Hofstra University
Model United Nations Conference 2025
United Nations Security Council
Joseph Falco Jr, Co-Chair
Anna Waitword, Co-Chair
Dear Delegates,
It is a great pleasure to meet all of you. My name is Joseph Falco Jr., and I am a third-year student at Hofstra University. I have been studying Computer Science and Cybersecurity and it has been a blast so far. Most importantly, I am your Co-chair for the upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) committee during this HUMUNC conference.
I first experienced Model UN during my first year at Hofstra University. Although I had no experience beforehand, the concept immediately captured my interest, and from there, I participated in this club as much as possible. My experiences have led to me participating in several competitions from different colleges, where I have learned a great deal and had fun while participating. This will be my first time acting as a chair for a committee, but I promise I’ll do my best to make sure you have a similar experience at HUMUNC.
Besides my involvement in Model UN, I am a huge fan of video games. I mainly enjoy RPGs and platformers, but I generally enjoy any genre of video games as long as they are fun. It is difficult to choose my favorite game, but at this time, I think it is Persona 3 Reload. Aside from that, I enjoy acting and the amount of work involved in creating a character and narrative. Plays and musicals are among my favorite pieces of acting, so much so that I often get involved in school productions whenever I have the opportunity. One more thing, I am a huge fan of dogs. It doesn’t matter what dog it is; I guarantee you I will love it from the bottom of my heart.
I’m hoping that through this introduction, I might lessen your nerves for this competition. I have been in your place before, and I know that sometimes it can feel stressful to prepare for a Model UN competition. However, the main priority for this competition is for you all to have fun. After all, why put all your effort into something if you cannot enjoy it? Let’s find the answer to this question together and make this an amazing experience. Have fun and get ready for this amazing opportunity! I look forward to meeting all of you soon.
Sincerely,
Joseph Falco Jr. UNSC Committee Co-Chair HUMUNC 2025
Dear delegates,
Hello everyone, my name is Anna Waitword. I am from Queens, New York and I am a senior studying Forensic Science. This will be my fourth year participating in Model UN and my third year participating in HUMUNC. I am so excited to be your Co-chair for this year’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC)!
I started participating in Model UN here at Hofstra during my sophomore year, when I helped with HUMUNC and participated in a collegiate conference at the University of Chicago (CHOMUN) where I was a delegate in a committee that simulated Disney’s acquisition of Lucasfilm. In high school, I took an AP government class, which had many lessons that were run like a Model UN debate.
Outside of Model UN, I love to dance and swim — which are not only fun activities but tend to be where I also meet many friends. In high school I swam competitively for my school's team. At Hofstra I am a member of a sorority on campus, where I have met many close friends who share similar interests, whether it be dancing or swimming, or even music and television shows.
My goal with this committee is to create an environment where delegates can learn a little more about collegiate Model UN, as well as some UNSC issues, while also having fun. Welcome to the UNSC committee — I cannot wait to meet you all!
Sincerely,
Anna Waitword Co-chair HUMUNC 2025
Introduction to the Committee
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is not only one of the six main principal organs of the United Nations (UN), but its chief purpose is to handle matters of disarmament, global challenges, and overall threats to peace. As such, the resolutions made by the Security Council are binding and must be followed by all member states.1 This organ seeks to resolve these issues through collaborative efforts between multiple nations to ensure the safety and security of citizens across the world.
Committee sessions are divided into three main sections: general debates, relevant discussions, and draft actions. The committee will first establish the main point behind this gathering alongside the opinions of each delegate on the matter. Afterwards, the committee will choose to focus on specific issues related to the main topic in order to start building a plan of action. After these subtopics are discussed, delegates will join together to draft resolutions to oversee each aspect of the larger issue.
The UNSC is unique amongst the other organs due to its small size of only fifteen voting members, which include ten rotating members (with two-year terms) and five permanent members of the council. These permanent members, known as the P5, include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The P5 members hold veto power over council actions, requiring only one veto to defeat a resolution.2 Additionally, the UNSC is the organ that is entitled to verbatim records coverage. In order to best foster debate in our simulation, we will bestow voting rights to special envoy members who are not actually on the current Security Council. Other features of the committee — including veto power, direction of
peacekeeping forces, the ability to declare sanctions, and cooperation with other UN bodies (the Disarmament and International Security Committee, for example) — will be preserved.
Topic 1: Securing Nuclear Material in Conflict Zones
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II had devastating effects on both residents and the environment. In the wake of the bombings, people were affected by radiation poisoning, which eventually led to significant health issues among survivors including physical amputations and cancer. Now, imagine a nuclear disaster four hundred times stronger than this atomic bomb. Unfortunately, such an incident is no fictional tale. The nuclear disaster at the Chernobyl power plant in Ukraine released such a devastating quantity of radiation over ten days in 19863 and radiation spilled from to Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant after an earthquake in 2011 caused measurable environmental damage.4
Nuclear plants contain the power of the atom in a delicate balance between engineering and safety procedures meant to harness energy while maintaining utmost safety. Fission (or the splitting apart of atomic nuclei) releases a large amount of energy, and nuclear plants typically harvest this energy by bundling rods of uranium together to create a fuel assembly that heats water. When controlled, this process generates steam which spins a turbine to produce electricity.5 Unfortunately, any issue that upsets this balance has the potential to unleash radioactive waste as the reactor experiences a “meltdown.”6
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 to help usher in safe nuclear power,7 but the diverse threats of the modern era necessitate support from the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the potential for tragic accidents similar to Fukushima or
Chernobyl, the modern world must be prepared for new threats that fall outside the scope of the IAEA, including non-state actors attempting to hijack power plants’ nuclear material and conflict zones adjacent to power plants. It will be up to the Security Council to protect humanity by developing and enforcing relevant safety guidelines.
Benefits of Nuclear Power
As nuclear power is associated with various threats, some might be tempted to encourage limits or even a total halt on its use, but an informed decision cannot be made without first understanding the immense benefits of this controversial energy source. Nuclear facilities require significantly less space than other renewable energy sources and less fuel than conventional sources. A solar farm would require seventy-five times more space than a nuclear plant to produce the same amount of energy, and an equivalent wind farm would require 360 times more space! A one-inch pellet of enriched uranium can even provide as much energy as one ton of coal (Figure 1). As such, the spent fuel pellets are small and easily manageable. They can be processed and either recycled and sold back to plants as additional fuel or safely stored in small repositories.8 Nuclear plants can also continually produce energy at “baseload” levels throughout the day, while solar and wind farms can only produce power intermittently (there is no sun at night, for example) and require a massive battery fleet to store the energy.9 Indeed, “nuclear energy has by far the highest capacity factor of any other energy source” as the plants operate at full capacity over 92.5 percent of the time.10
Figure 2: Uranium Enrichment Levels21
The IAEA has strong regulatory powers, but it struggles to adequately guard against unreported facilities. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Romania, and Syria have all attempted to develop nuclear capabilities via activities that went unreported. The Iranian nuclear program is an excellent case study for this trend, but each example shows that a “critical lesson from history is that would-be proliferators try to sneak out; they don’t breakout… [because] the IAEA is just too good at monitoring what’s declared.”22
Iran first began to enrich uranium in the 1980s after secretly obtaining black market centrifuges. As the technology was not reported to the IAEA, Iran was able to secretly develop and operate enrichment facilities until 2002. This situation was repeated in 2006 when Iran began constructing more secret enrichment facilities until their discovery in 2009. While the IAEA is not currently capable of detecting secret facilities easily, there are protocols that could be implemented to mitigate this threat. For example, free testing of radioactivity levels across a country could enable detection of secret enrichment facilities. Unsupervised interviews by IAEA
inspectors with program scientists could also provide opportunities to discover unreported sites. Additionally, there are a variety of reagents needed to enrich uranium, but the IAEA does not currently monitor these compounds. Regulating these non-nuclear reagents in addition to uranium may prevent the secret supplying of centrifuges.23 Similarly, regulation of unenriched uranium could limit the ability of states to power covert nuclear programs.
Nuclear Plants in Warzones
On the morning of March 4, 2022, only weeks into the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a Russian missile hit Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.24 The missile did not hit a reactor, and the damage was soon controlled. Regardless, the strike was alarming and raised questions related to the safety and security of these facilities; an unlucky strike could destabilize the reactor and unleash radiation in a meltdown scenario.25
In the wake of this incident, the IAEA released two protocols: the “Seven Indispensable Pillars” and “Five Concrete Principles.” The seven pillars lay out general guidelines that must be followed in an armed conflict to maintain the safety of nuclear power plants. These include communication between both parties, maintenance of off-site power to stabilize the reactor, and untouched supply chains. The “pillars” emphasize to potential combatants that the safe operation of nuclear facilities requires more attention that just what occurs at the site of the reactor.
Figure 3: Location of Zaporizhzhia Nucleal Power Plant26
Figure 4: The IAEA’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars”27
The five principles, on the other hand, are specific to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant incident and were announced by the IAEA Director General at a UN Security Council meeting in May 2023. These principles seek to protect the plant’s infrastructure and discourage military actions in its vicinity, including attacks generated from the plant or attacks against the plant. By stating in these five principles that military activity should not take place at nuclear sites, both sides in the conflict are meant to understand that the international community can hold them responsible for any damage to Zaporizhzhia’s operation that result from violating the principles.
Figure 5: The IAEA’s “Five Concrete Principles”28 Both plans work to alleviate the risk of a nuclear disaster.29
Unfortunately, the protocols set forth by the IAEA to maintain global safety have not been adhered to during the conflict. “From the start of their occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant, Russian forces have clashed with staff of Energoatom, Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear company.”30 In various statements made by the company in June 2022, it accused Russian forces of trying to make the plant workers appear irresponsible in order to justify their control of the plant.
The site’s inaccessibility has made independent verification of the claims of both sides difficult. However, there have been numerous events that clearly hindered nuclear safety. On June 30, 2022, Russian forces made plant workers drain the reserves of coolant that work to stabilize the reactor and prevent meltdowns. Shortly after this incident, “satellite images first showed Russian military vehicles and equipment in and around the plant itself,”31 and nearby artillery fire began to destroy the power plant’s connections to the electric grid. The IAEA eventually entered the facility on September 1, 2022, to assess the situation. While the regulators
noted that “the seven pillars have all been compromised,” both Ukraine (via Energoatom) and Russia have contested the report.32
However, Zaporizhzhia was not the only nuclear facility attacked during the war between Russia and Ukraine. The Chernobyl site was captured by Russia in February 2022, and though it is not an active nuclear plant, the facility stores nuclear waste and contains radiation from the prior meltdown. While held by Russia, Chernobyl’s power was cut off, forcing Ukrainian engineers to find alternate sources to fuel the station. One engineer explained “if we had lost power, it could have been catastrophic…I was scared it would be a tragedy for humanity.”33 The threat to nuclear facilities has persisted throughout the conflict, including a drone strike was recently carried out against the Zaporizhzhia plant in April 2024.34 Though neither side has claimed responsibility, and the IAEA stated that this attack did not “compromise nuclear security”, the incident shows the continuing threat. The importance of stronger international action to preserve nuclear security has never been greater.
Bloc Positions
Nations with existing nuclear capabilities will generally support strong regulation of nuclear power to prevent other nations from developing weapons. On the other hand, nations seeking to develop a weapons program might not consent to more stringent regulations that could hinder their plans. These clashing aims may foster strong debate in committee, but delegates will likely be much more in agreement when examining the safety of nuclear material in zones of conflict. It will be up to the United Nations Security Council to weigh these concerns and draft an outline for new regulations to maintain global security.
Guiding Questions
(1) Does the Security Council have a responsibility to prevent nuclear accidents?
(2) Can current IAEA guidelines serve as a framework for the Security Council?
(3) How can the international community prevent rogue actors from obtaining nuclear material?
(4) What policies can the international community agree to abide by to protect nuclear plants in the middle of conflict zones? Should outside forces protect “demilitarized zones” around nuclear power plants?
(5) How can safeguards be enforced to ensure global nuclear security?
Topic 2: Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles
Starting in the 1960s countries began to develop Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRVs) to enhance the payload of nuclear missiles. MIRVs are a shuttle for nuclear capable warheads delivered by ballistic missiles, but they allow the warheads to split up, allowing one missile to target multiple sites35 (see Figure 6).
6: (a) MIRV bus prior to launch and the MIRV bus orienting warheads mid -launch (b)36
As each MIRV warhead released by a missile can be directed with a different velocity, it is more challenging for traditional ballistic missile defense systems to destroy the incoming warheads.37 Both land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) can fire MIRVs. The United States was the first to develop the technology for MIRVs, later followed by the Soviet Union (today, Russia). Both countries had expanded their arsenals throughout the Cold War, however, MIRVs have been used only one time in conflict: Russia launched a Oreshnik-class Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Figure
a) b)
armed with six conventional warheads on a MIRV bus at Dnipro, Ukraine in November 2024.38 The remaining P5 nations (China, France, and the United Kingdom), as well as India and Pakistan, all possess MIRV technology. North Korea has tested missiles that could carry MIRVed warheads.39 Indeed, Pakistan successfully tested MIRV warheads on its Ababeel missile in late 201740 and India followed suit, publicizing a successful test of MIRV warheads fired by its Agni-5 missile in March 2024.41
Destabilizing Effect of MIRVs
Nuclear capable nations are attracted by MIRVs because of their increased efficiency. A single missile can launch warheads at many targets if equipped with a MIRV bus (a launcher inside the warhead), so fewer missiles and launch facilities are needed to achieve the same firepower. However, the advantage that comes from the firepower concentration makes the technology a destabilizing force “by concentrating many warheads on single missiles that present attractive targets, in a crisis land-based MIRVs could undermine deterrence and incentivize shooting first”.42 It is significantly easier to destroy a MIRVed missile on the ground, before launch, as opposed to individually targeting and destroying the separate warheads after launch. Thus, countries with MIRVs would have an incentive to use them as part of a first strike while maintaining full effectiveness (“by shooting first, an attacker with MIRVs could in theory eliminate their adversary’s ground-based forces and still have a reserve — a thermonuclear war ‘win’”).43 Those threatened by MIRVs “have an equally strong incentive to attack” and destroy them before any nuclear warheads are fired.44
Of note, SLBMs may also have MIRVs, but the destabilizing effect to global security is generally much lower for these missiles. Nuclear submarines holding MIRVed missiles spread out, undetected, on patrols across the ocean. This keeps the weapons safe, altering game theory considerations. MIRVed SLBMs that are out at sea are out of reach for a pre-emptive first strike by adversaries, and thus, there is no incentive for the nation holding them to launch a first strike to prevent them from being destroyed, as land-based ICBMs could be . However, this safer equilibrium only exists when the submarines remain at sea. Maintaining submarines at pier, especially if two submarines are at the same pier, eliminates this benefit: their MIRVed missiles with extra warheads become concentrated and targetable, just like land-based ICBMs.45
Legal Framework
As a class of nuclear weapons, MIRV technologies fall under the umbrella of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty came into effect in 1970 and prohibited nations lacking nuclear capabilities from developing them.46 Due to a lack of sufficient mechanisms for enforcement, “nine states possess nuclear weapon capability and approximately [thirty] states have the technical ability to acquire it”.47 The NPT technically bans the development of MIRV buses for non-nuclear capable states (they are a nuclear weapon associated technology), but this ban is in name only. The terms of the NPT are clearly not enough to curb MIRV technologies. Future international treaties regulating MIRVs will have to adopt stronger enforcement strategies to find success. Beyond international treaties, various bilateral agreements on nuclear weapons may serve as inspiration for MIRV regulation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I, was
signed in 1991 to reduce the size of Soviet and American nuclear arsenals by placing a cap on the number of missiles and warheads allowed. It also regulated MIRV style warheads; Article 5 Clause 12a of the treaty stated that both nations agreed “not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles”.48 The regulations of START I were largely effective at reining in nuclear arsenals, but the cap on MIRVs was still large. At the time, the U.S. viewed the treaty “as a bridge to a ‘deMIRVing treaty’ creating lower and ‘dramatically more stable force structures’.”49 Such a treaty was almost enacted in 1993. Fueled by promising initial dialogue, START II lowered nuclear arsenal caps even further and, more importantly, banned the “multiple warheads on land-based strategic missiles — along with further general reductions in strategic delivery vehicles”, as well as a reduction in the number of MIRVs deployed.50 Unfortunately, the treaty was short-lived and never officially entered force due to disagreements over U.S. missile defense systems, a weak Russian economy that could not support the replacement of MIRVs with a matching number of individual missiles, and an overall deterioration in relations between the two countries. The subsequent SORT and New START agreements abandoned the MIRV ban attempted by START II, and no treaty currently in force bans them.51 In a world where MIRVs have expanded beyond the United States and Russia and limiting MIRVs have moved beyond their bilateral treaty attempts, perhaps the United Nations Security Council can focus on the issue and pass a multilateral resolution.
Case Study: MIRV and Deterrence Stability in South Asia
The tensions between India and Pakistan encapsulate the pressures of a nuclear arms race and the associated stabilizing and destabilizing factors. Animosity between the neighboring nations flared up almost immediately after they gained independence in 1947. Multiple full-scale wars were waged in 1947, 1965, and 1971, in addition to smaller conflicts which threatened to flare into greater threats to peace.52 However, the political landscape of the subcontinent reached a “significant turning point” in 1998 as both India and Pakistan became nuclear-armed nations. Nuclear deterrence gave rise to increased stability, “discouraging large-scale military conflicts and promoting cautious behavior.”53
This balance was later undermined by India’s successful development of Ballistic Missile Defense systems (BMDs). Pakistan’s missiles no longer posed the same threat to India, so Pakistan was incentivized to expand the firepower of its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the Pakistani Armed Forces released a statement after a successful MIRV test in 2017 explaining that the missile was developed to ensure the “survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) environment.”54 India’s rapid response with its own MIRV test may have been guided by the MIRV-based growth in Chinese and Pakistani nuclear arsenals, and the expanding BMDs of China likely played a role as well.55
Case Study: Diverging MIRV Concentrations in Russia and the United States
The nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia has followed a largely different path than the Indian subcontinent. Both nations have complied with bilateral treaties to reduce
the total size of their nuclear arsenals. The U.S. has gone beyond these agreements and has complied with the MIRV ban of the failed START II. America’s MIRVed Peacekeeper MX missile, which held ten warheads, was never developed and its Minuteman III missile was scaled back from three warheads to one. Of note, the United States still maintains MIRVed SLBMs (less destabilizing than land based MIRVs), and U.S. law requires the military to maintain the ability to restore MIRVs to land based ICBMs.56
Russian military doctrine trends in the opposite doctrine. Instead of reducing reliance on MIRVs, Russia has expanded the role of MIRVs in its nuclear arsenal. It has increased deployment of its SS-27 Mod 2 missile which can release four warheads, is designing a new MIRVed ICBM that can hold between ten and twenty-four warheads, and set plans to “have its entire road-mobile ICBM fleet MIRVed by the early 2020s.”57 As with the Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese nuclear rivalries, American BMDs played a role in shaping Russia’s desire to maintain its fleet of MIRVed missiles.58
Bloc Positions
Regulation of MIRVs represents a complicated topic without two clearly defined blocs. Nations without nuclear ambitions would likely be in favor of restrictions on MIRVs to boost international security, but they may be wary of compromises that reduce BMDs. On the other hand, nuclear capable and nuclear aspiring nations are a much less homogenous group. These nations have maintained MIRVs to project their power and evade enemy BMDs. Some might be open to compromises in which MIRVs are limited or banned in exchange for reductions in defense systems. Such a trade-off would involve delicate negotiations.
The United States, for example, values its BMDs for defense against rogue non-state actors and smaller adversaries like North Korea and Iran. On the other hand, Russian MIRV deployments are based on more than just a desire to evade BMDs; its weak economy means it can only achieve the nuclear parity it desires through the efficiency that MIRVs allow. Limiting the concentrationof nuclear firepower that MIRVs foster will increase global stability and security, but the unique circumstances of each nation will guide the flow of debate and any compromises made to achieve this goal.59
Guiding questions
(1) In what ways should international law regulate MIRVs?
(2) Can a treaty more rigorous than the NPT be enacted to successfully stop the expansion of MIRVs to new countries?
(3) Should international law (or smaller scale agreements) aim to fully ban countries with existing MIRVs from deploying them? Or should it place its focus on limiting the number of warheads on MIRVed missiles?
(4) How can MIRV disarmament be balanced to ensure deterrence? What compromises can be made?
(5) If multilateral or bilateral agreements are instead the chosen path of regulation, does the UN have a role in facilitating dialogue or monitoring compliance?
Endnotes
1 “What Is the Security Council?” United Nations,www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-securitycouncil
2 United Nations. (n.d.). Voting System. Security Council https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/voting-system
3 Vidal, John. "Hell on Earth." The Guardian 25 April 2005, http://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/apr/26/guardiansocietysupplement7
4 International Atomic Energy Agency. “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident” IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-accident
5 Office of Nuclear Energy. “Nuclear 101: How Does A Nuclear Reactor Work?” 2 August 2023, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-101-how-does-nuclear-reactor-work
6 Lamb, Robert & Bowie, Desiree. “How a Nuclear Meltdown Works.” 27 September 2023 https://science.howstuffworks.com/nuclear-meltdown.htm
7 International Atomic Energy Agency. “History.” IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history
8 Office of Nuclear Energy. “3 Reasons Why Nuclear is Clean and Sustainable.” 31 March 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/3-reasons-why-nuclear-clean-and-sustainable
9 White, Anne & Krol, Aaron. “Nuclear Energy.” MIT Climate Portal. 24 July 2024. https://climate.mit.edu/explainers/nuclear-energy
10 Office of Nuclear Energy. “Nuclear Power is the Most Reliable Energy Source and It's Not Even Close” 24 March 2021. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-power-most-reliable-energy-sourceand-its-not-even-close
11 Office of Nuclear Energy. “3 Reasons Why Nuclear is Clean and Sustainable.” 31 March 2021, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/3-reasons-why-nuclear-clean-and-sustainable
12 Office of Nuclear Energy. “Nuclear Power is the Most Reliable Energy Source and It's Not Even Close” 24 March 2021. https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-power-most-reliable-energy-sourceand-its-not-even-close
13 Energy Information Administration. “Nuclear power plants generated 68% of France’s electricity in 2021” 23 January 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55259
14 Röhrlich, Elisabeth. “The IAEA's Work” University of Vienna. https://iaea-history.univie.ac.at/theiaeas-early-history/the-iaeas-work/
15 IAEA. “Statute of the IAEA.” https://www.iaea.org/about/statute#a1-3
16 IAEA. “Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material” 2018. https://www.iaea.org/publications/12288/regulations-for-the-safe-transport-of-radioactive-material
17 IAEA. “Borehole Disposal Facilities for Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources.” 2024. https://www.iaea.org/publications/15332/borehole-disposal-facilities-for-disused-sealed-radioactivesources
18 Nuclear Threat Initiative. “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” 14 July 2024. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/international-atomic-energy-agency/
19 IAEA. “Safeguards Agreements.” https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements
20 Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Uranium Enrichment.” Tutorials. 2023, https://tutorials.nti.org/nuclear101/uranium-enrichment/
21 Ibid.
22 Acton, James. “Who Cares about an Iranian Nuclear Breakout? Beware of an Atomic “Sneak-out””. National Review. 4 November 2014 https://nationalinterest.org/feature/who-cares-about-iranian-nuclearbreakout-beware-atomic-sneak-11604/
23 Ibid.
24 Farmer, Matt. “Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant: A timeline of events since Russia’s invasion” Power Technology. 21 October 2022 https://www.power-technology.com/features/ukraine-zaporizhzhiatimeline-nuclear-plant/?cf-view
25 Frayer, L & Brumfiel, G. “Russian forces in Ukraine attack and seize Europe's largest nuclear power plant.” NPR 4 March 2022 https://www.npr.org/2022/03/03/1084414241/a-contested-ukrainian-nuclearplant-is-under-attack-by-russian-forces
26 Ibid.
27 IAEA. (2024, March 5). Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. IAEA. https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/nuclear-safety-security-and-safeguards-in-ukraine
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Farmer, Matt. “Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant: A timeline of events since Russia’s invasion” Power Technology. 21 October 2022 https://www.power-technology.com/features/ukraine-zaporizhzhiatimeline-nuclear-plant/?cf-view
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Limaye, Yogita. “Inside Chernobyl: We stole Russian fuel to prevent catastrophe” BBC 8 April 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61048256
34 https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/07/europe/russian-controlled-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-reactor-damagedfollowing-drone-attack/index.html
35 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2017) Fact Sheet: Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) https://armscontrolcenter.org/multiple-independently-targetable-reentry-vehiclemirv/
36 Doyle, G., Balmforth T., & Zafra, M. (2024). Enter ‘Oreshnik’. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/RUSSIA-MISSILE/gdpzknajgvw/
37 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2017) Fact Sheet: Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) https://armscontrolcenter.org/multiple-independently-targetable-reentry-vehiclemirv/
38 Doyle, G., Balmforth T., & Zafra, M. (2024). Enter ‘Oreshnik’. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/RUSSIA-MISSILE/gdpzknajgvw/
39 Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2017) Fact Sheet: Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) https://armscontrolcenter.org/multiple-independently-targetable-reentry-vehiclemirv/
40 Gady, F. (2017). Pakistan Tests New Ballistic Missile Capable of Carrying Multiple Nuclear Warheads. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistan-tests-new-ballistic-missile-capableof-carrying-multiple-nuclear-warheads/
41 Economic Times (2024, March). India joins the elite list of nations with test of Agni-V MIRV tech: What's MIRV tech? How is it unique? https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-joinsthe-elite-list-of-nations-with-test-of-agni-v-mirv-tech-whats-mirv-tech-how-is-itunique/articleshow/108397707.cms
42 Rudesill, D. (2018). MIRVs Matter: Banning Hydra Headed Missiles in a New START II Treaty. Stanford Journal of International Law Vol. 54. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3043941
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Freedman, L (2024). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-on-the-Non-proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons
47 Khalid, A (2018). Fifty years of NPT: Weaknesses over the course. Foreign Policy News. https://foreignpolicynews.org/2018/07/31/fifty-years-of-npt-weaknesses-over-the-course/
48 US State Department. (n.d.). Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic, Offensive Arms. https://19972001.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html
49 Rudesill, D. (2018). MIRVs Matter: Banning Hydra Headed Missiles in a New START II Treaty. Stanford Journal of International Law Vol. 54. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3043941
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Center for Preventative Action (2024). Conflict Between India and Pakistan. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan
53 Shah, J (2024). MIRV And Deterrence Stability: A Case Study of South Asia https://stratheia.com/mirvand-deterrence-stability-a-case-study-of-south-asia/
54 Gady, F. (2017). Pakistan Tests New Ballistic Missile Capable of Carrying Multiple Nuclear Warheads. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistan-tests-new-ballistic-missile-capableof-carrying-multiple-nuclear-warheads/
55 Keshavdev, V (2024). Agni-5 MIRV tech can target warheads across China and Pakistan: US top scientist. Fortune India. https://www.fortuneindia.com/macro/agni-5-mirv-tech-can-target-warheadsacross-china-and-pakistan-us-top-scientist/116126
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid (Rudesill, 2018)
59 Ibid
