policies and practices across the breadth of police services. AUTHORIZATION: TAPPING AN OBJECTIVE, INDEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE In short, the Beloit City Council commissioned Hillard Heintze to (1) conduct an independent assessment of the Beloit Police Department, including a systemic review of existing policies, procedures and practices, and then (2) translate the assessment’s key findings and recommendations into a clear and actionable roadmap to help the Department implement these changes over time. This report summarizes the results of the assessment. METHODOLOGY: SIX KEY PRINCIPLES Emerging from our experiences as leaders in a variety of law enforcement-‐related fields, the Hillard Heintze methodology is based on the following six strategic principles: 1. Independent and objective analysis 2. Solicitation of multiple perspectives and viewpoints 3. An acute focus on collaboration and partnership 4. An information-‐driven, decision-‐making mindset 5. A structured and highly disciplined engagement approach 6. Clear and open lines of communication

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

APPROACH: A HIGHLY INTENSIVE AND INTEGRATED PROCESS Over the course of this engagement, the Hillard Heintze assessment team: •

Conducted a Project Kick-‐Off meeting with key stakeholders and developed an understanding of the Department’s mission, vision and values, as well as its history, organization and cultural environment.

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Completed more than 185 interviews of command staff, Department personnel, city officials and other employees, area law enforcement leadership, and community members and stakeholders.

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Interviewed the Chief and Deputy Chief. Presented and discussed high-‐level initial results of Department interviews to the Chief and later presented and discussed the draft findings and recommendations with the Chief and Deputy Chief.

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Requested, received and reviewed extensive policing and public safety-‐related documentation relevant to the approved scope of the project and available to assessors as well as current duty manuals, written policies and procedures, and strategic plans and initiatives.

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Undertook site-‐specific inspections of the Department’s operations, assets and activities, including interacting with local stakeholders.

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Reviewed BPD’s command structure, command staff capabilities, and candidates for immediate and future leadership positions.

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Evaluated BPD’s operations and performance across an extensive array of issues and domains relating to, for example, leadership and supervision; organization and administration; patrol operations; internal affairs; discipline; general and special investigations; policies and procedures; training; technology; and community-‐oriented policing and engagement.

INTERVIEWS: SOLICITING MULTIPLE VIEWPOINTS The assessment team conducted more than 500 hours of in-‐person interviews with senior City of Beloit leaders and their advisors; current and former heads of the Beloit Police Department as well as both sworn and non-‐sworn officers; community leaders and residents; and representatives of local non-‐ profit, social services, civic, business and government organizations. ANONYMITY: AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE SUPPORTING THE INTERVIEW PROCESS From the first discussion with the former City Manager, the importance of maintaining the anonymity of those interviewed was stressed. This City Manager stated and believed that because the fear of retaliation by the Chief and some members of the command staff was so widespread among Department personnel, very few would speak candidly with the assessment team. This point was so critical that the former City Manager wrote a Department memorandum and attended roll calls to reinforce the pledge that all participants could be confident their participation would be anonymous. The belief that employees would be punished or retaliated against for saying anything

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perceived as negative was routinely stated to assessors conducting interviews with employees. Our pledge to protect anonymity was critical to obtaining the information contained herein as well as to ensuring cooperation from employees throughout the assessment. During the course of our assessment, BPD personnel and Beloit community members responded to survey questions regarding their opinions about changes in policing and the organization of the Beloit Police Department over the past few years. It was designed by researchers in both the COPS Office in Washington DC and the Criminal Justice Policy and Management program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and edited and adopted by Hillard Heintze. Our assessment team provided this anonymous online survey tool to the Beloit Police Department, who distributed it to the entire department including sworn and civilian personnel. We received 52 responses out of the 93 total personnel. Our team also provided direction on where to the Beloit community on where to locate and complete an anonymous electronic survey. This information was communicated during two public meetings – March 31 and April 1 – that were open to all community members. In addition, the City of Beloit mentioned the survey distribution in a media release and made paper copies of the survey available. We received 310 responses. ASSESSMENT TEAM: ABOUT HILLARD HEINTZE Hillard Heintze is one of this nation’s foremost privately held strategic advisory firms specializing in independent ethics, integrity and oversight services – with a special focus on federal, state and local law enforcement agencies including police departments, sheriff’s departments and internal affairs bureaus. The firm provides the strategic thought leadership, trusted counsel and implementation services that help leading government agencies and institutions, corporations, law firms and major public service organizations target and achieve strategic and transformational levels of excellence in law enforcement, security and investigations. We supported the Beloit Police Department through the Hillard Heintze Law Enforcement Advisory Practice. Individually, our staff members have been responsible for leading the significant transformation of many major city police departments and law enforcement agencies. Arnette F. Heintze, Chief Executive Officer As Hillard Heintze’s co-‐founder and CEO, Arnette Heintze has transformed a small high-‐performing cadre of senior experts into a globally recognized strategic law enforcement advisory and consulting firm with strong practices in security and investigations. Under his leadership, Hillard Heintze has emerged as one of the fastest-‐growing private companies in the United States. Heintze brings to our law enforcement clients over 38 years of experience in federal, state and local policing and law enforcement.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Kenneth A. Bouche, Chief Operating Officer Over nearly two decades, Ken Bouche has established a career as an executive leader and senior advisor at the forefront of applying best practices in management, government, technology, information sharing and intelligence to the highly specialized needs of the law enforcement, homeland security and justice communities. Today he serves as Hillard Heintze’s Chief Operating Officer, overseeing the day-‐to-‐day activities of the firm and the alignment of its resources, expertise and capabilities with the evolving needs of clients. Bouche has great depth in the justice and homeland security space having served as a member the IJIS Institute’s Board of Directors from 2009 to 2013. Bouche served for 23 years with the Illinois State Police, where, as Colonel and CIO, he was responsible for modernizing the agency’s technology functions. He recently served as Interim Chief of Police in Schaumburg, Illinois, for one year following Hillard Heintze’s assessment of the Village’s police department, an assessment which he led. Christi L. Gullion, Senior Director, Law Enforcement Advisory Practice

Christi Gullion is a highly accomplished expert in police reform and the introduction of strategic internal and external risk management practices to public and private sector organizations. Recently, she has been deeply engaged in the firm’s assessment of the Denver Sheriff Office and a part of the DOJ-‐directed collaborative team implementing community-‐based policing practices for the City of Baltimore. For over six years, Gullion managed national government contracts, namely the Los Angeles and Detroit police departments as a result of Federal Consent Decrees and Judgment Agreements between the cities and the U.S. Department of Justice. She had responsibility over existing policies, training, implementation and audits required to achieve compliance with policing reforms as part of an eight-‐ year, $18-‐million contract with the LAPD and five-‐year, $7-‐million contract with the Detroit Police Department. She reported to the cities of Los Angeles and Detroit, U.S. DOJ and U.S. District Court through monthly meetings and quarterly reports covering more than 450 compliance reforms. Steven M. Bova, Senior Director, Information and Technology Steve Bova is an expert in the application of information technology in the fields of justice and law enforcement. He provides Hillard Heintze with (1) expert understanding of this technology, (2) practical, hands-‐on experience in its application to complex justice and law enforcement challenges at a strategic level and (3) a strong track record of leadership in aligning technology with an organization’s mission, business and core operations. He currently serves in an investigative leadership capacity for the City of Springfield, Illinois Office of the Inspector General, helping the City adjudicate claims.

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Edie Casella, Senior Advisor, Law Enforcement Advisory Practice

Throughout her 26-‐year career in state law enforcement, Edie Casella gained the expertise and proficiency needed for her advancement into the public safety and consulting realms of homeland security, information sharing, and emergency management. During her tenure with the Illinois State Police, Casella managed the operational activities and fiscal administration of a statewide, multi-‐disciplined command with specialized units including Intelligence, Records, Strategic Analysis and Mapping, Technical Investigations, Riverboat Gambling Security, Sex Offender Registration, Commercial Vehicles, Gang Tactical Unit, Financial and Computer Crimes, Medicaid Crimes and Statewide Interdiction Task Forces. Additionally, she served as the investigative commander overseeing both urban and rural investigative functions. Robert Boehmer, Esq., Senior Advisor, Law Enforcement Advisory Practice Robert Boehmer is Co-‐Director of the Center for Excellence in Homicide and Sexual Assault Investigations and Director of the Institute for Public Safety Partnerships at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Boehmer is an experienced facilitator, trainer and public speaker, with expertise in collaborative problem solving. Most recently, he has been facilitating meetings for the Department of Homeland Security’s Building Communities of Trust Initiative, focusing on developing trust among law enforcement, fusion centers and the communities they serve. Boehmer served as chair of the U.S. Attorney General’s Global Advisory Committee from 2006 to 2015 and is a longtime member of the Board of Directors of the National Criminal Justice Association and a member of the Illinois Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation Council. He was previously general counsel and secretary for the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority. Prior to joining the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority in 1987, he served as a Chicago police officer. Chief Ricky C. Tanksley, Senior Advisor, Law Enforcement Advisory Practice Chief Rick Tanksley began his career with the Oak Park Police Department in 1984, and after serving in a number of positions, including Patrol Commander and Deputy Chief, was appointed Chief of Police in June 2001. Since 2001, he has also served as the Director of Emergency Preparedness for the Oak Park Police Department. Chief Tanksley has extensive knowledge and expertise in organizational change and behavior management, requiring collaborative subordinate involvement at all levels. As Chief of Police, he changed the department culture to one that is transparent, professional, courteous and respectful toward the diverse community it serves. This valuable change has resulted in single-‐digit citizen complaints in 2014 regarding officer conduct. Additionally, he led efforts as one of the first village departments to institute performance measures to monitor department operations, promote adherence to policies and strategic plans and create measurable evidence to justify budget requests. Chief Tanksley is a contributing author of Measuring the Quality of Police-‐Civilian Encounters and Agency Legitimacy: The Platform Public Satisfaction Survey, published by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

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KEY FINDINGS FINDING #1: AN ACUTE NEED FOR CHANGE Hillard Heintze’s primary finding is that the City of Beloit is currently confronting an acute need for reform across almost the full breadth of its capabilities, resources and core processes. City leaders need to initiate immediate and wide-‐ranging changes to many areas in order to place the Department on a par with best practices in policing among peer agencies across the State of Wisconsin and the nation. Throughout many areas of the Department, particularly in leadership roles, there is a lack of fundamental knowledge of policing, laws and law enforcement management techniques and best practices. These areas relate directly and indirectly to leadership and supervision; organization and administration; patrol operations; internal affairs; discipline; general and special investigations; policies and procedures; training; technology; and community-‐oriented policing and engagement.

FINDING #2: FOUR AREAS OF COMPETENCY AND STRENGTH On the whole, BPD’s officers and civilian employees represent the Department’s greatest asset and the engine of change – if, and only if, City leaders introduce to the agency the new leadership and experienced command staff crucial to its reform and progression. We base this finding on our observations relating to the following four areas. Peer Support – Despite the low morale that permeates the Department, BPD officers exhibit a general camaraderie and are quick to provide operational and moral support to their partners and units. Seeking the Right Answers – We credit many of the patrol officers for seeking counsel from the City Attorney on ensuring proper stops and arrests. In quite a few instances, this proactive behavior was undertaken when the officers considered their respective supervisor to be lacking in legal or policy knowledge. It also occurred in the face of a history of admonishments by the Chief and some command staff not to go outside of the chain-‐of-‐ command.

Dedication and Commitment – The vast majority of the BPD officers and civilian personnel we interviewed exhibited a clear sense of dedication and commitment to law enforcement as a career and to the Beloit community they serve, notwithstanding their low morale and the concerns they shared about the Department and its leadership. Work Ethic – Department personnel as a whole are working hard despite their lack of staffing in certain areas and specialized units, the related pressure on them to work overtime, numerous calls for service, and resource constraints, including in the areas of community-‐oriented policing and intelligence-‐led policing. However, we observed a widespread reluctance to go above and beyond their daily responsibilities due to a fear of discipline.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #3: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEPARTMENT IS ESSENTIAL One of the greatest challenges confronting the Department is its lack of strategic objectives and priorities. A clear roadmap defining the objectives and priorities of the BPD is needed to improve policing efforts, accountability, performance, communication and morale and to address the key findings and recommendations in this report. Strategic Planning – BPD has only a rudimentary strategic plan. There is no formal detailed strategic plan that governs and guides Departmental priorities, decisions and resource allocations. Addressing this deficit – and defining a high-‐ level mission and vision statement – will significantly improve Departmental cohesion and help ensure the participation of many critical stakeholders in the goal-‐setting process. Approach – In the absence of a strategic plan, the Department has placed too much of an emphasis on the Beat Management Plan (BMP) – to the detriment of other priorities such as investigations, community outreach, and proactive community-‐oriented policing. In coordination

with City officials, the Department must develop these strategic objectives and a strategy to achieve them in order to restore proactive and effective policing efforts, including community-‐oriented policing. The command staff and rank-‐and-‐file cannot communicate the Department’s strategic goals and priorities when asked about these, nor can the Chief and Deputy Chief articulate how strategies implemented in other Bureaus and units reflect, align and advance the Department’s overall objectives and goals. Coordination with City – The Department does not routinely coordinate with the City Manager and City

Council when defining priorities beyond those outlined in the City’s budget plan. Improved coordination in the development and prioritization of strategic objectives would ensure that policing efforts better address the needs of the community. Department Cohesion – The Department’s lack of strategic planning has prevented organizational cohesiveness and clearly defined approaches to crime control and investigative and patrol strategies. Every Bureau within the Department – from Investigations to Patrol – is managed largely on its own, with little overall coordination across the agency.

FINDING #4: THE CASE FOR MUCH STRONGER LEADERSHIP, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SUPERVISION BPD does not have effective leadership. Many of BPD’s current issues – from discriminatory behavior, discipline, communications and lack of cohesion to low morale – stem directly or indirectly from a deficiency in management and reporting relationships. By providing new leadership and documenting a strategic plan, Beloit’s leaders will begin to systematically resolve many of the issues the agency faces. Command Level Culture – The Chief’s unilateral decision-‐making, on the whole, has helped support a culture in which collaboration is neither encouraged nor rewarded. A perception exists in the Department that the Chief has surrounded himself with a command staff unwilling to engage in necessary debate and has either castigated or disciplined both current and former BPD officers who speak out against his decisions. The command staff told us debates occurred in staff meetings, but little evidence of this existed. In order for the Department to evolve into a healthy organization, it must not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints, but see them as opportunities to view multiple sides of complex issues. Despite the fact that decisions were clearly driven by the Chief, he routinely stated that issues were the responsibility of the commanders, especially when we discussed deficiencies in the Department. Additionally, some command officers pointed back to the Chief or each other when discussing deficiencies. In general, there was a general lack of accountability and acceptance of responsibility observed in the senior command.

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Transparency – Several internal interviews and surveys revealed significant deficits in trust, appreciation, autonomy, training and communication among employees, as well as overall concerns about leadership. This is driven, in part, by poor communication from the top down in the areas of promotions, special assignments, training, award recommendations and disciplinary actions without adequately informing supervisors and employees about how such determinations are made. Clear agency-‐wide standards in such areas must be established and effectively communicated in order to regain the trust of Department employees and eliminate the perception of favoritism. Integrity and Judgment – Many internal personnel who were interviewed expressed concerns about the integrity of high-‐ranking Department officials. Issues cited included, for example, adherence to Department policy, retaliatory actions, disregard of City direction on legal issues, unprofessional conduct, and a lack of consideration regarding family-‐related issues of Department employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Law – The Department inappropriately handles Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues. Employees have levied several FMLA complaints against the Department, some of which resulted in additional filing of discrimination complaints. Further, it has been reported that the Department has engaged in preferential treatment and discriminatory practices in promotion and special assignment selections.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Training Management – Just as management must hold supervisors accountable, supervisors need to do the same for all BPD employees. Apart from a few supervisors, there is little indication that supervisors are consistently reviewing employee’s training records annually to make training recommendations for improving employee skills, knowledge and abilities as required by Department policy. We found that in several important cases, mandatory training had not been completed throughout the Department, including training related to strip searches, use of force and weapons such as pepper spray and batons.

Performance Reviews – Performance reviews need to be tied to mission, goals and job performance. At the same time, supervisors must be held responsible for delivering fair and timely reviews. The standards to which BPD officers are held focus solely on adherence to the Beat Management Plan at the expense of other elements important for professional development such as community outreach, training, crime solving and leadership. Over time, this deficit undermines efforts to nurture proactive policing behaviors and stymies organizational development. Modeling Department Policy Adherence – There is a perception in the Department that the Chief does not follow Department policy. Several sources reported that while on duty, the Chief routinely goes out in public without his vest or gun, which is expressly against Department policy for officers and while policy allows some leeway for command in administrative positions, this would not apply to public contact or enforcement actions and is counter to best practices in officer safety. Morale – BPD needs to better support the men and women who represent the Department daily. As the Chief explained to our assessment team, he views morale as the individual’s responsibility, not his. He suggested to our assessment team that morale is environmental and that the individual can change their environment if they do not like it.

Critical Self Evaluation – BPD needs to embrace The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) protocols regarding critical self-‐evaluation of policies, procedures and practices to ensure the efforts put forth on accreditation are meaningful and provide value to the Department and community. Adherence to Law – One of the most basic requirements for Wisconsin Law Enforcement Certification is that the individual must not have a record of any federal felony convictions or any offense unless the applicant has been granted an absolute or unconditional pardon. There were numerous reports of the Deputy Chief concealing his relationship with and notarizing the expungement petition of a juvenile sex offender who was also later arrested for retail theft, with both arrests made by BPD officers who would be working side-‐by-‐side with him if the Department hired him. The felony expungement was needed for the individual to proceed as a BPD applicant as he was prohibited from carrying a firearm due to his felony conviction. This brings into question the Department leadership’s knowledge of and adherence to Wisconsin state hiring practices. It also raises important questions about whether the Department has violated City of Beloit hiring practices, which state that “whenever an application reveals that the applicant cannot meet the qualifications of the position applied for, the applicant will not be considered.” Additionally, Police and Fire Commission Rule 4.03, states that “whenever an application reveals that the applicant cannot meet the qualifications of the position applied for, the applicant will not be considered.”

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In a separate incident, the Deputy Chief improperly returned gambling proceeds to an arrestee awaiting charges despite the City Attorney advising the command staff that the gambling proceeds must be retained as evidence, preventing the case from being prosecuted. Lastly, we were told by multiple officers of at least two 911 calls alleging domestic violence at the Deputy Chief’s home. In both cases the Deputy Chief refused to cooperate and in one matter, he slammed the door in an officer’s face, refusing to allow the officer to investigate the call. No reports were taken on either matter.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #5: COMMUNICATION BY LEADERSHIP IS INEFFECTIVE AND OFTEN NON-‐EXISTENT The Department needs to do a much better job ensuring clear communication to all internal personnel, City leaders, partnering agencies and the public. Leadership Not Visible – The Chief and Deputy Chief are seen by the majority of Department personnel we interviewed as being “far removed.” The Chief is said to be rarely seen and often secluded in his office. A common theme throughout the interviews was lack of respect for the Chief. Strategic Vision and Plan – BPD’s leaders, and specifically the Chief, have fallen short in communicating the agency’s strategic goals. The Chief includes a strategic plan in his budget proposal, which he distributes to the City and his command staff, but not other agency personnel, on an annual basis. More importantly, however, this document lacks objectives or goals related to proactive policing, a focus on crime strategies or community-‐ oriented policing.

Messaging Consistency – Officers do not receive a singular, consistent message from the top down. In lieu of communicating directly with the Department, the Chief emails only the command staff. Then the command staff either forwards the email or interprets the Chief’s direction and sends an email. Finally, the sergeant relays the message during roll call. It is unclear why the Chief does not send a single email to the entire Department. Several agency personnel we interviewed indicated that, by the time officers have received the message, it is usually very different than the one originally issued.

Explanation of Decisions – When the Chief makes decisions involving change, he includes little context and explanation on the rationale supporting them or the value of their intended outcome. Many of the agency stakeholders we met with stated that whenever a backlash to these decisions emerges from Department personnel, media or the community, the Chief often unfairly blames others for the decision.

Rigid Chain of Command – One of the themes that carried through our assessment related to this issue. For example, many Department personnel indicated that the Chief would not talk to anyone below command staff. One interviewee stated that if the Chief observes a patrol officer engaging in behavior or a task that he disapproves of, rather than stopping and telling the officer, he is prone to sending an email to his commander to relay that message. Another pointed out that the command staff does not answer emails from patrol officers, and when officers ask a commander a question in person, commanders often reply by directing the officers to speak first to their respective supervisors. Recognition and Support – Many BPD employees expressed strong sentiments about not feeling appreciated. Very few receive any positive reinforcement from the Chief or the Department in terms of commendations or even regular communications. Instead, many employees stated that a disproportionately high percentage of their interactions with the Department’s administration are dominated by negative

issues such as policy violations or complaint investigations. Officers perceive a lack of listening and support from the Department at both a personal and organizational level. Communication with the City – There is very little, if any, routine, two-‐way communication between the Chief and the City Manager about designating priorities beyond what is laid out in the budget plan. Council members perceive that the Chief displays a “disdain” for the City. They feel the Chief began communicating with the City only when the assessment was announced and he began to worry about job security. In addition, we learned that the Chief and Deputy Chief often resist talking with the City Attorney, and frequently

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elect instead to send a commander to do so in their place. Communication with the Community – Department leadership does not often communicate with the community or with the media about major issues regarding crime, including the recent homicides. The Chief rarely attends events. Instead, he would often send the Deputy Chief or command staff to attend on his or the Department’s behalf, and on some occasions, the patrol commander would recognize the importance of the event and opt to attend. Furthermore, when the Deputy Chief or command staff attends community meetings at the Chief’s request, they do not generally actively participate in the meeting.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #6: PATROL OPERATIONS ARE UNDERMINED BY MANY CHALLENGES BPD needs to address many patrol management issues. These include matters such as a lack of shift overlap for coverage, an absence of field supervision due to a prioritized focus on administrative tasks, a misplaced emphasis on the Beat Management Plan without evaluation and oversight of activities, and inadequate direction to officers solely responsible for community meetings and engagement. Beat Management Plan – The Department needs to rethink its BMP-‐based method of policing as the plan is not meeting its intended goals. At present, officers can meet the basic requirements of their area’s BMP well within the rating period and also achieve a competent rating during their coaching reviews whether they (1) choose to be proactive and do more than what is simply required, or (2) do nothing but respond to assigned calls. These conflicting activity outcomes are due to BPD Beat Management Plan’s emphasis on numbers over activity.

Beat Assignments – The Department’s practice of bidding on assignments based on seniority has often resulted in less experienced officers assigned to more challenging areas of the City, such as neighborhoods confronting a higher rate of crime, gang-‐ and drug-‐ related problems, shootings and a variety of quality-‐of-‐ life issues. Continuous Coverage – Unlike a majority of police departments, the Patrol Bureau does not use an early/late car assignment system. This results in a period during shift change when there are no patrol units available to respond to in-‐progress calls. Deployment – A major focus for leadership should be on the appropriate allocation and deployment of patrol officers. It is not unusual for one of the eight patrol beats to go unstaffed, thereby leaving at least two areas of the City dependent on coverage from an under-‐ staffed patrol. When these vacancies occur, as they so often do, the field sergeant is not required to patrol the vacant beat until dispatched out for supervisory reason. Instead, BPD typically assigns

an officer in an adjoining beat the additional responsibility for the vacant one. Patrol Supervision – There is a lack of sufficient supervision of patrol officers due to a prioritized focus on administrative tasks. Officers reported that some patrol personnel are taking advantage of this lack of supervision by taking inordinate amounts of time on routine calls, excessively long meal breaks or traveling outside the perimeter of their beat assignment area without supervisory knowledge. These practices place an undue burden on other officers to respond to calls for service. Community Meetings – Due to the community’s apprehension and outrage over the unsolved homicides and crime, as well as an absence of community policing strategies, the command staff needs to step up and be more visible in the community, rather than leaving patrol officers with the sole task and responsibility of representing the Department at community meetings.

FINDING 7: THE DEPARTMENT’S DISCIPLINE PROCESS LACKS ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY The Department’s disciplinary process needs to undergo a careful examination. This should include providing guidelines and accountability measurements to address current deficiencies, which range from consistency and timeliness to appropriateness. Many officers we interviewed believe that every arrest or use of force incident will result in a disciplinary action. In contrast, they point out, supervisors are rarely disciplined and personnel at the command level and above do not receive discipline. Accountability and Transparency – Without using a discipline matrix or set of guidelines to arrive at the outcome for a disciplinary action, the Department lacks consistency or transparency in determining a consistent level of discipline for an infraction by any agency personnel. Although BPD does not have a formal Disciplinary Committee and instead command officers discuss serious cases at staff meetings, the Chief still makes the ultimate decision. No minutes or documentation of these meetings are available, nor is there an explanation or reason provided for the disciplinary action. The officer receives only a letter of discipline. Disproportionate and Preferential Treatment – There is a perception within the Department that discipline is not meted out proportionately, consistently or on a timely basis. Many personnel stated that discipline is rarely extended to supervisors and never to command level and above. When it is enacted, it is apparently often done so in a preferential manner. Even members of the BPD leadership team could not recall a commander served with disciplinary action in recent years. We were surprised to find many records for 2014 of the Department’s disciplinary actions but no

REFORM AND RENEWAL

records or evidence on file of any commendations given during the year. However, the BPD report for the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) published in 2015 reported that BPD has a commendations program and that eight commendations were awarded in 2014 and it was later reported that these were maintained in support services based upon commendations made by supervisors, which the Chief and Deputy Chief’s office did not see or maintain. Moreover, while 12 commendations were issued between January and April 2015, all were handed out by a single leader, the Patrol Commander. Revealing Policy Violations to Complainant – Another negative perception that emerged during our interviews is that during complaint investigations BPD leadership tends to be intent upon determinations, however minimal and tangential, to support findings of guilt rather than exoneration. Even if the violations were extraneous to the actual complaint’s allegations, a template response letter is often used advising the complainant of the unrelated disciplinary action against the employee accused. This supports the perception among some agency personnel that they will not be supported by the Department, even when the alleged policy violation has not occurred.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #8: THE DETECTIVE BUREAU REQUIRES A MAJOR OVERHAUL The Detective Bureau, which handles general investigations, needs new leadership, supervision, and guidance from an experienced executive willing to take an active role in supervising case workload and management, the progress of investigations, and the lifecycle of cases. Other challenges for the Bureau include staffing, crime analysis capability, internal and external communication and community relationships. Deficit in Leadership Experience and Knowledge – The commander who leads the Detective Bureau has not served as a criminal investigator and does not have an investigations background. Given the responsibilities of this position, it would be extremely difficult for anyone without investigative experience to perform this challenging, high profile role effectively. Perceptions exist that this individual does not have the qualities and capabilities to be an effective leader, and his reported disinterest and lack of engagement are discouraging to the detectives working investigations. The Deputy Chief advised detectives that the Department expected them to train this particular leader on investigations protocols and practices. Guidance, Direction and Active Role – The commander does not take an active role in cases and does not direct, supervise, or guide the progression of investigations. It was reported that the commander does not usually support the detectives by coming out to crime scenes. By not attending these scenes, he misses opportunities to learn about the investigative process and develop his professional investigative skills and abilities.

Supervision and Case Management – The commander lacks the investigative experience and training to identify which resources and capabilities are needed for initial response and investigative follow-‐up throughout the lifecycle of the case. Detectives new to investigations, or who do not have the training or expertise, are assigned cases instead of detectives with the required skillsets. In some instances, it was reported that the Detective Commander – despite being in the office and not engaged in either a call or meeting – often does not answer his desk phone, turns the ringer off and forwards his phone calls to the detectives without advising them. Internal and External Communication – The assignment of cases by the commander does not appear to be based on criteria or practice that is communicated to the detectives. Collaborative discussion between the commander and the detectives to establish effective case assignment procedures would resolve these concerns. There is a perception that the commander does not want to hear about "issues" or what investigators are doing with their cases. We heard concerns that information is not actively shared between bureaus and that detectives have not been aware of which cases other detectives were working until recently. At the same time, there is sensitivity in the community that BPD does not effectively communicate information regarding major crimes issues. These communication issues undermine the efforts of detectives when they approach members of the community for information relevant to solving crimes.

Staffing – There is a perception that the Chief, Deputy Chief and command staff do not understand or see a need for additional detectives in spite of the fact that violent crimes and backlogs in the caseloads each detective carries continue to increase. Aggravating this state of affairs is the fact that, since the elimination of a key administrative position several years ago due to budget cuts, detectives spend too much time fulfilling administrative tasks and, as a result, have less time to follow-‐ up on leads, interview witnesses and engage in other, much more important investigative activities. Case Workload – Detectives are assigned and respond to incidents immediately occurring – at the expense of major cases they have been tasked with resolving. The commander provides little to no guidance for determination of priorities with case workload and, without prior investigative experience, cannot accurately assess the time requirements to conduct cases thoroughly or determine timeframes required to perform and complete investigative steps. A dominant perception among detectives is that they go “from one crime to another” as cases continue to be added to their workload. It was reported that some detectives were investigating up to four homicide-‐related cases at a time in addition to their other significant active cases. Also, due to short staffing and in response to other, more violent crimes, it was reported that many burglaries were not investigated in 2014. Resource Allocation – Background investigations for hiring officer candidates are assigned to the detectives by the commander. This task can require travel and time commitments – to conduct the background investigation, system information checks, and interview references, associates and the candidate and follow-‐up leads – and takes time that would otherwise be focused on caseload

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management. There are also other types of backgrounds that the detectives work. Background investigations take time that would otherwise be focused on investigating crimes and how these investigative resources are allocated should be reexamined for prioritization or other alternative procedures. Preliminary Investigation by Patrol Officers – Initial BPD responses to sexual assault incidents are usually by patrol officers, including the preliminary investigation. Patrol sergeants call the Commander of the Detective Bureau only in the cases they determine require a detective. We are not aware of any criteria as to whether patrol or detectives investigate the incident. If patrol officers are responsible for responding and expected to investigate sexual assaults they must be provided with adequate investigative training to properly address these crimes and the resources to render appropriate assistance to the victims, such as social services. An outside agency reported concerns that recently patrol officers were dispatched by the child maltreatment detective to investigate allegations of sexual abuse against children instead of the detective assigned and trained on the appropriate protocols. BPD patrol officers are not sufficiently prepared to investigate these types of crimes. This task always requires the response of a trained detective.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #9: MANAGEMENT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS REFLECTS FAVORITISM A number of issues related to Special Operations in general, and the SWAT unit in particular, need immediate attention. The most important is the need for a careful analysis of budget, costs, benefits and resource balancing across other Department areas. Other issues include the selection process for specialized units, deficits in leadership and the lack of communications during callouts between commanders and supervisors. Cost-‐Benefit Analysis – The commander who oversees the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit stated that the SWAT unit responds to incidents approximately four to ten times per year. There is no line item for SWAT in the BPD budget and it is “funded as needed,” according to the Administrative Commander. The budget for the SWAT unit is not clear since it is combined with other budgetary funds dedicated to equipment, detectives and overtime. When asked, the Administrative Commander was not aware of the cost of his SWAT unit per year and had never done a cost-‐ benefit analysis, which is required by policy (AD 400; section 0415.0101) and represents a best practice for evaluation of resource allocation and budget. The Administrative Commander did not agree that the cost analysis was required or necessary. Selection Process and Callouts – A widespread perception exists within the Department that the selection process for the SWAT unit is not based on each candidate’s respective skills, knowledge and capabilities, but on favoritism due to the fact that the Administrative Commander handles recruiting and hiring for the SWAT unit without any real oversight from the Chief or Deputy Chief. Despite the fact that this unit trains for high-‐risk activities, BPD leadership does not require that the SWAT unit be used consistently for high-‐risk activities by all commands. The Administrative Commander

stated that he had submitted two proposals for a SWAT matrix for callouts and that neither proposal was acceptable to the Chief. Training and Overtime – There is a perception that the SWAT unit (1) receives much more training than do other units, and (2) is not working its regular positions very often due to training and callouts. The commander stated that SWAT training occurred, on average, two days per month, with one week of additional training per year. Due to SWAT training and callouts, Department personnel raised concerns not only that officers have to cover the SWAT officers’ absence, but that overtime is necessary to support this effort. Members of the Crisis Negotiation Team reported that they have not had training in several years and that, as a result, they do not believe they are fully prepared for these roles. The Administrative Commander disagreed, and stated there was training, but we did not receive (as requested) any evidence of this training. Leadership and Communications – Operational plans are not integrated into a “whole department” concept in a central repository for leadership review, evaluation, approval and tracking. Final review and evaluation of an operational plan before execution varies in supervisory review and approval. A centralized leadership review of all operational plans would consolidate and provide uniform oversight for officer safety, planning, high-‐risk response and after-‐action plan follow-‐up as lessons learned and best practices.

FINDING #10: A PRIORITIZED FOCUS ON POLICIES WILL YIELD DEPARTMENT-‐WIDE IMPACTS The Department as a whole – including the Chief, supervisors and officers – lacks legal and policy knowledge and regularly violates federal laws and departmental policy. Policies and policy updates are not adequately communicated to Department personnel. Violation of Policies and Federal Law – The Chief has been told by the City Attorney that he has violated federal laws in the past when he disciplined Department personnel in relation to their use of Family and Medical Leave Act time and that he cannot do so, to which the Chief responded that “it was not the City Attorney’s place to say so.” Additionally, several officers and command told team members that in the past, the Chief ordered every employee that had less than 40 hours of sick leave accrued to receive an oral reprimand; regardless of the circumstances of usage or ability to accrue time. Policy Knowledge – The City Attorney often receives daily calls from officers asking for legal advice relating to stops, arrests and other policing areas, as their supervisors do not provide sufficient guidance on these matters. These calls are viewed by the Department as going outside the chain of command. Officers have been told they cannot call the City Attorney for such advice even though neither they nor their supervisors understand these legal issues. In a district court case filed in January 2011, the judge’s opinion stated that during his deposition the Chief was not responding directly to plaintiff’s questions, not adequately articulating the official policy of the Department, and that his answers were often inconsistent and evasive. (See box at right.) Given that the Chief was testifying about the BPD officer's knowledge and conduct surrounding strip searches, it is important to note that the BPD policy on strip searches does not reflect the April 2014 legal changes and that

REFORM AND RENEWAL

the Department has not had strip search training in two years even though it is required to be conducted annually. Policy Dissemination – The more recently developed or updated Department policies are disseminated through a Power DMS System link, in which new policies are emailed to each officer, requiring the officer to open, read and sign the documents related to a new policy or revision. These new policies or revisions, however, are rarely and not adequately discussed in roll call or training. Officers are just expected to learn for themselves. Records Retention – BPD does not follow a standard procedure for records retention. We observed in many areas poor recordkeeping, file maintenance, review and purging. Important records – such as those related to training, internal affairs and inspections – are kept by individuals, with no oversight and review or guidance on policies and practices relating to retention. We were advised that the storage of in-‐car video is not maintained or managed in a way that video evidence can easily be retrieved, viewed or purged. The Department’s growing video storage exceeds 19 terabytes, which is costly, unnecessary and unsustainable. The January 2011 District Court opinion stated: “Jacobs never responded directly to plaintiff’s question whether defendant City has a policy or custom of public strip searches. If anything, Jacobs’s testimony confused the issue by not adequately articulating the official policy of the Beloit Police Department. Within the span of a few pages of deposition transcript, Jacobs stated that defendant’s conduct did not qualify as a strip search, that his conduct was a search but not a violation of the strip search policy and that his statement ‘Show me’ was an unlawful order. Jacobs’s deposition does not clarify the policies of the Beloit Police Department. His answers were often inconsistent and evasive.”

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #11: MANY TRAINING ISSUES MUST BE ADDRESSED TO IMPROVE BPD PERFORMANCE Some Department training courses have not been legally updated, and those that have were updated without accepting the offered assistance of the City Attorney or District Attorney. In addition, there is a perception in the Department that training requests by officers are denied without explanation, and there is no formal review of employees’ training records. Lastly, it was confirmed there is no process for evaluation of training instructors or observation of internal training courses. Legal Updates and Assistance Offered – Some policies and training have not been legally updated since 2008. Offers by the City Attorney to provide assistance for legal updates of training have been refused by the Department. In addition, the Department has made changes to policies covering legal issues without seeking the assistance of the City Attorney despite the City Attorney’s request to review and guide these changes. We were told by command staff that this is because the City Attorney would “take too much time” and “make too many revisions” and that, as a result, some BPD command staff only use the City Attorney for matters related to public or political issues. The District Attorney and City Attorney both stated to the assessment team that they repeatedly offered assistance but were told by the Department that the other attorney was assisting the Department when, in fact, neither was being consulted.

Disproportionate Allocation of Training – There is a Department-‐wide perception that a majority of the training is given to a “chosen few” and therefore disproportionately distributed among personnel. This perception is perpetuated by the fact that officers’ training requests are sometimes approved by their supervisors and denied by a commander, the Deputy Chief or the Chief without explanation. In addition, the general perception by officers denied training is that they are left to cover multiple beat areas or work overtime to cover for those attending training. Evaluation – There is no annual review of training instructors to determine if they should continue as instructors as required by policy. There also is no process for written evaluations conducted by attendees at the end of a training class nor observations of instructors by command staff or the Training Committee to determine whether the classroom training instruction is meaningful and appropriate. Dissemination Lacks Guidance – Since last year, the Department has had the ability to provide roll call training electronically, sending officers a video to open from their electronic devices and play from start to finish before allowing them to close it. However, there is rarely any follow-‐up in roll call to explain the broader importance, purpose and context. Officers are left to understand and interpret them on their own without supervisory guidance.

FINDING #12: TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES ABOUND While the City of Beloit and the Department have invested heavily in technology supporting police services, challenges remain in areas such as strategic planning, technology leadership, training, IT support, vendor accountability, information sharing and after-‐hours support. Management and Staffing – A single leadership position empowered with decision-‐making authority is required for interfacing with governance processes. The City should add one additional network administrator to offset support congestion and meet its operational needs. In order to capitalize and reduce downtime, the Department should establish super users on each shift to offset deficiencies in the City’s support model.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Confidential Reporting – The Department does not have an IT system in place to support the activity of an Early Intervention System (EIS). The IT system should be bolstered in order to provide the ability to identify, monitor and manage potential issues related to at-‐risk behavior. Capitalizing on Opportunities – Information technology solutions provide crucial support to the Department’s information sharing and crime analysis activities. Beloit IT staff should be required to participate in bi-‐weekly patrol briefings to foster a partnership across IT, administrators and patrol, as well as garner the necessary operational understanding regarding the contributions that IT systems are capable of making to officer safety and agency outcomes.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #13: COMMUNITY-‐ORIENTED POLICING NEEDS TO BECOME A HIGHER PRIORITY The Department does not have any coordinated community-‐oriented policing programs outside of patrol, which is minimal. The Neighborhood Resources Officer position is not useful nor has it been evaluated. Development of a strategy to engage the public in community policing and problem-‐ solving projects needs to be a priority. COP Programs – There is little coordination by BPD for community-‐oriented policing programs outside of patrol, which only relies on the Beat Management Plan and required community projects. There is also little documented departmental strategy to engage the public in any community policing programs or problem solving. We were shown a program called “Stop the Violence,” which was described as the current COP strategy, but saw no real tie to strategy of officer activity. Neighborhood Resource Officer – The Department’s Neighborhood Resource Officer is not adequately utilized and contact with residents via substation visits does not occur. Since this position was initiated by BPD five months ago, there has not been even one Merrill community resident visit or request, and yet the Department touts this as a community-‐ policing program. Multiple sources report that there has not been any evaluation on this program and its validity despite officers’ requests. One supervisor stated that he passed information to command regarding the ineffectiveness and high cost of overtime, but was told to stay the course. Community Projects – The community problem-‐solving projects required by the Department are solely meant to meet the guidelines of the Beat Management Plan and thus performance appraisals and not as a tool to engage the community. One officer, seeking

to fulfill his BMP-‐driven requirement of two problem-‐solving projects per year, proposed a community engagement initiative that was denied on the basis that it did not affect or fight crime, which is not the sole purpose of community policing. The criteria for problem-‐ solving projects are not clear to officers nor communicated effectively by leadership – and they don’t appear to reflect an accurate understanding of community-‐oriented policing. Community Engagement – The Department needs more partnerships with faith-‐based and other community organizations. Neighborhood watch groups do not know who to contact at the Department nor do they trust the agency. The Department should hold listening sessions with various community groups and businesses to identify specific and warranted community-‐ related programs. Due to current staffing levels and high volume of calls for service, programs such as officers walking beats are not feasible at this time; however, it should be evaluated as an appropriate support tool for community-‐ oriented policing when staffing levels or calls for service allow. In addition, the community does not feel the Chief, Deputy Chief or command staff reach out during times of crisis or when the community experiences a homicide that is widely reported in the media. For example, the parents of the victim of a highly publicized homicide stated that not only were they not contacted by the Chief, Deputy Chief or command staff, but that no one followed up to interview them or contact them regarding the crime except for the initial interview by a detective at the hospital.

FINDING #14: TAPPING THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE-‐LED POLICING WILL PAY STRONG DIVIDENDS Generally, BPD does not use data and analysis to support staffing, crime control and investigative initiatives and has provided limited resources to develop this capability. The Department’s current crime analysis activities are for informational purposes only, not driven by any formal crime reduction or resource mobilization strategy. Education and Support – There is little effort placed on educating rank-‐and-‐file officers as to their role in intelligence gathering, the management of tips and leads and the development of trusted relationships with members of the community who can provide actionable information. Data Collection and Analysis – The first step in problem solving is data collection and analysis. There are few examples of how data is supporting patrol functions. The recently proposed patrol schedule needs to be evaluated by hard data analysis as it relates to issues such as call, nature and time. Crime Analysis – While the Department provides Crystal Reports to patrol officers, BPD is not fully embracing crime analysis as a resource to aid in solving or preventing crimes. A structured approach is needed to ensure the timely dissemination of actionable intelligence information about relevant crime trends and patterns, while ensuring that crime control strategies are aligned across bureaus and units.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Internal Information Sharing – Critical operational information is not shared among bureaus and units. Currently, the Drug and Gang unit maintains an intelligence database comprised of narcotics, gang, and organized crime information obtained from sources including the public, outside agencies and patrol officers. An intelligence information form is completed and submitted to DAG. However, this database is only available to the unit’s officers and is not regularly shared with detectives, thus preventing detectives’ access to information that may assist in solving crimes. Intelligence needs to be shared with law enforcement both internally and externally in a sanctioned manner. Intelligence File Oversight – The Department does not have the appropriate policies and procedures in place to be compliant with 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 (28 CFR Part 23), which is designed to ensure the safeguarding of individuals’ privacy and civil rights. We found no policies governing the submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, security, inquiry, dissemination and review-‐and-‐purge process for intelligence files, nor did any member of command staff we interviewed have a clear understanding of this federal regulation.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

FINDING #15: CHANGES TO HIRING, PROMOTION AND SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS WILL HELP DRIVE REFORM BPD lacks standard selection criteria in its hiring, special assignment and promotions selection processes and does not adhere to national best practices in these areas. The processes lack transparency, with senior command staff having limited knowledge of selection criteria and officers provided with little to no feedback when rejected. Discriminatory Hiring Practices – The Department’s hiring practices do not follow national best practices nor do they follow the State of Wisconsin hiring model. The Department should immediately align itself with national and state standards in accordance with equal employment opportunity guidelines. Employment Qualifications – The Chief has developed his own hiring matrix, with arbitrarily weighted criterion. This matrix places an unwarranted emphasis on graduate-‐level education and undervalues prior military and law enforcement experience. This likely results in a disparity in the diversity of those selected to advance in the hiring process. Furthermore, a perception exists within the Department that the Chief discounts candidates with communication skills and other skills who would make good police officers in favor of candidates with master’s degrees. It was reported by a city official that the Chief stated that a pregnant applicant could not be hired by the Department, which is in direct conflict with the Equal Employment Opportunity law.

Validation and Selection Process – There is little transparency in validating those selected to advance in the hiring process. All supporting documentation is provided to the Chief without any testing or validation of areas such as education, military service or language proficiency. It was reported that hiring decisions, including the progression of candidates and ultimate hiring selection, rests solely with the Chief. Additionally, the background investigation information the Chief presented to the Police and Fire Commission on candidates he requested be hired often omitted critical information that should have been presented for full consideration by the Commission. Promotion and Special Assignment Selection – BPD lacks standard criteria in its promotion process and transparency in special assignment selections. While the Department conducts promotion testing, it was reported by the Chief that the test was created internally and that points do not determine who will ultimately be selected for promotion, with the ultimate decision left solely at the Chief’s discretion. Many BPD employees believe that the selection process for promotion and special duties at higher levels of pay is unfair and undermined by favoritism. Some Command Officers stated that specialty positions were also used to hide ineffective officers instead of dealing directly with the problems.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT: SCOPE, AUTHORITY AND OPERATIONAL FOOTPRINT Today, the City of Beloit, located in Rock County on the Wisconsin and Illinois state line, has a population of approximately 37,000 and covers approximately 17 square miles. The Beloit Police Department has 93 employees, including 72 sworn officers and 21 non-‐ sworn officers, who are led by Chief Norm Jacobs. Chief Jacobs has served in this position since December 2009 and reports directly to the City Manager. Beloit is governed by a seven-‐member City Council that is elected and has a Council President and Vice President. The Department’s senior command includes the Deputy Chief, three commanders at the captain level and the non-‐sworn Support Services Director. Command staff is supported by ten sergeants who serve as first-‐line supervisors. The Department is divided into four major areas: Patrol, Detectives, Administration and Support Services. The Patrol and Detective Bureau Commanders report to the Deputy Chief, who reports to the Chief. The Administrative Commander and Director of Support Services report directly to the Chief. The Detective Bureau oversees investigations, the Drug and Gang Unit, the FBI Street Task Force Officer, the evidence and property custodian, the Child Maltreatment Officer and Patrol oversee the School Resource Officers. The Administrative Commander oversees training, finance, Crime Scene Technicians, vehicle maintenance, emergency management, 911 Communications Center, Tactical and SWAT units, and other specialty teams. The Director of Support Services oversees the Records Division, Court Officer and Accreditation.

BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT VISION An accredited, progressive department with tremendous capacity; responsive to the needs of a d iverse citizenry; wisely using provided resources. MISSION Reduce disorder through problem solving and community cooperation. GOALS •

Build rapport with all our communities and people.

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Disrupt gang activity

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Remove crime guns from the streets.

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Enforce traffic laws consistently for safer roads.

PHILOSOPHY Policing is not only about tactics, policy and p rocedure or law. In the big picture, policing is about communication, time and accountability.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

REFORM AND RENEWAL

1 | LEADERSHIP AND SUPERVISION: THE BRIDGES BETWEEN VISION AND OUTCOMES Today, more than at any time since the modern civil rights movement of the 1950/1960’s, the country needs compassionate, community focused, forward-‐thinking leadership. Today’s police chief needs to be deeply engaged in leading the police department, its officers and their mission; the Chief must be an active member of the community – listening, communicating and adapting to the community’s needs; and most importantly must set the example for integrity, leadership, fairness, respect inside the department and throughout the community. THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS Fundamental Challenges Police leadership in Beloit is lacking in many fundamental areas. This leadership challenge is at the root of most of the major issues confronting the Department. Even the most basic of leadership responsibilities, such as directing people to accomplish the agency mission, are not occurring. We found little evidence that BPD senior executives modeled good leadership behavior. With the exception of the Patrol Commander and Civilian Director of Support Services, there are very few examples of effective leadership at the command level. Neither a formal strategic plan nor a mission was provided or created collaboratively. There is inadequate mentoring and encouragement of officers to step out of the status quo and proactively solve crimes in Beloit. Most importantly, the Department’s leaders do not engage in any activities, events or communications that might instill pride among employees in their work, in the Department itself, or in their commitment to the agency’s mission and the community it serves. Absence of Compensating Measures

Of BPD Officers Surveyed:

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79% feel that the Chief is not leading them in the right direction.

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75% feel that their commanders are not good leaders.

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73% disagree that their commanders value their input.

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71% feel the performance evaluation system is unfair.

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56% say they would leave the Department if given the opportunity.

Police departments can manage to obtain a measure of success with poor leadership through established management and oversight practices. In the absence of critical elements of leadership – such as strategy, communication, mentoring, innovation, inspiration and empathy – an agency can still have effective policies and practices in place to ensure that the basic functions of the department are being conducted correctly. Unfortunately, these, too, are lacking in the Beloit Police Department. In many areas, simple controls – such as investigative case management and review or routine field supervision – do not occur. Administrative practices – such as hiring, promotions and discipline – do not follow generally accepted practices or, in some cases, labor and employment laws. Strategic thought and direction is severely

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

lacking. Without effective leadership and management, BPD cannot be successful. The Department must re-‐engineer the methods through which its senior leaders both lead and manage. Strong Leadership Enables Healthy Discourse One recurring theme that we heard from the Department, the Beloit community and City management was the belief that the Chief was ineffectively guiding and managing the Department. A perception exists within the Department that the Chief has surrounded himself with a command staff unwilling to engage in necessary debate, and that he has castigated, isolated or disciplined both current and former BPD officers who speak out against his decisions. It was reported that this same behavior was demonstrated by the Administrative Commander. In order for the Department to evolve into a healthy organization, it must not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints but also see them as opportunities to view multiple sides of complex issues. The few individuals who stood in support of the Chief readily admitted that it was because they believe he is a “good person” or that they did not want to upset the status quo. However, few could articulate any positive practices or examples to support the Chief’s continued leadership. Our team heard from City executives, elected officials, City leaders and community groups that it was time for a leadership change and that they had requested that the Chief retire and assist in bringing new leadership, but that he had refused. The overwhelming lack of trust and support for the Chief inside the Department, the City government and the community clearly calls into question his ability to lead the Department into the future. MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY The Importance of a Strategic Plan A strategic plan provides critical direction for employees about their priorities and how they should invest their time when an emergency response is not in effect. A strategic plan also helps agencies conduct a critical self-‐evaluation of their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. BPD leadership has fallen short in effectively formulating and communicating the Department’s strategic goals. Apart from the Deputy Chief and command staff, BPD personnel do not clearly understand the Chief’s vision, leaving them unable to implement his vision as they carry out their duties every day. Although the Department has nominally established a vision, a mission and simple goals as well as a poster that helps meet accreditation requirements, these basic components do not represent a strategic plan. An effective strategic plan should, at minimum, include key elements such as:

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Strategy to communicate the process and plan

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Dedicated planning team

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Identification of the Department’s values

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Measurable goals and objectives

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Documented tasks

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Implementation policies

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Accountability metrics and measures

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Monitoring and evaluation practices

REFORM AND RENEWAL

We identified one example of planning in the Department: the Chief’s articulation of measurable goals in his budget request to the City. These goals were to: (1) maintain CALEA accreditation, (2) maintain or lower the vehicle crash rate, (3) focus on drug and gang enforcement, (4) maintain a consistent crime clearance rate in the Detective Bureau, and (5) improve internal communication of policies and training. However, we did not find any evidence that these goals are actively used to direct Department operations nor are they tied to objectives or activities except in a few instances in the Beat Management Plan. In short, these goals have not been used to advance the primary purpose of strategic planning: to align resources and activities to achieve the Department’s vision and mission. Moreover, the Department does not routinely coordinate with the City Manager or City Council when designating priorities beyond those outlined in the City’s budget plan. Coordination in the development and prioritization of strategic objectives would ensure that the Department’s policing efforts better address the needs of the community. The Beat Management Plan is Not a Strategy Without a cohesive strategic plan in place, the Department places too much emphasis on the Beat Management Plan to the detriment of other BPD operations, including investigations, community outreach and proactive policing. In response to questions about the Department’s goals, the Chief stated, “The goals of the Department are those in the BMP, like they have been for five years.” The BMP only measures whether officers complete their assignments and BMP tasks. It does not measure the relevance, validity or effectiveness of the plan or each officer’s tasks within the plan. An excerpt of the BMP guide and sample reports is located in Appendix A. The tasks are made even more meaningless by the way many officers complete them just to meet the numerical requirement. Many officers told us they meet their numbers in the first few days. Completing the requirements early ensures that they receive a competent rating during their coaching reviews whether they (1) choose to be proactive and do more than what is simply required or (2) do nothing but respond to assigned calls. These conflicting behaviors are due to leadership’s emphasis on numbers rather than outcomes. Expectations of Department Personnel In addition to not having a formal strategic plan, the Chief, Deputy Chief and command are ineffective at articulating the Department’s mission and informal strategic plan at the highest level and do not communicate the tactical missions of the bureaus and units within the Department. Every bureau – from Investigations to Patrol – is managed largely on its own, with little overall coordination across the agency. A common theme that emerged during our interviews is that officers have no understanding of a cohesive strategy. Many officers responded with blank stares when asked about departmental objectives.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Transparency in Decision-‐Making by Chief and Command Successful police organizations not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints, they also see them as opportunities to examine multiple perspectives on complex problems. In Beloit, however, the Chief makes most, if not all, major decisions and passes them down the chain of command and rarely seeks or allows input from other Department leaders and stakeholders. The Chief provides little explanation and context and, as a result, the intent behind his decision is often poorly understood. The Chief emails the Deputy Chief, who emails the commanders, who email the sergeants, who interpret the changes differently depending on their respective goals, perspectives and experience. The directive often loses its original meaning by the time it reaches officers on the streets. Many Department members stated that when these decisions involve a policy change, it is either poorly directed or implemented, and if backlash against the decisions emerges, the Chief is quick to blame others. For example, he instructed the committee overseeing the design of the new squad decals to remove the “in memory of 23” decal, honoring a BPD officer killed in the line of duty. Despite their expressed opposition to him on this course of action, when his decision became controversial, he blamed the committee for his ultimate decision. Retired BPD officers wrote him a letter disagreeing with the removal of the decal, and he responded by telling them they were no longer welcome at the Department. Additionally, we were provided a letter the Chief wrote (Appendix B) in response to a Facebook post (Appendix C). The Chief’s response was unprofessional. According to many individuals we interviewed, the Chief, Deputy Chief and command do not value the views of rank-‐and-‐file personnel, and almost always ignore their opinions when they conflict with their own. The following are examples of this disregard: 1. Increase in Violent Crime: It was reported that during the summer of 2014, command staff asked detectives for their views on how to address the increase in violent crimes. At a meeting in February 2015, the question was raised again. Recommendations and comments provided at both times included proactive initiatives and enforcement strategies. However, there is the perception that their information was not embraced or implemented. 2. Major Change: Many officers, sergeants and some command referred to significant changes that were implemented without any notice. In one now infamous example, the Consent to Inspect program, the Chief publically announced that Beloit City residents could volunteer to have BPD officers search their homes for illegal guns. This announcement immediately sparked public controversy and was reported on in the national news. However, city leaders, patrol officers, sergeants and some command were not informed of this initiative and only learned about it from media inquiries after the announcement had been made. This left those responsible for both the media inquiries and the potential police response unprepared. This was also an example of the lack of understanding of the importance of public perception and communications. What was designed as a public relations and safe-‐streets initiative quickly became perceived as a BPD attack on the Second Amendment, and the Chief’s inability to explain the program in a way that made sense attracted local and national media ridicule. 3. Fraternization: In response to suspected “fraternization” between an officer and a detained suspect, the Chief revised the detainee policy to state, “employees will not hold any

REFORM AND RENEWAL

unnecessary conversations with detainees. In answering detainee’s' questions, be brief and to the point. Rarely, if ever discuss their individual cases with them and above all, do not get involved in their personal affairs. Fraternizing with detainees will not be tolerated.” Because this policy was enacted without any explanation, it is unclear how officers should respond if, for example, a detainee on a domestic violence charge tries to discuss with the officer his girlfriend breaking up with him. The internal interviews and survey responses revealed significant deficits in trust, appreciation, autonomy, training and communication among employees as well as overall concerns about leadership. It is clear that these perceptions are driven by poor communication from the top down in areas such as hiring, promotions, special assignments, training, award recommendations and disciplinary actions. Management and Supervisory Review and Responsibilities The Chief, Deputy Chief and command staff do not have sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure proper oversight of Department functions. For example, there is not a regular executive review of criminal investigations. The Investigations Commander briefs the Chief and Deputy Chief at a very high level about investigations in weekly meetings but without insights that can only emerge from a formal oversight capability, this review is of marginal utility. We uncovered the following other indications that oversight is deficient: •

During our evaluation, personnel revealed a complete unfamiliarity with 28 CFR Part 23, which involves key regulations governing intelligence collection and the management of criminal intelligence information systems.

•

During our assessment of the Patrol Unit, we observed a strong emphasis on community policing projects and a significant commitment of resources into projects such as the Merrill neighborhood substation. These expensive initiatives were not evaluated for effectiveness. The assessment team was told by officers that in four and a half months of staffing the substation, not a single Merrill neighborhood resident had visited the location.

The behaviors, actions and omissions the assessment team has identified in this report appear to be inconsistent with the job functions and the knowledge, skills and abilities required in both the Police Chief’s and Deputy Police Chief’s job descriptions (Appendix D). The Department must institutionalize a more rigorous approach to basic management and oversight. Although the first steps are to develop a strategy and measurable goals, measuring the effectiveness of the Department’s activities is a critical management responsibility that is not occurring in most areas. Ensuring Consistent Implementation of CALEA Policies Accreditation and the testing and review of policies and procedures provide an operational and management framework for the Department. These are also elements essential to the operational efficiency of an agency and the pursuit of professional excellence. When followed correctly, the accreditation process strengthens the agency’s accountability both within the Department and with the community it serves. Earning CALEA accreditation can give members of the community as well as city management and elected officials valuable assurance that their police department’s operational and administrative policies meet or exceed standards based upon national best practices.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

However, when receiving accreditation becomes the end goal and the process is seen as simply a means to that end, the value of accreditation is lost. If there is no critical self-‐evaluation of how policies are implemented, applied and enforced, the benefits of accreditation rapidly diminish and can even become counter-‐productive. We did not observe any evidence that the command staff embraced the true purpose of CALEA and the benefits accreditation brings to an agency. Instead, our assessors found an honest critical self-‐ evaluation of policy and practice by the command to be lacking. Some examples of this were changes in policy simply to obtain accreditation, such as changing the DAG Official Advance Funds audit policy to a simple review because an audit was never conducted even though an audit is the best practice. Another example is that command officers were not compliant in March 2015 with their defensive tactics training when CALEA arrived, and were told by CALEA to complete this required training prior to July 2015, which they then rushed to complete and after doing so, became compliant. Another example is that prior to March 2015, sergeants and SWAT members were rushed through SIMS training for completion prior CALEA’s arrival. It was also reported that CALEA did not notice that the strip search policy was out of date, and that no annual training had occurred as required, which is currently being rectified. Honest reporting is the cornerstone of accreditation. In order for the CALEA or Wisconsin Law Enforcement Accreditation Group (WILEAG) to be meaningful, the command staff must embrace the audit and evaluation process as a tool to evaluate the policies, practices and procedures, not simply find examples of how they comply. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOR Unprofessional Behavior One of the most significant issues facing the Department is the unprofessional behavior demonstrated by the Chief on a frequent basis. We documented many anecdotal examples of the Chief acting in a petty, unprofessional manner toward officers, which has helped create a negative working atmosphere that permeates the Department. Examples of these behaviors include: •

Reluctance to extend common courtesies and greetings to officers in the station

•

Failure to acknowledge significant events, such as sickness, death or on-‐duty injury

•

Complete lack of a significant commendation process

•

Isolation of officers in the Chief’s disfavor

•

Banning retired officers from the Department when they disagreed with him

•

Sending unprofessional correspondence

•

Personal policy violations, such as not wearing a firearm or vest when in uniform

Department personnel believe that the command staff does not hold itself accountable to policies or laws covering conduct, hiring and discrimination. We learned that the Deputy Chief assisted an applicant in an attempt to have a felony conviction expunged from the applicant’s record. The felony

REFORM AND RENEWAL

conviction prohibited the applicant from carrying a firearm, thus making the applicant ineligible to be certified as a police officer. This same person had a conviction for a retail theft violation. Both arrests were made by BPD. This assistance was apparently provided despite legal prohibitions under the Rules and Regulations for the Police and Fire Commission of the City of Beloit. Some command officers told us that they vehemently disagreed with the Deputy Chief’s actions and advised him of this in staff meetings.

Type of Complaint

Filed

Complaint #1 Filed with State of WI Person A

1. FMLA 2. Opposing Discrimination

2009

Complaint #2 Filed with State of WI Person B

FMLA

2010

Complaint #3 Filed with State of WI Person C

1. Gender 2. Opposing Discrimination 3. Sexual Harassment

2010

Complaint #4 Filed with Fed EEOC Person C

1. ADA 2. Age 3. Gender 4. Retaliation 5. Sexual Harassment

2011

Complaint #5 Filed with State of WI Person C

1. Gender 2. Disability 3. Age 4. Opposing Discrimination

2010

Complaint #6 Filed with State of WI Person C

Retaliation

2011

Complaint #7 Filed with State of WI Person C

FMLA

2010

According to Rule 3.01(11) a patrol officer applicant cannot be a convicted felon unless pardoned as prescribed by the Minimum Standards for Employment established by the Law Enforcement Standards Board of the Wisconsin Department of Justice pursuant to Section 165.85 of the Wisconsin Statutes.i Additionally, Police and Fire Commission and Rule 4.03 states that “whenever an application reveals that the applicant cannot meet the qualifications of the position applied for, the applicant will not be considered.” Assisting a convicted felon in the application process violates these provisions.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

In a separate situation, the Chief required a pregnant officer to transition from light duty assignments to an unpaid Family and Medical Leave Act status – even though it was in violation of City policy and previous instances when the Department would allow officers who were pregnant to continue with light duty responsibilities. When the officer said that she could not be forced onto “FMLA leave,” she was told, “It’s the Chief’s decision.” The officer filed a complaint with the State of Wisconsin Equal Rights Division and was reinstated. Upon reviewing FMLA complaints further, we learned that this was not an isolated situation as other decisions in hiring or FMLA leave did not conform to the law. In the table below, the following complaints were filed against the Police Chief, Department and City. Many of the cases resulted in negotiated settlements, with the City prevailing in a few of the cases involving one employee but only after four years of litigation. In reviewing this information we also learned that the City Attorney had to spend an inordinate amount of time combing through files and time records in an attempt to defend the city as there were little to no records in the police department that addressed many of the complaints of unfair treatment by these female officers. In another situation demonstrating a lack of legal knowledge as well as inappropriate intervention in an arrest, the Deputy Chief involved the improper return of gambling proceeds to an arrestee awaiting charges previously approved by the City Attorney, which prevented this case from being prosecuted. Concerns about Retaliation The majority of BPD line officers we interviewed had concerns about retaliation by the Chief, Deputy Chief and command staff. In addition, community members reported that officers had been retaliated against by their supervisors and command staff. Some specific examples reported include: 1. The Chief cancels scheduled training when he hears Department personnel have applied to other Departments for employment. This is a practice that has been carried over from previous chiefs. 2. Officers have been moved to shifts or denied training by the Chief when they were vocal with leadership about various concerns. 3. The Chief has denied access to gym equipment when he considers the machines not clean enough, going beyond what is considered acceptably clean by many officers. 4. Officers have been told they will be “looked down upon” or penalized if they file a grievance related to their issue, which is within their right to do so. In addition, there were overwhelming concerns of retaliation by the Administrative Commander, who is responsible for special operations units and training. The most disturbing and common concern was the fear of retaliation employees believed would occur if they were identified as having provided information critical of him. It was reported that when this commander is not happy with officers, the commander cancels any scheduled training they were to attend. Although this could not be validated because, as is reported later, training is often denied without explanation, the overall perception was that the commander is prone to retaliate. Officers reported examples of retaliation including officers being moved to other shifts or being taken off specialized units, some commanders disagreed stating this was only done for legitimate reasons.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

It was also reported that the Administrative Commander is often angry and unprofessional. He rarely shows up for scheduled training exercises and routinely cancels them at the last minute because he has conflicts. Additionally, it was reported that the Administrative Commander has called officers “losers” and “cancer” in the hallway as others walk by who then tell those officers what he said. Executives from other agencies described him as condescending and unprofessional. Although this possible retaliation or perception thereof was only reported to the assessment team and has not been validated, the team has observed the commander’s anger first-‐hand – through his comments during meetings and his demonstration of open hostility as well as through his unprofessional emails. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN BPD AND THE COMMUNITY We observed significant limitations in the Department’s strategy and approach to communicating and interacting with the community. A major theme during our interviews with community members and business leaders, as well as in open community forums, was that the Department does not communicate well with the residents, businesses or community groups. Many members of the public complained that BPD has failed to address community concerns and requests regarding the rise in violence and homicide or the last shooting involving an officer. When asked about this, the Chief placed blame on the City Manager, whom he said had explicitly instructed him not to publically discuss the violence. There is not a public communication strategy in place on any issues, nor is there any evidence that there was ever a plan. Additionally, the Chief’s visibility in the community is low. He states that he belongs to many community groups and committees, but there is no evidence that he regularly attends meetings. COLLABORATION AND SHARING As stated earlier, the Chief does not engage city officials or community leaders in strategy, problem solving discussions or planning. The coordination of Department goals is limited to the City’s budget development. The consensus of the City Council members we interviewed was that the Chief does not want to hear from them and certainly does not want to take their direction. City Council members perceive that the Chief displays a “disdain” for the Council. We identified several instances in which the Chief resisted or unequivocally refused to work with the City Attorney – instances that involved areas such as the Department’s legal training, hiring, discipline and legal issues. The City Attorney stated that the Chief avoids talking with her and often sends a commander to speak with her in his place.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS 1.1 – Change at the Top: Hire a highly qualified Chief and leaders to fill some key command positions – personnel who are capable of delivering the leadership, vision, change management and management skills vitally needed to bring about reforms throughout the Department. BPD leadership needs to be highly visible throughout the Department and engaged in the daily operations. 1.2 – Definition of the Command’s Role: Facilitate an open discussion between the command and City leaders resulting in a clear definition of the command’s role both as a law enforcement agency and a Department subject to the authority and oversight of City leadership. This discussion is vital to ensuring that the Department’s mission, delivery and relationships are in alignment with both. 1.3 – Oversight and Strategic Planning: Institutionalize a more rigorous approach to basic management and oversight. The first steps are to develop measurable goals and a three-‐year strategic plan that incorporates the recommendations in this assessment. Ensure that the plan includes strategic objectives as well as clear strategies driving measurable outcomes in crime control, investigative and patrol in all bureaus and units and community-‐oriented policing. The plan should also define a regular and continuous process of coordination among the Department, the City Manager and the City Council in the development and prioritization of the strategic objectives to ensure policing efforts adequately address the needs of the community. 1.4 – A Collaborative Command Culture: Ensure the Chief, Deputy Chief and command staff embrace collaborative decision-‐making and engagement. The Chief must not only respect debate and opposing viewpoints but also see them as opportunities to view multiple sides of a complex issue. 1.5 – Communication and Transparency: •

Between Leadership and the City: Maintain routine, two-‐way communications between the Chief and the City Manager and City Council about priorities beyond what is laid out in the budget plan. In addition, the Chief and Deputy Chief should speak directly with the City Attorney and District Attorney when necessary.

•

Between Leadership and the Department: Increase trust, appreciation, autonomy, training and communication among employees. The Chief and leadership should effectively communicate the agency’s strategic goals. Officers should receive a singular, consistent message from the top down, and when appropriate, it should be delivered directly from the Chief. Have the Chief engage in communication with all Department personnel, including those below command staff – and extend to command staff an open-‐door policy for any officers with questions or concerns. Improve communication from the top down in the areas of promotions, special assignments, training, award recommendations and disciplinary actions – including informing supervisors and employees as to how such determinations are made.

•

Between Leadership and the Community: The Department leadership should communicate with the community about major problems and with the media regarding crime. The Chief should also regularly attend community events and meetings, allowing them to be open, and be approachable and participate rather than sending his Deputy Chief or command staff.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

1.6 – Integrity and Judgment: Encourage integrity among high-‐ranking Department officials related to adherence to Department policy, retaliatory actions, disregard of the City’s direction on legal issues and unprofessional conduct, including harassment of officers. 1.7 – Relationship with the Community: Charge the new leadership of the Department with building the platform for a new relationship with the community it serves – through strategies that range from community-‐oriented policing programs to dedicated, sustained and active participation in a broad range of community groups and activities. 1.8 – Crime Prevention: Sharpen the focus of crime control and problem-‐solving activities on neighborhoods and significantly increase citizen participation in the process. Key actions in this regard include increasing the Department’s participation in beat meetings and engaging the business community in crime control strategies. 1.9 – Accountability and Supervision: Hold supervisors accountable, and, in turn, have supervisors do the same for all BPD employees. Ensure the supervisors review employee training records annually to make recommendations for improving employee skills, knowledge and abilities per Department policy. 1.10 – Performance Reviews: Tie performance reviews to mission, goals and job performance, and ensure that every level of supervision is held responsible for delivering fair, honest and timely reviews. Revisit the standards BPD officers are expected to meet to ensure they focus not just on the Beat Management Plan but also on important elements for professional development, such as community outreach, training, crime solving and leadership. 1.11 – Support to Personnel: Place a much stronger, more sustained and comprehensive emphasis on supporting the men and women who represent the Department every day, and determine its effectiveness through the decisions they make and the attention they bring to every facet of BPD operations. Increase the number of commendations for good service and outcomes. Champion and reward positive behaviors. Ensure that the Chief is proactive in taking ownership of the Department’s morale and helping to foster a better working environment. 1.12 – Adherence to Laws and Best Practices: Ensure that BPD leadership understands and adheres to State of Wisconsin hiring practices. Handle Family and Medical Leave Act issues with Department employees more appropriately. Provide more consideration to the family-‐related concerns of Department employees. Bring a more rigorous approach to complying with CALEA standards, not just in the appropriate documentation for the purpose of accreditation but also in following through with the activities and behaviors that these best practice standards call for. Require the Chief to follow Department policy on all matters. 1.13 – Strategic Communications Plan: Establish a strategic communications plan in alignment with the Department’s own mission as well as the City’s. The plan should (1) identify the goals, tactics and vehicles of the message and coordination necessary to enhance the relationship between the Department and the Beloit community; (2) promote the City as a whole; and (3) increase trust and understanding between internal and external stakeholders.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

REFORM AND RENEWAL

2 | PATROL: THE FRONT LINE OF POLICING A SINGULAR FOCUS ON THE BEAT MANAGEMENT PLAN Policing is about communication, time and accountability – communication among the police and a city’s residents, visitors and business owners; time spent addressing mutually agreed upon problems; and accountability for the role they play in fighting crime. BPD attempts to accomplish this through a problem-‐oriented policing instrument, the Beat Management Plan. BPD has eight patrol beats, with one officer assigned to each beat. Beat Assignment All eight patrol officers are assigned to yearlong positions on a particular beat. At the beginning of each year, patrol officers select their beat based on seniority. Although this practice represents an incentive for senior officers, it has resulted in the assignment of less-‐experienced officers to beats with higher crime rates, gang problems and associated quality-‐of-‐life issues. These issues would be better addressed by a veteran officer, especially given the inadequate supervision of patrol officers. Assigning officers to permanent beats gives officers an opportunity to build rapport with residents, which may lead to a greater partnership in fighting crime. Beat Scheduling and Vacancies Because the Department does not have a beat vacancy assignment policy, supervisors and patrol sergeants manage beat vacancies in an inconsistent manner. As a result, beats often go unstaffed and unprotected. For example, one sergeant believes that because officers are “responsible for their beat” even when they call in sick, the beat is not staffed in their absence.

On occasion, some sergeants will assign an officer in an adjoining beat to provide additional periodic coverage in the unstaffed beat.

Of BPD Officers Surveyed: 78% feel that they spend less than half of their time during an average workweek engaged in preventative police work.

It is common – through improper scheduling, late and sick calls, or overall staff shortages – for one beat not to be staffed. Although this practice routinely occurs during the day shift, it has also occurred during the afternoon and overnight shifts. When notified in advance of a vacancy, the sergeant is able to offer other officers the opportunity to work overtime to fill the vacancy. However, without ample notification, the sergeant must force overtime on an officer, which often causes dissent throughout the Patrol Bureau because many officers on patrol already work substantial overtime hours due to understaffing. Supervisory Oversight There is relatively little supervisory oversight to ensure that officers are actually conducting business checks. During our interviews, officers reported that other officers simply drive by a business and enter a “business check” in the computer without ever leaving their vehicle or making face-‐to-‐face contact with the business owner. In this regard, the BMP falls short with respect to both supervisory oversight and officer accountability. There is currently not a

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

process for a supervisor to call and follow-‐up on the visits officers have performed to ensure that the visit actually occurred to hold the officers accountable for the task. The lack of sufficient supervision of patrol officers is reportedly due to administrative tasks taking precedence over patrol officer development. Officers reported that some patrol personnel take advantage of this lack of supervision by taking an excessive amount of time on routine calls, excessively long meal breaks or traveling outside the perimeter of their beat assignment area without supervisory knowledge. These practices place an undue burden on other officers responding to calls for service. We noticed that some officers begin their tour of duty and do not immediately proceed to their assigned area. Currently, an entire shift of officers end their tours of duty before the next shift begins theirs, leaving the city, especially the neighborhoods outside of downtown, unprotected and vulnerable as the closest car will be responding from the police station. This practice also results in an unacceptable delay in dispatching calls for service. Many police departments assign officers to arrive early or stay late in order to ensure continuous coverage of an area. As of the date of this report, the interim Chief has shifted schedules to create a staggered approach to shift change. Disparities between Plan and Practice Although the BMP provides a solid foundation for officers to initiate community relations, the plan does not include even the limited goals set forth in a Department-‐wide strategic plan or the objectives developed in part by community residents and business owners in order to foster greater community involvement in policing efforts. Even if the goals and objectives are included, dialogue must continue among beat officers, residents and business owners to

ensure that the objectives are being met and new issues have not emerged. After speaking with the patrol officers, we determined that many of them feel they are not seeing success or gaining work satisfaction from their role. Many are frustrated that the Department is not getting to the root causes of community problems, especially crime and disorder, and as a result they are not able to build a closer relationship with the community. Conflicts Between General Area Objectives and Shift-‐Specific Activities The assessment team realized that many officers find the BMP confusing. The BMP lists both area-‐wide objectives and shift-‐specific activity to be met in each patrol area. We discovered the following example involving conflicts between these two directives: •

General Area Objective for Area 301: According to the objectives of Area 301 – a large business, retail and restaurant neighborhood – officers should make themselves known to every business owner once a year in order to receive input on the area’s needs and problems.

•

Shift-‐Specific Activity for Area 301: Similar annual general area objectives are found in several BMP area plans; however, the “Shift-‐Specific Activities” for Area 301 call for first and second shift officers to make personal contact with 10 Milwaukee Road corridor business owners every six months. Additionally, the overnight third shift officers are to make 12 quarterly checks of businesses that are open. These yearly or monthly requirements are not isolated to the BMP for Area 301 but are required of all area plans.

•

Questions Raised: How can officers make themselves known to every business owner once a year when they are only required to

make a limited number of contacts every six months? How does the limited number of contacts foster the spirit of the BMP, which is to promote stronger relationships with the community, specifically the business community? However, officers are evaluated twice a year based entirely on their success, or lack thereof, in meeting their respective BMP goals. We have found examples where officers were disciplined, simply for numbers not meeting expectations, even though the supervisor stated that they recognized the officer was on special assignment or training and that assignment would negatively affect the officer’s statistics. This means officers have little incentive to demonstrate initiative and dedicate their efforts to other areas that may prove more productive. INSUFFICIENT RECOGNITION AND LOW LEVELS OF INITIATIVE The Department is not recognizing positive behavior in a consistent manner. Even though it is possible to meet the six-‐visit objective within the first few months of the year, conducting follow-‐up visits is not necessarily encouraged or rewarded. Without incentives, the likelihood of officers making additional visits to businesses is low. If additional visits do not occur, the need for an increase in communication between officers and business owners is even more critical. Officers can gain recognition from the Department if they demonstrate initiative by identifying and solving a “project” in their beat. Under the BMP, officers are required to address two problem issues per year, one for each rating period. First, the officer must identify a problem or “project.” After evaluating the issue, the officer is responsible for bringing together the necessary resources to solve the problem.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Unfortunately, the majority of the patrol force resents this form of recognition because many feel that some projects that should receive recognition go unrecognized while other, less complicated projects are set apart for recognition. Patrol officers also report that little activity other than that related to the BMP is ever rewarded regardless of its importance. For example, the Department received a complaint that a local GameStop was reselling merchandise without a secondhand dealer's license. An officer was dispatched to the GameStop to inform the owner of the license required to resell merchandise. This was not an officer-‐identified problem – it was simply a call for service. After the owner came into compliance with the proper license, the officer was surprised to learn that he was awarded a problem-‐solving award for his efforts. In another situation, an officer assisted by two members of the Beloit Fire Department acted heroically and potentially saved three lives. The firefighters received life savings awards but the officer did not. SUPPORTING PATROL’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMMUNITY Not enough emphasis is placed on establishing and maintaining ongoing community contact and input. In fact, in some instances, the shift-‐ specific activity is static, resulting in diminishing returns for the effort invested. Officers reported that when they submitted a project related to community engagement and problem solving to fulfill their requirement of developing two problem-‐solving projects per year on his BMP, they were denied because it did not “combat crime.” There were other examples of projects that officers requested but were denied without receiving an explanation as to why the project was rejected.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CRITERIA AND CONSISTENCY Performance evaluations do not currently include an appraisal of behaviors and activities outside of the BMP numbers, such as rapport with the community, interpersonal skills in the work environment, interview skills, investigative skills, getting guns and drugs off the street, and developing sources of information. Without this additional evaluation criteria and appropriate recognition given to officers on their biannual evaluation, many officers are content with writing one parking ticket or making the required six-‐to-‐ten business checks over a six-‐month period, rather than risk spending hours on a self-‐initiated gun or drug arrest and investigation for which they may not receive credit. CALLS FOR SERVICE ISSUES AND COVERAGE Call Duration, Availability and Supervision BPD’s Computer-‐Aided Dispatch (CAD) system is the software used to:

spend time addressing activities identified in their own BMP, such as conducting foot patrols or business checks. Repeated complaints have been made to sergeants about officers spending an inordinate amount of time on routine calls. Personnel interviewed indicated that sergeants rarely take action in these matters, even though they have the ability to monitor how long an officer has been on a call through their in-‐car computer. Computer-‐Aided Dispatch and Community-‐ Oriented Policing Without additional documentation, it is difficult to determine how BPD uses CAD’s Incidents by Type Report as an aid to its problem-‐oriented policing. Although the report has value, further analysis is needed and should be used to: 1. Analyze calls by call type and problem location 2. Conduct “hot-‐spot” analysis 3. Identify repeat callers

1. Capture data on calls for emergency services,

4. Study the number of calls by day of week and hour of day

2. Dispatch responding vehicles, and

5. Record the number of calls by beat

3. Facilitate communication in the field. The CAD system gives patrol officers, by means of their in-‐car computer, the ability to clear themselves from a call for service or remain busy on one for an extended period of time. During our interviews, many members of the Patrol Bureau said that some officers reported being on a call when they are in fact available to take another call from dispatch. This results in the dispatch system sending officers outside their assigned beat to handle another officer's call and leaving their beat unprotected. This practice also increases call to service response times and interferes with that officer's ability to

6. Analyze the number of calls requiring backup units

7. Study patrol officer time devoted to calls by type and priority 8. Analyze patrol officer time on calls by day, shift and geographic area If a goal of the BMP and the Department's overall community policing philosophy is to enlist the public's help in addressing crime-‐ related issues and the underlying causes of problems in the community, residents should be informed of recent criminal activity, which does not currently occur.

Response Times The assessment team reviewed the PremierOne Report titled “Response Time Statistics.” Gathering statistics is useful; however, the various times are listed by priority. This report should be run both ways – by priority number and call type – to allow for a more focused review of which calls are taking too long for the Dispatch Center to process.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

For example, if the Department responded to 25 domestic disturbances per year, and the average processing time was four minutes, a supervisor could question why it was taking the Dispatch Center so long to process this type of call. This could result in an improvement to protocols regarding which questions are asked and how to make the call-‐taking time for domestic disturbances more efficient. If this report determined, instead, that the Dispatch Center was operating in a timely manner, leadership could then study why the Patrol Bureau is logging delays from the time the call was dispatched to when the first officer arrived on the scene.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 – Beat Management Plan: Reconsider the BMP method of policing because the intended goals of leadership and community outreach are not being met, and the BMP emphasizes quantity over quality for activities. The requirement for officers to have five contacts with business owners over a six-‐month period should be evaluated to determine if it is actually fostering positive relationships within the business district. The BMP should allow officers to build relationships on a particular beat and view the outcomes of their work over time. 2.2 – BMP Goals: Revise the BMP to include the goals set forth in a Department-‐wide strategic plan. The goals should include the objectives developed in part by community residents and business owners in order to foster greater community involvement in policing efforts. 2.3 – Beat Assignments: Consider eliminating the practice of allowing officers to bid, on a seniority basis, their area of assignment for a year as this practice has resulted in less experienced officers assigned to more challenging areas of the City. Officers who are equipped with the necessary skills and abilities to address the challenging areas should mentor junior officers in patrol. 2.4 – Absence Policy: Develop a policy to manage beat vacancies and absences, and ensure consistency among patrol sergeants. A beat assignment policy would provide clarity and understanding among supervisors and officers. 2.5 – Continuous Coverage: Establish an early-‐ and late-‐car assignment system within the Patrol Bureau to allow coverage during shift changes and to respond to in-‐progress calls.

2.6 – Staffing Allocation and Overtime: Determine the appropriate allocation and deployment of patrol officers to avoid patrol beats going unstaffed. Address the challenges associated with the Bureau’s work under the burden of significantly high levels of required overtime. During our discussions with the Patrol Commander, we were told that an internal patrol staffing study was underway. Conduct a cost-‐benefit analysis of the current level of overtime expenditures. 2.7 – Patrol Supervision: Ensure there is sufficient supervision of patrol officers, including in-‐field supervision. Consideration should be given to having the support staff members take over administrative tasks now handled by these supervisors. 2.8 – Public Assistance: Enlist the public's help in addressing crime-‐related issues and the underlying causes of problems in the community to ensure the goals of the BMP and the Department's overall community policing philosophy are met. One approach to incorporating the public’s help is through crime mapping using CAD-‐acquired data. 2.9 – Community Meetings: Ensure the command staff is more visible in the community rather than leaving patrol officers with the responsibility of leading community meetings to quell the community’s anxiety over unsolved homicides. 2.10 – Performance Evaluations: Include an appraisal of behaviors and activities outside of the BMP numbers, such as rapport with the community, interpersonal skills in the work environment, interview skills, investigative skills, getting guns and drugs off the street, and developing sources of information.

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3 | INTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE BELLWETHER OF AGENCY PERFORMANCE Any police department’s internal affairs process is crucial to its performance. The internal affairs function reflects the ethics and integrity of the department’s personnel, from the Chief to the rank-‐and-‐ file. It builds confidence and trust between a department and its employees and augments its credibility with the community it protects and serves. INTERNAL AFFAIRS WORKLOAD, CASE REVIEW AND PROCEDURES Internal Affairs Responsibilities of the Administrative Commander The internal affairs process at the Department is under the direction of the Chief. The Administrative Commander serves this function and is responsible for administering an accountable, effective and transparent internal affairs process. This individual is entrusted with the confidentiality, content and security of the internal investigations system and oversees and investigates employee misconduct complaints whether they are serious, procedural or minor. The authority and accountability this position requires can be time intensive and challenging as the Administrative Commander needs to meet additional, unrelated responsibilities and assignments. He or she is also responsible for (1) managing special operations; (2) overseeing training, discipline, grievance, commendation and use of force actions and tracking administrative actions by keeping records and logs; (3) following up on pursuits and squad car crashes; (4) tracking and updating the directives manual; (5) preparing BPD’s budget; (6) supporting local emergency management response; and (6) serving as the Department’s 911 liaison. Some of these responsibilities are related to internal affairs, but others are separate from the function and may detract from the position’s requirements. Workload and Core Processes Per BPD Policy, supervisors, leadership and the Administrative Commander handle the internal affairs workload which consists of administrative and investigative authority, responsibility and process actions. Complaints are received from either external or internal sources. Initial duties by a supervisor include receipt and documentation of the complaint or allegation of misconduct against an employee. The supervisor receiving the complaint decides whether it represents serious, procedural or minor misconduct and then notifies the Administrative Commander and the Chief. The preliminary assessment process includes determining if required action for resolution of the complaint will occur through an informal inquiry, an internal investigation or a criminal investigation. An informal inquiry is handled through the chain of command. An internal investigation involving serious misconduct is handled by the Administrative Commander or his or her designee. If the alleged misconduct is criminal, the case is transferred to the Detective Bureau to open a criminal investigation. If additional resources are needed, the commander can request that internal officers or those from an outside agency conduct the investigation. BPD policy does not define guidelines on when to seek investigative assistance from external parties, only that the Chief has to approve the action.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

BPD policy requires supervisors to notify employees who are the subject(s) of a complaint as soon as reasonably possible, and if it is an internal investigation, the employee(s) must be provided with a written statement of the allegations against them and their rights and responsibilities. The investigator must ensure that the subject of the complaint is extended all rights afforded by the situation and understands any criminal charges and possible disciplinary action. The investigator provides a summarized report after the formal interview. Following the investigation, the investigator can assign the case one of the following adjudication classifications: unfounded, not sustained, sustained, exonerated and policy failure. Recommendations regarding the investigative outcome and sanctions are provided to the Chief and command staff by the Administrative Commander. Disposition and notification of outcome to the employee and the complainant are the final steps in the process. It is critical that all internal affairs investigations are fair, thorough and timely, and that the parties involved have confidence in the process. It was reported that internal affairs investigations cases have a different numbering system and are kept separately from the Department’s Records Management System (RMS). For each investigation, the unit commander initiates a case file and number based on year and order of receipt. The case folders are provided to the Administrative Commander. Per policy, the Administrative Commander tracks use of force incidents and discipline actions as part of his or her responsibilities relating to internal affairs outcomes and tracking. Use of force incidents are assigned a separate case number and that number is not included in the RMS system. Use of force incidents initially receive a Computer Aided Dispatch incident number, which is then paired with a use of force number. As demonstrated in Appendix E, Discipline history tracking is recorded by date and explains why the discipline was received. Recent changes require use of force case files to first be collated through support services, while discipline and internal affairs records are through the Patrol Commander and then all are provided to the Deputy Chief before being transferred to the Administrative Commander for oversight. It was reported that the change was necessary because files could not be located and information related to discipline, use of force reviews and internal affairs records were not recorded in the hard copy files provided to assessors to review while on BPD’s premises. Missing Information for 2013 Use of Force Incidents When reviewing the tracking reports for internal affairs investigations, use of force and discipline that we were provided, our assessors could not locate specific information. We learned that the entire 2013 use of force file used to generate reports was gone. The file may have been deleted accidentally, and it had to be recreated. Because the 2013 use of force data was deleted, the use of force incident summary reports from 2013 received by our assessment team had the header “reconstructed based upon available information.” This information is not only for internal use by the Department but is also compiled and made public each year on the City of Beloit Police Document Center website. This situation warrants further attention so there can be accountability and confidence in recording and tracking incidents as part of the recordkeeping function.

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Use of force incident summary report records only indicate the start date of the review, not when they were completed, which is important for timeline and reporting requirements. The records also do not record the date of the administrative review by leadership. On the use of force routing form, only the person conducting the review and the date are listed. Our assessors were unable to validate information about a specific 2013 use of force incident because the incident summary report did not indicate the level and type of discipline issued. Instead, under the findings column, it was recorded as acceptable, the action taken was noted as administrative review, and the discipline was listed as out of jurisdiction/off duty/reviewed by Rock County Sheriff’s Office. In another instance, our team attempted to validate a 2013 use of force incident with an internal investigation event, but the information could not be located in either report. In a third incident, discipline was issued to an officer but was not recorded in the 2013 discipline history report. THE BENEFITS OF AN EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEM One tool increasingly used by police departments is an electronic database that identifies officers exhibiting signs of repeated, troubling behavior. Often referred to as an early intervention system or an Early Warning System, the system involves entering into a database a set of identified variables to assist supervisors in identifying employees whose work-‐related behavior is considered to be at-‐risk and who may benefit from early intervention strategies, such as counseling and training, before misconduct occurs. This type of early warning system complies with CALEA 22.2.6; 35.1.9. BPD's discipline policy (3005.01.0) states, “Early identification of potential problem employees and a menu of remedial actions can increase agency accountability and offer employees a better opportunity to meet the agency’s values and mission statement. Therefore personnel ‘Early Warning System’ is used by the department” and policy (3015.02.05) also states, “The ‘Personnel Early Warning System’ is used to identify employees who may require agency intervention efforts.” It goes on to outline the responsibilities of the Chief, Deputy Chief, command staff and supervisors. BPD does not have or use such a system. Early warning systems are available in a variety of applications ranging from rule-‐based federated analysis to advanced analytic programs. These systems could be maintained by the Support Services section, whose personnel could enter information received from supervisors and command into the automated database. Types of information gathered could include, but are not limited to, the following: • • • • • • • • • •

Complaint reports Use of force cases Disciplinary action Counseling Use of sick days Performance evaluations Vehicle pursuits and traffic collisions Commendations and awards Arrests and charges against employees Civil and administrative claims and lawsuits

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

• • •

Assignment and rank history Training history and weapons qualifications Arrest reports, crime reports, citations, motor vehicle and pedestrian stops

For an Early Warning System to be effective, routine entries need to be put into the database. Reports should be generated regularly and shared with the Chief and other key staff members, who may discuss the data and take steps to address training needs and potential intervention counseling. Many police departments have the employee’s supervisor and command officer meet with the employee being evaluated to have a positive discussion that could lead to corrections in the employee’s behavior. These interactions can provide an opportunity for mentoring and, when handled properly, can increase the employee’s understanding of the Department’s expectations and boost morale. An Early Warning System can also be used to look at patterns of behavior, such as partnerships and units, which can be addressed with at-‐risk employees and used to develop proactive policing strategies. This information could also be provided to supervisors to help them better lead, manage and direct the actions of their officers and foster their role as leaders who are accountable for the Department’s operations. COMPLAINT PROCESS, INVESTIGATION AND NOTIFICATION Complaint Process BPD policy explains the steps of the complaint process from intake and initiation through investigation and final disposition. The process to file a complaint against an officer is posted on the Department’s website, and it provides information on how to reach a supervisor from each command. Complainants can contact BPD by telephone or in person. A supervisor is responsible for completing a standardized complaint form, but when reporting a serious allegation of employee misconduct, the complainant may be required to provide a written statement of the allegations. Action is taken on all complaints received, including those reported anonymously. After evaluating the complaint, the supervisor determines if an informal inquiry, internal investigation or criminal investigation will be conducted and what level of supervision is required to conduct the investigation. By policy the Administrative Commander should conduct investigations of alleged or suspected serious misconduct in which discipline could be an outcome, but in reality it is delegated to a supervisor. The Administrative Commander can also assign cases to others in leadership but is still responsible for overseeing the case. The employee’s supervisor usually serves as the investigator and makes the recommendations. The complaint process is initiated and notification of the employee occurs after the receiving supervisor documents the complaint and confirms receipt of the complaint with the complainant. The complainant is to be informed in writing of the outcome of the investigation; however, there are no guidelines as to how this should occur. The Administrative Commander said the complainant is typically told in person, which is meaningful when advancing community relationships.

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The timeframe between when an investigation is concluded and when the complainant is to be notified is not explained in the policy. Policy states that for lengthy investigations, an effort should be made to periodically communicate the status of the investigation to the complainant, but the policy does not explain how regularly the communication should occur. An officer who is the subject of a citizen complaint is to be notified of the complaint as soon as reasonably possible except in circumstances when doing so could jeopardize the investigation. The policy does not state whether the subject officer should be told in person or in writing. When there is an internal investigation, the subject officer is notified by a supervisor and is provided with a written statement of the allegations as well as the subject officer’s rights and responsibilities. The subject officer is notified when the investigation is complete and is told the outcome; however, the officer notification process is not explained fully in the policy. If discipline is issued, the administration of discipline serves as the notification. The Administrative Commander should maintain and track internal documentation that identifies the stages of the investigation. He or she should also schedule a file review for all investigative actions and responsibilities, including lead management, interviews and evidence tracking to assist with meeting policy requirements, identifying additional required action and tracking the complaint through adjudication to ensure prompt completion and that notification to the subject of the investigation and the complainant occurs. Some Department members expressed concerns about a form letter recently added to the internal affairs policy. The letter is to be used to notify a complainant about the results of an investigation regarding alleged misconduct of a member of BPD. The letter explains to the complainant that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation. However, it also states, “During the course of the investigation, it was determined that there were violations of Department rules and regulations, which were sustained, and the necessary disciplinary action has been taken by the Chief of Police.” Some officers perceive this letter to be a means for the Chief and the command staff to find a reason to discipline an officer once a complaint has been filed even if the allegation was not sustained. While, we concur that if extraneous policy violations are uncovered during an investigation they need to be appropriately dealt with, if these violations were extraneous to the complainant’s allegations then it is unnecessary and demoralizing to tell the complainant this additional information. A Common Best-‐Practice Approach to Structuring Internal Affairs It is widely recognized by many within the law enforcement profession that the two main purposes for a department-‐run internal affairs process are (1) to set a professional standard for the organization and (2) to change bad behavior. Organizations successful in reducing complaints against officers and holding personnel accountable for their behaviors have processes in place to involve rank-‐and-‐file staff in the receipt, response, investigation and adjudication of complaints.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

To illustrate the organizational value that comes from having a police department handle its own formal internal affairs process in a consistent fashion, Figure 1 outlines an internal affairs process model used by most law enforcement agencies. The process includes the following: •

A formal complaint is made to a police department or city employee, who then notifies his or her supervisor. The supervisor forwards the information to the internal affairs commander and notifies the chain of command.

•

After a review by the Internal Affairs Commander, if an investigation is warranted, the case is assigned, depending on the severity and type of complaint, to either an internal affairs investigator or returned to the officer’s commander for investigation.

•

The investigator completes a report outlining the results of the investigation.

•

The Internal Affairs Commander reviews the investigation. If the allegation appears to be sustainable, he or she has a discussion with the chief who routes the case to the appropriate command officer in the subject officer’s chain of command to make a disciplinary recommendation, which is routed through the officer’s chain of command to the chief. If the recommendation is for a suspension, the case is directed to the Disciplinary Review Committee (DRC) for review.

•

The decision of the DRC will be sent to the police chief for approval and implementation or forwarded to the Police and Fire Commission (depending on the severity of the discipline).

•

The officer is notified of the findings and disciplinary recommendation.

•

The complainant is notified of whether the case against the officer was sustained.

•

It is thorough, fair and objective for all parties involved – and includes the protection of due process rights for the subject officer.

•

It keeps the subject officer’s supervisor and chain of command informed of the details and circumstances of the incident. This ensures that proper training and ongoing supervision of the subject officer can occur, and it increases the likelihood that the officer will not engage in similar misconduct again.

•

It provides the command officers and supervisors with the opportunity and ability to lead the organization. It can reveal proactive steps that could have been taken to identify behaviors of concern before the incident occurred and a citizen complained. It also ensures that everyone in the department is aware of the organization’s high standards and what they must do to ensure they are met.

Although this complaint process may seem formal and labor-‐intensive, it represents an effective model in several respects.

Members of a law enforcement agency are more likely to support a department and its leaders when they know the internal affairs process is thorough, fair and objective – even when it leads to discipline.

Internal Affairs Process Model – Figure 1

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AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Internal Affairs Transparency Currently, the Department does not make use of a citizen review panel in the complaint process to ensure accountability to the community regarding complaints. There are several best practice models of citizen review that could be considered, including: a citizen review of the entire investigation; a limited citizen review involving a summary review of the investigation of actions determined by the Department; citizens and police serving together on an appeal board; or an independent citizen auditor who conducts a review of the process. Each of these models advances community relationships and transparency and should be considered when restructuring the review process. There is no BPD protocol governing the process if there are complaints and misconduct allegations that involve the Chief or the internal affairs officer. The policy only cites what actions will be taken if a complaint involves possible misconduct by the Deputy Chief or command staff. RECOMMENDATIONS 3.1 – Internal Affairs Unit: Create a dedicated Internal Affairs function that operates under the direction of a designated internal affairs leader, such as the Deputy Chief. Select two sergeants to serve on an as-‐ needed or rotating basis, and train them to conduct internal investigations. 3.2 – Accountability and Transparency: Establish a discipline matrix or guidelines of accepted practices and actions with clearly defined penalties for various types of violations to ensure consistency and transparency in determining appropriate discipline for all Department personnel. 3.3 – Disciplinary Review: Establish a Disciplinary Review Panel to facilitate positive collaboration and discussion among the Chief, command, the City Attorney, the Human Resources Department and supervisors about discipline cases before the final decision. 3.4 – Creation of Internal Affairs Policies: Create an internal affairs investigations policy and procedures guide that outlines the roles and responsibilities of supervisors and command as well as every step in the misconduct reporting, investigation, review and discipline process. 3.5 – Confidentiality of Investigations: Ensure that the information obtained during an investigation and the investigation process as a whole is kept confidential to maintain authority, accountability and continuity. 3.6 – Independent Investigations: Establish a policy that outlines when to use an independent agency to investigate alleged misconduct if a conflict of interest may be present or if a complaint is made against the Chief or an internal affairs officer. Recommendations emerging from the independent agency’s investigation should be provided to the City Manager and the Human Resources Department as well as the City Attorney. As a panel, they should review the recommendations and decide on a course of action to address the situation if the allegations are sustained. 3.7 – Missing Internal Investigation Data: Conduct an audit to reconcile the internal affairs tracking reports with the files to examine which reports actually exist.

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3.8 – Communication of Policy Violations to Complainant: Discontinue sharing findings unrelated to the complaint as is currently outlined in the form response letter used to inform the complainant of the status of the investigation. 3.9 – Internal Affairs Training: Ensure all supervisors and command officers receive appropriate training on the internal affairs process and their roles in advancing its effectiveness. 3.10 – Annual Internal Affairs Report: Provide annual reports on the internal affairs investigations to the City Manager and include the report findings in the Department’s annual report. 3.11 -‐ Early Warning System: Adopt an Early Warning System that can be used effectively in a positive and proactive manner to help at-‐risk Department members avoid misconduct incidents. 3.12 – Officer Recognition: Recognize on a regular basis positive conduct of officers both on and off duty to improve BPD’s reputation in the community as well as with recruiting efforts. This will increase morale and improve the organization’s culture. 3.13 – Job Audit: Conduct a job audit to assess the responsibilities of the Administrative Commander position to focus on those specifically related to internal affairs and to validate the scope of responsibility. The audit could also determine if BPD requires an appointed stand-‐alone internal affairs office and, if not, which command position should oversee the internal affairs process. 3.14 – Complaint Process: Clarify the steps of the complaint process and organize them into a simple diagram or discrete list to improve accountability, supervision and execution. 3.15 – Expansion of Complaint Process: Consider creating additional channels to receive complaints and make it easy for members of the public to voice their concerns. A website could be created through which a complainant can complete and submit the necessary forms. Complaints should also be accepted not only at the Department but also at any substation. Consider allowing individuals to submit complaints through the City Manager’s office because many may regard it as less intimidating than submission directly to the Department. 3.16 – Notification to Complainant: Establish a defined timeframe for notifying a complainant of the status of his or her complaint to maintain accountability for timely responses. Although policy states that for lengthy investigations an effort should be made to periodically communicate the status of the investigation to the complainant, there should be established intervals at which the complainant is notified and defined procedures regarding how that contact is to be made. 3.17 – Notification to Officer: Clarify the officer notification process in the policy, and specify precisely when the officer will be notified once the investigation has been completed. 3.18 – Citizen Review Panel: Consider establishing a citizen review panel as a key step in the complaint process to ensure accountability to the community.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

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4 | DISCIPLINE: THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVITY AND CONSISTENCY GUIDELINES FOR CONSISTENCY, APPROPRIATENESS AND TIMELINESS OF DISCIPLINE Consistency Challenges and Issues Disciplinary protocols and enforcement can have a significant impact on officer activity and morale. Unfortunately, the Department is not consistent in how it addresses discipline-‐related recommendations, determinations and final penalties. Although a command team meets to discuss serious cases, minutes are not taken and documentation of such meetings does not occur nor is there any explanation or reason provided for the disciplinary action decided upon. Although the Deputy Chief stated that he tried to look at previous disciplinary cases for similarities to make his recommendations to the Chief, he could not articulate how he went about doing this review. The command staff and the Deputy Chief admitted that they make their verbal recommendations during staff meetings, but ultimately the final decision is the Chief’s alone. There is no input from the City’s Human Resources Department or City Attorney in this process. Given how discipline is conducted and imposed, it appeared to our team that the Department could easily be challenged for failing to meet the statutory requirements for a fair and unbiased investigation. Many Department personnel and City officials stated that discipline is rarely extended to supervisors and never to command level and above. When the Deputy Chief was asked about discipline to supervisors and command, he stated that a sergeant was recently disciplined, but he could not recall any commander receiving discipline in the last few years. During our review we uncovered several

instances where some level of investigation and potentially discipline should have been considered regarding a command officer's behavior. Examples include: •

Inappropriate release of personal information of a suspect and victim of a sexual assault;

•

Demeaning and unprofessional statements and written correspondence to the commands of other police agencies;

• Failure to manage and safeguard evidence. The number of disciplinary actions in 2013 and 2014 were disproportionately high in relation to the number of officers in the Department.

Of BPD Officers Surveyed: •

73% feel that their commanders and the Chief discipline unfairly.

•

Only 50% clearly understand what type of behavior will result in discipline.

Determination of Discipline While BPD’s policy stipulates that the type of discipline chosen will be appropriate to the seriousness of the violation, both supervisors and officers need clarification and direction on how this is determined. There are few references to the command staff review panel in the discipline policy. All policies referencing discipline need clarification and alignment with the internal affairs policy so it is clear what command positions are on the panel. We could

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not find any guidelines explaining if a panel member needs to step down regarding a case due to a conflict. This is critical because the entire Internal Affairs function must have integrity for discipline to be fair and consistent. Although there are established timelines for use of force reviews and subsequent administrative reviews, many BPD personnel expressed concern about the timeliness of discipline. The policy acknowledges that extensions may be necessary due to extenuating circumstances, but a defined timeframe between the end of an investigation, the decision and the notification should be determined. We learned of one use of force incident in which the subject officer reported that they were not told an investigation was under way. An interview was not conducted with the officer, and the supervisor eventually received information from leadership that the officer would be disciplined. If there was an after-‐ action review but no investigation, notification should still have occurred and the review should have been conducted within the review timeframe. The incident was recorded in the use of force incident report, but it did not include reference to discipline issued. OBJECTIVITY IN THE APPLICATION OF DISCIPLINE While BPD employees said they were confused about how the decisions are reached regarding types of discipline, many also voiced concerns about what they consider a lack of objectivity in disciplinary decision making. General Order GO AD3000 sets forth investigation and disciplinary procedures and defines types of disciplinary actions and the administration of discipline. The policy also addresses emergency suspensions; use of the correction, disciplinary and commendation form; appeal procedures; and maintenance of

discipline records. It was reported that the policy is not always strictly followed and that leaders determine what type of discipline to issue on their own personal opinions, not on an established policy. There was also a perception among those interviewed that there was no objectivity when administering discipline to certain officers because they were “favored.” The role of first-‐line supervisors is important in the disciplinary process because they interact daily with their direct reports and are in a better position to observe their performance than anyone else. They are responsible for reinforcing the standards of professionalism. Per policy, “these supervisors shall make a recommendation to the Chief of Police, through the chain of command, as to the level of discipline they believes is appropriate in a disciplinary action involving an officer under their supervision.” The Administrative Commander who oversees the disciplinary process stated that instead of recommending discipline through the chain of command, sergeants should only document their findings. This conflicts with BPD policy. If sergeants are part of the process, their recommendations should also have consideration in the discipline decision. The progressive discipline practice is not adequately defined in the policy. There are statements in the administration of discipline section that discuss increasing levels of discipline for similar or persisting conduct, but it is not clear how that translates to a standardized method of application. Application of progressive discipline could be based more on the period of time that has elapsed between repeated or similar offenses rather than reoccurrence of offenses. However, using the amount of time elapsed between similar misconducts is not explained in the policy.

BPD maintains a spreadsheet, “Counseling and Disciplinary History File,” that provides a description of the violation, the complainant, the employee’s name, the investigator’s name, disposition and the date the discipline was issued. There is no policy that explains that this file is to be used to evaluate previous discipline as applied to similar current misconduct cases. If this is a tool that is expected to be referenced in disciplinary decision-‐making, there should be guidelines explaining how to use this as a matrix or progressive discipline resource. The Administrative Commander said command staff reviews this file when determining discipline and only command staff have access to it. It was reported that severity of discipline could increase from what command staff recommended to what the Chief issues. This creates a perception that the Chief increases discipline without explanation and has disregard for the recommendations. During an interview, the Administrative Commander was asked if the Chief increases discipline penalties after leadership has recommended a lesser level. The Administrative Commander stated that the Chief “mitigates rather than escalates” discipline. Since there are not formal notes or records from the command discussion, it is impossible to determine how much the Chief changes discipline. In one case, for example, we learned of a particular issue not referenced in the discipline history tracking report. Officers had responded to a violent incident and taken use of force action. After an outside agency conducted a review and ruled that the actions of the officers were justified, the Department meted out discipline for an equipment violation. Many perceived this punishment for the equipment violation to be unnecessary, and so untimely, it was believed to be added on just to have disciplinary action. It is important for leadership to remain objective when evaluating

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an officer’s response to a scene and an officer’s reaction to a complicated situation. DISCIPLINE AVOIDANCE Although the general perception among employees we interviewed was that discipline is punitive and excessive, many members of the Department also said that serious issues were often not pushed forward to the Police and Fire Commission. Most believed this was to hide incompetence. The patterns of counseling being used punitively and punishment of serious matters not pursued or negotiated below PFC review were examples of the Chief constricting the range of discipline and avoiding exposure to the PFC and public. In one situation, we were advised of the following acts by a single individual who ultimately was allowed to leave the agency, use accrued sick time under FMLA until it was exhausted, then retire. •

An individual attempted to turn in a gun that he said had been used in a homicide. This particular officer allegedly told the person that he could not accept it and that it should be returned to where it was taken from (allegedly, a felon who could not legally possess it) so that it could be retrieved using a warrant.

•

Assessors were told that the officer lied to the District Attorney about reports in a shooting investigation that the officer never completed. This caused discovery issues prohibiting the shooter from being charged. The suspect in this case subsequently shot someone else.

•

Additionally in this shooting, a surveillance video that the officer failed to place into evidence was subsequently lost.

•

While this officer was on sick leave his cases were transferred to another detective, who discovered that five banker boxes of

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evidence (original business records) were missing. These were never found. Command scheduled an administrative interview with the officer, but the officer arrived with his attorney, announced his retirement and refused to be interviewed. The Chief contacted the Human Resources Department and asked for advice on how to proceed with an internal investigation of the officer, which could not be conducted as the officer was no longer an employee. TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS IN DISCIPLINARY REVIEW PANEL PROCESSES Any time an investigation sustains a charge that could involve a higher degree of punishment – a three-‐day suspension or greater – the best practice is to have the investigation reviewed and a recommendation for any sanctions made by a disciplinary review panel. Currently, the Department requires command to meet and confer on discipline. This process lacks transparency and is viewed as a “rubber stamp” for the Chief. Disciplinary review panels usually include the commander responsible for the investigation; the agency’s remaining command staff as voting members; and representatives from the City’s Human Resources and Legal Departments. The panel conducts formal discussions on internal affairs investigations findings and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Chief. These recommendations take into account the circumstances of the case, the officer’s disciplinary and work history, and the discipline meted out in similar cases, all of which are discussed openly in the meeting. Typically, the commander of the subject officer submits the investigation for review, and the internal investigator presents the case to the panel. This is followed by a question-‐and-‐

answer session and a summary of the recommendation from the subject officer’s commander. If requested, the subject officer is permitted to make a statement to the panel, but the officer is not allowed to participate in or observe any other stages of the panel’s review. Finally, after the voting members of the panel have been sequestered for debate, they present a recommendation on discipline to the chief. The use of a discipline review panel yields many benefits to a police department: •

Increases internal support for and understanding of disciplinary decisions.

•

Focuses training on misconduct-‐related issues.

•

Provides an opportunity for the chief to take a leadership role in setting the standards for the conduct of the Department’s personnel.

THE DISCIPLINE MATRIX AS A BEST PRACTICE TOOL Although not in use at BPD, discipline matrices are used widely in law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions such as Tucson, Denver, Cincinnati and the states of Illinois and Washington.ii A discipline matrix functions as a benchmarking system that documents conduct categories, sets discipline levels and identifies sanctions and ranges of penalties. Similar and prior misconduct by other officers can be used for comparison, as can repeat misconduct by an officer. The matrix serves as a standard for command’s decision-‐making process and can define the steps for progressive discipline for multiple offenses, as well as establishing uniformity of consequences for different offenders. First-‐line supervisors and leadership can analyze and compare the source information before recommending and implementing discipline. The discipline process

itself can gain validity and bolster confidence among personnel and the public. A discipline matrix categorizes misconduct events by severity. Low-‐severity events might include coming in late to work or submitting a

RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 – Clarification on Discipline: Clarify for supervisors and officers how the type of discipline is determined to be appropriate for the seriousness of the violation. Document mitigating or aggravating actions and integrate these factors into the process when determining the severity of discipline. 4.2 – Notification Extension: Establish a more defined timeframe between the end of an investigation, the decision and the notification to the officer.

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report after a deadline. High-‐severity events might include an officer’s use of his credentials for personal gain or conduct unbecoming an officer, such as intoxication, public unruliness or egregious violations of policy involving behavior or force.

4.3 – Role of First-‐Line Supervisors: Ensure that the recommendations of the first-‐line supervisors are considered when the findings from an inquiry or investigation are provided. 4.4 – Counseling: Ensure that discipline is supplemented with guidance and counseling. 4.5 – Discipline Matrix: Use a discipline matrix (See Table 1 on the next page) to help guide BPD and City leaders when determining discipline for each individual, sustained misconduct case to ensure consistency and transparency in the disciplinary actions the Department takes.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Table 1. Sample Progressive Disciplinary Sentencing Matrix

Penalty level

Sentencing presumptions and prior record of sustained charges Infractions

Conviction for state-codified felony Aiding or abetting a criminal (conspiracy) Perjury (criminal or administrative hearing) Driving while intoxicated Chronic inefficiency or incompetence

DIS

—

Financial conflict of interest Unauthorized release of police intelligence Tampering with evidence (administrative)

RED 5+

DIS

—

Level 5 RED

Official inefficiency or incompetence Inefficiency or incompetence of superior officers Driving while intoxicated Drag racing

SUS 13-20

RED 5+

DIS

—

Level 4 SUS

Using excessive force Unauthorized strip/body cavity search Conviction for state-codified misdemeanor

SUS 10-12

SUS 13-15

RED 5+

DIS

—

Unlawful entry of home or business Unauthorized discharge of firearm Carrying unauthorized firearm or weapon

SUS 7-9

SUS 10-12

SUS 13-15

RED 5+

DIS

—

SUS 4-6

SUS 7-9

SUS 10-12

SUS 13-15

RED 5+

DIS

—

SUS 1-3

SUS 4-6

SUS 7-9

SUS 10-12

SUS 13-15

RED +5

DIS

—

Level 6 DIS

Unfit for duty Unauthorized release of prisoner Violation of pursuit policy Differential treatment Failing to answer subpoena Intoxicated while on duty Unauthorized disposition of police equipment Level 3 REP

Proffering derogatory references/demeanor Insubordination Failing to preserve crime scene

REP

SUS 1-3

SUS 4-6

SUS 7-9

SUS 10-12

SUS 13-15

RED +5

DIS

Level 2 WAR

Loss of city-issued equipment (except firearm) Feigning illness or injury/malingering Leaving assigned post/sector/zone Sleeping on duty

WAR

REP

SUS 1-3

SUS 4-6

SUS 7-9

SUS 10-12

RED +5

DIS

Level 1 COU

Proffering insolent language Accepting gifts and gratuities

COU

WAR

REP

SUS 1-3

SUS 4-6

SUS 7-9

RED +5

DIS

Improper wearing of department uniform Punctuality/tardiness

COU

WAR

REP

SUS

SUS 4-6

RED +5

DIS

Penalty levels COU = Counseling WAR = Warning notice REP = Written eprimand SUS = Suspension from duty RED = Reduction by a single rank for superior officers and detectives; + 5 days suspension from upper limit of previous grade for police officers DIS = Dismissal Multiple charges across penalty levels shall require the sentence to start at the beginning of the highest charge sustained

Principle of Endangerment Penalty Levels 1 and 2: Low risk of community harm and to department integrity Penalty Levels 3 and 4: Medium risk of community harm and to department integrity Penalty Levels 5 and 6: High risk of community harm, judicial and department integrity Merging charges and concurrent sentences shall be guided by the principle of endangerment

Downloaded from pqx.sagepub.com at JOHN JAY COLLEGE on January 24, 2012

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5 | INVESTIGATIONS: A CORE DEPARTMENTAL FOCUS INVESTIGATIONS WORKLOAD, CASE REVIEW AND PROCEDURES Organization and Staffing The authority for criminal investigations falls within the scope of the Detective Bureau. The Commander has a span of control of nine direct reports. The Detective Bureau includes five detectives (four permanent, one rotating); the Drug and Gang unit (one sergeant, two officers); a Child Maltreatment Officer; the Property and Evidence Manager; and a BPD officer assigned to the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. These positions report to the Detective Bureau Commander. A sergeant serves as a first-‐line chain of command reporting through the Commander but supervises only the two DAG officers. There currently is not a sergeant supervising the Detective Bureau. A detective sergeant is a critical position in the Detective Bureau as he or she is responsible for supervising the activities of the detectives and coordinating investigations. Additionally, a detective sergeant assists detectives with difficult and unusual investigations as well as manages administrative and case review matters pertaining to the operations of the Detective Bureau. The detective sergeant also conducts investigations but generally carries a smaller caseload due to the position’s administrative responsibilities. The five detectives in the Bureau are assigned to investigate homicides and deaths, shootings, armed robberies, sexual assaults, burglaries and substantial batteries. They also investigate theft, fraud, forgery, missing persons and other crimes. Detectives also carry an administrative caseload of employment backgrounds and licensing. Duties, Experience and Qualifications of the Commander According to the Detective Bureau Commander, his responsibilities include reviewing Watch Commander reports, all Patrol Bureau reports, assigning cases to detectives, and reviewing and approving detective reports via RMS. The specific reports he reviews and approves include the narrative and supplemental reports from the investigators. The Administration Commander also indicated that the Detective Bureau Commander serves as the SWAT Assistant Commander. According to policy, the Detective Bureau Commander’s responsibilities include supervising the Drug and Gang unit; assigning cold case and background investigations; overseeing the vice and organized crime control function; and administering the intelligence function, the security of covert intelligence files and the covert fund. The Commander also oversees the property and evidence function, serves as the media liaison and drafts press releases. There is no indication that the Commander oversees lead tracking or the progression of an investigation. When asked about the intelligence function, the Commander advised assessors that he has delegated this responsibility to the DAG supervisor. The team saw no evidence that the intelligence function is effectively utilized in BPD. The successful performance of these responsibilities should be based on prior experience and a clear understanding of the criminal investigations process. It would be extremely difficult for anyone who had not served as a criminal investigator to perform this challenging, high profile position and succeed

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

without training and mentoring. This command leadership challenge is further complicated by the absence of a first-‐line supervisor or lead detective to provide oversight or support to the detectives. The Detective Bureau Commander did not have any prior investigative experience, nor has he attended any meaningful investigative training in the two years he has held the position. The Chief reported to the assessment team that when considering the Administrative Commander again to take over the Detective Bureau, the Chief was aware that there had been complaints about this individual including that this commander “regularly disappeared” or was always gone for SWAT duties and training. As a result, the Chief opted to look at other commanders and selected the current Detective Bureau Commander instead despite his lack of investigative experience. Concerns were raised by Department staff about whether or not the commander had the appropriate level of experience and training as a criminal investigator. Based on this assessment, it was clear to the assessors that the Investigations Commander lacked the fundamental investigative knowledge required to be effective in commanding the Detective Bureau. A recurring theme in our interviews with members of this bureau was that the commander does not understand resource and time requirements to conduct and manage cases, and for a caseload comparison– and due to this, does not see a need for additional staffing. In our discussion with the Detective Commander, he stated he had numerous discussions with the Chief about staffing which were turned down, even after a staffing analysis was presented to the Chief. Members of this bureau also expressed doubt that the Department appropriately prioritizes investigations. It is critical that the individual in this position possess extensive experience and knowledge of investigations and be capable of serving as a strong advocate for the team with department leadership, criminal justice representatives and the public. Investigators should be comfortable that the supervisor can provide leadership, guidance and support to their investigations. The Need for Additional Resources and Accountability The investigations function should staff at least one sergeant in the chain of command for investigators to engage as an immediate supervisor and to act as a supplemental investigator during critical case investigations. The position would serve as a peer to the sergeant in the Drug and Gang Unit. Both sergeants should report to the Investigations Commander and would act as conduits between the two units to encourage more interaction and information sharing. The Department should also consider designating a lead detective to guide case response, information sharing and street outreach. Detective Unit Workloads The Detective Bureau has not investigated burglaries in the community over the past year since these cases are often displaced by investigations into more serious crimes. While every police department needs some latitude in balancing resources across property crimes and violent crimes, the public has the right to expect that burglary cases are being worked. Investigating burglaries can yield many broader benefits. For example, suspects arrested in a burglary may cooperate and provide information on other crimes in turn for consideration in their own cases. And the availability of accurate data on crime of all types can enhance crime pattern analysis, improve crime prevention, and lead to the successful closing of more investigative cases.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Until a rotating detective was assigned, there was little evidence that the Police Chief gave any consideration for additional detective staffing at the Bureau to handle the increasing workloads. In addition, cuts were made in 2012 that effected the staffing in investigations. Detectives are assigned and respond to incidents that are immediately occurring while high-‐priority active cases often remain pending. There is a perception that detectives go “from one crime to another” as cases continue to be added to their workload. We learned that some detectives are investigating between two and four homicides or attempted homicides at a time in addition to their other cases. There is no guidance from the commander or strategy for prioritizing the expanding caseloads. A review of open cases does not always provide an accurate picture because one case may require far more resources, time, and attention than others and each case is counted once regardless of its requirements. A problem-‐solving discussion between leadership and detectives to identify solutions for these concerns could serve as a first step toward an outcome that better serves the public’s interests. Workload and staffing issues are even more of a concern due to recent retirements and projected future losses. At the time of this report, it was not clear to remaining personnel the plan regarding replacements, how call outs will be determined with the shortage, and who will be re-‐assigned the retirees’ active and pending cases. As one way to help counter workload challenges, the commander could include the Child Maltreatment Officer as additional personnel to supplement on-‐going criminal investigations. Succession planning is important for effective investigative continuity. Several years ago, when the Department was cutting the budget, one of the positions it discontinued was the Detective Bureau’s secretary. Since then the detectives and the Drug and Gang unit have been operating without administrative support. This requires the commander, detectives and the Drug and Gang unit to perform administrative duties when they can better spend their time investigating crimes and conducting enforcement activities. Making Investigations an Attractive and Rewarding Responsibility According to the commander himself, the Detective Bureau was once a coveted assignment, but patrol officers now lack interest in doing criminal investigations. The commander who oversees this Bureau needs to be more actively engaged in seeking to change this mindset by promoting, for example, joint initiatives between the Patrol and Investigations units. These initiatives could provide patrol officers with further insight into detective activities. The Department needs to develop incentives to spark patrol officer interest in investigations. The assessment team learned that extensive overtime is spent on patrol officers. This may help explain why officers do not apply for jobs and assignments in criminal investigations. The specialty pay that detectives receive is viewed as an insignificant stipend by patrol officers, many of whom reported that there is no incentive to become a detective. Officers stated that the heavy workload of a detective, combined with the lack of financial incentives and the perception that leadership does not care about investigations, makes it an undesirable position. During our review, the Detective Commander reported his proposals for additional detectives, potential financial and other incentives that were denied by the Chief.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Case Assignment and Follow-‐Up Investigative caseloads for detectives include each having responsibility for from two to four homicide cases. The general investigations case selection process is often driven by situations that arise during patrol operations. When an incident occurs, the decision to initiate a follow-‐up investigation is typically made by the patrol sergeant on duty based on the circumstance and patrol resources. Incidents – including homicides, shootings where a victim is shot, armed robberies and thefts of more than $10,000 – are immediately sent for follow-‐up by the Detective Bureau. In some instances, a patrol sergeant contacts the Investigations Commander to call attention to a case that he or she wants investigated. The commander reviews report incidents that the sergeant decides will not be followed up on by Patrol. The matter can be sent back to the sergeant for follow-‐up when there may be links to events on other shifts. The Patrol Commander can also weigh in on these decisions. The commander said that when he reviews Watch Commander reports to determine whether or not to assign follow up to the Detective Bureau, he relies on his memory to identify similar past incidents. If there is a connection to a current case the commander may assign a detective. The commander noted there are no written criteria for the types of cases the Detective Bureau will work, but he assigns cases based on seriousness and potential public endangerment. He indicated that this decision is sometimes just a coin flip, based on availability. Several members of the Detective Bureau confirmed that case assignment by the commander is not based on criteria or practices communicated to detectives. BPD policy requires that “personnel will be assigned to the investigation of cases, whenever possible, on the basis of expertise. Examples of this would include officers with special training or experience in the investigation of arsons, death investigations, sexual assaults, armed robbery or vehicle thefts.” Policy also outlines the criteria for assigning cases for follow-‐up investigation, including factors such as the officer’s experience with similar cases, leads and amount of property loss. We learned, however, that these guidelines are not necessarily followed, and that cases are not always assigned to the individual with the most appropriate skillset and experience. Engagement of Commander in Investigative Operations Other than case assignment, the commander does not reportedly provide much direction on issues such as the development of leads or the sequencing of criminal investigative phases. One individual stated that the commander periodically checks with detectives about case status. But the commander apparently rarely supports the detectives by coming out to supervise or assist them on investigation call-‐ outs to crime scenes despite the fact that doing so would expand the investigative team for that incident and also provide the commander with an opportunity to learn more about the investigative process. The commander’s disinterest and lack of engagement is discouraging to the detectives working these crimes. Our assessors were told by the commander himself that he “did not want” the position but was ordered to assume it by the Chief. It is widely perceived that the commander is not interested in hearing about “issues” or how the investigators are managing their cases. He reportedly sits in his office at his computer for extended periods of time, during which he often does not answer his desk phone, turns the ringer off and has his calls forwarded to the detectives.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

With no experience with the investigative process, the commander cannot accurately assess the extent of investigatory requirements to thoroughly conduct cases. Also, the commander has no first-‐hand familiarity assessing timeframes required to perform investigative responsibilities or deciding which specific tasks need follow-‐up. It would be difficult for any commander to assign additional cases to an investigator without a clear understanding of how much time it takes on average to, for example, investigate a homicide, review a crime scene, create photo arrays, or write and obtain court documents for search and arrest warrants. The commander advised assessors that he reviews and approves reports submitted through the RMS system. Our review of the system entries, however, confirmed that the commander appears to have merely checked the boxes so the investigations could be processed in the records management system. Assessors saw no evidence of review or oversight in the form of comments, questions or tasking to the detectives for follow-‐up, which is common in case review. The commander further advised he does not receive a printout of the complete case for review before the detective presents it to the District Attorney’s office – and that he does not need to because he is aware of the details of the case through his individual review of reports. It is important to note that RMS also has reports from other agencies, such as the crime lab and coroner’s office, which the commander may not review. Again we saw no evidence of the commander’s critical review if he is not processing the whole case file. These additional reports provide supplementary case analysis and information important to a more complete understanding of the criminal investigation. Two Important Guidance Documents We suggest that the Department review two guidance documents to improve its approach to investigations. •

The first document, “Homicide Process Mapping: Best Practices for Increasing Homicide Clearances,” published by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice details effective investigative practices based on a review of jurisdictions with high clearance rates.

•

The second document, “10 Things Law Enforcement Executives Can Do to Positively Impact Investigation Outcomes” published by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in conjunction with the International Association of Chiefs of Police, focuses on the administrative environment necessary to support successful homicide investigative outcomes. This document also includes 10 recommendations as well as sample checklists for homicide investigations. While both of these are focused on homicide investigations, they can provide BPD with assistance in effectively managing investigations.

Policy Integration Policies related to criminal investigations, investigator best practices, informants, vice control, intelligence, handling covert funds and background investigation are treated separately in the BPD policy manual. Given their interdependency, however, these areas should be addressed in one comprehensive policy. Both Detective Bureau and Drug and Gang unit should be included in this policy and be tasked with following the same procedures, including a joint intelligence function. The

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Department should also consider engaging third-‐party inputs on policy from outside agencies, such as state and federal prosecutors and law enforcement agencies as well as local criminal justice agencies. Background Investigations Background investigations to advance the selection process for police officer candidates are assigned by the commander. Detectives usually conduct these investigations while maintaining a large criminal investigation caseload. At the conclusion of a background investigation, detectives are not permitted to present concerns or recommendations about the police officer candidates. The Detective Bureau is also required to investigate liquor license agents, operator licenses, and door-‐ to-‐door sales and pawn shop licensees; however, the Commander simply provides a criminal history and recommendations to approve or deny these licenses. Additionally, renewal inspections for establishments serving liquor are conducted by patrol officers whose only instruction on this process is an outdated checklist. Background investigations can take time away from more pressing cases. The commander indicated that this was a concern in that background investigations require several interviews and sometimes out-‐of-‐town travel. BPD leadership needs to recognize this issue and find alternate solutions when other crimes take precedence. One tactic, as some agencies have found, is to hire retired law enforcement officers as part-‐time employees or refer the out-‐of-‐town leads to local law enforcement agencies whenever possible. Sexual Assault Investigations Patrol officers conduct the initial BPD response to sexual assault incidents, including preliminary and follow-‐up investigations. Patrol sergeants request the support of detectives, when circumstances warrant. We are not aware of any criteria as to whether patrol or detectives investigate the incident. If patrol officers are the ones responding and are expected to investigate these assaults then leadership must require and provide adequate investigative training to properly address these crimes and render assistance to the victims through social services. In addition, an outside agency reported concerns it received from its clients that they did not understand why patrol officers investigate these crimes instead of detectives. Child Maltreatment Officer Law enforcement becomes involved in child abuse, sexual abuse or neglect of a minor either by referral or a direct call for service. BPD is a mandatory reporter of actual or suspected child abuse or neglect. The role of Child Maltreatment Officer is considered to be a specialty assignment although it is not a listed position in the specialized assignments policy. The child maltreatment policy discusses procedures, not specific performance-‐ and skill-‐based requirements for the position. Once a child maltreatment incident occurs, child protective services notify either the commander or officer. The commander assigns the case to the Child Maltreatment Officer through the RMS system. The Child Maltreatment Officer is not a detective and does not engage or provide assistance or support to other detectives. The officer appears to work independently within the investigations command.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

It was also reported that no BPD supervisor, including the current one, has any child maltreatment experience to provide oversight in these investigations. Through the Rock County Child Advocacy Center, the District Attorney’s office and Child Protective Services investigators provide assistance. Two previous, experienced Child Maltreatment Officers are in investigations and can provide assistance, insight and serve as backup to this position if required. One outside agency commented that the Child Maltreatment Officer has a good working relationship with outside criminal and social justice agencies and engages an inter-‐disciplinary, team-‐based approach to these special types of crimes. Training for officers in this position is sufficient and ongoing – and requests for training are approved and supported by command. However, it was reported that there are situations when patrol officers are initially dispatched to investigate allegations of sexual abuse against children instead of the detective assigned and trained on the appropriate protocols. This is in violation of the agreed-‐upon multi-‐jurisdictional child advocacy center protocols and national best practices. BPD patrol officers are not sufficiently prepared to investigate these types of crimes. These investigations require the response of an officer trained in child maltreatment protocols. Drug and Gang Unit The mission of this unit is to investigate street-‐level narcotics trafficking and illegal street gang activities and support community education in these two key areas. The unit includes a vice and organized crime control function. Officers report through a sergeant to the Investigations Commander. In addition to one sergeant, current staffing for the unit includes three officer positions, one of which is currently vacant. A BPD officer assigned to the FBI Safe Streets Task Force reports directly to the DAG supervisor. We learned that the task force officer’s interaction with the sergeant is positive and effective – in great measure because the task officer shares intelligence and operational activities with the sergeant proactively, on a regular basis. Some officers in this unit also serve in ancillary roles with the SWAT Unit. Command staff explained that while communication exists between the sergeant and the commander, the unit largely operates on its own with no meaningful case oversight by the commander. This further illustrates the risks inherent in operations overseen by a commander with insufficient training and experience in investigations. The unit is migrating away from an approach concentrating on uniformed traffic and “Terry stops” to one that places a higher emphasis on activities such as plain-‐clothed and covert vehicle surveillance on suspected drug and gang activities. In line with this new priority, work hours now start at mid-‐day depending on operational requirements. Overtime for the unit is available through the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force. This new direction is intended, in part, to attract patrol officers to the unit. The approach has merit since a change in work hours would appeal to officers who want regular hours but shifts are unpredictable for this type of work. The sergeant reviews reports and paperwork from the team and then forwards electronic reports to the commander for review and approval through the Records Management System. The sergeant keeps unit enforcement statistics, covert fund expenditure tracking and confidential source files separate from the RMS system.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

Patrol officers complete an intelligence form when they receive information. These forms are sent to and kept in covert intelligence files in the Drug and Gang unit, which operates an “intelligence” database and a confidential informant file. The intelligence database contains complaints regarding organized crime and narcotics and gang activities and information from officers submitted on an intelligence information form. The intelligence file is currently kept on a shared network drive with access limited to the DAG unit, the task force officer and the commander. The file contains very valuable information to support investigations, but the information is not available to or shared with the detectives. The database consists of a file folder on the shared drive and contains more than 10,000 word files dating back to 2002. These files are labeled by address or suspect name. Because of the way the files are kept, they are not easily subject to query, analysis and review. The files also have limited utility since there is no easy way to link addresses, incidents or offenders except by memory. Information is not placed into the records system until the case is ready for prosecution. There is a concerted effort through support services to migrate these intelligence records to a separate component in the system for continuity and uniformity of information storage. Once incorporated into the RMS system, the information can be separated and secured from other operational data in the RMS database. Reports and information will be easier to access and manipulate for search purposes. Recently the DAG unit has begun investigating heroin overdose deaths in addition to other overdose cases. DAG does not have any training in death investigations at this time. This represents an opportunity for the Detective Bureau and DAG to combine their investigative strengths to identify who provided the heroin to the victim. Training opportunities are available and approved for this unit on a variety of job-‐related topics. DAG was also assigned to investigate recent shooting cases, which the commander justified. These additional assignments take time away from the DAG Unit’s primary responsibilities and may have contributed to the decline in the unit’s productivity in 2014. In 2014, DAG made only 55 arrests, which compares unfavorably with its 162 arrests in the prior year. This year’s results included 18 search warrants, 14 “knock-‐and-‐talk” sessions, eight presentations at community meetings, and 56 controlled buys. The unit made only four arrests related to gang enforcement that year compared to its goal of 50. The team seized 11 firearms and made nine firearm-‐ related arrests. This area of emphasis should be re-‐evaluated either through strategic changes (which are being initiated) or lowering the goal to a number more reasonably attainable given the size of the unit. Both the DAG unit and the Detective Bureau make regular public presentations regarding gang awareness, alcohol and tobacco sales awareness, and crime prevention and awareness. Confidential Informant Official Advance Funds Official Advance Funds are monetary rewards, also known in BPD as Covert Funds. Official Advance Funds are important to any covert investigative unit for covert purchases but especially to maintain a viable informant program. Investigators pay informants for information about criminal activities from agency funds. It is therefore essential that these funds are properly controlled and accounted for. BPD, however, does not have sufficient supervision and controls in place. Our review demonstrated that the simple controls in place to document the use of these funds were inadequate to demonstrate the integrity of the process. Informants were not required to sign a receipt for the funds received nor are

REFORM AND RENEWAL

there regular audits of these funds by command. During the preparation for the recent CALEA Audit, the failure to audit funds was discovered and instead of rectifying the situation and conducting an audit of the funds to come into compliance with policy and best practice the policy was changed to reflect a simple review of the funds by the supervisor. In another example of the lax use of a fund which should be tightly controlled, it was reported that the Administrative Commander takes money from covert funds for purchases that would be legitimate using petty cash, but not OAF, and later replaces those funds with petty cash money. Evidence Tracking There are concerns about the lack of controls in place for tracking and accountability with regard to evidence maintenance at BPD. We saw no proof of audits or adequate controls. There is also concern that evidence determined to be missing in 2014 did not result in a full follow-‐up audit. The Detective Commander reported that he requested audits and was denied funding to do so by the Chief. Without additional follow-‐up of this evidence, to include an inspection or an audit as well as protocols and procedures surrounding evidence, there is no way to know if all evidence is accounted for. OUTCOME FOLLOW-‐UP, CIS AND CRIME SOLVING Strong community relationships are one of the keys to solving homicides. Developing strong relationships with the community is not solely the detectives’ responsibility – it is the responsibility of all members of the Department. BPD leadership needs to engage in a consistent, long-‐term approach toward developing trust in the community. That relationship should include a communication plan to manage community expectations about the progress and results of homicide investigations and other violent crimes. Investigators must appreciate their important role in the community policing initiative as they walk the streets for information. In particular, the Department should provide the community with a general understanding of the basics of the investigative process to manage expectations about what can and cannot be accomplished. When tension and anxiety permeate the community, as they have during the recent murders and shootings, community residents and business owners want to see and hear from someone in authority who can effectively communicate what is being done about the violence and disorder and how they can help. Both detectives and the DAG unit participate in town hall and community meetings as well as public events organized by the City. The DAG unit and the detectives provide awareness presentations about gangs, public alcohol and tobacco sales and crime prevention. A crime analysis capability can be very beneficial in the investigative process. Like the Patrol Bureau, the Detective Bureau does not usually use crime analysis capabilities nor has there been any direction from

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

command staff on the availability of department resources. It was reported that some personnel have seen crime maps posted on the Department walls. More recently, some progress has been made by a detective on their own initiative, conducting an analysis of addresses that have been burglarized. As a result there has been some success in identifying burglary patterns across the city. A strong crime analysis capability can guide and refine prioritization of cases and resource allocation. It can also provide actionable insights into some types of crime by time-‐of-‐day and day-‐of-‐week. Crime analysis can provide information for the development of a strategy towards DAG unit enforcement activities including the gang affiliation of targets, level of violations and locations of occurrences. The Investigations Bureau should take advantage of crime analysis tools and assistance from the Wisconsin Statewide Information Center (WSIC), the Rock Co. Sheriff’s Office, and even local resources working in partnership with Beloit College to examine crime patterns as well as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) intelligence center. While quarterly reports, which list the status of cases assigned to each detective and other enforcement activities, are compiled by the commander, the reports are not used to measure the overall performance of the investigative function. For example, the commander does not attempt to calculate clearance rates, claiming that they will be misunderstood by the public and news media. While clearance rates should not be the only measure of an investigative unit, the number of cases assigned, the number of cases closed, and how these cases were closed should be collected and aggregated to assist in measuring the performance of the Bureau. REPORT QUALITY, TIMELINESS AND MANAGEMENT REVIEW Homicide investigations can be challenging and complex and require effective communication with the community. Officers responding to a crime must assess the situation, protect the crime scene, monitor the area, detain witnesses who may have knowledge or involvement, and examine the area for potential evidence related to the crime. The criminal investigation policy focuses on providing guidance for the officers initially responding to and assessing the scene before detectives arrive. Responding patrol officers receive little guidance or training on identifying potential witnesses and bystanders and safeguarding additional evidence that could make the difference in solving the crime.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Our review of sampled cases revealed that in some instances the identity and contact information of possible witnesses or bystanders initially at the scene were not captured in reports. Individuals interviewed at the scene could have been asked more specific questions about what they saw or heard. BPD leaders need to clarify whether first responding officers should conduct the preliminary investigation or safeguard the scene. Information documented by first responding officers at a scene can be extremely valuable for the investigation. If training is an issue, then the Department should either provide preliminary investigative guidance during in-‐service training or have detectives team up with patrol as BPD’s initial response to a scene. A cohesive, integrated approach to solving crime would also build a closer relationship between patrol and investigations and serve the community more effectively. We noted that officers do not always complete the RMS’s “Person Supplement Report”. As a result, previously entered information about a person will not be included in a search. The absence of such information presents an officer safety issue when all the information about a suspect entered into the system cannot be retrieved from the search. The Detective Commander needs to more closely understand and examine how this is occurring and where the errors are occurring. Assessors did not identify any lead-‐tracking process used by the Department. The development of a manual tracking capability or an investigative leads management component to the RMS system would greatly assist with lead tracking and management. Leads documented as part of each case can determine additional actions. In an automated system the leads are tracked from time of entry and can record whether the lead was effectively investigated with a documented outcome or still in pending or open status. Documented lead tracking would also enhance both investigator and supervisor review of case management. Case details as the lead information is tracked would be available and any unresolved leads would be identified for future action. INTERNAL INFORMATION SHARING AND UNIT COORDINATION Detective Bureau and the Drug and Gang Unit The Detective Bureau and the DAG unit support one another in key regards. DAG does the operational plans and conducts tactical response for detective high-‐risk arrest warrants. DAG also interacts with the community to develop leads or provide information from the street for detective investigations. Leadership needs to encourage personnel in both units to discuss and share intelligence as well as case activities in order to avoid conflicts with any overlapping suspect, victim, evidence, modus operandi and informant activities that others in the bureau are working. Until recently, regular meetings to share information about active cases within investigations did not occur and detectives were not aware of the status and details of other detective active cases. In fact, detectives indicated that they are rarely aware of the Drug and Gang Unit’s activities. Recent efforts, such as the February 2015 meeting between the Bureau and DAG Unit, should continue in order to cultivate collaboration and increase situational awareness of ongoing investigative efforts. Several Department personnel indicated that the intelligence function within DAG was not accessible to detectives. The assessment outcome is an opportunity to evaluate the intelligence process so both

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

groups have the same access to reports and intelligence. Informants should be developed in the same manner and both groups need to employ the same reporting and payments procedures. Also, informants should be shared if possible since information provided by confidential sources will often include intelligence about guns, gangs, drugs and an array of criminal activities. On the flip side, DAG will have access to detective reports in the RMS system to review the current status of enforcement activities. Another opportunity for collaboration is for detectives to provide surveillance in support of DAG proactive enforcement. With these types of interactions, combined staffing can support a greater amount of proactive enforcement, intelligence gathering and crime solving. The Drug and Gang Unit and FBI Task Force Detectives work well with the BPD representatives on the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. Assessors learned that the two functions operate well together and are prepared to support each other in investigative activities. For example, detectives use the DAG unit for arrest warrants. There are times when the task force invites the detectives to meetings with the U.S. Attorney's Office. The detectives attend this meeting hoping to uncover information provided from cooperating individuals that might be helpful for solving other crimes. The DAG unit and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force have shared objectives with their investigative processes and work closely together with planned activities. There is usually daily operational communications between the DAG sergeant and the BPD officer assigned to the task force, according to information reported to assessors. The task force has access to the DAG database through the BPD assigned officer. This officer serves as the conduit between the two entities so information flow is a mutual approach because the task force itself is interconnected through various federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Both groups could be investigating the same narcotics dealers or street gang activities. An officer safety issue could arise if investigative efforts and proactive enforcement activity is not discussed and coordinated. As previously reported, DAG has had an Excel spreadsheet intelligence database since 2002. The detectives have no access to that database for developing informants or assessing whether subjects in the system could provide information about general criminal activities and possible suspects in pending cases. This is an area that needs to be addressed so that all of Investigations has access to this information when needed. It is also an opportunity to build stronger working ties between the two groups. Detectives and Child Maltreatment Officer As reported previously in the Investigations section, the Child Maltreatment Officer is not a detective and does not engage or provide assistance and support to other detectives in their investigations. The officer usually works independently within the Investigations command. The detectives and the Child Maltreatment Officer should rely on one another as additional staffing. Two detectives are retiring and it would be operationally effective to engage the Child Maltreatment Officer as an additional body in training status for eventual investigative work.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 – Knowledge of Investigations: Ensure that the Commander of the Detective Bureau has served as an investigator and has an investigations background. 5.2 – Guidance, Direction and Active Role: Have the Detective Commander take a much more active role in cases and direct, supervise and guide the progression of investigations. The commander should support the detectives by coming out to crime scenes to act as an additional resource when appropriate; by learning more about the unit’s capacity, investigative process and practices; and by identifying opportunities for professional development of investigative skills and abilities for themselves and the unit. 5.3 – Staffing: Employ additional staffing to effectively address criminal investigations and violent crimes in the city. Add an additional first-‐line supervisor in the command staff as a detective sergeant supporting both the Detective Bureau and DAG. Reinstate the administrative secretary position so that detectives who engage in administrative tasks can be used more effectively to follow up on leads, interview witnesses and engage in other investigative activities. 5.4 – Case Assignment Protocols: Define these more clearly – beyond a brief and general reference in the Department’s policy – and ensure they are consistently followed. 5.5 – Case Classification: Have the commander define the criteria in the policy that determine whether or not the case should be classified as active. He will also gain value discussing the case assignment process with detectives and seeking their input. 5.6 – Case Workload and Review: Have the Detective Commander provide guidance for prioritizing case workload and accurately assess the time requirements to thoroughly conduct cases or determine timeframes required to perform investigative responsibilities. A strategic approach is necessary so burglaries can be investigated as well as other crimes. Establish a strong crime analysis capability to guide and refine prioritization of cases and resource allocation. Conduct case review at specific intervals throughout the lifecycle of the case at a pre-‐determined file review schedule to ensure all leads have been exhausted or addressed and that necessary investigative actions have been taken. 5.7 – Supervision and Case Management: Ensure that individuals new to investigations or who do not have the training or expertise are not assigned cases they are not prepared for or skilled to investigate. 5.8 – Evaluation of DAG Unit: Conduct an analysis of the DAG Unit’s operational efficiency and return on investment. Define a strategic plan for the unit, including unit and individual goals, to help set direction, clarify priorities and target specific operational efficiency outcomes. 5.9 – Evidence Management, Inspections and Audits: Initiate a 100 percent inventory of all evidence and implement an appropriate schedule for both annual and unannounced inspections and inventory audits. Establish stronger controls over tracking and assuring accountability in maintaining property and evidence.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

5.10 – Management of Informants: Ensure that both the Bureau and the DAG unit develop informants in the same manner and employ the same reporting and payments procedures. Also information from informants should be shared whenever possible since information provided by confidential sources will often include intelligence about guns, gangs, drugs and an array of criminal activities. Also establish the proper controls to hold officers, detectives and supervisors accountable for confidential informant funds. 5.11 – Critical Data Entry into RMS System: Require and validate that officers always complete the RMS’s “Person Supplement Report” to help preserve officer safety and streamline cross-‐functional synergies and efficiencies. 5.12 – Lead-‐Tracking System: Create or establish a lead-‐tracking process to enhance both investigator and supervisor review of case management. Case details as the lead information is tracked would be available and any unresolved leads would be identified for future action. 5.13 – Internal and External Communication: Convene a collaborative discussion between the Commander and detectives about establishing an effective case assignment approach. 5.14 – Relationship with the Community: Improve the unit’s relationship with the community in order to have witnesses willing to cooperate with the detectives. 5.15 – Resource Allocation: Reassess the assignment of background investigations to determine if they can be assigned elsewhere, outsourced or handled by part-‐time investigators. 5.16 – Investigative Succession Planning: Create a pool of trained detectives for succession planning that can build on one another’s capabilities. Establish the Child Maltreatment Officer position as a permanent detective position. Have other detectives who are already trained in forensic interviewing and have served as previous Child Maltreatment Officers supplement these responsibilities when necessary. 5.17 – Performance Measurement: Institute a formal process to measure the performance of the Bureau. In addition to clearance rates, use metrics such as number of cases assigned, number of cases closed and how these cases were closed.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

6 | SPECIAL OPERATIONS: TACTICAL RESPONSE AND EXPERTISE OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS Officers who primarily serve in the Patrol or Investigations units have the ability to be selected to join Special Operations in an ancillary position. Special Operations is made up of specialized assignments: SWAT, Evidence Tech and Emergency Management. The Crisis Negotiation unit is organizationally under the Detective Bureau, although the Detective Bureau Commander was reportedly not informed this was his responsibility and in turn, he and other department personnel believed the Crisis Negotiation unit was the responsibility of the Administrative Commander over Special Operations. In these roles, officers are tasked with performing high-‐risk and special tactical missions and may be deployed as evidence technicians to crime scenes and incidents for collecting and processing evidence. Before their first Special Operation assignment, officers receive initial training on the special equipment and protocols. According to the Administrative Commander, the SWAT unit receives additional training on an average of two days per month, with one week additional training per year. The Administrative Commander is responsible for oversight of the Special Operations unit in addition to his duties related to internal affairs, discipline, training and administration. According to Department policy AD0400, the Chief and leadership staff review specialty assignments annually. However, our assessment team found that a general Department perception is that the selection process is not based on credentials, but more so on the personal relationship the candidate has with the Chief and leadership staff.

Since this is an ancillary position, officers are under the leadership of both their regular commander and the Administrative Commander, which often causes confusion. If the commanders do not communicate with one another, officers are often assigned to two assignments at the same time, thus leaving one uncovered. When critical incidents or active threats occur, current policy provides guidance for employing tactical operations, crisis negotiations, crisis management and other relevant areas. While this policy helps establish a Departmental approach for coordination and consistency, further guidance is needed in order to effectively and consistently deploy the SWAT unit on high-‐risk activities within the Department. Our assessment revealed that BPD does not currently have a SWAT deployment matrix. The Administrative Commander submitted two proposals for one but stated that neither was approved by the Chief. The Administrative Commander said BPD works collaboratively with a number of area tactical teams. Memorandums of Understanding with agencies exist for tactical and explosive ordnance disposal support and these agreements have been exercised over the years. The Administrative Commander also advised that in 2010, the BPD SWAT unit was presented with a State of Wisconsin SWAT Team of the Year award for hostage rescue in a mutual aid situation.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONCERNS RAISED BY SWAT AND CRISIS NEGOTIATION PERSONNEL During interviews, many questions were raised by BPD personnel about the SWAT assignments, which are overseen by the Administrative Commander, and how this unit is seen as being mismanaged and suffers from low morale and mistrust. In addition, those interviewed said the Chief provides little fiscal oversight for these units. After speaking with members of SWAT and the Crisis Negotiation Unit, our assessment team discovered many common themes: •

SWAT and Crisis Negotiation units do not train together on a regular basis and SWAT trainers and Crisis Negotiation sergeants have complained about this for several years, but the Administrative and Detective Commanders fail to address the rationale or provide any corrective action, perhaps due to the confusion by the Detective Commander that he is responsible for the Crisis Negotiation unit.

•

The SWAT unit trains two days per month. Without an explanation or proper notification, the commander frequently cancels scheduled training days. It was reported that although the commander tells personnel he is at tactical training two days per month, he has only shown up twice in two years.

•

SWAT members have repeatedly requested that the commander add target-‐specific directed fire drills to the training schedule. The commander reportedly told the unit that, “the Chief doesn’t believe in it.” SWAT members, however, said they believed that the commander did not discuss this type of training with the Chief.

•

Training for less lethal, chemical and extraction devices was reportedly cancelled and qualification was completed only

annually, instead of semi-‐annually as required. However, it was reported that there was not annual training in 2014, and therefore done quickly in February 2015 prior to CALEA’s arrival in order to be compliant. THE HIGH COSTS OF SWAT AND THE NEED FOR COST ANALYSIS During interviews, we realized that there is a perception that SWAT is an extremely high-‐cost unit and many Department members question its effectiveness. SWAT should be highly trained and well equipped, and a tour of the team’s storage facility, commonly referred to as “The Barn,” displayed an impressive array of weapons, communications equipment and command and urban assault vehicles. It is clear that these items are very costly and, when speaking with leadership, it was reported that funding for ancillary assignments is generally approved by the City Council. Monies received from Homeland Security grants were spent on specialty unit communication equipment, radios, and equipment and training. Leadership also told our assessment team about an armored rescue vehicle that was purchased by BPD but shared through a Memorandum of Understanding with two other agencies, the Janesville Police Department and the Rock County Sheriff’s Department. These departments also provide funds through an asset forfeiture cost-‐sharing program as part of City Council’s directive to collaborate with area partners. Department policy requires an annual cost-‐ benefit analysis of SWAT to be conducted; however, such an analysis has never taken place. The assessment team found that, on average, BPD spends from $20,000 to $25,000 annually, not including overtime, on tactical equipment, ammunition, and chemical or less-‐

lethal munitions specific to tactical operations. We also found that the average cost of tactical unit deployment ranges from $2,500 to $4,000 for 4 to 6 hours, which includes the entire unit and its shift replacements. In addition, it was reported that an 8-‐hour SWAT training day every month costs patrol $3,000 to back fill those officers, which exceeds $50,000 annually. SCOPE AND FREQUENCY OF SWAT DEPLOYMENT BPD was unable to provide a timeframe for actual individual deployment hours per event; however, leadership compared these costs with the evidence technician team and detective deployments related to violent crime response. The Administrative Commander revealed that the Sniper Team is not used very often and that explosive breaching may have been used only once over the years. Members of this team could not recall any in the last 12 years. Even though these units might not be deployed very often, it is critical to have these individuals trained and the tactical equipment available in case they are needed. Despite the level of funding allocated to SWAT, information provided by Department leadership indicates that the SWAT is usually deployed four to ten times per year for tactical callouts. There is a perception that SWAT is not used very often and when it is deployed, it is mainly for mutual assistance and to increase usage.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Leadership provided a tactical call-‐out summary as follows: • 2012 – Seven activations • 3 joint, multi-‐jurisdictional high-‐risk warrant service • 1 high-‐risk drug search warrant • 2 dignitary visit/multi-‐jurisdictional events • 1 armed barricade • 2013 – Eight activations • 2 high-‐risk warrant service assist • 2 high-‐risk warrant service – murder suspect • 2 assist high-‐risk warrant service mutual aid • 2 armed barricade • 2014 – Five activations • 1 high-‐risk warrant service • 1 high-‐risk warrant service – assist • 1 assist – armed burglary suspect • 2 armed barricade • 2015 – Three activations as of May 13 • 1 high-‐risk warrant service/multi-‐ jurisdictional warrant sweep • 2 partial team deployment – mutual aid

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

In the past two years the City of Beloit has experienced an upswing in violent crime and homicides, but the SWAT team has only been activated a few times. Based on callout information for the years 2012 through 2015 year-‐to-‐date, it does not appear practical to have these officers dedicate this time and staffing via the current model used by the Department for SWAT and other special services. Given the lack of sufficient resources across the Department, we question the Department’s decision to continue to invest so heavily in this particular unit when both the Department and the community would be better served by looking for ways to reduce the expenditure by utilizing a multi-‐jurisdictional approach or eliminating activities that could be requested from the Sheriff, Wisconsin Department of Justice, or federal partners and divert the resources to other areas. COLLABORATION ACROSS SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS There are individuals in the Drug and Gang unit that are also members of SWAT. DAG usually conducts its own tactical and enforcement activities without formal SWAT assistance, depending on the circumstances. DAG conducts its own surveillance of target locations to gather intelligence before any planned activities. DAG also writes its own operational plans and compiles after-‐action reports, as viewed by one of the assessors. The DAG unit meets with peer groups at Janesville Police Department on the third Monday of every month to share narcotics and gang intelligence. Additionally, these teams collaborate on ways to assist each other – by discussing investigations, proactive enforcement tactics, and covert activities and examining whether additional staffing is needed for operational activities. Those that participate feel that these meetings create positive

relationships that are productive and provide mutual support among the teams. While there is positive collaboration between BPD and the Janesville Police Department, and the unit’s representative on the FBI Safe Streets Task Force does work with the Wisconsin State Fusion Center in his duties at the task force, we learned that there is very limited interaction between the DAG unit and the Wisconsin State Fusion Center. According to an email sent by the Administrative Commander, BPD is the primary backup to the Janesville Police Department SWAT and has an inter-‐state, inter-‐agency agreement with Illinois’ Winnebago County SWAT Unit. In addition, BPD SWAT works closely with federal tactical units, including the FBI, ATF and DEA as well as the Wisconsin Division of Criminal Investigation and the neighboring counties of Dane and Walworth, but did not provide any information regarding a current working relationship with Wisconsin’s Rock County SWAT team. It was reported that the Rock County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO) approached both BPD and the Janesville Police Department about taking over their SWAT unit as they were disbanding it. According to the Administrative Commander, it became a political issue and the county withdrew from the discussions. There is a common belief within BPD that the working relationship between RCSO and Beloit is not positive mainly due to the Administrative Commander’s attitude regarding the situation. At some level of leadership, a discussion should take place to resolve issues surrounding Rock County and BPD SWAT teams. Conversations should not just be about which entity, if either, should control SWAT teams, because both centralization and individual agency operations have merit. The discussion should be about effectiveness, costs, dependability and

coordinated joint response since maintaining SWAT teams – including their training requirements, personnel overtime costs and equipment maintenance needs – is an expensive undertaking. STANDARD PROCEDURES AND OPERATIONAL PLANS WITHIN SPECIALIZED UNITS Officers are required to use the operational plan template when conducting tactical operations. These include templates for search warrants, confidential informant buys, buy busts and undercover buys. Operational plans are written and kept by individual units within the Department. The level of supervisory planning, review and approval of operational plans before execution varies with the individual function. Without a centralized leadership review of operational plans, it is impossible to create uniform oversight for officer safety, planning, high-‐risk response and after-‐action follow-‐up. Before conducting a high-‐risk activity, pre-‐ execution intelligence gathering and verification is required, but our assessment team discovered that it did not always occur before the mission meeting. The Administrative Commander requires SWAT to provide intelligence at least three weeks ahead of time when possible. We saw no indication, however, that verification of intelligence is conducted immediately before the high-‐risk event even though it is possible that intelligence may have changed since the initial verification. When asked about deconfliction,iii the commander stated that it is completed by the Investigations unit.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Our assessment team discovered that intelligence gathering does not always take place before a final briefing before executing high-‐risk and tactical activities during searches and raids. Additionally, we saw that operational plans are not consistently used during raids. The DAG unit keeps separate operational plans that are reviewed by the DAG sergeant before execution of the mission. DAG uses operational plans for controlled buys, search warrants and interdiction initiatives. The Detective Bureau does not usually use operational plans, but DAG will write the operational plan for detectives if they are conducting high-‐risk activities. According to reports, the Investigations unit does not use operational plans unless DAG, FBI Safe Streets Task Force, or U.S. Marshals Service are involved.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 – Integration and Centralized Oversight: Combine all special operations units under the appropriate Operational Commander to increase coordination with one another, including operational planning and information sharing. Establish centralized oversight and uniform guidelines for when operational plans will be used and at what level of supervision review and approval will occur. Create a SWAT matrix and operational plan requirements as these will contribute to the management review process necessary for accountability in high profile, high-‐risk and tactical operations. 6.2 – Selection Process and Callouts: Establish criteria for those selected to the Special Operations unit to ensure the individuals with the most qualified skills, knowledge and capabilities are chosen. 6.3 – High Risk Operational Plans: Integrate operational plans into a “whole Department” concept in a central repository. The final evaluation of an operational plan should be approved by the Deputy Chief before operations commence and pre-‐execution intelligence gathering should always take place for verification before the mission meeting and as part of the briefing. 6.4 – Deconfliction: During operational planning, require the use of deconfliction practices, such as a checkbox on the plan to record the deconfliction inquiries as well as intelligence verifications.

6.5 – Cost Analysis: Conduct a cost-‐benefit analysis of the SWAT Unit, including training, equipment and overtime use. This is required by policy and a best practice for evaluation of resource allocation and budget. 6.6 – SWAT Budget: Ensure that SWAT expenditures are added to the BPD budget rather than just “funded as needed” from special funds without appropriate oversight. 6.7 – SWAT/Special Operations Consolidation: Make efforts to examine all the local special operations high-‐risk/low-‐frequency units to determine if cost savings are feasible and attainable through a multi-‐jurisdictional approach.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

7 | POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: THE RULES THAT GOVERN AND GUIDE THE BPD POLICY UPDATES, REVIEW AND DISSEMINATION The Department's primary means of policy dissemination is through Power DMS, an online system that allows staff to review policies online and confirm that they have read them. As described by the Deputy Chief, in the case of an updated policy, commanders access Power DMS and make highlighted changes. The policy then enters a queue in which each member of the command staff, including the Chief, reviews it and makes any needed changes. Once all changes have been made, each command staff member signs off on the policy and it is sent to the rank-‐and-‐file through Power DMS. New or updated policies are brought to the attention of the rank-‐and-‐file either through an email or a Department Correspondence memo. Staff members are then instructed to log onto Power DMS to review the policy. Although Power DMS does a good job of disseminating policies and information to officers, it has some shortcomings regarding measuring how much an officer learned and understood. After reviewing a policy in Power DMS, officers sign to indicate that they have read it. Command staff indicated that new policies are rarely discussed during roll call, and if they are discussed it is in a limited fashion – usually just a verbal notice that they are available online. Officers are directed to schedule a time to meet with a sergeant if he or she has questions regarding the new policy. Regarding policy requirements, the assessment team noticed that BPD policy does not address selection and training for the Hostage [Crisis] Negotiation Team, according to the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Accreditation Group Report for 2015. During our interviews, many officers revealed that they felt that roll call briefings were not long enough to discuss policy updates and changes or to answer questions. One of the major reasons why roll calls are short is because on-‐coming officers have to relieve the off-‐ coming shift. COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION According to the Deputy Chief, the District Attorney and City Attorney routinely send legal updates to the Department, which are communicated and reviewed by command staff. These changes are then sent and disseminated through Power DMS. In certain situations – e.g., when the City’s liability exposure is elevated – the Department works with the District Attorney and City Attorney on a policy update. However, if a policy change is required because of a minor change in the law, the Department does not consult with either attorney before sending out the notice. Despite leadership’s assertions that a collaborative relationship exists between the Department and the District Attorney and City Attorney, it is evident that the Department does not work in close collaboration with either of them on a consistent basis. Rather, the administration's practice is to insulate itself from other city departments. The City Attorney revealed that officers often call daily asking for legal advice. However, this is seen as going “outside of the chain of command” because they were told not to contact the City Attorney. Officers reported that certain supervisors cannot answer their legal questions, particularly those relating to probable cause and issues surrounding stops and

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

arrests, so they risk going outside the chain of command to ensure that they are acting within legal boundaries. Legal and Policy Knowledge and Adherence Both the Department and the Chief lack legal and policy knowledge and adherence. The Department has reported that the Firearms Instruction has improved and is professionally presented for In-‐Service Training and qualifications, but the officers stated that they would benefit from additional range time. It has also been reported that each year one or two people have not qualified with their weapons and that even though BPD policy OP0215.02.03 states that officers must qualify before returning to active duty, this policy is often violated. We were told that officers simply re-‐qualify when they are able to do so. It was reported that during last year's qualification, several officers did not qualify with their weapons but were still put back on active duty and were on patrol with their weapons later that same day. It was more specifically reported that one officer took months to re-‐qualify, and several additional officers took anywhere from one day to weeks to re-‐qualify, and yet all of these officers still continued on active duty during that time. In addition to the lack of adherence to the weapons qualification policy, it has been reported that the Department is lacking updates on many of its weapons. The assessment team noted that an officer’s pepper spray was out of date as the date shown on the spray on his gun belt was 2005. In a district court case filed in January 2011, the opinion stated that during his deposition the Chief was not responding directly to plaintiff’s questions, not adequately articulating the official policy of the Department, and that his answers were often inconsistent and evasive. The circuit court judge reprimanded the Chief for being evasive and stated, “Jacobs’ deposition does not clarify the policies of the Beloit Police Department. The only concrete evidence presented to this court on the municipal liability issue is the defendant’s statement ‘It’s just not the way we operate’.” Currently, the BPD policy on strip searches still does not reflect the April 2014 legal changes nor could we find any evidence of annual training on the strip search policy. Therefore it was determined that BPD policies have not been reviewed and updated annually as required by Wisconsin statute § 968.255 regulating strip searches. The Chief has made negative comments regarding officer’s use of FMLA and his actions may have violated federal laws when disciplining personnel for their use of Family and Medical Leave Act time. In one instance, the City Attorney told the Chief that he cannot discipline personnel regarding FMLA and the Chief responded that it was not the City Attorney’s place to say so.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 – Policy Dissemination: Discuss policies during roll call or training in addition to disseminating them through the Power DMS System link to ensure that officers understand updates and changes in policy. 7.2 – Legal Updates and Assistance: Legally update Department policies and ensure that the Department views the District Attorney and City Attorney as valued partners in the legal updates. 7.3 – Policy Knowledge: Ensure that the Department – including the Chief, officers and supervisors – are trained and knowledgeable in legal and Departmental policy in order to properly advise officers about stops, arrests and other policing topics. In addition, the Department should welcome the officers using the City Attorney as a resource for such legal advice. 7.4 – Violation of Policies and Federal Law: Require the Chief and the Department to adhere to all laws and court decisions, including guidance and laws on hiring, promotion and the Family Medical Leave Act as well as Department policy.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

REFORM AND RENEWAL

8 | TRAINING: THE LIFEBLOOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND BIAS-‐FREE POLICING NEWLY DEVELOPED AND REVISED DEPARTMENT POLICIES Some of BPD’s training courses have not been updated with regard to legality since 2008 despite offers of assistance from the District Attorney and City Attorney related to training and updates. Their offers of assistance were denied, and both attorneys stated that on several occasions they were told by the Chief or command staff that the other attorney would be assisting the Department on legal updates for policies and training when, in fact, neither was. In May 2015 the Department asked the City Attorney for assistance in providing materials for a legal update for training but did so with little notice. Although the Administrative Commander said he did not receive

training materials from the City Attorney, he indicated that he gave little notice due to the short timeframe in which the training was to be conducted. The City Attorney said scheduling and providing training materials are not issues as long as advanced notice is provided. The assessment team was advised by the Administrative Commander that an update to the Department’s stop-‐and-‐frisk policy had been implemented recently. The Administrative Commander also stated that neither the City Attorney nor the District Attorney had been involved. In addition, the Department has not had strip search training in two years although it is required by policy to be provided annually.

TRAINING FOR DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL The assessment team did not find any indication that supervisors annually review employee training records to make recommendations on improving employees’ skills, knowledge and abilities as required by Department policy. Currently supervisors are not held accountable for ensuring that Department employees are properly trained. The Administrative Commander was unsure whether annual reviews take place and suggested the assessment team ask the Patrol Commander. As evidenced, in part, by the near daily calls placed to the City Attorney regarding legal issues, it is also clear that the Department does not provide adequate training to officers and supervisors on the legal basis for stops, arrests and other legal issues.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

There is also a Department perception that BPD does not release probationary officers if they do not complete the Probationary Training Officer (PTO) program in a satisfactory manner. The Department and City Attorney reported that 100% of the members of each probationary class have completed their probationary program and become BPD officers since the beginning of 2010. This is in spite of the fact that, in at least one case, a poorly performing officer whose release was recommended by two successive PTO supervisors was merely transferred to a third, who ultimately approved him for service in the Department. Department personnel have reported concerns with officer safety regarding working with those officers who perhaps should not have been allowed to complete their probationary program. Department personnel believe that the Chief does not want to let probationary officers go due to his unilateral decisions regarding hiring and his own hiring matrix.

TRAINING FOR SPECIALIZED UNITS AND GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS PERSONNEL There is a Department-‐wide perception that most training opportunities are extended only to select units and individuals. This perception is perpetuated by the fact that officers’ training requests are sometimes approved by their supervisors and denied by a commander or the Chief without explanation. For example, between 2013 and 2015, almost 15 percent of training requests reviewed were approved at the initial commander level or by the Training Committee and were then denied without explanation – sometimes by a commander but more often by the Chief. Without a reason for denial, the perception of favoritism of the “chosen few” increases because the officers have to cover multiple beat areas and work overtime to compensate for the absence of officers approved to attend training. Others have reported that training requests go in a vacuum and nothing is ever known by the officer nor feedback or outcome of these requests received.

In addition, as mentioned throughout the discussion of investigators and specialized units such as DAG and the Crisis Negotiation Team, many of the investigators and officers in specialty positions have not had any specialized training as is required of their positions or the training they have had is limited, including homicide, sexual assault and crisis negotiation training. In an example of punitive denial of training, it was reported that an officer who testified contrary to the Police Chief in a court case was shortly thereafter denied specialty training that had been approved by his command.

EVALUATION AND OVERSIGHT BPD training instructors do not receive an annual review to determine if they should continue as a training instructor or to determine whether their classroom instruction is sufficient and engaging, as required by BPD policy. Additionally, written evaluations are not conducted by attendees at the end of a training session nor are instructors observed by command staff or the Training Committee. The assessment team learned that the commander overseeing training believes that if the instructors are approved by the State of Wisconsin they do not need to be observed or evaluated. Since 2014, the Department has had the ability to provide roll call training electronically by sending officers a video to open from their electronic device and that they must play from start to finish before being allowed to close the video. Unfortunately, officers indicated that there is rarely any follow-‐up during roll call to supplement these videos. This leaves officers to understand and interpret training changes and updates on their own, without any supervisory guidance.

As previously reported, many in the Department perceive that the SWAT unit receives much more training than other units. For example, assessors heard reports that the Crisis Negotiation unit has not received any training in more than two years and that funds earmarked for training of the unit have been used for SWAT purposes. However, the assessment team noticed that other than exercises, “no BPD officers were sent to training for Hostage [Crisis] Negotiation in 2015 and it is recommended to include proof from earlier training,” according to the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Accreditation Group Report for 2015. The assessors confirmed that at least two of the Crisis Negotiation officers have not received any additional crisis negotiation training since 2013. The Administrative Commander oversees both the SWAT and Crisis Negotiation units. Although the Administrative Commander stated that the SWAT unit only receives training approximately two days per month, the assessment team was unable to confirm this because the SWAT Unit’s training records are not kept electronically.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

The assessment team discovered that the SWAT unit training records were locked in SWAT filing cabinets by one of the SWAT members instead of by the Administrative Commander who oversees SWAT and training. This SWAT member also kept the SWAT lesson plans, sign-‐in sheets, class curriculum and other documents in the locked filing cabinet, which was well maintained and organized. However, the Administrative Commander was unsure where or what was specifically kept in the cabinet and could not say if the cabinet contained the attendance sheets for specific dates and courses for several years.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 – Legal Updates and Assistance Offered: Update the training curriculum to meet new legal requirements. Require the Department to take advantage of the assistance provided by the City Attorney and District Attorney to ensure that legal updates are made.

8.2 – Disproportionate Training: Provide appropriate documentation explaining the reasons why a training request has been denied in order to eliminate the Department-‐wide perception that training is disproportionately distributed among Department personnel. Review the participation of personnel in training to ensure there is a proportionate amount of Department personnel in attendance.

8.3 – Evaluation: Conduct an annual review of training instructors, as required by policy, to determine if they should continue to be instructors. Have written evaluations completed by attendees at the end of training classes. Have command staff or the Training Committee observe instructors to determine if the classroom training instruction is meaningful and appropriate.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

9 | TECHNOLOGY: THE VALUE OF AUTOMATION, EFFICIENCY AND COMMUNICATION BPD has made significant capital investments in technology and works with several partner agencies to advance its goals related to automation and police technology systems with respect to issues such as mutual aid, information sharing and cost containment. The Department has or participates in a consolidated: • • • • •

Computer-‐aided dispatch center Records management system Jail Management System (currently in progress) Automated report writing capabilities Laptops and video cameras in police cars

In the City of Beloit, information technology (IT) has been administratively centralized to assure the efficient use of resources. While BPD’s IT requests are serviced by City of Beloit employees, in addition to the few administrative staff members employed by BPD, these individuals have little experience in the application of IT best practices to law enforcement priorities. As part of our team’s high-‐level IT assessment, we conducted interviews with key personnel – such as the Director of Information Technology for the City of Beloit, the Director of Administration Services, administration staff, shift supervisors and patrol officers – to understand the IT issues facing patrol personnel on a daily basis. In addition, we participated in several ride-‐alongs to confirm or refute issues raised by officers. IT Leadership and the Importance of Experience BPD needs effective IT leadership to ensure the proper delivery, adoption, acceptance and utilization of IT systems and solutions that support the operational requirements of the agency. Leadership should be responsible for ensuring that IT solutions are implemented within a standardized enterprise architecture – taking advantage of economies of scale and resource allocation and limiting the required knowledge base and costs associated with the maintenance and care of independent or disparate systems to streamline support requirements. BPD participates in the governance processes implemented with the county at varying levels. Participation in any governance process requires consistent and qualified leadership. This includes detailed knowledge and ability to understand the solutions and how they will impact the agency, and the commitment to ensure follow-‐up and delivery based on required timelines and deliverables. However, our interviews identified inconsistences in leadership participation among those who have a direct understanding and responsibility for the impact and delivery of system services to BPD officers.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

IT SUPPORT AND THE ROLE OF THE CITY’S IT TEAM A staff of four provides IT support from the City: the Director of Information Technology, two individuals dedicated to the help desk and one network engineer. These employees are responsible for IT services supporting the entire City’s government operations, including administration, public works and police and fire departments. The IT staff provides traditional IT services relating to the file server, printer and email systems, as well as back-‐office business software applications specific to the business administration of BPD. These systems are appropriately monitored, maintained and managed to industry standards. Operationally, most activity takes place during normal business hours with the exception of the police and fire departments, which are active around the clock. The county, as part of the consortium, also provides system support and maintenance for key systems but requires resource utilization by the City’s IT staff to assist in those activities. When issues arise, it falls to the Director of Support Services to work with patrol supervisors to resolve issues as soon as possible. Resolution is usually achieved by the following day during normal business hours. We suggest that BPD staff work with the City’s IT department to develop an acceptable Service Level Agreement with defined response and resolution times that meet operational demands. All support staff should attend detailed operational overviews and participate in bi-‐weekly patrol briefings. One way to supplement the City’s IT support is by engaging super users in specific workgroups. These users understand and use systems and processes at an advanced level in support of their specific roles and responsibilities. Their knowledge and understanding can be shared with other team members when issues arise that might traditionally be called directly into the help desk or support environment, thus saving time and effort. During interviews with members of the Patrol Unit, several officers were identified as being more advanced users, but officers interviewed were not aware of anyone being designated as go-‐to personnel in the event of an issue. Although the Patrol Commander indicated he does have some expert officers as training-‐the-‐trainers, there is a lack of communication in these limited efforts, leading to operational inefficiencies. In many police departments, super users address questions during roll call, submit support tickets if they are unable to answer questions and provide supplemental train-‐the-‐trainer training. These activities reduce downtime and increase productivity. IT SYSTEMS AND WHERE PARTNERSHIP CAN PROVIDE VALUE BPD relies on participation in the County Consortium for most of its officer safety systems such as dispatch, records management, citation, crash reporting and jail management, as well as solutions provided in partnership with industry leaders, such as Spillman Technologies and Motorola. Officers use Motorola for dispatch, which was changing to Spillman during the time of this assessment, and while in police cars to check for wants and warrants, homeland security information and stolen items across multiple state and federal systems. Spillman Technologies provides systems or interfaces to address the records management aspect of policing for the Department.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

The partnership among the County Consortium, the City of Beloit, BPD and their system providers is solid, cooperative and collaborative. Spillman Technologies and Motorola, along with other vendor partners, work proactively to keep systems updated to current versions. These systems are the backbone for policing operations, providing actionable information in a timely and secure manner for the protection of the officers and the citizens they serve. An additional benefit of the collaborative data is that it provides a baseline for crime analysis and predictive policing – a policing best practice. The systems described create the information sharing environment for the Department – a detailed series of data points used by BPD and its partner agencies to identify, arrest and prosecute offenders. The ability for officers across multiple agencies to share actionable information quickly and securely is mandatory in today’s policing climate. The misidentification of a known subject or the untimely release of an offender would be alarming to the public and could adversely affect their safety or the safety of officers. Furthermore, these systems are the conduit to identifying crime trends and subject identification and resource allocation needs, and they serve as key indicators for the success and failure of department strategies developed for the reduction of identified crime activities. We identified gaps or the lack of IT systems dedicated to the case management of internal affairs activities and an Early Warning System (EWS) designed for the identification and management of officers with a propensity for use of force. Both systems provide leadership with management and alerting capabilities to maintain integrity and reduce overall liability for the Department. The internal affairs component should be used to maintain separation and confidentiality of ongoing processes and proceedings regarding complaints brought forth against officers, supervisors or command personnel as well as control over the application and administration of discipline. The Early Warning System is a necessary tool for police departments in identifying potential at-‐risk officers and developing a risk mitigation strategy. The Early Warning System allows police departments to identify patterns of behavior inconsistent with standards or expectations and provides modifying activities that better serve the officer and the community before unwanted behavior occurs. INFORMATION SHARING AND ITS BENEFITS As previously mentioned, BPD participates in a successful consortium of local and county police agencies to share policing data. This proven model continues to be replicated throughout the nation, and economies of scale and integrated information sharing are the primary drivers. Each agency must agree to share its data across all of the partner agencies for the ability to access the data of the partner agencies. This ability to share data across common systems based on industry specific information sharing standards exponentially expands each department’s crime fighting ability. Criminals are not always stagnant or confined to a small location protected by one department. More often than not, criminals conduct opportunistic criminal activities that cross multiple jurisdictions. The ability to share data across agencies amplifies the participating departments’ abilities to solve crimes collaboratively. Benefits of information sharing include crime trend analysis and predictive policing or intelligence-‐led policing activities. The validity of the analytical outcomes and statistical probabilities is improved when a greater amount of data is available.

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BELOIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS 9.1 – Staffing: Provide appropriate staffing levels to meet Service Level Agreements based on operational need to ensure officer safety. Hire one additional full-‐ time equivalent network administrator to meet the requirements of the Service Level Agreement. Develop an on-‐call process to ensure that in the event an issue arises, it can be resolved without waiting until the next business day. 9.2 – Service Level Agreement: Enter into a service-‐level based agreement with the City IT Department or an outsourced vendor to ensure systems and hardware remain in working condition and operational. 9.3 – Technology Assistance: Identify super users to address support issues in the Department. Information sharing and data integrity are crucial in law enforcement because the ability to obtain accurate and timely information is necessary to provide public services and ensure officers’ safety. 9.4 – Vendor Management: Continue to make vendor management a focus of all parties involved in the County Consortium. Monitor and manage compliance with contracted deliverables consistently. 9.5 – Management: Identify one individual to be empowered and held responsible for participating in the governance process and overseeing consortium-‐based IT solutions. This individual must be knowledgeable about BPD’s IT needs and have collaborative communication skills. The Director of Support Services should be considered a viable candidate. 9.6 – Data Sources: Seek opportunities to acquire more relevant data sources. These will be increasingly important as BPD continues to mold its strategy and implementation of crime analysis activities. Additional data will provide greater accuracy of outcomes and thus greater success in crime reduction and crime-‐solving activities. 9.7 – Confidential Reporting: Research and purchase an IT solution to support the early warning process. Blue Team is an industry standard that should be considered. 9.8 – Participating in Briefings: Require IT staff to participate in bi-‐weekly patrol briefings to foster a partnership among IT, administration and patrol personnel. The briefings also provide the necessary operational understanding regarding officer safety and the role of IT systems.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

10 | COMMUNITY-‐ORIENTED POLICING: WORKING TOWARD A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST Community policing is a philosophy that should be practiced Department-‐wide, not just in the Patrol Bureau. It is difficult to discern what role Investigations plays within the Department’s community policing initiative, but true community policing involves officers working in concert with community leaders, agencies and residents as well as teamwork across units. For a law enforcement agency to be successful in its community policing efforts it must promote organizational strategies that support the organization's desired outcomes – namely, forging strong community partnerships to address issues related to crime and quality of life. In this regard, BPD has fallen short in its efforts. Effective partnerships between law enforcement and community stakeholders are essential to public safety. It is important for BPD leadership to actively engage and nurture the support of community groups, businesses, faith-‐based organizations, nonprofits and private citizens in the shared responsibility of public safety. LEADERSHIP’S COMMUNITY OUTREACH AND ENGAGEMENT There is little sustained engagement with community stakeholders on behalf of leadership or the Department as a whole. BPD holds few community meetings and when it does leadership rarely attends. Instead, they leave that responsibility to the area patrol officers. This responsibility is not one that should be left solely to a line officer.

Of Beloit Community Members Surveyed: •

70% are NOT satisfied with the overall performance of the Beloit Police Department, b ut

•

77% believe BPD officers treat people fairly and 80% believe BPD officers treat them with respect.

•

Given these results and the numerous open-‐ended survey responses, the overall theme from respondents is that they believe the issues are with the Chief, Deputy Chief and leadership, and not officers.

Due to recent tension in the community over several unsolved homicides, BPD’s leadership was forced to face residents and explain what progress the Department was making in solving the crimes. However, once the crisis was over, leadership returned to its usual pattern of leaving patrol officers responsible for communicating its message of community policing. The BMP does not call for the area officer, shift supervisor or Patrol Commander to have any meaningful contact with stakeholders in order to meet Department expectations. For example, a resident, whose goal was to rehabilitate homes in a challenged area of the city came to the Department for assistance in helping turn the area around. The resident met

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with the Deputy Chief and explained the significant investment he wanted to make in the community. The resident felt that for the plan to be successful, Department support was essential. After listening to the resident’s proposal, the Deputy Chief referred him to a sergeant for follow-‐up. The Deputy Chief’s actions left the resident feeling like community policing was not a priority with BPD leadership. The resident was successful in converting a number of homes, but received no support from BPD command. STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING INITIATIVES Fighting crime is not the sole purpose of community policing programs, and the criteria for what constitutes a problem-‐solving project is not clear to the officers as it is not communicated effectively by leadership nor is it related to community-‐oriented policing. Successful community policing requires police departments to identify and prioritize community problems with input from residents. To build a partnership, the Department must work with residents to identify problems and create solutions as a component of proactive policing. Currently, the Department is in a reactive position because it has not collaborated with the community to address current problems. The community problem-‐ solving projects as currently required by the Department are solely meant to meet the guidelines of the BMP and performance appraisals. They are not meant as a tool to engage the community. Another example of how the Department's community policing plan lacks cohesion and fluidity can be found with the position of Neighborhood Resource Officer (NRO). The NRO position was initiated by the Department in February 2015 on a temporary basis – three to six months. The NRO reports to the patrol

sergeant and is based at the Merrill Substation. The NRO’s schedule is Monday through Friday, 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. during the school year and 1 p.m. to 9 p.m. during the summer. The job description for the NRO position appears to be no different from a patrol officer’s. According to our interviews, there have not been any citizen visits or visit requests since the creation of the position. A number of patrol officers we interviewed feel that the NRO is a wasted position that does nothing to foster a closer relationship with the community. We heard from multiple people that an evaluation of this program and its validity has not been conducted despite officers’ requests. In addition, patrol sergeants do not feel that they have the authority to modify the NRO's duties as the dedicated substation assignment came from leadership. Despite this, the Department touts the NRO as a community policing program and requires the NRO to be present at the substation several hours a day even though no citizen contact is being made.

THE DEPARTMENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMMUNITY A number of officers and supervisors feel that the residents of Beloit do not trust or respect the Department due to its lack of progress in solving a number of homicides and shootings. However, this lack of respect and trust can also be attributed in large part to the Department's poor attempt at forging collaborative working relationships with both residents and business owners as seen in the following examples: •

•

Officers are allowed to select their assigned beat by seniority through a bid process. Because of this practice, less experienced officers are assigned to the City's more challenging areas, which experience complex problems, such as gangs, drugs and violence. When this process is coupled with inadequate street supervision and the Department is left with officers who do not meet the demands of their assigned areas residents are left underserved. Many plans call for the area officer to meet with the Neighborhood Watch Commanders only twice a year. Some Neighborhood Watch Commanders have requested that officers refrain from personally visiting with them and instead contact them by mail because they do not want their neighbors to see them meeting with the police.

•

Many beat plans only require the area officer to make a limited number of business checks for the entire year.

•

BPD has designated one patrol sergeant to be the liaison to all neighborhood Watch Commanders. Periodically, the sergeants participate in poorly attended meetings at the Department. It has been reported that problems discussed at these meetings may or may not be shared with the Patrol Bureau for follow-‐up.

•

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The Department has fallen short in providing timely information to residents. This includes, but is not limited to, community meetings, newsletters and media outreach. This has resulted in little, if any, involvement of the community in addressing issues of mutual concern. For example, it was reported that in 2010 there was a string of approximately 30 burglaries in the City of Beloit and similar burglaries in nearby areas, and yet the citizens of Beloit were not well informed about this pattern of crime.

Community-‐oriented policing calls for frontline officers to be decision-‐makers on calls for service and other neighborhood issues; however, the voice of the Police Chief and command staff is needed on policy, deployment and budgetary issues of Community Policing. If the Department is to gain community trust, it must seriously rethink its current community policing initiative and place increased emphasis and frequency on community dialogue with the Police Chief and command. CRIME ANALYSIS AND INTELLIGENCE-‐LED POLICING Crime analysis refers to the analytical study and identification of crime trends based on the types of crimes reported, the geographical footprint of crimes reported and other identifiable characteristics, such as weapons, vehicles and gang affiliations. Intelligence-‐led policing takes the output of the crime analysis and provides actionable information that police departments can use to determine patrol activities. It is critical that both of these activities are aligned with the strategic and tactical goals of the Department. Establishing performance benchmarks and metrics provides measurable accountability of the resources being spent on these programmatic endeavors. Additionally, these measures help command-‐

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level personnel identify trends as well as successes and failures of specific crime-‐ reduction activities. Trend analysis and technologies such as geocodingiv are important tools to identify patterns of crime, types of crime and weapons or tools used in the commission of crime as well as other relevant and identifiable information. In some cases, the output is a timeline of activity and could provide a potential identification of the next probable target. Predictive policing or intelligence-‐led policing is a powerful output for any crime reduction or resolution strategy. Distribution of Crime Reports and Memos BPD does not currently have a Crime Analysis Unit. The Department does, however, produce and distribute a number of crime-‐related reports and special memos that originate from several sources, such as leadership and sergeants, and officers who are encouraged to produce crime bulletins associated with their assignment areas. Special memos are sometimes distributed to patrol officers though email or read at roll call. However, in other cases, crime analysis data is simply posted on the bulletin board in the roll call room with the expectation that officers will read it, understand it and know what is expected of them. Crime Analysis The manner in which the Department currently uses its crime data does not aid in its efforts to prevent and suppress crime, apprehend criminal offenders, respond to emerging trends or educate the public. BPD’s current use of trend analysis is based on a five-‐year output of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data supplied to the FBI as a component of national reporting requirements.

The Uniform Crime Reporting data is available to officers in the patrol briefing room, but it only provides a summary and no actionable information. Officers need to have an understanding of the data presented, what strategy is to be employed to reduce the criminal activity, the duration of the strategy, measures of success or failure of the activity, and what is expected specifically of the officers – all of which are the baseline criteria for a successful crime-‐reduction strategy. Officers indicated that command staff often post crime maps in the roll call room but provide no explanation or discussion of the crime maps or intelligence sharing, leaving officers on their own to determine the maps’ relevance to the overall patrol strategy. There does not appear to be a cohesive message from command staff about how to apply this type of information to officers’ daily duties. In discussions with patrol officers and as observed during ride-‐alongs, officers do not take crime analysis seriously and therefore do not apply it to their daily patrolling. Records Management Software BPD uses Spillman Technologies, Inc. as its provider of records management software (RMS) as well as the reporting tool Crystal Reports to provide visual output of the queried data. The output culminates in traditional crime location data or hot spotv identification. In its current implementation, the output is rudimentary and can only be used to provide basic information rather than determining actions. These visual depictions lack the necessary context, such as crime analysis, to transform these rudimentary visual products into actionable intelligence. Crime analysis is critical to ensuring that officers have a thorough understanding of the threats and concerns that exist within the communities they serve. Merely providing such images to

patrol officers without the accompanying analysis and assessment of the situations these images represent prevents the patrol officers from providing effective and targeted policing for the City of Beloit. For example, one such image shows a representation of what appears to be a high crime area on the west side of Beloit. After reviewing the data, it becomes clear that the image depicts three burglaries, but it lacks actionable information. The image shows four subjects or persons of interest, which is important information for officers to maintain awareness, but the hot spot map serves no practical application. Another example is a map that depicts locations where shots have been fired within the City of Beloit. Understanding this information is critical to officers’ safety, but further analysis and explanation is needed for the officers to understand the background and drivers for the shootings.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

Missing from the map is an analysis of the actual data elements, such as: •

Times of occurrence

•

Dates of occurrence

•

Criminal relationship (e.g., gang, drug, domestic or other types of activity)

•

Known subjects or persons of interest

•

Strategy or indicators for reducing activity

• Desired goal or outcome BPD is in the infancy stage of practically implementing these disciplines and resources that need to be applied for crime analysis. The Patrol Commander and the Director of Support Services are working diligently to understand the technology and how to best use the query and reporting tool. Crystal Reports is a complex reporting tool that requires extensive training and continued practical application in order to successfully implement this type of technology.

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RECOMMENDATIONS 10.1 – Comprehensive Program Expansion: Develop a strategy to engage the public in community policing programs and problem solving that goes beyond Patrol and the BMP. Tie the more robust community-‐oriented program to a strategic plan and defined goals. 10.2 – Neighborhood Resource Officer: Evaluate both the Department’s Neighborhood Resource Officer position and the program as a whole to ensure that resources are being properly allocated to meet the program’s goals as it is currently doing little, if anything, to foster positive community relations. The officer should be moved out of the substation and squad car and be required to patrol the beat on foot or bike patrol, making it more likely that the officer will meet people and engage them in conversation. 10.3 – Community Projects: Define the criteria as to what constitute problem-‐solving projects and communicate these clearly to officers. 10.4 – Community Engagement: Develop more partnerships with faith-‐based community groups, nonprofits and other organizations, and create more neighborhood watch groups as the current groups lack diversity and their members do not know who to call when a problem arises. Hold listening sessions with various community groups and businesses to identify specific community-‐related programs that should be developed. Require the Chief to become deeply involved in the community in order to hear and understand community issues and concerns. Have a broader representation of the Department attend community meetings.

10.5 – Crime Analysis: Establish a Crime Analysis unit to have a systematic approach for the collection, analysis and distribution of statistical data on reported crimes and criminals. Adopt a structured approach to ensure the timely dissemination of actionable intelligence information about relevant crime trends and patterns while ensuring that crime control strategies are aligned across bureaus and units. Consider making saturation enforcement based on crime analysis of high-‐ crime neighborhoods an ongoing proactive initiative. 10.6 – Intelligence Collection and Internal Information Sharing: Place more effort on educating rank-‐and-‐file officers regarding their role in intelligence gathering as well as the role of tips and leads and the development of relationships built on trust with members of the community who can provide information. Share critical operational information among bureaus. 10.7 – Data Collection and Analysis: Evaluate the recent proposed patrol schedule using hard data analysis regarding the number of calls, the nature of calls and what time calls are made, among other data.

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11 | ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: FROM STAFFING TO SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS ORGANIZATIONAL STAFFING AND SUPERVISION In 2012, the Department and the City of Beloit initiated a reduction in force by eliminating both sworn and support staff positions from the Department as well as from many other City departments. Although a staffing analysis was outside the scope of this survey, it is clear that there are some areas in which the lack of staffing is having a detrimental impact on operations. The most significant weakness is in the area of first-‐line supervision, as noted earlier in this report. A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE An often overlooked and underappreciated component of any police organization is the civilian workforce. These personnel are dedicated to the mission of protecting the communities they serve as well as the officers they work with to provide public safety services. The civilian workforce at BPD is no different – they are committed to protecting and serving their community. BPD’s civilian workforce is comprised of a director, supervisor and 11 full-‐ and part-‐time staff members. The director reports to the Chief and is responsible for overseeing and managing the supervisor and staff members. The supervisor provides first-‐line management and oversight of the first-‐line personnel.

Director Support Services

Records Management

1st Shix

2nd Shix

Sworn Court Oﬃcer

3rd Shix

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The organizational structure of the civilian personnel, as well as their roles and responsibilities, meet the operational needs of the Department, which include providing records management, training coordination, court officer and building maintenance services, providing front-‐line customer service to in-‐person or phone inquiries from constituents, validating warrants for officers in the field and operating in parallel shifts with the patrol. The civilian staff is also responsible for the dictation and validation of field reports provided by the patrol officers, which requires detailed accuracy for accountability and court proceedings. During our assessment, the civilian workforce demonstrated dedication and professionalism. They have the work ethic required to ensure the professional, timely and proficient completion of their job tasks to support the officers and citizens they serve. During our field interviews, patrol officers, sergeants, commanders and command personnel praised and expressed their appreciation for the civilian personnel and recounted stories of staff members going beyond their job duties. However, our interviews also uncovered multiple instances of communication and process failures from the command staff to the civilian workforce. One such example was the “Guns in Homes” program envisioned by the Chief and designed to provide a process to recover and dispose of guns within the Beloit community that were no longer wanted or that were possessed illegally. Although there are many crime reduction programs nationwide that include a plan for reducing the number of weapons on the streets, in this instance, the civilian personnel were not informed of the initiation of the program, what it entailed, how it was to operate or what the goals and objectives were. These are key details that require direction and since they are responsible for addressing public inquiries, they should have been provided talking points. This failure in information sharing led to frustration within the community because their questions were not answered. There was also frustration within the Department because the staff members and patrol officers were ill-‐prepared for providing customer service due to the lack of responsiveness by the Chief, Deputy Chief and other leadership personnel. Inquiries about the program came from local and national media outlets, who demanded answers regarding the program and its unpopular acceptance by the community. These inquires went unanswered for an extended period of time, which caused frustration and angst within the civilian staff and reflected poorly on the Department. HIRING, PROMOTIONS AND SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT PROCESSES Promotions Qualifications and Selection Criteria BPD Policy AD3100 Promotional Procedures, dated August 5, 2005, and updated February 6, 2015, sets forth the various procedures for the promotion of personnel to the ranks of sergeant, commander and Deputy Chief. During interviews with patrol officers and sergeants, complaints were raised as to the lack of transparency and outright disregard of stated promotional steps during previous promotional exams, specifically for the position of sergeant. Given the lack of transparency and validation in the selection process, the Department leadership’s failure to adhere to policy, and the prevalent perception of nepotistic selection practices, BPD officers have lost faith in the integrity of the selection process.

REFORM AND RENEWAL

A March 5, 2013, memo issued by Chief Jacobs titled, “Sergeant Promotion/Eligibility List,” outlines the steps that were to be followed for the upcoming process. Although the memo gave the impression that at some point during the process an eligibility list would be established, interviews with several patrol officers and sergeants revealed that if an eligibility list was created after the 2013 process, it was not shared with promotion-‐ eligible participants or the Department as a whole. In fact, participants in the process were not informed of their scores for either the assessment center or the written test. Individuals who successfully passed each stage of the process had no indication of where they ranked in comparison to the competition. Additionally, this memo states that leading candidates would receive an invitation for an interview in June 2013. As the administration personnel were the only ones who had knowledge of how the applicants performed on both the assessment center and written test, applicants had no idea what the Chief meant by the phrase “leading candidates,” which left Department personnel to suspect the process was not to be trusted. In the 2010 sergeant promotion process, of the three officers who were interviewed by the Chief in the third assessment phase, two officers were promoted to sergeant. Then in 2013, due to retirement, another sergeant position became available. Many in the Department presumed the third officer would be promoted to sergeant since it was believed he was the only candidate still in contention. However, another officer who had not previously received an interview was contacted by the Chief’s office and asked if he would like to interview for the position. In the end, another officer who was not previously granted an interview was subsequently promoted to sergeant. Updated Policy Needs Work The current policy greatly improves upon the 2013 process. Policy Section 3115.02.08 states, “after completion of the assessment, interviews with the Chief and selected personnel from his/her staff will be scheduled for all remaining candidates.” Additionally, Section 3115.06.01 states that eligibility lists will be formulated after the testing process for each position that has been tested. Section 3115.06.02 notes that, “Candidate's individual test scores will be placed on an eligibility list and used as one consideration for promotion.” The amended policy could reestablish trust in and the transparency of the promotional process. However, such policies are fruitless if leadership does not adhere to them and uphold the integrity of the promotion process. It was reported by the Chief that the points awarded through the promotion

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examination are not indicative of who will ultimately be selected for promotion, as the ultimate decision rests solely at his discretion. BPD's process for promotions is troubling. Rather than being open and honest in its practices, the administration often operates in secret and makes up rules as it goes along. By not posting a sergeant's eligibility list, the Department places itself, by accident or design, in a position to manipulate the process, which undermines faith in the process. Special Assignments Qualifications and Selection Criteria BPD Directive AD0400 pertains to specialized assignments and outlines the procedures to be followed by those who oversee specialized units. It also sets forth the criteria to be used when considering an employee for assignment to such a position. This directive primarily addresses the SWAT and Crisis Negotiation unit assignments. Additional assignments that fall under the “Specialty Assignment” category include: canine officer, Drug and Gang officer, court officer, permanent detective, task force (narcotics), School Resource Officer and rotating detective. During our interviews, many officers raised questions regarding how specialized unit selections are made. Section 0405.01.01 of the specialized assignments directive states, “The Beloit Police Department recognizes the need to establish a system to fairly implement special assignments and to monitor these assignments to ensure they are cost effective.” However, according to some interviewees, the selection system is not fair. Although BPD Directive 0415.02.01 and 0415.03.02 state that all applications requesting assignment to either SWAT or the Crisis Negotiation unit must be made through the chain of command, it was reported that some officers have submitted applications and either received a letter of denial from leadership or were given no response at all. It is suspected by some officers that leadership is not forwarding applications through the chain of command for those officers whom they do not like. One common theme heard throughout the interviews was that if an officer applied for a position and was denied, no explanation was given for the denial. Because of this, officers have no idea what areas of their performance they should improve upon in order to be considered in the future. This lack of communication reflects similar practices that exist within the promotion process. Additionally, there is a general feeling within the Department that assignments are not based on qualifications but rather on friendships or as a way to punish one who falls out of favor with certain members of the administration. Hiring Qualifications and Selection Criteria A number of officers questioned the process for selecting entry-‐level personnel, specifically with respect to the hiring matrix the Chief uses to assist in the selection process (Appendix F). BPD policy AD3300 Selection of Personnel makes no mention of a hiring matrix scoring procedure for entry-‐level hiring, and it is apparent that the Chief has developed his own hiring matrix with arbitrarily weighted criterion. The Chief’s hiring matrix places an unjustified weight on graduate-‐level education, exceeding the education requirements of the State of Wisconsin, and may undervalue other areas such as prior

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military and law enforcement experience. The hiring matrix was never reviewed by human resource hiring experts or tested for disparate impact. Based on the arbitrary nature of the application of the hiring matrix, it likely results in a disparity in the diversity of those selected to advance in the hiring process. In discussion with the assessors, the Police Chief could not explain how he came to the weights he assigned other than that he saw these as areas of importance. A perception also exists within the Department that the Chief discounts candidates with communication and other skills that would make strong police officers in favor of candidates with master’s degrees. In the current system, the Police and Fire Commission (PFC) has a limited role in the hiring process. After applicants pass all required exams, the Chief has the final say on which candidates are presented to the commission. Section 3315.01.01 of AD3300 states, “the actual approval of a candidate is done by the Police and Fire Commission.” Section 3315.01.02 states, “Even though the Human Resources Department is involved in the selection process identifying the most viable testing candidates, and process of the candidates through the recruitment process, the Chief of Police or his/her designee retains the responsibility for selection of personnel.” Additionally, the Chief failed to present a full picture of candidates presented to the PFC by omitting negative information from the requests-‐to-‐hire submissions. A review of the background investigations over the past five years compared to the documents presented to the PFC uncovered omissions of background information. Examples of the omissions are: • • • • •

Juvenile arrests Adult misdemeanor arrests Excessive alcohol or drug use history (including marijuana and methamphetamine) Several “conditional” psychological recommendations Untruthful responses recorded

• • • • •

Associate’s degree: 1 point Bachelor’s degree: 2 points Master’s degree: 5 points Veteran: 2 points Enrolled in a Wisconsin police academy: 1 point

While it is unlikely that most of the omissions in themselves would have resulted in the disqualification of the candidate, honesty and transparency in the process is critical. Under current policy, the Human Resources Department's official involvement in the entry-‐level hiring process ends at the recruitment stage. Once applicants are identified, the applications are given to the Police Chief and it is at this point that the Chief determines what points are to be added into his hiring matrix to determine those applicants who are invited to take the written test. There has not been any review by legal counsel or the Police and Fire Commission of this matrix prior to implementation. The Chief provided the first page of a six-‐page document detailing the Department's latest entry-‐level exam process. During this process, 227 people submitted applications. This document illustrates the points that applicants can earn for meeting certain criteria. It is not known how the various criteria were decided upon or by whom. Points are awarded in the following categories:

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• • • • •

Graduate of a Wisconsin police academy: 3 points Current certified Wisconsin police officer: 2 points Law enforcement experience outside Wisconsin: 1 point Current Wisconsin corrections officer: 1 point Fluent in Spanish: 2 points

Through interviews with staff, a clearer and disturbing picture emerged about how the Department uses this system to screen applicants. It also raises questions about the Department's lack of transparency and overall fairness. After applications are submitted, the Chief reviews them and matrix points are awarded to each application based on the various criteria. Only those applicants who attain a certain score on the matrix are invited to take the written test. The Chief failed to provide any documentation as to what score an applicant had to attain before being allowed to proceed to the next step of the process. When asked about the hiring matrix, the Deputy Chief could not answer any questions regarding how points are applied, stating, “Only the Chief knows about the hiring matrix.” There is no transparency in the validation of those selected to advance in the hiring process as applicants are not informed that this unofficial matrix point system will be used to review their application. All supporting documentation is provided to the Chief without any involvement of a second party, such as the Deputy Chief or human resources professionals. When asked, the Chief acknowledged that the current process and documents used are not validated by the Human Resources Department. The use of a preference point system is not new in the field of public safety. Many police and fire departments currently use such a system. However, BPD fails to follow best practices as to how such a system is typically employed. Matrices of this nature are not normally used as an applicant-‐screening tool. Typically, preference points do not come into play until after an applicant has concluded all tests. It is at this point that an applicant can claim his or her preference points, which are then added to his or her final score. By using the matrix as a screening tool, the BPD unfairly prohibits applicants who were otherwise qualified to take the written test. This tactic has severely reduced the applicant pool and calls into question the Department’s hiring practices.

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RECOMMENDATIONS 11.1 – Creation of Detective Sergeant: Create and staff the position of Detective Sergeant to ensure supervision and investigative excellence. 11.2 – Examination of Patrol Sergeant Duties: Study the administrative burden put on patrol sergeants and implement measures to reduce this burden to ensure field supervision. 11.3 – Patrol Staffing Analysis: Complete the staffing analysis of the Patrol Bureau that is currently underway as well as the workload analysis of the Detective Bureau. Determine if the patrol force is adequately staffed to accomplish its missions and conduct a cost-‐benefit analysis of the current level of overtime expenditures. 11.4 – Information Transparency: Require command personnel to ensure that both the sworn and civilian workforces are informed on matters of interest to the public and are provided with talking points that articulate the Department’s position and action plan on the specific topic as they are filling a front-‐ line Public Information Officer function. 11.5 –Information Inclusiveness: Ensure continuous communication from the command staff on activities of the Department, providing more inclusiveness and appreciation between the command staff and the civilian workforce. 11.6 – Civilian Commendations: Provide civilian commendations – both formal and informal – to personnel who continually go beyond what is required. 11.7 – Promotion and Special Assignment Selection: Standardize criteria in the promotion process and create transparency in the special assignment selections. The ultimate decision should not be left solely to the Chief’s discretion but should include the Chief, Deputy Chief, command, a selection committee or human resources professionals. 11.8 – Employment Qualifications: Immediately discontinue using the current hiring matrix and adopt a professionally created and tested hiring process. Make the hiring matrix transparent and explain clearly the criteria for hiring BPD candidates. Require the Chief to adhere to Equal Employment Opportunity laws and best practices regarding the hiring process. 11.9 – Validation and Selection Process: Ensure that the validation process for those selected to advance in the hiring process has transparency, including supporting documentation that is reviewed by not only the Chief but the Police and Fire Commission as well as individuals such as the Deputy Chief, command staff, the City Attorney and the Human Resources Department. 11.10 – Discriminatory Hiring Practices: Ensure that the Department’s hiring practices follow national best practices, laws and policies, as well as Wisconsin’s model for hiring. Additionally, the Department should immediately align itself with national and state standards in accordance with equal employment opportunity guidelines.

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APPENDICES Appendix A: Beat Management Guide and Example Plans

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Appendix B: Chief Jacob’s Response Letter To the “In Memory Of 23” Facebook Post by Retired BPD Officer

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Appendix C: Facebook Post by Retired BPD Officer Regarding “In Memory Of 23” Decal Removal

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Appendix D: Job Descriptions for Chief of Police and Deputy Chief of Police

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Appendix E: Disciplinary Tracking Log

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Appendix F: Hiring Matrix

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ENDNOTES i

Wis. Admin. Code § LES 2.01(1)(c) (c) The applicant shall not have been convicted of any federal felony or of any offense which if committed in Wisconsin could be punished as a felony unless the applicant has been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon.

Shane, Jon M. “Police Employee Disciplinary Matrix.” Police Employee Disciplinary Matrix. 1John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY, 18 Jan. 2012.

iii

Event deconfliction is the process of determining when law enforcement personnel are conducting an event in close proximity to one another at the same time. The use of an event deconfliction system also helps to reduce risk and liability, improve the wellness of officers, and safeguard citizens.

Geocoding is the plotting of longitude and latitude coordinates on a map identifying the location of an incident.

Hot spots refer to crimes located within a specific geographic perimeter, usually aligned with patrol beat alignments.

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