The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs
Legal Committee International Intelligence Acquisition and Sharing Rutgers Model United Nations 16-19 November 2006
Director: Jessica Altenor
Š 2006 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA) This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model United Nations 2006. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net
Introduction _________________________________________________________________ 1 Background _________________________________________________________________ 3 Intelligence and International Law___________________________________________________ 6 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ____________________ Error! Bookmark not defined. Espionage during the World War II Era _____________________________________________ 12 Espionage During the Cold War Era ________________________________________________ 15 Espionage during the Post-Cold War Era ____________________________________________ 17
Current Status ______________________________________________________________ 18 Key Positions _______________________________________________________________ 21 Regional Positions________________________________________________________________ 21 United States ___________________________________________________________________________21 Europe ________________________________________________________________________________21 Africa ________________________________________________________________________________22 Rogue States ___________________________________________________________________________22
Summary___________________________________________________________________ 23 Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 24 Works Cited ________________________________________________________________ 25
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Introduction Under international law, there are no statutes officially prohibiting intelligence activities, however every nation has laws against foreign states conducting espionage within its territory. Intelligence acquisition and sharing involves the practice of obtaining information for military, political, or economic advantage. It is usually thought of as part of an institutional effort, through the use of spy agencies and organized informationgathering networks. There is no singular definition for espionage, however there are some general features that are usually present within intelligence systems, including secrecy, state activity, and understanding or analysis. There are a wide range of methods used to collect information including both human and technological sources alike. Those who are responsible for analyzing intelligence to determine what others are planning utilize both open and closed sources to assess a specific situation and help advise decision-makers on the most appropriate course of action. The acquisition of intelligence during peacetime is considered to be a preventative measure to resolve conflicts before they escalate. In this manner, the collection of information is a tool of diplomacy and is arguable used to advance the goals of peace. Recently, collaborative efforts between states to promote international peace and to limit threats to security have led to increased cooperation and the sharing of intelligence. If violence breaks out due to a group or a situation under surveillance, it could be considered a sign that intelligence collection efforts either failed or misjudged the imminence of the threat.
Military intelligence is also a commonly used form of
information gathering although this type is utilized during actual conflict to provide useful information for formulating strategy. Although there is no direct international legislation pertaining to guidelines for intelligence acquisition and sharing, international law does address concerns regarding the issue. The basic premise of international law is focused on respect among states for territorial integrity and political independence. This sentiment is conveyed repeatedly in various pieces of international legislation and documentation. For instance, the Charter
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of the United Nations clearly asserts the principle of sovereignty which precludes a state from interfering in the domestic matters of
without the expressed permission of that
Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to the power, and the right to exercise that power of self-government that all independent countries have. They can exercise the power of the state without asking permission from another state.
state. In this fashion, Argentina does not
Source: www.naiadonline.ca/book/01Glossary.htm
another country. More directly, states are not permitted to operate in other states
have the legal right to operate an intelligence gathering operation in Brazil unless Brazil has specifically authorized them to do so. If Brazil discovers Argentinean operatives within its borders, it has the right to apprehend or immediately deport them.
The
difficulty in assessing the legality of intelligence gathering operations is that they do not always happen within the technical borders of a given state. States have launched a series of satellites into space with the sole purpose of monitoring electronic communications, and taking pictures of other states. While these devices are not within the territorial confines of a state, they are used to gather information, which, if completed on the ground, would be considered illegal. Intelligence efforts have existed since the inception of the modern state, however, innovations in technology have made the acquisition of information more extensive since the time of the Second World War. The Cold War greatly heightened the importance of national intelligence agencies, most of which were established in the 1950s. The tension between the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States was intensified by concerns regarding espionage and enemy infiltration into society. Following the fall of the USSR intelligence maintained its importance within society as policy objectives for states shifted to adjust to the new world order created by the fall of global power. Intelligence acquisition is still being utilized, although there has been criticism concerning the application of the information gathered. Primarily, the use of intelligence in determining to enter Iraq in spring of 2003 is questioned by members of the global community, as the information used to support the war has since been determined to have been false, or improperly analyzed.
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Intelligence gathering is widely used within the global defense community for a variety of purposes.
There are, however, legal ambiguities regarding the practices
through which intelligence is collected. Resolving these issues will clearly define what is and is not permissible, and will help to avoid violations of sovereignty rights.
Background There are a wide range of definitions ascribed to the term intelligence, some of which are simple, and others of which reflect the complicated nature of this process. One definition is, “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.”1 A more simplistic definition is, “the secret collection of someone else’s secrets.”2 There are also various types of intelligence. Government intelligence is usually delegated to an agency responsible for conducting information gathering that utilizes a wide range of techniques such as secret agents, satellite technology, communication intercepts, and surveillance. Surveillance encompasses a wide range of activities such as telephone tapping, communications interceptions, cameras, electronic tagging, tracking using global positioning systems (GPS), reconnaissance aircraft and satellites, and computer monitoring, among others. Military intelligence, is used most frequently during wartime, and concentrates on collecting, analyzing, and assessing intelligence to gain an advantage over enemy forces.
This form of intelligence uses methods similar to government
intelligence acquisition but directs efforts in a concentrated area, most frequently against an opposing military force.
Corporate intelligence also exists, however, businesses
engage in different practices than government organs. Although there is little uniformity to intelligence gathering models, certain elements are fundamental to the understanding of intelligence: secrecy, state activity, and understanding or analysis. Secrecy is a vital aspect of intelligence because it allows for a 1
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (as amended through 9 May 2005) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 2 Davies, Philip H. J. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No.3, October 2004.
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state conducting intelligence gathering activities to gain an advantage over its adversaries. Although, some intelligence is classified,
from open sources, or those that are widely
Classified: Classified information is secret information to which access is restricted by law or corporate rules to a particular hierarchical class of people. A security clearance is permission to handle classified documents or class of information, often requiring a satisfactory background check. This sort of hierarchical system of secrecy is used by virtually every national government, and by many corporations as well.
accessible such as news outlets or internet
Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified
listings.3 Closed sources are those from which
National Security: the condition of the nation, in terms of threats, especially threats from outside. One of the major jobs of the federal government is to ensure the security of the nation.
meaning that it is not immediately available for public consumption, most estimates suggest that ninety per cent of the information used in modern intelligence analysis systems comes
information is gathered through espionage or covert operations.
In the instance when
information is deemed classified, it is because
Source: www.historycentral.com/Civics/N.html
the information in question is of such a sensitive nature that it must be kept private for reasons pertaining to national security. State activity is critical to the definition of intelligence acquisition as information gathered by a national government is different than that conducted by non-state actors. For instance, the information collected by a national intelligence agency is distinct from information acquired by news agencies, corporations, or transnational organizations such as terrorist cells like al Qaeda. The ability to understand information that has been collected through covert action or other means is vital as the data are useless without he ability to integrate them with other information, meaning analysis is crucial to the process.4 There are several purposes of intelligence acquisition, the first of which is to recognize opportunities to intervene in a situation in a manner that might change the outcome, especially if this opportunity is prior to conflict. If the intelligence collection and analysis processes are effective, then it is possible to thwart an attack – military or 3
Treverton, Gregory F., Seth G. Jones, Steven Boraz, and Phillip Lipscy. “Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report.� RAND National Security Research Division. 2006. Accessed 20 August 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2006/RAND_CF219.pdf 4 Ibid.
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terrorist – before they eve take place. A basic function of intelligence is to protect the state and enhance national security. The acquisition of information allows a state to better understand a situation, culture, or perspective, and this knowledge is instrumental to developing appropriate policies. Moreover, good intelligence can aid a state in managing its resources effectively.
Although these are rather broad purposes of
intelligence acquisition, the objectives of each state will vary depending upon their specific foreign policy agenda.5 National intelligence agencies can be found in many states throughout the world. Each agency executes its strategies differently, utilizing different equipment and methods of information collection. Intelligence is also a different priority for each state when it considers where to focus its attention and efforts. This is reflected in the budgets allotted to these agencies by their federal government. Still, states ranging from Afghanistan to Colombia to the United Kingdom to the Isle of Man have intelligence agencies. Some states have several institutions devoted to intelligence acquisition; for instance, the United States and Argentina both have more than ten agencies responsible for collecting such information. Although many states have national intelligence agencies that collect international intelligence data, these states simultaneously have domestic laws against espionage with severe criminal sanctions if violated. Intelligence sharing is also an important consideration when discussing international information systems. Intelligence sharing is recognized as an effective means of battling transnational crime such as drug trafficking and terrorism. Transnational groups function across borders, limiting the ability of a single state to adequately prosecute the illegal efforts.
Instead, collaboration is necessary through
which information gathered from various states is combined and processed collectively rather than independently thus offering a much more complete sense of the activities, but more importantly, offering a more complete criminal complaint for when the case comes to trial. Through sharing intelligence, law enforcement agencies can be much more 5
Ibid.
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effective. Despite the benefits available through sharing this information, states are often hesitant to relinquish the information they possess. As mentioned, superior intelligence provides a state with a comparative advantage therefore distributing such information among other nations removes this important advantage. Moreover, a state must be fully assured that those with whom they share confidential and sensitive intelligence can be trusted, meaning that they are a close ally with similar policy aims regarding the situation in question. Geographic proximity can serve as a compelling reason to share intelligence as is seen in the case of Europe, which collects and shares intelligence extensively through the Europol agency.
The United States has also developed a policy of
intelligence sharing, especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Intelligence and International Law Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of international law is mutual respect among states for territorial integrity and sovereignty. This principle is conveyed through the United Nations Charter which expresses in Chapter I: Article II, that the “sovereign equality of all its members.” 6 In the same Article the document goes on to oblige member nations to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” 7 The Charter further disallows states from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”8 In 1933, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States reinforced these principles and was widely accepted by state governments. The intervention of a government into the affairs of another state is irreconcilable with this fundamental framework of international law.
Increased
globalization, however, leads states to interact with one another more frequently and on a
6
Charter of the United Nations. Chapter I, Article 2, Section 1. About the United Nations: An Introduction to the Structure and Work of the UN. Accessed: 20 August 2006. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
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multitude of different levels which provides a wide range of opportunities for states to intentionally or unwittingly assert influence over each other’s acts.9 The term ‘intervention’ connotes authoritative interference yet this notion is also vague. It is difficult to determine precisely what actions constitute interference rather than mere incentives or persuasion. For instance, it is questionable whether, “economic embargos [or] peremptory diplomatic notes”10 are considered as illegitimate interference. The United Nations has an extensive history of implementing punitive sanctions on a state for acting in certain ways. These sanctions are designed to convince a given state that its activities fall outside of internationally accepted norms, and that the suffering caused by economic restraints will cause them to change their policies.11
Hague Convention of 1907 One of the first international protocols to address espionage was the Hague Convention of 1907. This document addresses the laws and customs of land war. It states that with regard to spies, “A person can only be considered a spy when, acting Clandestine: kept or done in secret, often in order to conceal an illicit or improper purpose. Source: users.wpi.edu/~kgagne/vocab/vocab13.html
clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the
hostile party.”12 The Convention also guarantees a trial for any spy accused of this crime. This document, however, only speaks to espionage during a time of war, and does not address how to handle peacetime violations of territorial integrity. During peacetime, a government agent entering a foreign state and conducting espionage is a violation of the law of that nation in addition to being a violation of international law, remembering that 9
Quincy Wright, Julius Stone, Richard A. Falk, and Roland J. Stanger, Essays on Espionage and International Law ed. Stanger, Roland J., (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962), 3, http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=61631790. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Chapter II. “Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907.” The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Modified 20 August 2006. Accessed 20 August 2006. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm#iart1 Art. 29.
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states are bound to respect the “territorial integrity and political independence” of one another. Every sovereign nation is allowed to create laws that punish individuals who “seek to obtain classified documents, who penetrate forbidden areas, who fly over its territory without permission, or who engage in seditious or other activities which it has made illegal.” 13 States are allowed to enact and enforce their laws so long as they maintain the commitments made to international treaties and parties. “It belongs to each state to define peacetime espionage, sedition, subversion, sabotage, incitement, and conspiracy as it sees fit, and it is the duty of other states to respect such exercise of domestic jurisdiction.” 14 The laws developed against espionage are thus state-based rather international as each sovereign state can determine what constitutes spying and how accusations of such should be addressed. Moreover, although several international treaties deal indirectly with intelligence matters, no major international legislation speaks to the legality of these practices.
Diplomacy Before addressing the convention itself, it is necessary to understand the purpose behind efforts of diplomacy. Diplomatic missions are solely for the purposes of the state. Essentially, diplomatic missions are designed to allow the sending state a formal window from which to observe the happenings in the receiving state. That is, a diplomatic mission is essentially a legalized spy operation. This does not, however, suggest the legalization of espionage or the occurrence of illegal activity. By definition, the purpose of a diplomatic mission is to allow for and to promote open communications between states. In practice, diplomatic missions are, in effect, listening posts from which states can learn about 13 14
Quincy. Ibid.
Diplomacy: Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between accredited persons (the diploma of the diplomat) representing groups or nations. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peacemaking, culture, economics, trade and war. International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy
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their counterparts. By having people stationed on other countries, states can learn about their cultural norms, and monitor political developments as they happen and from their own perspective, instead of relying upon newspaper reports or other intermediary sources. Diplomatic relations also serve to protect citizens while traveling overseas. Should a Canadian citizen be detained by authorities in Germany, for example, there are formal rules regarding how he is to be treated, including the provision of access to the Canadian consulate. When foreigners face financial or legal troubles in another state, they typically have the support of their consulate or embassy in ensuring that proper legal procedures are followed.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations One of the several treaties that address intelligence acquisition with regard to international law is the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). The Convention details the specific rules and regulations of exchanging diplomatic representatives in a formal procedure that maintains communication links between nations. “The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent,” that is to say that the establishment of a diplomatic mission or embassy in a given state must be agreed to by both states.15 As an example, the United States has developed very strong diplomatic relations with states like the United Kingdom, Canada, and South Africa. It does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Iran, Cuba, or North Korea, meaning that conversations between the U.S. and these states must happen through an intermediary, most often the Swiss. Also of note is that in cases where there are no formal diplomatic relations, states assign “protecting powers” to protect the interests of their citizens while in that country. Should an American traveling in Iran get into trouble, the United States has established an agreement with the Swiss government to ensure proper protections of its citizens. Instead of visiting an American embassy, they would go instead to a Swiss facility, and staff there would work to protect their interests. 15
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 2.
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Diplomatic relations require that both nations must agree to allow agents of the other state into their country, and they also have the right to formally ask them to leave. The receiving state also has the right to declare a member of the diplomatic mission persona non grata should they determine that they are operating in a manner outside the protections of the VCDR, and may demand their immediate departure from the nation. The VCDR sets out specific privileges and protections to which members of a diplomatic corps have access in order to allow for the operations of the diplomatic efforts to proceed. Article 29 of the VCDR states without equivocation that: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps 16 to prevent attack on his person, freedom, or dignity.
Although this article provides broad protections for an individual, there is very little debate as to how it should be interpreted. Sending nations work under the assumption that this part of the convention will be followed with the utmost care. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir, or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agents 17 in the receiving State outside its official functions.
As such, members of their diplomatic mission are to be afforded with immunity from the violation of local laws while performing the functions of the sending state. This right is not without recourse, however, as the sending state has the right to expressly waive this inviolability at its own behest. If a member of its diplomatic staff were to murder someone while overseas, the sending state has the right to allow for the receiving state to enforce its laws, but it also has the right to recall that person so as to allow them to avoid prosecution. The idea behind this article was to prevent the receiving state from allowing the legal harassment of a diplomatic agent. If the receiving state could arrest these
16 17
Ibid., Article 29. Ibid., Article 31.
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individuals or detain them without cause, then there would be great potential for an international incident, as the VCDR provides for the peaceful relations among states. The VCDR also provides for the inviolability and protection of the mission, private residences of the diplomatic staff, and means of transportation used in conjunction with diplomatic responsibilities. There are also specific provisions for the maintenance of security and safety of the mission. According to Article 22: 1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of mission. 2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. 3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment, or execution.18
Thus, by welcoming agents from a foreign state, the receiving state undertakes several specific responsibilities to provide for the protection of these individuals. In exchange, the agents of the foreign government agree not to interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving country. Perhaps the most controversial protection afforded a mission is that of the “diplomatic bag.” Any enclosure, provided that it is clearly marked as property of the mission, may not be opened without express consent of the sending state. The individual carrying the bag is also afforded the protection of the VCDR while undertaking possession of the bag. While in theory, the bag is little more than the extension of the person of a diplomatic agent, there is question as to what can actually be sent in the bag. According to Richard Wood of the British Foreign Office, they can send “anything we want” to their embassies around the world.19 While these bags are generally reserved for official communication or documents, they sometimes are used for other purposes, including moving the personal possessions of diplomatic agents. Notably, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill received normal shipments of Cuban cigars by way of
18
Ibid., Article 22. “Diplomat Bag: The inside story,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/672786.stm, Accessed 1 August 2003.
19
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this bag.20 If the bag may not be opened by anyone other than the diplomatic staff, there is question as to what can be sent, including illicit materials or weapons. To that end, the bag need not be a bag, in the specific sense. Rather, the vessel can be of any shape or size, provided that it is denoted as protected by the VCDR. Since the diplomatic agent does not need to pass through Customs, and that the bag cannot be opened by any foreign state, this means could be used to transport anything across borders. The importance of the VCDR and its provisions in relation to espionage is clearly illustrated in an incident that occurred in August 2006. Venezuelan authorities were accused by the United States of illegally seizing and searching a diplomatic bag that was being sent to the American embassy in Caracas. While Venezuelan officials maintained that they were searching for military hardware entering the country illegally from America, the United States decried the search as a flagrant violation of international rules. The United States Department of State issued a formal complaint and called for the immediate return of the bag, while the Venezuelan foreign ministry claimed that the luggage seized from the US naval attaché was not an official diplomatic bag and thus not subject to the VCDR. The naval attaché whose bag was searched is new to the position as the individual who previously held the post was ordered to leave the country by the Venezuelan government on suspicion of spying. Indeed, the United States, like many other nations, likely uses its diplomatic services to gather intelligence regarding the states in which they are conducting relations. Growing tensions between the United States and Venezuela, however, causes increased uneasiness concerning the privileges entitled to diplomats in foreign states.21
Espionage during the World War II Era On February 1, 1943, a top-secret group called the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service, the forerunner of the modern-day NSA, began a lengthy undercover project to intercept and analyze Soviet diplomatic traffic. That undertaking, code-named 20
Ibid. Morsbach, Greg. “Venezuela in Diplomatic Bag Row.” BBC News. 25 August 2006. Accessed 25 August 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/5284260.stm
21
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“Venona,”22 was the brainchild of Colonel Carter Clarke, the chief of the U.S. Army’s Special Branch, a sub-department of the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division. In 1943 Clarke had received signals that a possible German-Soviet peace deal was in the works, and he wanted to find out if what he had heard had any merit. Clarke ordered his small code-breaking unit to read all Soviet diplomatic messages being sent from the United States to Moscow. 23
Operating in utmost secrecy from their
headquarters in Arlington Hall, in what was then an out-of-the-way Virginia suburb of Washington, D.C., the code-breakers analyzed thousands of pages of correspondence intercepted from Soviet missions around the world, picked up through communications cables.24 Through harrowing months of trial and error, the analysts were able to crack the Soviet code, and what they found was not information leading to a peace treaty between the Russians and the Germans, but a large-scale, well-organized Soviet espionage penetration of the highest levels of the U.S. government. Highlighting the importance of international collaboration, this project would not have been possible without the support of the United Kingdom’s MI5 spy agency. The Soviet official entrusted with the handling of those messages from 1943 to 1946 was Lt. Gen. Pavel Fitin, the head of the First Chief Directorate, the foreign intelligence branch of the KGB, or State Security Committee, in Moscow. Fitin ran five Lend Lease Act: The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, was the principal means for providing US military aid to foreign nations during World War II. The act authorized the president to transfer arms or any other defense materials for which Congress appropriated money to "the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States." Source: www.p38lessonplan.com/termsH.html
different espionage branches in the United States. The first operated through commercial ties, such as the AMTORG Trading Co., which was active from the 1920s to the end of the 1930s.
Behind
its
commercial
facade,
AMTORG was a covert means of obtaining intelligence on American industrial ventures
and all information coming from the U.S. Lend Lease Program to the Soviet Union. Fitin 22
Kross, Peter, The Venona project revealed Soviet espionage in the United States after WWII--until it was in turn compromised. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=2131046 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid.
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also oversaw the use of Soviet diplomats as intelligence agents, offering direct relations with KGB headquarters in Moscow, along with managing efforts of the joint Soviet military intelligence (GRU) and Red Army general staff intelligence directorate and the GRU-Soviet naval intelligence staff. By the time the analysts were able to understand Russian communiques, the war had ended. What they did learn in the early 1950s, however, was that the Soviet Union had penetrated the topsecret Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, New Mexico, where U.S. scientists had been developing the atomic bomb.
Manhattan Project: Secret American effort to build an Atomic bomb in collaboration with Great Britain. Organized by J. Robert Oppenheimer the effort was directed by General Leslie Groves. Pushed by other scientists Albert Einstein first wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939 warning that Nazi German could be developing an Abomb. Roosevelt subsequently authorized the Manhattan Project. Source: www.pbs.org/redfiles/kgb/inv/kgb_inv_voc.htm
Messages originating from the GRU and KGB
translated by the analysts in Arlington Hall provided the names of spies working directly for the Manhattan Project, including British scientist Klaus Fuchs; David Greenglass, a U.S. Army soldier and courier located in Los Alamos; his wife and co-conspirator Ruth Greenglass; Harry Gold, a key intermediary in the transporting of secret Manhattan Project materials to the KGB in New York; and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, given the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
code names “Liberal” and “Antenna” in the Venona files. The man in charge of espionage within the Manhattan Project was KGB officer Leonid Kvasnikov. Codenamed “Anton” in the Venona files, Kvasnikov worked undercover at the AMTORG Trading Co., but his primary job was to handle the information coming out of Los Alamos.
The information culled by Venona regarding the Rosenbergs is noteworthy. The intercepts showed the significant role Julius Rosenberg played in recruiting a large number of scientists in the private sector to steal commercial as well as industrial secrets. It also revealed the indisputable fact that Rosenberg served as a prime conduit between
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the couriers in Los Alamos and the KGB in New York. The Venona files further show that Ethel Rosenberg, while aware of her husband’s spying activities, played only a minor role in the overall theft of atomic secrets. If the information in the Venona files had been made available to the court during the Rosenbergs’ trial, it might have mitigated Ethel’s eventual death sentence. The last year of WWII was also pivotal as far as data emanating from Venona was concerned. In 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk working in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, defected with hundreds of classified documents. Gouzenko told the Canadians that the Soviets had a mole inside their intelligence system. He also named numerous top-level U.S. officials who were stealing national secrets for the Soviets. Among them were Harry Dexter White, an assistant to the secretary of the U.S. Treasury and a confidant of President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Laughlin Currie, a friend and toplevel adviser to the president in the White House; and Alger Hiss, a State Department official who was accused of espionage by Whittaker Chambers, a one-time staff writer for Time-Life magazines.25
Espionage During the Cold War Era In the 1950s the Cambridge Five was a ring of British spies who passed information to the Soviet Union during World War II and later in to the 1950s. It has been suggested they may also have been responsible for passing Soviet disinformation to the Nazis.26 All of the Cambridge Five were communists who believed that the Soviet Union was a stronger safeguard against fascism than Depression-era Britain. During World War II, all of the Cambridge Five penetrated either the British Foreign Office or the intelligence services, giving the Soviets, then allies, secrets that the British and Americans were withholding.27 This group gave Moscow information about a weak spot 25
Kross, Peter, The Venona project revealed Soviet espionage in the United States after WWII--until it was in turn compromised. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=2131046 26 Barnes, Julian E. The Third Man. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=8948521 27 Madeira, Victor. MOSCOW’S INTERWAR INFILTRATION OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE, 1919-1929. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=1235514
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in German tanks that helped the Soviets triumph in the pivotal Battle of Kursk.28 Spying for an ally who was fighting a similar enemy may have been morally ambiguous, but the spy ring’s Cold War espionage on behalf of Stalin’s totalitarian state was not. In the height of the Cold War era, John Anthony Walker Junior, a Chief Warrant Officer and communications specialist for the US Navy sold his services as a spy to the Soviet Union from 1968 to 1985. In this time he helped the Soviets decipher more than one million classified encrypted naval messages. John Anthony Walker gave the KGB the locations of American nuclear submarines and the procedures the United States would follow to launch nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union should there be a war. 29 The Soviets were also alerted to the locations of secret underwater microphones used by the United States to track Soviet nuclear submarines. KGB agents learned each and every American troop movement to Vietnam between 1971 and 1973, and they passed on to their allies the times and planned sites for U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. Walker was able to escape the authorities for so long because the Soviets took extraordinary precautions to conceal their source, limiting knowledge of this agent to just twelve people. Between the 1970s and 1990s, the United States accused Chinese agents of stealing nuclear weapons secrets.
The Cox Report is a classified United States
government document reporting on China’s covert operations in the United States, focusing on the theft of design information on the United State’s most advanced thermonuclear weapons. The series of events that led U.S. investigators to uncover what they now describe as a vast Chinese conspiracy to steal vital American nuclear secrets started in the winter of 1995.30 A Chinese spy, known in the espionage trade as a “walkin,” approached the Central Intelligence Agency and turned over secret documents. Among them was an official Chinese government paper containing design information on the most advanced nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal, known by the code name W-88. 28
Barnes, Julian E. The Third Man. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=8948521 29 Ragavan, Chitra. The Traitors. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=8948524 30 Inhofe, James M . What China Stole--and When. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=2068128
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On the face of it, Cox’s conclusions could hardly be more serious. In almost 900 pages, the unclassified version of his report charges that since the late 1970s, China has stolen design secrets for all seven nuclear warheads now deployed on U.S. missiles.31 Beijing also illegally obtained equipment for improving missile guidance systems, finding submarines, and budding advanced electromagnetic weapons. Over the same period, investigators concluded, China established some 3,000 front companies in the United States to acquire sensitive military and strategic technology. The Chinese infiltrated U.S. weapons laboratories, and received classified information from American companies that used Chinese rockets to launch satellites.32
Espionage during the Post-Cold War Era The terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States on 11 September 2001 shocked the world. Following the attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was established to serve as an impartial investigatory body.
The commission was tasked with determining if America was
unprepared and how the attacks were carried out. The final report of the body found flaw in the American intelligence system, finding it overly bureaucratic and inefficient. The many different agencies that gather information did not effectively share information with one another, limiting the ability to make connections to possibly uncover plans or strategies. The intelligence agencies were also accused of being overly complex and secretive.33 Since that time, the United States maintains that it has vastly improved the quality of its intelligence and cooperation amongst agencies. The United States sees sharing intelligence as fundamental to fighting terrorism and engages in information sharing with other agencies.34 The events of 11 September 2001 also led to the global 31
Ibid. Chinese Spy Manual Backs Cox Report. Website: http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=2638660 33 Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations. Thomas H. Kean, Chair. 9/11 Discourse Project. December 5, 2005. 34 “A Global Force.� Bureau of Diplomatic Security: Diplomatic Security Fights Terrorism. United States Department of State. December 2005. Accessed 21 August 2006. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58304.pdf 32
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War on Terror, an effort to limit future terrorist attacks throughout the world. While strides have been made in preventing terrorism, there have been attacks in Madrid, Spain and London, England that have been linked to the al Qaeda network. One of the key ways to combat terrorism is through sharing intelligence and making sure information is communicated effectively through all channels. A successful application of intelligence occurred in July 2006 when a terrorist plot on a British airline was revealed by local police after proper intelligence allowed for a thorough investigation. Such methods can be applied to help further the cause against global terrorism. The Iraq War in which the United States has been involved since 2003 was largely based upon the findings of the international intelligence community regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction within Iraq. The Coalition of the Willing entered the war on the premise that they were halting the production of potentially deadly weapons. In reality, weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq. While the United States spearheaded the movement toward war, the largest intelligence gathering states in the world, including the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, France, the Russian Federation, and Germany all largely believed that for Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was involved in stockpiling a significant arsenal of weapons.
Current Status It was reported on 18 May 2006 in the USA Today that China is running antagonistic and wide-ranging espionage maneuvers aimed at stealing U.S. weapons technology that could be useful against U.S. forces, according to the nation’s top spycatchers. 35 U.S. counterintelligence officials have also detected an increase of spy networks run by Russia, Cuba and Iran targeting the U.S. government and, in the case of Iran, U.S. military machinery, according to Timothy Bereznay, assistant director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division. China, however, has emerged as the head espionage threat, according to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 35
Diamond, John. China broadens espionage operations. Ebsco Host. USA Today; May 18, 2006 WebSite:http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=J0E320113645306
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Counterintelligence is a highly covert sector of intelligence and law enforcement, involving criminal investigations and classified information. China has “put out a shopping list” of weapons and components it is seeking to arms dealers and middlemen, who often ethnic Chinese, operate out of shell companies in the USA.
36
The list includes night-vision gear, radar-evading and radar- and
communications-jamming equipment, missile-guidance systems and torpedoes. In May 2006, accused Chinese spy and Taiwanese businessman Ko-Suen “Bill” Moo, pleaded guilty
to
charges
he
tried
to
buy
military
parts
and
weapons, including an F-16 fighter jet engine and cruise missiles. ICE officials said Moo attempted to purchase an AGM-129 cruise missile from undercover agents.37 The FBI has arrested twenty-five Chinese nationals or Chinese Americans in cases involving the targeting of U.S. machinery since 2004, a notable increase in clandestine efforts from prior years. Most of the cases entail alleged theft of sensitive equipment. ICE has initiated more than 400 investigations since 2000 involving unlawful export of U.S. arms and technology to China, according to agency statistics. 38 The emerging espionage threat involves business people, trade representatives and academics in the U.S. Sometimes the technology they target is highly sensitive but not classified, requiring the government to prosecute export violations rather than espionage. Both parties in Congress, and U.S. President George W. Bush have all agreed that Washington needs to dramatically improve and expand its human intelligence-gathering abilities. More than four years after the attacks of 11 Septermber 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency is nowhere near to achieving that goal. After dealing with the criticism for the intelligence failures on 9/11 and for misjudging the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, the agency has been set back further by more recent allegations of torture and mishandling of detainees under its control.39 36
Ibid. Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Robinson, Linda, Whitelaw, Kevin, L. R., U.S. SEEKING SPIES. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=1959375 37
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The center of the current crisis involves the agency’s National Clandestine Service, or Directorate of Operations (DO), as it was known until it was renamed in 2005. The DO has some 1,200 case officers around the world: men and women trained to recruit spies from foreign governments and hostile groups, gather information on weapons and other threats, and, when necessary, conduct offensive operations.40 Over the years, the DO has been home to some of the CIA’s most respected, courageous, and colorful operatives, some of whom have scored some major, and largely still secret, successes since 9/11. Despite these results, however, a three-fold threat of plummeting morale, a loss of fieldtested veterans, and the drain of trying to counter a seemingly unattainable insurgency in Iraq has left the DO today facing some of the most serious challenges in its history. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the White House ordered the CIA to increase the number of clandestine case officers by 50 percent, to some 1,800 operatives.41 The agency is attracting new recruits, but veteran officers have been leaving one after another. Although CIA attrition is said to be below 5 percent, less than the average in the private sector, insiders say the problem is more serious for the DO. Official figures for the clandestine service are classified, but dozens of current and former officers say the attrition there is significantly higher and has increased greatly since 2004.42 The CIA says its attrition rate is returning to historical levels after dipping in the immediate post-9/11 period, but it is concerned about the number departing after just five to 10 years of service. Among the CIA’s four directorates, the clandestine service has always seen itself as first among equals. President Bush’s new CIA director, Porter Goss, has a different view. A new reorganization plan, announced in January 2006, proposes melding the four directorates into a new functional design.43 Also, intelligence sources criticize what they say is a diversion of resources intended for the “core collectors” of the clandestine service: the case officers assigned to recruit spies and the reports officers who are charged with writing up the intelligence they collect. 40
Ibid. Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 41
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Key Positions Regional Positions United States The United States supports intelligence sharing in effort to ensure national and international security. The United States has a reputable Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which engages in research, development, and deployment of technology for intelligence purposes. As a separate agency, the CIA serves as a self-regulating source of analysis on topics of distress and also works closely with the other organizations in the intelligence community.44 While the United States supports its own efforts at detecting and analyzing intelligence information, it is hesitant to allow for a system that it believes would undermine American national security. The U.S. has been accused by many states of demanding individuals be arrested without providing the necessary evidence to support those claims. Moreover, the CIA has recently admitted to the use of secret prisons where detainees have been mistreated in hopes that they would divulge sensitive information.
Europe Intelligence and security analysts in European Union (EU) member states that encourage the proposal of a European common intelligence policy believe that intelligence collaboration is already taking place successfully around the world. However, the toughest challenge for the European Union has been the area of intelligence sharing. The European Union decided that from 1 January 2008 forward, any information available in one country should be available in all other 25 member states. 45 The European Union, together with the United States and the United Nations, has also become a force in intelligence gathering and analysis. The intelligence collection process in Europe is supported by agencies in the larger EU member states. Whereas small states are seeking universal intelligence sharing regulations, the states that have effective intelligence strategies are reluctant to simply 44
Central Intelligence Agency website: https://www.cia.gov/ciainformation/info.html. Accessed on August 6, 2006. “The European Union’s Proposed Intelligence Service.� http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=316&language_id=
45
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hand over their information. Countries with effectual intelligence service like Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain, which together with the Netherlands and Sweden participate in the Situation Center (SitCen), are in opposition to universal notification, citing security concerns.46
Africa Africa is in support of intelligence sharing as long as they are informed and aware of the consequences that may ensue. They are in support of intelligence acquisition as long as its efforts are aimed toward national security. As a continent that has suffered consistent economic hardship, individual states typically lack the resources necessary to establish far-reaching intelligence operations of their own, and rely upon those of more successful states for information. While Africans support intelligence gathering activities in principle, they are hesitant to broadly support such efforts, as many intelligence operations in Africa, while officially designed for the investigation of threats to security, have in fact been used for domestic and politically-motivated spying.
Rogue States Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are opposed to intelligence sharing especially when it has to do with information that affects their states. Iran has rejected the US-European program of economic incentives to share with the world the status of its nuclear program. Tehran insists it wants nuclear technology solely for civilian power generation, but others believe that the program is for the design and deployment of nuclear weaponry.47
46
Ibid. Blanche, Ed. Battleground Iran. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=166765
47
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Summary Although states have federal laws banning intrusive forms of intelligence acquisition such as espionage, governments still conduct such activities. Intelligence focuses on gaining information as a means to provide a competitive advantage or protect national security. Good intelligence allows leaders to make informed decisions that promote a country’s objectives. Despite the benefits provided by intelligence, there remains the question as to the legitimacy of such practices.
One of the foremost
principles within international law is respect for the sovereignty of other states. In addition, territorial sovereignty and political independence are also seen as critical. It would thereby logically follow that breaches of a states national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence through intrusive means of intelligence acquisition are, in fact, violations of international law. Still, debate arises in that ambiguities exist regarding exactly what constitutes intrusion. While these ambiguities are being examined, it is also necessary to examine efforts to share information gleaned from such programs. In a world that is increasingly affected by non-state actors, it is becoming increasingly important for states to share their information so as to allow for connections to be made across state lines. The United States and United Kingdom have a long history of sharing such information, but the European Union is growing increasingly reluctant to share information with the U.S., as it feels that the current administration has not been effective or fair in its use of such information. Despite recent developments, it is clear that the sharing of this information is an effective way to detect and potentially reduce the threat of international terrorism.
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Discussion Questions • Does international intelligence acquisition and sharing infringe upon national sovereignty? Are embassies and other diplomatic missions really intelligence stations in disguise? • Is international intelligence acquisition and sharing necessary in order to ensure national security? International security? • Is it the responsibility of the United Nations to promote international intelligence acquisition and sharing? Is it possible to reach a multilateral agreement on these strategies, or are bilateral efforts more effective? • What are some of the possible consequences that can occur as a result of undetected international intelligence acquisition and sharing? • Do individual states need to present all of their information to the Security Council or other oversight body within the United Nation in order to assess its accuracy? Should states be permitted to act upon their own intelligence information? • What are the drawbacks of international intelligence sharing strategies? Are smaller nations at increased risk due to their lack of advanced intelligence capabilities? • Should spies be protected under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations? • What is the risk of intelligence agencies being used for improper purposes? Does the international community have a role in ensuring that these agencies are only used for international intelligence gathering purposes?
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Works Cited Barnes, Julian E. The Third Man. Academic Search Premiere. U.S. News & World Report; 1/27/2003, Vol. 134 Issue 3, p61, 2p, 1bw http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=8948521 Blanche, Ed. Battleground Iran. Middle East; Apr2005 Issue 355, p14-16, 3p, 1c. Academic Search Premier. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=166765 Brownfeld, Allan. Indictments, Israel Lobby Critique Place Much-Needed Spotlight on AIPAC. Academic Search Premiere. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs; July 2006, Vol. 25 Issue. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=21126807 Chamberlain, Phil. Mr. Mills’ Circus. Academic Search Premiere. History Today; Apr2004, Vol. 54 Issue 4, p4-5, 2p, 1bw. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=12705400 Chinese Spy Manual Backs Cox Report. Human Events; 12/24/99, Vol. 55 Issue 48, p8, 1/2p, 1bw. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=2638660 Diamond, John. A world of spies has its eyes trained on USA Source: Academic Search Premiere. USA Today; 05/18/2006. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=J0E003464012606 Diamond, John. China broadens espionage operations. Academic Search Premiere. USA Today; May 18, 2006. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=J0E320113645306 Farley, Jonathan David. The N.S.A.’s Math Problem. Academic Search Premiere New York Times; 5/16/2006, Vol. 155 Issue 53581, pA25-A25, 1/3p. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=21075123 Felten, Peter. Playa Girón. The Missile Crisis in Cuba (Book) Hispanic American Historical Review; May2002, Vol. 82 Issue 2, p412, 3p. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=6999937
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Hamby, Alonzo l. Red Spies Everywhere. Academic Search Premiere. Diplomatic History; Jun2006, Vol. 30 Issue 3, p565-570, 6p. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=20696448 Husain, Aiyaz. Covert Action and US Cold War Strategy in Cuba, 1961-62. Academic Search Premier. Cold War History; Feb2005, Vol. 5 Issue 1, p23-53, 31p. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=15501848 Inhofe, James M . What China Stole--and When. Human Events; 07/16/99, Vol. 55 Issue 26, p3, 1p. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=2068128 Kross, Peter. “The Venona project revealed Soviet espionage in the United States after WWII--until it was in turn compromised.” Military History, 08897328, Jul/Aug2006, Vol. 23, Issue 5. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=2131046 Madeira, Victor. “Moscow’s Interward Infiltration of British Intelligence, 1919-1929.” Academic Search Premiere. Historical Journal; Dec2003, Vol. 46 Issue 4, p915933, 19p. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=12355141 Nyanto, Kgomotso, South Africa: Spy Wars. New African; May2006 Issue 451, p26-27, 2p. Academic Search Premier. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=2079 Ragavan, Chitra. The Traitors. Academic Search Premier. U.S. News & World Report; 27 January 2003, Vol. 134 Issue 3, p66, 2p, 2c, 4bw. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=8948524 Robinson, Linda, Whitelaw, Kevin. “U.S. Seeking Spies.” News & World Report, 00415537, 2/13/2006, Vol. 140, Issue 5 Academic Search Premier. http://search.epnet.com.proxy.libraries.rutgers.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph &an=1959375