The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs, Inc.
African Union Ethiopia and Eritrea Director: Sonali Patel
Š 2006 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA) This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2007. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net
Introduction _________________________________________________________________ 1 Background _________________________________________________________________ 2 Historical Context_________________________________________________________________ 2 Federation and Unification _________________________________________________________ 4 The Mengistu Regime and the Cold War ______________________________________________ 6 Independence ____________________________________________________________________ 7 The 1998 – 2000 Border War_______________________________________________________ 10 The 2000 Algiers Agreement and UNMEE ___________________________________________ 13 The Boundary Commission ________________________________________________________ 14
Current Status ______________________________________________________________ 17 Bloc Positions_______________________________________________________________ 19 Eritrea _________________________________________________________________________ 19 Ethiopia ________________________________________________________________________ 20 Somalia ________________________________________________________________________ 20 Uganda_________________________________________________________________________ 21 Algeria _________________________________________________________________________ 21 UNMEE Troop Contributors: Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria _________________ 21 Egypt __________________________________________________________________________ 22 Mauritania, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Angola, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo _______________________________________________________________ 22
Summary___________________________________________________________________ 23 Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 25
PhilMUN 2007
1
Introduction Two years after the Derg military junta in Ethiopia fell in 1991, Eritrea peacefully declared independence from Ethiopia and for most of the 1990s, and the two neighboring states coexisted without conflict and enjoyed friendly relations. This peace came after decades of civil and regional wars and political instability resulting from the difficult process of decolonization and Cold War politics. The fall of the brutal Mengistu regime in 1991, as well as an end to Soviet and United States involvement in the Horn of Africa, provided the opportunity for an end to the constant fighting. When Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zewali, leaders of separate rebel groups, had their forces act in concert to overthrow the Mengistu regime, the eventual independence of Eritrea was both expected and accepted by both sides. These two leaders were praised worldwide and sparked hope of a new era of peace in East Africa. These hopes collapsed quite abruptly in 1998, when Eritrea’s independence caused Ethiopia to become landlocked, leading to a number of economic and logistical disagreements between the two states. Tensions exploded when a small military incident in Badme, a city locate near the Ethiopian and Eritrean border, ignited a two year war that claimed tens of thousands of lives and drew the condemnation of the international community. The war was not triggered by a defined policy objective but merely a poor control of troops on the ground. Both sides claim that the other’s soldiers had crossed international borders and engaged defensive forces without justification. Two years of vicious warfare between the two impoverished state was halted by the 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement, brokered by the Organization of African Unity and supported by the UN Security Council through the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) peacekeeping force as well as numerous resolutions.
The year 2003 saw an escalation in hostilities despite the concerted
international effort to bring peace to the two feuding states. The 2000 peace agreement included a provision for a “neutral Border Commission” to survey the disputed territory
PhilMUN 2007
2
and legally bind the belligerent states to accept its findings.8 In 2002 the commission’s findings incorporated Badmé, as well as a number of other symbolically significant cities, into Eritrean territory. This act infuriated Ethiopia and caused the government in Addis Abba to renege their promised acceptance of the commission’s findings.9 Despite a sizeable international military presence on their shared border and years of attempts at defusing the crisis, the situation in late 2003 seemed bleak and Ethiopia and Eritrea were again on the brink of war. The provocative actions of 2003 suggest that Ethiopia and Eritrea have reverted back to the same non-peaceful policies as in 1998. The basis of the 2000 agreement was the mutual acceptance of an official border defined by a neutral and a legitimate international body, and the rejection of the findings of this body fundamentally threatens the peace process. New developments in the region, including a potential war with Somalia, suggest that the international community must take a firm stance to prevent conflict. The current international atmosphere and general revival in an interest in the strategic Red Sea and East African regions could have a profound influence on the current crisis. Although the African Union has unanimously passed a number of resolutions on this issue, many analysts suggest that a deeper international involvement in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict must be undertaken to ensure peace between the two devastated states.
Background Historical Context Ethiopia and Eritrea, though presently separate states, share many cultural ties. Both countries are exceptionally diverse, with populations comprised of myriad ethnic groups that are further stratified by different languages and two major religions.1 Although at many points in history Eritrea had been under Ethiopian administration, it
1
“World Factbook 2003,” Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html, Accessed: 31 January 2004.
PhilMUN 2007
3
has generally been considered an independent entity.2 The two primary religions of the region, Islam and Christianity, represent approximately forty per cent of the populations of both regions. Despite this seemingly religious acceptance, a key difference is the ethno-linguistic composition of the two states; while Eritrea is composed of nine officially recognized ethnic nations, Ethiopia is a significantly more diverse state that recognizes more than seventy nations. An important link between the two states remains, as the current leadership of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are both of the related Tigrayana-Tigrean ethnic category, groups that appear relatively identical to outside observers.3 Although the United Nations views this conflict as between states, many analysts have described it as actually being between Eritrea and its Tigrayan neighbors from Ethiopia with whom they share many cultural ties. These similarities only reflect the cultural dynamic at the present time, as different ethnic groups and coalitions have held power in Addis Abba throughout Ethiopia’s tumultuous history. With the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, the ethnically diverse East African region became the crossroads for the Mediterranean and Red Seas.4 The states of 19th Century Europe, perhaps at the peak of their colonial ambitions, were quick to recognize the value of the Horn of Africa. Not only could this region be a potential hub for intercontinental trade, but it could also function as a strategic chokepoint to control the expansion of other sea-faring empires. In 1889, Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia signed a treaty of friendship with Italy; Italy, however, claiming the treaty had incorporated Ethiopia under its protectorate, invaded Ethiopia in 1895. Italian forces were defeated at the city of Adwa in 1896, and the Treaty of Addis Ababa ended
2
“Ethiopia,” Country Reports, www.countryreports.org/history/ethiophist.htm, Accessed: 1 March 2004. “World Factbook 2003.” 3 Lata, Lena. Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, Palgrave Macmillan: 2003, New York, New York. 4 Negash, Tekeste. Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience, Transaction Publishers: 1997, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
PhilMUN 2007
4
hostilities with Italy’s recognition of an independent Ethiopia. Eritrea, officially an Italian colony since 1890, remained under its control.5 The rise of fascism in Europe, fueled by ultra-nationalistic leaders promising their respective nations a return to imperial glory of the past, revived European interest in Africa in the 1930s. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was determined to exact revenge upon Ethiopia after the embarrassing defeat at Adwa, and ordered a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. King Haile Selassie of Ethiopia fled his country in 1936, and Ethiopia was formally reintegrated into Italy’s colonial territories shortly thereafter. Although British and South African forces were able to liberate Ethiopia and Eritrea with little difficulty during the African campaign of the Second World War, the vanquishing of Italian forces did not grant these states autonomy.6
Federation and Unification After the expulsion of Italian forces from the Horn of Africa in 1941, Ethiopia regained its sovereignty and Eritrea came under British administration. Hopes of the significantly weakened United Kingdom expanding its empire were quickly humbled as it became apparent that it was having difficulty retaining even its current colonial holdings. The British soon sought to relinquish control of the problematic Eritrean state; unfortunately, Eritrea was considered too weak to sustain a modern government. The bleak view of the British was only encouraged by an increasingly large irredentist movement seeking to annex Eritrea into Ethiopia; though the two countries had been separated for many years, cultural and historical ties within their populations endured and were strengthened by the anti-Italian resistance movements.
The Four Power
Commission of Enquiry, composed of the formerly Allied powers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Soviet Union, was unable to reach an agreement that
5 6
Ibid, Chapter 1-2. Ibid.
PhilMUN 2007
5
was acceptable to Britain, and the issue was turned to the United Nations.7 In 1950, the United Nations became the primary vehicle to settle this very complicated issue.
Some suggested awarding Eritrea’s Tigrinya-speaking southern
territories to Ethiopia which had a sizeable Tigrinya population of its own, while others suggested that Eritrea should belong entirely to Ethiopia; another view held that Ethiopia’s disconnection from the sea was a central issue and should be addressed; not by union with Eritrea, but by control of a few of its Red Sea ports. A compromise was reached late that year: on 2 December 1950, UN resolution 390 was passed, placing Eritrea under a federation with Ethiopia. Though sovereign to the Ethiopian crown, both Ethiopia and Eritrea were considered independent and equal units under a federal system that jointly planned defense, foreign, and economic policies.8 Backed by the legitimacy of UN Resolution 390, Ethiopia and Eritrea officially declared themselves a federation on 15 September 1952, however the federation was characterized not by the degree of equality implied in Resolution 390 but in fact by excessive Ethiopian control of what was intended to be a relatively autonomous Eritrea. Furthermore, while European control of Eritrea was characterized by efficient economic policies and a sense of fiscal regulation, Ethiopian economic policies quickly drove Eritrea into economic turmoil. Additional tensions within the federation built quickly as many Eritreans, especially those associated with the Moslem League party, were suspicious of Ethiopian intentions. Many Eritreans feared that the federation might ultimately be dissolved and Eritrea annexed as an Ethiopian province.9 Although there was significant opposition to further integration with Ethiopia, hard-line irredentists within the dominant Unionist Party endured, and the Eritrean legislature voted for unification with Ethiopia in 1962. This move only inflamed antiunionists and led to the emergence of two rival rebel groups, the Eritrean Liberation 7
Ibid. Ibid, Ch. 3-4. 9 Ibid. 8
PhilMUN 2007
6
Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which took up arms against both the Ethiopian government and each other to pursue Eritrean independence. The emergence of these groups is considered to be the start of a chain of civil and interstate wars that cause many observers to categorize the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict as Africa’s longest war. While the ELF was initially devoted to protecting the rights of Muslim Eritreans and attempted to gain support from the Middle East by catering to panArab movements, the EPLF’s position was a broader-based ideology friendly to Christianity and could look to the West for support. Although both groups found a common enemy in the Ethiopian government, they spent much of their resources fighting amongst themselves to determine which of their ideologies would represent the Eritrean people.
The Mengistu Regime and the Cold War In 1974, the centuries-old Ethiopian monarchy was overthrown in a military coup d'etat and soon after, Mengistu Haile Mariam, a mid-ranking military officer, came to lead the military junta known as the Derg that took control of the country.10 The ascension of this group was a critical turning point in Ethiopia’s international relations because since the Second World War, Ethiopia had been supported militarily by member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The United States, in
particular, had invested significant sums of capital to solidify bilateral relations, as Ethiopia hosted a crucial American communications base near the Eritrean city of Asmara. In exchange for this land, the US supplied military hardware to what would become one of the largest and best-equipped armies in Africa. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in response, had been supporting Ethiopia’s traditional rival and neighbor Somalia.
Like so many other hotspots of the Cold War, the two
superpowers became involved in a proxy conflict that represented the ongoing violent
10
Woodward, Chapter 5.
PhilMUN 2007
7
dichotomy of the Cold War.11 Despite long standing ties between Ethiopia and the United States, Mengistu’s Marxist-Leninist leanings led him to seek an alliance with the Soviet Union. The USSR had been dissatisfied with the behavior of the Somali leadership and was eager to accept a regional power’s defection from an alliance with the US. Not surprisingly, given the loss of its regional ally, the US began to supply Somalia with what were described as defensive arms as part of America’s efforts to contain the spread of Communism.12 The effect of these developments on Eritrean independence movements is important to consider. By engaging in international power politics and playing both sides of the Cold War, Mengistu was able to consolidate his domestic rule by harnessing the support of both superpowers when convenient. Furthermore, while the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977 posed a legitimate threat to Ethiopian security, the massive scale of Soviet military support for its new found ally Ethiopia and abrupt abandonment of Somalia only strengthened Mengistu’s power. This complicated the activities of the ELF and the EPLF, and the independence movement required both greater coordination and the withdrawal of the great powers to gain momentum against the Mengistu regime.13
Independence Both the ELF and the EPLF had liberalized their ideologies during the years of the Mengistu government in an effort to form a coalition of supporters from all Eritrean ethno-religious backgrounds. Soviet support enabled the Ethiopian government to react violently to any internal challengers, and the two rebel groups sought greater popular support to counter this brutality.14 As the campaign for independence continued, the EPLF emerged as the dominant Eritrean rebel group, controlling much of rural Eritrea and nearly crushing the ELF. The possibility of a union between the groups had been 11
Ibid. Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Negash, Chapter 5-6. 12
PhilMUN 2007
8
explored, but the EPLF was unwilling to share power with the significantly weakened ELF; although the EPLF publicly claimed that ideological differences were the primary cause of the hostile relationship between the two organizations, it was clear to many that the primary opposition to a merger was political.15 Simultaneously, an Ethiopian rebel group called the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) began an armed campaign against Mengistu’s government. The TPLF, a group of Ethiopians united by a common language and ethnicity, shared many cultural ties with the people of Eritrea and made common cause with the EPLF against the Derg junta. Commencing an intensified campaign against Eritrean separatists in 1978, the Ethiopian military was able to reclaim most of Eritrea by 1980. While the EPLF was able to sustain the Ethiopian offensive and successfully held their base encampments, the weakened ELF was obliterated by Ethiopian forces. A joint operation in the summer of 1981 conducted by the EPLF and the TPLF forces vanquished the remaining ELF forces from Eritrea and established the EPLF as the sole expression of Eritrean separatism.16 The onset of the 1980s saw a substantial weakening of the Mengistu regime and a rapidly shifting international situation that would ultimately benefit the EPLF forces. Although the EPLF sought a political solution at an early point in the decade through a referendum on a potentially independent Eritrean state, the Ethiopian government rejected this idea outright. Instead, Ethiopia maintained its position that the surprisingly resilient EPLF forces could be crushed by the much larger and better-equipped Ethiopian military. Despite this disparity, however, significant international factors would quickly undermine the Ethiopian position and substantially weaken its control over Eritrea.17 In 1984, Ethiopia was struck by a widespread famine that had been anticipated for some time. The Mengistu regime’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, in addition to the expensive anti-insurgency campaigns in Eritrea, turned off many potential aid 15
Ibid. Ibid. 17 Woodward, Chapter 5. 16
PhilMUN 2007
9
suppliers, and the Western powers and Western-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) refused to act. To many members of the international community, Ethiopia’s turmoil was merely an expected result of Mengistu’s fiscal mismanagement and muddled priorities that the Soviets would have to help address.18 The ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev and the liberalization of Soviet policies caused a fundamental shift in the nature of international politics. While previous Soviet leadership sought to use influence over ideological allies as a check to Western power, Gorbachev was more cooperative with the West and began to withdraw material support of the Mengistu government. Furthermore, international trends of self-determination became especially popular with those ascribing to Western political philosophy. Both developments threatened Ethiopia’s position; the Mengistu regime was losing the constant inflow of Soviet arms that formed its power base, and international sentiment offered growing sympathies to the EPLF.19 By the end of the 1980s, both the TPLF and EPLF had gained substantial ground in their campaign against Mengistu and the Derg. In 1988, the EPLF dealt the Ethiopian army a decisive defeat at the city of Afabet. In addition to this very significant loss, Mengistu was forced to simultaneously deal with the growing strength of the TPLF and a demoralized military whose senior officers had attempted and failed to overthrow the increasingly desperate Ethiopian government.20 With the direct threat posed by the TPLF eclipsing that of the EPLF, the Derg was faced with two internal challengers its disaffected military was unable to defeat. It was clear that the objective of the TPLF was to destroy the Mengistu government and to create an Ethiopian state based on voluntary nationalism.21 The TPLF then transformed itself into the broader based Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
18
Ibid. Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Negash, Ch. 5. 19
PhilMUN 2007
10
(EPRDF) and committed itself to a new Ethiopian nationalism legitimized not by the whims of a dictator, but instead by a popular affirmation of unity. The EPRDF led a lightning-fast military campaign throughout Ethiopia from 1990 to 1991 during which time the irresolute army of the Ethiopian government offered little resistance to the determined rebel forces. The flight of Mengistu on 20 May 1991 and the subsequent occupation of the capital city of Addis Ababa signaled the victory of the EPRDF forces. On 24 May 1991, EPLF occupied Eritrea’s capital city of Asmara and peacefully disarmed the remaining Ethiopian soldiers. In support of the principle of self-determination, the new EPRDF government of Ethiopia offered its unequivocal support when Eritrea declared independence two years later.22
The 1998 – 2000 Border War The 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union presented a transformed international system that had the potential to become an era of peace and prosperity for many developing countries. Although these states had been promised a similar rebirth during the postwar decolonization process, they were drawn into power politics as pawns of the Cold War.
Eritrea’s split from Ethiopia was
uncharacteristically peaceful considering the history of the continent, but significant difficulties regarding the secession remained. Between states, secession is a complex issue to tackle even if the split is amiable. Although one or both parties believes that fundamental differences exist between the two nations, justifying their existence as separate states, many years of cultural diffusion makes partitioning the nations and demarcating a border difficult. Ethiopia and Eritrea’s shared border had been determined somewhat arbitrarily in the early 20th Century during the Italian colonization of Eritrea. However, reinterpretations of geography during the years of the federation and unification put the true border into question, specifically in the 22
Ibid.
PhilMUN 2007
11
area of Northeastern Ethiopia where linear Italian demarcations had been redrawn to increase Ethiopian territory.23 Another disagreement over the separation relates to the economic implications of the change. As a result of Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia became land-locked and lost unimpeded access to a number of lucrative Red Sea ports. These ports, which once served as Ethiopia’s outlet to world markets during the years of the unification, were now under Eritrean sovereignty. By having to undertake the regulations and restrictions associated with transit through another sovereign state, trade was increasingly difficult for Ethiopia. In addition, Eritrea was widely accused of manipulating currency exchange rates in order to amass large monetary reserves. Combined with the recurring drought and famine that plague the region, the resulting economic instability and desperation of the Ethiopian populace only complicated the state building process.24 The most significant variable that complicated secession was the expectations and resulting policies of the political leadership of the two states.25 Ethiopia’s prime minister and EPDRF leader Meles Zelwai expected and allowed Eritrea to secede from the federation in 1993. However, he also believed that Eritrea would then seek a new and genuine federation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s post-1993 policy was exceptionally benevolent and characterized by efforts at economic integration and profit sharing from Ethiopian facilities that remained in Eritrea. These policies, though benefiting Eritrea greatly, clashed with Eritrea’s focus on independence and desire to sustain its nationalism through an entirely sovereign state. These conflicting policies created tension between the neighbors as Ethiopia’s once friendly attitude towards Eritrea became an underlying contempt for the smaller state’s ingratitude. Latent tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea sparked a minor military engagement 23
Lata, Chapter 3. Ibid. 25 Ibid. 24
PhilMUN 2007
12
near the city of Badmé on 6 May 1998.26 The city, located in the disputed border region in northeast Ethiopia, has since become the primary focus in the conflict. Although the symbolic value of Badmé has eclipsed most other objectives for both states, this incident was more of an accident than a deliberate invasion. It began with six Eritrean officers confronting a group of Ethiopian soldiers to inform them that they had wrongfully crossed the Eritrean border. The six Eritreans were killed, and the Ethiopians claim that both sides sustained casualties. It is clear that neither side had intended to commence an invasion of the other, and that the exchange of fire had been little else than a lack of discipline among the troops on patrol. Nonetheless, this minor incident sparked one of the fiercest border wars of the 20th Century, causing countless casualties on both sides.27 The chain of events immediately following the incident in Badmé reflected a series of overreactions from both the government in Asmara and its counterparts in Addis Ababa. On 12 May 1998, Eritrean forces moved en masse and occupied the city of Badmé, claiming they were reinforcing sovereign Eritrean territory from future Ethiopian attacks. The Ethiopian parliament responded a day later with a denunciation of the Eritrean “invasion” and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces. Ethiopia bolstered its claim with their sizeable military capability, and the international community, led by the US and Rwanda, launched into a frenzy of diplomatic negotiations and attempts at peace. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolved during a meeting from 8-10 June 1998 that Eritrea should withdraw from Badmé. The UN supported this decision via Security Council Resolution 1177.28 Eritrea found these terms unacceptable and continued to occupy Badmé. Both sides used the lull in fighting during the negotiation period to rearm and regroup their forces for a renewed offensive. Despite the breakdown of the peace process and the renewed fighting, the OAU continued to mediate the process with Security Council 26
Ibid. “Oh no, not again.” 28 Ibid, Chapter 3. 27
PhilMUN 2007
13
oversight. The Eritrean military was vastly outnumbered and poorly equipped compared to its Ethiopian counterparts, but they were initially able to repel Ethiopian forces quite effectively. In February 1999, Eritrean forces lost control of Badmé and were forced to retreat. This development thrust the Eritreans into a state of desperation and forced them back to what would become unsuccessful negotiations under the OAU. In May 2000, the Ethiopians renewed their offensive and pushed beyond the disputed region into undisputed Eritrean territory. The Security Council responded with resolutions 1297 and 1298, the latter imposing a one-year arms embargo on the heavily-militarized states. This agreement, however, did not come smoothly, as it would cause a financially-ailing Russia would lose two of its best clients for arms sales. Russian concerns imposed a one-year time limit on the arms ban in lieu of the indefinite embargo presented by the Western powers.29
The 2000 Algiers Agreement and UNMEE At the time of the final Ethiopian advance, more than 10,000 soldiers had been killed, along with thousands of civilians on both sides. The war had also directly affected 700,000 civilians and complicated much-needed humanitarian relief efforts for both countries.30 By May 2000, Eritrea’s territorial integrity was so badly compromised that the situation forced Eritrea to sign the OAU-brokered Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea in Algiers on 18 June 2000. The Security Council reacted with the passage of Resolution 1312, establishing the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), initially composed of 200 military observers. Resolution 1312 was updated with Resolution 1320, adding 4,000 international peacekeepers to patrol a 25km demilitarized region known as the
29
BBC News, “Battles Rage in Africa,” BBC News, 2004. <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/750478.stm>, Accessed: 31 January 30 “DPKO: UNMEE Background.” Lata, Chapter 3.
PhilMUN 2007
14
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).31 The TSZ was secured to separate the clashing armies, and UNMEE had to deploy unilaterally after negotiations with both countries stagnated. Two other bodies created by the Algiers agreement included the Claims Commission, intended to award damages for acts committed by enemy forces, and the Boundary Commission, which was tasked with the demarcation of a permanent border.32 Both Ethiopia and Eritrea, based upon the Algiers agreement, were considered legally bound to accept the findings of the neutral Boundary Commission. It was expected that the findings of this body would be the final step to peace and a path to permanently defusing the crisis.
The Boundary Commission The independent Boundary Commission reported its conclusions in 2002. The highly disputed border city of Badmé, the location of the 6 May 1998 incident, was found to be within Eritrean borders, a result that infuriated the Ethiopian government. Though both parties in the conflict had agreed to accept the findings of the Commission, Ethiopia rejected the initial demarcation, jeopardizing the basis of the peace process.33 However, Eritrea was also uncooperative, rejecting the UN peace envoy Lord Axworthy of Canada in 2003.34 It had been hoped that by agreeing to arbitration by a neutral yet internationally legitimate third party, Eritrea and Ethiopia could be politically bound to make the difficult concessions necessary to preserving peace between the neighboring states. However, with the physical demarcation process indefinitely delayed, what began as a fragile but focused peace plan appears to have become a period of rearming and recuperation for the two belligerent states. Hostile rhetoric between the two governments 31
“UN Security Council Resolution 1312,” United Nations. 3 March 2004. Lata, Chapter 3. www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html , Accessed: 32 Lata, Chapter 3. Ibid. “UN Urges Ethiopia to Cooperate in Border Dispute,” UN Wire, www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040108/449_11871.asp, Accessed: 1 March 2004. 33 Ibid. 34 “Eritrea Rejects U.N. Envoy as Border Mediator,” UN Wire, www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040105/449_11721.asp, Accessed: 1 March 2004.
PhilMUN 2007
15
escalated in late 2003 and early 2004, catching the attention of the international community and attracting a more focused diplomatic effort for peace. Western involvement in East Africa, though deepening in the past few years, is still conducted at arm’s length. America’s global anti-terrorism campaign has led to the establishment of a military base in Djibouti as well as less publicized intelligence and other covert operations in the Horn of Africa. In addition, discussions on resuming a US military presence in Eritrea have been held, though the recent deterioration of the border conflict seems to have stalled negotiations.35 America’s interest in Eritrea has yielded a marginally more aggressive policy on the conflict. While previous American responses were mostly expressions of concern and a reaffirmation of America’s desire for a peaceful resolution, in early 2004 the State Department threatened to punish both countries with economic sanctions if they did not abide by the findings of the Boundary Commission.36 Although the states of the European Union (EU) have considered similar conditions on development aid and economic ties, Britain has publicly stated a policy of not linking aid to Ethiopia to its actions regarding the dispute. Neither approach is completely indefensible. The fact remains that Ethiopia and Eritrea are among the poorest of the world’s nations and recurring famine and drought have continually ravaged the people of East Africa for decades. Stripping these desperate peoples of humanitarian aid would most likely worsen the situation. At the same time, it is difficult to pressure either side into negotiation without the possibility of punitive action. Furthermore, there is an inherent risk of destabilizing either country when dealing firmly with the regime in power. In a region of the world that has been armed as if it were a testing ground for Soviet and American weapons designers, power could
35
“Port of Assab / Aseb,” Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/assab.htm, Accessed: 31 March 2004. 36 “US fears fresh Horn hostilities,” BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3419873.stm, Accessed: 1 March 2004.
PhilMUN 2007
16
conceivably shift quickly and unexpectedly, resulting in a failed state situation similar to that of Somalia, which has been operating without a formal government since 1991.37 With the deployment of UNMEE, more than four thousand international peacekeepers began a limited mission to act as a wedge between combatants and to observe and report on possible violations of cease-fire terms. In a scenario in which hostilities were to resume, which is becoming increasingly possible, the Security Council would face the fundamental question of how UNMEE’s mandate should be modified in light of the situation. Although it is unlikely that the mostly disinterested member states of the UN would extend UNMEE’s mandate to physically enforce the 2000 peace agreement, a withdrawal from the region would only encourage criticism of the embattled Security Council. Both the Russian Federation and the US have clear interests at stake in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, but most other Security Council members view the situation as not directly related to their own international strategies. Moreover, even states that do choose to be involved in the conflict only do so out of a minor and indirect link to their primary foreign policies. While most states publicly support the ideal of collective security that the United Nations continues to attempt to implement through the Security Council, they are unwilling to take substantial risks in establishing this model. Ironically, it is the unanimity of voting on relevant resolutions that exemplifies the complexities of this situation. Though the post-Cold War Security Council is free from deadlock between veto-holders and extended debate resulting from a divided council, the Security Council has not been able to achieve a durable peace between the two states. The presence of UNMEE peacekeepers discourages renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea as they form an internationally-legitimate buffer, but the force would be unable to respond to renewed hostilities. 37
“UK rejects Ehtiopia aid proviso,” BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3494109.stm, Accessed: 1 March 2004.
PhilMUN 2007
17
Current Status The tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have continued since the Algiers Agreement. A recent Security Council resolution reaffirmed the need for Eritrea to reverse all restrictions on UNMEEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s movement and operations and provide UNMEE with the access, assistance, support and protection required for the performance of its duties. In this regard, the Security Council expresses its deep concern at the recent expulsion of UNMEE personnel by Eritrea. Additionally, Resolution 1710 (2006) urges that Ethiopia accept the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) so they can fully demarcate the border completely. This resolution also reissued the mission until January 2007, at which time the mission will be revisited. The recommendations made in this resolution have largely reflected those that were made in the Algiers Agreement. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have yet to comply with the set of guidelines to which they previously agreed.
Arbitration is inconsequential without
support from both parties, and the lack of action and seriousness with which UN legislation has been regarded by both nations is a serious issue in trying to stabilize the situation and continue on with the demarcation process. In addition to hindering the demarcation process, both nations have managed to create minor disturbances which have further escalated tensions. In September of this year, Mr. Negash Kerberet Botora, the Ethiopian envoy to the United Nations, made a statement which foreshadowed events to come should there not be further multilateral talks: In May 1998 Eritrea launched unprovoked attack against Ethiopia in a blatant disregard of international law, thereby igniting the war and leading up to the present crisis. In this respect, I wish to draw the attention of the Assembly to the decision of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission as to liability for the war between the two countries.
This type of response is not conducive to the efforts being made by the African Union or the rest of the international community. Eritrea has repeatedly expressed the belief that they are being ignored in this situation and has in the past year taken their frustrations out on the UNMEE personnel.
PhilMUN 2007
18
For example, Eritrea banned UNMEE helicopter flights, reducing the blue helmets’ capacity to monitor the TSZ by more than half and prompting major troop contributing countries to contemplate withdrawing their forces entirely. When in December the Security Council demanded a lift on the overflight ban, Eritrea responded by demanding that UNMEE staff from 18 Western countries leave. On October 23, 2006, some 1,500 Eritrean troops and 14 tanks moved into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) that is currently being monitored by UN peacekeepers. Eritrea maintains that “this is not a provocative act” and that it “is sovereign Eritrean territory, so how can this be a breach of a cease-fire agreement? This statement is rubbish because it has no sense of balance and does not talk about the 1,001 times that Ethiopia has violated the agreement by forcefully occupying our territory.” The press has also associated Eritrea as an arms contributor to the Somalian movement against Ethiopia. Ethiopia, on the other hand, has since 2005 begun to accept the conditions outlined by the Commission, stating that while they view the judgment as “unjust and illegal,” they will continue to accept the decision “in principle,” specifically clarifying that it “does not mean going back to the drawing board, and it does not imply that [they] are introducing a precondition.” When responding to the 24 October troop movement by Eritrea, Ethiopia maintained that it was not going to react to the provocation and still looks to resolve the border issue peacefully. In addition to the Eritrea issue, Ethiopia is in the early stages of conflict with Somalian Islamist militants who have claimed jihad on the Ethiopian government. As of 24 October 2006, Ethiopia is “technically” at war with Somalia’s Islamist extremists after their declaration of jihad against Addis Ababa according to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Somalia is about 99 percent Islamic, while Ethiopia boasts an equal amount of Muslims and Christians within their borders. The tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have escalated in the past few years and many are suggesting a need for peacekeepers along their borders to avoid an intensified situation. The fight over Ogaden, a Somali
PhilMUN 2007
19
speaking city that was ceded to Ethiopia, is inevitable if the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) succeeds in taking control of Somalia’s central government.
Ethiopia has been
backing President Abdullahi Yusef’s interim government which has in recent months become isolated and virtually powerless against the rise of the UIC within their borders. The recent tensions and constant bickering between Ethiopia and Eritrea have given rise to a humanitarian aid crisis. For example, a recent visit to Eritrea by an envoy from the World Food Program wrote a report in which he “stressed the need for stronger links between humanitarian assistance and long-term interventions aimed at addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity.” Although the past two rainy seasons have been good and food security does seem to be improving, the aftereffects of four years of drought have left Eritrea with a high level of malnutrition. In addition to that recent humanitarian report, on 20 October 2006 Eritrea moved 1,500 troops and 14 tanks into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), raising grave concerns from the African community and the UNMEE alike. Eritrea maintains its ban on UNMEE helicopters and the Mission’s ability to carry out patrols in at least two sectors of the TSZ remains restricted, adding to the volatility and tension of the situation. The UNMEE currently has 2,300 military personnel in the region to observe the security commitments that were made by both Ethiopia and Eritrea, but until both nations decide to fully adhere to all of their obligations, the threat of war continues to loom over the region.
Bloc Positions Eritrea Eritrea has become increasingly disgruntled with the international community and their lack of support in the current situation. Although the town of Badmè, the town that sparked the 1998-2000 war, was awarded to Eritrea, they have yet to receive full control of the territory. Eritrea’s position is that Ethiopia has violated the peace accords by
PhilMUN 2007
20
refusing after nearly three years to implement the border ruling and by its continuing occupation of sovereign Eritrean territory. The African Union to date has still to act on a full-scale intervention, and their hesitancy to do so has prompted Eritrea to recall the Eritrean ambassador to the African Union in protest.
Ethiopia Ethiopia originally addressed the situation with Eritrea as an inevitably peaceful separation.
Over the years, tensions have escalated and Ethiopia has repeatedly
challenged the decision of the Boundary Commission. Although it has never explicitly stated its reasoning for disagreement, many agree that it is due to their new status as a landlocked country and the hardships that this presents.
Ethiopia has expressed
uneasiness with the Boundary Commission’s decision to award territory to Eritrea and as a result, they have contested the decision and refused to comply with it.
When
responding to the 24 October troop movement by Eritrea, Ethiopia maintained that it was not going to react to the provocation and still looks to resolve the border issue peacefully. In addition to the Eritrea issue, Ethiopia is in the early stages of conflict with Somalian Islamist militants who have claimed jihad on the Ethiopian government.
Somalia As of 24 October 2006, Ethiopia is “technically” at war with the UIC in Somalia after their declarations of jihad against Addis Ababa. The tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have made headlines because of the new developments that have taken place. The interim government of Somalia is rumored to be supported by Ethiopia, although Ethiopia continues to deny the presence of its troops in Somalia’s borders. The largely Islamic population of Somalia, however, has made it clear that its alliance is with Eritrea. A highly suspected arms deal between Eritrea and the UIC further complicates matters and Somalia has the potential to spark major clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea; if conflict occurs, each state will support opposing sides.
PhilMUN 2007
21
Uganda Uganda is currently involved in the peaceful relations with Sudan as well as their internal struggle to end civil unrest with the Lords Resistance Army. Although they border Ethiopia, their involvement in the issue is minimal.
Uganda is currently
attempting to build up their economy. They have offered their troops to peacekeeping should the situation in Somalia escalate, but momentarily are not invested in either side of the conflict, merely to the maintenance of peace.
Algeria Algeria was an essential player throughout the entire peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It was Algeria that brought the two nations to the negotiating table in 2000 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, and official talks took place within Algeriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s borders.
It is invested in the success of peace between the
Ethiopia and Eritrea.
UNMEE Troop Contributors: Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria have been personally devoted in the peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. They have all not only signed the Algiers agreement along with the rest of the AU but have also sent in troops to carry out the United Nations Mission In Ethiopia and Eritrea mandate. Eritreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s restrictions on movement, as well as the repeated defiance by both nations regarding the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), have caused many troop contributing nations to reconsider their involvement. To date, their have been 16 fatalities, including 11 military personnel, 2 international civilian personnel, and 3 local personnel. These facts have led to some hesitancy regarding the continuation of the mission as well as the level of cooperation that they should look for from both Eritrea and Ethiopia in the future.
PhilMUN 2007
22
Egypt Concerning the Horn of Africa, Egypt looks forward to the deployment of UNMEE so that the necessary political climate for confidence-building and a peace agreement can be established between the two sister states. According to the UN General Assembly, “Member States contributing to the peacekeeping operations — and Egypt is one of them — should consider the reform of that particular area of the work of the United Nations as very important … United Nations peacekeeping operations should be effective from the point of view of timing, deployment and operational efficiency.” Egypt believes that in order for UNMEE to be more effective, certain reforms must be made, especially with respect to leadership.
Mauritania, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Angola, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Democratic Republic of Congo This bloc of nations has been generally uninvolved in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. With the recent developments in Somalia, however, all states in Africa have a reasonable stake in the situation. The general policy reflected by the African nations is one similar to that endorsed by the African Union. The Organization of African Unity was the primary catalyst towards the Algiers Agreement and as such, all member nations have vowed to keep an impartial stance and have declared their commitment to maintaining peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The African Union to date has still to act on a full-scale intervention, but the truth remains that the African Union has vowed to maintain peace, and should matters escalate, action is inevitable. What will be the differentiating factor between the members of the AU are the economic and cultural ties that are shared by each state with Ethiopia and Eritrea. Subtle policy leanings will be important when discussing a solution because very few nations have publicly announced what their stance on this issue is. Many have claimed that the looming conflict with Ethiopia and Somalia is merely Eritrea attempting to fight on two fronts.
PhilMUN 2007
23
Summary The 2000 peace agreement at Algiers provided a framework for Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their border dispute peacefully and under the supervision of regional and international organizations. It is clear that peace cannot be fully secured without the cooperation of both states. The governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea appear ready to resume their fierce border war, and it is evident that the people of both states will take many years to recover from the destruction wrought from the 1998-2000 war. Ethiopiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rejection of the findings of the Boundary Commission has essentially reversed the progress made on the path to peace and has instead returned both parties to a collision course towards war. The clash between Eritrean nationalism and a multiethnic Ethiopia has plagued bilateral relations since pre-modern times and only continues to complicate the current situation. Conflicting efforts between Eritrean integration and efforts to affirm Eritrean national sovereignty has compounded minor tensions, causing the very minor 1998 incident at BadmĂŠ to ignite a catastrophic war. Combined with recurring humanitarian disasters and recent decades of continuing warfare, the imminent collapse of the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace process appears to be worsening the situation in the Horn of Africa. Historically, international intervention has been more of a curse for Ethiopia and Eritrea than a source of assistance; however, the combined response of the UN and OAU to the 1998 war offered a solution to the conflict not based on political aspirations of colonial powers but instead by the ideal of collective security. The peace effort has been almost entirely diplomatic and states involved in the arbitration do so only if no significant political risks are taken or resources are employed. Nonetheless, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict is one of few examples in which the international community has acted almost perfectly in concert to prevent further bloodshed.
The situation is nowhere near stable, however, and there is an opportunity
PhilMUN 2007
24
for conflict to arise should the situation deteriorate in the near future. The issues aroused when discussing an increased role for the African Union in Ethiopia and Eritrea question the very fundamentals of international relations. Concepts such as national sovereignty, enforcement of international agreements, and the behavior of independent, self-interested nation-states all come into play.
PhilMUN 2007
25
Discussion Questions •
Though most countries involved in the mediation of this conflict reaffirm their dedication to a peaceful resolution and attempt to negotiate evenhandedly, the international community has been criticized for a lack of commitment and organization in its efforts. How should the AU restructure the peace process to be more effective?
•
Many observers conclude that the inability of the two countries to make concessions as well as their continued belligerence prove the inevitability of further bloodshed. Noting the obvious disregard that both nations have displayed towards the peacekeeping efforts, what new solutions would be most reasonable within the scope of the African Union?
•
Have the conditions of the Algiers Agreement been upheld? What are some changes that would impact the efficacy of the peacekeeping mission on the ground? Should the African Union be more involved in the situation or should the bulk of the responsibility lie on the shoulders of the UNMEE?
•
Was the previous arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea effective in limiting the scale of the conflict? Would another embargo help defuse the current tensions? What, if any, punitive actions should be taken against parties that sell arms to either side of this conflict? Take into consideration the lack of action that has resulted from the previous resolutions as well as the economic repercussions that arise from embargoes. Who will be most affected by the embargo? The people? The government? The militias?
•
How do the humanitarian issues in Ethiopia and Eritrea complicate this situation?
• What could be done to ease potential problems brought on by renewed warfare? • With regard to the new developments in Somalia, should there be greater involvement between the African communities? What preventative measures should be taken, if any?
PhilMUN 2007
26
Works Cited “Africa’s Forgotten War.” The Economist. http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=606438 “Background Note: Eritrea.” United States Department of State. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2854.htm. BBC News. “Battles Rage in Africa.” BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/750478.stm. “Brazil in the Security Council, 1998 – 2000.” Brazilian Mission to the UN. http://www.un.int/brazil/book/basic-book.htm. “China, Eritrea Mark 10th Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties.” People’s Daily Online. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/24/eng20030524_117156.shtml. “CIA accused of Eritrea ‘Coup Plot.’” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2347291.stm. “DPKO: UNMEE Background.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html. “Eritrea Protests African Union's Inaction.” Washington Times. http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20031120-014656-1979r.htm. “Eritrea Rejects U.N. Envoy as Border Mediator.” UN Wire. http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040105/449_11721.asp “Ethiopia.” Country Reports. http://www.countryreports.org/history/ethiophist.htm. “Ethiopian Border Stance Risks Aid.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3340593.stm. “Landmine Issues.” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/cjjk/2621/t15397.htm. Lata, Lena. “Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations.” Palgrave Macmillan: 2003. New York, New York. “Mission Statement.” Romanian Mission to the United Nations. http://www.un.int/romania/.
PhilMUN 2007
27
Negash, Tekeste. “Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience.” Transaction Publishers: 1997. New Brunswick, New Jersey. “One gun for every 20 Africans.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3135146.stm. “Oh no, not again.” The Economist. http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1682814. “The Philippines and the Security Council.” Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations. http://www.un.int/philippines/security_council. Pillar, Paul. “Terrorism and US Foreign Policy.” The Brookings Institution: 2001. Washington, DC. “Premier Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/wenvisituscaeth/t56332.htm. “Port of Assab/Aseb.” Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/assab.htm. “Security Council: Voting.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/. “UK rejects Ehtiopia aid proviso.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3494109.stm “UN Security Council Resolution 1312.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html. “UN Urges Ethiopia to Cooperate in Border Dispute.” UN Wire. http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20040108/449_11871.asp. United States Department of Defense, “Building a Presence in Djibouti.” US Department of Defense. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2002/n12112002_200212112.html. “US fears fresh Horn hostilities.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3419873.stm. Woodward, Peter. The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations. Tauris Academic Studies: 1996. New York, New York.
PhilMUN 2007 “World Factbook 2003.” Central Intelligence Agency. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
28