Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc.
Disarmament and International Security Rise of Terrorism Director: Ilke Denizli
Š 2010 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA) This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2010. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net
Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1 Chronology__________________________________________________________________ 3 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 _________________________________ 3 2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad _____________________________________________ 4 2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 _________________________________ 4 2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque______________________________________________ 5 2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War ________________________________________________________ 5 2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict _______________________________________________________ 6 2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan _______________________________________ 7 2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul _____________________________________________ 7 2008-2009 - Gaza War _____________________________________________________________ 8
Possible Causes ______________________________________________________________ 9 Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism ________________________________________________ 9 Community Infrastructure and Poverty______________________________________________ 10 Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization ______________________________________________ 11 Comparison of Causes ____________________________________________________________ 12
Actors & Interests____________________________________________________________ 12 States in Civil Conflict ____________________________________________________________ 12 Insurgent Groups ________________________________________________________________ 14 State Sponsors of Terrorism _______________________________________________________ 15 Target States ____________________________________________________________________ 15 Developed States _________________________________________________________________ 16 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) ___________________________________________ 18
Projections & Implications ____________________________________________________ 19 Conclusion _________________________________________________________________ 20 Bibliography________________________________________________________________ 22 Further Reading _________________________________________________________________ 22 Works Cited_____________________________________________________________________ 23 Works Consulted_________________________________________________________________ 27
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Policy Dilemma The United Nations (UN) Security Council currently defines terrorism as any criminal act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, or provoke a state of terror, with the purpose to “intimidate a population or compel a government or international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”1 While the definition of terrorism itself is highly debated among the international community, its methods and consequent effects are much more evident. Terrorism aims to terminate political processes and produce dissension as a means of forcing change.2 Thus, terrorism not only costs the lives of civilians and destroys community infrastructure, it also threatens the foundations of state institutions – the prospect of which hinders regional cooperation and endangers international security. Although terrorism in the Middle East is certainly not a new phenomenon, it has become progressively worse over the last decade. Since the inception of the United States’ War on Terror, the lack of stability in Iraq has resonated through the region. Organizations like Al-Qaida have been at the forefront of terrorist attacks. While large organizations, such as Al-Qaida, have served as the face for the terrorist attacks, smaller, more localized, affiliations and criminal organizations have also been active participants.3 In particular, insurgent identity groups and militias have both engaged in sectarian and intra-communal violence. Even though the number of individual terrorist attacks has decreased in the past few years, the threat of terrorist activity continues to plague state security and instill fear among the general population. In the Middle East, Iraq remains at the center of most terrorist affiliated incidents, as insurgents groups fight against the Iraqi government and 1
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://daccessods.un.org/TMP/9969713.09185028.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 2 Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html (accessed 27 December 2009). 3 Ibid.
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coalition forces. The most common modes of attacks have been through improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including vehicle-borne ones, and suicide bombers.4 Other terror campaigns in the region have been directed towards Israel, whose targets face terrorist threats from the West Bank and Gaza. In Lebanon, insurgent groups assassinated several key political figures to intimidate pro-government forces and shape the numerical composition of parliament.5 Terrorist activity has also recommenced in Turkey, where Kurdish rebels in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are engaged in armed conflict with the state. The rise of terrorism in the Middle East is a multifaceted issue that requires immediate response. Cross-border terror activities in particular require regional cooperation, as they destabilize the entire region. Indeed, terrorism has a plethora of effects on the socioeconomic infrastructure of a society. In response to terrorist threats and incidents, states have begun to allocate a significant portion of their funds toward military preparation and action.6 This often entails a shift in monetary resources from the social sector into the armed forces, which weakens social systems like health and education. As a result, communities begin to deteriorate and children become vulnerable to external influence, particularly in relation to insurgent groups. With anti-government arguments and false promises, insurgents groups thus convince susceptible individuals into supporting their cause – a reality that propagates the cycle of terrorism. If the international community fails to prioritize the issue, the problems of a destabilized Middle East will quickly spread to neighboring regions and cause even developed states to incur socioeconomic devastation. Responses toward terrorist activities thus far have mostly involved an increase in security services, with states strengthening their capabilities to fight terrorism. With the aid of developed states and international organizations, states like Iraq have attempted to draft reconciliation related legislation and participate in antiterrorism assistance 4
Ibid. Ibid. 6 James Phillips, “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm (accessed 27 December 2009). 5
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programs, which aim to address issues between certain identity groups and strengthen legal regimes.7 However, because some states covertly support terrorism by funding specific organizations, it is important to consider both short and long-term solutions.
Chronology 2001 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 Following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 as a comprehensive document outlining counter-terrorism measures against any such future incidents. Implemented under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the Council to take direct action for the restoration of international security, the resolution is binding for all UN member states.8 Therefore, its passage signaled a shift in international law, as precedent had originally dictated that only voluntary signatories were bound to UN treaties. The resolution aims to prevent the organization and development of terrorist groups, particularly in relation to fund-raising activities.9 It encourages member states to publicize their information on terrorist groups for the purpose of thwarting international terrorism. The landmark provision of the resolution calls upon member states to amend their national laws as a means of ratifying international conventions on terrorism; it specifies that states criminalize support for terrorist activities on all levels. In order to monitor state compliance, the Security Council established the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), which conducts assessments and offers procedural assistance.10 However, the CTC is more of a technical body because it does not have the ability to sanction specific terrorist organizations or individuals. Although the resolution was successful in facilitating transparency of information among states, it failed to define
7
Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1373(2001) (accessed 29 December 2009). 9 Ibid. 10 Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “The Committee’s Mandate,� United Nations, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (accessed 29 December 2009). 8
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terrorism and only included al-Qaida and the Taliban on the sanctions list.11 This allowed states to interpret terrorism in their own perspectives, theoretically permitting some authoritarian regimes to label nonviolent protests as terrorist acts.
2003 - Canal Hotel Bombings in Baghdad In August and September of 2003, Al-Qaeda organized the vehicle bombings of the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, Iraq. The first suicide bombing targeted the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), which the Security Council had created days earlier as means of incorporating the new Iraqi government into the international community.12 The second attack led to the withdrawal of over 600 UN staff members from Baghdad, along with members of other aid agencies; most of the UN branches in Iraq were subsequently relocated to Jordan. Both blasts killed several UN officials, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Iraq. The events hindered international efforts to rebuild Iraq and contributed to a significant change in UN security protocol. With remote UN supervision, humanitarian support within Iraq has primarily been through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
2004 - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 After a series of terrorist attacks in Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1566 to reaffirm Resolution 1373. Unlike its predecessor, Resolution 1566 defined terrorism as: Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.13
In adopting such a definition, the Council established a working group to formulate recommendations on measures to be imposed upon groups or individuals associated with such activities. For example, the resolution calls for more effective procedures in 11
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. Kim Ghattas, “Mixed Feelings Over UN Iraq Role,� BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6941560.stm (accessed 29 December 2009). 13 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004) (accessed 29 December 2009). 12
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prosecuting involved entities, even recommending extradition.14 The resolution also advocates that the aforementioned working group consider establishing an international compensation fund for the victims of terrorist attacks and their families, though it does not specify funding aside from the seized assets of terrorist organizations and related affiliates.
2006 - Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque In February 2006, a bomb detonated at the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq – one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam. No organization has taken responsibility for the attack, but al-Qaeda members confessed to taking part in the bombing.15 Though the attack itself caused no injuries, the subsequent violence in the days after claimed hundreds of lives. Shia rebels attacked Sunni mosques and kidnapped or murdered imams throughout Iraq. In Shia majority cities, Shia terrorists tortured and killed Christian and Sunni Muslim civilians, journalists, and men of Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish nationality.16 Iraqi officials feared that Iraq was on the brink of civil war and consequently implemented a curfew in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. Despite such measures, severe sectarian violence continued throughout Iraq, devastating infrastructure and disrupting everyday life. The bombing demonstrated that the consequences of terrorist activities, no matter the death toll, often times have greater long-term implications. In this case, the bombing debilitated Iraq as a governing state, shaking the already fragile foundations of the nation.
2006 - Israel-Hezbollah War The Israel-Hezbollah War, also known as the 2006 Lebanon War, began when militants of Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist paramilitary organization in Lebanon, fired
14
Ibid. “Letter May Detail Iraqi Insurgency’s Concerns,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/10/sprj.nirq.zarqawi/ (accessed 30 December 2009). 16 Robert F. Worth, “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting off Sectarian Fury,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/22cndiraq.html?hp&ex=1140670800&en=1077baccd068bf6b&ei=5094&partner=homepage (accessed 30 December 2009). 15
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rockets at Israeli border towns. During the 34-day military conflict, Israel carried out massive airstrikes on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.17 Israeli actions called into question the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism, as the event affected mostly Lebanese civilians – in addition to claiming the lives over a thousand noncombatants, the conflict severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure and displaced approximately one million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis. Although Security Council Resolution 1701 called for the disarmament of Hezbollah, both the Lebanese government and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) declined to do so, citing that such a move would be unrealistic without reconstruction of the region.18
2007 - Lebanon Civil Conflict In May 2007, fighting broke between Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni Islamist militant organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Bared – a camp in northern Lebanon that is part of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).19 When the insurgents refused to surrender, thus spurring violence in surrounding refugee camps, the LAF staged a series of counterattacks, eventually capturing the militant base in September. During this period, militants of Fatah al-Islam bombed several commercial and residential locales in Beirut. They also bombed a vehicle carrying personnel from UNIFIL, gathering support from al-Qaeda.20 As the worst domestic conflict since the Lebanese Civil War, the fighting not only devastated UNRWA camps but also forced the relocation of several thousand Palestinians in Nahr al-Bared.21 Lebanese officials held Syria responsible for supporting Fatah al-Islam and asked other Arab governments, as well as Western states, to aid Lebanon through logistical and military equipment. 17
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 18 Ibid. 19 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Archive for May 2007,” 2007 Lebanon Emergency, http://www.unrwa-lebanon.org/nle/?m=200705 (accessed 30 December 2009). 20 Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/06/2008525122010725840.html (accessed 30 December 2009). 21 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1.
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2007-2008 - Turkish Invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan Days after terminating a unilateral ceasefire with the Turkish government, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) staged a suicide bombing in a commercial district of Ankara, the state capital. The bombing occurred as several world leaders gathered in Turkey for a NATO summit. Shortly after the incident, the Turkish military announced that it would launch an incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan upon further hostilities, by which time American troops withdrew from the area.22 Following another suicide bombing and series of PKK attacks on army bases, Turkish troops launched a ground incursion into northern Iraq. During this period, the PKK continued to bomb industrial and residential areas in Turkey, killing both natives and tourists. Unlike its past undertakings, the PKK also detonated an explosion over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, halting the supply of crude oil through the Caucus region for weeks and contributing to a rise in oil prices.23 The PKK terrorist attacks and consequent Turkish military response had widespread effects; they not only destabilized the region but also the Turkish political system, helping lead to a failed coup d’état attempt against the existing government.
2008 - Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul In July 2008, a suicide vehicle bombing took place outside the gates of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The attack was the deadliest since the fall of the Taliban and prompted a massive investigation by the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan, India, and the United States.24 The findings of Afghan and Indian agencies had profound implications on regional relations. The agencies reported that the embassy itself was the main target, suggesting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had planned the
22
Selcuk Gokoluk and Orhan Coskun, “Bomb in Turkish Capital Kills Six, Injures 80,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22619461.htm (accessed 29 December 2009). 23 Alex Barker, “Kurds Lay Claim to Blast on Azeri Oil Pipeline,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4836dca-64e1-11dd-af61-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 (accessed 29 December 2009). 24 Somini Sengupta, “Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/asia/09india.html?_r=1 (accessed 30 December 2009).
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attack with either the Taliban or al-Qaida. While the Taliban denied any involvement, Afghan officials insisted on the collaboration between an insurgent group and the ISI. After reports of intercepted communication confirming such a relationship arose, U.S. officials expressed their doubt as to the reliability of Pakistan as an ally in the American War on Terror.25 Pakistan continued to deny such claims, but participated in bilateral talks with India to discuss the incident and cross-border terrorism. Meanwhile, Indian defense officials suggested that their government increase its military presence in Afghanistan.26 Because India already has contributed to Western counter-insurgency operations, other officials believed that such involvement would jeopardize India’s socioeconomic investments in the region. Though the joint meetings failed to produce a positive identification of perpetrators, they demonstrated the importance of joint anti-terror mechanisms in maintaining transparency and regional stability.
2008-2009 - Gaza War After the end of a ceasefire with Israel in December 2008, Hamas – a Palestinian Islamist paramilitary organization – began a series of rocket attacks on Israeli towns. During the three-week military conflict, Israel carried out massive airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, with the aim of stopping Hamas terrorism.27 Like the Israel-Hezbollah War in 2006, Israeli actions called into question the methods of fighting cross-border terrorism, as the event affected mostly Lebanese civilians. However, this time, the damages were more intense and constituted a humanitarian crisis; more than a thousand Palestinian civilians died and over 400,000 people in the region lacked running water and other basic amenities. In September 2009, a UN mission produced a report – an unprecedented
25
Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?hp (accessed 30 December 2009). 26 Sengupta, 1. 27 BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7838618.stm (accessed 30 December 2009).
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publication in relation to the history of terrorism in the region – accusing both Palestinian militants and Israeli defense forces of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity.28
Possible Causes Post-Colonial Politics and Separatism Acts of terrorism, especially suicide bombing, are often associated with postmodern war tactics brought by the imposition of Western colonial rule and its subsequent collapse.29 During imperial rule, colonial administrators specifically defined different identity groups, proceeding to favor one at the expense of others. With decolonization, colonial officials arbitrarily drew boundaries and constructed national governments without considering their regional implications, provoking displacement of individuals and ethnic clashes.30 From the moment of independence, government officials exploited past resentment to maintain political authority and assert control over opposing constituencies. This engrained sense of injustice, whether justified or not, established the foundations for terrorism in the Middle East. As a reflection of their separatist beliefs, terrorists utilize post-modern war tactics to facilitate the creation of new national subjects and boundaries.31 Thus, acts of terrorism make no distinction between combatants and civilians. Post-colonial politics in Lebanon and Iraq have contributed to massive civil conflict in each region, both marred by sectarian instability. Post-conflict resolutions in these regions did not adequately address the historic prevalence of identity clashes, laying out a framework for the development of radical separatist beliefs and hence, acts of terrorism by insurgent groups.
28
BBC, “UN Condemns ‘War Crimes’ in Gaza,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm (accessed 30 December 2009). 29 Dan Smith, “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center, http://www.berghofhandbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf (accessed 24 February 2009). 30 Ethel Brooks, “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, November 2008. 31 Ibid.
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Community Infrastructure and Poverty Studies have highlighted the correlation between poor community infrastructure and a rise in terrorism. The likelihood of resorting to terrorist activities is higher in communities with elevated levels of unemployment and concentrated poverty.32 Such locales, usually in or surround relatively industrialized areas, also possess high levels of population turnover and overcrowded IDP or refugee camps. In states with civil conflict, many rural areas lack basic infrastructure, particularly electricity. A lack of roads and transportation forces children to travel to remote areas for schooling and limits the ability of individuals to utilize institutional mechanisms and engage in nonviolent political participation.33 For example, better transportation can provide security in remote regions and thus improve the likelihood of legitimate school enrollment and employment. The deteriorating physical and social infrastructure of these communities may prompt residents to lose faith in government and search for alternative means of support. With little income and limited options, parents in impoverished areas are more likely to send their children to madrasas or other social and educational institutions sponsored by insurgent groups.34 Because these communities usually lack social investment, the availability of resources is also limited. This hinders children from attaining a balanced education or getting appropriate help if something happens to their parents. A lack of funding in public services further jeopardizes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, especially those aimed at children, thus propagating a cycle of terrorism through the next generation.35 Poor infrastructure also affects the capabilities of the social welfare system – impoverished areas lack the sources of support that offer protection for vulnerable children and families.
32
Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working Paper Series, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-043. 33 Ibid. 34 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 35 Ibid.
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Socioeconomic Policies & Globalization In the developing world, particularly the Middle East, the policies of globalization reduce budget allocations to education, healthcare, and related preventative measures.36 The desire of states to strengthen their industrial and military sectors further jeopardizes the maintenance of services necessary for the social development of vulnerable communities. In particular, such governmental policies usually compel children to withdraw from educational institutions. This restricts the possibilities available to Middle Eastern populations, propelling a cycle of economic insecurity that drives terrorism as a viable option. The far-reaching financial effects of globalization compel governments to focus more on industry and open the markets up to external influences, which terrorists argue exploit native workers and cultures.37 Like economic instability, political instability in this region directly fuels terrorism and jeopardizes social initiatives to hinder its growth. Authoritarian figures may misuse allocated funds and favor certain identity groups over others, establishing the foundations for rebel group activities.38 Corruption also makes it unlikely that governments will abide by international treaties or implement new policies hampering the growth of terrorism, especially in regards to fiscal support of insurgent groups. A lack of transparency between different levels of government and outside organizations decreases the likelihood of cooperation between different actors, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of programs designed to counter terrorism.39 Corruption also hampers the ability of NGOs to attain information on events and program initiatives that may be essential to preventing regional terrorism.
36
Miemie Winn Byrd, “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” Defense Techincal Information Center, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4106.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 37 The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” Club de Madrid, http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010). 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.
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Comparison of Causes During the late twentieth century, post-colonial governments explicitly ignored social welfare in negotiations while pouring millions of dollars into defense and military training. States proposed social welfare and educational programs that attempted to enforce particular ideas about identity and regional politics.40 This allowed different identity groups to take advantage of civilian populations, particularly children and minorities, in reinforcing group ideologies. With the advancement of globalization, states in the Middle East once again opened to external influence and political leaders followed the notion that economic development parallels the maintenance of order. However, terrorist organizations have taken advantage of this belief to reassert ideological battles and propel movements against external influence. With the social sector of states largely undeveloped, communities with poor infrastructure are especially vulnerable to joining terrorist causes and propelling a cycle of terrorism. The lack of a stable economy and democratic mechanisms in these states allows insurgent groups to silence and control a significant portion of their related populations.
Actors & Interests States in Civil Conflict States in civil conflict, primarily as Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan, were plagued by post-imperial conflict throughout the early twentieth century, thus engraining a notion of resentment towards Western involvement in state affairs. The movements for and transition to independence destabilized the nations, leading to the establishment of insurgent groups and conflict among various identity groups.41 Their governments lost control over domestic issues and are now unable to provide security for their constituents. Rebel groups in this region act under near autonomy, asserting control over specific territories and preventing international aid from reaching civilian populations. The failure 40
Brooks. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,� U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm#political (accessed 2 January 2010). 41
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of these states to assert political authority places severe restrictions on the international community in addressing the concerns of vulnerable populations.42 States experiencing some form of civil conflict are interested in stopping violence and initiating a peaceful path to modernization. They recognize the existence of identitybased violence and fully condemn acts of terrorism but lack the resources to address the predicament.43 They are still engulfed by the long-term effects of civil conflict and focus on political stability as a safety measure against warfare. These states rule over impoverished constituencies and much of their funds go toward combating terrorism and restoring access to basic institutions after attacks. Though these states recognize the influence of insurgent groups on constituencies, they do not have the resources to establish social programs for groups vulnerable to recruitment. These states support international NGOs in their efforts to distribute basic commodities, set up rehabilitation camps, and provide medical assistance. Within their territories, they house a number of overcrowded internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and outside their borders, there are thousands of refugees awaiting repatriation. The governments of these states aim to address the concerns of such vulnerable groups under national initiatives of reconstruction. Their interests are also long-standing, as governments look to establish strategic ties and garner additional funding for socioeconomic projects.44 Economically unstable, these states may also call upon developed states or allies in the region to provide military and monetary aid for the purposes of training law enforcement and preventing further uprisings. For example, Iraq is working with the United States to formulate a national law to promote amnesty among different identity groups and tackle terrorism from its foundations.45 However, some of these governments
42
Meg Samuelson, “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 833-855. Lakhdar Brahimi, “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 44 Ibid. 45 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 43
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are not willing to risk losing political stability and may prolong the process of adopting laws or strengthening social and judicial institutions.
Insurgent Groups Because there is no international consensus on the legal definition of terrorism, not all insurgent groups are recognized as terrorist organizations by certain states and institutions. However, the UN categorizes the activities of these groups as terrorist acts if they fulfill the criteria designated under Security Council Resolution 1373.46 Insurgent groups regarded as terrorist organizations or as utilizing acts of terrorism usually include paramilitary forces. They may also have a sociopolitical influence, often participating in local elections and occupying seats in state parliaments. For example, Hamas holds a large majority in the Palestinian Parliament and governs the territory of Gaza; aside from its armed political conflict with Israel, Hamas is also known for funding educational, health, and cultural services in the region.47 Insurgent groups usually operate as networks and have regional sponsors, which may be ideologically similar organizations or states that covertly support their goals. Since the American War on Terror, al-Qaida leadership in particular has become more decentralized, leading to the emergence of regional units that execute plans in their respective areas.48 Terrorist organizations vary in the radicalism of their techniques and objectives, but all aim to change the political status quo. Some insurgent groups may deny employing terrorism and claim to be “freedom fighters”; but for them, the end justifies the means, even if that involves civilian casualties.49 For this reason, insurgent groups are largely unwilling to negotiate with target states or opposition groups without concessions and rarely participate in bilateral talks. They often terminate ceasefires upon unfavorable 46
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), 1. Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (accessed 2 January 2010). 48 Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 49 Ibid. 47
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state proceedings and become hostile towards international organizations, particularly those of non-regional influence. However, insurgent groups may also vocalize approval for state initiatives that parallel their objectives and subsequently cease attacks, as temporarily done by the PKK after Turkey’s initiation of a legal movement for increasing Kurdish minority rights.50
State Sponsors of Terrorism It is especially important to note the existence of states that covertly support rebel groups in their attacks against certain identity groups or states. Their interests are to thwart internal rebellions and assert political control over their constituencies through the manipulation of external politics.51 Though these states may be signatories to international legislation, they disregard the existence of the issue and undermine international efforts looking to investigate their roles in terrorism. They possess some of the same objectives as insurgent groups, primarily in wanting to change the political status quo of the Middle East. However, they often deny involvement to maintain a level of legitimacy in international reputation and not thwart potential investment. Within the international arena, they are largely unwilling to cooperate with target states. It is usually within their interests to spur some form of instability within target states, which is why they may financially, logistically, or militarily aid insurgent groups in their respective missions.52 They are usually reluctant to participate in bilateral talks but may become open to multilateral talks with support of regional allies; for example, Syria recently began talks with Israel on the exception that Turkey, an ally of both states, is involved.53
Target States Situated primarily along the Mediterranean coast, target states are the object of terrorist attacks. Their constituents, especially the populations near state borders, are 50
“PKK Ceasefire a Balancing Act for Turkish Government,” Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-03-voa36-68802802.html (accessed 2 January 2010). 51 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1. 52 Ibid. 53 Robert F. Worth, “Warmer Ties With Turkey Kindle Hopes in Syria,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/middleeast/15syria.html (accessed 2 January 2009).
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largely vulnerable to insurgent groups. Unlike states in civil conflict, target states are generally developed, have functioning governments, and possess the resources to tackle terrorism. They fully condemn acts of terrorism and spend a significant portion of their funds on logistical and military equipment to respond to related incidents.54 Target states like Israel and Turkey have initiated incursions and are willing to respond to terrorist pressures with force. For them, national sovereignty is of upmost importance; they are unwilling to concede to terrorist demands that involve infringing upon their territorial integrity.55 The primary concern of target states is national security and protecting their constituents from ideological and physical terror. These states support international NGOs in their humanitarian efforts, but believe that insurgents may use them as safehavens and respond accordingly. Target states often have international allies who are willing to support them with military and monetary aid.56 They participate in multilateral talks and are open to negotiate with international organizations, but do not recognize the legitimacy of negotiating with terrorist groups. Thus, they often acknowledge UN orders but are unwilling to concede anything that would potentially compromise their national autonomy.
Developed States Developed states have an invested interest in the Middle East and thus support the economic, social, and political advancement of states experiencing terrorism.57 Within the international community, these states promote the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. As third-party negotiators, they recognize the need to address the vulnerability of certain groups in armed conflicts. They condemn the use of terrorism as a method of political expression and encourage regional cooperation in responding to the 54
Bekir Cinar, “The Use of Military Force Against Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135640 (accessed 2 January 2010). 55 Ibid. 56 Michel Chossudovsky, “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906 (accessed 2 January 2010). 57 Paul Wilkinson, “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010).
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issue.58 For them, current efforts are ineffective in thwarting the foundations of terrorism. They believe that an international coalition or a higher institution like the UN should be involved at all levels of conflict-resolution for proposed actions to be successful and sustainable. Developed states advocate multilateral talks and direct state intervention as the most effective ways of addressing terrorism. They call for the universal implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and support the addition of terrorism into the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).59 In conflict-ridden areas, they call for the development of monitoring and logistical mechanisms. The European Union (E.U.) in particular views “accurate and timely information and intelligence [as] crucial to forestalling terrorist attacks and identifying the perpetrators.”60
Developed states
support strengthening political institutions as a safeguard against terrorism, particularly in states, like Lebanon, that are experiencing civil conflict. However, the doctrine of national sovereignty and general mistrust of Western involvement prevents developed states from staging direct intervention. Oftentimes, developing states in the region accuse developed states of pushing certain ideologies and reject their propositions – a situation that endangers the strengthening of social institutions and hinders progress toward countering terrorism.61 To counter such effects, developed states fund UN entities and international NGOs that possess good standing with target regions while still maintaining transparency.62 For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) often funds school construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip through the UNRWA.
58
Ibid. Adamantios Vassilakis, “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm (accessed 2 January 2010). 60 European Union Committee, “After Madrid: the EU’s Response to Terrorism,” The Stationary Office of London, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/.../53.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 61 United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 62 Kerlin, Janelle, “U.S. Government Funding for International Nongovernmental Organizations,” Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311332_funding_NGOs.pdf (2 January 2010). 59
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Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) NGOs are instrumental in addressing the humanitarian consequences of terrorism. In areas of conflict, NGOs are mainly responsible for allocating basic resources and sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. When dealing with the issue at hand, NGOs want states to respect international humanitarian law and respond proportionately to terrorist attacks.63 During the Gaza War, several NGOs like Amnesty International and OXFAM reported on the severe implications of Israeli response on civilian life and provided vulnerable groups with basic resources. As a response to terrorist attacks on residential areas in Iraq, UN-Habitat initiated the Urban and Housing Rehabilitation Program (UHRP), which constructs emergency shelter for families without homes and helps strengthen civil society through community work.64 Some NGOs also attempt to establish bilateral relations with governments in order to influence postconflict resolution so that it includes counter-terrorism measures.65 NGOs situated in states with civil conflict often become single actors in their plight to aid vulnerable groups. Host countries usually lack stable infrastructure and states are not able to provide funds, leaving NGOs to oversee their programs without direct assistance.66 In some conflict-ridden regions, NGOs themselves become the targets of rebel groups during insurgencies and face expulsion. Coupled with time limits, these roadblocks prevent NGOs from fully pursuing their agendas. In recent years, NGOs began promoting partnerships with grassroots organizations as a method of ensuring that long-term goals are still pursued after withdrawal. Recognizing the role of social
63
NGO Monitor, “The NGO Front in the Gaza War: The Durban Strategy Continues,” NGO Monitor, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/data/images/File/NGO_Front_Gaza.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 64 UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuId=0 (accessed 2 January 2010). 65 UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000. 66 UN Economic and Social Council (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2), 10.
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institutions in reconstruction, these organizations specialize in community resilience and development.67
Projections & Implications Terrorism is a multifaceted issue with far-reaching implications for society. It has cost the lives of innocent civilians and affects a number of vulnerable populations by diminishing community infrastructure and hindering socioeconomic development. Not only do acts of terrorism infringe upon international law and the rights of human beings, but they also have multifaceted affects on society. The short and long-term consequences of disregarding the rise of terrorism in the Middle East are tremendous. States will continue to experience massive population displacement, as refugees flow into neighboring nations, creating slums around urban centers.68 In some states, these displacements lead to family breakdown and changes in community structures, eroding traditional ways of life. Such an environment has major repercussions for childhood development, as diminishing social institutions ensure that children preserve a repetitive cycle within their societies.69 A multifaceted response to the issue directly corresponds to regional development and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Without formulating a response, the international community will indirectly give legitimacy to rebel groups that subjugate vulnerable populations. The prevalence of insurgent activity will lead to an increase in state funds toward military services and propagate the deterioration of socioeconomic infrastructure in the region.70 Thus, acts of terrorism, no matter how minimal the damage or small in scope, threaten the very foundations of state institutions. As the global community has witnessed in the last decade, terrorism hinders regional development and greatly endangers international security.
67
Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and Governance,� Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf (accessed 2 January 2010). 68 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 69 Phillips, 1. 70 Bureau of International Information Programs, 1.
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Conclusion Unfortunately, the issue of terrorism has remained at a status quo for the past few years. Since the passage of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, the international community has come to disagree on the precise definition of terrorism. The UN has passed resolutions reauthorizing the document and establishing counter-terrorism programs to combat, in particular, sectarian conflict. However, the scope of UN activities remains limited and cooperation within the Middle East remains low. State initiatives have focused mostly on military responses and prosecution, overlooking the preventative capabilities of a strengthened social sector. Without regional cooperation and the inclusion of measures to prevent identity-related tribulations in post-conflict resolution, insurgents’ reliance on armed conflict as a means of political change will continue to increase
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Discussion Questions • What is the definition of terrorism as recognized by the UN? What are the some of the problems associated with adopting a universal definition? How may these hinder efforts to address terrorism? • What was the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1373? How did it deviate from precedent and what were some of its landmark provisions? • How did the Canal Hotel bombings change UN practices in the Middle East? • What is the significance of the al-Askari Mosque bombing in relation to the effects of terrorist activities? How did it demonstrate the importance of identity politics in sustaining terrorism? • Why did the Lebanese government and UNIFIL refuse to disarm Hezbollah despite UN command? What does this demonstrate about the influence of insurgent groups on civilian populations? • In relation to state responses to terrorism, what did the Israel-Hezbollah and Gaza Wars call into question? How can the committee address this issue without infringing upon national sovereignty? • What are some of the roadblocks that NGOs and developed states face in their attempts to help states in civil conflict combat terrorism? • How can the UN address the issue of state sponsored terrorism? • In certain societies in the Middle East, sectarian conflict and poor community infrastructure are roadblocks to initiating counter-terrorism measures. What can the international community do to combat this without infringing too heavily on societal values? • Has globalization played a role in the rise of terrorism? Explain why and/or why not. What types of socioeconomic policies are favorable to limiting the influence of terrorism? • Identify governmental programs that your state initiated to combat terrorism. What lessons can be learned from their successes and/or failures? What is your state currently doing to address the concerns of vulnerable populations?
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Bibliography Further Reading Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,� U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html This source provides a comprehensive background of the issue and why terrorism should be at the forefront of the global agenda. It includes a quick summary of international progress and lays out a series of possible frameworks in combating terrorism. The document gives a good understanding of the underlying causes propelling terrorism and the military, economic, and social issues at hand. United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html This source provides a good insight onto the humanitarian aspect of the issue at hand. It illustrates the necessity of mechanisms for the social advancement of vulnerable populations and outlines the progression of international initiatives over time. Organized by the Human Rights Council, this document particularly focuses on the role of NGOs in addressing the consequences of terrorist acts and state responses to related incidents. It calls into the question the actions of targeted states. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004) This is the quintessential UN document for understanding the role of the UN in addressing the issue. It outlines the jurisdiction of related UN agencies in combating terrorism and highlights the importance of regional conventions. It summarizes the agreed conclusions of the Security Council and provides useful objectives for formulizing successful resolutions.
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Works Cited Abadie, Alberto. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” Working Paper Series, Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government, RWP04-043. Al Jazeera, “Lebanon Blast Kills UNIFIL Troops,” Al Jazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/06/2008525122010725840.html Alex Barker, “Kurds Lay Claim to Blast on Azeri Oil Pipeline,” Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4836dca-64e1-11dd-af610000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” University of Michigan, http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/twq06spring_atran.pdf BBC, “Gaza ‘Looks Like Earthquake Zone,’” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7838618.stm BBC, “UN Condemns ‘War Crimes’ in Gaza,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8257301.stm Blanchard, Christopher M. “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf Brahimi, Lakhdar. “State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries,” UNPAN, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf Brooks, Ethel. “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, November 2008. Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Background Note: Lebanon,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833.htm#political Byrd, Miemie Winn. “Combating Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,” Defense Techincal Information Center, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4106.pdf
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Chossudovsky, Michel. “’Triple Alliance’: The US, Turkey, Israel and the War on Lebanon,” Center for Research on Globalization, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2906 Cinar, Bekir. “The Use of Military Force Against Terrorism,” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=135640 Council on Foreign Relations, “Hamas,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ European Union Committee, “After Madrid: the EU’s Response to Terrorism,” The Stationary Office of London, www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/.../53.pdf Ghattas, Kim. “Mixed Feelings Over UN Iraq Role,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6941560.stm Gokoluk, Selcuk and Orhan Coskun. “Bomb in Turkish Capital Kills Six, Injures 80,” Reuters, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22619461.htm Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism,” Club de Madrid, http://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Serieson-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf Kerlin, Janelle, “U.S. Government Funding for International Nongovernmental Organizations,” Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311332_funding_NGOs.pdf “Letter May Detail Iraqi Insurgency’s Concerns,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/10/sprj.nirq.zarqawi/ Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmitt. “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?hp NGO Monitor, “The NGO Front in the Gaza War: The Durban Strategy Continues,” NGO Monitor, http://www.ngomonitor.org/data/images/File/NGO_Front_Gaza.pdf
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Phillips, James. “The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism,” The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/BG1005.cfm “PKK Ceasefire a Balancing Act for Turkish Government,” Voice of America, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-06-03-voa36-68802802.html Samuelson, Meg. “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 833-855. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, “The Committee’s Mandate,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html Sengupta, Somini. “Afghan Bombing Sends Stark Message to India,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/asia/09india.html?_r=1 Smith, Dan. “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000. UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuI d=0 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 (2006), UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c30b6e0.html United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Archive for May 2007,” 2007 Lebanon Emergency, http://www.unrwalebanon.org/nle/?m=200705 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1373(2001) United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://daccessods.un.org/TMP/9969713.09185028.html
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United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566 (2004), United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1566(2004) United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” InterParliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf Vassilakis, Adamantios. “EU Presidency Statement: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” European Union @ United Nations, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_2065_fr.htm Wilkinson, Paul. “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp084.pdf Worth, Robert F. “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting off Sectarian Fury,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/22cndiraq.html?hp&ex=1140670800&en=1077baccd068bf6b&ei=5094&partner=home page Worth, Robert F. “Warmer Ties With Turkey Kindle Hopes in Syria,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/world/middleeast/15syria.html
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Works Consulted Brooks, Ethel. “Feminist Perspectives on War and Terror,” Women and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, November 2008. Bureau of International Information Programs, “State Department on Terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2008/April/20080430121233eaifas0.4066278.html Groots International, “Grassroots Women’s Initiatives in Reconstruction and Governance,” Groots International, http://www.groots.org/download/Sri_Lanka_exchange.pdf Samuelson, Meg. “The Disfigured Body of the Female Guerilla,” Signs 32, no. 4 (2007): 833-855. Smith, Dan. “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict,” Berghof Research Center, http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/smith_handbook.pdf UN Economic and Social Council. Commission on the Status of Women Acting as Preparatory Committee for Women 2000, 3rd Session. Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action (E/CN.6/2000/PC/2). 19 January 2000. UN-Habitat, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Housing Sector in Iraq,” UN-Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=692&catid=203&typeid=13&subMenuI d=0 United Nations, “2008 Parliamentary Hearing, Background Paper: Session II,” InterParliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga08/s2.pdf