YOUR LEVY AT WORK
A GUIDE TO NEW ZEALAND’S BIOSECURITY SYSTEM Eve Pleydell : HortNZ risk policy advisor
A Swiss Cheese Model of NZ’s Biosecurity System All layers of the system are required to provide maximum protection
, ns e ns n e io ntin io es o e t t i c t nc y ns a nc e ara ec la c o a l p rit l p i l fi s s s n sp ri nt cu ei in , qu rve es io nts e in nts e e v e t r e r v e s su m os rta me hor me or nt su ing ity er sm e bi es ur po ire rd ses nsh tme ctiv ram lic ort fs eat c f c m o b i m u s r e t I q B a O ea O tr A rog Pu rep Fa rac os & re tr & p Bi & p
Unwanted pest or disease causes damage in NZ
Unwanted pest or disease in a foreign country
Pre-Border
Border
Post-Border
Each layer of the system has imperfections or vulnerabilities (holes). If each layer is functioning well, it is harder for multiple holes to line-up Credits: Original source – James Reason, adapted from Ian Mackay’s interpretation
Part 1: All layers of the system are required to provide maximum protection Key messages • New Zealand’s biosecurity system is made up of many layers • Multiple people and organisations are required for it to function well • Primary producers play important roles across the system During a recent biosecurity presentation, a speaker suggested that the Swiss cheese model could be used to illustrate how the different layers of the biosecurity system work together to provide protection. In this article I’m taking that idea and exploring it further. The Swiss cheese model was developed in the 1990s by the psychologist James Reason to illustrate how accidents may happen. In this model, each layer of defence against an accident is illustrated as a piece of Swiss cheese with random holes. The slices of cheese are arranged in a line one after another and accidents happen when the holes line up from one end of the line to the other. While this model has been applied and maybe even misapplied to many different situations, it can be used to provide a simplistic, but helpful overview of the biosecurity system. 8 NZGROWER : MAY 2022
It is tempting to think of the biosecurity system as being the things that the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) does at the border to protect New Zealand from being invaded by unwanted pests and diseases. That is certainly one of the most public facing aspects of the biosecurity system, but equally important things happen offshore (commonly referred to as “pre-border”) and onshore here in New Zealand (commonly referred to as “post-border”). In a series of short articles, we’ll take a closer look at each of these parts of the system, but for now let’s consider some of the holes in the biosecurity cheeses. In his original model, James Reason described two types of holes, which he termed “active failures” and “latent conditions.” Thinking about how this applies to biosecurity, a system failure could be considered an active failure. This could be something arriving in New Zealand that the system as a whole was not expecting and was unprepared for. The importation regulations did not cover it, it was not detected at the border, there was no active surveillance to detect it, normal farming practices did not stop it from spreading, and no one in New Zealand spotted it or reported it before it started to cause damage. Another type of active failure could be human errors such as treatment failures, inadequate inspections, or people
