An Analysis of Ambiguity in Law

An Analysis of Ambiguity in Law

By Lale Şevval Göncüoğlu

I. INTRODUCTION

The leading case, Yates v. United States, demonstrates a defendant’s offense and defense against an accusation by using a possibly ambiguous word ‘’tangible object’’ and the origins of the code he is accused of committing. What makes Yates’s case significant regarding ambiguity is how he defends himself by pointing out an ambiguous word and the background of the code. Yates was charged with violating 18 U.S.C §1519 by dumping an undersized group of redfish against the inspection’s instructions. He faced with twenty years imprisonment by violating §1519, which states a person will be imprisoned if he ‘’knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsified, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct or influence’’ a federal investigation (Yates v. United States, 2015). Yates argued in the court that the language “tangible object” does not include fish. Yates also argued that because the act, §1519, was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley act due to multiple bankruptcies and financial frauds coming into public knowledge in 2002, falsifying or making a false entrance is valid in the case of records and documents but not fish. Therefore, the question regarding ambiguity is what kind of measures the court can take when faced with ambiguity and what needs to be considered in such cases. A. Definition of Ambiguity When it comes to ambiguous words, the first sources applied to consider and evaluate the meaning of the words are dictionaries. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ambiguity as ‘’duplicity indistinctness, or uncertainty of the meaning of an expression used in written instrument’’ (Henry Campbell Black, 1968). Mozley and Whiteley’s define it as ‘’uncertainty of meaning in the words of a written instrument’’ (West & Neave, 1904), and Oxford’s Law dictionary defines it as ‘’uncertainty of meaning’’ (Elizabeth A. Martin, 2003).The only thing they have in common is

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that ambiguity causes confusion, which necessitates numerous meanings rather than just one. It is also noteworthy to make the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness to avoid any further confusion. In certain ways, vagueness differs from ambiguity. Mainly, vagueness does not specify any particular thing or statement. By saying a word is vague, it is implied that it lacks clarity, is too general, and so forth. In contrast, saying a word is ambiguous; one states that uncertainty comes when the word has more than one meaning. It implies that the word can be interpreted in several ways. For example, ‘’Mary is a successful woman’’ is a vague statement because the question arises of what is accepted as successful, how successful, and compared to who/whom Mary is successful. On the other hand, ‘’I broke the frame’’ is an ambiguous statement since one can ask about the meaning of the frame, which can mean a framework for a pair of eyeglasses, a picture, or even a body part (“Frame” | Definition and Related Words, n.d.). Hence, as seen here, ambiguity allows interpretation to find the right meaning in the given context. Moreover, as will be observed in the case of Yates v. United States, interpretation frequently ignores the goals of the parties since it only concentrates on the words and their meaning. Thus, a method that takes into account the parties' intentions, background information, potential loopholes, and the overcriminalization caused by ambiguity must be demonstrated. B. Ambiguity in Law Certain canons were established to address ambiguity and avoid such interpretation. For example, in Yates v. United States, we see canons that the court applied, including ejusdem generis and rule of lenity. Ejusdem generis states that if statutes list persons or things in general, these can only apply to similar persons and things (The People's Law Dictionary, 2005). Rule of lenity affairs that in case of ambiguity in the statute, the case will resolve in favor of the

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defendant (Merriam-Webster, n.d). These do not limit the canons that address ambiguity; for instance, some revoke each other's rule, and some are deferences based on case results.

Noscitur a sociis, similar to ejusdem generis, is a doctrine that suggests an ambiguous word should be evaluated in the associated context (Merriam-Webster, n.d). Contra proferentem acts opposite to the rule of lenity and states that if the case involves ambiguity, the clause should be resolved against the defender (Oxford Reference, n.d).

Furthermore, the two essential deferences for ambiguity are Chevron and Auer deferences. Chevron deference points out that if an issue is implicit, the court cannot substitute its interpretation with the interpretation made by the agency (Legal Information Institute, n.d). Thus, Chevron has two evaluation steps: courts determining whether the intent is ambiguous or not and if it is ambiguous; moving to step two, the court decides whether the congress was explicit or implicit. If the congress is implicit, the agency's interpretation is accepted as binding (Ballotpedia, n.d). In contrast, Auer's deference does not include a two-step evaluation and gives the agency the right to interpret the regulation if it is ambiguous (''Auer v. Robinson'', 2021).

II.

THE CASES APPLIED CANONSBefore examining the applications of these canons and analyzing the Yates v. United States, we will review three supreme court cases that use the canons and deferences we mentioned above. The first case is Deal v. United States. The defendant committed six robberies, using a gun in each of them, and was convicted to a total of 105 years imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which states that "if a second or subsequent conviction is committed, the person will be sentenced to no less than 25 years of imprisonment" (FindLaw, 2018). The defendant argued that "second or subsequent conviction" stated in §924(c) was ambiguous and requested to invoke the

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rule of lenity (Deal v. United States, 1993). The so-called ambiguous word "conviction" is defined as "in a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged" by Black's Law Dictionary (Henry Campbell Black, 1968). The definition and the defendant's continuity of his actions after the first one (subsequent five robberies) could not invoke the rule of lenity. Thus, petitioner Deal was sentenced to 105 years in prison in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). In Deal v. United States, we see two crucial things that conclude a case shape around ambiguity: finding the word's definition coherent with the statute and the defendant's actions. Deal v. United States is an example of a case in which the defendant's intent was seen and the court interpreted an ambiguous legislation in a way that eliminated the ambiguity.

The second case is the source case of the Chevron deference, Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. The Clean Air Act requires states to implement some standards through individual plans approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). While state governments monitor and conduct inspections, the EPA reviews these state inspections (Ballotpedia, n.d). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 required the nonattainment states, where air quality is worse than others (Non-Attainment Area, 2018), to regulate "new or modified major stationary sources' ' of air pollution. This allowed the states to adopt the definition ''stationary source'' which explains pollution-emitting devices can be rearranged without applying the requirements if the total emission will not increase (Constitutional Law Reporter, n.d). The court confirmed the EPA's plantwide definition of ''stationary source'' and reversed the case (Legal Information Institute, n.d). In Chevron, the ambiguous word "stationary" was the factor determining the subject of the case, as seen in other case examples. It is also worth noting that, despite the fact that the case does not focus on the

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defendant's crimes, the ambiguous word "stationary" might be viewed as a loophole because it creates a discrepancy between two separate government statutes. The difficult element for the court was establishing an interpretation as well as a precise definition of "stationary." The Chevron deference was established as a result of the court's decision to concur with the EPA's definition. As previously mentioned, Chevron deference has a two-step evaluation of the ambiguous word in a government agency's regulation based on this case. The significance of ambiguity can be examined in Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc, as ambiguity created confusion in state regulation and put an additional requirement for evaluating the ambiguity in the agency's statute.

The last case, Auer v. Robbins, which was brought to the Eighth Circuit's attention, established a deference similar to Chevron but for different reasons. Police sergeants and a lieutenant in St. Louis prosecuted their police commissioners for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Auer v. Robbins). The respondent put forward 29 U. S. C. §213(a)(1), which states that the provision of 29 U.S. Code § 206, minimum wage regulation, will not apply to ''any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity'' (Legal Information Institute, n.d). The U.S Department of Labor also affirms that overtime payment will be made if the employee (which is defined in §213(a)(1)) works more than 40 hours in a workweek that is also stated in the Fair Labor Standards (FLS) (Department of Labor, n.d). Thus, the respondent argued that they are not required to pay them overtime by pointing the sergeants and lieutenants count within the bona fide executive, administrative, or professional definition. In addition, FLS states that to qualify for the exemption, employees must meet the ''salary basis test''. Employees must receive $684 per week, which is called a salary basis that means an employee regularly receives a predetermined number

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of wages weekly (Department of Labor, 2019, p.1). In response, petitioners claimed that they could not meet the salary basis test since the Police Department regulations could theoretically reduce their wages (Auer v. Robbins, 1997b). Although the case of ambiguity is not direct here as in other cases, defining the ''employee'' and ''salary basis'' within the legislation was challenged by petitioners, and the court was once again concerned about ambiguity. Auer v. Robbins built the very foundations of Auer Deference, the recognition of an agency to interpret its ambiguous regulations. Unlike chevron, Auer deference only applies to an agency's ambiguous regulation (Ballotpedia, n.d).

Each of these cases represents different aspects of ambiguity and the consequences that came with it. It is crucial to understand that ambiguity can be a possible tool to damage the legal system by giving defendants the chance to play with the words and hide their true intentions but also causing to create controversial canons or deferences, as seen in Chevron and Auer. For example, later on, Justice Scalia encouraged the court not to apply Auer deference. Justice Thomas called Auer into question, and Justice Scalia with Chief Justice Robert, indicated the re-consideration of the deference (Simonsen, 2018).

III.

AN ANALYSIS OF YATES v. UNITED STATES

Yates v. United States has a uniqueness like Chevron, but in this case, ambiguity does not question the legislation but questions the code's background and why it passed. Yates's primary defense was built on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the origins of 18 U. S. C. §1519. For these reasons, deciding upon the definition of the ambiguous word ''tangible object'' in Yates v. United States was not the only challenge the 11th circuit faced.

A. Accounting Scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley Act

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In 2002, a vast crisis hit Wall Street with the two giant companies' bankruptcy and accounting scandals within them. One of these companies was Enron Corporation, an energy company based in Houston worth around 101 billion dollars (Enron, 2021). What caused Enron's bankruptcy was primarily the "mark-to-market accounting" technique that the company relies on to hide its financial troubles (Bondarenko, 2021a). Mark to market is a technique that adjusts the value of an asset to the current market value and shows the worth of an asset if it's sold today. This can be reflected in the record as good profits even if it is at its lowest level (Amedeo, 2020). In October 2001, Enron announced that it had lost $638 million for the third quarter, and in the following days' government started to investigate Enron's financial reports (Bondarenko, 2021b). As a result, Enron filed for bankruptcy and ceased all its operations in 2007. Another company that shared the same faith with Enron was WorldCom, one of the largest telephone companies in the United States involved in similar activities and filed for bankruptcy in 2002.

As a result of these scandals and the bankruptcy of America's biggest companies, Congress drafted several legislations. Michael Oxley introduced the ''Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002'' and Senator Paul Sarbanes introduced the ''Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002'' (Williams, 2003, pp. 8, 9). Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed on July 30, 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act states and recognizes crucial regulations, including confirmation of the stated conditions in the financial reports and statements, reports' accuracy, and the requirement of internal controls. If these are not entirely fulfilled, it also recognizes severe penalties, such as 10 to 20 years imprisonment (Corporate Finance Institute, 2020). In addition, 18 U.S.C. section 1519 and followings 1520 was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacting penalties for false statements and destruction of evidence. Ron Paul is one of the Sarbanes-Oxley act's critics,

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despite the fact that it successfully decreased fraud charges in the US. He urges the repeal of monetary and fiscal policies that distort the market and draws attention to the need for fewer acts and preventions. (Haman, 2007). While criticism continues today, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act plays an essential role in America's economy and businesses. In 2015, this vital act will come back on stage in Yates v. United States case, but this time it will be the fish, not the money, that the fraud is committed.

B. Crimes and Defenses of Yates

Officer John Jones of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission boarded Miss Katie during an offshore inspection. After measuring the three red grouper on the deck, officer Jones found that 72 fish were shorter than the 20-inch mark. According to 50 CFR §622.37(d)(2)(ii), the red grouper must be released if the grouper is less than 20 inches. Therefore, the officer ordered to separate the red grouper until the ship returned to shore. Instead, Yates directed his crew to overthrow the undersized fish (Yates v. United States, 2015). For this reason, Yates was charged with destroying evidence, violating 18 U. S. C. §1519. The code states that if the person "knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence a federal investigation" will be imprisoned no less than 20 years (Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 1994a). Other than §1519, Yates was also charged to violate: 16 U.S.C. §1857, 18 U.S.C. § 2232, and 50 CFR §622.37. Pointing to § 1519's origin as a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Yates argued that §1519's reference to "tangible object" does not apply to fish but only to computers, hard drives that can store the information. Upon this argument, the 11th circuit started discussions on defining the ambiguous word, ''tangible object'' and the origins of 18 U.S.C. §1519.

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C. Defining Tangible Object

Apart from the main code that Yates was charged with, the court also looked at the regulations that came before and after §1519. For example, the title of 18. U.S.C. §1512 is ''Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant'' and contains regulations and penalties for retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant; Title of 18. U.S.C. §1520 is '' destruction of corporate audit records'' and 18. U.S.C. §1517 ''obstructing examination of financial institutions'' that is designed for financial fraud and bankruptcy (Legal Information Institute, n.d). Court also examined the Model Penal Code to see how the destruction of evidence was addressed. Justice Ginsburg stated that ''... unlike §1519, the M.P.C. provision did not prohibit actions that specifically relate to records, documents, and objects used to record or preserve information'' (Yates v. United States, 2015, p.17). Thus, Justice Ginsburg points out that the court relies on the principle of noscitur a sociis. Therefore, when the court assessed other codes and the M.P.C., it concluded that the ''tangible object'' should be evaluated in the given context in which fish cannot be falsified, altered but the documents and any other record could. Thus, Justice Ginsburg points out that the court relies on the principle of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Therefore, when the court assessed other codes and the M.P.C., it concluded that the ''tangible object'' should be evaluated in the given context in which fish cannot be falsified, altered but the documents and any other record could (Yates v. United States, 2015c). Also, related provisions and regulations are concerned with financial matters, as they had a background that dates back to accounting scandals, and the verbs listed in §1519, ''knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record'' cannot be apply anything than the documents, computers, and hard drives.

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While Justice Ginsburg focused on the ambiguous word in the context of background events, Justice Alito touched on a different aspect of the case, determining the three features of 18 U.S.C. §1519, which are the status list of nouns, verbs, and title. When reviewing the nouns of §1519, tangible objects are similar to records or documents. Next, considering verbs like ''alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry'' apply to a record of the document rather than general items like fish—lastly, the title of 18 U.S. Code § 1519. Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy points out file keeping rather than fish (Yates v. United States, 2015d). Justice Kagan, dissenting, stated that ‘’Section 1519 is very broad. It is also very clear. Every traditional tool of statutory interpretation points in the same direction, toward “object” meaning object’’ and points to the fact that the court generally focused on the ordinary meaning (Yates v. United States, 2015, p.15). Although the District Court found Yates guilty of violating §1519, the 11th circuit reversed the case, finding the lower court's decision incorrect, agreed with Yates's argument, and concluded that it would be best to interpret "tangible object" as only applicable to objects used to record or preserve information (Yates v. United States, 2015e). Nevertheless, John Yates was still sentenced to violate §1519 and imprisoned for 30 days by the Supreme Court, establishing a more precise guideline for the lower courts on applying and interpreting 18 U.S. Code § 1519.

One of the reasons the court was concerned in defining "tangible object" and looking at the root of 18 U.S.C. 1519 was the equivalent penalty, which is a 20-year imprisonment. The court was concerned about potential overcriminalization based on ambiguity, as well as the notion of sentencing someone to 20 years in prison for dumping fish into the water. As a result, Yates' argument was accepted, and he was fined in accordance with his offense.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

The examples examined, including Yates', demonstrate an important aspect of the legal order's ambiguity. The meaning of a word is a potent tool that can undermine trust in justice by providing a pathway for criminals as well as overcriminalization due to ambiguity in the law. It has been passed down from generation to generation that every crime has consequences. As a result, it was assured that the social order comprises individuals who follow the laws for the good and safety of society. Therefore, when it comes to ambiguity, which is a tool that can be used to change legislation into personal standards with exceptions for serious offenses, it becomes a threat to society and an exemplary act of these acts. Although Yates v. United States can be considered an exemplary action, the case shows something significant. Crimes do have penalties, but heavy fines for minor offenses create another loophole, which is overcriminalization. Most crimes carry serious penalties, such as jail time, fines, and a lifelong criminal record that can make it difficult to obtain work. That is why the law must be predictable so that anyone may determine whether their behavior is prohibited and decide how to proceed. One of the reasons judges are cautious of ambiguity can be seen here. They may not want to expose the defendant to the heavy consequences that follow a criminal conviction because they are unsure whether the legislation intended to make some immoral conduct illegal. If the legislation is vague, courts may be reluctant to punish a defendant whose acts could not have been projected to break the law. At the same time, judges' leniency in an ambiguous case might provoke public outrage that can inspire legislative reform. In the end, ambiguity is a true dilemma for judges as well as a challenge to the legal order, and one shall see how the legal system may effectively address ambiguity, close the loopholes, and prevent the overcriminalization that comes with it in similar cases featuring ambiguity.