An impact analysis for the National Guide for Wildland-Urban Interface Fires

Page 32

Caton et al. (2017) discuss experimental and fire-experience evidence quantifying fundamental exposure conditions contributing to ignition and fire spread, especially firebrand production, dimensions, mass, temperature, and fuel bed ignition. They also provide various historical fire statistics for the United States. Hakes et al. (2017) complement Caton et al.’s review by quantifying the response of various building components and systems such as roofing, gutters, eaves, vents, siding, windows, glazing, decks, porches, patios, fences, mulches, and debris. The data may ultimately contribute to a future physicsbased model of fire transmission, damage, and property loss. Manzello (2014) describes an experimental program by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology to understand structure vulnerabilities to wind-driven firebrand showers in wildlandurban interface fires. It does not offer quantitative relationships between attributes of the WUI fire and ignition probability or degree of damage. 2.7 Deaths, non-fatal injuries, and post-traumatic stress disorder Ahrens and Evarts (2020) summarize fire death statistics in the United States in 2019. Their Table 1 shows that the US experienced 264,500 fires in one- and two-family homes, including manufactured homes, resulting in 2,390 civilian deaths and 8,800 non-fatal civil injuries, meaning 0.0090 deaths per house fire and 0.0333 non-fatal injuries per house fire. CAL FIRE data suggest lower fatality rates in WUI fires. In California’s 20 most destructive wildfires, 207 people died and 51,745 structures were destroyed, suggesting a fatality rate of 0.0040 deaths per destroyed structure. Since destroyed structures represent about 93% of building ignitions, the fatality rate equates with about 0.0037 deaths per ignition. If non-fatal injuries occur in proportion to deaths, these data suggest 0.0138 non-fatal injuries per ignition. There is some uncertainty about fatality numbers, however. Von Kaenel (2020) suggests that the Camp Fire killed about 140 people, rather than the official tally of 85 (CAL FIRE 2019), and the number may be even higher. Survivors claim that many people died after the fire because of respiratory conditions, stress, and other problems that are hard to directly causally connect to the fire. Prime Clerk (2020) provides a database of claims against Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) resulting from the Camp Fire (among others). It includes approximately 270 unique names of people in wrongful death claims. Using 140 to 270 deaths as the likely range of actual deaths and 14,343 housing units damaged or destroyed, the fatality rate appears to range between 0.0098 and 0.019 deaths per ignition, or approximately one to two times the nationwide average from all structure fires suggested by Ahrens and Evarts (2020). Prime Clerk’s (2020) database lists approximately 28,475 personal injury claims against PG&E resulting from the Camp Fire, judging each unique address associated with a personal injury claim from the Camp Fire as one injury. Approximately 52,000 people were evacuated because of the Camp Fire, so 28,000 injuries seem implausible, especially since most of the claimant addresses are in Butte County, as opposed to people in distant downwind counties who might have suffered respiratory problems because of smoke. Still, even if only 10% of injury claims were legitimate, the implication is that WUI fire injuries outnumber deaths by 10 to 1, as opposed to 3 to 1 as suggested by Ahrens and Evarts (2020).

16


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B.6 Knowledge gaps and limitations of these conclusions

3min
page 133

B.4 Penticton Indian Band

1min
page 131

B.3 Sagkeeng Anicinabe First Nation community

1min
page 130

Table 44: Summary of limitations and opportunities for future work

28min
pages 109-124

Table 43: Community costs to satisfy recommendations of the National WUI Guide

9min
pages 105-108

Table 42: Allocation of costs and benefits among stakeholder groups

5min
pages 102-104

Table 41: Long-term national benefits and costs of the National WUI Guide

1min
page 101

Table 39: Total household costs for community-level compliance

1min
page 99

Table 37: New design benefits, costs, and benefit-cost ratios for satisfying the National WUI Guide

12min
pages 91-95

Table 38: Municipal and utility costs for a sample community

8min
pages 96-98

Table 30: Vulnerability (i.e., the response function) by equation 5

2min
page 86

Table 20: Cost options to evaluate for each archetype

1min
page 75

Table 19: Unit costs to satisfy recommendations of the National WUI Guide

2min
page 74

Table 17: Vinyl cladding fire spread ratings for some leading manufacturers and common products

13min
pages 68-72

Table 18: Initial clearing and maintenance costs for priority zones

2min
page 73

2.12 Community costs for planning and resources

5min
pages 36-37

3.6 Community costs for WUI guide Chapters 4 and 5

11min
pages 48-52

Table 2: Sample house data fields

6min
pages 43-45

2.13 Cultural and other intangible non-monetary issues

2min
page 38

3.2 Select archetypes

1min
page 42

2.8 Additional living expenses and business interruption losses

3min
page 33

2.6 WUI fire vulnerability models

2min
page 31

1.3 Organization of the report

1min
page 19

2.1.4 Relevant Evidence from the 2011 Flat Top Complex Wildfire

3min
pages 21-22

2.7 Deaths, non-fatal injuries, and post-traumatic stress disorder

2min
page 32

2.1.6 Relevant Evidence from Recent California WUI Fires

7min
pages 24-26

2.3 Retrofit and new design costs, benefits, and benefit-cost analysis

2min
page 28

Summary of key findings

2min
page 17

2.2 WUI guides, standards, and model codes

2min
page 27
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