Volume 12 Issue 1 2014 by ICAS Critical Animal Studies

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Â

Journal for Critical Animal Studies

Volume 12 Issue 1 January 2014

ISSN: 1948-352X

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

Journal for Critical Animal Studies Editorial Executive Board

Editors Dr. Susan Thomas Hollins University

susanveganthomas@aol.com

Dr. Lindgren Johnson Virginia Union University

lindgrenhalejohnson@gmail.com

Associate Editors Dr. Mary Trachsel University of Iowa

mary-trachsel@uiowa.edu

Dr. Vasile Stanescu Mercer University

stanescu_vt@mercer.edu

Dr. Carol Glasser Independent Scholar

cglasser@gmail.com

Larry A Butz Rice University

larry.a.butz@rice.edu

Special Editorial Consultant Jade Ortego, J.D.

jade.ortego@gmail.com

Editorial Board For a complete list of the members of the Editorial Board, please see the JCAS website’s Editorial Team page. Cover Art: Photograph from We Animals (www.weanimals.org) by Jo-Anne McArthur, with permission. Drew Robert Winter deserves special thanks for his expert assistance with the issue design and visual components.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

JCAS Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Issue Editor Larry A Butz

larry.a.butz@rice.edu

TABLE OF CONTENTS ISSUE INTRODUCTION….……………..………………………………………iv–v ESSAYS The Elephant, the Mirror, and the Ark: Rereading Lacan’s Animal Philosophy in an Era of Ontological Violence and Mass Extinction Hub Zwart…………………………………………………………………………1–32 The Analogy Between the Holocaust and Animal Factory Farming: A Defense Corinne Painter……………………………………………………………………33–62 Eating Animals at the Zoo Sabrina Brando and Jes Lynning Harfeld ……………………………...…………63–88 “Where is the Seat for the Buffalo?”: Placing Nonhuman Animals in the Idle No More Movement Adam J. Fix……………………………………………..………………………89–119 REVIEWS Ecology and Environmental Humanities Symposium (September 13–14, 2013) Sarah Bezan……………………………………………………………….……120–122

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

Issue Introduction Larry A Butz This issue of the Journal for Critical Animal Studies (JCAS) marks a moment of transition. We bid a fond farewell to John Sorenson and warm welcomes to new Editorsin-Chief Susan Thomas and Lindgren Johnson. Readers will notice a new style that special editorial consultant Jade Ortego has designed based on the Chicago Manual of Style and the specific needs of JCAS. They will also notice that the journal retains its commitment to dynamic modes of theory and practice, relating animal liberation at intersections of all social justice issues. The articles herein speak to the range of topics and disciplines under the umbrella of critical animal studies. As guest editor, I have been honored to serve as a caretaker and have been humbled by experiencing the commitment to academic integrity of our editorial staff, review board, and authors. Hub Zwart begins this issue by examining the “animal philosophy” of the formative French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In “The Elephant, the Mirror, and the Ark: Rereading Lacan’s Animal Philosophy in an Era of Ontological Violence and Mass Extinction,” Zwart uses insights from Lacan’s study of ethology and psychology to move beyond standard anthropocentric humanist understandings of psychoanalytic theory. Frans de Waal’s primate ethology is used to update Lacan’s work. In doing so, the essay offers a new frame for understanding human obligations to nonhuman animals at the complex scales of ecology mandated by the anthropocene. The next essay, “The Analogy Between the Holocaust and Animal Factory Farming: A Defense,” faces head-on one of the most contentious rhetorical figures in animal rights and liberation discourses. Philosopher Corinne Painter explores and acknowledges important and subtle differences in the forms of violence and oppression faced by nonhuman animal victims of factory farming practices and victims of the Holocaust, while arguing that the analogy between the two violent institutions is very strong from a philosophical perspective. Furthermore, she explains that the analogy is crucial for exposing speciesism to be just as indefensible as racism or anti-Semitism,

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 bringing to light the perspectives of victims of the Holocaust who have become important figures in fighting factory farming. Sabrina Brando and Jes Lynning Harfeld expose the inconsistencies between the stated animal welfare values of many facilities that display nonhuman animals for public viewing (e.g., zoological gardens) and the reality of the standards controlling the lives and deaths of nonhuman animals used to feed display animals at and visitors to these facilities. “Eating Animals at the Zoo” reveals the double standard at work in the discourse around animal welfare in these operations, suggesting that certain welfare standards have more to do with marketing than care for nonhuman animals, before going on to explain what it would mean for this dissonance to be resolved. The essay is an important addition to ethical critiques of zoos in critical animal studies. Finally, Adam J. Fix explores the position and status of nonhuman animals among indigenous North American communities and social movement in “‘Where is the Seat for the Buffalo?’: Placing Nonhuman Animals in the Idle No More Movement.” Idle No More has become an important movement for its intersectional commitments regarding environmental protection and the rights of various minority groups. Fix approaches Idle No More’s perspective on nonhuman animals and animality through interviews with activists and the work and writings of John Grim and Oren Lyons, among other indigenous thinkers. It is an important essay for bringing to bear the weight of nonWestern perspectives in discussions between animal rights and liberation groups with peoples coming from a “more-than-human-oriented worldview,” such as Idle No More.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

The Elephant, the Mirror, and the Ark: Rereading Lacan’s Animal Philosophy in an Era of Ontological Violence and Mass Extinction Hub Zwart* Abstract Jacques Lacan’s views on “animalhood” constitute a crucial dimension of his intellectual endeavor. While distancing himself from the traditional Cartesian understanding of animals as “machines,” and of humans as rational “thinking things,” Lacan uses insights from ethology, comparative psychology, and paleoanthropology to reframe our understanding of human and animal existence, articulating remarkable and challenging insights on animal experimentation and the protection of endangered species. And yet, while raising the hope that (on a theoretical level at least) things may change, there is a sense of disillusion as well. Notwithstanding his “subversion” of Cartesianism, Lacan still adheres to the persistent ontological tendency to single out humans as unique living beings. Yet, for Lacan, this uniqueness is a deficit, rather than a privilege. We are different not because we have something that other animals lack (e.g., a “rational soul”) but rather because we lack something that other animals have. Language and culture were meant to counteract our primordial vulnerability, and the uncanny sway of modern science and technology over the future prospects for survival of countless species must be seen as a symptom of overcompensation. In this paper, key components of Lacan’s “animal philosophy” are analyzed and assessed, exposing new insights coming from contemporary primate ethology, most notably the work of Frans de Waal. The paper concludes that Lacan’s views provide an intriguing point of departure for reframing moral obligations toward animals in an era of ontological violence and mass extinction. Key words Animal Philosophy, Jacques Lacan, Psychoanalysis, Animal Research, Endangered Species, Philosophical Anthropology, Animal Ethics, Continental Philosophy

Hub Zwart (1960) studied philosophy and psychology. In 2000, he became full professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Science (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands) and chair of the Department for Philosophy and Science Studies, where he established the Centre for Society and Genomics (now: Life Sciences) in 2004. His research is focused on the psychoanalytic angles (e.g, psychoanalysis of Knowledge) of viewing the philosophical dimensions of the life sciences, ranging from landscapes and animals to genomes and synthetic cells. He is the editor-in-chief of the open access journal Life Sciences, Society and Policy, published by Springer. *

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

Introduction

In 1953, the French psychiatrist Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) began his famous series of seminars, fourteen of which have been published in French (seven of which also appeared in English). The cover of Seminar I1 bears the image of a large elephant with impressive white tusks, but the link between cover and content is far from clear. For although a plethora of issues are being discussed, elephants are only mentioned in passing—in Session XIV, to be exact. And yet, this seminar provides a point of entrance into Lacan’s “animal philosophy,” as I will argue. Twenty-five centuries ago, when Socrates shifted the focus of philosophy from nature (as “object”) to humans (as “subjects”), Western thinking became “infected” with a tendency to single ourselves out as a unique ontological category (as “rational animals”), distancing personhood from animalhood, a view that has increasingly been challenged (if not besieged) by insights and findings from empirical animal research, notably primate ethology. This basic tension (between biology and metaphysics) constitutes an important strand of thought in Lacan’s work. Already in his first key publication, 2 he developed his views on (nonhuman) animals3 in a dialectical manner, questioning and incorporating the results of primate ethology and comparative Gestalt psychology, while distancing himself from the Cartesian Cogito concept. Although he continues to emphasize the singularity of human experience compared to the animal world, the human-animal relationship is reframed in a rigorously post-Cartesian manner.4 In this paper, Lacan’s re-conceptualization of the human-animal divide will be critically assessed. To what extent does it still echo the ontological tradition, extending 1. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 1975. Seminars are referred to in-text in the English “Seminar” but listed in the bibliography in the French “Le Séminaire.” 2. Écrits, 1949/1966. 3. In the remainder of this paper, I will use “animals” as shorthand for “nonhuman animals,” while “we” and “us” refers to humans. 4. Some years ago, I published a comparative analysis of the “animal philosophy” of Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, and Heidegger, exploring the contours of a post-Cartesian animal ontology, Hub Zwart, “Understanding Nature: Case Studies in Comparative Epistemology.” This article constitutes a follow-up, shifting attention to Lacan. H. Peter Steeves has edited a volume, Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life, in which the contours of the views of “continental philosophy’s most influential thinkers” on animals are explored. As Lacan is mentioned only in passing in this collection, my paper is meant as a supplement to this volume, a flanking essay to Elisabeth Behnke’s presentation of the animal philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961).

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 from Aristotle up to Hegel? What was Lacan’s response to insights from biology, notably primate ethology? Finally, what is the relevance of his views for important contemporary issues such as animal husbandry, research on animals, and mass extinction? To address these questions, I will begin at the beginning, namely with the views on animalness brought forward in what is generally regarded as Lacan’s first key paper, the inaugural nucleus of his work, his famous lecture on the mirror stage, presented in 19495 (Section 1). Subsequently (Section 2) I will my turn attention to Seminar I, already mentioned above, to show how closely Lacan’s animal philosophy is interwoven with his core insights concerning the imaginary and the symbolical as basic dimensions of human experience (Sections 3 and 4). I will emphasize that, for Lacan, the human-animal divide is not an ontological “given,” but rather the outcome of an intricate dialectical development, both on the ontogenetic level (i.e., the vicissitudes of human individuals during early childhood) and on the phylogenetic level (the coming into being of humankind). In fact, Lacan explicitly builds on Hegel’s famous account of the relationship between Master and Servant as a philosophical alternative to Darwinist and survivalist conceptions (Section 5). After this conceptual analysis “from within,” I will broaden the scope by assessing animal experimentation (Section 6) and primate ethology (Section 7) from a Lacanian point of view and by addressing Derrida’s criticism of Lacan (Section 8). Finally, I will point to the relevance of Lacan’s views for contemporary controversies concerning the future prospects of animals (both wild and domesticated) in an era of high technology and mass extinction (Section 9). 1. Psychoanalysis, Primate Ethology, and the Cogito: the Mirror Stage

Lacan presented his lecture on the mirror stage twice: at the Fourteenth International Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in Marienbad in 1936 and subsequently at the Sixteenth International Congress of the IPA in Zürich in 1949. Neither presentation made much of an impression on his audience, but

5. “Le Stade du Miroir Comme Formateur de la Fonction du Je, telle qu’elle Nous est Révélée dans l’Expérience Psychanalytique,” Écrits, 1949/1966.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 the published version6 became an intellectual classic of the 1960s and is now generally regarded as the inaugural building block of Lacan’s oeuvre. 7 Given the degree of complexity of most of Lacan’s texts, this paper is remarkably clear—the fruit of a thirteen-year gestation period, as Nobus8 phrases it—and the initial lack of response must no doubt be due to the innovative nature of Lacan’s endeavor. For in the 1930s, the systematic study of animal behavior was still in an early stage of development, and although the work of Lorenz and others was beginning to attract the attention of zoologists, many psychologists still clung to the idea that psychology was exclusively about humans.9 It was not until the 1950s that John Bowlby again endeavored to combine views from ethology and psychoanalysis. Thus, in retrospect, Lacan’s effort to use comparative research on humans and chimpanzees to further psychoanalytic theory was fairly innovative and daring. Lacan notably builds on the work of a friend, the Marxist Parisian philosopher/psychiatrist Henri Wallon, who had compared the reactions of human infants and young chimpanzees to their reflection in a mirror. Around the age of six months, Wallon claimed, both humans and chimpanzees begin to recognize their mirror image, but whereas human infants tend to be fascinated by it, examining their reflected gestures in a playful manner, young chimps initially presume they are facing a fellow member of their species and quickly lose interest, turning their attention to other things. Wallon published a paper on this topic in 1931, which became part of a monograph on childhood development.10 For Lacan, the mirror experience is an important moment, because, in his view, our primordial experience of our bodily Self during very early childhood is one of discord, turbulence, and fragmentation. This is connected with a biological insight: the 6. In Marienbad, Ernest Jones, as congress chair, cut him short after ten minutes, long before the lecture (referred to in the IPA Bulletin as a paper on “The Looking-Glass Phase”) reached its conclusion. It marked Lacan’s “failed encounter with the psychoanalytic establishment,” Nobus, “Life and Death in the Glass: A New Look at the Mirror Stage,” 102. Lacan left the next day to witness the Berlin Olympic Games, replacing the conference stage (where he failed to experience his moment of “jubilation”), with a mass audience stage devoted to the celebration of a particular Gestalt or image of human embodiment. 7. It serves, for instance, as the opening chapter of the English translation of Écrits (1-6). 8. Dany Nobus, “Life and Death in the Glass: A New Look at the Mirror Stage,” 104. 9. Dylan Evans, “From Lacan to Darwin,” 2005. 10. Henri Wallon, Les Origines du Caractère chez l’Enfant: Les Préludes du Sentiment de Personnalité, 151-180.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 prematurity (i.e., the, in many ways, still fetal condition) of human beings at birth,11 their lack of control over their mobility and bodily functioning in early life, and their extreme dependence on others for survival. It is only when we begin to recognize ourselves in a mirror that we manage to see ourselves as a unity, a whole. According to Lacan, the confrontation with this image (imago, Gestalt) of ourselves triggers in us a sense of jubilation. He calls it an “Aha-experience,” a reference to the work of the German Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler12 on primate problem-solving behavior, conducted at an anthropoid research station on Tenerife in 1913.13 Köhler described how chimps, like humans, after having worked on a puzzle for quite some time, may suddenly see how the pieces fit together. In fact, during the first months of their existence, Lacan points out, human infants find themselves surpassed in performative intelligence by infant chimpanzees.14 Due to the mirror event, however, our fragmented bodily sensations suddenly seem to converge and a pre-linguistic sense of Self is established—and this is a fundamental experience, an ontological triumph.15 And yet, it results in an “imaginary,” alienated Self, grounded in the perception of an external image, an imago or Gestalt, providing merely an illusion of identity and control. Therefore, this imaginary Self is bound to result in new instabilities, conflicts, and threats. A more robust sense of Self can only come about when the child enters the symbolical order, the world of language.16 It is only then, by becoming linguistic beings instead of staying fixated and immersed in the mirror stage (as in the legendary case of Narcissus), that the uniqueness of human existence, also in comparison to primate life, becomes more apparent. Thus, the imaginary Self that is formed during the mirror stage functions as a precursor to the final subjectivation of human beings within the symbolic realm. Lacan presents his 11. This insight was developed in the 1920s by the Dutch paleoanthropologist Louis Bolk (Das Problem der Menschwerdung) who claimed that human singularity consists in chronic juvenility. Becoming human constitutes a significant challenge given the early childhood malaise of prolonged dependency and lack of coordination. Yet, eventually, our prematurity becomes a major benefit. As unfinished animals, humans are adaptive, creative, and flexible. In contemporary discourse, this view is taken up by Sloterdijk in “Domestikation des Seins,” 189, and others. 12. The Mentality of Apes, trans. Ella Winter, 1917/1925. 13. In fact, the term was coined by Karl Bühler, “Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: Über Gedanken,” 1907. 14. “Le Stade du Miroir Comme Formateur de la Fonction du Je, telle qu’elle Nous est Révélée dans l’Expérience Psychanalytique,” Écrits, 93. 15. Nobus, 104, 107. 16. Cf. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V: Les Formations de l’Inconscient (1957–1958), 222.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 interpretation of the mirror stage as incompatible with a framing of human subjectivity in terms of the Cogito, as issuing from Cartesian philosophy.17 The mirror experience is especially intriguing from a Lacanian viewpoint because it constitutes the onset of our libidinal relationship with our own body, that is, our narcissism, as well as our aptitude for being mesmerized by visual images. The mirror experience is the paradigm of “the imaginary” as a basic dimension of human existence. Whereas, in (other) animals, sexual, aggressive, and other behaviors are triggered by a limited set of specific visual cues, acting as signals that are bound to unleash specific behavioral patterns, human beings can project their fears and desires upon almost any object in their environments. Thus, Lacan argues, a plethora of symptoms that surface in the social and erotic lives of human adults can be elucidated through a comparative analysis of the behavioral repertoires of animals and very young humans placed in front of a mirror.18 Wallon’s interpretations have been challenged/modified by later empirical studies, such as the mirror test devised by the American psychologist Gordon Gallup to demonstrate self-awareness of chimpanzees,19 which was later successfully applied to other highly intelligent animals, such as elephants and dolphins. Some see this development as detrimental to Lacan’s ideas.20 Yet, psychoanalysis is not the same as developmental psychology. It has as its own primary source of information the verbal encounter between analyst and patient. Although Lacan borrows insights from other fields (such as ethology) to elaborate his views, the “psychoanalytical experience” (the dialogue between analyst and patient) remains his primary test-bed and point of departure. This is already underscored by the title of his paper, presenting the mirror stage as a formative moment in the development of the ego “as revealed to us in psychoanalytical experience.”21 Still, in view of these more recent developments, the 17. “Le Stade du Miroir Comme Formateur de la Fonction du Je, telle qu’elle Nous est Révélée dans l’Expérience Psychanalytique,” Écrits, 93. 18. Lacan’s use of primate ethology has been criticized by Webster who argued that Lacan projected his own inner turbulence and discord, as well as his “dandyish” dependence on his public “image,” on the writings of Köhler and Wallon. See Richard Webster, “The Cult of Lacan: Freud, Lacan and the Mirror Stage,” 2002. 19. Gordon G. Gallup, “Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition,” 1970. 20. Richard Webster, “The Cult of Lacan: Freud, Lacan and the Mirror Stage,” 2002. 21. Köhler had similar motives for turning his attention to primates. It was a return to a point of origin that is difficult to study directly in humans, the performance of a task for the very first time: “In the intelligent

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 evolving dialogue of psychoanalysis with ethology and developmental psychology (as an iterative process of mutual exposure) must be regularly updated. For that reason, a contemporary specimen of primate ethology will be addressed from a Lacanian perspective in Section 7. Before doing so, however, I will outline how deeply Lacan’s animal philosophy is entrenched in his theory of human and animal existence as such. 2. Naming the Elephant: Animal Philosophy in Seminar I

The basic issue addressed in Seminar I 22 is the relationship between words (concepts, symbols, signifiers) and things. During the first session, Lacan explains that words for him are “instruments” for dissecting and delineating things—such as animals.23 He sees science, notably laboratory science, as a kind of asceticism, allowing individuals to rid themselves of sloppy and imprecise (everyday) language, thereby sharpening their linguistic tools. In the final session, this idea is taken up again. Throughout the centuries, Lacan argues, science has functioned as purification: a relentless progress of the symbolic.24 For indeed, Lacan unequivocally attributes the astonishing and uncanny powers of modern science (its far-reaching sway over nature, its penetrating comprehension of the real) first and foremost to the development and effective use of symbols (e.g., numbers, mathematical symbols, and chemical symbols). According to Lacan, science basically consists in a drastic “symbolisation” of the real, a systematic replacement of primordial phenomena and things by words, formula, measurements, and numbers. Scientists are virtuosi when it comes to handling symbols, and it is precisely through the effective use of letters, words, equations, and the like that they manage to gain such control over nature. The availability of words and numbers makes it possible to deal with entities like animals even without actually seeing, smelling, or touching them.

performances of anthropoid apes we may see in their plastic state processes [that cannot so easily be investigated in humans],” 3-4. 22. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 1975. 23. Ibid., 8. 24. Ibid., 303.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 It is precisely this idea that also surfaces in the brief section devoted to elephants in Session XIV.25 The fact that we, at a certain point, coined the word “elephant,” Lacan argues, is the single most important event in this animal’s entire history. It is due to the fact that we have the word “elephant” at our disposal that we are able to deliberate about this species’ future. Thanks to the word, we can make decisions (for better or worse) and design policies that will determine the elephant’s future.26 According to Lacan, animals themselves do not enter into deliberations or policies of this kind. They dwell in a different, “imaginary” world, dominated by images. Indeed, as we have already seen, “image” (often replaced by its Latin and German equivalents imago and Gestalt) is a key Lacanian term. From a Lacanian perspective, it is clear that, whereas the image of a large elephant may well evoke in us a sense of admiration, fear, or terror, depending on the circumstances, the scientific gaze approaches such animals from a completely different (and apparently more neutral) angle, namely, by labeling them (e.g., attributing a Latin name and surname to them), classifying them (e.g., under the heading of pachyderms) or by counting them (e.g., in order to formally determine whether they should be regarded as an “endangered species”). This means that, while our relationships with animals are fundamentally mediated by taxonomy, regulations, quantifiable indicators, and the like, animal relationships evolve among animals themselves (or among various species of animals) in an incomparably different way. Our relationship with animals is thoroughly grounded in the symbolic order—the world of names and numbers, of science and research, of legislations and treatises, of stocktaking and population counts. By voicing such ideas, Lacan (to a certain extent, at least) seems to build on a long tradition of philosophers who, beginning with Aristotle, developed their conceptualizations of humans and animals on the basis of dichotomies. In his book on politics, for instance, Aristotle claims that, of all animals, only humans are by nature 25. Ibid. 26. “C’est du fait que le mot éléphant existe dans leur langue, et que l’éléphant entre ainsi dans leurs délibérations, que les hommes ont pu prendre à l’endroit des éléphants, avant même d´y toucher, des résolutions beaucoup plus décisives pour ces pachydermes que n’importe quoi qui leur est arrivé dans leur histoire. . . . [Rien qu’avec le mot éléphant] il arrive aux éléphants des choses, favorables ou défavorables, fastes ou néfastes—[To this, Octave Mannoni, who participated in this seminar, added that] ‘La politique vis-à-vis des éléphants est possible grâce au mot’” (ibid., 201-202).

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 political animals.27 Aristotle does not deny, of course, that many other species actually troop together in packs or herds, but he regards such behavior as something other than political. Humans are “political” in a different manner than insects or gregarious animals because they alone possess speech. Although animals are able to produce sounds, they do not have a voice. Although they are able to shriek and howl and bellow and whistle and wail, they do not produce meaningful words. They are able to signal pain or fear, but the possibility of conveying meaning is denied to them. They will never develop what can be properly called a language. Although Lacan appears to subscribe to such views, on closer inspection it becomes clear that he simultaneously aspires to challenge and subvert this tradition in a rather fundamental way. For, whereas Aristotle and his followers see the human-animal divide more or less as an ontological given, arguing that humans “have” something that (other) animals apparently lack—for instance, a rational “soul”—Lacan reframes this idea by arguing that we are the ones who lack something that is granted to all other animals, but not to a Mängelwesen28 such as us. Lacan builds on Freudian theory, but also makes ample use of insights provided by research fields whose histories more or less coincide with that of psychoanalysis, such as ethology, comparative psychology, and linguistics. Like psychoanalysis, ethology budded during the 1890s (with the work of Conwy Lloyd Morgan and others) and acquired international standing during the interbellum through pioneers like Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. For Lacan, 29 the use of insights from ethology to elucidate psychoanalytical experience concords with the “style” and “spirit” of the work of Freud who, in Jenseits des Lustprinzips, had given the example by reframing his theory of the drives with the help of biology, notably the work of Weismann. 30 Since Freud, Lacan argues, significant progress has been made in

27 Aristotle, Politics, trans. Harris Rackham, 1932/1967, 1253 a 3. 28. i.e., “deficient beings,” a term coined by Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: Seine Natur und Seine Stellung in der Welt, 1940/1962. 29. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 1975, 139. 30. “Freud adosse sa théorie de la libido à ce que lui indique la biologie de son temps. La théorie des instincts ne peut pas ne tenir compte d’une bipartition fondamentale entre les finalités de la préservation de l’individu et celles de la continuité de l’espèce. Ce qui est là en arrière-plan, ce n’est rien d’autre que la théorie de Weismann,” Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 139.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ethological research, due to Lorenz and Tinbergen, whose work he explicitly mentions,31 so that the dialogue between psychoanalysis and biology must be updated. Lorenz and Tinbergen allow us to see how in animals the sexual “mechanism” is triggered, not by the real presence of the partner, but rather by something more powerful—a particular image that acts as a signal, a Gestalt.32 Ethology shows how the sexual mechanism is switched on by an imaginary interaction, a “rapport imaginaire.”33 Therefore, these studies may deepen our insights into the libidinal functioning of the imaginary as such—the world of triggering, inciting or inhibiting images, as encountered and recorded in psychoanalytic practice as well. 3. Animals and Humans: the Imaginary and the Symbolical Realm of Experience

Lacan’s reframing of the human-animal divide is intimately interwoven with his basic conceptual distinction between two dimensions of experience, namely “the imaginary” and “the symbolical.” According to Lacan, both ways of envisioning the real—the imaginary (relying on the use of images) and the symbolical (relying on the use of symbols such as letters, numbers, names, computational symbols, mathematical equations and the like)—are open to human beings. The symbolical is the realm of legal and physical formulas and is tied up with uniquely human pursuits, such as jurisdiction and scientific research. Indeed, the symbolical, as a basic dimension of experience, is only open to humans. Whereas animals dwell in an “imaginary” world, we have access to the “symbolical” realm through language. Although certain images may trigger certain responses (such as sexual arousal or fear) in humans as well, it is the coming into being of the symbolical world that makes possible the development of science, ethics, and politics, as well as genuinely moral relationships. Thus, Lacan sees humans as beings that dwell in a world of meaning. More than anything else, they are producers and consumers of meaning, through the creation and interpretation of “forms” (i.e., signs or symbols, such as letters, words, sounds, and gestures) that are invested by us with meaning. The sign or symbol functions as a 31. Ibid., 140. 32. Ibid., 140-141. 33. Ibid., 141.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 signifier referring to concepts or objects (usually not actually present or visible as such). A symbol is therefore an arbitrary connection between a visual or acoustical signifier (a particular set of lines, dots, characters, or sounds) and the meaning/concept signified by it. The signifier is the visual or audible form, while the concept to which it refers is the signified. Lacan borrows these ideas from linguistics, notably the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), a contemporary of Freud. That is, he uses linguistic concepts for understanding the symbolical in a similar way as he uses ethological concepts for understanding the imaginary. Following this line of reasoning, animals do not use symbols. A loud shriek may indicate that an animal is in pain, or is experiencing hunger, and particular behavioral patterns may indicate arousal or aggression, but animal behaviors must not be regarded as gestures and their sounds must not be regarded as words. Although we may recognize and respond to them (for instance, by feeding a hungry animal or by avoiding an angry one), the signals exchanged by animals are different from signs. Predators may recognize and react to certain typical behavioral patterns of their animals of prey, but this interaction cannot be regarded as a dialogue in terms of language.34 In the case of human beings, a particular sign (e.g., the word “hunger”) will convey a meaningful message regardless of whether it is spoken in a loud or quiet voice. It can be understood by other human beings, provided they have a sufficient grasp of the language system to which the utterance belongs. The situation is more nuanced for domesticated animals or animals kept in confinement, Lacan admits. Dogs, for example, are addressed verbally by us, so that they participate in a world of language to some extent;35 Lacan also mentions the example of minks who learn to respond to human voices in captivity.36 Still, though dogs learn to recognize auditory signals and to respond to the tone and volume of our voices (regardless of whether we address them in German, French, or English), only human beings really grasp the meaning of the words we utter. The difference between humans 34. According to Lacan, ancient cave paintings, or “art pariétal,” in Lascaux and elsewhere indicate that, even in primeval times, sheer fascination with the image of a deer-as-prey had already given way to animals as symbolic items in graphic constellations that probably functioned in the context of religious practices and processions. Unpublished Seminar XIII: L’objet (1965-1966), 503, http://www.lacaninireland.com. 35. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire XVII, 194. 36. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V, 339.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 and animals is not that humans produce different sounds or more complicated sound patterns, but that human beings convey meaning and produce meaningful speech acts, rather than sounds. The wonderful sound sequences produced by blackbirds or nightingales, for example, will never convey lyrics or stories. And in this resides the basic difference: only humans have the possibility of entering a symbolical universe, the world of language, numbers, and negotiations.37 Rather than arguing that we “have” something that animals lack (e.g., intelligence or a rational soul), we dwell in different worlds. Whereas the animal world is basically composed of threats, food, predators, cubs, partners, etc., human beings dwell in a world of symbols. This is especially noticeable on the visual level where, according to Lacan, animals inhabit a world of visual forms likely to incite responses such as fear, sexual arousal, maternal care, or rivalry—images that effectively guide these animals through their umwelt.38 Yet, they have a propensity to ignore much more than they actually see.39 Sense organs first and foremost function as mechanisms of defense. Out of the overwhelming fullness of the real, only particular visual patterns or images with survival value are selected,40 while other sensory input is neglected. Animals of prey, such as chickens, will panic or freeze when spotting a buzzard (1981),41 but ignore the silhouette of an airplane. They are well adapted to, but also engrossed in—even “chained to”—their surroundings.42 For us, however, such well-trodden paths through an umwelt that is able to satisfy our needs are missing.43 It is precisely the lack of concordance with our natural environments, the fundamental split between what we seek and what we find, which allows the symbolic to invade our world, to overwhelm us with verbalizations of desire. Famous tales about mice or men offering lions their future help if the latter allows them to escape for once are implausible. Animals never negotiate in such a fashion. The eagerness of a particular lion to respond to the visual, acoustic, or olfactory “image” of a potential prey will predominately depend on the lion’s sense of hunger. 37. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire XIX, 78. 38. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, 3. 39. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire II, 370. 40. Ibid., 371. 41. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, 3. 42. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire II, 371. 43. Ibid., 137-138.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Visual items, such as scarecrows, may frighten or attract certain animals, but these items do not function as signs, like traffic signs do for us. In the interaction between animals, visual cues may play a significant role, for instance, as items of intimidation. With the help of feathers, fins, or tusks, animals (notably males) may present themselves to fellow males as exceptionally frightening and to members of the opposite sex as exceptionally powerful or attractive. Such items function in duels, parades, and other signaling games (described by ethologists) featuring animals who provoke and challenge one another.44 Yet, according to Lacan, the world of human culture—of dance, ballet, and music—is of a completely different nature. Additionally, only humans can really engage in a therapeutic relationship (based on language). Whereas horses, dogs, and other animals may be subjected to therapy by horse whisperers (Evans 1995), 45 dog whisperers, 46 and similar professionals, unlike psychoanalysis these therapies rely on nonverbal signals rather than verbalization. From a Lacanian perspective, words and numbers are not merely additional communication techniques. They open up worlds of their own, expanding cultural and temporal horizons in a way that is without precedent in nature. This does not mean that animals are bereft of moral status; rather, the idea is that, because we inhabit a symbolical world, we are obliged to respond to animals in a responsible manner, modifying and curbing our natural impulses. It would be a misunderstanding to conclude that Lacan sees humans as ontologically privileged beings. To the contrary, he sees them as having fallen “prey” to language. 47 The symbolical is basically a compensation for our prematurity, our ontological deficit. In other words, Lacan sees human subjectivity as a “symptom.” This already applies to the imaginary, which, in the case of humans, assumes very singular, fragile, and instable aspects. The fact that humans (unlike other animals) can project their desires onto a plethora of images arising in man-made techno-cultural environments should not be regarded as “liberty,” but rather as maladjustment and as a basic human aptitude for perversity and aberration. Thus, rather than saying that we “have” something that (other) animals lack, it is the other way around: we lack something that other animals 44. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V, 1998, 182. 45. The Horse Whisperer is better known for its cinematic version, directed by and starring Robert Redford. 46. The most famous contemporary dog whisperer is perhaps Cesar Millan: http://www.cesarsway.com/ 47. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire XIX, 70.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 have, namely, a natural concordance or adaptation between umwelt and drives. Indeed, it is only in captivity that (other) animals develop neuroses similar to ours. It is the artificial estrangement from their habitat (i.e., the captivity imposed on them) that causes psychic malfunctioning, although most “model organisms” have become artifacts of contemporary laboratory life to such an extent that they seem excluded from a natural habitat for good, so that the laboratory is their habitat. In humans, however, neuroses develop in supposedly free and autonomous individuals who inhabit what is considered a more or less normal environment, namely modern civilization, an environment allegedly brought into existence in order to meet our needs more effectively and readily than wilderness. To the extent that civilization is a large-scale experiment, we are ourselves surely its test animals. 4. The Phenomenon of Intimidation and the World of Chivalry: Seminar IV

We may nonetheless look for similarities and continuity between the human and the nonhuman animal world. At first glance, countless analogies to duels and parades as they occur in the animal realm can also be found among humans. Take, for example, medieval contests involving valiant knights in full armor with flying colors and coats of arms. Can we see them as efforts to mimic similar phenomena in the animal world? According to Lacan, also in this case, the differences are much more astute than the similarities.48 Lions or eagles painted on medieval flags or shields, for example, although they may to a certain extent have served to frighten and deter opponents in a distant past, were principally used to indicate the knight’s symbolical allegiance to one of the parties in the field. These images were signs or symbols in the strict sense of the term. All those lions and roses painted on armor served as arbitrary signs. Their meanings were highly political, highly symbolical: the soldiers involved expressed their allegiance to a particular political entity, represented by, for example, a white or a red rose, a lion, or an eagle. In the regions these knights came from, lions had never really existed. To the medieval knight, the lion was an imaginary animal, a fascinating Gestalt, a sign conveying a certain message. Heraldic images indicated the “house” or clan to which 48. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire IV, 1994.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 medieval knights belonged and allegiances to particular dukes or kings, allowing them to distinguish friend from foe, even in the midst of battle, when time for complicated gestures, words, or explanations was scarce. A similar role is played by fetish-like erotic items, such as a particular pearl earring or a particular type of shoe. Lacan argues that, not only human perception, but also human memory is organized differently from that of animals.49 Whereas in animals the memory function is based on the retention and connection (through conditioning) of visual, acoustic, or olfactory impressions, human memory is predominantly organized in a symbolical manner, through series or circuits of signifiers. Phenomena like free association, dreams, and neurotic symptoms show that such connections often rely on words and tropes, on alliteration for instance, rather than on images. It goes without saying that the imaginary is present in the human world as well. We remain animals in many respects, frightened or captivated by images that correspond to mental templates, triggering pre-wired responses. Yet, in the human world, all this is eclipsed (although never completely erased) by the force of the symbolical. Lacan’s reading of Hegel’s famous analysis of the encounter between master and servant allows us to further elucidate this view. 5. Master and Servant: Human History as a Step-Wise Transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolical

The phenomenon of intimidation as a possible link between human and animal behavior has already been mentioned. With the help of certain bodily features (such as tusks) or with the help of certain behaviors (such as growling), animals (especially mammals, notably males) may intimidate, frighten, and deter one another, and analogies of such behaviors abound among humans, who likewise may present themselves as frightening apparitions, forcing the other to withdraw. Guns or helmets worn by soldiers, for example, are not only safety devices, but also function as items of intimidation. Still, Lacan maintains that even intimidation is different when it occurs between humans. Hegel’s dialectical analysis of the emergence of self-consciousness, one of the highlights

49 Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan 3; Le Séminaire IV, 234.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 of his Phenomenology of the Spirit,50 provides us with a concise yet intricate account of the step-wise transition from sheer intimidation to the intricacies of modern politics.51 I will summarize this famous section here in outline before turning to Lacan’s reframing of it. Initially, Hegel argues, our relationship with our environment is fuelled by pure desire.52 We try to overcome the division between Self and object (Self and otherness) by simply abolishing otherness: by consuming the object. In this primordial state, we are bent on annihilating the living images or Gestalten, the edible entities we come across. The Will to abolish or annihilate these independent life forms is called desire (Begierde). In the course of this process, however, subjects are bound to experience the obstinacy, the relative independence of objects. Instead of being satisfied by their abolition, desire is aroused time and again. As we annihilate an object, it essentially escapes us—it cannot survive. The satisfaction is transient. Perhaps one could say that this “stage” roughly corresponds to the world of primordial hunter-gatherers, roaming natural environments as clans searching for edible items. True satisfaction of desire, Hegel argues, can only be achieved in an encounter with a true Other, another Self, a double: an unknown challenging living figure, an object who verbally acclaims its own otherness and independence. Both entities, both Selves, will try to realize themselves through the destruction of the other. Thus evolves a lethal conflict. The possible outcome of this violent encounter is twofold. We may either refrain from conflict, thereby becoming an object for the Other, losing our independence in slavery, or the otherness of the Other may be abolished by us. In order for the Self to maintain its own integrity, the other has to be annihilated, so it seems. This other being, however, is not merely an object—it is an independent Other, acting in a self-conscious manner, quite similar to us. Both Selves mirror one another, engage one another in a kind of game that entails a serious threat to both. Eventually, through a series of dialectical 50. G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807/1973. 51. In the 1930s, together with other famous French intellectuals such as Georges Bataille, Maurice Merlau-Ponty, Raymond Queneau, and André Breton, Lacan had attended the seminars of Alexandre Kojève, which provided him with a model for his own seminars in the 1950s. In Kojève’s lectures, the Master-Servant dialectic played a pivotal role. 52. G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 145ff.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 movements, both Selves will have to recognize their mutual independence and selfconsciousness. How does this come about? The first dialectical movement is that both Selves face one another in a selfconscious, daring, provocative manner. They still basically consider the other as an object, a figure or image amidst the extensive fullness of life. Both of them are bent on annihilating the other. They both aim to destroy the intimidating foe. They challenge and intimidate one another and put themselves to the test, until one of them gives way. In the struggle for life that is about to erupt, they will have to put their lives at risk and prove their readiness to die, showing that there is nothing they would not be willing to give up in order to stand the test. One of them will either die or prove unwilling to risk his life. The latter thus betrays attachment to life, an unwillingness to give it up. This means giving in to anxiety in the face of death—the “absolute master,” as Hegel calls it— fearing for one’s whole being. At that point, the precarious game is over. The first dialectical movement has come to an end, and we end up with an unequal relationship between, on the one hand, the slave or servant (someone who recognizes the independence of the other) and, on the other hand, the master (the one whose independence is now firmly recognized). From now on, the servant lives on behalf of someone else. Life was the chain from which he was not willing to free himself in battle, as Hegel phrases it, and this chain now chains him to servitude under his master’s sway. But this is not the final outcome. As for the master, instead of having a direct relationship with the world of objects, the servant functions as a mediator. Whereas the master enjoys the pleasures of life and consumes the fruits of the latter’s labor, the servant is the one who really encounters living objects in the outside world. These objects are not completely abolished by him. It remains the master’s privilege to annihilate and consume them. Rather than abolishing the objects he encounters, the servant cultivates them and processes them, depriving them of their independence by means of his labor, but without destroying them. Perhaps we can say that, at this stage, humankind has entered the world of agriculture. Gradually, it becomes apparent that the “masters” have in fact become highly dependent on (the service of) their servants and that the masters’ apparent independence is actually an illusion. The servants are the ones who really achieved control over nature,

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 by cultivating it through labor. The masters, moreover, when it comes to recognition of their mastery, are dependent on their servants; however, because the servants are themselves dependent upon the masters, they cannot genuinely recognize them, because true recognition presupposes independence. Meanwhile, in contrast to this imaginary recognition, servants achieve real independence through their hands-on interaction with nature. Labor is restrained desire, and therefore, through labor, they not only transform nature but also themselves through self-discipline (self-labor). The capricious freedom of masters does not yield true autonomy. Real freedom is the privilege of the servant. From a Lacanian perspective,

Hegel’s analysis reads like a concise

reconstruction of the phylogenetic process of becoming human. The world of consumption and sheer intimidation gradually gives way to a more humane world of negotiations and labor; the imaginary is gradually eclipsed (but never completely erased) by the symbolical. At first, the Self encounters a frightening “Other,” an intimidating, captivating image or Gestalt. Techniques of intimidation will be displayed to frighten one another, engage one another in a kind of game, a show of strength, until one of them (due to fear of death/attachment to life) submits. Both are bent on annihilating the other, until one of them shudders before the frightening image of the rival. In the animal world, such contests (usually between males) will always remain on this imaginary level.54 Often, rivalry takes the form of a show or parade so that the supremacy of the other is recognized without a real battle actually taking place. Instead, one of the rivals suddenly assumes a posture of defeat. A real physical violent collision is thus prevented. The participants were merely posing as an intimidating Gestalt; their conflict remains an imaginary contest. In an imaginary world, Lacan argues, it is impossible to tolerate the other’s independence.55 The other emerges as rival, someone who frustrates our desires and draws us into a “struggle for life.” Yet, Lacan vehemently discards the political “myth,” fostered by Darwinism, that social life is a continuation of the struggle for existence we

53. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I; Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan 3; Le Séminaire XVII, 1991; Le Séminaire Livre X, 2004. 54. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 310; Le Séminaire V, 182. 55. Le Séminaire I, 200.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 encounter in the animal world.56 He contends that, in the human world, struggle for life remains a highly exceptional situation. The unequal situation that results from submission (slavery) has given way to a modern civil society, a situation of mutual recognition in which all parties recognize the independence of the other. Mutual recognition is what constitutes “the supra-natural world of the symbolical.”57 An important precondition is the establishment of human sway over nature through labor and technology. Political autonomy and justice presuppose a certain level of technical control over nature, making slavery redundant. Through their interactions with nature, only the servants realize genuine humanity,58 and this process was nearing its completion in Hegel’s era, the famous “end” of human history. Genuine and mutual recognition is fundamentally different from intimidation, where one of the rivals is forced to recognize the supremacy of the other. The most important outcome of the efforts of servants is not the consumables they produce. Their most important “product” is the symbolic world of organized labor—of negotiations, agreements, and time schedules. Instead of begging for mercy, the modern servant signs a contract as a citizen in the world of labor. Quite often, modern “servants” logging into electronic systems will hardly ever meet their CEO face to face. Fear and intimidation long ago gave way to a world of regulations, although they may resurge in dreams and nightmares involving managers no doubt. Battles gave way to labor, direct consumption to a gradual transformation and domestication of nature through agrotechnology. Instead of being completely at the mercy of the other, the relationship between employers and employees is regulated by mutual consent and stipulations. It is not the dreadful grin of the master, but the signed contract that sets the employee to work, unless of course we are dealing with severely neurotic individuals. In modern life, things like dread or admiration only play a concomitant role, as both parties have entered a symbolical environment composed of time schedules, salaries, deliverables, and quantifiable output (including academic h-factors). One of the dangers of the current wave of neoliberal globalism is precisely this relapse into situations of violence and 56. According to Lacan, such an idea could only arise in the mind of someone who belonged to a “nation of pirates” who at that time were establishing their global colonial empire. Le Séminaire I, 200. 57. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire I, 243. 58. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, 3.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 intimidation, notably in regions where industrialization and urbanization evolve at a staggering pace. In the animal world, organized labor is unthinkable, as it presupposes a symbolical world of technologies and agreements—in short, the use of language. Both parties consent (“Yes”) and can always appeal to the “letter” of their mutual agreement. As animals are neither able to speak nor count, the possibility of entering into a symbolical relationship is denied to them. They remain dependent on behavioral repertoires involving intimidation and attraction (e.g., parades, postures, vocal signals, and facial expressions), or (as necessary) down-right aggression. They continue to rely on color or size of feathers, tusks, and fins—in short, on their physical tools for seduction and enforcement. 6. On Animals “Serving” in Research Facilities

A strategic meeting-ground for the (“symbolical”) human world and the (“imaginary”) animal world is the animal laboratory where experimenters (as absolute Masters) employ research animals basically as laboratory gadgets. According to Lacan, animal laboratories, such as the one set up by Ivan Pavlov, are highly symbolical environments.59 All items are carefully selected, all activities are standardized, and all important events are meticulously quantified. Signals act as “signifiers” to which animals respond by producing certain behaviors, or certain bodily fluids, such as gastric excretions, 60 although on closer inspection these are produced by the experimenters themselves, using animals as mere “machines,” as living reactor vessels.61 Basically, the sense organs and the perceptivity of research animals are tested and employed, but a true dialogue never comes about.62 Although model organisms, like dogs, may actively (or even eagerly) participate in the research, they will never become equals or partners,63 as the crucial moment of informed consent is lacking. 59. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V, 340. 60. Ibid., 339. 61. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire XI, 1973, 254-255. 62. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V, 340. 63. In publications, Pavlov expressed his gratitude to his dogs, formally thanking them for their assistance: “[T]his method was adopted as a result of a hint given by one of the dogs subjected to the operation. We

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Ideally, the animal laboratory is a perfectly organized setting that satisfies all animal needs. It reflects a modernistic, even utopian ideal,64 a brave new world perfectly managed with the help of science and technology.65 In reality, however, the laboratory produces neuroticism in its animal inhabitants, surfacing in various kinds of symptoms.66 It is a severely pathogenic environment, a totalitarian regime that “cares” for its animals but exploits their bodies as production factors, while the scientific Master enjoys the fruits of their labor, namely publishable knowledge—a truth factory driven by desire, the human will to know.67 7. The Primate World According to De Waal: A Lacanian Reply

“The more we learn about great apes, the deeper our identity crisis seems to become.” —Frans de Waal68 The human-animal divide propounded by traditional ontology has been emphatically challenged by biologists, notably ethologists studying the world of primates—a field that made impressive progress since the days of Wolfgang Köhler, notably due to the work of authors such as Jane Goodall and Desmond Morris. A prominent representative of contemporary primate ethology is Frans de Waal,69 a scientist who, both in his publications and in his lectures, eagerly contributes to philosophical debates as well. For decades, he studied what he explicitly refers to as chimpanzee “politics” (1982/1998). Using terms like “coalitions,” “reconciliations,” “seeking reassurance,” and “recruiting support,” he invites us to look at the primate world with different eyes. Chimpanzees, De Waal assures us, have outspoken personalities and a plethora of communication techniques at their disposal. They mourn, grieve, care and gratefully acknowledge that by its manifestation of common sense the dog has helped us as well as itself,” Ivan Pavloc, Selected Works, 89,90. For Pavlov, the dog was “almost a participant in the experiments conducted upon it, greatly facilitating the success of the research by its understanding and compliance,” Daniel P. Todes, Pavlov’s Physiology Factory: Experiment, Interpretation, Laboratory Enterprise, 52; Hub Zwart, “What is an Animal? A Philosophical Reflection on the Possibility of a Moral Relationship with Animals,” 110 ff. 64. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire V, 461. 65. Ibid., 463. 66. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire Livre X, 72. 67. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire XI, 264. 68. Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes, 3. 69. de Waal’s surname happens to be the Dutch version of Henri Wallon’s.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 love, use sign language, and can even learn to rear their newborns on the bottle.70 Their power games, moreover, are very reminiscent of what happens in the human world. And yet, if we read De Waal’s rich descriptions of the politics (or “group dynamics”) of chimpanzees, it becomes apparent that, although these studies have greatly expanded our knowledge of (and hopefully our empathy with) these admirable and intelligent animals, and although they emphasize that the dichotomous opposition between humans and (other) animals that was once imposed by the Cogito-perspective can no longer be upheld—a view that Lacan basically shares, as we have seen—the human-animal divide as such is not completely erased. Let me use as an example the very first anecdote recounted by De Waal in his highly intriguing book, in which power plays among humans (in this case represented by Richard Nixon, at one time first citizen of the United States) are compared to the vicissitudes of chimpanzee leadership: Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein describe in The Final Days Richard Nixon’s reaction to his loss of power: “Between sobs, Nixon was plaintive . . . How had a simple burglary done all this? . . . [H]e got down on his knees . . . leaned over and struck his fist on the carpet, crying aloud, ‘What have I done? What has happened?’” Nixon was the first and only U.S. president to resign. . . . As we shall see, one of my chimpanzees had tantrums similar to Nixon’s (minus the words) under similar conditions.71

If we submit these lines to a Lacanian reading, some significant details strike the eye. One of the most telling elements no doubt is the—apparently casual—insertion (between brackets) of the phrase “minus the words.” This is a reference to what Lacan sees as the “symbolical order.” Minus refers to the mathematic symbol for subtraction, and the term “words” refers to the symbolical realm as such. From a Lacanian point of view, it is precisely the use of mathematical and linguistic symbols that opens up a whole dimension of experience. Although “alpha” chimps doubtlessly display fascinating rituals of resignation, the entity “U.S. president” can only exist within a symbolical realm, a world of language. Leaders (alpha individuals) are everywhere, both among domesticated animals and in the wild, but U.S. presidents can only exist in a human world. And only U.S. presidents can 70. Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes, 59. 71. Ibid., xiii.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 be “the first one to resign,” for such a phrase presupposes historical records and a temporal horizon that can only be provided by annals, mass media, historiography, and grammar. This does not imply that the human world is more interesting in terms of social drama and intrigue; quite the contrary, it must be extremely fascinating to meticulously monitor the real-time interactions of primates, more fascinating perhaps than political journalism—but that is not the point. The point is that, notwithstanding the many similarities in behaviors, postures, and rituals among chimps and humans, a basic difference persists. Due to the symbolical realm, we may relate to events or individuals we cannot touch, smell, or see. Richard Nixon died almost two decades ago, but we can still deal with his “case,” for instance by using the suffix “-gate” to refer to more recent scandals (political and otherwise), such as Monica-gate, Climate-gate, Tiger-gate, etc.72 And we can design policies with the explicit purpose of preventing such things from happening in the future. As our daily lives to some extent remain under the sway of the imaginary, the superb ethology of De Waal may provide us with a behavioral “mirror” allowing us to discern the intricacies of this dimension. Yet, from a Lacanian point of view, the quintessence of politics resides in the singularly human ability to deliberate about (make decisions about, regard or disregard the interests of) humans or animals we cannot touch or see, simply because they are present in the words, names, and numbers that we use. And this adds a fundamental dimension to human politics compared to chimpanzee politics. Indeed, it is only in humans that the observation of chimpanzee rituals can give rise to what De Waal refers to as an “identity crisis.” Again, however, the symbolical is not a “privilege” of humans, but rather an (often hopelessly insufficient) overcompensation for our adaptive weaknesses and chronic defects. 8. Subversion of the Cogito: Hope or Disillusion?

Lacan sees his views on human subjectivity as incompatible with the Cartesian understanding of the subject as Cogito, as we have seen.73 This is important, because 72. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_scandals_with_-gate_suffix 73. [The experience of psychoanalysis] “nous oppose à toute philosophie issue directement du Cogito,”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Cartesianism not only conveys an ontological understanding of the human subject (as a rational thinking thing, detached from its own body), but also an ontological view (that is no less radical) on animalness. From a Cogito-perspective, the animal is literally a machine, not only incapable of thought, but also of pain and sensation.74 According to Descartes, animals cannot really suffer—a somewhat perverse, if not sadistic view that has had severe practical consequences as well, granting philosophical legitimacy and moral backing to vivisection (the dissection of living animals, including mammals, without anesthesia) as a research practice, exemplified in the nineteenth century by master-physiologist Claude Bernard. At first glance, Lacan apparently aims to distance himself from this anthropocentric tradition, taken by Descartes to its logical extreme. And yet, by rephrasing the human-animal divide in terms of the imaginary and the symbolical, we may question whether and to what extent he really succeeds in doing so. This is precisely the question raised by Derrida in his essay on Lacan’s understanding of animals.75 Initially, Derrida argues,76 Lacan’s dispersed statements concerning animals give rise to the “hope” that things are going to change, that the “subversion” 77 of the Cartesian subject—as well as its flanking concept, the animal-machine—will finally come about. Yet, Derrida’s essay basically conveys a sense of disillusion. The “hope for a decisive displacement” of the Cartesian view quickly expires when it becomes clear that, for Lacan, the animal’s way of being-in-the-world is still remarkably mechanistic and preprogrammed.78 Lacanian animals are basically captivated, imprisoned, and immobilized by the imaginary. Their coded messages and pre-wired behavioral mechanisms do not really convey meaning. 79 Access to the symbolical order is firmly denied to them. Therefore, they are not subjects in the genuine sense of the term. They cannot really respond to a stimulus, but can merely react. For Derrida, Lacan’s texts on animals Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 93. 74. Hub Zwart, “What is an Animal? A Philosophical Reflection on the Possibility of a Moral Relationship with Animals.” 75. Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded,” Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. Cary Wolfe, 2003, 121–146. 76. Ibid., 121. 77. Jacques Lacan, “Subversion du Sujet et Dialectique du Désir dans l’Inconscient Freudien.” 78. Jacques Derrida, “And Say the Animal Responded,” 122. 79. Ibid., 122.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 “announce at the same time a theoretical mutation and a stagnant confirmation of inherited thinking.” 80 Lacan persists in dissociating the anthropological from the zoological. And perhaps this must be seen in connection with the resurgence of humanism and its anthropocentric ethos during the post-war years,81 which apparently affected not only Sartre but Lacan as well. Still, Derrida also points out that, from a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective, the uniqueness and exceptionality of human beings should not be seen as a kind of ontological privilege somehow bestowed on us. Rather, Lacan reframes it as compensation for a basic fault or defect, grounded in our prematurity, our fetal condition at birth. This indeed may serve as starting point for a reply to Derrida (and likeminded critics). The uniqueness of humans is difficult to ignore. We are the only species who (verbally or in writing) critically reflect on our obligations toward other species. Our astonishing, if not excessive, ability to generate artificial, man-made, global socio-cultural environments is unprecedented in evolution, as is our talent to unleash devastating destruction and decimation, not only on other humans, but on a quickly expanding number of other species as well. We are the only beings (as far as we can tell) to develop a sense of global responsibility. In short, the subversion of the Cartesian Cogito does not exempt us from the philosophical duty to address the moral implications of the ontological uniqueness of our way of being-in-the-world. And we cannot live up to this duty simply by ignoring it. What is so intriguing about Lacan’s view on humans and animals is that, for him, our uniqueness stems not from something we “have,” but rather from something we “lack,” as we have seen. It is a symptom of our prematurity at birth, our chronic sense of uneasiness (even in a world of luxury and comfort), and our persistent defectiveness. Language, culture, and technology have emerged as large-scale compensations for our initial defects as ontological, disadvantaged Mängelwesen. These compensations became devastatingly effective and downright excessive so that they now pose lethal threats to an exponentially growing number of other living beings. Thus, Lacan’s understanding of culture as an excessive compensation for a primordial deficit

80. Ibid., 122. 81. Ibid., 135.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 constitutes a point of departure for coming to terms with the intra-species challenges of the present. 9. The Global Ark

To paraphrase Rousseau: animals are by nature free, and yet everywhere they are in chains. This notably applies to myriads of domesticated animals kept in high-tech facilities, as plants or bio-machines of meat, but we may extrapolate this to “wild” animals as well, whether living in zoos or inhabiting wild life parks (the real-space zoos of global tourism). The vicissitudes of animals in the current global animal industrial complex are likely to evoke moral uneasiness or even downright disgust. They seem to exemplify the utter reverse of a moral relationship. Yet, from a Lacanian perspective, moral talents and destructive tendencies are two sides of the same coin, much as Kant and De Sade were contemporaries.82 In an era of ontological violence and mass extinction, an animal philosophy seems exceptionally urgent, but its starting point should not be the idea that we “are” animals. Due to language, records, international regulations, species counts, and the like, we know what we are doing, even to animals we cannot directly touch or see, even to future generations of animals. As speaking subjects, we can coin moral concepts and principles, as well as design moral policies. To paraphrase the section quoted by De Waal: we are the only living beings who can really ask the question “What have we (as a global community) done (or failed to do)”? We must acknowledge the devastating impact of our specifically human qualities on ourselves and the rest of the planet. Fascinating theatres of group dynamics no doubt flash up among primates or elephants, but the decision to formally regard these animals as “endangered species,” deserving protection, is a decision that can only be taken by humans. This ability is intimately connected with our uncanny and unprecedented power to allow countless species of animals to become extinct in an era of devastating mass destruction. But it is precisely this symbolical realm (which gave rise to our uncanny and pervasive technologies) that allows us to develop an ethical stance towards other species. 82. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire VII, 1986.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 The progressive intrusion of the symbolical into human-animal relationships cannot be undone. Human culture has experienced a symbolic turn long ago and the hegemony of the symbolical is bound to prevail as long as we stay human. 83 The paradigm of a symbolical relationship with animals is the Ark. In its original version (in Genesis) it functions as an emblematic image, an idealized picture of human-animal relationships—the idea of domestication taken to its very extreme. The inaugural gesture is nonetheless a highly symbolical one. After Adam had already named the animals, Noah counts them. Two specimens of each species are admitted into a wooden mobile zoo to await a time when animal passengers can again be released into the wild. Interestingly, whereas the imaginary Biblical Ark probably never existed in the real, the Ark as a concept has become more real than ever on a symbolical level.84 The Biblical story anticipates a basic truth, namely, that animals (both wild and domesticated) have become fundamentally dependent on us (on our deliberations and decisions) for their survival. Indeed, our sway over animals has become thoroughly symbolized, based on international guidelines and population counts. We select, list, and number the species we single out as worthy for preservation. Nowadays, it seems as if the world as such has been transformed into a global Ark, floating through the flood of extinction, keen on keeping in existence this highly symbolical category of animals called endangered species. 85 Of course, imaginary elements continue to play a role. Notably for broader audiences, some of these endangered species may stand out as especially valuable, because of their admirable image, their Gestalt—such as tigers or ice bears or pandas. They are “imaginary” animals in a way, because as (stylized) icons, they become increasingly detached from their real surroundings and conditions of life (like imaginary wild-life pets). But these emblematic images can only function against the backdrop of a thoroughly symbolical world where science and technology allow us both to erase and to preserve the animals with whom we share the planet. In the course of what Lacan refers to as the symbolization of the real, we have acquired decisive responsibilities concerning the phenomenon of survival as such. 83. Lacan acknowledges the possibility that, at a certain point—at the end of history, as it were— humankind may revolve into “normal” animals again. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire II, 282. 84. Hub Zwart and Bart Penders, “Genomics and the Ark: An Ecocentric Perspective on Human History,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 54, no. 2, 2011. 85. The IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) Red List of endangered or even critically endangered species sets fairly precise criteria for placing species on this list on the basis of their quantified extinction risk.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 This seems more relevant than ever, given the current spring tide of high-tech globalization, putting the vast remaining expanses of natural wilderness increasingly under pressure, so that these landscapes (and the animals inhabiting them) run the risk of quickly becoming imaginary rather than real. The most extreme version of the Ark, as a thoroughly symbolical environment in the Lacanian sense of the term, is the animal research facility, as we have seen, where lab animals dwell as objects of scientific inquiry, spending their lives in confinement until a so-called “humane end point” is reached. Such facilities function as fleets or archipelagos of high-tech, air-conditioned Arks. Amidst a world of “wild type” animals, a limited number of “model species” are kept as laboratory artifacts. An intricate decision process is installed to determine which animals should be allowed to live for how long and under which circumstances. Their daily lives are closely monitored and protocolled. Animal ethics committees allow researchers to engage in scrutinized experiments, involving preset numbers of animals. Such committees are established with the explicit purpose of deliberating about living beings whom they cannot directly see, smell, or touch. Members are not supposed to react to visual cues, such as the sight of a suffering or imprisoned lab dog as a Gestalt, and they have even learned to discard or ignore such images as irrelevant to their ethical triage. Such cues are put aside as “emotional” (“imaginary”) images that may disturb the symbolical process of ethical assessment. We could see this as a moral mechanism of defense, allowing animal ethics committees to focus on symbolical items, such as regulations, prior decisions, licenses and permits, number of animals within a trial, quantifiable degrees of suffering or discomfort, or humane end-points (operationalized in terms of body weight). They will focus on formal procedures, rather than on (disquieting or even revolting) images of sick animals or dissected corpses. More concretely, they will focus on a limited set of signifiers, such as “suffering,” “distress,” “discomfort,” “well-being,” “relevance,” and (perhaps) “integrity.” These are quantifiable moral precision tools involving scales, standard terminologies, and ratings. In other words, the deliberations are de-subjectivated. Animal ethics committees formally determine whether our treatment of animals must be regarded as responsible scientific research or as sadistic torture. Yet, the basic uneasiness is never completely silenced.86 86. “Through the blanks between the concepts of the symbolic order one experiences ‘something,’

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Should uneasiness (in the Freudian sense of Unbehagen) disappear altogether, ethics would give way to proceduralism. The uneasiness evoked by visits to high-tech research facilities does not necessarily stem from animal suffering as such, given cases in which research animals are better cared for than household pets. The uneasiness comes from the awareness that this drastically symbolized world entails ontological violence. Food intake and waste disposal are managed in a thoroughly scientific way—using “applied mathematics,” as Upton Sinclair phrased it in his highly disconcerting novel The Jungle, depicting the fate of livestock arriving at the Chicago beef industry around 1900, where whole “rivers of life” are processed into canned meat within a day’s work.87 Our uneasiness pertains to the concern that these animals, or rather animals in general, have lost their former independence in a very fundamental way. Increasing numbers of animals are faced with two options: either mass extinction or the Ark. Bibliography Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Harris Rackham. London: Heinemann; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932/1967. Behnke, Elizabeth A. “From Merleau-Ponty’s Concept of Nature to an Interspecies Practice of Peace.” In Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life, edited by H. Peter Steeves, 96–116. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Bolk, Louis. Das Problem der Menschwerdung. Jena: Fischer, 1926. Bühler, Karl. “Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge: Über Gedanken.” Archiv für Psychologie 9 (1907): 297–365.

especially in the case when there is only you and the suffering animal. . . . It should be a challenge to fill the blanks in our symbolic order by a denser net of concepts. The introduction of new concepts like ‘intrinsic value,’ ‘integrity,’ ‘subject of a life’ are illustrations of this activity to close the grid of the symbolic order,” Tj. de Cock Buning, “Animal Ethics or the Conscious Control of the Umwelt,” 193. 87. “Eight or ten million live creatures turned into food every year. . . . The stream of animals was continuous; it was quite uncanny to watch them—a very river of death . . . the wonderful efficiency of it all. . . . It was pork-making by machinery, pork-making by applied mathematics,” Upton Sinclair, The Jungle, 38, 40.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 de Cock Buning, Tj. “Animal Ethics or the Conscious Control of the Umwelt.” In Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics, edited by M. Dol, S. Kasanmoentalib, S. Lijmbach, E. Rivas, and R. van den Bos, 185–197. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1997. Derrida, Jacques. “And Say the Animal Responded.” In Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, edited by Cary Wolfe, 121–146. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Evans, Dylan. “From Lacan to Darwin.” In The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, edited by J. Gottschall and D. Wilson, 38-55. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005. Evans, Nicholas. The Horse Whisperer. New York: Delacorte, 1995. Freud, Sigmund. “Jenseits des Lustprinzips.” In Gesammelte Werke XIII, 1–70. London: Imago, 1920/1940. Gallup, Gordon G. “Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition.” Science 167, no. 3914 (1970): 86– 87. Gehlen, Arnold. Der Mensch: Seine Natur und Seine Stellung in der Welt. Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1940/1962. Hegel, G.W.F. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1807/1973. Köhler, Wolfgang. The Mentality of Apes. Translated by Ella Winter. London: Kegan Paul, 1917/1925. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966. ———. Ecrits: A Selection. Edited by Alan Sheridan. London: Travistock / Routledge, 1977/2011. ———. Le Séminaire I: Les Écrits Techniques de Freud (1953–1954). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975. ———. Le Séminaire II: Le Moi dans la Théorie de Freud et dans la Technique de la Psychanalyse (1954–1955). Éditions du Seuil, 1978. ———. Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan 3: Les psychoses (1955-1956). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1981. ———. Le Séminaire IV: La Relation d’Objet (1956–1957). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ———. Le Séminaire V: Les Formations de l’Inconscient (1957–1958). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1998. ———. Le Séminaire VII: L'Éthique de la Psychanalyse (1959–1960). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986. ———. Le Séminaire Livre X: L’Angoisse (1962–1963). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004. ———. Le Séminaire XI: Les Quatre Concepts Fondamentaux de la Psychanalyse (1964). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973. ———. Le Séminaire XVII: L’Envers de la Psychanalyse (1969–1970). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991. ———. Le Séminaire XIX: . . . Ou pire (1971–1972). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2011. ———. “Le Stade du Miroir Comme Formateur de la Fonction du Je, telle qu’elle Nous est Révélée dans l’Expérience Psychanalytique.” Écrits, 93–100. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1949/1966. ———. “Subversion du Sujet et Dialectique du Désir dans l’Inconscient Freudien.” Écrits, 793–828. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1960/1966. Nobus, Dany. “Life and Death in the Glass: A New Look at the Mirror Stage.” In Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, edited by Dany Nobus, 101–138. London: Rebus Press, 1998. Pavlov, Ivan. Selected Works. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955. Sinclair, Upton. The Jungle. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1906. Sloterdijk, Peter. “Domestikation des Seins.” Nicht Gerettet: Versuche nach Heidegger, 142-234. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001. Steeves, H. Peter, ed. Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Todes, Daniel P. Pavlov’s Physiology Factory: Experiment, Interpretation, Laboratory Enterprise. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001. de Waal, Frans. Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes. New York: John Hopkins/Harper & Row, 2002. Wallon, Henri. Les Origines du Caractère chez l’Enfant: Les Préludes du Sentiment de Personnalité. 3rd ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949/1954.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Webster, Richard. “The Cult of Lacan: Freud, Lacan and the Mirror Stage.” 2002. Accessed May, 2013. http://www.richardwebster.net/thecultoflacan.html. Zwart, Hub. Understanding Nature: Case Studies in Comparative Epistemology. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008. ———. “What is an Animal? A Philosophical Reflection on the Possibility of a Moral Relationship with Animals.” Environmental Values 6, no. 4 (1997): 377-392. Zwart, Hub and Bart Penders. “Genomics and the Ark: An Ecocentric Perspective on Human History.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 54, no. 2 (2011): 217–31.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

The Analogy Between the Holocaust and Animal Factory Farming: A Defense Corinne Painter* In their behavior towards animals, all men are Nazis; for the animals, it is an eternal Treblinka.

—Isaac Bashevis Singer1

Abstract In this paper, I argue that the analogy made between human Holocaust victims and animal factory farm victims, which is highly controversial and is taken as offensive to many people, is a strong analogy. My argument hinges, primarily, on my claim that non-human animals have inherent value that makes raising them as food, particularly in the conditions present within modern factory farms (though this is not the only place where we find animal victims), philosophically indefensible in a way that is relevantly similar to—though certainly not identical with—the indefensibility of what is now referred to as the Holocaust. So, while I shall acknowledge some important differences between the two murderous forms of oppression—after all, analogies imply differences and similarities—as well as briefly discuss the difficulties of making accurate, comprehensive comparisons that involve the suffering of others, I shall nevertheless argue in various steps for the thesis that “speciesism,” which appears to provide the primary justification for the raising of non-human animals as food and our eating of them, is a bias that is as philosophically and ethically indefensible as “racism” or the practice of “ethnic cleansing,” including in the form of anti-Semitism, and that, consequently, just as we should not tolerate racist or human genocidal ideas and * Corinne Painter has been a member of the Professional Faculty of the Philosophy Department at Washtenaw Community College (Ann Arbor, MI) since fall 2006. Before this, she was a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University (East Lansing, MI) (2005-2006) and an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University (Emporia, KS) (2004-2005). Her book, Introductory Logic for Community College Students: What is a Good Argument?, is forthcoming with Cognella (January 2014), and she is the co-editor of and contributor to Phenomenology and the Non-Human Animal: At the Limits of Experience, published with Springer (2007). Professor Painter has also published several articles in the areas of Ancient philosophy, Continental philosophy, and Animal Ethics. 1. Isaac Bashevis Singer, “The Letter Writer,” The New Yorker, 271.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 practices, we should also find practices that are speciesist, such as raising non-human animals for food, similarly intolerable. Key Words The Holocaust, Factory Farming, Speciesism, Anti-Semitism, Superiority vs. Inferiority, Dichotomy Introduction In this paper, I argue that the analogy made between human Holocaust victims and animal factory farm victims, which is highly controversial and is taken as offensive to many people,2 is a strong analogy. Examples of the use of this analogy, both in academic and in non-academic contexts, such as literary and animal advocacy contexts, abound. For example, J.M. Coetzee, a Nobel Laureate in Literature, writes through his fictional character, Elizabeth Costello, the following: Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.3

In addition, the well-known animal advocacy group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) launched a campaign several years ago entitled “The Holocaust on your Plate” exhibit, which explicitly employed the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming. In defending the use of the analogy as a way to advocate for the ethical treatment of animals, Matt Prescott, the brainchild of the exhibit, who lost several relatives in the Holocaust, stated the following: The very same mindset that made the Holocaust possible—that we can do anything we want to those we decide are 'different or inferior'—is what allows us to commit atrocities against animals every single day. . . . The fact is, all animals feel pain, fear and loneliness. We're asking people to recognize that what Jews and others went through in the Holocaust is what animals go through every day in factory farms.4

2. Including, even, some animal rights advocates. 3. J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 21. It is worth noting, however, that this sentiment (and similar sentiments) is (are) advanced often in the work of Coetzee, both in his fictional work and in his nonfictional writings. 4. David Teather, "'Holocaust on a Plate' Angers US Jews," The Guardian. Presscott will be appealed to

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 My defense of this analogy hinges on my claim that non-human animals have inherent value that makes raising them as food, particularly in the conditions present within modern factory farms,5 philosophically indefensible in a way that is relevantly similar to—though certainly not identical with—the indefensibility of the Holocaust. In this connection, I appeal to two very moving accounts of Holocaust survivors who acknowledge that it was their experience of the Holocaust that inspired not only their recognition of the similarity between how Holocaust prisoners were treated in concentration camps and how industrially farmed animals are treated in factory farms, but also their desire to become lifelong advocates for animal justice. So, while I shall acknowledge some important differences between the two murderous forms of oppression as well as briefly discuss the difficulties of making accurate, comprehensive comparisons that involve the suffering of others, I shall argue that “speciesism,” which appears to provide the primary justification for the raising of non-human animals as food and our eating of them, is a bias that is just as ethically indefensible as “racism” or the practice of “ethnic cleansing,” including in the form of anti-Semitism.6 Accordingly, just as we do not tolerate racist or human genocidal practices, we should also find practices that are speciesist, such as raising non-human animals for food within factory farms, similarly intolerable. Ultimately, I attempt to show that those who oppose the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming either misinterpret the purpose of the analogy or reject it on speciesist grounds (or both), and that the analogy is therefore a strong analogy. Finally, in my concluding remarks, I return to the analogy between racism and speciesism, appealing to the historical example of how the recognition that slavery relied upon racism, which was acknowledged as philosophically and morally bankrupt, helped to overturn the institution of slavery. In this connection, I argue that, although acknowledging the strength of the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust again in the second section of the paper. 5. This is certainly not the only place where we find animal victims; however, I will focus my analysis on factory farm victims, since (as stated) the goal of this paper is to argue that the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming is a strong one. 6. I am aware of scholarship that argues that anti-Semitism is not a form of racism and that it is a wholly different form of prejudice, primarily rooted in religious hatred. I do not wish to enter this debate here, as it is not necessary for me to take a position on this in order to argue for the position that commands my attention in this paper.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 may not be sufficient to end all non-human animal oppression, just as recognizing the indefensibility of racism eventually helped to end the institution of slavery, if we recognize, through a proper interpretation of the analogy, that speciesism is just as indefensible as racism, we cannot help but realize that defending this analogy is a crucial and important element in the fight to end non-human animal abuse and injustice. 1. A Brief Explication of the Speciesist Objection and its Most Common Responses As Peter Singer and others have advanced, speciesism refers to a bias in favor of the members of one’s own species and against members of another species, simply because of the species distinction and not because of any relevant differences in capacities between the species groups that warrant the favoring.7 Indeed, Singer defines speciesism as "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species,"8 and he goes on to link speciesism to racism and sexism, using the notion of the principle of equal consideration, which refers to the idea that the similar interests of beings (for example, the interest in not suffering that sentient beings share) deserve equal moral consideration, if we are not to be guilty of arbitrarily preferring our own group over another group. In this vein, Singer writes: Racists violate the principle of equal consideration by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate the principle of equal consideration by favouring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical in each case.9

There are two common responses to this “speciesist objection.” One response attempts to deny that those who do not support the concept of animal rights10 are not actually guilty of speciesism. These objectors11 claim to distinguish the moral entitlements of humans 7. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 6, 9. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Or, put differently, those who do not support the idea that animals are entitled to the principle of equal consideration of their interests, which, importantly, does not imply equal treatment of humans and animals but does imply that we cannot harm or kill animals unnecessarily for trivial reasons, just as we cannot treat humans in these ways. 11. See, e.g., Carl Cohen, “A Critique of the Alleged Moral Basis of Vegetarianism”; Daniel Dennett,

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 and non-human animals12 on the basis of different capacities that objectors deem morally relevant. In this way, these objectors deny that they are basing their positions merely on whether an individual is a member of a particular species for which moral relevance has been pre-attributed. However, this response is, at best, misinformed, and, at worst, intentionally misleading, given that the capacities that are generally implicated in these responses include those that involve cognitive or intellectual abilities of some sort (or to the past or assumed future possession of them) that some humans do not possess.13 As many animal rights advocates have acknowledged, any capacity that all humans possess will be one that some non-human animals possess, and as such, to extend rights to individual humans who do not actually possess these capacities on the basis of the fact that most humans possess them, but not to animals who do actually possess them is inconsistent and therefore arbitrary from a philosophical and ethical standpoint. In animal rights literature, this is known as the “Argument From Marginal Cases” (AMC), given that it hinges on the so-called “marginal cases of humanity,” such as infants, the severely mentally challenged or otherwise cognitively compromised humans, senile humans, and so on, none of whom possess the capacities in question.14 The most common response to the AMC involves the claim that this argument fails to realize that the moral world, per definition, is a human world, given (1) that morality, in its fullest sense, is linked with moral “agency,” i.e., with the ability to deliberate about and act in accord with moral rules and principles, (2) that non-human animals, as far as we know, never—or at least hardly ever—possess what is referred to as moral agency, which is linked to the cognitive capacities just mentioned, and, more importantly, (3) that, whereas it is not “natural” (i.e., “normal”) for non-human animals to possess moral agency, it is “normal” for human animals to possess moral agency, despite the fact that there are “marginal cases” of humanity that do not possess it (making these “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why”; Nell Noddings, Caring, 148–170; Richard Posner, “Animal Rights”; and Paul Staudenmaier, “Ambiguities of Animal Rights.” 12. For the sake of simplicity and for space considerations, sometimes (though not always) I will employ the term “animal” in place of “non-human animal” and the term “human” in place of “human animal.” However, I do not mean to imply by this that humans are not animals, or that they are superior animals, as this would be a gross misrepresentation. 13. The most commonly appealed to capacities involve higher-level cognition, such as (higher-order) reflection and language. 14. For an example, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, or animal rights theorist Daniel Dombrowski, “Vegetarianism and the Argument from Marginal Cases in Porphyry,” 141-143.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 humans “abnormal” on this view). According to these thinkers, it is not the properties that any individual human being actually possesses (such as the language capacities or intellectual capacities that are typically associated with moral agency), but the capacities that are normally associated with human beings who are not immature or deficient in some way—i.e., humans as a group—that ground membership in the moral community. There are many ways to argue against this objection, including pointing out that granting membership to the moral community on the basis of an individual’s possession of the capacity for moral agency merely presupposes its claims, rather than arguing for them or the appropriateness of such a criterion. In addition, a non-speciesist reason for why the so-called “marginal cases of humanity” should be included in the “moral club” is, sadly, nowhere to be seen in this objection.15 Although I certainly hope this does not need to be pointed out, let me be clear that I am not proposing that the so-called “marginal cases of humanity” should be used, abused, exploited, and eliminated, e.g., by being raised or kept in factory farms as they are prepared to become food for the “non-marginal cases of humanity.” Rather, I am merely pointing out that whatever criterion is being used to determine that all humans, regardless of their actual intellectual capacities—assuming the criterion is not simply “being human,” since this is clearly speciesist—is going to be a criterion that at least

15. For example, Carl Cohen defends this view, writing that “since human beings, according to their nature, normally possess certain morally relevant capacities that animals, according to their nature, normally lack, by virtue of belonging to a species that normally possesses such morally relevant capacities, the so-called ‘marginal cases’ of humanity are granted membership in the moral community whereas animals are not . . . so, possessing certain capacities, or having moral agency, is not a test to be administered on a case-by-case basis . . . [since] humans are of such a kind that rights pertain to them as humans: humans live lives that will be, or have been, or remain essentially moral. It is silly to suppose that human rights might fluctuate with an individual’s health, or dissipate with an individual’s decline. The rights involved are human rights. On the other hand, animals are of such a kind that rights never pertain to them to begin with, [thus] what humans retain when disabled, rats never had,” Cohen, “A Critique of the Alleged Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,” Food for Thought. Although I have a rather lengthy response to this objection, I believe it is sufficient to suggest that, although Cohen (and others with similar views) do not admit this, upon close reflection, it should be transparent that Cohen’s response to the AMC is actually speciesist. Put very plainly, Cohen is guilty of begging the question (in more than one manner) in his response, insofar as (1) he takes it for granted that the moral world is a human world per definition without giving good reasons for accepting this view, and without giving good reasons for accepting the more specific, related claim that possessing the capacity for moral agency is the appropriate morally relevant criterion for granting individuals membership in the moral community. Moreover, (2) he fails to address in a non-speciesist manner why the so-called “marginal cases of humanity” should be included in the “moral club” so to speak.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 some farm animals meet. Unsurprisingly, the characteristic that I have in mind here is sentience, which I soon discuss. A second response to the speciesist objection used in animal rights arguments openly admits that its anti-animal rights position is, in fact, speciesist. A rebuttal of this argument requires its opponent, i.e., the animal rights advocate, to take seriously the claim that favoring members of one’s own species group merely and only on the basis of the fact that they belong to the same species group is philosophically justified. However, to take this position seriously, one needs to view those beings, groups, or species who have the most powerful capacities (whatever they might be) to be coincident with those beings, groups, or species who have more moral significance than those who have less power. But this is simply a version of a “might-makes-right” theory, which is not an ethical theory at all, but is an explanation either of non-ethical processes, such as some processes that exist in nature, which are morally neutral, or of un-ethical relationships, such as those that are grounded in hierarchical, oppressive power relations that cannot be legitimated on ethical grounds, despite the fact that perhaps economic or political legitimation may have more success. Here, I must admit an unwillingness to entertain this response further, since I do not believe that it can be taken seriously as a reasonable ethical stance. One reason for this is my certainty that, as soon as humans would no longer be in the privileged species position, we would no longer attempt to justify speciesism or any version of a “might makes right” theory, given that we would be the “losers” (so to speak) according to this theoretical stance. It should be obvious that to defend such an inconsistent view is an exercise in hypocrisy, not to mention one that is steeped in a dogmatism or ideological stance that cannot be defended philosophically. Besides pointing out the hypocrisy of this position, I want to draw attention to how nicely it shows the analogous ways in which speciesism, racism, and sexism are philosophically and ethically illegitimate, as was discussed earlier. For while racist and sexist practices and attitudes still exist, sadly, and while it cannot be denied that in some parts of the world religious or cultural ideologies are still used to defend racism and sexism, in most parts of the world these “isms” are no longer justified philosophically. Unfortunately, however, speciesism is not only still robustly practiced by most humans around the globe, but is also promoted and maintained legally, politically, and

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 structurally. Using racism as our example, the analogy between speciesism and racism should be easy to detect insofar as it is grounded upon the analogous definitions of each phenomenon: just as speciesism is defined as a preference or a bias in favor of members of one’s own species and against members of another species simply because of the species distinction and not because of any relevant differences in capacities or characteristics possessed only by the species group that is taken to warrant the favoring, racism is a bias in favor of the members of one’s own race or ethnicity and against members of another race or ethnicity simply because of the ethnicity distinction and not because of any relevant differences in capacities or characteristics possessed by the ethnic groups that are taken to warrant the favoring. Furthermore, just as racism is not philosophically or ethically justifiable, given that an individual’s race or ethnicity on its own is not relevant to that individual’s worth or moral significance, as prohibitions of human slavery and the fairly recent civil rights movement in the United States have shown, so, also, is an individual’s species on its own irrelevant to that individual’s worth or moral significance.

Instead, direct moral significance seems much more

appropriately based upon whether an individual is sentient, i.e., on whether the individual in question is the kind of being that is capable of feeling pain and pleasure,17 or, to use Tom Regan’s famous term, whether the individual is a “subject of a life,”18 and not on whether a being is human or is a member of a particular racial or ethnic group.19 Certainly, most human and non-human animals are (sentient) subjects of a life understood in this way, whereas the same cannot be said for the possession of intellectual capacities, the latter of which, again, if used as the standard for granting genuine moral considerability to beings, would not even apply to all humans. As Gary Francione explains, 16. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Animal Liberation. In the third and final section of the paper, I return to this issue in the context of discussing the importance of employing analogies in fights for justice. 17. Indirect moral significance of nonsentient entities is not addressed here as it is beyond the scope of this paper. 18. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 243f. 19. In more detail, as Gary Francione, a well-known abolitionist animal rights advocate, puts it, “a sentient being is a being who is subjectively aware; a being who has interests; that is, a being who prefers, desires, or wants. [But] those interests do not have to be anything like human interests. If a being has some kind of mind that can experience frustration or satisfaction of whatever interests that being has, then the being is sentient,” Gary Francione, “Sentience.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 we engage in speciesist thinking when we claim that a being must have a humanlike mind to count morally. That is, it is speciesist to claim that a being must have a reflective sense of self awareness, or conceptual thought, or the general ability to experience life in the way that humans do in order to have the moral right not to be used as a resource. As long as there is someone there who is subjectively aware and who, in that being’s own way, cares about what happens to him or to her, this is all that is necessary to have the moral right not to be used as a resource.20

Along with many other animal rights theorists, then, I believe that the analogy between racism and speciesism should be transparent, particularly if one understands that the bases of these two prejudices are identical, and thus if one is indefensible, so is the other. Moreover, although it appears as though differing racial groups, for example, racial minorities in the United States, were finally given full moral, political, and legal status (at least in principle, even if not in practice) because their humanity was acknowledged—“all humans are created equally”21—an adequate philosophical or ethical justification for this expansion of the moral, political, and legal community must refer to something more than simply belonging to the species group that currently happens to be (generally) more powerful than any other species group, if it wants to withstand the test of time; for this justification, as argued earlier, will not stand up to philosophical scrutiny if circumstances change such that humans, as a group, are no longer in the privileged power position.22 2. The Analogy between Human Holocaust Victims and Animal Factory Farm Victims We are now in a position to examine the analogy between the Holocaust and animal factory farms, which is connected to the analogy between racism and speciesism. I should like to begin, however, by acknowledging that, while on the one hand, many 20. Gary Francione, “Sentience.” 21. Not incidentally, this is a theoretical principle and not a statement of fact, since all humans are certainly not “equal” or “the same.” 22. Furthermore, we would do well to note, in this context, that there are many places in the world where certain minority groups still suffer from severe oppression and discrimination, the justifications for which, when given, do not attempt to argue that the oppressed groups are not really human; rather, they argue that the oppressed are “deficient” or “different” in some way that makes their rights and entitlements differ from the rights and entitlements of others. For example, they may claim that the so-called “deficient” groups have customs and practices that are “uncivilized” or “barbaric,” or that the rational capacities of the group’s members are compromised, but they almost never claim that the “deficient group” is simply “not human.” I bring up this point not in order to support it, but simply to show that such justifications, which are ethically indefensible to be sure, are nevertheless not attempting to support a speciesist view. I suspect that this is because the illegitimacy of speciesism is recognized; however, this then means that such defenses would fall prey to the “AMC” response that I recounted earlier.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 people, including animal rights advocates, are offended by this analogy, on the other hand, there are many people who are not offended by this analogy and support it, not the least of whom include Holocaust survivors themselves, as well as former Nazis.23 For example, in Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, Charles Patterson devotes an entire section of his book to telling the story of many such persons, writing that the activists profiled in his chapter entitled “We Were Like That Too: Holocaust-Connected Animal Advocates” were “able to extend their concern and compassion beyond the species-barrier to those whom Henry Spira called ‘the most defenseless of all the world’s victims,’”24 namely, non-human animals. This is not only (perhaps) a surprising and interesting point to note, but also an important one, insofar as it shows that the offense that many take at the suggestion that Holocaust victims and factory farm animals suffer in similar ways is not viewed as offensive, demeaning, or otherwise disrespectful to many victims who actually suffered at the hands of the Nazis. Put plainly, the analogy compares the treatment of humans in the Nazi concentration camps to how animals in the factory farm are used, abused, valued, and killed only insofar as they are useful to their human oppressors. Importantly, the chapter in Patterson’s book shows that some of those who were closest to victims of the Holocaust see the analogy as a strong comparison. There are far too many accounts of concentration camp survivors in Patterson’s book to recount here, so I will only recount, briefly, two of these narratives. One Holocaust survivor and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) activist, known only as “Hacker” in Patterson’s account, grew up in Nazi Germany and experienced so much cruelty as a little boy that he reports that it is still as real to him as the tattoo that marked his stay in Auschwitz. Consequently, when he came to the United States in his teens, was adopted by the owner of a New York neighborhood butcher shop, and was eventually made to run the shop, his revulsion toward slaughterhouse horrors finally drove him out of the business and into animal advocacy.25

23. Owing only to time and space considerations, I cannot recount these narratives here. 24. Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, 139. Spira explains the inspiration for his animal activism, ibid., reporting on being deeply troubled by the atrocities of the Holocaust while also reflecting on the hypocrisy of caring so strongly for one animal “while sticking a knife and fork into another,” Feder, “Pressuring Perdue.” 25. Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, 141-142.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Indeed, Hacker even went so far as to repeat the claim made by I.B. Singer with which I began this paper: “In their behavior towards animals, all men are Nazis.”26 Another story Patterson relays is that of Alex Hershaft. Hershaft is also a Holocaust survivor, as well as the founder and president of the Farm Animal Reform Movement (FARM). Hershaft spent time in the Warsaw Ghetto, and while the Nazis killed his father, his mother managed to survive. They reunited after the war, eventually making their way to the United States.27 In an interview he gave in the late 1990s, Hershaft had the following to say: “I know firsthand what it is like to be treated like a worthless object, to be hunted by the killers of my family and friends, to wonder each day if I will see the next sunrise, to be crammed in a cattle car on the way to slaughter.” 28 While some might object that, since non-human animals do not “know” or experience such feelings or fears and do not “wonder” about their futures in the same way as Hershaft or any other Holocaust victims did, treating them in these ways is either less of a mistreatment of them or no mistreatment at all, scientists and other scholars have shown that, while most non-human animals are not able to engage in higher-order reflection at the same level as humans in possession of “normal” cognitive capacities are, they certainly experience a range of painful emotions, including fear and hysteria, as well as complex social lives; in addition, many of them (certainly most factory-farmed animals) have self-awareness and at least a rudimentary sense of personal existence over time, including the capacity to remember.29 But even absent this evidence, it is crucial to take seriously Hershaft’s response to his experience. As he puts it, “my experience led me to a lifelong pursuit of justice for the oppressed. I soon discovered that the most oppressed beings on earth are non-human animals and that the most numerous and most oppressed among them are farm animals.”30 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., 144. 28. Loren Goloski, “Holocaust Survivor Heads State Animal Rights Group,” Montgomery County Sentinel. 29. See, e.g., studies on the emotional lives of chickens, often thought to be the least intelligent of farm animals: Donald D. Bell and William D. Weaver Jr., eds., Chicken Meat and Egg Production, 89; T. Dustan Clark et. al., “Understanding and Control of Gangrenous Dermatitis in Poultry Houses,” 2; Daniel S. Mills and Christine J. Nicol, “Tonic Immobility in Spent Hens After Catching and Transport,” The Veterinary Record 126, 212; and Lesley J. Rogers, The Development of Brain and Behaviour in the Chicken, 218. 30. Andrew Silow Carroll, “The Oppressive Mindset is the Issue,” Jewish World, 9.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 For these two survivors, as for so many other survivors that Patterson discusses, their experience of suffering at the hands of the Nazis did not cause them to see themselves and their suffering as more important or worse than the suffering of nonhuman animal victims, but instead resulted in their seeing animals as victims who continue to suffer in horrifically unjustifiable ways that are analogous to the ways that they and their fellow concentration camp comrades suffered. In turn, this inspired their tireless efforts to attempt to end what they (and many) refer to as an “eternal Treblinka” for animals. Quoting Hershaft again,31 in our technologically advanced contemporary world, “there are ‘black boxes’: they are the biomedical research laboratories, factory farms, and slaughterhouses – faceless compounds where society conducts its dirty business of abusing and killing innocent, feeling beings. These are our Dachaus, our Bechenwalds, our Birkenaus . . . ” and our Auschwitzes.32 In connection with this, as Andrew Linzey, the Director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Studies and a well-known theologian and animal advocate, reminds us in a recent editorial in the Journal of Animal Ethics, one need only reflect on how (what are referred to as) the “‘Ag-Gag’ laws prevent consumers and taxpayers not only from knowing but also from seeing and judging for themselves” what is happening in animal production facilities and within the industry in general.33 Furthermore, we would also do well to remind ourselves that in the history of moral causes, the denial of transparency invariably betokens something to hide . . . [for] what we see, or are allowed to see, affects our moral judgment. That so much of industrialized farming is, as a matter of course, hidden from view hinders full moral evaluation.34

If nothing else, these exemplary narratives of Holocaust survivors, as well as our acknowledgment of Linzey’s reminder that the practices we hide from the public typically suggest horrors that we would like to keep secret due to the fear of moral outrage that might result if such practices are made public, should motivate us to at least consider that the offense that many people feel when factory farming is said to be analogous to the Holocaust is inappropriately grounded in the notion that the two events are incomparable, and that it would be better to replace this offense with moral outrage at 31. Alex Hershaft, “Warning: This Book May Change Your Life.” 32. Ibid. 33. Andrew Linzey and Priscilla N. Cohn, “Entitled to Know: Editorial Press Release: U.S. ‘Ag Gag’ Laws ‘Sinister’ say Leading Academics,” Journal of Animal Ethics 3.1, vi. This statement may also be found on the Centre’s website: www.oxfordanimalethics.com. 34. Ibid.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 the injustice of factory farming itself, just as Hacker and Hershaft (and so many other Holocaust survivors) do. In addition to this, although my defense of the analogy between human Holocaust victims and animal factory farm victims does not judge which group’s sufferings were or are worse, since I do not think this is entirely possible or that it is necessary to do this in order to defend the analogy, I would like to point out something that many scholars (in different contexts) have noted, namely, that it is reasonable to think that precisely because most non-human animals do not operate with the same set of cognitive abilities that most humans do, in some cases, such as confinement and torture, their suffering may actually be worse than it would be for humans. This is because humans can use their intellectual capacities for trying to understand what is happening to them, for producing calming imaginations, for hoping that their suffering will end, whereas most animals likely cannot. As Karen Davis puts this in her “A Tale of Two Holocausts,” in contrast to humans, factory-farmed animals “have no cognitive insulation, no compensation, presumably no comprehension of the causes of their suffering, and thus no psychological relief from their suffering.”35 Furthermore, as Matthew Scully claims, For all we know, [animals’] pain may sometimes seem more immediate, blunt, arbitrary, and inescapable than ours. Walk through an animal shelter or a slaughterhouse and you wonder if animal suffering might not at times be all the more terrifying and all-encompassing without benefit of the words and concepts that for us, after all, confer not only meaning but consolation. Whatever is going on inside their heads, it doesn’t seem ‘mere’ to them. 36

Again, let me be clear that I do not wish to argue that factory farm victims suffer more than Holocaust victims did and do. Nevertheless, I want to point out that those who would argue that the suffering of Holocaust victims was (obviously) worse than the suffering of animals living in factory farms are fighting an uphill battle. I say this not only because it is reasonable to claim that some forms of suffering may actually be worse 35. Karen Davis, “A Tale of Two Holocausts,” 7. It should be noted that Davis’s work is primarily focused on the treatment of chickens in factory farms; however, I take it as obvious that the general claims that she advances about the lives and the suffering of chickens within factory farms can easily be made about virtually all factory farmed animals, given that they all have emotional lives, they have fairly complex social lives, they possess at least a rudimentary sense of self-awareness (i.e., they are subjects of a life and their lives matter to them), but, even so, they are made to live in conditions that produce intense suffering, just as chickens are. 36. Matthew Scully, Dominion, 7.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 for non-human animals (for the reasons just stated), but also because we cannot know exactly what the suffering of another is like, non-human or human, since suffering is a first-person experience. This in turn means that we cannot make entirely accurate or comprehensive comparisons between sufferings, though, obviously, given the project within which I am engaged, I do not believe that this should stop us from drawing intelligent analogies between aspects of events that involve obvious suffering, as long as they are compared with appropriate sensitivity. Another important insight about measuring the suffering of others comes from 37

Davis, who notes that “the problem of apprehending the pain or suffering of others is increased when the others are in a situation of mass suffering,”38 since individuals tend to disappear as individuals and instead are viewed as generic members of a group. Certainly, this may be applied both to human Holocaust victims and to animal factory farm victims, despite the fact that the awareness of this will not be identical between the two groups of victims. In any event, one can certainly understand, particularly on an emotional level, why many Holocaust victims feel resentment and perhaps even outrage when the analogy between what they suffered in the Holocaust and what animals suffer within factory farms is advanced: presumably, they do not want the uniqueness and profundity of the Holocaust as an event, the reasons for it, and the unjust suffering and death that resulted from it, to be lost and simply lumped together with another event or practice, even if the other practice is acknowledged to be unjust as well. And they are justified in not wanting this to happen. So, in what follows, I take up this justifiable worry by analyzing what I take to be the main reasons why many people feel so offended by this analogy. This analysis not only (re)-emphasizes that such resentment and outrage over this analogy is not the reaction of all Holocaust victims, but also argues for why being offended by the analogy is indefensible from a philosophical standpoint, despite its understandability. Before moving on to analyze these disparate responses to the analogy in more detail, however, I would like to respond to an objection that could be advanced at this 37. For other discussions of this, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights; Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain. 38. Karen Davis, “A Tale of Two Holocausts,” 5. Also see Karen Davis, “Open Rescues: Putting a Face on Liberation.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 juncture of my consideration—namely, that I have so far primarily only offered personal stories that suggest that the analogy between Holocaust victims and factory farm victims is reasonable, coupled with some discussion of the general difficulty of making comparisons of suffering, particularly mass suffering, none of which “proves” anything. First, let me say that I do not intend to debate differing accounts of what counts as “proof” or as “reasonable evidence,” as I think this is a debate better left to epistemologists. However, I will say that, given certain understandings of “proof,” those who oppose my thesis have certainly failed to “prove” their theses. Secondly, whatever we might want to say about this, I admit that, although personal narratives can be extremely philosophically valuable, particularly the narratives presented here, given that they give us accounts from people whose positions are grounded in experiential knowledge that most people do not have and which most people would not expect to lead to the conclusions recounted, I, too, believe that more explicit philosophical (or theoretical) arguments are in order, if my defense of the analogy is to be persuasive. Toward this end, I shall begin by acknowledging that, despite the many moving stories we have of Holocaust survivors defending this analogy, there are far more people, among them Holocaust survivors and descendants of Holocaust victims, arguing against the analogy. A perusal of the literature shows that those who object to the analogy, whether they are or are not intimately connected to the Holocaust,39 tend to reject the analogy primarily for two reasons. The first is a failure to understand how the analogy is (or at least ought to be) used, namely, not in order to make the judgment that the two groups suffered in exactly the same way or that one group’s suffering is more important than another group’s. Nor does the analogy attempt to take away the uniqueness of the suffering of either group. As stated above, completely accurate or comprehensive judgments of others’ suffering, especially mass and structurally sanctioned suffering, such as what happened in the Holocaust and what currently happens in factory farms, is not possible, and thus neither are wholly adequate comparisons of these victims’ suffering, particularly if they are not made on the basis of adequate philosophical and 39. It ought to be noted that this is a term initially associated with animal slaughter and that it was only later taken over by Jewish and other people after WWII to identify the mass slaughter of those killed at the hands of the Nazis. See Boria Sax, Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust. Sax states that the term “‘Holocaust’ originally denoted a Hebrew sacrifice in which the entire animal was given to Yahweh [God] to be consumed with fire,” 156.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 empirical evidence, where the goal is to work toward lessening or eliminating unjustifiable suffering. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that it is simply a logical mistake to claim that drawing an analogy between two events means that the events in question are being identified; rather, they are being compared and said to be similar regarding certain aspects that are detectable to us; however, this need not detract from the unique nature of the events being compared. Put simply, it is not true that the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming must detract from the suffering of Holocaust victims by turning it into an instance of some sort of “generic suffering” that any other group has faced, is facing, or could face. Interpreted correctly, the analogy allows the suffering of Holocaust victims to remain unique and wholly its own event. This is more easily grasped as long as one understands that the purpose of the analogy is to provide a familiar and emotionally charged language and imagery that inspires us to engage what animal rights advocates believe is action we must take in order to eliminate the undeniable suffering of the millions of animal victims that our current social, political, economic, and legal structures promote and maintain through institutions and practices, such as factory farming. As Matt Prescott, the creator of PETA’s controversial Holocaust On Your Plate exhibit, explains, this was certainly the motivation behind that campaign, as I will discuss shortly. In addition, as Peter Singer puts it, while “our current sphere of moral concern is wider than that of the Nazis, as we are no longer prepared to (legally) countenance a lesser degree of concern for other human beings… there are still countless sentient beings for whom we appear to have no real concern at all,”40 despite the fact that at least some of our rhetoric claims otherwise. For this reason, drawing an analogy that forces us to notice that we still support industries and practices that are morally illegitimate is a crucial weapon in the fight for animal justice. For although there are virtually no morally relevant distinctions that justify the intense suffering that non-human animals endure at our hands in our factory farms, our research labs, and elsewhere, the justification that we use to treat, use, and exterminate animals in the way that we do is quite similar to the justification that the Nazis used to explain their ill treatment, use, and 40. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 84–85.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 extermination of the Jewish and other so-called “undesirable” people imprisoned within their concentration camps, namely, that “they” are inferior to “us.” In any event, as the earlier accounts of Holocaust victims who claim that it was precisely their experience in concentration camps that inspired them to fight for animal justice suggest, they understood the nature of the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming in the way that I outlined. Indeed, they see the analogy as a meaningful comparison that is not drawn with the goal of judging which group’s suffering is worse or more horrific, but with the goal of showing the horrific nature and unjustifiability of both groups’ suffering, which (again) need not render non-unique or meaningless the suffering of either group, nor of any individual within either group. For the basis of recognizing the reasonability of the analogy is an admission that the treatment of Holocaust victims as well as the treatment of non-human animal victims of factory farming are both wrong, regardless of whether one group suffered or suffers more than another (assuming we could know this), and, moreover, that they are wrong for similar reasons. For, in the one case, the unjustifiable, oppressive, ultimately lethal treatment is largely based on racist, anti-Semitic ideology, whereas, in the other case, the unjustifiable, oppressive, and ultimately lethal treatment is largely based on speciesist ideology, both of which share their own analogy, and neither of which can withstand serious philosophical scrutiny (as was established in the first section of the paper). The second, related reason that people object to the analogy does not lie so much in their failure to understand how the analogy is being used (or ought to be used), but in their speciesist attitudes, which appear to provide the foundation for their view that the two events are incomparable or that they should not be compared because it is just too offensive to the human victims and survivors of the Holocaust—and to all humans—to make such a comparison.41 In this connection, we would do well to note Peter Singer’s astute comment, which he advanced in an interview in 1987, about the “conditioned 41. For example, Tom Regan, to whom I earlier appealed, asks in The Case for Animal Rights whether we should “dare” to speak of a Holocaust for animals. Although Regan answers this question in the affirmative, he attempts (among other things) in his book—which, not incidentally, also includes recounting narratives of Holocaust-connected victims who support the analogy—to show why the affirmative answer is reasonable, all the while still treating the analogy very cautiously. In addition, Peter Singer is also very careful to qualify his language whenever he compares the suffering of animals to the suffering of Holocaust victims in his work so that he can stress that he does not mean to suggest that “ordinary” meat-eating people are just like Nazis.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ethical blindness” both of the Nazis as well as of animal experimenters and industrialized factory farmers.42 The notion of “conditioned ethical blindness” points very explicitly to the pervasiveness of speciesism as an “ordinary” attitude possessed by most people, as the well-known expression “Holocaust victims were treated like animals” demonstrates, insofar as it is meant to say that Holocaust victims were mistreated because they were treated as “mere animals.” However, while it is certainly true that those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis were treated in horrifically unjustifiable ways, and it is true that they were treated in many ways that are shockingly similar to the ways that animals are treated in factory farms (and elsewhere, such as in research laboratories), it does not follow from this that the way that animals are being treated in factory farms is permissible or justifiable for them. In other words, the Holocaust victims were treated wrongly not because they were treated in ways that are only fitting for non-human animals; rather, they were treated wrongly because they were made to suffer and die for illegitimate reasons. But this is also why the current treatment of non-human animals in factory farms and other places is wrong. In this connection, I agree with Jim Mason who claims that factory farms are literally concentration camps, which are comparable to Nazi concentration camps.43 In addition, as I intimated previously, I also applaud Prescott’s defense of PETA’s Holocaust On Your Plate exhibit, since he explains that the analogy goes both ways: not only is it the case that Holocaust victims were treated like animals, but it is also the case that factory-farmed animals are treated as Holocaust victims were.44 As Prescott explains about the exhibit, comparisons [of factory farms] to the Holocaust are undeniable and inescapable not only because we humans share with all other animals our ability to feel pain, fear and loneliness, but because the government-sanctioned oppression of billions of beings, and the systems we use to abuse and kill them, eerily parallel the concentration camps.45

42. David Macauley, “An Interview with Peter Singer,” 42. It should be noted that others have also used the term “ethical blindness” to describe human-nonhuman animal relations, as well as other ethical problems. 43. Jim Mason, An Unnatural Order, 119. 44. See Karen Davis, “Tale of Two Holocausts,” 3. 45. Karen Davis, The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale, 8. This passage comes originally from a private email communication between Davis and Prescott.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Naturally, Prescott goes on to list many of these similarities (as do numerous other scholars).46 Rather than contributing to this body of scholarship, I now turn my critical gaze to Roberta Kalechofsky, since she is as an example of a scholar who rejects the analogy for both of the reasons outlined. For, while she admits in her Animal Suffering and the Holocaust: The Problem with Comparisons that the sufferings of human Holocaust victims and animal factory farm victims are similar, unjustifiable, and gratuitous evils committed by the hands of humans, she explicitly opposes drawing an analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming. 47 Kalechofsky does this most directly when she discusses the way in which history separates the Holocaust and factory farming. According to her, it is in large measure because the suffering of the Holocaust victims is more “historically memorable” than the suffering of factory farm victims that it is also more “morally significant,” which leads her to conclude that the atrocities caused by the Holocaust are far worse than those caused by factory farming.48 While I already admitted that I do not intend to take a side on who suffered/suffers more out of these two groups, as doing so misses the point of the analogy, even if it were possible (which I have argued it is not), I should like to offer a reminder that taking this stance as a way to discredit the analogy cannot work insofar as it rests upon a misunderstanding of its purpose, which does not involve claiming that the suffering of the groups being compared is identical. Kalechofsky’s rejection of the analogy not only misses the proper purpose of it, however, it also demonstrates that she is guilty of speciesism, or if we want to use “softer” terminology, that she is guilty of “conditioned ethical blindness.” While there are several distinctions between the Holocaust and factory farming that Kalechofsky discusses in her analysis of the analogy, there are two historical distinctions that she focuses upon in her analysis, which substantiate the charge of speciesism most strongly, namely: (1) that Holocaust survivors and their offspring remember this grave offense, as well as the anti-Semitism that spawned it (not to mention that they are still victims of it), whereas animals who survive factory farms and their offspring do not remember the offenses perpetrated against them or their ancestors (as far 46. See, e.g., David Sztybel, “Can the Treatment of Animals be Compared to the Holocaust?” This article very carefully discusses thirty-nine points of comparison between the Holocaust and modern factory farming. 47. Roberta Kalechofsky, Animal Suffering and the Holocaust, 7. 48. Ibid., 37–57.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 as we know),49 and (2) that Holocaust victimization is symbolic in a way that factory farm victimization is not, as is captured when she writes: the Jew inspires a dizzying array of symbols crushed on top of symbols, symbols obliterating and melting into other symbols. No creatures, human or non-human, carry such symbolic overload. Rarely does an animal arouse such . . . paroxysms of hatred from its killer.50

Indeed, Kalechofsky goes on to discuss how “to the anti-Semite51 . . . the Jew is always something else, the bearer of a universal stigmata [that] the anti-Semite feels in his flesh. . . . [Whereas, for example], the beaver is killed simply because his fur or his meat is useful.”52 To be sure, these distinctions suggest that there is more going on in her analysis than pointing out differences between the two events, which the analogy could withstand. As I will discuss next, her discussion of these claims takes on a tone that is lathered in speciesism.53 In connection with the comparison that Kalechofsky makes between human memory and animal memory of suffering due to unjust treatment, I agree that surviving animal victims and their offspring are not aware of past offenses committed against them in the same way humans are; for example, they (likely) cannot formulate the judgment that they were treated unjustly, so they will not experience the feelings that accompany this particular judgment. Nevertheless, their behavior undeniably indicates that they are aware of dangers and threats to their lives, much of which is acquired on the basis of their memory of past experience. Indeed, non-human animals learn from their experiences by remembering what is threatening and what is non-threatening to them within their environments, and they pass this on to their offspring when possible. As such, memory of past threats or incidents of suffering is not an “all or nothing distinction,” as Kalechofsky might have us believe, nor is it clear that it speaks to the question of the reasonability of the analogy, especially since the capacity to judge threats or suffering as unjust is not meant to be one of the many ways in which the Holocaust and factory farming is said to be analogous. To claim that it is, rather than to acknowledge that this capacity is not 49. Ibid., 39–40. 50. Ibid., 44 51. Not incidentally, Kalechofsky’s analysis focuses almost exclusively on the Jewish victims of the Holocaust. 52. Ibid. 53. I should like to underscore that Kalechofsky’s analysis appears to be approached with sensitivity; in addition, I want to note that I do not believe that she intends to offer a speciesist analysis, despite the fact that (in my view) her analysis is speciesist.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 shared by both sets of victims, not only fails to understand the nature of the analogy, but also betrays Kalechofsky’s speciesist disposition, since, on her account, even Holocaust victims or descendants who (like animals) do not have the capacity to make judgments about their past unjust treatment are harmed more than factory farmed animals are by virtue of the fact that humans, as a group, are historically aware beings. In addition, I should like to point out that giving the capacity for historical awareness of injustice relevance in many parts of her critical analysis of the analogy while brushing aside its moral relevance at other points is inconsistent. Kalechofsky does this quite explicitly when she admits that “it is just history that separates animal suffering from the Holocaust,”54 and not a difference in the degree to which individuals within each group suffer, nor, even, whether one group’s suffering is more unjustifiable than another’s. While I suspect that this (confused) part of Kalechofsky’s analysis stems from her (understandable) worry about rendering the Holocaust non-unique, as was stated previously, since this need not be the outcome of intelligent analogies that are appropriately offered and interpreted, this worry need not occupy her (or anyone’s) attention. In any event, I certainly do not think that Kalechofsky can have it both ways: either it is “just history” that distinguishes the suffering of these two groups of victims, and as such it is neither morally significant nor a reason for rejecting the analogy, or historical memory in the sense in which human victims can possess it but non-human animals cannot is so important that it renders the analogy unreasonable. Which is it? I do not believe that the second view can withstand philosophical scrutiny, since historical memory of the unjustifiable nature of an event does not make a horrific, morally repugnant event more horrific or morally repugnant in itself; rather, it simply makes it more memorable to the individual minds of those who remember it. More importantly, according to many animal rights theorists, and rather ironically, the historical (human) memory that exists in the case of the Holocaust, but not in the case of factory farming, is one of the main reasons for drawing the analogy between the two events in the first place, as the goal is for the unjustifiability of factory farming to be brought to the forefront of the ordinary human person’s imagination so that, like the Holocaust, it, too, may become something that we no longer tolerate. 54. Ibid., 35, emphasis mine.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 I also reject Kalechofsky’s claim that, whereas Jews symbolize something other than what they are, non-human animals do not. For, given that farm animals do, in fact, symbolize something other than what they are, inasmuch as they are viewed, used, and abused in ways that do not do justice to their nature as sentient beings who have interests of their own and whose lives matter to them experientially, they, too, are, in an important sense, simply “symbols.” This is clear in that factory-farmed animals are perceived as beings who have significance only (or primarily) as profit-making entities—commodities, really—that satisfy many non-necessary, often even trivial, human preferences. In this vein, and once again, in contrast to other parts of her analysis, Kalechofsky even admits that throughout history animals have been viewed as symbols in various ways, for example, within religious rituals as well as within our contemporary, industrialized world, given that they are viewed as “production centers” or “profit-making machines.”55 As such, Kalechofsky’s claim that Jews were not destroyed for their usefulness, but for opposite reasons. They were destroyed under the motto of ‘life unworthy of life’, and this is not the argument used against animals. No one thinks of the beaver, the mink, the leopard, or the elephant, as ‘life unworthy of life’ . . . [rather] to the trapper who traps and skins the beaver, the beaver is simply a beaver56

should be rejected. While I realize that she is no doubt hoping to highlight the sense in which the beaver—or in our case, the factory-farmed animal—does not symbolize something hated, as the Jewish person does to the anti-Semite or to the Nazi, it is not clear that the hatred that may be responsible for the Nazi’s desire to exterminate the Jewish people57 is worse than the instrumental view that most humans have of nonhuman animals. Following this line of reasoning, I take it as obvious that if non-human animals, particularly those we house and use within factory farms, were not seen as essentially powerless creatures (compared to humans) who are instrumentally valuable to us, but were seen as threatening, dangerous, and/or evil, as the Nazis (and, probably, antiSemites in general) viewed (view) Jewish people, and assuming we possessed the knowledge, the power, and the necessary apparatus to eliminate them, animals would 55. Ibid., 53–55; see ibid., 35–37, 51. 56. Ibid., 44. 57. Not all scholars working on the Holocaust agree that hate is what primarily motivated the Nazi Programme. However, I do not wish to enter this debate here.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 suffer exactly the same fate that over six million Jewish (and other) people did during the Holocaust. Put very plainly, the only reason we do not exterminate the non-human animal species that we share spaces with—though we have no difficulty inflicting immeasurable suffering on them—is because they are extremely useful to us, and because we have very convenient, profit-making mechanisms in place to capitalize on their utility, which we exploit with the greatest of systematic, industrialized expertise, prior to putting an end to their lives. Consequently, while it may be a stretch, as I just acknowledged, to claim that the existence of factory farms and the treatment of animals within them is rooted in a hatred of animals that is similar to anti-Semitism or to Nazi hatred of Jewish people, it does not follow from this that the common conception of them as only or primarily of instrumental value is justifiable, or that it is less harmful than hating them. At least this seems to be true from the animals’ perspective, given that they end up suffering similar fates as Holocaust victims, with the only exceptions being (1) that factory farmed animal victims’ entire lives are full of suffering whereas this was not true of the Holocaust victims, and (2) that the latter victims were not raised to be food for us, as factory farmed animal victims are. In fact, along these lines and in response to Kalechofsky’s claim (quoted earlier) that Jews were destroyed because they were seen as “life unworthy of life” and that this is not the argument used against animals, it could be objected, as Davis puts it, that it is surely “the psychology of contempt for ‘inferior life’ that links the Nazi mentality… to that which allows us to [continue to] torture and kill billions of non-human animals,”58 with almost no regard for their suffering or their desire to live, simply because we believe that they are not entitled to anything unless we (humans) permit it. This view was held by the Nazis toward the Jewish and other people they captured, abused, and exterminated in their concentration camps,59 and it is still held today by most people with respect to non 58. Karen Davis, The Holocaust and the Henmaid’s Tale, 110. 59. Let us not forget that while there may not be a “plan” in place (at the moment) to exterminate all farm animals, ultimately, factory-farmed animals that cease to be of use to us are, typically, exterminated, unless they die on their own, or they escape or are rescued. In addition, let us also not forget that the healthiest concentration camp victims were often used and abused prior to their extermination as well. For example, the healthy prisoners were made to work in labor camps before they were murdered, and medical experiments were performed on many of the captured victims, especially children. Moreover, the Nazis confiscated virtually everything of value that the Jews or other prisoners possessed, from gold teeth to expensive jewelry or artwork. In this way, Kalechofsky’s claim that the Nazis were not interested in using the Jews and others that they captured, but were only interested in killing them out of hatred, is not entirely

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 human animals. I submit that we ought to be able to see quite clearly how the underlying attitude of anti-Semitism and the underlying attitude of speciesism, both of which rely upon viewing the “other group” as inferior to one’s own, provide the primary, systematic justification for the use, the abuse, and the ultimate fate of the Holocaust victims as well as for the use, abuse, and ultimate fate of factory farm victims. Accordingly, it is reasonable to advance that since (1) a deeply-engrained, culturally supported, but morally bankrupt, false dichotomy of superiority-inferiority fuels both relationships and (2) there is an undeniable similarity in the way in which the two sets of victims were (are) treated as well as in how they suffer, the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust is extremely strong and should be recognized as such. 3. Brief Concluding Remarks: The Analogy as Weapon to Fight Non-Human Animal Injustice and Suggestions for Future Explorations Despite the evidence that I have presented in defense of the analogy, I admit, along with Davis (and others), that it remains extremely difficult for most people to support this analogy and make these comparisons. However, as I have argued, this difficulty is primarily due to an “ethical blindness” that is characterized by an indefensible speciesism, which presupposes a false superiority-inferiority relation between humans and animals that is rarely questioned. In this vein, Davis lucidly writes: That there could be a link between the Third Reich and society’s treatment of nonhuman animals is hard for most people to grasp. That nonhuman animals could suffer as horribly as humans in being reduced to industrialized products and industrial waste and treated with complete contempt—a clear link between Nazism and factory farming—contradicts thousands of years of teachings that humans are superior to animals in all respects. Not only is this a “humans versus animals” issue in the minds of most, but by this time the Holocaust has become iconic and “historical,” whereas the human manufacture of animal suffering is so “normal” and pervasive that many people find it hard even to regard the slaughter of animals as a form of violence.60

Sadly, this “speciesist blindness” not only permeates the minds and everyday practices of ordinary people, but it is still not often discussed in an authentic way in intellectual settings, including in many of our universities and other research true, insofar as many prisoners who were deemed “useful” were, in fact, used before they were exterminated. 60. Karen Davis, “A Tale of Two Holocausts,” 2.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 institutions.61 This is the case despite the fact that many of these institutions have erected “animal welfare” programs and despite the fact that food production corporations and the legal system have erected “standards of treatment” for non-human animals housed within factory farms and elsewhere, given that these programs and protections operate on the supposition that it is permissible, for example, to raise non-human animals as food and to use them as subjects in painful medical research tests. If speciesist suppositions were not in place, the “animal welfare” studies, programs, and so-called protections would not be focused on answering the question of how we can lessen or reduce the suffering of animals within such institutions,62 but rather on eradicating these institutions, given that their eradication is required for eliminating the unjust treatment of animals. Here it might be helpful to ask how we would react to someone who proposed the following: let us round up all the Jewish people (or some other group that those in power deem inferior, feel threatened by, or do not value), so that we can use them for feeding the rest of the population, for doing manual labor that we do not want to do ourselves, and as subjects who we subject to dangerous medical and other tests; but before we could object, the proposer goes on to state that we will employ standards of care and put protections in place to ensure that we treat the captive individuals in ways that produce as little suffering as possible, and that when we kill them after their use is spent, we will try to do so painlessly. Presumably, at this point in history (at least in the Western world) we would do more than simply take offense at this proposition and would forbid it not only morally, but legally, as we now do. The reason we would react this way is that most of us have rejected the superiority-inferiority dichotomy that has been used historically to endorse treating humans who were categorized into different groups, including different ethnic groups, different gender groups, and different religious groups, in illegitimately different ways. Indeed, it is for this reason that we recognize that practices such as 61. For example, an internal college publication announcing my invited lecture on this very topic changed the title to “The Injustice of Factory Farming,” removing all mention of the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust. 62. Within the food production industry, although one can hear (and read) this rhetoric, the real questions of concern center on determining the most efficient and effective way to “produce” the animals, who are viewed and treated as mere commodities, so that the corporations may turn the largest profit possible while keeping the public from being offended. In this connection, we might be reminded of Linzey’s statement (appealed to earlier in the paper), within which he notes the suspicious nature of hiding things from the public. In any event, to put the matter plainly, “animal welfare” concerns within this industry are really just business concerns.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 slavery and human genocide are illegitimate and cannot—will not—be tolerated. This paper has tried to argue that a proper understanding of the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming can be viewed and should be employed as a weapon in our fight against non-human animal injustice, insofar as it should inspire us to have the same reaction to the current factory farming institution as we do to my hypothetical proposal. Thus, in spite of being fully aware both of the difficulty of making comparisons of separate instances of suffering, as well as of the thousands of years of being taught that human animals are superior to non-human animals, I should like to make a plea for each of us to defend this analogy on the grounds that it will hopefully help more people see that, because the comparison should be accepted on philosophical and ethical grounds, the repugnancy and moral outrage that most people feel toward the Holocaust should also be felt toward the practice of factory farming. For, in agreement with David Sztybel, I believe that “far from the comparison [between factory farming and the Holocaust] being intrinsically objectionable, it is potentially useful and illuminating, [since it] may help to underline the gravity of our oppression of non-human animals.”63 In this way, continuing to advance and support this analogy is an important element of the attempt to bring about justice for non-human animals, even if it is not sufficient for bringing about this justice. Along this line of reasoning, we would do well not only to remind ourselves of the discussion of the analogy between racism and speciesism offered in the first section of the paper, but, more specifically, of how racism provided the unjustified basis for slavery, since this prompts us to remember that once this unjustified basis was acknowledged, the (legal) institution of slavery was eventually eradicated, which in turn paved the way for the eventual fight for civil rights. As Peter Singer, among others, reminds us, once Thomas Jefferson came to recognize the indefensibility of racism as a justification for slavery, it led him to oppose slavery even though he was unable to free himself fully from his slaveholding background. . . . [W]hatever be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the property or person of others.64

63. David Sztybel, “Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?” 130. 64. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 6.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 In addition, Jeremy Bentham not only expressed a similar sentiment against the legitimacy of racism, which provided the justification for slavery (which France, unlike the United States, had outlawed by the time he wrote his famous text), he also went further in extending the notion of rights to all sentient beings and not just to all human beings, thereby including non-human animals as rights holders. In this vein, he wrote: The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”65

Certainly, noting the important effect that the recognition of the illegitimacy of racism had on the abolition of slavery, as well as the fact that there is a philosophical and moral precedent for acknowledging the analogy between the injustice of enslaving humans and the injustice of enslaving animals (made by Bentham, for example), strengthens my thesis that we should defend the analogy between the Holocaust and factory farming. For this shows that arguments from analogy can induce important changes, not only in our theoretical, philosophical, and moral attitudes, but also in our social and political practices—as well as, eventually, within our legal system. Indeed, acknowledging this makes it difficult to deny the importance that employing reasonable—defensible—analogies can be utilized in fights to end the oppression and injustice of certain populations, whether they are oppressed human populations or oppressed animal populations. And who among us wishes to cling to indefensible biases that impede the fight for justice? As Martin Luther King, appealing to St. Augustine, so eloquently stated, “a threat to justice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”66 Finally, then, given (1) that the analogy between factory farming and the Holocaust has 65. Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 310–311. 66. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” 3.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 been shown to be a strong analogy and (2) that the recognition of analogies between different forms of injustice is known to be a possible catalyst for bringing about justice to oppressed populations, I submit that this analogy, which I have carefully argued in this essay, should command our attention and energy. Bibliography Bell, Donald D. and William D. Weaver, Jr., eds. Chicken Meat and Egg Production, 5th ed. MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2009. Bentham, Jeremy. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1789/1823/1907. Carroll, Andrew Silow. “The Oppressive Mindset is the Issue.” Jewish World (1990): 1521. Clark, F. Dustan, Susan E. Watkins, Frank T. Jones, and Robert A. Norton. “Understanding and Control of Gangrenous Dermatitis in Poultry Houses.” University of Arkansas, United States Department of Agriculture, and County Governments

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ———. “A Tale of Two Holocausts.” Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal 2, no. 2 (2004): 1-20. Dombrowski, Daniel. “Vegetarianism and the Argument from Marginal Cases in Porphyry.” Journal of the History of Ideas 45, no. 1 (1984): 141–143. Feder, Barnaby J. “Pressuring Perdue.” New York Times Magazine, November 26, 1989. Accessed

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http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/26/magazine/pressuringperdue.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Francione, Gary L. “Sentience.” Animal Rights: The Abolitionist Approach. Accessed October 14, 2013. http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/sentience/. Goloski, Loren. “Holocaust Survivor Heads State Animal Rights Group.” Montgomery County Sentinel, November 21, 1996. Cited on Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, 261. Hershaft, Alex. “Warning: This Book May Change Your Life.” FARM Report (1998). http://www.farmusa.org/. Kalechofsky, Roberta. Animal Suffering and the Holocaust: The Problem with Comparisons Massachusetts: Micah Publications, Inc., 2003. King, Martin Luther, Jr. “Letter From A Birmingham Jail.” Martin Luther King, Jr. Papers Project, 1963. http://www.kingpapers.org/. Linzey, Andrew and Priscilla N. Cohn. “Entitled to Know: Editorial/Press Release: U.S. Ag Gag Laws ‘Sinister’ say Leading Academics.” Journal of Animal Ethics 3, no. 1 (2013): v-vii. [This statement may also be found on the Centre’s website: www.oxfordanimalethics.com.] Low, Phillip. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, edited by Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van, Swinderen, Philip Low, and Christof Koch. UK: Cambridge, 2012. Macauley, David. “An Interview with Peter Singer.” Animals’ Agenda 7 (1987). Mason, Jim. An Unnatural Order: Uncovering the Roots of Our Dominion of Nature and Each Other. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Mills, Daniel S. and Christine J. Nicol. “Tonic Immobility in Spent Hens After Catching and Transport.” The Veterinary Record 126 (1990): 210-212.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Noddings, Nell. Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Patterson, Charles. Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. New York: Lantern Books, 2002. Posner, Richard A. “Animal Rights.” Slate Magazine, June 12, 2001. Accessed October 14,

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http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_ rights/_3.html. Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983. Rogers, Lesley J. The Development of Brain and Behaviour in the Chicken. UK: Cab International, 1995. Sax, Boria. Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the Holocaust. New York: Continuum, 2000. Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Scully, Matthew. Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002. Singer, Isaac Bashevis. “The Letter Writer.” In The Collected Stories of Isaac Bashevis Singer, 250–276. New York: Farrar/Straus/Giroux, 1982. Singer, P. Animal Liberation (1975/1990/2002) New York: Avon Books. Staudenmaier, Paul. “Ambiguities of Animal Rights.” COMMUNALISM: International Journal for a Rational Society 5 (2003). Sztybel, David. “Can the Treatment of Animals be Compared to the Holocaust.” Ethics and the Environment 11, no. 1 (2006): 97–140. Teather, David. “‘Holocaust on a Plate’ Angers US Jews.” The Guardian, March 3, 2003. Accessed

October

14,

2013.

http://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/mar/03/advertising.marketingandpr.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Eating Animals at the Zoo Sabrina Brando * Jes Lynning Harfeld ** Abstract In many zoological gardens, safari parks, dolphinaria, and aquaria (zoos) worldwide, all levels of staff work hard to create enriching environments as well as to highlight welfare initiatives. In these same zoos, however, food for guests and feed for animals are often sourced from unsustainable farming practices and/or produced under welfare detrimental circumstances in industrialized agriculture and fisheries. The current paper focuses on the concept of animal welfare, as an ethical dilemma for zoos in a broader sense than is usually considered. More specifically, it is an investigation into the apparent discrepancy between official animal friendly values and the lack of regard for the welfare issues surrounding the origins of the meats and fishes offered at zoo restaurants and in animal feeding practices. That is, we argue that there is a normative double standard at issue in the dichotomy between how zoos approach and assert the value of their exhibited animals and the way they approach and assert the value of the farm animals and fish that are consumed by zoo visitors and fed to zoo animals. Moreover, we explore the fundamental characteristics of this double standard and the actions that zoos can take in order to avoid this ethical animal welfare dilemma. *

Sabrina Brando works full time through Animal Concepts as a consultant in animal care and welfare, working in zoos, marine parks, animal shelters, government facilities, research laboratories, and wildlife sanctuaries worldwide. Sabrina has a BSc. in psychology and animal behavior. She is currently enrolled in a MSc. of Psychology and a MSc. in Animal Studies. She is presently involved in several research projects on human-animal interaction, and has authored and co-authored peer-reviewed scientific publications, as well as book chapters, has presented extensively, and has been an invited and keynote speaker at animal welfare and advocacy conferences. ** Dr. Jes Lynning Harfeld is an assistant professor of bioethics and health care ethics at the Centre for Applied Philosophy at Aalborg University, Denmark. He has spent the last five years teaching, researching, and writing about the relationships between humans and animals from a philosophical perspective. He works in the field of philosophical ethology—i.e., asking questions about what we can know about animals and how. Mostly, however, he is interested in the ethical and political consequences of our relationships with animals.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Keywords Zoos, Animal Welfare, Fisheries, Food Ethics, Intensive Farming Introduction A day at the zoo may include two types of encounters with animals: first, animals as interesting and exotic beings exhibited in appropriate surroundings, and second, animals as nice meals, snacks or picnic items consumed together with friends or family. Although some establishments allow guests to bring their own food, all zoos offer a large variety of animalbased food to their visitors. The focus of this paper is this food and the dichotomy between sets of values for similar animals in different circumstances. This paper includes different types of animal parks and exhibitions—from aquaria to major parks with large open habitats. Animals are displayed in many different types of facilities worldwide, from small, roadside animal parks and aquaria to large safari parks and aquaria, housing whale sharks. The exhibits include a large and diverse number of animal species, from mammals to birds and amphibians. Many of these facilities also have children’s zoos, which house goats, sheep, pigs, horses, cows, guinea pigs, rabbits, and other domesticated animal species. Photo opportunities, camping at the zoo, “wade and swim with” programs, animal encounters, and horse, camel, and elephant rides, as well as animal feedings by the public are all part of many zoos’ day-to-day operations. These programs tend to include general information on the species, their habitats, and ecological threats, but also details about individual animals, such as their names, ages, and likes and dislikes. Hand-outs, flyers, slide shows, and presentations are all used to convey information to the public before, during, or after the activities. The idea is that an up-close-and-personal experience provides the participating visitors with information about the species and the threats they face in the wild but also—and this is crucial—will create an emotional bond to the animal and a desire to help and preserve the species. It is hoped that the activities will induce behaviors such as recycling, responsible consumerism, reduction of car usage, and donations to conservation programs. Through conservation projects, parks contribute to the protection and conservation of entire ecosystems and species diversity, as well as specific habitats occupied by different 64

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 populations of animals. Successful collaborative captive breeding programs and ongoing research into the conservation of endangered and threatened species in the wild are just a few of the activities modern zoos are involved in. Zoos are also contributing to successful reintroduction programs, capacity-building programs and habitat preservation, and are funding in- and ex-situ conservation and research programs. Successful captive breeding and reintroduction programs have been conducted in zoos across the world; for example, the black-footed ferret has been successfully released to multiple sites.1 Besides the aims of conservation, education, research, and entertainment, modern zoos and aquaria promote and describe, as shown in section two, the importance of animal welfare in their facilities and activities. Keeper talks, information panels, and information available on each company’s website inform the public about the facility’s efforts to ensure the highest standards of animal welfare. Zoo education programs convey information about husbandry practices and enrichment and health care programs, and it is important for the zoos to publicly indicate and emphasize undertakings aimed at promoting high animal welfare standards.2 High standards of (preventive) health care and training,3 appropriate nutrition,4 and housing and social conditions,5 as well as enrichment,6 are highlighted as being part of an animal welfare program. This paper will develop in eight sections. First, the paper gives a short clarification of the concept of animal welfare in the context of this paper. Section two is an analysis of the public communication of the zoos and their organizations; the paper reveals both the direct and indirect concern for individual animal welfare and the written requirements to support these policies outside of the operation of the zoo facility. Section three describes the framework of research into zoo menus. The next sections, four and five, present the problems of conventional animal agriculture and fishing. Section six takes up the issue of using live fish as a combination of feed and enrichment in an aquarium. In the seventh section, this paper argues that food consumers need special knowledge in order to be able to 1. Black-Footed Ferret Recovery Implementation Team, “Captive Breeding.” 2. Devra G. Kleiman, Katerina V. Thompson, and Charlotte Kirk Baer, Wild Mammals in Captivity. 3. Robert J. Young and Cynthia F. Cipreste, “Applying Animal Learning Theory.” 4. Walter L. Jansen and Joeke Nijboer, Zoo Animal Nutrition. 5. Kleiman, Thompson, and Baer, Wild Mammals in Captivity. 6. Jill Mellen and Marty Sevenich MacPhee, “Philosophy of Environmental Enrichment.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 make ethical and consistent choices. When consumers buy food while visiting zoos, it is the zoos’ responsibility to enable knowledgeable choices by providing menu options and information about animal welfare. The concluding section presents a number of suggestions and alternatives to the current situation. 1. Animal Ethics and Welfare

In the context of zoos, animal ethics could be seen as having two distinct approaches: one aimed at arguing that animals could be kept in zoos if they could live good lives there (welfare) and one arguing that animals should not be kept in confinement at all since this violates certain intrinsic rights (abolition). This paper does not take a stance on whether or not zoos are inherently morally problematic. It does, however, recognize that zoos exist at the present and will continue to exist in the immediate future. Thus, this paper is about the importance of taking zoo animal welfare ethics seriously in a comprehensive way. This paper was written with the understanding that its approach is but one side of a traditional divide in animal ethics7 and does little to address the other side: the question of animal rights and possible abolition. However, it is imperative that its perspective on welfare, as well as its arguments about ethics and dichotomy, be accessible within the framework of traditional zoo ethics. The welfare approach provides the ability to bring these arguments inside the normative world of zoos in a way that the abolition/liberation debate does not. In the context of this paper, animal welfare refers to quality of life as experienced by animals’ mental capacity. In this respect, the focus is on a certain aspect of “mind.” The arguments of this paper assume the validity of this declaration by Daniel Dennett: “Only mind-havers can care; only mind-havers can mind what happens. If I do something to you that you don’t want me to do, this has moral significance. It matters, because it matters to you. It may not matter much, or your interests may be overridden . . . If flowers have minds, then what I do to flowers can matter to them . . . If nobody cares, then it doesn’t matter what happens to flowers.”8 This does not necessarily exclude living creatures without minds (e.g., 7. Jes Lynning Harfeld, “Telos and the Ethics of Animal Farming.” 8. Daniel Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 4.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 flowers) from ethical relevance. It simply means that if those creatures are ethically relevant, the relevance is not based on welfare. Potential negative welfare for an individual animal is characterized by five domains.9 Four of these domains cover the physical aspects that might produce a varied array of negative subjective experiential qualities for the animal, and include (1) food and water deprivation, (2) environmental challenges, (3) disease and injury, and (4) restrictions on behavior and interaction. The fifth domain consists of mental components, such as the feelings of loneliness, thirst, pain, anxiety, boredom, and frustration. Good welfare, however, demands more than the absence or low levels of negative stimuli and experiences. Indeed, if to “fare well” is intrinsically also an experiential quality, the presence of positive subjective experiences is necessary in order to talk validly about good welfare. This means that beyond keeping animals from getting hurt, bored, undernourished, etc., animal caretakers must also focus on creating environments and lives for the animals that allow the possibility of experiencing positive emotions, such as joy, playfulness, and social affection. When considering zoos and population biology, the concept of “welfare” is often at a different level than “welfare” as was just described. The focus of many zoo activities and, indeed, one of the fundamental pillars of many contemporary and historical zoo programs, has been conservation, i.e. the management of welfare and survival of groups or even entire species. When phrasing the question at this level, one could ask, “How are the tigers doing in India?” and the question would not inherently include the positive experiences of tigers in India. Instead, the question is aimed at uncovering the procreative success of the Indian tigers. To “fare well” in conservation terms is synonymous with the proliferation of the indicated group or species. This is, in practice, almost always related to wild animals; however, it could be used validly to estimate the species success of other types of animals— for example, in agriculture. Nevertheless, species welfare and individual animal welfare are not necessarily intertwined. The modern industrial broiler chicken is probably one of the most successful animals when it comes to species survival and procreation, reaching

9. David J. Mellor, Emily Patterson-Kane, and Kevin J. Stafford, The Sciences of Animal Welfare, 6.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 population numbers in the billions.10 Nonetheless, these animals experience a great number of different individual welfare problems.11 2. Mission Statements and Official Codes of Conduct

A zoo is a business, and any zoo that does not generate enough income from guests and donors ceases to exist. That said, the traditional values and visions of conservation, research, and education of the public are intrinsically instrumental to the cost-benefit strategy of running a zoo. They can be understood and used merely as marketing tools and in branding schemes. Often, however, these values and visions are genuine aspects of the reasoning of zoo staff and management—even to the extent that they can be accepted as being disadvantageous to financial success. To demonstrate a commitment to the three values (or goals) mentioned above, zoos and their umbrella organizations frequently state their concern about individual animal welfare, which is perhaps expressed in most detail by the World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA). All zoos studied and mentioned in this paper are members of WAZA and its national and regional subsidiaries. Membership of WAZA includes mandatory compliance with the codes of ethics and animal welfare adopted in 2003,12 and stipulated in chapter 9 of the organization’s strategy document Building a Future for Wildlife.13 This code clearly stipulates that the obligations of zoos under WAZA extend beyond the preservation of species, groups, and habitats and should include a focus on the individual animal. Indeed, it is emphasized that actions “taken should be in the context of species survival without compromising individual welfare.” 14 WAZA rules assert that the environments of animals housed in the zoos should “take into account the animal’s behavioral and physiological needs” and that the animals “be free to express ‘normal’ behavior and [. . .] not suffer from thirst, hunger and malnutrition, pain, injury and disease, discomfort, fear and stress.”15 Not only does the WAZA code of ethics and animal welfare 10. Ricke et al., Organic Meat Production and Processing, 13. 11. Werner Bessei, “Welfare of Broilers.” 12. WAZA, “Code of Ethics and Animal Welfare.” 13. WAZA, “Building a Future for Wildlife.” 14. Ibid., 59. 15. Ibid., 62.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 require member organizations to ensure that their management practices and conservation efforts are carried out with respect for animal welfare, it also stipulates that members should “promote [. . .] animal welfare to colleagues and to society at large,”16 and are required to condemn “ill-treatment and cruelty to any animals and should have an opinion on welfare issues for wild animals external to its membership.”17 At a national level in the UK, the British and Irish Association of Zoos and Aquariums (BIAZA) have similar standards and (somewhat lower) ambitions for the welfare of the animals in their care. Realizing that animal welfare is more than merely the absence of sickness, BIAZA states that physical and mental health and social life are all integral to the accomplishment of an animal’s welfare.18 For example, BIAZA points to the fact that “an animals’ [sic] behaviour can indicate its underlying psychological state”19 and notes that aspects such as enrichment and adequate social living conditions can influence such psychological states positively. It is the aim of the BIAZA Living Collections Committee to prioritize research into animal welfare and to “ensure high standards of animal welfare, husbandry and management in BIAZA member zoos and encourage such standards elsewhere.”20 The clear and unambiguous focus on individual animal welfare is, however, rarely included in the publicly-presented goals and visions of the members of WAZA. Many zoos ignore this aspect entirely and focus almost exclusively on conservation issues, while some include it as a secondary point or indirectly in the description of educational programs or other activities. An example of the latter is Copenhagen Zoo, which, like many comparable institutions, has articulated mission and vision statements that are primarily focused on what one might call anthropocentric goals. The zoo views itself first and foremost as a conveyor of recreational activities, educational knowledge, and scientific investigations. However, its mission and vision statements both include goals that are, at least partly, nonanthropocentric. In line with the zoo tradition, these goals mainly pertain to the preservation of animal species and the conservation of biodiversity. Animal welfare is not mentioned specifically on the “Mission and vision” page but could be seen as implied in the vision of 16. Ibid., 60. 17. WAZA, “Code of Ethics and Animal Welfare.” 18. BIAZA, “Animal Welfare.” 19. Ibid. 20. BIAZA, “Animal Care and Management.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 being “[k]nown and respected for . . . high standards and quality regarding the keeping of animals and the standard of animal enclosures” and the goal of being a “company with high ethical standards.”21 Furthermore, animal welfare is directly mentioned as an aspect of the instructional module on “farm animals, zoo animals and pets”22 for school children. The zoo asserts that animal welfare is an essential consideration with regard to zoo architecture (“The architect—the most dangerous animal in the zoo”). 23 Finally, Copenhagen Zoo emphasizes its membership of the Danish Association of Zoos and Aquaria (DAZA) (and thus indirectly EAZA and WAZA), which, as indicated above, presupposes adherence to a vast number of guidelines pertaining to the protection of individual animal welfare. Similarly, Frankfurt Zoo does not directly mention animal welfare among its goals or values, but advertises its membership of EAZA and WAZA, and thus, it must be assumed, adherence to the animal welfare guidelines of these umbrella organizations. To find mention of animal welfare on the Frankfurt Zoo website, one must browse through a number of answers on their FAQ page. Here, several of the answers are arguments based on animal welfare.24 For example, zoo guests are not allowed to bring their dogs to the zoo, due to the stress that this can cause the zoo animals. Additionally, the absence of polar bears and elephants in the Frankfurt Zoo is explained as being due to the lack of adequate physical environment for ensuring the welfare of these animals.25 Likewise, Helsinki Zoo mentions both environmental awareness and animal welfare among their set of values.26 Givskud Zoo in Denmark has embedded the ethical rules from DAZA, making statements such as, “against a backdrop of increased knowledge about the biology of the animals[,] their physiological and behavioral opportunities must be improved continuously.”27 SeaWorld in San Diego states that they “strive to create an environment that is fun, interesting, and stimulating for the animals” and identify themselves as an organization with a “commitment to animal welfare” and a leader in animal care.28

21. Copenhagen Zoo, “Mission and Vision.” 22. Copenhagen Zoo, “Domestic Animals, Zoo Animals and Pets.” 23. Copenhagen Zoo, “Why Norman Foster?” 24. Frankfurt Zoo, “Frequently Asked Questions.” 25. Ibid. 26. Helsinki Zoo, “Tasks of Helsinki Zoo.” 27. Givskud Zoo, “Our Code of Conduct.” 28. SeaWorld San Diego, “SeaWorld’s Animal Welfare.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 3. Feeding Visitors and Zoo Animals

The authors researched and inspected the menus posted online by fifty-five zoos in Europe and North America, using the EAZA and AZA websites to select the zoos. Zoos in the major cities and capitals, and in the geographical north and south of countries, were selected. This research assumed that if words such as “organic” or “animal friendly welfare practices” or the like did not appear, all meat and fish originated from conventional farming practices. Typical food items on the menu were hot dogs, chicken nuggets, hamburgers, fish burgers, fish fingers, schnitzel, roast of ham, shrimp salad, and salmon, all often served with fried or baked potatoes. In the sandwich category, options included ham, salmon, eel, salami, and roast beef. Vegetarian and vegan options were available in only a few places, with vegetarian options more common and vegan options (defined here as those obviously intended to accommodate a vegan diet; for example, dishes with beans, tofu, or tempeh, and not merely a green salad or fried potatoes), only sporadically. Vegetarian options included pasta and lasagna, salads and cheese sandwiches. But the overall selection offered on all menus was meat- and/or fish-based. After researching fifty-five zoos in Europe and North America, the unfortunate conclusion is that most use meat and fish originating from conventional farming and fisheries. If it is correct to assume that menu items are conventionally produced if not otherwise indicated (i.e., labeled as humane, organic, sustainable, or the equivalent), zoos are not, by default, providing customers with animal products from farms and fisheries concerned about animal welfare. Some aquaria promoting “sustainable seafood” provide information on their websites about sustainable fisheries and marine conservation and advertise that the marine animals served in their restaurants are procured in an “environmentally friendly” and “ethical” fashion. “Sustainable seafood” is defined as catch sourced from marine life communities monitored for ecological stability or “health.” Practices utilizing a “no-discard policy” aim to keep and bring to shore the entirety of their catch. This rule is considered non-standard among industry fishing practices. Alternatively, so-called “sustainable seafood” may also come from aquaculture, artificially created fish production facilities, usually land-based, that sometimes claim to be “environmentally friendly.” Two of these aquaria are the Monterey

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Bay Aquarium and New England Aquarium. A quote from the website of the latter is illustrative: “When you choose ocean-friendly seafood today, you help ensure that we will have plenty of tasty seafood options for years to come. Your seafood choices matter. Some types of seafood are more environmentally friendly than others. The New England Aquarium’s Celebrate Seafood program will help you choose seafood that is good for you and good for the environment.”29 Meat and fish sourced from farms and fisheries concerned about animal welfare can be found on the menus of some zoos. Bristol Zoo Gardens, for instance, states on its website that it offers “a great selection of hot and cold options made using the best local, ethical and sustainable ingredients.”30 These websites and menus, however, do not define what constitutes “sustainable” or “ethical.” Feeding other animals to carnivorous zoo animals is of course important for their welfare. Animals can be fed meat and/or fish, varying from shellfish to insects, squid, whole carcasses, and larges fishes. The way animals are fed can also influence their welfare, as was reported in a study by Bond and Lindburg; they found that “[i]mproved appetites, longer feeding bouts and a greater possessiveness of food characterized the carcass-fed animals.”31 Cow, horse, pig, deer, trout, cod, salmon, and herring are some of the species fed to carnivores housed in zoos. There are a few aquaria and zoos that buy their fish from fisheries with the Marine Stewardship Council label. The Marine Stewardship Council states on its website that its guidelines for the ecolabeling of fish and fishery products require that a program have (1) an objective, third-party fishery assessment using scientific evidence; (2) transparent processes with built-in stakeholder consultation and objection procedures; and (3) standards based on the three factors—sustainability of target species, ecosystems, and management practices.32 Though the sources of meat and fish used in zoos and aquaria can vary geographically, animal feeds are generally procured from intensive farming systems that are detrimental to the welfare of farmed animals. 4. The Origins of Meat 29. New England Aquarium, “Celebrate Seafood.” 30. Bristol Zoo Gardens, “Coral Restaurant.” 31. Julie C. Bond and Donald G. Lindburg, “Carcass Feeding of Captive Cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus).” 32. Marine Stewardship Council, “How We Meet Best Practice.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

Given the clearly articulated care for animals and the ostensibly animal-friendly focus of many activities and exhibitions in zoos, it is relevant to explore the lives of animals indirectly influenced by the business of zoos. This section examines the origins of some of the animal-based foods that are served in zoos across the world. As the initial analysis of zoo menus has demonstrated, the choices of meat, eggs, and dairy products for hungry zoo visitors rarely include products with any type of animal welfare certification, such as the American Humane® Certified program or the EU organic labeling (which incorporates and states principles and policies for the achievement of animal welfare, defined as providing “good food, good living conditions and good healthcare”33). Instead, most animal food products derive from industrialized animal housing systems in what is commonly referred to as conventional agriculture. The technological and economical developments in agriculture during the last eighty years have primarily been part of the process of turning conventional farming into “factory farming”—a method of production characterized by its severely negative impact on the welfare of the ever-increasing farmed animal population. 34 The suffering this causes individual animals is not necessarily a change from “the good old days.” Many animals in pre-industrialized agriculture also suffered greatly, and, as Harfeld has argued, scientific advances and the general modernization of agriculture have also brought about better medical treatment of sick animals, possibilities for better and more adequate feed, and technology for better winter housing.35 These modern benefits, however, have not precluded the harm of modern industrialized agriculture, which is rife with problems concerning, for example, confinement, social isolation, overcrowding, lack of positive natural behavior, and stress during transport.36 One relevant example of animal suffering in conventional intensive farming concerns the breeding, housing, and transport of the common domestic pig. Pigs are raised for consumption with negligible concern for their comfort or what would commonly be understood to be their “welfare”: the conventional housing and management of pigs 33. European Commission, “Animal Welfare.” 34. David Fraser, “Farm Animal Production,” 181–82, cited in Harfeld, “Husbandry to Industry,” 133. 35. Jes Lynning Harfeld, “Husbandry to Industry,” 133; David Fraser, “Farm Animal Production,” and Peter Sandøe and Stine B. Christiansen, Ethics of Animal Use, cited in Harfeld, “Husbandry to Industry,” 133. 36. John Webster, Animal Welfare, 12, 28, 63, 258.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 provides very little enrichment, imposes limited movement, sometimes through the use of gestation crates, and involves routine surgical procedures (such as tail docking and castration) without anesthesia.37 Tail biting is one example of the many welfare problems endured by pigs in modern industrialized agriculture. Pigs are highly intelligent animals 38 with a wide range of possibilities of behavior. Barren and cramped housing systems are not only a problem for the animals because they lead to tail biting. The biters are, in their biting activity, exhibiting a coping behavior that is the result of being denied adequate stimulation.39 Similarly, a number of different problematic behavioral expressions, such as apathy, stress, and stereotypical behavior, can be traced to the lack of opportunity for exploratory behavior.40 It is one of the fundamental premises of good zoo animal management that, in order to provide good animal welfare, the mental capacities of different types of animals be met with adequate environments and enrichment. In the case of industrially farmed pigs, such concerns have taken second or no place to the effectiveness of the production system. The pigs have been shaped to fit the system; the system has not been shaped to fit the pigs and their physical and mental capacities. As Bernard Rollin phrases it, this amounts to forcing “square pegs into round holes.”41 The battery farming of egg-laying hens represents another relevant example of a problematic farming practice that clashes with the ostensible concern for animal welfare of the zoos where the eggs are served. Eggs are not only consumed as products in themselves (boiled, fried, scrambled, etc.), but they are an essential ingredient of a large number of different dishes and pre-made foods. Thus, it can actually be quite difficult for consumers to recognize whether they are eating eggs or not. There are several different types of housing systems for egg-laying hens. In Denmark, for example, eggs in the supermarket are categorized into four groups: cage eggs, barn eggs, free range eggs, and organic eggs. Each category demands a different and increased level of attention to the welfare of the animals, considering factors such as beak 37. Barnett et al., “A Review of the Welfare Issues for Sows and Piglets in Relation to Housing.” 38. Elise T. Gieling, Rebecca E. Nordquist, and Franz J. van der Staay, “Assessing Learning and Memory in Pigs.” 39. Per Jensen (ed.), The Ethology of Domestic Animals, 168. 40. Wood-Gush and Vestergaard, “Exploratory Behavior and the Welfare of Intensively Kept Animals.” 41. Bernard Rollin, Science and Ethics, 168; see also Harfeld, ”Husbandry to Industry,” 134, 141, 147, 154, 156.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 trimming, flooring material, number of hens per square meter, access to daylight and outdoor areas, and total number of hens per flock.42 Since “cage eggs” (from battery farming) are by far the cheapest option, they are the most common choice of institutions that purchase large quantities of eggs, and they are often the eggs used as ingredients in other foods. The substandard lives of battery hens are representative of the most problematic animal welfare issues in modern agriculture. The new EU rules banned traditional battery cages beginning on January 1, 2012 and endorsed new and larger enriched cages. 43 This move, however, does not indicate a major breakthrough in the welfare of egg-laying hens in Europe. Not only is it expected that up to one third of the European egg producers are going to disregard the rules for now, the change represents the adjustment from one welfare-detrimental cage system to another welfaredetrimental cage system. The extra room per hen amounts to the size of a standard postcard, far from enough space to permit the caged hens to express innate behavior, such as wing flapping, dust bathing, or even postural changes in order to thermo regulate.44 Indeed, some researchers argue that the welfare improvement intended with the new cage systems is highly questionable. Research aimed at measuring the degree of stress through immunological parameters “indicates similar levels of existing stress condition between the [two] caging designs.”45 5. The Origins of Fish

Although the official concerns with intensive fishery practices usually center on sustainability and disregard animal welfare,46 both are important topics. Pollution from intensive fish farming, 47 by-catch, 48 fish dying from suffocation, and the billions of “wasted” animals 49 are all serious concerns from both individual animal welfarist and conservationist points of view. 42. Animal Welfare Society, “Egg Guide.” 43. Michael C. Appleby, “The European Union Ban on Conventional Cages for Laying Hens.” 44. Michael C. Appleby, Joy A. Mench, and Barry O. Hughes, Poultry Behavior and Welfare, 61. 45. Tactacan et al., “Performance and Welfare of Laying Hens in Conventional and Enriched Cages.” 46. European Commission, “Fish Farm Pollution Damages Seabed Ecosystems.” 47. Ibid. 48. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species (CMS), “Bycatch of Marine Mammals.” 49. European Commission, “Unwanted Catches and Discards.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 By-catch is “the portion of a commercial fishing catch that consists of marine animals caught unintentionally.”50 Each year, poor fisheries’ “management” and “wasteful” fishing practices increasingly decimate the world's fish stocks. These practices also destroy marine habitats and incidentally kill billions of fish and other marine animals, such as turtles, cetaceans, and birds. The impact from a conservationist point of view is immense, specifically the depletion of fish stocks51 and waste issues, as well as the many tons of annual by-catch by modern fisheries methods, such as long line52 and bottom trawling.53 Animal welfare concerns arise in different fishery practices. In fish farming, problems can include the experience of pain, anxiety and fear, behavioral conflicts, and cannibalism.54 Animal welfare concerns can, furthermore, include starvation and crowding-induced stress,55 as well as disease caused, in part, by negative stress in the fish.56 The Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, is an example of a species that is intensively farmed in vast quantities. Salmon farming begins at hatcheries, landed freshwater holding facilities, where the salmon are hatched from eggs and then raised. Although many modern hatcheries have systems57 by which the water is recycled within the hatcheries, many conventional systems still discard the water, including the waste products and feed, into local rivers, damaging the local wildlife.58 Once the animals develop into smolts, they are transferred to sea pens housing up to 90,000 fish. The fish are very valuable and numerous measures are taken to protect them. The welfare and lives of other wildlife are threatened by the installation of bird- and seal-scaring devices,59 as well as hunting. Hundreds of common and 50. Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “bycatch.” 51. Steven A. Murawski, “Rebuilding Depleted Fish Stocks.” 52. Sebastian Jiménez, Andres Domingo, and Alejandro Brazeiro, “Seabird Bycatch in the Southwest Atlantic;” Derek J. Hamer, Simon J. Childerhouse, and Nick J. Gales, “Odontocete Bycatch and Depredation in Longline Fisheries;” Miguel Donoso and Peter H. Dutton, “Sea Turtle Bycatch in the Chilean Pelagic Longline Fishery in the Southeastern Pacific.” 53. Lobo et al., “Commercializing Bycatch Can Push a Fishery beyond Economic Extinction;” Álvarez de Quevedo et al., “Sources of Bycatch of Loggerhead Sea Turtles in the Western Mediterranean Other than Drifting Longlines;” Iiona Stobutzki, Margaret Miller, and David Brewer, “Sustainability of Fishery Bycatch.” 54. Etienne Baras and Malcolm Jobling, “Dynamics of Intracohort Cannibalism in Cultured Fish.” 55. Oppedal et al., “Fluctuating Sea-Cage Environments Modify the Effects of Stocking Densities on Production and Welfare Parameters of Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar L.).” 56. Edward J. Noga, Fish Disease. 57. Martins et al., “New Developments in Recirculating Aquaculture Systems in Europe.” 58. D. Clare Backman, Sharon L.DeDominicis, and Robert Johnstone, “Operational Decisions in Response to a Performance-Based Regulation to Reduce Organic Waste Impacts near Atlantic Salmon Farms in British Columbia, Canada.” 59. These devices are commonly referred to as “acoustic deterrent devices” or “seal scrammers.” Whale and Dolphin Conservation (WDC), “Fish Farms and Acoustic Deterrent Devices in the UK.”—Ed.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 gray seals are shot every year in Scotland alone in efforts to protect farmed salmon.60 An additional problem is the procurement of feed for the salmon. It requires two to four kilograms of fish caught in the wild to produce one kilogram of farmed salmon.61 New technologies and knowledge of spawning patterns, which vary depending on species, enable the harvesting of forage species as they come together, removing the fish before they have actually spawned.62 The survival of wild predator species depends on their ability to find forage schools in their feeding grounds. However, the great ocean predators find that, despite any adaptation for speed, size, endurance, or stealth, they will lose when faced with the machinery of contemporary industrial fishing.63 6. Live Feeding of Fish as Enrichment

Animal welfare of animals housed in zoos is of great concern. But a discrepancy exists between the care for display animals in zoos and the animals used for feeding and in enrichment activities. The housing and care for an animal whose role at the zoo is “food for other animals” is considerably different from the care for an animal whose role is to be visible and on display. Not only is the (social) housing of food animals frequently substandard, these animals also face other challenges. Where allowed by national law, the “food” animals, such as fish and insects, are often fed to predators while still alive in the interest of enriching the predator’s experience or welfare. There is often little concern on the part of the staff with regard to the welfare of these prey “enrichment” animals. For example, fish are dropped into bird, cat, and bear ponds without places to hide, nor with enough conspecifics to school and find safety in numbers. This may also apply to insects. Using live prey in enrichment activities for display animals is a difficult ethical question in itself, but the welfare of prey animals (including opportunities to hide, escape, and/or defend themselves) should be given the highest concern and attention, as well. Within the zoo community, some believe that it is actually more humane to let the prey be killed

60. Butler et al., “The Moray Firth Seal Management Plan.” 61. Naylor et al., “Nature’s Subsidies to Shrimp and Salmon Farming.” 62. Kathleen T. Pirquet, “Follow the Money.” 63. Ibid.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 immediately, sparing the animal from a long and stressful death. Consequently, providing hiding and escape opportunities would only prolong their suffering. From personal observations and experience with live fish enrichment, there are several concerns regarding these practices. Different species of fish can be housed in smaller aquaria or holding tanks, which often lack a species-specific and stimulating environment until they are used for these activities. When these fish are handled for transport to the location where the enrichment will take place, a variety of methods can be used to capture, handle, and transport the fish. During capture, nets of different shapes and sizes are used, not always suited to the different species. Large fish can be captured with small nets that do not hold the size and weight of the animal easily, making the capture even more stressful than necessary. The type of netting used in the catching can also be damaging and painful to the fish. The handling of a fish can also be a stressful event, and it can potentially damage the protective mucous layer. Apart from physically damaging the fish, handling has also been shown to elicit the highest stress response.64 For transport, many different types of containers can be used, with or without water. Some buckets are too small to hold the larger fish, resulting in them being transported with only their heads in the water and their bodies sticking out. Alternatively, many fish are transported en masse with minimal amounts of water and/or at high stocking densities. Fish can be moved in the capturing nets, alone or with other fish, submerged, partially submerged, or even without water, all of which are very stressful. When the fish arrive on location, they are not always immediately moved into pools or aquaria. Sometimes several hours go by before they are attended to or used. When they are moved into pools or aquaria, the fish may be thrown individually, be submerged and let out of the net or container, be dumped from the container, or be carefully moved by hand. Different features of housing environments also impact the fish’s welfare, with clear concrete pools offering no hiding areas for the prey animals, while other environments can be said to be much more prey-animal friendly. Following from the definition of welfare adopted by this paper, fish intended as prey have their welfare compromised through mishandling, poor housing, and transport conditions. It might be argued, from a welfarist point of view, that stress or injury does not matter, as fish do not feel pain and/or are going to die soon anyway. However, much recent 64. Michael W. Davis, “Fish Stress and Mortality Can Be Predicted Using Reflex Impairment.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 scientific evidence indicates that fish do indeed feel pain.65 With this background, zoos employ a double standard when causing unnecessary suffering for prey species while striving to minimize or eliminate suffering for exhibited fish. Similarly, arguing that maltreatment is less problematic because the live fish will die within a short period of time seems unreasonable and contradictory given the stated and implied welfare goals for relevantly comparable animals in the zoo. More research is needed on the welfare of fish used as live prey for carnivores as well as on the methods of introducing and housing prey and predators together. 7. Consumers, Animal Welfare, and Zoo Responsibility

When a visitor at a zoological garden purchases food, the visitor is, besides hungry, exhibiting what we might call value-laden consumer behavior. Such value-laden behavior can be the result of at least three varieties of value origins. First, it may be an aesthetic value with the choice founded in preferences of taste, smell, and texture. Second, it can be cultural or religious behavior in which certain unexamined norms dictate what should or should not be eaten. Finally, it can be ethically founded behavior, resulting in a food purchase choice rooted in reflected-upon notions of “the good” or “doing the right thing.” Clearly, the latter two value origins do not negate the first, but merely set a certain framework within which the choice is made. Similarly, there can be room for ethical deliberation within the framework of cultural or religious norms and vice versa. For the purpose of this article, the focus is solely on the ethical values in food consumer behavior and feeding practices. Any ethical deliberation, however, relies on knowledge. Information, experience, and the mental capacity to understand causality are indispensable in the effort to produce sound answers to the question: What ought we to do? Thus, it is a significant ethical problem that the system of modern food production—both in primary agriculture and in processing—has developed during the last century to be progressively and increasingly more difficult for consumers to comprehend and obtain reliable knowledge about the products. Additionally, a well-established discrepancy exists between zoo visitors’ 65. Lynne U. Sneddon, “Pain Perception in Fish: Indicators and Endpoint.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 expressed concern for the environment and general animal welfare and their buying behavior as food consumers.66 This seems, then, to represent a dual failure of ethical consumer behavior consistency in food purchases. Such consistency is, to a large extent, epistemologically founded. Epistemologically, this consistency depends on an individual’s experience of and knowledge about food production, which is not readily accessible to the average consumer today. As discussed in the section on the origins of meat, the modern food production system in Western countries has intensified and become industrialized. This has led to fundamental changes in the demographics of Western societies. In Denmark, for example, the countryside generates the impression of an agricultural nation; yet, while farming might still be considered part of the national identity, citizen involvement in agriculture has been gradually disappearing. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 40 percent of all adult Danes were employed in agriculture. By 1950, this number had dropped to about 25 percent, and today it is around 3 percent and declining.67 Such a fundamental occupational change necessarily leads to a general loss of knowledge and gradual estrangement between the general public and the agricultural industry. At the same time, however, the production of animals, eggs, and milk has increased dramatically, and the Danes have become world leaders in the per capita consumption of meat, 68 followed closely by other Western countries. The apparent failure of ethical consistency and the dichotomy between values and action are parallel problems for citizens and for zoo organizations. Both—or at least many representatives of both—exhibit and defend values in areas that are not readily followed in other relevant areas. For zoos, this failure is especially apparent in the differences between the values that the organizations express—figuratively, in their daily work, and literally, in codes of conduct, official documents, and educational program content—and in their purchasing and retailing of food for visitors and display animals. The dichotomy is clear and extensive. The menus of most zoos largely consist of products that originate in traditional intensive agricultural and fishing practices. As discussed earlier, this means that food eaten 66. Richard Shepherd, Maria Magnusson, and Peri-Oloh Sjödén, “Determinants of Consumer Behavior Related to Organic Foods.” 67. Birgitte Brøndum, Marianne Mackie, and Kamilla E. Nielsen, 60 år i tal: Danmark siden 2. Verdenskrig, 9; Hans Christian Johansen, Dansk Historisk Statistik 1814–1980, 108–09. 68. Torben R. Simonsen, “Danmark er det suverænt mest kødspisende land i verden.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 in zoos derives from farming and fishing systems that often severely and intrinsically lack concern for animal welfare. If zoos are sincere about animal welfare, they must consistently adhere to welfare standards for all species, regardless of categorization (e.g., wild or domesticated for agriculture or companionship). To focus solely on, for example, the welfare of wild or exotic animals, constitutes an anthropocentric definition of animal welfare, rendered into meaninglessness. To support the welfare of exotic pigs like babirusas and not support the welfare of domestic pigs could only be considered inconsistent, irrational, and, for the domestic pigs, unfair. Zoos are in a unique position to educate the public about animal welfare and to support animal welfare throughout society. Initially, zoos and zoo managers might be, in some respects, as estranged and unknowledgeable about farming practices as the general zoo-going public. However, due to their in-depth knowledge of animals and animal welfare, they are uniquely capable of understanding the welfare impact of different types of agriculture and aquaculture. As organizations whose expressed and tacit values include animal welfare, they have additional obligations regarding food animal production vis-Ă -vis their specialist knowledge, and they are obliged to share this knowledge with their visitors. Zoos can either obscure consumer understanding of food origins or help to attenuate the distance and estrangement between food production and consumers. In choosing the latter, they would become true advocates of both sustainability and universal animal welfare. 8. Conclusion and Suggestions for New Practices

Throughout this paper, it has been shown that (1) beyond the traditional values and goals of conservation, zoos incorporate and highlight the value of individual animal welfare; and (2) the menus for both zoo guests and display animals consist of meat, dairy, eggs, and/or fish predominantly derived from production systems that are highly problematic from both welfare and sustainability points of view. This paper does not attempt to introduce or dictate new values or foci for zoos. Rather, it argues that the values and foci already adopted and practiced by the studied zoos must necessarily consider non-display animals, such as feed animals, for the stated values

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 and foci—i.e., individual animal welfare and conservationism—to be consistent and meaningful. In addition, accepting this argument could and should lead zoos to reflect on and institute more educational themes connected to animal welfare and ecological concerns. Most importantly, however, zoos could make a significant animal welfare impact by changing their food sales and feed purchase practices. This would entail doing business with certified organizations genuinely adhering to animal welfare and sustainability standards. One possible model currently employed by some zoos involves feeding deceased display animals to predator display animals.69 There are a number of organizations equipped to provide information and guidance to zoos wishing to make informed decisions on sources and certification of sustainable and animal welfare-friendly products. These include Compassion in World Farming, 70 the Marine Stewardship Council, 71 Humane Society International, 72 and many national and regional equivalents. By adopting this paper’s recommended reforms, zoos have the opportunity to convey a more holistic welfare narrative and better educate the public about animals. Furthermore, as major retailers and consumers, zoos are positioned to significantly increase market demand for agricultural and aquacultural products certified under animal welfare, conservationist, and sustainability standards. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Kathleen Dudzinski and Justin Gregg for their comments on the early version of this paper. We would also like to thank our two anonymous reviewers for their valuable input.

69. Aalborg Zoo, homepage. 70. Homepage, http://www.ciwf.org.uk 71. Homepage, http://www.msc.org 72. Homepage, http://www.hsi.org

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014

“Where is the Seat for the Buffalo?”: Placing Nonhuman Animals in the Idle No More Movement” Adam J. Fix*

Abstract The Idle No More social movement represents an emerging international community that has received widespread attention for its positions on Indigenous rights, women’s rights, and environmental protection. Much less notice, however, has been paid to the place of nonhuman animals within the movement. Indeed, the most accurate conception of the movement may well be understood as a communion of worldviews based on, in the words of John Grim, a “mutuality of knowing between humans and animals,” a concept that is “one of the least understood dimensions of indigenous thought from a Western intellectual perspective.” Mainstream coverage of Idle No More has nearly universally overlooked the conspicuous use of nonhuman animal imagery in protests and social media. Yet by examining the work of prominent Native thinkers, as well as comments from activists within the movement, a more-than-human-oriented worldview is revealed in Idle No More messaging. Stated succinctly by Onondaga Chief Oren Lyons: “They [nonhuman animals] tie us together with the Creation.” Key Words Social movements, Indigeneity, Religion and Animals, Speciesism

Introduction

Adam J. Fix is a wilderness ranger at Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks. He holds an M.S. from the Institute for the Study of Human-Animal Relations at Canisius College and a B.A. in Philosophy from the University at Buffalo. He may be contacted at fix2@canisius.edu.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Within a social movement like Idle No More, which represents a great diversity of people, dominant narratives inevitably form. These narratives both guide the expectations of the movement and its members as well as simplify the movement’s message for external consumption. The great confluence of disparate elements that emerges, though necessary for communication and cooperation, can be seen as a kind of stereotype. The simplified narrative, carried within a cultural vehicle, is used to drive the adoption of shared goals across groups. Yet the narrative exists tenuously, subject to internal tension as much as agreement. “The reality is that [the Idle No More founders] are not qualified to speak out on behalf of people living in the tar sands, or the First Nation in B.C. [...] or the people from Barriere Lake Algonquin Nation,” says Clayton Thomas-Muller of the Indigenous Environmental Network.1 “You can’t say any one group represents all First Nations in this country.”2 Just as the founders of the movement are not qualified to represent all other groups in an overarching Idle No More narrative, so too am I unqualified to present the ideology of Idle No More in such a fashion. Neither they nor I are aware of but a small percentage of the myriad intricacies of culture at play within the movement. Approaching that realization with humility, honesty, and curiosity is, accordingly, the first step toward an inquiry that seeks to examine both the tension and cohesion of a movement—an inquiry that digs deeper than the stereotype, but will ultimately and inevitably fall short of a comprehensive or universal explanation. Of course, this paper can only hope to scratch the surface of the deep cultural roots of the movement and its relationship with nonhuman animals. As such, the methods chosen to begin this conversation are varied, and include: a speciesist critique of the movement, case studies of nonhuman animal imagery, a look at nonhuman animals threatened by oil sands development, an examination of the links between ecological and spiritual degradation, and an attempt to build connections between a very few of the many different “ways of knowing” that are present within Idle No More. These methods have led me to rely heavily on the words of individuals involved on the ground with Idle No More. To even begin to gather information on the worldviews 1. Chris Plecash, “Idle No More Movement Led by Aboriginal Women.” 2. Ibid.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 expressed by a particular group of people, it makes sense to use the words of the people themselves. Too often, critics remark, scholarship on the native experience declines to quote native people.3 In an effort to frame these remarks in a holistic way, I work to build comparative frameworks with the ideas of past native and non-native thinkers. What is Idle No More?

“The thread of differences that unites indigenous perspectives provides further elaboration of what Thomas Berry calls a ‘communion of subjects,’” writes John Grim.4 Indeed, the following survey of the words of Idle No More activists yields multiple perspectives under the banner of one movement. The movement’s mission statement reads, “Idle No More calls on all people to join in a revolution which honors and fulfills Indigenous sovereignty which protects the land and water.”5 Gyasi Ross writes, “the Indigenous resistance to the raping and pillaging of the Earth is not new . . . the #IdleNoMore movement is simply the latest chapter in that resistance.”6 According to Ross, this suggests the movement is about protecting the earth “from the carnivorous and capitalistic spirit that wants to exploit . . . the land.”7 He sums up the movement in a few sentences: “It’s about clean water. It’s about clean air. It’s about safety for all women. It’s about making a positive change in our communities.”8 Wab Kinew, director of Indigenous Inclusion at the University of Winnipeg and Idle No More organizer, writes that Idle No More was, at its inception “a loosely knit political movement encompassing rallies drawing thousands of people across dozens of cities, road blocks, a shoving match on Parliament Hill between chiefs and mounties and one high profile hunger strike [held by Chief Theresa Spence].”9 Idle No More has now

3. Vine Deloria, Jr., “The Speculations of Krech: A Review of The Ecological Indian.” 4. John Grim, “Knowing and Being Known by Animals: Indigenous Perspectives on Personhood,” 377. 5. Idlenomore.ca. 6. Gyasi Ross, “The Idle No More Movement for Dummies (or, What the Heck Are All These Indians Acting All Indian-ey About?).” 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Wab Kinew, “Idle No More is Not Just an ‘Indian Thing’.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 expanded, Kinew says, to include ideals such as “engaging youth,” “finding meaning,” “aboriginal rights,” “the environment,” and “democracy.”10 Niganwewidam Sinclair notes that “[Idle No More] has really been a refining of leadership, and a focus on local communities and those communities sharing with one another amongst social media but also around conversation.” 11 The issues remain, according to Sinclair, “land and resource management.”12 Pam Palmater, a Mi’kmaq lawyer, professor, and director of the Centre for Indigenous Governance at Ryerson University, writes that Idle No More “represent[s] Canadians’ last best hope of stopping Canada from mass destruction of our shared lands, waters, plants and animals.”13 It is a responsibility of the First Nations people, she claims, arguing that “Idle No More arises from our responsibility to live up to the sacrifices of our ancestors and to the duty we have as guardians of the earth and to the expectations [that] our children and grandchildren have of us to protect them.”14 The movement was born out of a Saskatoon rally against Bill C-45, the Canadian government’s 2012 fall budget implementation act.15 It began quietly in early October with rallies and teach-ins, and quickly spread across the country. 16 The movement describes its beginning succinctly: Idle No More began with 4 ladies; Nina Wilson, Sylvia McAdam, Jessica Gordon & Sheelah McLean who felt it was urgent to act on current and upcoming legislation that not only affects our First Nations people but the rest of Canada's citizens, lands and waters … All 4 women knew that this was a time to act, as [Bill C-45] and other proposed legislation would affect not only Indigenous people but also the lands, water and the rest of Canada.17

Bill C-45, which passed on December 14, 2012, amends the Fisheries Act, the Canada Labour Code, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Indian Act, and the Navigation Protection Act (formerly Navigable Waters Protection Act).18 Idle No More activists are most concerned about amendments of the latter three acts, as they say 10. Ibid. 11. Niganwewidam Sinclair, “Idle No More Shifting to Localized Activism, Says Sinclair.” 12. Ibid. 13. Pam Palmater, “Why Idle No More Matters to Us All.” 14. Ibid. 15. Chris Plecash, “Idle No More Movement Led by Aboriginal Women.” 16. Matt Sheedy, “From Occupy to Idle No More.” 17. Idlenomore.ca 18. CBC News, “9 Questions about Idle No More.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 they will drastically reduce protection of the land and water, as well as allowing native land, formerly community-owned, to be individually parceled and leased or surrendered. The passing of Bill C-45 results in “the removal of all waterways protections in Canada, leaving only 1% protected,” says Idle No More co-founder Nina Wilson.19 CBC News reports that under the Navigation Protection Act, “major pipeline and power line project advocates aren’t required to prove their project won’t damage or destroy a navigable waterway it crosses, unless the waterway is on a list.”20 Movement co-founder Sheelah McLean adds, “It’s so clear what the government is doing: the bill opens the land for resource development, and for oil pipelines.”21 McLean and others in Idle No More point to the development of the Alberta oil sands region as the specific impetus for the passage of Bill C-45. On December 11, 2012, Attawapiskat Chief Theresa Spence launched a hunger strike in Ottawa, near Parliament Hill. She demanded a meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and a representative of the Queen of England to discuss First Nations treaty agreements.22 The hunger strike brought international media attention to the Idle No More movement, as Chief Spence subsisted on water, tea, and fish broth until ending the strike on January 24 because of the signing of a declaration of commitment, which partially addressed her concerns. During Spence’s hunger strike and subsequent hospitalization, the Idle No More movement swept across North America, resulting in a string of flash mob-style round dances and protests.23 During this formative period, the media focused on indigenous rights, women’s rights—due to the prominent female leaders—and environmental protection. Much less notice, however, was paid to the place of nonhuman animals within the movement. The attention that has been given to sensitive issues such as race, gender, and the environment indicates the potential for including the animal, but the topic has been largely ignored. A poem appearing in the journal Decolonization provided early evidence that nonhuman animals could play an important role in Idle No More. 24 In it, Rita Wong names 19. Personal correspondence, 2013. 20. CBC News, “9 Questions about Idle No More.” 21. Sarah van Gelder, “Why Canada’s Indigenous Uprising is About All of Us.” 22. Obert Madondo, “What Chief Spence’s Hunger Strike Says About Canada.” 23. Aura Bogado, “Chief Spence Hospitalized, Ending Hunger Strike.” 24. Rita Wong, “J28: A Poem by Rita Wong.”

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 influential indigenous leaders and activists in the same sentence as various other species, as beings that “we need to align ourselves with”: “Wab and Harsha and Clayton and Eriel and eider ducks and water bears/ Takaiya and Roxanna and Glen and David and wolves and whales.”25 The poem indicates that Idle No More is a unique and powerful lens from which nonhuman animal issues may be critically examined, but also begs the question: do other animals really play a leadership role in the movement? Reading comments from Onondaga faithkeeper Oren Lyons, it becomes apparent that many indigenous cultures believe that other animals matter on a political level.26 Invited to speak before the United Nations in 1977, Lyons recalls his message: For a short time we stood as equal among the people and the nations of the world. And what was the message that we gave? There is a hue and cry for human rights—human rights, they said, for all people. And the indigenous people said: What of the rights of the natural world? Where is the seat for the buffalo or the eagle? Who is representing them here in this forum? [...] We said: Given this opportunity to speak in this international forum, then it is our duty to say that we must stand for these people, and the natural world and its rights; and also for the generations to come. We would not fulfill our duty if we did not say that.27

Lyons’ query was meant as a wakeup call to the United Nations, an organization that he clearly viewed as anthropocentric. Three and a half decades later, what does the most prominent indigenous social movement have to say about our relationships with other animals? Ultimately, in that conversation, is there a seat for the buffalo or the eagle? Speciesism

Idle No More adopts overtly anti-racist and anti-sexist positions, as seen in the writings of prominent activists within the movement, but an anti-speciesist position has yet to be explicated. Speciesism is a complex term, and has been interpreted differently in various contexts, leading to a somewhat nebulous sense of the word. In The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals, Paul Waldau provides a “working definition” of the term: “Speciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the 25. Ibid. 26. Oren Lyons, “Our Mother Earth.” 27. Ibid.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle.”28 The “moral circle” can be analogous to one’s community. As S. R. L. Clark notes, “The commonest moral distinction, historically speaking, is between those creatures that are part of our own community (whether strictly human or not) and those that are outsiders.”29 The term “speciesism” has of course been criticized by various philosophers, providing what Waldau calls “an important corrective to excessive reliance on the analogies to racism and sexism,” but the criticisms often “fail to focus on the usefulness of the anti-speciesism critique as a descriptive tool for what has happened in history.”30 Taken as such, the practice of examining speciesist actions allows us to closely analyze the makeup of our moral community. Waldau outlines three “essential concerns” that define whether one can be considered to be inside or outside of a moral circle, paraphrased as: (1) an obligation not to kill (qualified to exclude immediate and unreasonable danger to others), (2) freedom from interruption of life by harmful instrumental use, and (3) freedom from direct, intentional infliction of (unnecessary) harm, pain, or suffering.31 An analysis of these concerns in the context of the Idle No More movement reveals that we may, in a limited sense, regard Idle No More as speciesist. This statement centers on the holistic view of nonhuman animals present in many of the worldviews that undergird Idle No More, in which other animals may be killed for the benefit of humans—a violation of the first essential concern. Chief Theresa Spence’s widely publicized reliance on fish broth during her hunger strike is an example of a speciesist action by Idle No More activists. In addition, arguments by activists that glorify subsistence fishing traditions in order to condemn environmental degradation could be labeled speciesist. But a focus on the acceptance of killing some animals within indigenous worldviews as speciesist distracts from the “usefulness of the anti-speciesism critique as a descriptive tool for what has happened in history” that Waldau emphasizes.32 When used in a comparative critique, we may be less inclined to label the movement speciesist, since it opposes a Western civilization that is much more prone to violating the three “essential 28. Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals, 38. 29. Clark, quoted in Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism, 51. 30. Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism, 55. 31. Ibid., 39 32. Ibid., 55.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 concerns” of speciesism as presented above. Haudenosaunee scholar John Mohawk, for example, views the commodification of the natural world as an assault on his moral community: The Western culture has been horribly exploitative and destructive of the Natural World. Over one hundred forty species of birds and animals were utterly destroyed since the European arrival in the Americas, largely because they were unusable in the eyes of the invaders… The vast herds of herbivores were reduced to mere handfuls; the buffalo nearly became extinct.33

Mohawk continues: “Our essential message to the world is a basic call to consciousness . . . The technologies and social systems that have destroyed the animals and the plant life are also destroying the Native people.”34 Mohawk’s statements point toward a holistic sense of the term “moral circle,” in which the term “circle” could be understood as equally as important as “moral.” The ethic at play here views the world as a circular, naturally-replenishing entity which provides equally for all species; from this standpoint, human subsistence on fish broth is seen as natural in the same sense as the wolf hunting the deer. “The soil is rich from the bones of thousands of our generations,” Mohawk writes. “We deeply understand our relationship to all living things.”35 In Black Elk Speaks, John Neihardt summarizes Nicholas Black Elk’s discussion of “the sacred hoop”: “Everything the Power of the World does is done in a circle. The sky is round, and I have heard that the earth is round like a ball, and so are all the stars. The wind, in its greatest power, whirls. Birds make their nests in a circle, for theirs is the same religion as ours.”36 Perhaps it is this holistic outlook that is responsible for the lack of an overt nonhuman animal-focused message in the Idle No More movement. If one regards other sentient beings as part of the land, and also regards parts of the land as sentient, distinctions between “animal” and “environment” quickly blur. Further, by viewing one’s “moral circle” as, literally, circular, moral focus on the individual is de-emphasized in favor of moral attention to relationships. Thus we see moral consideration as a “triangulated” affair between humans, natural forces, and other animals.

“Understanding the world through a relationship framework … we don’t see ourselves, 33. John Mohawk, with Oren Lyons and Jose Barreiro, Basic Call to Consciousness, 89. 34. Ibid., 90. 35. Ibid., 86. 36. John Gneisenau Neihardt, Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux, 156. 37. John Grim, “Knowing and Being Known by Animals: Indigenous Perspectives on Personhood,” 381.

Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 our communities, or our species as inherently superior to any other,” says BlackCherokee writer Zainab Amadahy, “but rather see our roles and responsibilities to each other as inherent to enjoying our life experience.”38 The difficulty of communicating this worldview to a Western culture focused on a hierarchy of individuals, and not on relationships, may be another reason for the underrepresentation of nonhuman animals in Idle No More. Sheelah McLean, one of Idle No More’s four founders, believes Idle No More can contribute to the struggle against speciesism: All of the founders and organizers want to protect all species—I can only speak for myself when I say that the violence animals face … is indicative of an ugly and violent culture. We hope to use INM to educate the public on these issues and stop the abuse of animals. We have to position other species in our campaign for justice—the corporations that devalue human beings and the land, also devalue other species and there are many at risk.39

Nina Wilson, another co-founder, agrees: [Nonhuman animals] actually are a nation as we are and many of our people still practice nation to nation with them [because] it is a part of our traditional laws, which are imbedded in our languages, which are directly tied to the land. These laws are not legend. They are real. Just as real as the laws of the non-native, which also derive from their religion and [are] written in the Bible. Our traditional laws do not place us humans above the lives of other nations, such as animals. So animals for the first time, at such a deep level, have needed us to defend them like never before.40

Clearly, the Idle No More movement has the potential to adopt an anti-speciesist position, despite the continued reliance on some traditions that would presently be viewed as speciesist. The tension at play here is not due to a lack of compassion for the more-than-human world; rather, the tension results from a fundamental clash between indigenous subsistence traditions and Western culture. We may therefore wish to overlook any speciesist predilections of the movement in favor of an emphasis on the common ground between Idle No More and the animal rights/liberation movement. The next section, which examines nonhuman animal imagery in Idle No More, provides further evidence that the movement maintains, at a fundamental and integral level, a compassionate and respectful view of other animals. 38. Harsha Walia, “Decolonizing Together: Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Toward a Practice of Decolonization.” 39. Personal correspondence, 2013. 40. Personal correspondence, 2013.

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Bear Imagery in Idle No More

The Idle No More movement has consistently utilized bear imagery. Bears have been invoked in logos, on protest signs, in photos posted to social media, and within select narratives. These images are simultaneously literal and symbolic, bringing bears into the dialogue on various levels: as allies, mascots, and beings in need of aid. Figure 1 is one of the main logos of Idle No More, often displayed in the movementâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s social media channels. It features a grizzly bear print colored red and adorned with three black feathers. This is the first instance of a connection between bear, bird, and human, which will be discussed in later sections of this essay.

Fig.1. Source: IdleNoMore.ca Figure 2 shows the logo in use by protesters. Though various images and illustrations are presented here, the bear print is clearly the focal point of the protest.

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Fig. 2. Source: IdleNoMore.ca In these images, the bear print is presented, both in style and color, in a fashion similar to the iconic â&#x20AC;&#x153;raised fist,â&#x20AC;? which signifies power from the ground up and solidarity with the oppressed. (The Idle No More movement does use a raised fist holding an eagle feather as a logo as well, as discussed elsewhere in this paper.) Figure 3 brings bears into Idle No More quite literally, although presumably in a tongue-in-cheek fashion.

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Fig. 3. Source: Idle No More Facebook page Collectively, these images offer an entry point into a discussion of the role of the bear, and human-bear relations, in Idle No More. These images have symbolic roots in many disparate indigenous cultures. One example is found in the work of George Bird Grinnell, who noted the Blackfeet word “O-kits-iks” was used to describe a bear paw but could also be used to describe a human hand.41 Another is the Southern Ute Bear Dance, the “oldest known continuous dancing tradition in North America,” which encourages healing, rejuvenation, and reciprocity.42 There are many, many other examples that could be used here, which suggests a connection between indigenous societies and bears that spans great distances and cultural divides. Feather Imagery in Idle No More

41. George Grinnell, Blackfoot Lodge Tails: The Story of a Prairie People. 42. Laura Pritchett, Great Colorado Bear Stories.

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Idle No More’s bear paw logo contains feathers, and indeed feathers are perhaps the most prominent animal-related image in Idle No More. Oren Lyons holds that feathers symbolize a mutualistic relationship between humans and birds: the feather with Indian people, as you know, is very important for us, and the reason why is that birds have an important role in the discussion of everyday life. They tell you a lot of things. If you learn their language, they’ll tell you what they are saying [...] You get to appreciate that, and to recognize them as friends and as partners in life.43

Fig. 4. Source: Idle No More Facebook page Feather images foreground the importance of the bird in Idle No More discussions. The possible intelligibility of bird language need not be interpreted as merely a spiritual or metaphysical statement. Though humans may not have the ability to speak the same dialect as the bird, we still possess the ability to communicate with other species in deep and meaningful ways. David Abram (1996) examines this concept at length in The Spell of the Sensuous, arguing that the spread of “alphabetic culture” led to “the profoundly detached view of 43. Oren Lyons, “Importance of Feathers & the Next Generation.”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 nature that was to prevail in the modern period.”44 The written language, he asserts, transfers “the participatory proclivity of the senses . . . from the depths of our surrounding life-world to the visible letters of the alphabet.”45 Despite the seeming universality of the alphabetic culture, there remain, on the edges and even in the midst of this ever-expanding monoculture, small-scale local cultures or communities where the traditional oral, indigenous modes of experience still prevail—cultures that have never fully transferred their sensory participation to the written word. They have not yet closed themselves within an entirely human field of meanings, and so still dwell within a landscape that is alive, aware, and expressive. To such peoples, that which we term “language” remains as much property of the animate landscape as of the humans who dwell and speak within that terrain.46

From here, Abram immediately turns to a discussion of “the language of the birds.” He notes that it is a common belief among oral and indigenous cultures that nonhuman animals understand human language, but mostly choose not to speak it. Accordingly, some people, like the Koyukon of northwestern Alaska, “take great care to avoid speaking of certain animals directly, using elaborate circumlocutions so as not to offend them.”47 When birds do choose to communicate with humans via language, it can be because of an important event that impacts both animals. “Once, some years ago, people heard a horned owl clearly intone the Koyukon words ‘Black bears will cry,’” writes Abram. “For the next two seasons, the wild berry crops failed and many bears found it hard to survive.”48 Here again we see a connection between birds, bears, and humans. “Different birds have different work, and they’re all important,” says Lyons, but The eagle is recognized [by indigenous peoples] as the leader of the birds. And the reason why, at least from the Haudenosaunee side… and pretty much the way I understand it around the rest of Indian country is that the eagle is the most powerful and flies the closest to the Creator. Therefore he carries your words on his wings and he carries them as the messenger who reaches closest to the Creator. And so we value his feathers and we value his presence.49

44. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World, 138. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., 139. 47. Ibid., 151. 48. Ibid., 149. 49. Oren Lyons, “Importance of Feathers & the Next Generation.”

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Fig. 5. Source: Idle No More Facebook page Linda Hogan, writer in residence for the Chickasaw Nation, chooses mysterious and reverential descriptors when discussing the delicate power of eagle feathers: There is something alive in a feather. The power of it is perhaps in its dream of sky, currents of air, and the silence of its creation. It knows the insides of clouds. It carries our needs and desires, the stories of our brokenness. It rises and falls down elemental space, one part of the elaborate world of life where fish swim against gravity, where eels turn silver as moon to breed.50

Hogan’s words connect the hopeful soaring of the eagle to the universal human desire for meaning. This connection is strong within “almost all Indian nations” according to Oren Lyons, who says, “you’ll find [eagle feathers] always somewhere on headdresses and so forth of our people because they tie us together with the creation.”51 Given the power of the eagle, who is able to exist in the liminal space between human and Creator, and also able to hear and speak the language of people, it was 50. Linda Hogan, Linda, Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World, 20. 51. Oren Lyons, “Importance of Feathers & the Next Generation.”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 heralded as a positive development when a golden eagle circled over a particular Idle No More event.

Fig. 6. Source: Idle No More Facebook page This picture (fig. 6) was posted to the Idle No More Facebook page during an event called “the Journey of the Nishiyuu.” The Journey of the Nishiyuu involved seven Cree youth, aged seventeen to twenty-two years, walking 1,600 kilometers to Ottawa over sixty-eight days. They arrived at Parliament Hill on March 25, 2013, to a crowd of over 4,000.52 Along the way, they snapped a photo of a golden eagle overhead, interpreting it as a sign that their message was being delivered to the Creator. 52. Jorge Barrera, “Journey of Nishiyuu Walkers Names Now ‘Etched’ into ‘History of this Country.’”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Figure 7, a raised fist with eagle feather, has become another iconic image within the Idle No More movement.

Fig. 7. Source: IdleNoMore.ca The raised fist, that veteran of myriad social clashes, that symbol of solidarity with the oppressed, of “speaking truth to power,” here combines with the eagle feather, the multifaceted symbol of leadership, of spirituality, of decorum, and of communication with human, nonhuman, and divine. This commanding image thus indicates that the group is speaking truth, and is unafraid to send that message to all relations or to the Creator. Bears and Birds: Threatened by Oil Sands Development

The development of the Alberta oil sands region threatens bears in the future via habitat destruction, environmental degradation, and possible oil spills. However, it has already led to an exponential increase in human-bear conflict. Wildlife officials killed 145 black bears in the oil sands region in 2011, raising serious questions from concerned observers. This represented nearly triple the amount of killed bears from the year prior.53 Alberta Sustainable Resource Development, the provincial wildlife management agency, has responded with multiple different reasons for the increase—none of which involve habitat encroachment due to oil sands development. ASRD spokesperson Darcy 53. Indian Country Today Media Network, “145 Black Bears Killed in Tar Sands Region in 2011.”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Whiteside says that “68 of the killings happened in tar sands camps and facilities to which hungry bears are attracted by unsecured garbage,” and, in a CBC report, ASRD Minister Frank Oberle says there will be a review of “garbage management” practices.54 Another ASRD official “blamed a berry crop failure for the increase.”55 Constable Dustin Greig of the Wood Buffalo Royal Canadian Mounted Police attributes the increased bear presence to a “massive forest fire north of town.”56 National Wildlife Federation scientist Doug Inkley responds angrily: Their approach seems to be, if it becomes a problem, kill it—rather than prevent the problem in the first place. Humans are destroying bear habitat and not disposing of garbage properly. So, we kill the bears . . . This is death by a thousand cuts. It may seem like there are plenty of black bears now, but look what’s happening: the tar sands area that could be developed is the size of Florida, and this is going to be repeated over and over and over if we keep encroaching on their habitat.57

Birds are also threatened by the development of the oil sands region. According to a 2008 report commissioned by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Boreal Songbird Initiative, and the Pembina Institute, “millions of birds will be lost by tar sands development.”58 “Each spring more than half of America’s birds flock to the Canadian Boreal forest to nest,” states the report.59 “There, a square mile . . . can support as many as 500 breeding pairs of migratory birds.”60 The projected loss of habitat due to stripmining in the area will result in a loss of 4.8–36 million birds over the following twenty years.61 One of the many affected species highlighted in the report is the Bohemian waxwing, which is called diltsooga by the Koyukon, meaning “he squeaks.”62 Citing a passage from Richard Nelson’s Make Prayers to the Raven: A Koyukon View of the Northern Forest, David Abram writes: “According to a Distant Time story, the waxwing had a very jealous wife who once dragged him around by the hair, giving him the crest 54. Ibid. 55. Brody Fenlon, “145 Black Bears Killed in Alberta Oil Sands.” 56. CBC News, “Bear Sightings Increase in Fort McMurray.” 57. Peter LaFontaine, “145 Black Bears Shot in Canada’s Tar Sands Region, More Deaths Likely.” 58. Wells et al., “Danger in the Nursery: Impact on Birds of Tar Sands Oil Development in Canada’s Boreal Forest,” 1. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Murphy n.d. 62. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World, 148.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 that now adorns his crown and making him cry out until his voice became nothing but a squeak.”63 Another bird of the boreal forest, the thrush, is understood by the Koyukon people to sometimes say nahutl-eeyh, translated as “a sign of the spirit is perceived.”64 This spiritual messenger is another species affected by tar sands extraction, as the toxins released lead to lower probabilities of breeding.65 A 2011 CBC News report notes that an iconic bird, the whooping crane, could be threatened with extinction due to oil sands development.66 The whooping crane is an endangered species in both Canada and the United States, and the majority of the remaining cranes migrate between Alberta and Texas. The size of this flock was estimated at 270 in 2008, and had dropped to 187 by 2010.67 According to National Wildlife Federation estimates, less than 400 total (wild and captive) whooping cranes exist today.68 Birds, Bears, and Humans

Idle No More imagery clearly communicates a special and particular relationship between birds, bears, and humans. Indigenous philosopher Vine Deloria, Jr. explains this connection: The Plains Indians saw a grand distinction between two-legged and four-legged creatures. Among the two-leggeds were humans, birds, and bears. Bears were included because when feeding, they often stand on two legs. Since the two-leggeds are responsible for helping to put the natural world back into balance when it becomes disordered, birds, bears and humans share a responsibility to participate in healing ceremonies and indeed the cumulative knowledge of these three groups is primarily one of healing.69

The idea that the two-leggeds share responsibility for healing and putting “the natural world back into balance when it becomes disordered” resonates in much of the 63. David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World, 148. 64. Ibid. 65. Wells et al., “Danger in the Nursery: Impact on Birds of Tar Sands Oil Development in Canada’s Boreal Forest,”16. 66. CBC News,“Oilsands May Threaten Whooping Cranes’ Survival,” July 15, 2011. 67. US Fish & Wildlife Service. 68. Murphy, n.d. 69. Vine Deloria, Jr., “Foreword,” xii.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 imagery in the Idle No More movement. Including bears and birds in the discussion brings forth a host of meaningful virtues and desired qualities: healing, rejuvenation, community, honor, respect, empathy, reciprocity, authority, decorum, partnership, beauty, and communication with all relations. But why must those qualities be tied to bears and birds? Can we, as humans, not summon these virtues without needing other animals? Deloria, Jr., responds: It was said that each species had a particular knowledge of the universe and specific skills for living in it. Human beings had a little bit of knowledge and some basic skills, but we could not compare with any other animals as far as speed, strength, cunning and intelligence. Therefore it was incumbent on us to respect every other form of life, to learn from them as best we could the proper behavior in this world and the specific technical skills necessary to survive and prosper. Man was the youngest member of the web of life and, therefore, had to have some humility in the face of the talents and experience of other species.70

As opposed to the human-centered, top-down ideologies espoused by thinkers like Descartes, Deloria, Jr. here reveals a bottom-up, earth community-centered worldview that is respectful of other animals not because they are useful, but because fostering a relationship with those animals is a reciprocal process that is the key to a prosperous existence for both. This theme is echoed in the words of Idle No More activists, including Wanda Nanibush, an Anishnabe-kwe writer and artist who says that a sacred relationship with the land underlies Idle No More actions . . . We look to honoring the nation-to-nation relationship in order to protect all of creation . . . Because humans are the weakest link in all of creation because we depend on all of it to survive – we must protect and nurture it. Humans have relationships with the natural world precisely because we are one with it and dependent upon it . . . We choose actions that place a deep emphasis on remembering and maintaining our relationships with all of creation.71

Here Nanibush presents an ethic that is based as much on the fragility of the human as it is based upon human ingenuity or flexibility. We are therefore obligated to protect the nonhuman world as a sort of payment upon a debt, and also as a pathway to human prosperity or flourishing. As such, maintaining a reciprocal relationship with the morethan-human world becomes a self-actualizing experience. 70. Ibid., xi. 71. The Globe and Mail, “The Spiritual Side of Idle No More.”

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Private Property Rights and Ecological Fragmentation

As we lose “wilderness” (a term we may use to describe the oil sands region before its development), we not only lose a part of ourselves, but the threat to life, which once existed in the world around us, moves within, explains psychologist C. A. Meier.72 “The whole of western society,” he says, “is approaching a physical and mental breaking point.” 73 Linda Hogan writes that the result is “a spiritual fragmentation that has accompanied our ecological destruction.”74 Indeed, as discussed above, a lost connection with the more-than-human world is equivalent to a lost opportunity for self-actualization. The present situation stems from “the objective to make human societies as independent as possible and to make the natural world as subservient as possible to human decisions,” writes Thomas Berry in “Ethics and Ecology.”75 He continues, Only now can we appreciate the consequences of this effort to achieve human well-being in a consumer society by subduing the spontaneities of the natural world to human manipulation. We begin to realize that the devastation taking place cannot be critiqued effectively from within the traditional religions or humanist ethics. Nor can it be dealt with from within the perspectives of the industrial society that brought it about.76

Yet access to perspectives outside of industrial society is increasingly difficult. Colonization has affected the core beliefs and practices of indigenous societies. In an article titled “Re-envisioning Resurgence,” Jeff Corntassel recounts a story of the Mohawk delegation to the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in 2010.77 Questions from indigenous participants at the conference in Bolivia “challenged the three Mohawk travelers to the very core of their identities.”78 They asked us, “so you’re from that region of the world, are you still connected to nature? Is your community and your people still in tuned with the natural world?’” Hemlock said. “We had to honestly tell them, not really, to a degree but not really. So they asked us, ‘What makes you

72. See Linda Hogan, Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World. 73. Quoted in Linda Hogan, Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World, 52. 74. Ibid. 75. Thomas Berry, “Ethics and Ecology,” 8. 76. Ibid. 77. Jeff Corntassel, “Re-envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-determination.” 78. Ibid.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Indigenous?’” Hemlock said that they explained where Kahnawake was situated [...] He stated that because of Kahnawake’s location that, as a people, we too are struggling to try to maintain our identity and live in a sustainable way. “So they said, ‘so how do you do it? What’s the example that your community is giving to all the surrounding communities about how to live sustainably with the environment, what are you showing them?’” Hemlock recounted. “Again we had to say, we’re doing our best in a lot of areas, but as a community we really have to ask ourselves that question of what are we doing? When we look at our community and seeing so much land being clear-cut; so many of the swamp and marshlands being land-filled; so many dump-sites. There’s all these things within our own little community and we’re supposed to be the Indigenous examples of living healthy and sustainably with the environment.79

The struggle to maintain an indigenous identity in the face of Western civilization was occurring even at the earliest stages of contact with European settlers, says environmental historian William Cronon.80 Differing views on property rights and the market economy led Europeans to label indigenous people as poverty-stricken, mainly “because the Indians lacked the incentives of money and commerce.”81 Cronon notes that John Locke and other European economists failed to notice that The Indians did not recognize themselves as poor. The endless accumulation of capital which [Locke] saw as a natural consequence of the human love for wealth made little sense to them . . . Thomas Morton was almost alone among his contemporaries in realizing that the New England Indians had chosen [a different] path. As he said [...] they “lived richly,” and had little in the way of wants or complaints. Pierre Biard [...] extended it into a critique of European ways of life. Indians, he said, went about their daily tasks with great leisure, “for their days are all nothing but pastime. They are never in a hurry. Quite different from us, who can never do anything without hurry and worry; worry, I say, because our desire tyrannizes over us and banishes peace from our actions.”82

A more tangible difference between the societies was the relationship with nonhuman animals. “Where the Indians had contented themselves with burning the woods and concentrating their hunting in the fall and winter months,” writes Cronon, “the English sought a much more total and year-round control over their animals’ lives.”83 The importation of vast numbers of livestock in the seventeenth century resulted in a changed 79. Ibid., 87. 80. William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England. 81. Ibid., 79. 82. Ibid., 79–80. 83. Ibid., 128.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 landscape in New England, and also challenged the concepts of property rights held by the indigenous people. Since “Indian property systems granted rights of personal ownership to an animal only at the moment it was killed,” conflicts arose, even when Indians acknowledged English property rights. 84 Colonists objected when Indians killed livestock that had broken loose, and Indians contended that the animals damaged their agriculture. These matters were then settled through the colonists’ justice system, which in turn led Indians to alter their agricultural processes. As Cronon explains, “Indians wishing compensation for damages to their crops were required to capture wandering animals and hold them until they were claimed by their owners . . . Indians had no right to collect damages by killing a trespassing animal.”85 The result was a shifting paradigm, in which Indians began to adopt a property rights mentality towards nonhuman animals, and even began to construct fences to protect their agriculture. Eventually, Indians were even “assumed to be [financially] liable for the maintenance of their own fences.”86 Cronon’s narrative serves to illustrate the corporeality of the connection between indigenous relations with nonhuman animals and the beginnings of colonization. The introduction of private property rights for nonhuman animals served to change some of the most basic agricultural, and thereby cultural, customs of the native people of New England. “The Haudenosaunee have no concept of private property,” writes John Mohawk, concluding, “That idea would destroy our culture.”87 Oren Lyons explains that “Private property is a concept that flies in the face of our understanding of life, and we would say the reality of life.”88 He critiques private property as “a conception, a human conception, which amounts to personal greed,” describing the spiritual terms on which “our worldview, our perspective, and our process of governance” are connected to the nonhuman world in an anecdote: “And then there’s the spiritual side [of governance] . . . [Y]ou see it in the eyes of the deer, that bright spark, that life, that light in his eyes, and

84. Ibid., 130. 85. Ibid., 131–132. 86. Ibid., 132. 87. John Mohawk, with Oren Lyons and Jose Barreiro, Basic Call to Consciousness, 105. 88. Oren Lyons, “The Leadership Imperative.”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 when you make your kill, it’s gone. Where did it go? It’s the same light that’s in the eyes of children, or in the eyes of old men, old women.”89 These comments point to a belief in a systemic crisis within capitalism, which can be attributed to privatization, commodification, and the exploitation and destruction of natural resources. As an alternative, Mohawk and Lyons could be interpreted as proponents of economic development that does not have profit as its primary goal, but rather the sanctity of human and nonhuman life. Religious Context

“Context is all-important for both practice and understanding of reality,” writes Vine Deloria, Jr.90 Put in proper context, we see that the fragmentation, commodification, and degradation of the natural world shake the very foundation of many indigenous cultures. The “vast majority of Indian tribal religions” have a sacred center at a particular place, which allows them to orient themselves historically, culturally, and spiritually.91 This spatial understanding of religion is to be contrasted with what Deloria, Jr. refers to as the “Near Eastern” or Abrahamic traditions, in which religious reality is to be understood temporally, or as an historic sequence of events rather than a continuous revelation.92 “Tribal religions,” meanwhile, “are actually complexes of attitudes, beliefs, and practices fine-tuned to harmonize to the lands on which the people live.”93 The structure of these religions “is taken directly from the world around them, from their relationships with other forms of life.”94 Therefore, displacement from the lands, destruction of the lands, or severance from other animals effectively eliminates the potential for spiritual experience. As the Bolivians pointed out to the Mohawk delegation, “being indigenous” is maintained on a fundamental level by more than genealogy.95 Activist Harsha Walia notes that “being 89. Ibid. 90. Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion, 65. 91. Ibid., 66. 92. Ibid., 67. 93. Ibid., 69. 94. Ibid., 65. 95. Jeff Corntassel, “Re-envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-determination.”

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Indigenous is not just an identity but a way of life, which is intricately connected to Indigenous peoples’ relationship to the land and all its inhabitants.”96 To be indigenous is to maintain an integral connection with the natural world. But to maintain an integral connection to the natural world is also to experience a spiritual connection, says Deloria, Jr.; “So much energetic potency exists,” he writes, “that we either must describe everything as religious or say that religion as we have known it is irrelevant to our concerns.” 97 Thomas Berry agrees, noting “there must have been a bio-spiritual component of the universe from the beginning.”98 Further, in the essay “Loneliness and Presence,” Berry writes, “we cannot be truly ourselves in any adequate manner without all our companion beings throughout the earth,” because the “larger community constitutes our greater self.”99 As such, “to reduce any mode of being simply to that of a commodity as its primary status . . . within the community of existence is a betrayal.”100 Berry calls for an integral and holistic reexamining of Abrahamic religious traditions, arguing that our present difficulty is due to our anthropocentrism, both in our biblical religions and our Greek humanist traditions. We see the human as a princely resident on a planet that is completely lacking in any inherent rights that must be respected by humans. If there are any rights toward the natural world obliging the human it is obligations that they owe to themselves, not to the non-human world. The universe as such has no psychic, moral, or spiritual dimension.101

But Berry also notes that there are some traditions that do acknowledge obligations to the natural world. The spiritual “majesty” and “mystery” of the natural world (or “universe”) “[have] been recognized by indigenous peoples everywhere,” he writes.102 Indeed, “even today the indigenous peoples of the world can teach us” these “primordial lessons.”103 Yet indigeneity, it seems, is a rapidly vanishing mode of being. As Jeff Corntassel explains, even some native delegates are experiencing existential doubt, wondering about

96. Harsha Walia, “Decolonizing Together: Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Toward a Practice of Decolonization.” 97. Vine Deloria, Jr., God is Red: A Native View of Religion, 151. 98. Thomas Berry, “Ethics and Ecology”, 2. 99. Thomas Berry, “Loneliness and Presence,” 5. 100. Ibid., 9. 101. Ibid., 2–3. 102. Ibid., 9. 103. Thomas Berry, “Ethics and Ecology,” 4.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 the depth and veracity of their indigenous experience and identity.104 John Grim writes that meaning in indigenous settings “results from cultivated bodily attention to the environment,” and that “a primary characteristic of knowledge acquired in indigenous ecological attention… is of personhood in the life of animals.” 105 This sense of “meaning” is echoed in the words of Idle No More activist Eriel Tchekwie Deranger of Fort Chipewyan: “This is my family, this is my land, these are my relatives. When I say relatives I don’t mean other human beings, but I mean the trees, the water, the moose, the caribou, the ducks and the fish that are my brothers and sisters, cousins and ancestors. Without all of that, there is really nothing left for my people.”106 The act of situating one’s self in the web of ecological relationships has led indigenous groups to develop “rituals of respect,” says John Grim, which embody and enable “mutual reciprocity” and “show a close connection between vibrant, mature personhood and animal presences that evoke cosmic powers.”107 John Mohawk writes of the loss of these ancient relationships and connections, “A consciousness of the web that holds all things together, the spiritual element that connects us to reality and the manifestation of that power to renew that is present in the existence of an eagle or a mountain snow fall, that consciousness was the first thing that was destroyed by the colonizers.”108 When removed from the continually-revelatory experience of mutuality with the other-than-human community, all that is left is the “fragility” and “humility” of the human experience described by Wanda Nanibush and Vine Deloria, Jr. This displacement has taken place, even subconsciously, since the early stages of European contact, as noted by Cronon earlier, and is struggled with both spiritually and politically, as shown in the comments of Oren Lyons regarding private property. Because displacement has a symbiotic relationship with both loss of spirituality and loss of culture (together seen as loss of indigeneity), “resurgence” must be the inverse. As such, a revitalized spiritual and cultural world can be experienced through re-situating spatially and ontologically within 104. Jeff Corntassel, “Re-envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-determination.” 105. John Grim, “Knowing and Being Known by Animals: Indigenous Perspectives on Personhood,” 381. 106. Robert van Waarden, “Photo Essay on Canada’s Filthy Tar Sands—This is Why Keystone XL Must Be Stopped.” 107. John Grim, “Knowing and Being Known by Animals,” 381, 376. 108. John Mohawk, with Oren Lyons and Jose Barreiro, Basic Call to Consciousness, 123.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 the natural world. This is the “primordial lesson” Thomas Berry was referring to in “Ethics and Ecology.” “They tie us together with the Creation”

The Idle No More movement utilizes nonhuman animal symbols because of their deep spiritual significance. The movement foregrounds bird and bear because of the special relationship those two groups have had with humans for millennia. The relationship is spiritual, but it is also fundamentally reflective of the ongoing experience between those groups. Therefore, the virtues that emerge from the grouping of birds, bears, and humans together exist as abstract concepts but are also fiercely representative of the actual lived experience of those animals. For example, David Abram’s foray into the Koyukon understanding of the language of birds shows a richly communicative world in which birds speak on a spiritual plane, but may also choose to communicate with humans, especially when it becomes important on a practical level. This relationship with birds, bears, and the nonhuman world is an example of what John Grim refers to as “the mutuality of knowing and being known by animals,” 109 and is a key part of the indigenous spiritual landscape which fosters an ethic of stewardship that results from both obligation and purpose. Maintaining a mutualistic and reciprocal relationship with the nonhuman world thereby becomes a process of self-actualization. During this process, balance is brought to the relationship between, for instance, bear and human. “Though much diminished and changed by the forces of global colonialism,” writes Grim, “in many rural settings indigenous perspectives on animal personhood continue into the present.”110 The strikingly nuanced narratives within the Idle No More movement reflect this worldview, bringing the marginalized views of rural indigenous peoples into the discussions of mainstream culture. The popular interpretation of Idle No More involves the basic message that indigenous rights, women’s rights, and environmental protection are issues to be debated within typical social and political channels. However, a fuller 109. John Grim, “Knowing and Being Known by Animals: Indigenous Perspectives on Personhood,” 376. 110. Ibid.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 understanding of Idle No More posits an alternative to the dominant modes of humannonhuman relations in contemporary society. As such, Idle No More is seeking a resurgence of indigeneity, and is building momentum toward a shifted paradigm that includes “a seat for the buffalo and the eagle.” Bibliography Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-ThanHuman World. New York: Vintage Books, 1996. Barrera, Jorge. “Journey of Nishiyuu Walkers Names Now ‘Etched’ into ‘History of this Country.’” APTN News, March 26, 2013. Berry, Thomas. “Ethics and Ecology.” Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values. Harvard University: Cambridge, 1996. ———. “Loneliness and Presence.” In A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, edited by Paul Waldau and Kimberley Christine Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Bogado, Aura. “Chief Spence Hospitalized, Ending Hunger Strike.” The Nation, January 24, 2013. CBC News. “9 Questions about Idle No More,” January 5, 2013. ———. “Bear Sightings Increase in Fort McMurray,” August 9, 2011. CBC News. “Oilsands May Threaten Whooping Cranes’ Survival,” July 15, 2011. Corntassel, Jeff. “Re-envisioning Resurgence: Indigenous Pathways to Decolonization and Sustainable Self-determination.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1, no. 1 (2012): 86–101. Cronon, William. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England. New York: Hill and Wang, 1983. Deloria, Jr., Vine. “Foreword.” In Keepers of the Animals: Native American Stories and Wildlife Activities for Children, edited by Michael J. Caduto and Joseph Bruchac. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1997. ———. God is Red: A Native View of Religion. Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1973.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ———. “The Speculations of Krech: A Review of The Ecological Indian.” Worldviews 4 (2000): 283–293. Fenlon, Brodie. “145 Black Bears Killed in Alberta Oil Sands.” Huffington Post, February 22, 2012. Grim, John. “Knowing and Being Known by Animals: Indigenous Perspectives on Personhood.” In A Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, edited by Paul Waldau and Kimberley Christine Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Grinnell, George. Blackfoot Lodge Tails: The Story of a Prairie People. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1920. Hogan, Linda. Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World. New York: Touchstone, 1995. Idle No More Facebook page. https://www.facebook.com/groups/Idlenomore.official/. Idle No More website. http://www.idlenomore.ca/. Indian Country Today Media Network. “145 Black Bears Killed in Tar Sands Region in 2011,” February 24, 2012. Kinew, Wab. “Idle No More is Not Just an ‘Indian Thing,’” Huffington Post, December 17, 2012 LaFontaine, Peter. “145 Black Bears Shot in Canada’s Tar Sands Region, More Deaths Likely.” National Wildlife Federation, February 27, 2012. Lyons, Oren. “Importance of Feathers & the Next Generation,” YouTube, FeatherProject, September 19, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEJUkaHapuc. ———. “Our Mother Earth.” In Seeing God Everywhere: Essays on Nature and the Sacred, edited by Barry McDonald. Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, Inc., 2003. ———. “The Leadership Imperative.” Orion, January/February 2007. Madondo, Obert. “What Chief Spence’s Hunger Strike Says About Canada.” Huffington Post, December 14, 2012. McAdam, Sylvia. (2013) “Good morning everyone.” Sylvia McAdam Saysewahum Facebook Page. March 16, 2013, 12:04 PM. ———. “Idle No More is a grassroots movement, not exclusively Indigenous.” Twitter post @sylviamcadam, April 16, 2013, 10:09 AM.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 ———. “One of the founders of Idle No More is Sheelah McLean and she is our white sister #idlenomore4.” Twitter post @sylviamcadam. April 16, 2013, 10:07 AM. Moe, Kristin. “Indigenous Women Take the Lead in Idle No More.” Yes! Magazine, January 18, 2013. http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/indigenous-womentake-lead-idle-no-more. Mohawk, John, with Oren Lyons and Jose Barreiro. Basic Call to Consciousness. Summertown, TN: Native Voices, 1978. Murphy, Jim. (n.d.) “Tar Sands: Wildlife Impacts and Overview.” National Wildlife Federation Report. http://www.nrcm.org/documents/NWF_tarsands_presentation.pdf. Accessed November 8, 2013. Neihardt, John Gneisenau. Black Elk Speaks: Being the Life Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988. Palmater, Pam. “Why Idle No More Matters to Us All.” Now Toronto 32, no. 19 (2013). http://www.nowtoronto.com/news/story.cfm?content=190705.

Accessed

November 4, 2013. Plecash, Chris. “Idle No More Movement Led by Aboriginal Women.” Hill Times, January 14, 2013. Pritchett, Laura. Great Colorado Bear Stories. Helena, MT: Riverbend Publishing, 2012. Ross, Gyasi.“The Idle No More Movement for Dummies (or, What the Heck Are All These Indians Acting All Indian-ey About?).” Indian Country Today Media Network,

January

16,

2013.

http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/01/16/idle-no-moremovement-dummies-or-what-heck-are-all-these-indians-acting-all-indian-ey. ———. “Sunday question: Is it possible for white people to understand how profoundly being white affects & benefits them every single day?” Twitter post @BigIndianGyasi, April 21, 2013, 11:59 AM. https://twitter.com/BigIndianGyasi Sheedy, Matt. “From Occupy to Idle No More.” Waging Nonviolence, January 8, 2013. http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/from-occupy-to-idle-no-more/. November 4, 2013.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Sinclair, Niganwewidam. “Idle No More Shifting to Localized Activism, Says Sinclair.” APTN News, April 11, 2013. http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2013/04/11/idle-no-moreshifting-to-localized-activism-says-sinclair/. Accessed November 4, 2013. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. “Species profile: Whooping Crane (Grus americana),” November

2013.

http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=B003#oth er. Accessed November 8, 2013. The Globe and Mail. “The Spiritual Side of Idle No More,” February 18, 2013. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-spiritual-side-of-idle-nomore/article8765756/. Accessed November 4, 2013. van Gelder, Sarah. “Why Canada’s Indigenous Uprising is About All of Us.” Yes! Magazine,

February

2013.

http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/how-

cooperatives-are-driving-the-new-economy/why-canada2019s-indigenousuprising-is-about-all-of-us. Accessed November 4, 2013. van Waarden, Robert. (2011) “Photo Essay on Canada’s Filthy Tar Sands—This is Why Keystone XL Must Be Stopped.” The DeSmog Blog, August 23, 2011. http://www.desmogblog.com/photo-essay-canada-s-filthy-tar-sands-whykeystone-xl-must-be-stopped. Accessed November 4, 2013. Waldau, Paul. The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Walia, Harsha. “Decolonizing Together: Moving Beyond a Politics of Solidarity Toward a Practice of Decolonization.” Briarpatch Magazine, January 1, 2012. http://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/decolonizing-together.

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November 4, 2013. Wells, Jeff, Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, Gabriela Chavarria, and Simon Dyer. “Danger in the Nursery: Impact on Birds of Tar Sands Oil Development in Canada’s Boreal Forest.”

Natural Resources Defense Council Report, December

2008.

http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/borealbirds.pdf. Accessed November 4, 2013. Wong, Rita. “J28: A Poem by Rita Wong.” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, January 28, 2013. http://decolonization.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/j28-apoem-by-rita-wong/. Accessed November 4, 2013.

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Event Reviews Ecology and Environmental Humanities Symposium (September 13–14th, 2013) Rice University Department of English Houston, Texas Organizers: Rodrigo Martini Paula and Larry A Butz Reviewed by Sarah Bezan* On September 13th–14th, 2013, Rice University’s Department of English hosted the Ecology and Environmental Humanities Symposium. The event, which was attended by approximately fifty participants, featured keynote addresses by Dr. Timothy Morton (Rice University) and Dr. Claire Colebrook (Pennsylvania State University), and aimed to encourage conversation about, and responses to, the ecological and nonhuman turn in the humanities. Along with the two keynote addresses, nearly thirty symposium papers were presented on subjects as diverse as animal rights discourse, commercial agriculture, species extinction and the anthropocene, eco-poetics, inter-species relations, bio-art, community gardening projects, personhood and disability studies, pet-keeping, and print culture. The rich variety of topics, objects of study, and methodological approaches enabled the intersection of multiple disciplines and stimulated timely critical responses to current debates within ecology and the environmental humanities. In Dr. Timothy Morton’s keynote address on Friday, September 13th, 2013, entitled “Mal-Functioning,” Morton discussed environmentality in relation to its continual adaptations and its capacity to “malfunction.” Meditating upon the form and function of eco-poetry, including Brenda Hillman’s “Cascadia,”1 Morton drew from his previous work on “dark ecology,”2 while reanimating his ideas on the philosophy of *

Sarah Bezan is a doctoral student in the English and Film Studies Department at The University of Alberta. Her doctoral project, entitled “Post-mortem Proximities: The Contiguity of Animal and Human Death in Contemporary Literature and Culture,” is funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Graduate Scholarship. Her academic work has appeared in the Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Criterion, and the Journal of the African Literature Association. 1. Brenda Hillman, Cascadia, Wesleyan University Press, 2001. 2. See, e.g., Timothy Morton, Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics, Harvard

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 objects in ecological thinking.3 Morton’s address inspired inquiries and discussions about the material environment and semiotics of the poetic form, along with the “malfunctioning,” and continually adapting, nature of artistic production. Dr. Claire Colebrook’s keynote address on Saturday, September 14th, 2013, entitled “Sex, the City, and the Anthropocene,” brought together and “intensively” read (as per the method of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari) the multifarious orientations and encounters between the human and the non-human through the concepts of sex, the city, and the anthropocene. Elaborating upon her current work on extinction,4 Colebrook’s address considered humanity’s imagined non-existence and impending extinction, and ruminated upon the salience of this surmised non-being as a new point of reference for understanding

industrialization,

modernization,

and

the

hyper-consumption

commodities. Following Colebrook’s address, discussion centered in part around the significance of a program of “sustainability” as a response to the anthropocene, and led into larger debates about the constitution of urbane collectivity and the nature of desire in determining new forms of human and non-human relations. Consistent themes and discussions arising from the symposium presentations included the (sometimes calamitous) consequences of inter-species interactions, the rupturing of anthropocentric notions of subjectivity and personhood, the politicization of ecological relations in activism and resistance movements, and the implications of representing non-human life and death. Many of the continually emerging themes and discussions of the symposium reflected the most pressing debates in the environmental humanities. The keynote addresses, given their focus on the precarity of human and nonhuman relations in the era of the anthropocene, and on the literary and artistic representation of humanity’s relationship to the environment, productively pushed these debates into increased proximity with wider considerations, both within and beyond the humanities, of the global impact of human behavior upon the Earth’s ecosystems. One particular panel, for example, focused on the representation of human and non-human life in contemporary artistic and visual media. The conference paper University Press, 2007. 3. See, e.g., Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought, Harvard University Press, 2010, and HyperObjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World, University of Minnesota Press, 2013. 4. Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2, Open Humanities Press, Forthcoming.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 presented by Jacob T. Riley (University of Florida), entitled “Interfacing Life: The Creative Posthumanism of Bio-Art,” analyzed the moulding tissue of Deborah Dixon’s “SymbioticA” (housed at The University of Western Australia) in order to consider its anti-representational ethics, its traversal of the life/death threshold, and its incisive response to the practice of tissue engineering in contemporary culture. Javier O’NeilOrtiz (University of Pittsburgh) presented a paper on “Ethology, Film, and the Digital Turn in the Visualization of Animal Perception,” in which he explored ethological practices (particularly that of Jakob von Uexküll) and the advantageous, and problematic, ways that film and digital media have sought to capture the perceptual life of non-human animals. In his paper, “Who is the Camera: Experiments in Material Poetic Geography at Biosphere 2,” Eric Magrane (University of Arizona) discussed how Biosphere 2, a 3.14 acre biosphere facility housed at the University of Arizona, serves as a space for scientific discovery and creative involution, where geo-poetic projects appear alongside the production of detailed scientific records of water distillation and temperature change within the biosphere. All three conference papers were concerned with the meeting of scientific and artistic practice, both locally and globally. These ideas inspired debate about the division between representation and reality, a topic that was widely discussed across multiple panels and papers during the symposium. Between panels, delicious vegan meals were served for all the participants of the symposium, provided generously by Rice University’s Department of English, the Rice Graduate Student Association, and the Humanities Research Center. In addition to the vegan meals, participants enjoyed the intimate atmosphere of the panels, which enabled lively discussion and provided opportunities for networking, sharing resources, and establishing new contacts. The Ecology and Environmental Humanities Symposium proved to be a vibrant, productive occasion for presenting critical work and for anticipating new developments in the discipline.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 What Do You Know about Ag Gag Laws? Featuring Matthew Dominguez and Katie Jarl from the Humane Society for the United States Review (October 15th, 2013) Houston Bar Association Animal Law Section and the South Texas College of Law Animal Law Society Houston, Texas Reviewed by Larry A Butz* On October 15, 2013 at South Texas College of Law in Houston, Texas, the Houston Bar Association Animal Law Section and the South Texas College of Law Animal Law Society hosted presentations and a discussion about developments in legislative battles throughout the United States that are jeopardizing the interests of farmed animals, the rights of agricultural workers, animal activists, and investigative journalists, as well as public food safety. An audience of lawyers, law students, activists, and academics, among a diverse group of the general public, listened to and discussed the political and legal victories that the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) has been integral in securing thus far. Attorneys and law students were able to earn continuing legal education credits for attending the event. Matthew Dominguez, Public Policy Manager in Farm Animal Protection for the HSUS, gave an account of the ongoing Farm Animal Protection Campaign that has been challenging the animal agriculture industry’s attempts to chill speech and, in many cases, criminalize whistleblowing and undercover investigations of agricultural facilities across the United States—key strategic elements for those mobilized on behalf of nonhuman animals, workers, and consumers. *

Larry Albert Butz is a Ph.D. student in English at Rice University. His work formulates labor as a critical lens for posthumanist biopolitical thought, leveraging feminist work on affect to theorize how companion animals participate in social production and reproduction. Forthcoming book chapters include “The Limits to Consumer Activism in Functionally Differentiated Society” in Education for Action: Top Ten Strategies for Peace and Justice (New Society Press) and an account of transforming human-canine social relations resulting from legal formalization of nonhuman affective labor in legal definition of service animals and assistance animals. Currently Larry is organizing the Institute for Critical Animal Studies North America 2014 Conference to be hosted at Rice University April 11–13.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Every state in the United States has animal cruelty statutes, but—in this nation of animal lovers, as Dominguez stated—farmed animals are almost entirely unprotected. No federal law protects farmed animals, and almost every state with animal cruelty statutes exempts “standard industry practices” from any punitive measures from legal and government authorities. The dissonance between the overwhelming public support for farmed animal welfare and the gruesome reality of the lives of the billions of animal bred, housed, and slaughtered each year for food in the United States is precisely what makes whistleblowing and investigations by groups like HSUS, Mercy for Animals (MFA), and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) so important. The impact of exposing what the public holds to be unjust and morally reprehensible about farmed animal agriculture is so great that the industry has been engaged in trying to pass in legislatures around the country what New York Times journalist Mark Bittman has coined “Ag-Gag” bills. Dominguez explained that these bills have come in three types: (1) Those that would ban photography or video documentation on agricultural facilities without the company’s permission; (2) Those that would criminalize an investigator’s employment at such facilities; (3) Those that would mandate reporting of animal abuse to “the authorities” with the requirement that footage of abuse be turned over to said authorities in “impossibly short timelines.” The third type, Dominguez said, has been the most difficult of the bills to successfully defeat. But the campaigns against these bills over the last year have been remarkably successful, Dominguez explained. All eleven Ag-gag bills proposed in state legislatures were defeated last year. In Tennessee, where the bill was passed by its legislature, HSUS was able to inform and engage citizens to the extent that the governor vetoed the bill—his first ever veto. The Attorney General of Tennessee even gave a public speech about how the bill would have violated constitutional rights, especially the freedom of speech. These successful defensive campaigns have created momentum for animal advocates, Dominguez believes. While it is clear the industry will continue to push for

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 Ag-gag style laws, likely with certain tweaks to break up coalitions and appeal more to the public in their rhetoric, Dominguez suggested that animal advocates now have an opportunity to use this momentum to go on the offensive in the fight for farmed animals’ protection. Ag-gag bills have turned out to be a massive public relations failure for big agriculture and their lobby. Dominguez notes that the National Pork Producers’ own study found that 99 percent of stories about the bills were, for their interests, negative. The press surrounding these legal and legislative battles has brought huge publicity and new audiences to previously conducted investigations while new investigations draw the public eye more than ever before. In his estimation, advocates and campaigners can embrace this opportunity to make it a turning point in history. “As a nation,” he said, “we love animals. We need to add ‘all’ in front of ‘animals’ in that sentence.” The Texas Director of HSUS, Katie Jarl, spoke briefly about local issues related to Ag-gag initiatives and how advocates can best work to help the public and animals alike. While no Ag-gag bills were introduced in Texas last year, HB 2434, the so-called “hunting-gag bill” that would have made it an offense to record footage of the hunting and trapping of wildlife, was broached. After HSUS and citizens lobbied against it, however, the bill never made it out of the Calendars committee. The same proactive methods that helped defeat this bill will serve us well in any future initiative, Jarl suggested, and we need not wait for another bill to be introduced before we take the following actions: •

Call and write legislators expressing how important animal issues are to you as voters for health, animal welfare, and civil rights reasons;

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Write letters to the editors of newspapers to build a public dialogue and spread factual information;

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Attend public meetings and raise questions and concerns about issues relating to animals;

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Arrange personal meetings with legislative officials, especially in your districts and when legislature is out of session;

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Respond to action alerts from HSUS and other advocacy organizations.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 As Dominguez stated, the broad coalition of groups HSUS has worked with to achieve these successes against proposed Ag-gag bills include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “sustainable farm groups,” the Center for Food Safety, environmentalists, journalist organizations, and worker rights groups, among numerous others. Insight into the intersectionality of this successful coalition was one of the most remarkable things to come out of the event. Following the presentations and a brief question and answer session, Dominguez spoke with me about their intersectional coalition. Larry Butz (LB): What kind of intersectional leverage can you get with labor rights or worker oppression? Matthew Dominguez (MD): One of the things that we’ve (HSUS) done really well this year, and I think that we were more successful this year than last year—because last year ten states introduced [Ag-Gag legislation], three passed, seven were killed—this year eleven were introduced, all of them died. What we found this year—is we got a coalition together; we’re talking the ACLU, we’re talking about sustainable farmer groups, food safety groups, like Center for Food Safety, animal welfare groups, environmental groups, workers rights groups—we’ve got them all under one umbrella opposing Ag-Gag. And so you have a coalition of about sixty-five public interest groups fighting them. I’ll tell you, the workers’ rights issue is huge. Because (under Ag-Gag) these workers would be banned from being able to film—say you have a worker that notices a piece of equipment that is not working right and it’s a workers’ hazard—they pull out their phone and take a picture: that is illegal. I mean that’s . . . that’s horrible. And so we’ve done a better job this year of not only making it about animals, which is important enough for me, but making it about the environment, making it about food safety, making it about workers’ issues also. In the presentations and discussions about Ag-Gag in particular, the HSUS representatives stressed the importance of the impact that any citizen in any state can make on one’s legislators. I asked him to elaborate.

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MD: I’d say the most important thing is to meet your legislators. . . . [Y]ou can become that person your legislator looks to when it comes to animal issues. You can build a relationship with them, and being a local group and if you have a certain legislator, you can work to get that legislator to care about whatever issues there are—and become a champion for them. And it is amazing how legislators will do what their constituents want when they know it is going to get them reelected. And so, first, we have to make our legislators see that caring about animals is something people vote about. And then you are going to start seeing them vote in favor of animal issues. Recognizing the particular divisions in local and state political terrains, Dominguez elaborated on how activists and citizen advocates can be successful in representing their causes: MD: You have to know your audience. When I go into every state, I will read a lot in the news about what is happening; I will make sure I know what issues are politically hot and what aren’t; I will study the legislators to learn what issues are they champions about, whether they profess to be champions of the Constitution or they really care about workers’ rights, or if they care about protecting the unborn child. You find what they are passionate about and you bootstrap. You bootstrap your issue to it because you want their overall moral compass to really carry along whatever you are working on. So for the animal issue, if they really care about environmental issues, “Well let me tell you why factory farms are really bad for the environment. That is why you want us to be able to expose the cruelties that are happening and the environmental issues.” Luckily enough we have legislators that care about the animal issue enough to act just on their care about the animal issue. But if they don’t, we have to find a reason—whether it’s First Amendment issues, whether it’s food safety, whether it’s workers, whatever it is. LB: I wonder if, given your background in law, you see that changes in the law actually might create certain norms or expectations or values in society in a way that—if you have

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 more anti-cruelty or more animal welfare laws on the books—that seems to influence the moral standards operating in society. MD: You’re absolutely right. And even though we know our laws are decades behind—I mean, we have laws about—we don’t even have laws on social media or the internet because we are so far behind—um, they say the court systems are a decade or two behind the culture. But what is important is that, when you look at a class (MD likely means a class as defined in legal contexts)340, when you look at something whether it is a chair or a car or a person, you look to their legal protections to see where their standing is in our society. Farm animals have no legal protection—that is why their standing is so poor in our society. But if we start gaining them protections from abuse, you start elevating their societal weight. That is why it is important that, even with some of these practices, that we ban these practices, even in states not necessarily where they have a lot of these practices happening! It is important to have a law on the books that says you can’t do whatever you want to a farm animal; there are some lines that we are going to draw. And that’s where the court systems, where our legal system, comes into play: where we draw those lines and say, “As a society, we are not allowed to do this. You cannot overstep those boundaries.” And then we keep pushing those (lines) forward. It’s what we’ve done for minorities, what we’ve done for women, what we’ve done for every class of individual that is abused and neglected. Because in the end, it is about taking the side of the weak to fight against the strong. That’s what it’s about for me. Conversations among animal advocates often dwell on the question of whether or not it is effective for the total liberation of farmed animals to push for welfare reform that would legally require modifications to animal agriculture practices—such as the size of battery cages for hens and access to sunlight and outdoors for animals held outside of battery cages. I asked for Dominguez’s legal perspective on this question in regard to the subtleties of differentiated social spheres and areas of the law and was surprised to learn 1. “n. in legal (not sociological) terms, all those persons in the same category, level of rights (e.g. heirs of dead person who are related by the same degree), or who have suffered from the same incident. Whether a person is part of a class is often crucial in determining who can sue on behalf of the people who have been similarly damaged or collect his/her share if a class action judgment is given.” Legal dictionary on Law.com.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 that the “offensive” opportunities mentioned in his talk had a lot to do with instituting animal protection statutes and laws in places of least resistance, where the Big Ag industry has little monetary interest in fighting, but also in effecting change through direct dialogue with the companies themselves. LB: Society is differentiated in a lot of different ways, each system functioning differently—and you have to direct your actions and your strategy at all the different ways that social institutions and systems operate. So, with regard to the law, where there is a lot of value and I think a great opportunity for cooperation between various grassroots organizations, NGOs, and non-profits, is in putting pressure on other forms of social action, while also acknowledging strategically that the law works in a certain way. MD: Absolutely. One of the strongest forces that we have for farm animals is not necessarily laws—it’s corporate outreach. It’s getting companies to eliminate certain practices out of their supply chain. Getting them to have a more humane supply chain. Not allowing certain practices to exist. That is huge—and that’s not law. But what we need, as our society pushes these practices out, is a placeholder; we need the law to say, “Okay, we as a society do not support this. We’re putting a placeholder here. We don’t go backwards.” Because it is amazing how, when you don’t codify something into law, it comes back up. And that is what the laws do for animal protection. But there are so many other parts of our social movement—whether it’s our eating habits, our simple awareness, our buying habits—whatever it is, those play a very important role in our social movement. Our social movement is not just about protecting animals through the legal system—that’s a part of it—but it is using every tool and facet that we can to eliminate suffering for them. I really view the animal protection—whatever you want to call it—movement, is really about reducing suffering for animals. That is what it comes down to, and using whatever tools you can to do it.

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JCAS: Submission Guidelines How to Submit Authors should submit three documents to editors via email: a brief (limit 250 words) abstract; an autobiographical note including full name(s) of author(s), affiliations, and contact details (e.g., email addresses); and the full manuscript. The editors and contact information for each issue are listed on the journal website’s submissions page. Submissions may also be sent to chief editors Dr. Lindgren Johnson (lindgrenhalejohnson@gmail.com) and Dr. Susan Thomas (susanveganthomas@aol.com). Once your submission has been received, you will receive a receipt of submission and status updates throughout the review process. The issue editor will contact you informing you that your submission has been accepted, rejected, or requires revisions. Issue editors will work with authors to revise according to reviewer feedback and journal needs.

Editorial Objectives The Journal for Critical Animal Studies (JCAS) is open to all scholars and activists. The journal was established for the purpose of fostering academic study of critical animal issues in contemporary society. While “animal studies” is now an established field of importance in the academy, much of the work being done under this moniker takes a reformist or depoliticized approach that fails to mount serious critiques of underlying issues of political economy and speciesism. JCAS is an interdisciplinary journal with an emphasis on animal liberation philosophy and policy. This journal was designed to build an archive of knowledge for animal liberation activism while simultaneously providing a forum for academic specialists to address ethical and political crises relating to nonhuman animals. We encourage and actively pursue a diversity of viewpoints of contributors from the frontlines and intersections of activism and academics. The journal seeks to facilitate communication between the various perspectives of the animal advocacy movement. Thus, we especially

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 encourage submissions that seek to create new syntheses between differing parties and paradigms either insufficiently explored or entirely unexamined.

Suggested Topics Papers are welcomed on any area of animal liberation thought from any discipline, and authors are encouraged to share theses and chapters. Because a major goal of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies, which oversees the publication of this journal, is to foster philosophical, critical, and analytic thinking about animal liberation, papers that contribute to this project are given priority when appropriate (e.g., papers addressing critical theory, political thought, social movement analysis, tactical analysis, feminist thought and praxis, critical race theory, and post-colonial perspectives). Contributions engaging animal liberation thought where it has received little attention within disciplines and ongoing debates are especially welcome.

Review Process JCAS uses a double-blind peer review system. Each submission is initially reviewed for general suitability for publication. All suitable submissions are stripped of any indications that might identify the author and are then reviewed by at least two members of the journalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s editorial board.

Manuscript Requirements JCAS now uses a style guide based on The Chicago Manual of Style (16th edition). Spelling for prose works (e.g., academic essays and reviews) should conform to standard American English, excepting text that is quoted or written in another language. Body text should be in 12-point Times typeface with 1.5 line spacing throughout. References are included as footnotes with author name (last, first, middle), title of work (italics for books and films, in straight double quotation marks for essays and short works), followed by page numbers for citations, then a period. Footnotes should be formatted in 10-point Times typeface with single spacing and no superscripts. A bibliography should be included at the end that conforms to 16th edition Chicago Style.

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Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2014 See the JCAS style guide for further explanation. Good electronic copies of all figures and tables should also be provided. If your work reproduces copyrighted images, please indicate the owner, the copyright, and whether you have already secured permissions. As a guide, we ask that regular essays and review essays be between 2000 and 8000 words with limited footnotes. In exceptional cases only will JCAS consider publishing longer works (up to 15,000 words). Creative works have no suggested word range.

Copyright JCAS only considers original contributions for publication. Simultaneous submissions are not considered. Please indicate if you your submission is under consideration for publication elsewhere. Works published in JCAS become the legal copyright of the publisher unless otherwise agreed.

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