IFATCA The Controller November 1974

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JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERAT!ON OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATI ONS

In this Issue:

FRANKF U RT AM MAIN

Future Air Traffic Control Systems

NOVEMBER1974

CONCORDE and Air Traffic Control

VOLUM E 13

NO . 4

441 .015

International Air Traffic :

-SAFETY FIRST Our contribution : ATC radar systems AEG-TELEFUNKEN Fachbereich Hochfrequenztechnik 79 Ulm · PB 830 Federal Republic of Germany

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Radar equipment of AEG-TELEFUNKEN

IFATCA

JOURNAL

OF

AIR

TRAFFIC CONTROL

THE CONTROllER Frankfurt am Main, November 1974

Volume 13 • No. 4

Publlsher: International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations, P. 0. B. 196, CH-1215 Geneva 15 Airport, Switzerland.

Ofllcers of IFATCA: J-0. Monln, President, O. H. J6nsson, Vice-President (Technical), R. E. Meyer, Vice· President (Professional), H. Guddat, Vice-President (Administration), T. H. Harrison, Executive Secretary, J. Gubelmann, Treasurer.

Editor: G. J. de Boer, P. 0. B. 8071 Edleen, Kempton Park, Tvl., 1625 South Africa Telephone: 975-3521 Contributing Editor: V. D. Hopkin (Human Factors) Publlshlng Company, Production, Subscription Service and Advertising Sales Office: Verlag W. Kramer & Co., 6 Frankfurt am Main 60, Bornheimer Landwehr 57a, Phone 43 43 25 and 49 21 69, Frankfurter Bank, No. 3-03333-9. Rate Card Nr. 4.

Printed by: W. Kramer & Co., 6 Frankfurt am Main 60, Bornheimer Landwehr 57a. (Federal Republic of Germany).

Subscription Rate: OM 6.- per annum for members of IFATCA OM 10.- per annum for non-members (Postage will be charged extra) Contributors are expressing their personal points of view and opinions, which must not necessarily coincide with those of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA).

CONTENTS

IFATCA does not assume responsibility for statements made and opinions expressed, It does only accept reu;10nsibility for publishing these contributions.

Future Air Traffic Control Systems ....................... ·

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Contributions are welcome as are comments and criticism. No payment can be made for manuscripts submitted for publication in "The Controller". The Editor reserves the right to make any editorial changes In manuscripts, which he believes will Improve the material without altering the intended meaning.

Selection and Training of ATCO Cadets in the U. K. . ..... · ·

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The Control of Air Traffic in Europe ................. · · · · · · ·

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Medical Research into the Profession of Air Traffic Control ... ·

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Concorde and Air Traffic Control ............. · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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Written permission by the Editor is necessary for reprinting any part of this Journal.

Report from the British Accident Investigation Branch .... · · · ·

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ATC Clearances contrary to Administrative Directions .. · · · · · ·

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ARTS II Automated Air Traffic Control System ... · · · · · · · · · · ·

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International Law ................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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News from Member Associations ...... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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A Commonality of Interest ....... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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News from Corporation Members .... ·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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News from the Federation ...... · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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The Pilot's Point of View .......... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

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Folos: Aerospatiale, Archiv, Department of Trade and Industry, U. K., The Herald & Weekly Times, Lockheed Electronics, Marconi Radar Systems, Ministry of Technology, U. K.• PATCO. Cover: Horst Guddat Advertisers In this Issue: AEG-TELEFUNKEN (inside cover) Civil Air Operations Officers' Association of Australia (page 47/48) Selenia Radar and Systems Division (back cover)

Editorial IFATCA '75 Australia has been elected by the Federation to host the 14th Annual Conference in 1975.

The conference will be held in the Melbourne Hilton Hotel from 14-18 April, 1975.

The Executive Board urges its individual members to make an all-out effort to attend the 1975 Conference. Australia's International Airline, QANTAS, will offer extensive air fare discounts, and for most of us, this will be the opportunity of a lifetime to visit the Continent "down under." Do not let the distance discourage you, because in our modern age, distances mean little, and you will undoubtedly regret it later on if you do not take advantage of this exceptional opportunity to visit Australia, especially since the host Association is going all out to make the Conference another memorable occasion.

The Civil Air Operations Officers' Association of Australia has been in existence for 26 years, and was founded on 25th August, 1948, when its first members consisted of a small band (approximately 104) of Air Traffic Controllers, Examiners of Airmen and Airways surveyors. The first Secretary of the Association was D. G. Anderson (now Sir Donald Anderson C. B. E.) who was then Superintendent of Air Traffic Control. Sir Donald was Director-General of the Department of Civil Aviation for nearly 20 years prior to becoming Chairman of the Board for the Australian International Airline, Qantas, at the end of 1973.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, it is a safe bet that Sir Donald will be one of Australia's aviation personalities you will meet.

The Association's membership is now over 1200 and consists of Air Traffic Controllers (the bulk of the membership), Superintendents of Flying Operations and Airways Operations.

Examiners of Airmen, Airways Surveyors, Flight Test Officers, Air Safety Investigators and Airport Directors/Managers.

Although the Association is involved in negotiations with Government Authorities to secure benefits for members in remuneration and working conditions, it participates regularly in a consultative professional capacity with the Department to improve operating procedures, operating techniques, facilities planning and accomodation.

For further partie.Ylars regarding the organisation of the Conference, please see the Association's announcement published elsewhere in this Journal.

Air Movement Record Analysis and ATC Expenditure The value of present-day air movement records collected within the ATC environment are, to say the least, of questionable value and this was clearly outlined in the articles written by Mr. B. L. Watkin of the New Zealand Association which have appeared In recent issues. Other perhaps not too well known aspects in the relationship between these records and ATC expenditure were mentioned by Mr. S. R. Walton, Director of Administration in Britain's Air Traffic Services, in his address at the Royal Aeronautical Society Symposium in London earlier this year.

The first part of Mr. Walton's paper (published elsewhere in this issue) dealt with the problems of some small countries in handling the increasing amount, and more particularly the increasing speeds, of air traffic during the sixties. Apart from the other difficulties which they experienced was the obvious difficulty of expense, in that it became necessary to invest in very much more sophisticated types of equipment. During much of this time Mr. Walton was personally involved in having to make out the case for financial expenditures on ATC equipment, and he was often met with the counter-argument that the amount of traffic had gone up only by such and such a proportion, and that the rate of increase of expenditure on ATC ought not to rise faster.

However, this is a false argument, and the points Mr. Walton mentioned at the Symposium in trying to deal briefly with it were as follows: a) the complexity of air traffic control is influenced first by the number of aircraft in the airspace being controlled. However it does not rise simply in proportion to that number, because the purpose of the control is to prevent collisions. In other words it rises as the square of that number. One example quoted by the speaker was the number of civil air traffic movements handled in the U. K. in 1970 compared with 1950. In the interval the figure had just about quadrupled. This therefore represents, in very broad terms, a multiplication of the complexity of the control task not by four, but by sixteen;

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b) the second factor is of course the speed of the aircraft, or rather the inverse of that speed. The faster the aircraft with which a Controller has to deal, the shorter is the decisionmaking time at his disposal. Again, the speaker quoted the 1950-1970 interval, which was a good one for this purpose as it covered the introduction of jet aircraft into civil aviation.

In 1950 the fastest civil aircraft in operational service was flying at about 300 miles per hour. In 1970 the corresponding figure was about 600 miles per hour. Again in very broad terms, the Controller was having to make his decisions in half the time he had been able to use twenty years earlier. Whether this multiplies the complexity of air traffic control by two or by some higher number is an interesting question, but one can at least take two as a minimum; c) a further factor, not so easily assessed, is the difference between the speed of the fastest and slowest aircraft which the Controller has to handle. Obviously if all aircraft fly at about the same speed, his task is simpler. The greater the span of speed the greater the problem of maintaining the longitudinal separation. With the introduction of new types of aircraft this span tends to widen, and it was certainly much wider in 1970 than in 1950.

These are three fairly crude but perhaps easily understood factors - no doubt there are others too that will occur to readers. Judging by them alone however one can at once see how wrong it would be to say that, because 1970 traffic was about four times that in 1950, the control task, and similarly expenditure thereon, should be only four times as complicated. A better figure to advance would be a multiplier of at least fifty. Indeed, the fact that expenditure has not increased by this amount, and yet collisions are still remarkably rare, suggests that there was fortunately a good deal of slack in the system of 1950!

How Others Look at Us Occasionally, 'this journal contains an article on some aspect of ATC written by a columnist who has no direct connection with our profession, but who looks at what goes on within our midst through interested eyes, sometimes those of a pilot, or an airline spokesman, an aviation journalist, etc. Although such articles may contain nothing new for controllers, it is thought that we can still benefit by knowing how others view the developments in ATC and what they think of us. The writers' views, of course, are their own, and controllers may agree or disagree with them and at times dispute the correctness of their statements, but whatever the views expressed, let's take them in the spirit in which they are made: an honest attempt in trying to understand the complexities of today's Air Traffic Control Systems.

GdB

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Future Air Traffic Control Systems An Important New Study by Controller/Pilot Group

Introduction The Air Traffic Control Systems Committee is a private British group which was set up to consider and propose long-term planning concepts for a new ATC system. Its membership consists essentially of ATC system users, with advice upon the engineering and ergonomics aspects of system design provided through the Royal Aeronautical Society, and is drawn from the British Air Line Pilots Association, the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators, the Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers and the Royal Aeronautical Society. The work has been entirely voluntary and in a personal capacity, with members being nominees rather than representatives to avoid any formal commitment to particular interests. It is believed that the contribution of this Committee may be unique, at least in the field of aviation, in that - as far as is known - this is thought to be the first time such a system design study has been jointly undertaken by the principal users rather than by designers or researchers.

It is not in any sense contended that a users' study should replace that by designers. But it is suggested that neither, alone, can be sufficient and both are essential.

Whether the desired result (i. e. better systems) can be achieved by full participation and equal involvement of all parties in one system study, remains to be explored in the future.

The Chairman of the Committee is Mr. B. Job, D. F. C., Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers; the Deputy Chairman is Captain A. Caesar-Gordon, D. F. C., D. F. M., Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators; and the Committee's Secretary is Mr. R. G. Boulter, Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers.

Royal Aeronautical Society representation was achieved by the introduction of Professor G. A. Whitfield, Head of the Department of Electronic and Control Engineering, College of Aeronautics and Cranfield Institute of Technology; and tater Professor B. Shackel, Head of the Department of Ergonomics and Cybernetics at Loughborough University and Scientific Editor of the Journal Applied Ergonomics, also joined the Committee.

The Group has issued a report on the preliminary study upon which it first embarked and the results of this study are embodied in specific proposals expressing the aims, design principles and functional requirements for a new ATC system on a national basis but taking account of international implications. Particular emphasis is given to the vital importance both of the place of man in the system, and of the environmental factors affecting the efficiency of the air traffic controller and the pilot, especially in the context of increasing automation. It is the Committee's firm conviction that the future will see a predominantly "directive" method of Air Traffic Control rather than a totally permissive one, and that the predictable penalties associated with a preplanned traffic flow are to be preferred to the chance penalties associated with a random distribution of traffic.

At the same time it is imperative to reduce all possible

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penalties associated with the system to an acceptable minimum.

At its first meeting, the Committee adopted the following broad terms of reference: "The Committee is dedicated to the promotion of an Air Traffic Control System acceptable to all world aviation authorities, which task will include the development of an ATC System on a national basis, taking account of international implications."

Initially, the period selected for study extended from the 1970s to 1990 but, in view of the constraints to which the introduction of system changes might well be subject and the inevitable variability in air traffic forecasts, the committee's work was not specifically confined to any fixed time period. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the 1980s would be the period most likely to see significant changes in the basic ATC system. The committee agreed at an early stage that a pilot-study should be completed as soon as possible, the result to include recommendations for a National Air Traffic Management System.

It was pointed out that the committee should consider the needs of all pilots, as well as all controllers, both civil and military. In order to proceed, however, it was decided in the first instance to focus upon the requirements of commercial aviation and compatible elements in the general aviation and military categories. It was postulated that by 1990, 2000 all aircraft in such a system could be fitted at a reasonable cost with a navigational aid presenting better than a 0.5 nm positional accuracy, with self-warning of navigational discrepancies.

Initially three main themes seemed very clear. The system used for Air Traffic Control would: (a) be essentially Strategic in character; indeed as far as the controller or pilot wa~concerned it would be largely "speechless"; (b) be based on the concepts of navigation on the flight deck and control from the ground. Tactical separation should not devolve upon the pilot, although station-keeping might become an accepted technique and airborne Collision Avoidance Systems might have a function as a useful se;:>aration monitor; (c) require in the specifications for ATC ground equipment, both off-line (planning) and on-line (dynamic) computer systems.

While flexible aircraft performance was highly desirable it was also recognised by the committee that those aircraft in the system which had a great deal of in-built flexibility should, nevertheless, not be subjected to unwarranted demands upon such characteristics.

After the exploratory discussions which had preceded it, the committee was able to specify its first task in the following terms: "The Committee accepts as its first task the formulation of principles and objectives, both general and detailed, which should govern the implementation of the next generation Air Traffic Control System." Thereafter an attempt was made to visualise the kind of system which should evolve and the part which the controller, in parti-

cular, should play in it. At this stage an inevitable question to be answered was whether it was possible to foresee a time when the incidence of unlawful acts in the air (such as hi-jacking), severe fuel restrictions, disputes between the management and staffs of innumerable aviation organisations, and other disruptions, would be of such a high order as to negate any plans for a strategically based international ATC system. The committee believed that to entertain such considerations would be an admission of defeat, not only on the part of national administrations, but also by ICAO and the entire aviation community. Consequently, members were re-inforced in their view that the continual application of predominantly tactical forms of ATC would be wasteful of overall resources, including fuel and personnel, and lead to inefficiency in terms of regularity.

Experience has shown that the most critical part in the development of any evolutionary ATC system can be the stage where the introduction of new elements and subsystems is made into the basic system. With this in mind, therefore, the committee considered some of the ways and means of achieving the desired eventual system. No-one can envisage, as yet, a really practical Air Traffic Control System which does not rely upon the active participation of individual human beings in one way or another. It is inconceivable, that an operational ATC system could be devised during this century without such participation; neither could engineers put the performance reliability figures for technical sub-systems at a sufficiently high level with any degree of confidence. Therefore, the place of pilots, controllers and other human operators in the system is certain.

Having said this, one is faced with the considerable difficulties attending the various interfaces which are commonly and collectively known as the "man/machine relationship".

In addition to the means by which the controller talks with the machine, the problems include the design of the "universe of discourse" within which the conversation takes place, and the development of a synergic working relationship between man and computer within this framework.

Some difficulties are inevitable and cannot be shortcircuited; they must be studied and resolved when planning the details of a system. Paradoxically, the importance of the man/machine relationship in Air Traffic Control has in the past consistently been undervalued. The members of the ATC Systems Committee, because of their particular professional disciplines and experience, considered that they were qualified to place especial emphasis upon this subject, under the broad heading of "Human and Environmental Considerations", to be covered later on in the study.

The effect of future large-scale use of newer forms of airborne vehicle, such as Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) aircraft and Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) aircraft, was considered. However, although the introduction of such aircraft could radically change airport design, and even substantially increase the traffic offering from individual airports, the effect upon the en-route ATC system was mainly one of scale and differing parameters, e. g. for climb and descent, rather than one of basic system incompatibility. In view of the many uncertainties surrounding the large-scale introduction of such aircraft it was not only difficult but also unrewarding to dwell ~pon these effects at this time. There were, however, considered to be some side-effects on the ATC system related to airports

due to noise pollution and its abatement and to wake turbulence from large aircraft, and these aspects will be covered later on.

Finally, it might appear that, in postulating a system for Air Traffic Control which substantially serves air transport and similar aircraft, the growing proportion of general aviation aircraft has been ignored. Not only that but the committee may appear to have taken the easy path towards its conclusions, rather than consider the whole population of air users, which might have been more difficult. Members would, however, consider this to be an unjust criticism, if it were to be made, for the undermentioned reasons.

A safe system demands conformity to certain basic rules: consequently if the air user demands safety of a sufficiently high order he should be prepared to pay, not only financially, but by discipline for such conformity. (In this context many aircraft in the expanding general aviation category will, in fact, be relatively sophisticated in equipment and pilotage). A lower order of air safety will always be acceptable to certain air users, provided that it costs them less than the full system and that the demands made on total airspace availability by the air transport sector are not disproportionate.

The great mass of both passengers and goods, as well as military supplies, will be moved by the aircraft of commercial or State operators for several decades to come. If only for economic reasons, it is unlikely that to-day's freedom of the private individual to have access to the roads as he wishes will be repeated in the air.

The Strategic System Concept and Aircraft Performance In order to assist in the determination of Principles and Objectives of the future system, the committee first produced the following two papers on the Strategic System Concept and Aircraft Performance.

Paper 1: The Strategic ATC System The case for a basically strategic Air Traffic Control system, as opposed to one which is predominantly tactical, depends upon an apparent need, at least within Europe, to use the limited resources of airspace, communications, manpower and, to some extent, the airports in an economic manner. The very notion that mainly tactical forms of control would suffice springs from a false assumption that capacity within the system is to be had just for the asking.

At this stage there is only a somewhat imprecise definition of "strategic" as applied to ATC. At one end of the spectrum one could have a system which planned every flight in detail whilst the aircraft schedule was being drawn up. At the other end one could have a system which avoids being termed "tactical" only because it at least plans the total flight of the vehicle to its destination, even if it does so at the last minute. Despite the difficulty of terminology and that of deciding exactly where in the spectrum the preferred system should lie, the committee was convinced that the system should be a "strategic" one, in the sense that the whole pattern of operations is pre-planned so that minimal (if any) urgent intervention is required during normal operation.

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The Concept In its ideal form the strategic ATC system is one where 3-dimensional navigation and time all accord to a basic known plan. It is "speechless" in the sense that it is not dependent upon intervention from either controller or pilot, except where changes to the planned flow become necessary due to the inability of one or more aircraft to meet declared parameters for their flight. However, at various stages of flight, e. g. after transfer of control from one ATC unit to another, confirmation of clearance, probably by an automatic data link, would be a routine requirement. Essentially such a system applies programmed scheduling both en route and at airports, in order to accord with system capacity. Consequently, it serves primarily air transport and other co-operating agencies, although adequate capacity should be reserved for unscheduled and general aviation operations.

The Requirement The need for a basically strategic system arises from the requirement for increased overall ATC capability within limited airspace, without making uneconomic and impractical demands for ATC staffing, software and hardware. Except at some airports there is, currently, little effective strategic planning of flights for ATC purposes, although there is much planning for commercial advantages, etc.

Coarse flow controls are currently applied to both departure intervals and/or departure rates as well as to acceptance rates at both airports and en route Area Control Centres. The tools are crude and the results are of comparable imprecision. Inevitably a degree of confusion often results.

While air traffic continues to increase, the rate of increase of sector capacities at Area Control Centres is very slow and temporary overload conditions result in ad hoe methods, e. g. radar vectoring and en route holding.

Because ATC response to a situation is not very predictable, intervention by a controller often comes at an inconvenient time for the pilot. Not only ATC workload but also pilot workload requires to be balanced and a succession of alternating "do little" I "do a great deal quickly" situations eliminated. A tactical system suffers not only from a limited, but also a finite, capacity due to the heavy workload generated. A strategic system has greater capability and, if well planned, provides the potential for expansion.

The Role of the Controller and the Piiot in a Strategic System To achieve the degree of co-ordinated planning required in an efficient strategic system, automation of the planning functions is essential. It should be stressed that the difference between an "automatic" and a "manual'' system is not the difference between machine-made and man-made decisions; it is the difference between control decisions made off-line by management and decisions taken on-line by pilots or controllers.

The ATC system software design should give the controller in the field the maximum possible control over the behaviour of the system, e. g. the choice of data to be displayed, the display formats, and the style of solution served up by the machine. A major outstanding task for the software designers is to ensure that there exists a suitable

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special-purpose "language" by which a practising controller with no extensive training in programming can shape the behaviour of the automatic system to suit his current needs. Present-day techniques of software specification and implementation are too cumbersome to deal with the dynamic problems of an evolving ATC system, and controllers in the field can be frustrated by their inability to influence the electronic straight-jacket by which they are surrounded.

In the automated system, a major task of the controller and pilot is to act as monitors; the controller of the separation, navigation and achieved flow within the total system, the pilot of the navigation both horizontal and vertical, flight progress (time) and other related flight systems in his aircraft.

One fundamental question concerns the degree of intervention by the human controller or pilot which may be essential to the system. Yet another is whether either, in the long run, should retain overriding control of increasingly complex dynamic situations.

Opinion is that the human element must be retained in order to provide immediate intervention in the event of breakdown or overload. It follows, therefore, that both controllers and pilots must be in sufficient practice to make such intervention effective, and this could mean radical changes to training methods, including the requirement for regular controller continuation training using simulators.

In this context, it is understood that humans make poor passive monitors of dynamic situations. However if, within their intelligence, they make essential functional inputs into the system they can remain alert to the current situation. In the event of partial system failure they can then more readily provide a supplementary service and, in the event of temporary complete failure, take emergency action. To fulfil this function, for example, a controller may request that all aircraft identify themselves by SSR l/P on first contact, a pilot by executing and obtaining a feedback on identification and confirmation of clearance.

It is futile and dangerous to suppose that, in the increasingly complex automatic systems, every traffic eventuality will have been foreseen and catered for. Thus, even in the absence of equipment malfunction, there is a problem of fitting the infinitely variable situations that arise in the real world into a finite number of pigeon-holes for which the software has been designed.

The System The theme is efficient pre-flight organisation and minimum in-flight intervention. There are a number of fundamental elements of this organisation, listed hereunder, which should be considered: - The international integrated scheduling of traffic, taking account of normal maximum airport and en route sector capacities. The probable demands to be placed on the system by agencies which are unable to forecast their activities far in advance, i. e. business/executive flights, military aircraft, etc., would be estimated.

- On-line computer/computer transmission of proposed schedules prior to collation and, subject to necessary adjustments, acceptance by the concerned ATC authorities.

- Approved flight plans, probably long-term, with declared tolerances throughout a flight for horizontal and vertical navigation and time.

- A route structure designed for the desired maximum flow and a minimum number of confliction points.

- 4-Dimensional navigational capability in the aircraft is required in order to meet the requirements mentioned above.

- An airborne monitor of flight progress which would also be data linked to ATC to permit corroboration of ground surveillance data, i. e. identification, horizontal and vertical position, velocity and time.

- A ground surveillance and monitoring system with automatic alarms for conflict detection, navigational deviations and system malfunction, as well as ATC ability to intervene tactically if necessary. Access to data link would be required for the relay of clearances and to confirm adherence to flight plan, as a routine.

- ACAS (Airborne Collision Avoidance System) for station-keeping or collision avoidance, as a component in a "fail-soft" system.

dividual aircraft operating capabilities in order to maximise the efficiency of the system in terms of capacity and economical operation of the aircraft, while always maintaining safe separation. The system should be capable of providing a service for all types of aircraft, from general aviation light single-engined to the SST (Supersonic Transport). However, it is recognised that some segregation will be necessary between those aircraft able to conform in all respects to a fully automated system and those requiring limited or total manual control.

Some Dlfflcultles to be Overcome on the Way

Speed at all Stages of Climb, Cruise, Descent and Approach to Land

There are again a number of factors, listed below, which will have an inevitable effect on the smooth working of a strategic system. These are: - Emergencies.

- Other contingencies, e. g. delays due to weather (possibly becoming rarer), weather hazards in flight and inability to achieve the desired profile and/or time schedule due to weather effects (temperature, wind, turbulence, etc.).

- The injection of priority traffic into the system at short notice.

- A range of parameters governing the performance of individual aircraft which is too wide and, therefore, incompatible in a system depending on adherence to planned profiles.

- Too low a proportion of properly equipped aircraft for the system to work except with reduced reliability and/ or capacity. It seems likely that only regulatory methods can adequately deal with such a situation.

It is re-emphasised that it will be necessary in an increasingly more complex, automated system to establish the real responsibilities of controllers and pilots at the interface between man and machine. Similarly, the inherent flexibility and skills of pilots and controllers should continue to be utilised as part of the fail-safe or fail-soft element of the system. How this is done, while maintaining essential job satisfaction, may be a critical issue.

Paper II: Aircraft Performance and ATC With regard to aircraft performance it is readily apparent that there is often considerable flexibility already built in, and so the principle question is how best to use it. However, since all variations from the optimum performance carry some penalty, either operational or economic or both, one must look at those aspects which are not only rewarding from an ATC point of view but which result in minimum penalty to the aircraft operator.

Should the system fit the aircraft - or should the aircraft fit the system? The result will obviously be a compromise but, essentially, the system should exist to serve the needs of the aircraft.

Principles An Air Traffic Control system should provide a service to all aircraft which require it, utilising the flexibility of in-

Considerations Insofar as the present generation of aircraft and the foreseeable future generations are concerned, the parameters of aircraft performance detailed below will have to be considered.

(a} The indicated speed of modern aircraft in the climb is probably the most constant. Each aircraft type has an optimum climb speed for overall economy. This speed can be varied for maximum gradient or maximum rate. However, changes in gradient or rate have a corresponding effect on forward speed if optimum power is maintained. If flexibility of speed, gradient and rate is required, flexibility of climb power will need to be provided. (b) Cruise speed is more manageable, but changes from optimum usually result in a fuel penalty and reduced economic efficiency. (c) Descent speed is normally amenable to variation but fuel penalties may be incurred. (d) The approach speed is much less flexible since the appropriate aerodynamic configuration will have associated limiting ranges of speed, and the final approach speed will be governed by the weight of the aircraft. Operationally, it should not be arbitrarily adjusted for ATC reasons. (e) Generally, if optimum speeds are filed in a flight plan, they may only be varied to a strictly limited extent.

In a strategic system using an off-line ATC computer, flight profile speeds would need to be flexible in each direction while remaining within acceptable limits.

Climb and Descent Profiles These can be varied by changes in speed or power; both are conditional on aircraft weight and ambient air density. Variation in climb profile is very limited but quite a wide range in descent profile can be accomodated on request, provided the requirement is clearly stated prior to commencement of descent.

Operating Altitude Band Upper and lower limits are determined by various factors; upper limits by pressurisation considerations, oxygen status, aircraft weight, power output, ambient density, etc., and lower limits by terrain clearance and fuel consumption.

Most aircraft (turbo-jet and turbo-prop) suffer economic penalties of fuel and speed at the lower operating altitudes.

The optimum altitude providing overall economy for a specific operation is directly related to the stage length.

Turning Circle This is a function of true airspeed and bank angle. In practice bank angle is fixed for passenger comfort and

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therefore airspeed is the only practical variable. For maximum efficiency, tracks with minimum turns are required, particularly in terminal area operations in the departure phase. Sequencing for approach may exploit the generally lower speed and resultant smaller turning circle. The higher speed necessary at the higher altitudes result in large turning circles.

Fuel for Range/Endurance and Contingency Since variations from optimum flight path and performance are all costly in fuel time, extra fuel required to meet such variations results in loss of payload availability and possible reduction in the operating range of the aircraft. All variations from the optimum operation required

by ATC must therefore be considered against the fuel and time penalties.

Navigational Ability An aircraft's performance in an ATC environment can only be as good as its navigational system; therefore, accuracy and versatility must be of a high standard to provide the maximum flexibility of operation in four dimensions, i. e. including time.

Variations in Present-Generation Aircraft Performance Speed variation of ± 25 knots, at an average climb or descent speed of 300 knots, result in a change of 2 1/2 minutes of sector time over a distance of 150 miles. Similarly, at an average cruising speed of 600 knots, a variation of ± 50 knots results in a change of 5 minutes in sector time over a distance of 300 miles.

Rates of climb average 1000 ft. per min or 2-3° climb angle up to 20,000 ft. decreasing thereafter. Steeper rates or gradients can only be achieved with a loss of forward speed or, to a very limited degree, by using extra power.

Rates of descent average 1500-2000 ft. per min. or 340 gradient and can be substantially varied by use of power or drag devices according to aircraft type.

Factors Affecting Variations in Aircraft Performance Restrictions that may be placed on aircraft performance for safety reasons, in certain configurations and situations, are as follows: (a) maximum speed for bird impact; (b) maximum speed with unheated windscreens; (c) maximum and minimum speeds in severe turbulence; (d) maximum speed with flaps, undercarriage, drag devices, etc. extended; (e) maximum rate of climb or descent determined by the pressurisation system; (f) maximum ± g-force.

Aircraft Types and their Performance Requirements In the cruise phase, aircraft of widely differing performance would normally be separated by their altitude requirements; the slow, unpressurised aircraft operating at or below 10,000 ft. and SSTs above 50,000 ft. In between, provision must be made for aircraft of differing capabilities.

During climb and descent all aircraft are, at some stage, using the same altitude band. On short stage flights, high performance aircraft will require to operate at the lower levels and will need to be integrated with the slower traffic.

Specific tracks within a parallel track structure may need

8

to be designated for aircraft having significantly different speed requirements; alternatively it may be possible in low traffic densities to relate cruising speed with altitude.

Conclusions It is considered that, at the planning stage, the avoidance of conflict can best be achieved by the application of vertical separation coupled with track separation based on an accurate airborne navigation system. Tactical separation can be achieved by short-term variations of any or all of the performance parameters.

In every phase of flight, there exists a requirement for an aircraft not to be subjected to unwarranted demands regarding its flight profile .. The system must be programmed with the performance parameters of each aircraft type wishing to accept the ATC service, together with the maximum acceptable variations.

(This is the first in a series of articles presented to readers of "The Controller". The second article will appear in a subsequent issue.)

ICAO Statement on Developments in Air Traffic Services Each year, the Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organisation prepares - and the ICAO Council approves - for transmittal to Member States, a comprehensive Annual Report on developments in the field of civil aviation.

In its Report released in May 1974, ICAO says that the year saw no major breakthrough in equipment or techniques in Air Traffic Services, designed to alleviate air traffic congestion in high traffic density areas of the world, but that steady efforts to improve the overall traffic management system continued to be made on a broad front, regionally and world-wide.

The Report continues: The need for extending Air Traffic Control service to areas where flight information service or air traffic advisory service had so far been considered sufficient or acceptable was further emphasized and also confirmed by two major ICAO Regional Air Navigation Meetings.

In high traffic density areas, insufficient aerodrome and ATS capacity resulted in a need for more advanced planning of air traffic service systems to permit better utilization of airspace and to achieve greater air traffic handling capacity. The potential of area navigation techniques continued to receive attention and studies regarding the role of increased accuracy and reliability of aircraft navigation and groundbased monitoring systems in relation to reduction of the current separation minima were accelerated.

Toward the end of the year, the need for optimum efficiency within the air traffic services system and for general availability of direct ATS routes was further accentuated by determined efforts to conserve fuel in the face of a general shortage of aviation fuel.

Measures were taken to regulate traffic flow along heavily travelled air routes or to limit the number of flights into particularly congested aerodromes, as a means of alleviating excessive delays. These were implemented on a provisional basis, pending increase in the capacity of the system.

Disruption of the air traffic flow in Western Europe continued to be particularly se rious in the summer months and confirmed the need for central flow-control facilities intended to improve the organization of the air traffic flow. Th e situation was aggravated by prolonged labo ur disputes in some States between the A ir Traffic Controllers and thei r employers.

The developm ent and application of primary and secondary radar techniques continued , as did the use of automation for the processing and displaying of flight plan and flight progress information. Research continued into the requirements of SSTs for air traffic services and into the means of meeting these requirements and of integrating SST traffic into the existing traffic flow patterns.

Airborne collision avoidance devices continu ed to be the subject of considerable publicity. Furthe r development and evalu ation of such devices, capable of universal application, we re considered important.

It was, howeve r, generally recognized that the primary system for the prevention of collision between ai rcraft continued to be a well-organized and well-managed ai r traffi c services system. This led to the conclusion that any airborne collision avoidance system developed fo r universal application must fulfil the fundamenta l requirement of being

supplementary to, compatible with and ful ly integrated with the air t raffic services infrastructure, particularly that of the Air Traffic Cont rol system in its most advanced forms.

By the end of the year, airborne anti- collision devices were not in general operational use and no specific type or system had been selected for standardization, nationally or inte rnatio nally.

It was generally recognized (1) that the efficiency and capacity of the air traffic services are closely tied to the quali ty of the available navigation/ commun ications faci lities and meteoro logical/ aeronautical information services and (2) that improvement in the air traff ic services will largely depend upon the developments ach ieved in t hese related fields.

It was also recognized th at, in Western Europe, the air navigation system could not keep pace with the traffic growth, at least in the near future. Furthermore, the period when traffic growth cou ld be accepted without relating it to the capacity of the air navigation system, especially that of the air traffic services, was rapidly approach ing an end. The Euro pean Air Navigation Planning Group, constituted in November 1972, set up comprehensive evaluation mach inery in the fo rm of various working groups and addressed itself to improving the situation.

Selection and Training of ATCO Cadets in the United Kingdom*

by C. Hudson, Chief Instructor Aerodrome and Approach Control, College of Air Traffic Control, Hurn**

Foreword Safety a first concern The AT CO's first concern is safety: that is th e prevention of colli sion between aircraft in the air and on th e ground at airports. The secondary task is to bring about a rapid and efficient flow of traffic and to prevent undue congestion and delays. During periods of heavy traffic he works in a high stress situ ation which calls co ntinuous ly for assessment, judgement and decision.

In such a situation there is rarely opportunity to seek advice. For this reaso n a controller has to be trained to be entirely self-sufficient. He must be completely confid ent in hi s own judgement and abl e to make rapid decisions. Each yea r a sing le air traffic controller may be respo nsible for the flight of ai rcraft carrying as many as 3 million passengers in total. As the International Labour Office po inted out in a review : 'There are not many industrial occupations in which sense of responsibil ity for the lives of others is so necessary, and in effect, so highly developed as in the wo rk of the air traffic contro ller.'

The contro llers are in sole command of airc raft movements. They tell the pilots of o utgoing aircraft when to

â&#x20AC;˘ Adapted from a presentation made at the 'Stress In Air Traffic Control ' Symposiu m held at t he Univer sity of Manchester, October 1973. â&#x20AC;˘â&#x20AC;˘ The College this year celebrates 25 years of service to avi ation .

Cliff Hudson

9

start engines, when to begin to taxi to take-off point, when to start their take-off run and change direction at the correct altitude. They facilitate the climb to the enroute operating level, and when the aircraft is cruising comfortably above the clouds, the controllers co-ordinate its safe flight path in relation to other aircraft - both civil and military. They accept incoming aircraft for the final approach to the airport, and guide them along the taxiways to the correct part of the apron.

Only with such rigid control of an aircraft's movements is it possible to provide it at all times with a clear path and protection from collision whatever the visibility.

Growth of the College: From 12 Students to 909 Britain was the first country in Europe to institute regular training courses for controllers, the first 'College of Air Traffic Control' being set up in one room in the Post Office building at Goodge Street in London in 1937. In 1949 the School (now the College) of Air Traffic Control at Bournemouth (Hurn) Airport was formed with a teaching staff of six including the ATCO in charge. Other countries began to send students to learn their exclusive techniques and the year 1950 was notable for the introduction of the first course for training new entrant ATCO's. The year was notable also for the appearance at Hurn of the first foreign and Commonwealth students, the grand total for that year being 234 U. K. and 16 overseas students.

The College grew steadily during the ensuing 10 years.

By 1959 its staff had risen to 20 under a Superintendent and students to 472 (386 U. K. and 86 Overseas). The College as it stands today was built in 1962 at a cost of ÂŁ 505,000 and its annual running costs are in the same region. By 1963 the College had a throughput of 568 students; the 1970 figure was 909. Since its inception in 1949, 7,000 students had trained at Hurn at the end of 1971, including 1,700 from 94 overseas countries.

The Controller, What He Does, How He is Selected and How He is Trained What the Controller does Air Traffic Control Officer is often abbreviated to A.T.C.O. or even just ATCO. Most members of the public associate ATCO with a lawn mower, but the air traffic controller offer is a very poor buy when it comes to cutting grass. However he does have to get through a great deal of paperwork and study before he can get at an aeroplane to control it. He has to have a licence, and there are a number of ratings which he has to possess, be examined in and qualified in.

Air Traffic Control started well before the 1940-1945 War, and a number of our early people, Jimmy Jeffs was one, have only recently retired. They were the pioneers but then when the war started, ATC more or less went into cold storage while the aeroplanes developed very rapidly.

The war saw the development of air frames and engines which produced very sophisticated machines whereas the control system remained more or less static. At the end of war they had to recruit and train a large number of controllers, and as many of us had been in the R.A.F. as either pilots or navigators, we soon adapted to becoming

10

controllers. The system in use was that there was an Aerodrome Traffic Zone, of approximately 11'2 miles in diameter, around the airport and about 2,000 feet in height.

A controller with an aerodrome rating tried to separate the aircraft in the vicinity of the airfield both in the circuit and on the ground. This he could do but on the approaches to the airport was the Flight Information Region where the controller could not give positive control but only advise and give information.

There were a number of incidents which could be called near misses and so we had to resolve this and the next step was to have an Approach Control Zone. This was approximately 10 miles in diameter and 6,000 feet high.

Within this area the approach procedural controller could ensure that approaching aircraft were separated from departing aircraft and approaching aircraft separated from other approaching aircraft. Procedural control was the mental agility of the controller in separating traffic by using the minutes between them or a thousand feet of altitude, but without using radar. What we had really done was to take the problems from the approaches to the Aerodrome Traffic Zone, and move them to the edges of the Approach Control Zone. The controller separated his traffic within this area but the problems still arose on the approaches to and from the limits of the Approach Control Zone. The next step was to take a leaf from the Americans' book and introduce an Airways system. These are merely lines joining one busy airport with another using the most popular and busier routes. Now we could introduce an Area or an Airway Procedural Controller, to take the problems away from the edges of the Approach Control Zone, sort the traffic out en route and provide vertical separation.

Eventually by using procedural separation you get more aeroplanes and you are able to offer a service. With procedural control and aircraft flying at the same speed, height and direction, a procedural controller is required to have 10 minutes between those aircraft (at modern jet speeds this is round about 80 nautical miles). By using radar, the radar controller can reduce the separation to 5 nautical miles and this is obviously going to expedite the traffic. How did we develop this radar? After the war we were left with some old war time radars known as 'GA 3' and with this we could offer a service to any pilot who wished to have it, but it was not a compulsory service and if he preferred to make a procedural approach using some other form of landing -aid or approach aid, he could.

I remember that Mr. Eric Mathews, our Deputy Director of Personnel, was one of the few who stuck their necks out and said: let's take them all on radar. On that particular day the weather was miserable. We took all the aircraft, whether they wanted it or not, and gave them an approach radar control sequencing onto final approach using three miles spacing. The object was to do away with the 'stack' and take the aircraft as they approached London and sequence them until you have a three mile space between them as they touch down.

After the war we were left with some rather obsolete radars but almost without exception these are gone and we are now using quite sophisticated radar, particularly at the London Air Traffic Control Centre where the area controller is now able to put 5 miles either latitudinally or longitudinally between aircraft. He can, of course, also put 1OOO feet between them, as he normally does.

To summarize the ratings which a controller must obtain: First, there is the Aerodrome rating which qualifies

The College of Air Traffic Control at Bournemouth (Hurn) Airport. Part of the right hand section of the building is occupied by the Air Traffic Control Evaluation Unit which provides some services, notably simulation, to the College.

him to be a Tower controller using his eyes to separate the traffic around the airfield. Then there is the rating for the Approach procedural controller who separates his traffic by mental agility and by using progress strips which contain details of flights under his control. Next comes the rating for the Approach radar controller who uses his radar to control the approaches to the airport. At Area Control you have the ratiri.gs for the Area procedural controller and the Area radar controller. In Britain, there are three Flight Information Regions, i. e. Scottish, Northern and Southern, and these have control zones joined by the airways. The military also have their own military air traffic zones. With this amount of controlled air space over the country controlled by licensed and rated controllers, it does not leave much for the private flyer, but nevertheless the safety of the passenger carrying aircraft is very well assured by this controlled airspace.

How the Controller is Selected We still recruit adult entries from people who have been pilots or navigators in the Royal Air Force or the Royal Navy. Of the approximate 110 new recruits each year some 66 are Cadets and the rest are either ex RAF and ex RN or promotees from the ATC Assistant Grades. Therefore, our main method of recruitment is through the Cadet Scheme. The number of retiring, semi-retiring or short service commission officers is nowhere near the immediate postwar situation, so we had no alternative but to adopt the cadet scheme.

How do we get these cadets? Firstly, we advertise in the national press and aviation magazines; the entry qualifications being aged between 17-24 years, 5 'O' levels which must include English and Mathematics, and 2 'A' levels one of which must be Mathematics, Geography or a science subject. Mathematics help when you have to make very quick mental calculations when there is 5 minutes between aircraft or on a climb through; Geography helps because most counties in clude climatology in 'A' level geography; Science helps in that physics assists with meteorology. We get approximately 600 applicants who are then reduced by about 100 because of failure in one of their 'A' leve l results or have some obscure education qualification which we decide is not on a par with an 'A' level. This leaves us with 500 applicants to fill 44 vacancies and so we now lool< at their motivation or declared interests in aviation. Has

the boy spent perhaps his summer holidays earning money and taking flying lessons to gain a private pilot's li cence?

Has he joined the Air Training Co rps and gained a gliding certificate, or has he been a member of a school cadet corps? This leaves us w ith 200 for interview. The Board consists of a chairman, a sen ior professional manager who is used to reading characters, pe rsonality and assessing people, and two senior Air Traffic Control Officers. They try to pick what they consider to be the best 44 people as well as 10 reserves because we ocassionally find that some boy fails to pass the medical examination. The co ntroller is required to have an annual medical just as the pilot has a six monthly medical and the validity of his licence depends upon having a valid medical. From our 44 applicants and 10 reserves we pick j ust 44 who are formed into two courses of 22 students.

At the moment we are trying to evaluate aptitude tests, but w ith all due respect I do not have a great deal of faith in psycho logy and aptitude tests. These have bee n tried over the years and up unt il now have not bee n successful but the ones in present use are mo re in lin e with air traffic control and I th in k that it is the fi rst time that one has been devised especially for air t raffic control.

So the new suggested method of recruitment, should t he evaluation prove to be suitable, w ill be to set off with our 600 candidates and the lack of suitab le qualifications would reduce this number by about 100. T hey wou ld be given 6 aptitude test papers. The first three are fairly stan dard, being for intellig ence, visual dexterity and c omprehension, while the other three are specifical ly designed for the control officer and cover mental agi lity and aircraft movement interpretation. These tests are given to new recruits when they en ter the College and we are also giving them to th e g rad uat ing cadets when they become controllers. The indications are that the tests will be successful and wo uld then replace t he 'dec lared interests' of the candidates and wou ld be used to elimi nate them down to 100 appl icants for interview. The interview wou ld then reduce this to t he 44 posts followed by the medical examination until we end up w ith two courses of 22 students.

(Note: After the ser ies of pil ot studies into selection testing among ATCO cadet ¡guinea pigs¡ at the College during the past 18 months. aptitude selection tes ting for ATCO trainees was schedu led to comm ence a short time ago for intakes join ing limited and open cadet competi tions. - Ed .)

11

How the Controller is Trained The cadet scheme lasts for three years and at the College the cadet begins with four weeks of study. This is fairly elementary but it more or less equips him up to the standard required for a private pilot's licence. The scope of the Primary Air Traffic Control course is suggested by the fact that its syllabus calls for a sound knowledge of two hundred and fifty different items. The Air Traffic Control section which takes up to 861/:z hours includes a study of the International Civil Aviation Organisation in its several aspects, Aviation law, aerodrome inspection, relationship with HM Customs and Excise on aerodrome, the characteristics of different aircraft - to name a few of the nearly 190 sections. The same ATC course includes navigation which takes up 36 hours commencing with 'Form of the Earth' and going on through terrestrial magnetism, maps and charts, the triangle of velocities - again to specify only a tiny section of the studies. Meteorology also included in 301/2 hours calls for a knowledge of gusts, squalls, local winds, types of cloud, ice accretion, land and sea fogs - in fact, every aspect of the earth's atmosphere in every conceivable condition examined for its possible effect on air traffic control.

Finally, 40 hours are devoted to Telecommunications from basic radio theory through all its multifarious technicalities such as, to quote one single section: "The principles, characteristics, coverage, operation of Consol, Decca, Gee, Loran, M F non-directional beacon, radio range, fan markers, VOR, DME 200 mc/s (alternatively 965 mc/s and 1200 mc/s for overseas students}. At the end he takes an oral and a written examination conducted by the College.

The successful cadet now goes-¡for two months flying training up to the private pilot's licence standard. It is not essential to obtain a P. P. L. but it is considered essential to undergo all the training. 99 D/o of our students do get their P.P.L. although there is the odd one who suffers from air sickness who does not actually qualify.

It gives the cadets a clear understanding of the- needs and problems of the man in the pilot's seat. Beyond this, the cadets fly regularly to keep their licences valid and to keep abreast of new developments on the pilot's side.

Following the two months of flying training they are sent out to various airfields throughout the country, and spend two months doing familiarization with Air Traffic Control. The cadet would normally do the work of an air traffic controller's assistant; helping the controller, feeding the controller with information from flight plans, making out progress strips, answering telephones and similar duties. It acts as a short of buffer between school and the hard reality of the world of aviation. He then returns to the College for a 10 week course during which he has to acquire the air traffic controller's licence and an aerodrome rating. From an academic point of view this is the most difficult course and includes the same subjects as on the initial course but Aviation law and Aerodrome Control taught in much greater detail.

The examinations are conducted, not by the College but by our Examining Branch who visit the College periodically to set, invigilate and mark the examinations.

In other words, the College has no hand in the examination procedures. The successful candidates are sent out to various airports in the country and they have to reach what we call a unit endorsement standard; with a qualified 12

controller it would be called validation. In other words, he has to learn the procedures of a particular airport, such as Manchester Ringway, know the length of the runways, where the beacons are located and all the other technical information needed by the controller. He has to be passed out by the controllers at that airport, which is in marked difference from the College course where the College does the testing while in the field it is his fellow controllers who assess him. We can give as much training as necessary at the College and produce a successful student, but once he goes out into the real controller's world and talks to real live aeroplanes, he could be a different person altogether. He has to prove his ability in the field; we should really say that the better part of the training is given by controllers in the field. The College only plays a minor part by giving the students the basics but it is in the field at the airports and centres that our future controllers are really trained.

During his first year, the cadet will undertake two familiarization flights with perhaps a flight to Paris with British Airways or another scheduled air service. He is given a cockpit pass which allows him to enter the cockpit and see what goes on in a real aeroplane. In the second year of training he returns to the College for a 13 week course. In the first 6 weeks we teach him Approach Control and Approach procedural control; how to separate aircraft by using his brain - the only description I can apply to it is like playing a game of chess without being allowed any time to think between the moves. At the end of this 6 weeks course, as at the end of every course, there is an examination using synthetic equipment, a written and an oral examination, organised by the Examining Branch from London. The course then continues on to the Approach radar where the cadet has to learn the theory and present policy of radar, not only know what radar does but how it does it. We also use live training because a Civil Aviation Flying Unit is based at Hurn so that the controllers and students can use both live aircraft as well as synthetic equipment. The cadets fly in the right-hand seats, which gives them a future appreciation of the pilot's job. If the cadet is successful in these two courses and examinations, the remainder of the year is spent at another airport where he has to reach unit endorsement standard in the procedures at that airport in Approach Control and Approach Radar Control. During this second year we send him back to flying school so that he can keep his flying licence valid and also undertake two familiarization flights with one of the passenger carrying airlines.

In the third year the student returns to the College and concentrates on Area Control; the first 6 weeks on Area procedural control including FIR procedures. The second part of the course covers Area radar procedures using synthetic equipment. After an examination at the end of the course, the cadet goes out to an Area Control Centre or an Area Radar Unit where he has to reach unit endorsement standard. In this third year he also does refresher flying to keep his P. P. L. valid and has two further familiarization flights. He is then sent to the British Airways simulation centre at Southall for two weeks where they have opportunity to fly the simulators on which the pilots are trained. This is the only part of the courses for which there is no examination. He finally returns to the College for two weeks on an A.V.P. or computer course but it is only an elementary one week introduction to computors fol-

'J

Many overseas students receive instruction at t he College.

T

lowed by a techniqu es.

one week

introduction to

management

The cou rse closes w ith a graduation ce remony, where th e Head or Deputy Head of the N at ional Air Traffi c Services exch anges the Air Traffic Controller's Ce rtifi cate for the Air T raffic Controlle r' s Li cence. Not yet, h oweve r, can the candidate practice as a fully qualified ATCO . He can now go to a c entre or airport but he has to validate at that centre or airpo rt first. When he has obtai ned t hat validation. he w ill have undertaken a total of 39 examination s and has fin ally reached the end of hi s trainin g and is cons idered

ab le to operate wit hout su pervis ion. Without any doubt I think that we have p rod uced a safe controller who can be entrusted with the fu ll responsibilities of an Ai r T raffic Control Officer who is capable of ach ievi ng a safe, o rderly and exped itious flow of traffic.

(Brief history of the author: 1940-46 RAF Navigator, f i nally ATC; 1947- 51 Edinburgh and Prestwi ck Airports; 1951-55 Instructor, College of Air T ra ffi c Control ; 1955- 60 Prestwick Airport; 1960-64 Headquarte rs , London: 1964- 66 London Air Traffic Control Centre; 1966-69 Supervisor Scottish ATCC & Ocean ic Control; 1969- 70 Chief Officer, Glasgow Ai rport; 1970- 74 Chief Instructo r . College of Ai r T raffic Contro l. )

The Control of Air Traffic in Europe*

by S. R. Walton.

Director of Ad ministration in Britain 's Nat ional Air Traffic Services, Civi l Aviati on Authority

Developments prior to 1963 T raffic control in Europe, and elsewhere in the world , is primarily a national res pons ibility, and sin ce th e war th e stand ard s appli ed and the safety requirements im plic it in those standards have been co-ordinated through the In ternation al Civi l Aviati o n Organ isation. T he standards arrived at have been t ranslated into specific faci lities through the medium of large regional meetings, an d embodied in so-ca lled Region al Plans covering most of th e world.

¡Thi s paper was presented at the Royal Aeronautical Society¡s Air Transport G r oup All-day Sympos ium he l d in London on 16th January 1974. and represen ts a personal viewpoint. not a declaration of official policy. What sets this paper apart from the techn ical articles published in THE CONTROLLER recently on th e developments taking p lace in E urope, is Mr. Walton's reference to the relationsh ip of Eurocontrol to the European Econom ic Community (EEC) in part of h is thesis . a nd the hurdl es which st ill r emain b efore th e wh ol e concept of Europeanisa tion of the various ATC S e rvi ces in Europe is fully r ealised .

Whi le these Plans list the faci lities which individual countries p rov ide or intend to provide in o rder to meet their ICAO oblig ations, they do not of course set an upper limit on t he lengths to which a nation may go i n t he pursuit of air safety, and seve ral European countries, including the United Kingdom, have always operated air navigation and air t raffic cont rol systems well i n advance of the ICAO requirements.

Even so the g rowth and changing co mposition of ai r tra;isport in Europe in the 1950's led to increasi ng problems.

The mai n new factor was the in troduction in to c ivi l ai r tran sport of the jet engine, and this had several effects.

Among these it too k c iv il transport into th e upper regi ons of th e ai rspace which had p revio usly been the p reserve of the m i litary flyer. Secondly it sent airc raft through the sky at s uch speeds that t hey might remain in the ai rspace of a particular country only fo r a matter of mi nutes. Th ird ly it so shortened the dec ision-making time of the air t raffic control machine th at advanced eq uip ments and new operating techniqu es had to be int roduced. Costs escalated 13

rapidly and began to give real concern to the countries providing the air traffic control services, at that time still out of the pocket of the taxpayer. For obvious reasons this concern was most strongly felt by the smaller countries i. e. those countries which, as already said, the new fast aircraft traversed in so short a time.

All this was happening at a time when, in other contexts, the idea of Europeanisation was beginning to strike root. In the air traffic control field a number of European countries therefore got together to see whether something similar might be the solution to their problems. The Benelux countries, and Belgium in particular, already in the forefront of the movement towards a united Europe, played a large part in this new thinking, and they were joined by Germany, France, Italy and the lJnited Kingdom. The outcome, in 1960, was the drawing up and signing of a new Convention known as the Convention relating to CoOperation for the Safety of Air Navigation. By 1963 this Convention had been ratified by six of the signatory countries, the exception being Italy. Subsequently the Irish Republic acceded to the Convention, so that the seven members of Eurocontrol, as it is called, are now Benelux, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Ireland. There is a strong likelihood that Spain will shortly join and become the eighth member. The Convention remains effective for twenty years from its date of entry into force, so half of that period has now been completed.

The period is automatically prolonged in five year steps provided that no contracting party expresses its intention of denouncing the Convention.

The Eurocontrol Convention

the single body were to be shared between the Member States broadly in proportion to their gross national products. The Eurocontrol Convention thus embodied a kind of joint support system, the effect of which was to provide upper airspace control over its seven Member States at a cost borne mainly (i. e. about 85 %) by the three major participants France, Germany and the United Kingdom. It could be thought at first that this represented an act of generosity on the part of the larger States towards the smaller ones, but there is more to it than this.

The larger States have on the whole the larger numbers of registered aircraft flying the European airways, so they are the main beneficiaries of any arrangement to improve the overall standard of safety.

While two of the problems were dealt with in this way the third - the mix of civil and military flyers - was left severely aside. Eurocontrol was given the responsibility for controlling only the civil aircraft in the upper airspace military aircraft, apart from those flying according to civil procedures, remained a national responsibility. The nettle of civil/military air traffic control integration was therefore never grasped, and Eurocontrol can only proceed by way of co-ordination or co-location with military control systems rather than integration. Because of the inevitable interactions between the two forms of control, the Convention provided that each Member State should be represented, on the main policy-setting bodies of the Organisation, by a military as well as a civil member. In practice the civil members have always played the major part in the affairs of the Organisation, the military members regarding their role as being mainly to ensure that the Organisation does not come in conflict with their defence responsibilities.

The Eurocontrol Convention tackled two of the problems Eurocontrol Organisation that 1 have mentioned above, and did so in prima facie The structure of the Organisation as laid down in the reasonable ways. To deal with the fact that high flying Convention followed a pattern fairly standard among interaircraft traversed individual national airspaces in quick national bodies. At the top is the Permanent Commission succession, the Eurocontrol Organisation, which I shall consisting of fourteen representatives, namely one civil and describe later, was given executive responsibility for the one military Minister from each of the Member States. This control of all civil aircraft throughout the upper airspace.

Commission meets only three or four times a year, and is To some extent this meant a handing over of sovereignty there to deal with the political aspects of the Organisation's on the part of the several Member States. The limit at which work, though the terms of the rather elaborate Convention "upper airspace" began was not defined in the Convention, require quite a lot of the detail of the work of the but was left for unanimous decision by the national Organisation to receive Commission approval, which in Ministers involved, and it has been established in general specified cases has to be unanimous. Responsible to the at 25,000 ft, though some countries have adopted the level Commission for the running of the Organisation, including of 20.000 ft. This is a small anomaly which makes little the executive control of upper airspace, are two bodies. difference in practice. Thus the resulting concept, so far collectively known as the Agency. The first of these is the as air traffic control responsibility is concerned, is one Committee of Management, consisting like the Commission of a layer of upper airspace within which all civil traffic of two members from each Member State, in this case is controlled by an international organisation while each drawn from highly placed officials dealing with air country remains responsible for control in its own "lower navigation. The Committee usually meets about six or airspace" underneath. National interfaces are theoretically seven times a year, and carries the general responsibility, abolished in the upper airspace; as against this horizontal subject to the oversight of the Ministerial body, for the interfaces are created between the airspace within which policies of the Organisation. The other constituent of the Eurocontrol carries control responsibility and that where Agency is of course the staff of international civil servants control remains a national responsibility. responsible for the day-to-day runnning of the Organisation, The second problem. namely the burden imposed on with all the administrative, planning, financial, engineering, smaller countries by the increasing complexity and cost etc. activities which that entails. These international civil of air navigation services, was intended to be met by the servants function under a Director General, and are provisions made for the joint financing of the Eurocontrol therefore referred to collectively as the Directorate. The Organisation. It was thought that in any case a single body Director General, Monsieur Rene Bulin, is an energetic with air traffic control responsibility over a large area and efficient Frenchman, and the senior posts in the would be cheaper than six or seven separate bodies Directorate tend to be shared out among Member States carrying out parts of the same task. Moreover the costs of

14

in proportions roughly reflecting the importance of those States in the work and financing of the Organisation.

At the top however it remains the case that the principal decisions have to be taken on a Committee basis, i. e. either by the Commission or the Committee of Management, and it is arguable that this is not the best basis for discharging a complicated executive task in a fastchanging sphere such as air transport. Perhaps fortunately, in this sense, Committee of Management decisions do not require unanimity, being taken by a variant of weighted majority voting.

Thus Eurocontrol was launched in the early 1960's and it assembled, after the manner of international organisations, an able and enthusiastic staff within the Directorate.

They had a formidable task ahead of them, and they set about it with something of a sense of mission, seeing themselves as the spearhead of an organisation which would eventually embrace all en route air traffic control within Europe, in both upper and lower airspace, and conceivably extending some day to military as well as civil aircraft. There were good grounds for seeing the Organisation in this light, having regard to some of the terminology in the Eurocontrol Convention. When it came to implementation, however, differences in time-scale emerged between the planning of the Directorate and the speed at which certain Member States were prepared to hand over their remaining control responsibilities. The Directorate saw themselves making an early start with the erection of separate Upper Airspace Centres in Europe, operated by the Organisation's own air traffic control staff and maintained by its own engineers. Such expectations obviously involved in some cases a certain amount of duplication of existing facilities, and the pressure for an early general take-over of this sort, plus the considerable expenditure it would involve, led to some differences of view between Member States, among themselves as well as with the Directorate.

Early Problems These problems of differing approach and time-scale are well illustrated by the situation that existed in the United Kingdom. At the time the Eurocontrol Organisation was getting under way, we were building up a new air traffic control system within this country, at very considerable expense. The Mediator Plan, as it was called, had as one of its pillars the increasing introduction of automation into the air traffic control field, and this was seen as leading to the eventual integration of civil and military control functions. To the same end, the National Air Traffic Control Services had been formed, and was already planning the future of air navigation services in this country on a joint civil/military basis. As already mentioned, the Eurocontrol Convention was oriented away from such integration. We were thus well set on a course of joint control and joint Centres, which contrasted with the separate civil Upper Airspace Centres philosophy of the Directorate. :he conceivable amalgam of introducing Eurocontrol staff into the Centres we were planning, to take over the control of the upper airspace civil flyers, was impracticable because of the serious problems of divided allegiances and security which it raised. The French were similarly in the formative stage of a large national plan, though it was not at that time so advanced in the direction of civil/military integration. In addition to these substantial

facts of life some doubts were already beginning to arise as to the operational desirability of having two different control regimes with a horizontal interface.

All this led, as might be expected, to great turmoil in the Eurocontrol camp, with accusations and counteraccusations about breach of the Convention. However when the dust settled down at the beginning of 1966, an interpretation of the Convention had been agreed unanimously at Ministerial level, which in effect applied it differently in different regions. The thinking on which this agreement, known as the Moroni Report, was based was that in two of the regions, namely France and the United Kingdom, the standard of air traffic control was already high, and far-reaching new systems to improve it still further were in train. In Benelux and Germany, on the other hand, comprising the third region, planning and implementation was at that time less advanced. This could be explained by the aftermath of the war, the amount of military flying by aircraft of many nationalities, the financial burden on the smaller States referred to already, and soforth, but whatever the reasons the fact remained that it was in the Benelux/German region that an urgent need for improvement existed. Therefore, said the Moroni Report, let the Eurocontrol Organisation concentrate its early efforts on providing services in this region, where hardly any civil upper airspace control existed. Meanwhile France and the United Kingdom could go ahead with their new high standard control plans, acting in their upper airspaces as the agents of Eurocontrol. This would meet the needs in those two regions for the foreseeable future, i. e. up to about 1980, the Directorate playing in the main an overseeing and co-ordinating role.

It is arguable that the Directorate should have been happy that circumstances allowed them to delegate their responsibilities for two of the regions, and so devote most of their planning and engineering resources to meeting the priority need in the third. They did not view the Report in this light, but they were faced with the unanimous decision of the Commission, and the Moroni interpretation has now achieved the status almost of part of the Convention itself.

The interpretation has two financial ancillaries. On the investment side the capital expenditure on new facilities in Germany and Benelux is jointly and currently funded by the seven Member States through the Eurocontrol Budget, but that in France and the United Kingdom is initially put up by the two countries and the resulting installations are in effect hired (so far as the upper airspace component is concerned) by Eurocontrol over their period of operation.

On the operational side the current costs of air traffic control in the three regions are borne regionally, and thus do not appear in the main Eurocontrol Budget at all. This has the incidental effect, in the case of the United Kingdom, of leaving us free of Eurocontrol oversight in regard to staffing levels, conditions of service, rates of pay, etc. of air traffic services staff.

Achievements to date With its energies channelled in this way by the Moroni Report, the Organisation has built and is operating several units of different sorts. Its main headquarters is in Brussels, and there are small Regional Offices in France and the United Kingdom which play a part in the planning of the air traffic control systems in those two countries. The first Eurocontrcl Centre outside their Head-

15

quarters was the Eurocontrol Experimental Centre built at Bretigny near Paris, which is equipped with a very powerful simulator and has had a major role in the planning of the upper airspace¡ -control system now taking shape in Benelux and Germany. The Centre also works, on a repayment basis, for Member and nonMember States on projects outside Eurocontrol's own responsibilities. More recently Eurocontrol has set up the European Institute of Air Navigation Services at Luxembourg, for the training of air navigation services personnel on both the air traffic control and the engineering sides.

Here again, as at Bretigny, the Luxembourg Institute has been mainly concerned up to now with work for Eurocontrol's own needs, but it is open for the training of students of any nationality. One must add, however, that the general need for an international training centre, which was assumed when the decision to build the Institute was taken, has not materialised, and the Organisation is having to consider what steps would need to be taken to make the Institute pay its way.

More directly concerned with the executive air traffic control responsibility of the Organisation are three Control Centres at Maastricht in Holland, Karlsruhe in South Germany and Shannon in Southern Ireland, the latter two at present being only at the building stage. Maastricht and Karlsruhe have been designed to meet between them the upper airspace control needs of the Benelux/ Germany region. The Maastricht Centre, coming into operation now in phases, is a very up-to-date and highly automated Centre, which is likely to prove an effective shop-window for the planning and technological skills of the Directorate staff. Although initially designed to control only civil traffic it was converted at the half-way stage, as the result of some fundamental re-thinking of air traffic control responsibility in the four countries of the region, into a co-located civil/military Control Centre. The military control will apply to the upper airspace of north Germany, but the combining of the two sets of control does not mean extension of the responsibilities of Eurocontrol itself into the military field. The position is rather that Eurocontrol staff will carry out the control of the civil aircraft, while German military staff located in the same building will continue to control the military aircraft in the North German upper airspace. The Karlsruhe Centre is being planned on the same joint co-location pattern. All this has meant some rather complicated cost-sharing arrangements, but so far as the United Kingdom is concerned we have welcomed this evidence of Benelux/German ATC philosophy developing in the direction we adopted when we began to plan West Drayton. Finally, while Maastricht and Karlsruhe are initially to deal only with the upper airspace, they will have a fair amount of spare capacity in their systems, and it is likely that in due course some of the Benelux/German countries will propose transferring to these Centres the responsibility for more and more of their national lower airspace control. This may be the way in which, by a roundabout route, the concept of separate upper and lower airspace control regimes is eventually circumvented.

Apart from such concrete evidence of its activity, Eurocontrol has played a part in co-ordinating the air traffic control systems of its Member States, though not so large a part as it probably could have played or would have wished to play. Through a variety of Working

16

Groups and Panels it has served to align the views of its members on various ATC matters coming up in other international contexts, and particularly ordinating enthusiasm has, by and large, outrun that of its Member States. Those States have not seen internationalisation as an end in itself, and have accordingly wished to have alleged advantages clearly demonstrated before embarking on such proposals as the pooling of equipment orders, a single SST Control Centre of all Europe, or some panEuropean levelling of "social" conditions of service.

Attempted demonstrations by the Directorate have left them unconvinced, either in principle or as to timing.

A notable exception is the very considerable exercise in co-operation which has led to the institution of a regional Route Charges System. This system, most efficiently implemented through the agency of the Eurocontrol Directorate, has a number of special features, summarised below.

Two facts pointed to Eurocontrol as a suitable means of instituting a charge for en route services. The first was that provision existed in the Eurocontrol Convention for the levying of such a charge, although this provision, like most of the rest of the Convention, extended only to the upper airspace. The other fact was the principle adumbrated by ICAO that en route charges should so far as possible be imposed on a regional basis, so that operators would be faced with only one charge per flight. A Working Group was accordingly set up by the Eurocontrol Commission of Ministers to advise them on the possibilities of instituting an en route charge, and this Working Group went into a number of alternatives very thoroughly. One of its first conclusions however was that, pace the Convention, it would be quite impracticable to confine such a charge to the upper airspace parts of flights. The only workable system was to have the upper airspace charge equated to a lower airspace charge, so as to avoid any need to know, and base calculations upon, the exact point at which aircraft crossed the interface. Ministers were accordingly asked whether they would agree to reflect, in the lower airspaces for which they were individually responsible, the exact pattern of charges which with their Ettrocontrol hats on they were prepared to levy in the common upper airspace. This of course involved their undertaking to introduce the necessary legislation in their respective countries, and meant the drawing up and unanimous acceptance of an elaborate Multilateral Agreement.

Having got this far, the role of the Directorate became clearer, for it could not collect lower airspace charges as a principal. The agreed answer was for it to act as the agent of the Member States in the collection of charges both in the lower and upper airspace. This is the pattern which has been successfully implemented via a series of bilateral arrangements between each country and the Agency. An en route user charge has now been in existence for over two years, and after a certain amount of resistance and some minor teething troubles is generally accepted; indeed the system is not only functioning efficiently in the European area, and collecting in addition for four other European States, namely Austria, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland, but it has also strongly influenced the pattern for en route charges recently recommended to States generally by the ERFA (Economics of Route Facilities and Airports} Conference of ICAO. The measure of co-operation achieved in this system is

illustrated by the fact that all the many and complex decisions required in order to set it up and oversee its operation have been taken unanimously.

Looking at air traffic control in the European frame therefore one sees seven countries acting together in an international Organisation, with an eighth possibly joining soon. Three other countries are closely involved with Eurocontrol in the running of a common en route charges system, and certain other countries have concluded association agreements with the Agency, which provide in the main for mutually beneficial exchanges of information. In the European countries outside Eurocontrol the air navigation services and all that pertain to them remain a national responsibility. In the first ten years of its life Eurocontrol has built an international Experimental Centre, an international Training Centre, and an international Upper Airspace Control Centre, with another two on the way. If the first ten years are the worst in this field as in some others, the Organisation has established itself on the European scene, and can be expected to absorb more responsibilities, both downwards into the lower airspace and sideways with the accession of other Member States, in the next ten years.

Present Trends Yet some of the initial hurdles still remain. While the upper and lower airspace interface problem may be surmounted, as already mentioned, there are no signs at present of Eurocontrol nearing any solution to the problem of separate civil and military air traffic control. And a very real problem of timing remains. Countries responsible for their own national planning, whether in the lower or upper airspace, must always be looking ahead and implementing what they have already planned, and it is difficult to choose an appropriate moment for this process to be taken over by some outside authority. It was possible in the upper airspace of Benelux/Germany partly because Eurocontrol was then moving in, to some ~xtent, to fill a vacuum, but obviously some very difficult ~ssues can arise if an internationally manned organisation is to come in and displace an elaborate national one.

Eurocontrol is well aware of these problems but has not yet seen a way through them. Clearly they cannot be solved in the short term, and Ministers therefore agreed, as long ago as the Moroni Report in 1966 to initiate technical studies aimed at a target some fifteen years ahead. In other words they asked for expert advice on the likely basic concept, structure, organisation, etc. of European air traffic control in the 1980's. Agreement on thes~,. it was hoped, would then enable planning and prov1s1on of equipment to be concerted between the ~ember States throughout the 1970's, so as to produce m the end a homogeneous system.

Despite the length of time since this programme of study was decided upon, the only part on which Ministers hav.e. ~een able to reach unanimous agreement is the defm1tion of the concept that should be the basis of current. planning. This concept, known as the Common Operational Concept, lays down in short that there should be a common underlying basis for air traffic control extending through all airspace, upper and lower, without national boundaries, and that it should apply to all aircraft, both civil and military. When Ministers have been asked to give further guidance to the experts as to how

this agreed concept is to be implemented, however, they have not been able to reconcile their various views. The most serious problem is naturally the implied relinquishing of national control over military aircraft movements, and those Ministers who see this as unacceptable envisage the Common Operational Concept being implemented nation by nation, or at most on a regional basis. It may be that the introduction of the Concept on any wider basis has to take as a pre-condition some amalgamation of the air defence of the various countries.

The experience of Eurocontrol so far might well suggest that centralising the executive task of running upper airspace control over seven countries presents difficult problems of scale, let alone of co-operation. To discharge the same task in a much greater volume of international airspace would call for supermen. In practice the Directorate has, through force of circumstances, found a practical way of working with the organisations of its Member States without giving itself an impossibly large initial task, either technically or management-wise. Current forward thinking in the Organisation is therefore turning towards a greater degree of decentralisation at the executive level, with regional directorates co-ordinated by an overall planning and administrative headquarters. In this direction, and probably in this direction only, may lie the possibility of Eurocontrol enlarging its geographic responsibilities. This could be a lesson to be studied by other bodies entrusted with detailed control functions across the European board, in particular perhaps some of those within the competence of the E.E.C. This leads finally to the general question of the relationship of Eurocontrol to the E.E.C. In 1973 the European Parliament adopted a resolution which said in part that as regards air safety "the European States should adopt a common position, taking care to strengthen their co-operation and give it a more concrete form with a view inter alia to the standardisation of control systems for the upper and lower airspace by the common use of the Eurocontrol Organisation". There is thus already some recognition that the two Organisations must interact with one another. Indeed as the Common Market ties between Member States develop, leading to freer movement of working forces, international tendering, closer scientific and technological collaboration, and so forth, one can envisage Eurocontrol's progress towards its long-term aim of greater uniformity of ATC equipments and system patterns becoming correspondingly smoother.

On the other side of the medal there have been suggestions that the Common Market should promote closer collaboration in Europe on air traffic control research and development. It is not clear at the moment whether this will be pursued or not, and if so whether it should be done in a purely ATC context. There may be room for a much broader study which would take into account location of airports, nature of service, type of aircraft, the air traffic system, etc. in the long term - say at the end of the century. It is always a difficult problem deciding how soon such studies should start, with the long lead time of a full control system on the one hand and the difficulty of predicting requirements accurately on the other. However tbis may be, if an attempt is to be made to system plan the whole air transport complex on a European scale, Eurocontrol has certainly acquired enough experience and expertise to make a valuable contribution to it.

17

Medical Research into the Profession of Air Traffic Control

by Dr. NOLLAND, France

The 21st Congress an Aeronautical and Space Medicine (Munich, September 1973) brought together many participants, both from civil and military circles, and enabled 345 authors to present their work (182 papers were presented) to an international audience where the absentees were more noticeable than the various nationalities represented.

Close collaboration between civil and military medical circles is necessary because of the unequal distribution of medical resources which are distributed to fall into line with the subjects being studied.

Research programs of certain countries are primarily dominated by the exploration of space and the biological data obtained in this way are of interest to all branches of science. Interest in all of the problems being studied by the various branches of science is growing from congress to congress. we heard and read reports on bionics, psychology, psycho-physiology, anthropology, particularly anthropometry and psychosociology, and the physiology of underwater diving.

The two major aspects considered were the constraining effects caused by the aeroplane and of flight itself.

Statements were made on the effects of: acceleration and vibrations; decompression; lack of oxygen (hypoxia): weightlessness.

Studies explained the results in: clinic of aeronautical medicine; humoral biological variations; the cardio-vascular system; the equilibrium apparatus; the spinal column.

The effects of flight and air transportation on flight crews and passengers were considered by: the study of "work-rest" rhythms and cycles; irregularity of the circadian systems; safety and aircraft accidents; medical aspects and development of aircraft accidents; transport of the sick and injured by air.

Sessions were devoted to the practical results of these studies: selection and surveillance of personnel; -

reasons for flight inaptitude.

Finally, a session was set aside to reflect upon the evolution of aeromedical research.

The French representative, General Raboutet, showed how past and present studies have had a practical influence on the development of the Concorde in so far as aircrew and passengers, as well as the populations affected, are concerned.

The Italian representative, General Scano, emphasised the fact that until now medical research had been principally applied and not fundamental research. General Scano 18

hopes that fundamental research will apply to biochemical mechanisms, neuro-physiological and psycho-physiological, notably during sleep, somnolance, decrease in vigilance and non-vigilance.

During the last few years, however, the field of study in aeronautical medicine has not been solely limited to the constraints of the flying machine and of flight, but has progressively turned towards the study of non-flying personnel, either workers and technicians caring for aircraft on the ground, or, since recently, airport personnel, as people whose activities are conditioned by aircraft and the risks associated with the handling of them.

Moreover, the carrying of people as passengers creates numerous problems requiring studies in hygiene, sociology and psychology.

The Congress in Munich was marked by the introduction of two sessions which were devoted to Air Traffic Controllers as people who are directly involved in the mechanics of aircraft flight.

Dr. Evrard and his colleagues from Eurocontrol in Maastricht, Holland, outlined the medical problems related to the controllers of the Eurocontrol Area Control Center.

This study is interesting because of the data collected concerning radar, the cathode screen, lighting, and sound emissions.

The medical data, whether functional (psychosomatic) or lesional, supports our belief that the stresses endured by the controllers make them pass from the psychosomatic to the lesional stage to a degree which is related to the length of time they have been exposed to the risk, and to their individual "profile".

As is true for all of us, events in private life have an important effect on man's equilibrium, but there seems to be a reason for separating them from events which occur while practising the ATC profession, as this also influences general behaviour.

There are probably no specific psychosomatic problems.

What is important is that within the ATC profession they are the result of durable, repeated multiple stresses throughout the controller's career. These problems arise from a source of nervous tension and bring the individual's "weak points" to the stage where he "cannot hold himself in check".

The problems of organic pathology, notably visual pathology, whether an individual's own, or those caused by work situation, are not comparable to what is encountered in France: the population samples are different and the Center at Maastricht has not been long enough in operation to permit - under identical circumstances - comparison of length of service in the profession.

A report by C. E. Melton (FAA) and the biological chemistry laboratory of U.S. Naval Aviation is based on two schedules, 5 consecutive days (either 0800 to 1600 or 0000 to 0800) or 2 evenings over 2 days and one night (1600 to 2400, 1400 to 2200, 0800 to 1600, 0700 to 1500 and 0000 to 0800).

The comparison was accomplished using psysiological, biochemical and psychological research methods. The con-

trollers sleep a bit more in the first schedule but based on the physiological data ·the second schedule is preferable.

Systems, The Necessary Methods, and Understanding Them; J. W. H. Kalsbeek (Netherlands); ·

Nevertheless, the authors themselves feel that complementary studies should be pursued.

Results of research in ergonomics performed on Frankfurt controllers by Dr. Reiche's team from Darmstadt provided much data.

Signs of tension appear after an approach controller has been assigned to a position for an hour and a half. The tension seems to be linked to the "pressure over time element" factor.

With an equal traffic load the approach controller is subject to more pressure than the en-route controller. No relation has been discovered between peak traffic periods and the radar controller's behaviour. If there is an important variation between traffic peaks and lulls for any given time, vago sympatic symptoms indicate the development of a state of tension in the controller.

Among these symptoms: increase in heartbeat is a significant factor. As for the minimum variations in aircraft workload alleged to be capable of causing a change in pressure, we are rather sceptical as to the numbers given.

However, these very interesting studies do not take into account all the other factors effecting pressure: conflict resolution, different operating methods, atmosphere of the work environment, age and length of service of the controller, and actual experience in a specific control position.

On the other hand, these studies stress the different conditions in which "en-route"- and "aerodrome" controllers perform their duties.

In his lengthy report "Designing the Controller's Tasks in relation to his Human Capabilities", V. D. Hopkin of Farnborough (RAF) emphasises the fact that the relationship between a control system's capabilities and the controller's workload must not be underestimated as has been done in the past. It is not necessary to avoid heavy workloads and a certain amount of stress at all costs. What must be avoided as much as possible are excessive workloads and those with which the controller is unable to cope.

Automation could improve the completion of the work forecast if human capacity is taken into account and if the controller is given more freedom in sel·ecting the methods of control he wishes to use when he wants to employ them.

Automation could play a useful role by permitting verification of control efficiency and indicating the results of the programmed instructions.

A future improvement well worth investigating could be the construction of aids which would function during peak periods of traffic and would not be used in periods of normal or light traffic. Because an aid would not impose a "research task" on the controller at moments when he is busy, more time would be available for "automatic surveil· lance", even though it would be obvious that this could be done better by the machine than by the man.

Undoubtedly improvements will come to light when long term air traffic control plans have been put to the test.

These plans, taking into account human advantages and limitations, will bring about a system made up of man/ machine components. Their efficiency will be judged in terms of human requirements as well as by the adopted system's effectiveness.

Four papers were not summarised but have appeared in specialised reviews:

Task Evaluation by Analysis of Control Methods; W. Rehmert (RFA);

-

Evaluation of Stresses in Future Air Traffic Control

Transposition of a Physiological and Psychological Study on the Work Performed in an Actual Air Traffic Control System to the Workload of an Air Traffic Control Project; J. Ruterfranz (RFA); Installing a New Control System taking into Account Human Capabilities; H. Gunther (Eurocontrol). (This study was published in the February 1974 issue of The Controller - Ed.).

These studies, except the one by Mr. Gunther, demonstrate that the techniques of studying the controller's work are far from being agreed upon. Most certainly the approach should be pluri-disciplinary, but each branch should ask itself questions on the "how" of things and not only be content with an applied study.

The IFATCA paper: "Hopes and Fears of Controllers regarding Future Air Traffic Control Systems" raises problems. Some of them are common to those encountered by doctors and psychiatrists.

New control methods are conceived without consulting future users nor take into account the knowledge acquired in scientific circles by studying the man and his reactions in the work environment.

The Congress brought to light that quite a number of branches of science were seriously carrying out studies of the Air Traffic Controller's profession by: collecting statistical results; doing methodological studies; and making specialised studies on obvious professional achievements.

In addition, ways of transposing actual data and methods into new air traffic control systems were also being examined.

Comments by Air Traffic Spokesmen across the World Mr. Henry Marking, British Airways' Managing Director: British Airways' costs will increase by £ 175 million in the current financial year ending March 31, 1975. Of this, £ 110 million was fuel. About £ 3.7 million was being paid this year to Eurocontrol, and "I think I speak for all European airlines when I say that I do not think we are getting value for money."

"Eurocontrol was at the moment recovering 30 per cent of its costs, and the decision to increase this to 60 per cent would cost British Airways £ 7.5 million in 1975. If it went up to 100 per cent the airline would be paying Eurocontrol £ 121/:z million a year. This was in addition to increases in air navigation charges which would cost £ 600,000 more in the current year and £ 1 million a year thereafter."

(Will Airlines ever get on our wavelength? - Ed.) Mr. David Thomas, Chief of the Federal Aviation Agency's Air Traffic Service, in the "Saturday Evening Post" of January 19th 1963, on the subject of near-misses in the U.S.A.: "Statistically we know that a controller - even if he's perfect - will be involved in an incident once every thirteen years."

19

Concorde and Air Traffic Control*

by M. Jose Audy, lngenieur

a I'Aerospatiale

Poids et dimensions 34,am-..:

~ ~

P.MAX. Decollage P. MAX. Atterrissage Charge marchande

176.450 kg 111.130 kg 12.600 kg

General Characteristics CONCORDE is an aircraft designed to transport a 12/13 tons payload at Mach 2 on 6000 km stages using existing ground facilities . These figures are governed by several parameters: a speed of Mach 2 enables a wide use of in expensive and common aluminium alloys; a 6000 km range corresponds not on ly to the PARIS (or LONDON) - NEWYORK stage but also to a majority of airline networks.

Simil arly the state of art in aerodynamics, engine performances and structural design resulted in a slender wing associated with a fuselage of minimum frontal surface.

T ogether, these items give low supersonic drag and good subson ic handling characteristics. Straight jet engines with low diameter provide the best answer to superso nic crui-

Longueur 62,10 m Envergure 25,56 m 11,58 m · Hauteur

a higher speed. A big step forward has been taken with CONCORDE, as shown in fig. 1 where block times have been quoted for typical routes. But on the other hand, the aircraft is well adapted only to a part of the speed domain and several problems arise from this poi nt. Th e best illu-

Impact de la vitesse

sing.

The history of Air Transport shows that every new development has been closely correlated to an increase in commercial speed and this rule directed research towards • Presented at the XVth Technical Symposium of the French Air Traffic Controllers· Association (A.P.C.A.). hel d in Paris on the 19th A pril. 1974.

20

Figure 1

Figure 2

....,..__.;....._ ---,,,_... .

-

~

Flight test progress. april 16,1974

--

~- · ·

NUMBER OF

SOPHSUNIC

BLOCK

SUlUSllllC

FLIGHTS

FLIGHTS

TIME Hr:mia

TIME "llr:llill

001 *

397

249

812:09

254:49

002

434

196

820:10

173:26

01

166

129

395:52

164:19

02

128

101

360:43

139:20

32

26

97:35

36:52

15

6

42:43

3 :27

2,529:12

772:13

F.WTSS

G.BSST 6. AXON

F.WTSA

1 F.WTSB

2 TOTAL Figure 3

1,171

707

*Removed from service on Oct. 19. 1973

C'<>.ri~<>~de

World routes flown

; N

o;

g Figure 4

~ ._.----~---..,.--~------------------" 21

stration of this phenomenon is the graph showing fuel consumption versus speed (Fig. 2). One can easily see that the best perfomance is achieved around Mach 2 and that for a subsonic flight phase a M. 95 speed is recommended.

This factor plus the influence of a range variation on traffic potential for a given stage length results in a much higher penalty for SST, when used in non-optimal flight conditions, than for subsonics.

Figures for CONCORDE are not only based on theoretical studies but are now derived from flight test results i. e. more than 2 500 hours of flight including round the world trips which enabled us to fly it in different meteorological conditions and traffic patterns (Fig. 3 and 4).

Compatibility with Air Traffic The most convenient way to check compatibility is to follow a typical stage phase by phase.

Engine start, taxiing, take-off There is no major difference from subsonics in this respect but it is recommended that holding before taxiing or take-off be kept to a minimum so as not to reduce regularity and to limit pollution and the waste of energy as with subsonics.

Climb and transonic acceleration From take-off to flight level 250 CONCORDE can use the existing procedures but it should be noted that she is capable of a much greater vertical speed thus giving the controller an additional way of separating it from a preceding subsonic aircraft on the same route.

The first specific milestone of the flight appears around FL 250 and this is the transonic acceleration. This manoeuvre causes (at about M = 1.15) the emission of a focussed boom (when supersonic flow is obtained) followed by a continuous cruise boom until subsonic speed is reached again.

In the light of our experience we think that focussed booms must not impinge on inhabited regions. Therefore, if the aircraft is still over such an area when it reaches FL 250, it will have to level off at subsonic speed until it reaches a point where the projection of the focussed boom will not

hit sensitive zones. A good example is the PARIS (C.D.G.) departure to North America via EVREUX and LE HAVRE: without A.T.C. constraint FL 250 is reached at EVREUX but acceleration will be delayed for about 20 NM in order to avoid a focussed boom on LE HAVRE (Fig. 5). FL 250 is not mandatory for this level flight but it should be noted that if FL 300 for instance is the allocated flight level fuel consumption will be higher by about 7 lb per nautical mile.

Once the acceleration phase has begun it should not be interrupted by requests for levelling off unless safety is involved. This can easily be deducted by looking at the CONCORDE flight envelope which is not only much larger than a subsonic one but is also modified in two different ways: without pilot intervention, by the continuous variation in aircraft weight (fuel consumption); with pilot intervention by control of the center of gravity position (fuel transfer).

This relationship between Mach and centre of gravity position is a major factor of longitudinal stability and imposes a fuel transfer capability for SSTs. Thus at each moment of the flight there is a corresponding flight domain which is a function of weight, centre of gravity position and Mach.

Two examples are given in fig. 6 and 7: at the beginning of the stage, before starting acceleration (weight ,_ 175 tons, centre of gravity position 53 Ofo); at the end of supersonic cruise (weight,_ 110 tons, centre of gravity position 56 %).

When considering these graphs it is apparent that an interrupted acceleration will result in a "freeze" of the flight parameters in the most uneconomical conditions (maximum drag) and may require a fuel transfer inversion. And, although this has no effect on safety, any noticeable pitching or banking of the aircraft during this phase may result in the emission of a focussed boom hitting the ground outside the planned carpet.

Cruise The normal technique is cruise climb. By flying above subsonics and following a given route very accurately the aircraft will reach successive flight levels as indicated in fig. 8.

Figure 5

22

Domaine de vol pour c=53% et masse:175t

Figure 6

Domaine de vol pour c:567. et masse:110t Altltude(ft)

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Figure 7

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23

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02

The cruise boom characteristics are detailed in fig. 9, and fig . 10 shows the connection between these characteristics and the possible effects on the ground:

AAHHblE XAPAKTEPl13YIOIUl111 3BYKOBOH YAAP

150 Pascals under the flight path, along with a 1 millisecond rise time is the area where startle effect on human beings begin s;

CRfTERE D'APPREOATfON DU BANG

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the curve shows CONCORDE c ruise boom variation with cross-track distance. The so nic boom is acceptable under the flight path in non-sensitive areas (t. P ,..., 100 Pascals, L\ t ,..., 1 millisecond) and no lo nger has adverse effects at distance exceeding about 25 kilometers (t. P reduced by a factor of 2, t. t multiplied by at least 5).

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Figure 10

AIUtude l k m)

SST routes can be planned using this criterium and taking into account a very accurate navigation capability (3 INS) where geographical position and schedule are concerned. In particular aircraft flexibility - speed ratio approx imately two - enables CONCORDE to compensate for any differences with the scheduled time.

Depressurisation par perte d'un hublot

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24

Descent

L~

Apart from normal descents other causes of descent directly connected with Air Traffic Control exist. Two of them have been illustrated here and show the limits of this kind of manoeuvre:

TSS et la planification

in case of depressurization resulting from a broken window CONCORDE can develop a 10 OOO ft/mn plus vertical speed in order to limit the time passengers are exposed to a high cabin altitude (Fig. 11): if the radiation meter indicates a dose rate in excess of a given action level (e. g. 50 mrem per hour) the captain can decide to descend in order to obtain a better atmospheric protection. This is a normal descent (Fig. 12).

Hold Ing

This is a real desease on busy airports and CONCORDE's regularity will be determined by the efficiency of techniques designed to cope with holding delays. The key factors here are speed and altitude. But adapted speed and flight level are not the best way to absorb terminal delays: if A.T.C. is able to indicate a delay with reasonnable accuracy about one hour before E.T.A. the aircraft can absorb part or the whole of its delay in the most economical conditions by decelerating to a subsonic speed.

Fig. 13 shows the fuel saving for a 30 minute delay and varied holding conditions. But it should be remembered that this technique is based on several assumptions about A.T.C. performances: forecast of delays 40 to 60 mn in advance; communications between aircraft and approach control; credit given for absorbed delay and insertion in ..the approach sequence.

Figure 12

This can prove a difficult task but improvements in control aids (e. g. better communications, S.S.R., computerized control centres, etc....) and the small number of SSTs during the early years of service make a successful outcome to this challenge more than likely.

As an indication CONCORDE VHF range at the end of cruise is of the order of 250 to 300 NM. Approach and Landing

Using present day procedures CONCORDE shows only a slightly higher approach speed.

As on any recent jet aircraft, a category Ill automatic landing system is fitted and it can be estimated that the probability of a go-around and diversion after the captain

AVAtUAGE DE l 'ATTENTE LIN EAIRE LINEAR HOLDING ADVANTAGE

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25

has decided to land (that is to say with suitable meteorological conditions and with the automatic landing system working normally) is roughly 10-6. In the case of a goaround and a circuit, fuel consumption varies from 3800 to 4500 lb according to conditions.

Conclusion we have mentioned here some of the air traffic controllers' problems related to CONCORDE's entry into service. Two points must be emphasized: firstly the unprecedented volume of studies, simulations and tests before entry into service. These have raised

questions before actual operations start and we think that this favourable towards success; the second point is the high quality of data supplied to the crew. This characteristic is the direct result of extensive crew workload studies, and by facilitating accurate handling of the aircraft, it can help the controller in this task.

Finally, we must insist on the fact that most of CONCORDE's needs are no more than general air transport improvements. We do not hesitate to ask for these improvements to be studied and developed as we know that they are for the progress of the system as a whole and that we are acting in the general interest.

Report from the British Accident Investigation Branch In the official report of the airmiss between a SABENA Caravella and a World Airways DC-8 near Land's End in the United Kingdom on 12th March 1973, the following points were made: "The caravelle was operating a scheduled service from Brussels to Barcelona with 51 passengers. Due to the French Air Traffic Control strike at the time, the flight was re-routed over U.K. airspace to avoid flying over France.

The DC-8 was on a positioning flight - without passen. . . gers _ from Chicago to Paris: Whilst both aircraft were m the v1cm1ty of Land's End VOR in conditions of good visibility and under control they narrowly avoided a collision.

The direct cause of the airmiss was an honest mistake made by the radar controller whilst he was un~er heavy pressure, but shortcomings in ground ra~ar eq~1pment, a failure in the equipment for about one mmut¡e¡ 1ust before the incident, a:id unusually heavy traffic cond1t1ons exacerbated by the French ATC strike when .aircraft were b.~ing diverted into U.K. airspace, were contributory causes.

Three of the contributory causes of the near miss, according to the findings of the report, were: (1) Deficiencies in the cover provided by the primary radar equipment at Southern Radar seriously limited the use of radar west of Land's End to facilitate traffic entering or leaving the Oceanic Control Area; (2) Because of the limitations of the existing SSR equipment the controller was unable to obtain the assistance he needed in order to maintain aircraft identification in the particular traffic situation; (3) The facilities provided for the integration of military OAT (Operational Air Traffic) and GAT (General Air Traffic) to the west of Land's End VOR were inadequate and not conductive to the safety of civil and military GAT. In other words, the primary radar equipment ceased functioning for a short but critical time interval whilst its associated SSR facility had no height reporting mode and did not permit selective or full code identification. There were also complications stemming from the procedures applied to military aircraft operating in the area (which underline the serious problems arising from the procedures employed in the U.K. for the co-ordination of civil and mili-

26

tary traffic in the non-standard Upper Airspace Special Rules Area).

The situation at LATCC was unusual and complex for the Sector involved (23) due to re-routeings to avoid French airspace, and there was at the time an extremely high traffic loading which was compounded by a singular lack of appreciation by aircrews strange to the region and who had little or no understanding of the need to obtain and fly in accordance with Shanwick OAC Ocean Clearance when flight-planning via ocean routes to Spain/Portugal and the Mediterranean generally. Workload factors to LATCC and, ir. the manning situation then obtaining, at Sopley JATCRU, were correspondingly high. The Type BO Radar qualities are known to most radar controllers and the drawbacks have been well explained in the Report. It is significant that the measured R/T 132.6 loading over the period covering the incident was 79 % _ extemely high by any Sector standards in ATC. On top of this, the controller was confronted with the temporary complete radar failure of the Type BO Radar lasting one minute exactly and immediately prior to the incident and while the caravelle was beginning its right turn prior to descent.

The controller formed an erroneous impression that the DCB was routeing on URS after Land's End (LND) to IBY instead of its actual flight-planned, and indicated, route on UG4. One of the eastbound aircraft within the overall tra!fic picture was that due for the URB track and it was this echo the controller took to be the World ocs in error.

Without better radar and SSR assistance and followinQ the experience of the total loss of radar just beforehand. the controller, whilst noting the actual SE track of the world DCB, related this to one of four holding aircraft in the LND pattern at the time.

The Report acknowledges that the airmiss incident resulted from an entirely honest mistake any radar controller could make in similar loaded and unusual circumstances. Significantly, not long after this incident, the newertechnology 23 cm digitized Burrington AR5 service was instituted at LATCC, and the events which led to this incident are unlikely to be repeated now that appreciably extended and vastly improved primary and secondary radar cover extends not only over but well beyond Land's End into the Atlantic SW approaches.

Air Traffic Control Clearances contrary to Administrative Directions

by Andreas Avgoustis, LL. B. (London), Chairman of IFATCA Standing Committee VII

Introduction The question has been put whether or not Air Traffic Controllers commit an offence or breach of Administrative Law when, in their efforts to achieve safe operations of air navigation, they issue clearances to aircraft which are contrary to directions issued by the appropriate authority.

To illustrate, the following two examples are cases in point: a) A hi-jacked aircraft prepares to land at a certain airfield. Prior to landing, the appropriate authority of the State concerned directs the duty Controller to refuse landing clearance to the flight and meanwhile the runway is being blocked with every conceivable obstruction; b) During the so-called ,,cod-war" between Britain and Iceland in 1973, the Controllers of Iceland intentionally issued clearances to RAF. Nimrod pilots in defiance of administrative directions to the contrary. Nimrods were used by the RAF. to protect British trawlers fishing in disputed waters.

Despite the fact that the object to be achieved may be the same, each case requires individual treatment as they involve different circumstances. The former case may be said to be an international issue; the latter a dispute between two States. In the case of the hi-jacked aircraft one will treat this as being an emergency but the other is not. The pilot of the hi-jacked aircraft, provided of course this is permitted by the skyjackers, urgently needs his aircraft on the ground safely, and intentional delay as a result of action by services on the ground will inevitably increase his ordeal, and endanger the safety of crew and passengers even more. In the "cod-war" case, the Controllers who issued those clearances contrary to their Authority's directions could have found themselves in serious trouble, had the two States been officially at war; they could have been accused of assisting the enemy. This, of course, did not happen: however, the situation is treated below more critically.

The Hi-jacked Flight The State's Responsibility: By refusing the hi-jacked aircraft clearance to land on an airfield within its territories, the State itself commits a breach of International Law. Such State can be said to have acted contrary to Article 5 of the "Convention on International Civil Aviation". This Article reads as follows: "Each Contracting State agrees that all aircraft of other Contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in international air services 1) shall have the right subject to

the observance of this Convention to make flights into or in transit ... and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without necessity of obtaining prior permission ... " Additionally, the State in question acts contrary to the 1963 Tokyo Convention, which makes the following provision: " ... in the case of an anticipated or actual unlawful and forcible seizure of an aircraft in flight by a person on board, the States-Parties to the Convention are obliged 2 ) to take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful Commander or to preserve his control of it."

By this provision it is obvious that Signatories of the Tokyo Convention are under a duty to take all necessary measures to restore the aircraft to its lawful owners o:commander, but by refusing permission to land to such an aircraft, the State does not act in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Convention. What the State achieves by such negative attitude is nothing more than avoidance of its international obligations.

ICAO has until now made no representations to a State which has been guilty of this malpractice because the Organisation wants to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of a Member State. However, I believe this is not an internal affair of one State but of concern to the whole world.

In this particular instance, IFATCA may be in an advantageous position in comparison with ICAO. IFATCA's business is safety of air navigation, and a hi-jacked flight in the air is a danger to all flights. Any representations decided upon should be initiated by our Federation, either on its own or in association with IFALPA, and, if necessary, IFATCA should consider taking steps against such States which do not allow hi-jacked aircraft to use their airfields.

The Controller's Position: Let us now examine the position of the Controller. Is he in breach of the law because he issued a landing-clearance to the flight? Strictly speaking YES. He is acting contrary to administrative directions, and as a result he may be liable to disciplinary action; is he also in breach of his country's criminal code? Under the English Legal System he may not be liable, but circumstances may develop that will make him liable.

The Controller is getting paid to do his job. Failure to do so, and if death results, will make him criminally liable.

If, however, his employer decides that he must not issue a clearance to a particular flight, he will be bound to observe these directions and any liability will most certainly befall upon the employer. If, on the other hand, the Controller diverts from such instructions he may, as a result, be held completely liable if the Courts find that such directions relieved the employer from any responsibility.

1) When an aircraft comes under the control of a skyjacker, it should not be considered as being engaged in international air ser-

vices.

2)

When this term is used, the law interpretes it as "must".

27

would the Controller be liable if, seeing that the hijacked aircraft is in imminent danger, the aircraft crashes because he complies with his employer's directions? He will certainly not be held to have committed a breach of administrative law but he may be held liable by a Court for criminal negligence. The Courts normally take into account the circumstances of each particular case and of course the position of other Controllers who faced similar situations. It is argued, however, by Jurists that the Controller will not, under these circumstances, be criminally wrong but merely morally wrong. Moral wrongs do not necessarily come under the jurisdiction of the law of the land. English textbooks on criminal law support this contention and illustrate both arguments with two examples as follows: (1) the case of a good swimmer who does not help a person drowning in shallow waters; and (2) that of the cyclist who rides his bicycle at night without a light to seek help in an emergency. The former person is most certainly morally wrong but not, under English law, criminally wrong. The latter is however criminally wrong for riding his bicycle at night without a light, the fact that the cyclist had to use his bicycle in an emergency is no excuse; it is merely a mitigating factor in concerning sentence.

The "Cod-War" Case The State Concerned: As this case was both a political and an economic dispute between two neighbouring States, IFATCA is not in a position to express any views or suggest any action.

In a case of this nature, however, the State should be asked by tFATCA to avoid issuing such instructions which are most embarrassing to Controllers and endanger the safety of Air Navigation. The State should also be asked to be understanding to Controllers who may issue Air Traffic Control clearances for no other reasons than ensuring the safety of aircraft coming within their administrative directions.

The Controllers concerned: Undoubtedly, the action taken by the Icelandic Controllers is most commendable. Controllers all over the world are under an obligation to maintain safe standards in Air Traffic Control and such standards should not be minimised under any circumstances. However, one must not disregard the consequences which may fall upon the Controllers concerned. As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, had the two States been officially at war, the Controllers involved would most certainly have been charged with treason for assisting the enemy. In this instance, flightplans of the Nimrod aircraft were submitted at all times, and the action of the Icelandic Controllers was taken in agreement with the Head of ATC in Iceland. Political differences in this matter were secondary to air safety and no penalties were instituted against the Controllers.

The ~nvolvement of the Federation At the 13th Annual Conference of the Federation, held at Tel Aviv from May 20-24 1974, the following recommendations were submitted, and adopted during the Final Plenary Session: That IFATCA, either through its President or Executive Secretary, or individual Member Associations, or the Chair28

man of SC. VII, or all the above in association with IFALPA, communicates to all Member States of ICAO, the ICAO Secretary-General and other international organisations, that Air Traffic Controllers the world over are concerned with the recent tendency of some Governments to refuse Air Traffic Control clearances and services to hi-jacked aircraft, particularly landing- and departure clearances, within their territories; That all the above be informed that IFATCA will no longer remain inert but intends to take such action as necessary to assist the hi-jacked aircraft in effecting a safe landing in the name of Safety in Air Navigation, and if necessary seek the assistance of other professional organisations to pursuade States from taking such inhuman action.

Comments by Air Traffic Control Spokesmen across the World Mr. A. D. Stark, Chairman, Institute of Professional Civil Servants (U. K.), Air Traffic Control Branch, at the 'Stress in Air Traffic Control' Symposium: Fear is not far below the surface during the period of high traffic density with the possibility of an air-miss. To the controller the compilation of written reports and the subsequent investigative procedures of the air-miss section seems to be a fairly cold blooded thing slanted in the interests of safety and to ensure that there is no repetition of the incident. The controller understands this but it is only at operations room level that the shattering effect of an incident can be seen on the individual concerned.

Medical opinion sees finger tip tremour as a symptom of stress; perhaps it is not difficult to see why it is preferable for air-miss reports to be typed. This hazardous side of the job and the long term effects it can produce merits considerable and prolonged investigation.

L. S. Vass, P. R. 0., GATCO: Regarding the desirability of more in-flight, route and unit liaison, the increasing complexity of international ATC understanding and appreciation of the task in the air is such that the next decade must, in my opinion, prescribe a far greater and less restrictive involvement by air traffic controllers in both in-flight and unit familiarisation programmes appropriate to respective ATS units. These programmes must be totally worthwhile and conducted through the assistance of ICAO and IATA. There is nothing to substitute for the kind of rapport such personal visits and flight-deck involvement can bring to controllers and aircrews alike.

The controllers in the U.K. also hope for much closer regional and international ties to be established in the next few years. It is well noted that both the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force have interchange schemes for their own specialists. This, too, is a valuable ingredient to international understanding and provides an excellent example of why civil controllers in the U. K. and U. S. administrations might also participate in like schemes to the advantage of both organisations. Similar detachments for given periods would also assist investigation and implementation of flow control schemes between nations in Europe. Although flow control is an extremely critical problem, it may be one which international liaison can help to solve within the next decade.

ARTS II Automated Air Traffic Control System*

by G. J. de Boer

Introduction Lockheed Electronics Company's Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS) II represents a major breakthrough in Air Traffic Control automation. ARTS II is the first significant application of a low cost, high reliability minicomputer for Air Traffic Control technology - a breakthrough making automated Air Traffic Control facilities throughout the world economically feasible, regardless of size. The development places automation within comfortable reach of smaller airports.

In July 1972, LEC's design was selected by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration as the ARTS 11 System. The first system to employ a minicomputer instead of larger processing equipment, it is based on the ICAO standard radar beacon system. The minicomputer is the MAC 16, also a Lockheed product; with 12,288 (12 K) words of memory and appropriate inpuVoutput channels and peripherals. Each computer is prewired for 32 K words of memory to provide capacity for expansion; there are more than 2,500 MAC 16 computers in use. Advance software concepts are used to provide Air Traffic Controllers with alphanumeric display of aircraft identity and altitude in a given terminal area. Radar information is accepted from primary and secondary sets.

The Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport in Pennsylvania is the first U.S. FAA installation of an ARTS II system. The system has successfully passed its testing and evaluation phases and is fully operational.

The following description treats the ARTS II system from the viewpoint of the Air Traffic Controller.

Functional Description Before automation, with the growth in air traffic, control of aircraft became a difficult, time-consuming, and tension filled job. Before the A (Automated) was added to the RTS (Radar Terminal System), the presentation was basicafl.Y~ follows: the controller was forced to make frequent references to flight progress strips for aircraft identification and altitude data and to maintain this correlation mentally or through manual procedures using squawk identification, shrimp boats or grease pencil markings on his display. But primarily the sharp mind of an experienced radar controller was responsible for the association of the pertinent information with each aircraft radar return under his control.

With the introduction of ARTS I and ARTS Ill to the 64 largest terminals of the United States, the burdensome task of associating aircraft identity and altitude (for Mode c equipped aircraft), has been transferred from man to machine. The machine has also assumed numerous other tasks to aid the controller. However, this system has not

â&#x20AC;˘ Adapted for "THE CONTROLLER" from details supplie~ by Mr. Vincent Vinci. Director. Public Relations, Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc., U.S. Highway 22. Plainfield, New Jersey 07061, U.S.A., to whom any queries regarding this equipment should be addressed.

changed the requirement for a sharp-minded radar controller.

ARTS II through the use of a proven, highly-reliable, efficient mini-computer makes it economically feasible to provide the ARTS capability to all of the smaller radar equipped terminals. A number of other nonradar equipped terminals can be provided with the ARTS capability where adequate radar coverage can be obtained from a nearby radar site that serves an adjacent terminal or an en-route system. The major differences between ARTS Ill and ARTS II are lower cost, and, Lockheed believes, greater reliability, and use of a 16-inch CRT for each controller position rather than a 22-inch CRT. The most important feature of the ARTS II is the addition of descriptive alphanumerics to each controlled aircraft. These alphanumerics provide the cognizant controller with aircraft identity. Altitude is also automatically displayed for aircraft equipped with an altitude reporting feature (Mode C).

ARTS II is planned for implementation in two basic configurations - TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) and TRACAB {Terminal Radar Approach Cab). In the TRACON configuration, four radar alphanumeric display consoles are provided in the IFR Room and one BRITE alphanumeric display with its associated keyboard and data entry devices is provided in the Tower Cab. In terminals where air traffic does not justify an IFR Room, radar control is conducted solely from the Tower Cab. The TRACAB configuration exists to serve these facilities. In a TRACAB configuration, the system consists of three BRITE alphanumeric displays, each with its associated keyboard and data entry devices. An extra set of keyboard and data entry devices is provided for a maintenance position. Each ARTS II is capable of handling six displays and all displays are plug-for-plug interchangeable.

Thus, a system can be tailored with any combination of up to six radar and BRITE alphanumeric displays to fill the needs of a given site.

The Operational Features of ARTS II Base of the system is secondary surveillance radar and transponder-equipped aircraft. ARTS II correlates aircraft identity with its transponder reply; when an aircraft squawk idents, the letters "ID" appear in the data block and blink to attract the controller's attention. Data for this correlation are entered into the system by a flight data tape for departures, by a positive handoff for arrivals, or by keyboard entry for aircraft such as VFR pop-ups or non-scheduled departures. In operation, a distinction is made between associated aircraft (those aircraft under control of a specific controller) and non-associated aircraft (e. g. VFR or overflights). The pilot is instructed to set up a transponder discrete code. The ARTS II computer is previously given data to make a correlation between the aircraft call-sign (flight or tail number) and the discrete transponder code.

The computer then processes this information so that it is displayed at the cognizant controller's position. The computer. in analysing each aircraft transponder reply, selects

29

a letter or symbol to show which controller is responsible for the aircraft.

The alphanumeric data elements are: (1) controller's symbol, designating the cognizant controller; (2) leader, connecting the controller's symbol to the alphanumeric data; (3) aircraft identification (ID), which can be displayed as flight number, tail number, or transponder code; and (4) transponder reported altitude. For aircraft controlled from another position, only the appropriate controller's symbol is shown. For associated aircraft, the data tags are automatically displayed without additional controller action.

Special symbols are displayed for non-associated aircraft not under facility control or for aircraft transponding a non-discrete code (2 digits). Each controller is assigned a number of non-discrete codes which are designated selected codes. These selected non-discrete codes are then assigned to aircraft that are to be controlled. The symbols displayed indicate whether or not the aircraft is transponding a selected non-discrete code. This system feature is used to: (1) control aircraft that do not have discrete code (4 digit) transponders; and (2) initially control aircraft that are transitioning into the control area and have not yet been assigned a discrete code. This symbology can be altered to meet specific user requirements.

For Mode C equipped aircraft, altitude is automatically added to the data block. For aircraft not equipped with an altitude reporting capability, the controller can, through the use of his keyboard and position entry module, add assigned altitude. He can enter symbols to show that the aircraft is at an assigned altitude (indicated by the addition of the letter "A") or that the aircraft has been told to climb or descend to a specified altitude, which is shown by an ascension or descension arrow. As the system does not currently have secondary radar (beacon) level tracking, ground speed is not shown.

The computer places full data blocks on a controller's display only for aircraft under his control, but, in addition, the controller can "quick look" at the aircraft data blocks being controlled at other positions. This quick-look capability allows the full data blocks for aircraft under the control of the departure controller to appear on the arrival controller's display. In addition, the quick-look feature allows each display to serve as an immediate backup for any other display. Releasing the QUICK LOOK switch reverts the display to its original status. Additional QUICK LOOK switches are provided. One switch causes the transponder codes for all aircraft in the system to be displayed, and another causes all Mode C altitudes to be displayed. When applicable, a military QUICK LOOK switch is provided that causes all military modes (Modes 1 and 2) to be displayed.

Special emergency, radio failure, or hijack messages are displayed, and the data block blinks to alert the controller.

Both the emergency and the aircraft's previous data block are shown for three radar antenna scans (adjustable system parameter). The emergency display is shown at all controller positions. Any number of emergency type codes can be handled in this manner. b.ircraft manoeuvres or other causes can result in invalid replies or no reply to an interrogation. For a missed reply, the aircraft position is shown at the last valid position, and the word "OLD" is added to the data block. After a number of consecutive missed replies, the aircraft data block is moved to the tab area.

For those terminal areas that service both military and civil flights. the ARTS II system processes all ICAO SSR

30

interrogation modes (Modes 1, 2, 3/A, B, C, and D). When a new aircraft enters the system, the computer attempts to associate the transponder code with stored flight data.

If there is no association and the aircraft has transponded to a military interrogation (Modes 1 or 2), then the symbol M is displayed along with the reported Mode C altitude.

If an association is made, then the applicable controller's symbol and data block are displayed as for an associated civil aircraft.

An analog video channel is provided with code correlation capabilities (presently eight codes). The analog video is available for display simultaneously with the alphanumerics. Independent video level adjustments enable the controller to display any combination of alphanumerics or analog video. A supervisory control panel selects the codes to be used for analog presentation. Each controller can select the codes displayed at this position from the eight codes established by the supervisor. Emergency codes are processed and fed to each display independent of code selection. An additional capability is provided to independently display the raw SSA video (Modes 1, 2, 3/A, B, C, and D) at each controller position.

The system also has an altitude filtering capability to eliminate unnecessary clutter on the controller's display and inhibits the display of aircraft outside controller set limits. Non-associated aircraft within the altitude filter carry altitude; those outside the altitude filter are shown only with the appropriate symbol. Each controller can set upper and lower altitude filter limits.

Each aircraft data element (e. g. controller's symbol, aircraft ide~tification, altitude, leader, etc.) may be inhibited from the display at the controller's option. When two identical discrete codes are processed, question marks (???) are added to the data blocks for each aircraft. This can result from error or multipath returns. The controller must use a procedure such as squawk identification to identify and correct the cause of the question marks.

Displaying Additional Data The aircraft alphanumeric data blocks and symbols are the most important features of the system. They are, however, not the only feature; in addition to the data block, t~ere are three additional data areas (tab, filter and preview). These areas can be set at any selected location on the display and can be inhibited at any time. Thus, each controller can move the data areas to an uncluttered area on his display. . The first .of th~se areas is the tabular (tab) area which ll~ts non-active aircraft (figure 1 ). For scheduled flights, a flight data tape calls up these aircraft and their discrete code at a pre-selected time, e. g. 5 minutes before predict.ad t!me of departure. When the pilot requests clearance, he is given the appropriate discrete code and the controller n~ed ta~e. no ~d.diti?nal action to provide for display of the aircraft s 1dent1f1cat1on in the data block . Th e Iower t a b . area 1s reserved for disassociated aircraft. These are aircraft that have either terminated their flights or have not responded a valid transponder reply for three radar antenna scans. After five radar scans, they are deleted from the display and the transponder code to aircraft identification correlation is dropped from computer memory.

The preview area displays time; and the altimeter setting, which i~ used by the computer to correct transponder reported altitude; the next available transponder discrete

Hand off

Displaying Additional Data

l

TW46S 0602 DL 692 0404 140

NONACTIVE AIRCRAFT

DL 693 0405 50

JI

N 544 0202 73

TW1230LD

----1

50

DISASSOCIATED AIRCRAFT

Automated positive handoff is one of the most significant features of the system and reduces the controller workload, permits a handoff to be made without oral communication between controllers, and insures proper identification of an aircraft throughout the process. At the start of the handoff procedures, the data block appears only at the position controlling the aircraft. Only the responsible controller's symbol appears on the other displays. As shown, N 123 K is being controlled by the East controller, and his display has the data block. The West controller's display shows only E for N 123 K (figure 4).

Figure 1

code is shown in the second line of data. In this area, the controller can preview his keyboard message prior to entry.

Time is shown in hours, minutes and seconds. Altimeter setting (current field barometric reading) is shown in inches of mercury. The controller's input messages are displayed as he keys them in via his keyboard. After the controller enters the message into the computer, the computer checks the message and displays an error symbol if an error is detected (figure 2).

Displaying Additional Data

TIME

ALTIMETER SETTING

'-

I "-

I

21-44¡30 29.28

0611

/~~56P~ /

DISCRETE CODE

'

INPUT MESSAGE

c+Handoff BEGINNING

EAST DISPLAY

E

_.- N 123K 35

WEST DISPLAY

E

Figure 4

When the East controller, through the use of his data entry devices, indicates that he wants to make a handoff of N 123 K to the West controller, the data block for N 123 K appears on the West controller's display and blinks to alert him that a handoff is being requested by the East controller. In addition, HND appears in the data blocks to indicate that a handoff of N 123 K is being requested (figure 5).

As shown in figure 6, when the handoff is accepted by the West controller, the following changes are made to the displayed data: (1) The controller's symbol for N 123 K changes from E to W, indicating that the West controller is now responsible for the aircraft; (2) HND is dropped from the data blocks; (3) The data block blinks on the East controller's display to indicate that the handoff was accepted.

Figure 2

The filter area (figure 3) shows the altitude filter limit (aircraft above this height are not shown), and those nondiscrete codes which have been selected for display, e. g. a non-discrete code set up as a departure code for the departure control position. Each data area (tab, preview, or filter) can be positioned to the most convenient part of a display and may be displayed or inhibited at the controller's option.

,c+Handoff BEGINNING

EAST DISPLAY

E

_.- N 123K 35

WEST DISPLAY

E

START HANDOFF

Figure 5

Displaying Additional Data ALTITUDE FILTER LIMIT

I I 140 01 02 04

o~

I

~ NON-DISCRETE SELECTED CODES Figure 3

Figure 7 shows the final data display after the completion of handoff. Five radar scans after the handoff is accepted, the East controller's display for N 123 K stops blinking and the data block for this aircraft is removed from his display.

The ARTS 11 accepts data from both primary and secondary radars for display in standard analog form. The secondary radar data inputs are also processed by the data acquisition subsystem (DAS), which digitises this data for further processing by the data processing sub-system (OPS). The DAS also provides partial decoding and code selection in the event of a computer failure. The OPS communicates with the displays and data entry devices. The data entry devices consist of an alphanumeric keyboard; a position entry module, which moves a stop on the display to identify a target by its position on the display; the field 31

r+Handoff

WEST DISPLAY

EAST DISPLAY

BEGINNING

- - N 123K 35

E

E

START HANDOFF , ,

ACCEPT HANDOFF

I I

I I

,

-'';..-N123K-

- 1w â&#x20AC;˘

'

35

I

I I

w

...

I I

I

__- N 123K 35

select switches; and the "quick look" switches. Communication channels are provided to transfer flight plan data and to perform interfacility handoff with an adjacent center or terminal.

BEGINNING

WEST DISPLAY

EAST DISPLAY

E

- - N 123K 35

E

START HANDOFF

\

ACCEPT HANDOFF

- ' ';_.!..

-w

"I' I

COMPLETION

I I

I I

I I

,,

N 123K -

35

I I

w

'

'

w

__- N 123K 35

I \

w

__-N

123K

35

Figure 7

System Capacity This has been an abbreviated functional system description; much more could be said of the interfacility handoff, computer generated video map, communication of flight data, the ability to inhibit portions of the alphanumeric data blocks, or the ability of the controller to offset the leader and data block to any of eight compass positions to avoid overlapping of displayed information. The following is an equally brief description of the system's capacity: ARTS 11 can decode and analyse 256 transponder replying aircraft on each radar antenna scan; correlate up to 140 transponder codes to aircraft identities for each scan while performing all other system functions; and update up to 24 full data blocks or their time equivalent (for example 128 single controller symbols) on each of the six displays.

For traffic densities above these requirements, priorities are established by the computer for the data to be displayed.

ARTS II processes all controller's inputs to the computer within one second from entry, and processes all system inputs (from magnetic tapes, other centers, aircraft inputs, etc.) within 1.5 seconds of receipt.

Evaluation ARTS reliability has proved to be high. Lockheed reports that it is getting more than 6,000 hrs MTBF (mean time between failures) in the 24 hours continuous operation at Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport.

32

Broad FAA policy is that if an airport can justify radar for the control of air traffic, ARTS II is equally justified.

I '

Figure 6

r+Handoff

The company's marketing planning is geared to airport construction and improvement schemes in various countries throughout the world covering Terminal Air Traffic Control; En-route Air Traffic Control; and turnkey systems which require study, analysis, recommendation, installation and servicing of new ATC systems. Although ARTS II as designed for FAA is for Terminal Area Control, Lockheed has made it suitable also for en-route control.

Wilkes-Barre/Scranton is a modest size airport of some 200 movements daily. It was a good airport to do an evaluation, with a lot of overflying IFR traffic going into Newark and New York so that sorting is needed, but at the same time there is a moderate amount of local traffic so that if the equipment had broken down it would not have caused big problems. If the ARTS II had required a lot of maintenance - which it has not as it has been exceptionally reliable - Wilkes-Barre/Scranton could have carried on without it. But as it is, Lockheed and ATC had a very good evaluation program. LEC installed the ARTS II at the airport and put the equipment "on line" on December 12, 1972. On January 15, 1973, the package passed its final acceptance test. Between January 15 and April 15 1973, the ARTS II went through a full scale evaluation.

Quite a number of people have passed and are still passing through the airport these days. They fly in on the little Beech 99 commuter aircraft of Allegheny Airways across the Pocono mountains for a onetime pilgrimage to Wilkes-Barre/Scranton. After landing, they make a beeline for the Control Tower and the FAA Office. "We've had 285 visitors here in six months", notes Jim Sullivan, product service engineer for LEC. "All kinds of technical people, including Russians, Japanese, Australians, Canadians ... seems they just keep coming along in bunches. They all want to see the ARTS II and how it is performing." One of the things which interests visitors most is the additional safety feature built into the ARTS II which is a piercing alarm that shrieks to alert controllers when an aeroplane.. squawks an emergency on its transponder.

In Plainfield, N. J., Headquarters of LEC, Vice-President Matt Tutino reports that the ARTS II is envisaged for 69 different airport installations by the FAA between 1974 and 1977 - and it has started to move overseas as well. "We've sold the first unit to Italy. We took a complete set-up to Ciampino at Rome, demonstrated it in use, and Italy placed an order." LEC also took the full system to the U.S.S.R. for the Joint USSR/US Aeronautical Technology Symposium which was held in Moscow from July 18-27 1973. FAA cooperated with LEC in lending a radar alphanumeric display system (RADS) for the demonstration.

"We've found that nothing beats demonstrating the merchandise," Tutino says. "Once Air Traffic Control people see this equipment work, they can see its contribution to air safety. We have demonstrated it at Paris, Tokyo, Dulles, Rome, Moscow. We have demonstrated it using a wide variety of radars - Toshiba, Plessey, Marconi, Tasker, and Texas Instruments. It works just fine with all of them.

We've also interfaced with several displays."

Well, it looks as if we have a winner in this "poor man's" automated radar system. Smaller Administrations, especially those running international airports, would be well advised to have a good look at the possibilities of joining the growing community of automated radar system users.

International Law

The fourth article in our series on International Law as it affects the Air Traffic Controller. The author works at the Eurocontrol Experimental Centre at Bretigny, France, and is Chairman of the United Kingdom Sub-Committee of IFATCA's Standing Committee VII (Legal Matters), but has no connection with Eurocontrol's Legal Section.

Individuals, Corporations and Ships This article proposes to examine the remaining objects of International Law leaving the question of aircraft until we look at Aviation Law. As with territory International Law examines other objects from the standpoint of jurisdiction.

A State's treatment of its own nationals is generally speaking a question of municipal law but when a State seeks to protect its own nationals abroad matters of International Law arise. Every State has a right to protect its citizens and it is also established custom that every State should receive its own citizens back if they are expelled from another country. Obviously there are cases where through lack of diplomatic relations between States some citizens cannot be protected abroad by the parent State and this duty may be carried out on its behalf by another foreign State. Switzerland looked after the interests of British nationals in Egypt after the Suez War in the 1950s.

The State itself decides under its own law who shall be citizens. If there is a question of doubt the case will normally be decided under the law of the parent State seeking to protect the individual. There are exceptions as was proved in the Nottebohm Case in 1955. Diplomatic protection cannot be permitted if the bond of nationality between an injured person and the claimant State is not real and effective. In this case a naturalisation degree under the law of Liechtenstein was not admitted by the International Court of Justice.

Nationality usually stems from one of the following methods: birth, parentage, naturalisation, reintegration, .coJ,.. lective naturalisation or marriage. Place of birth is extremely important in many countries. Unless the parents of "foreigners" born in France register their children as foreigners at an Embassy, the boys when they become old enough are liable for military service. Anyone born in the United Kingdom can claim British nationality. In the United States a person born of European parents in China is Chinese as far as immigration quotas are concerned. In most States however nationality can be that of the child's parents and particularly of his father. Ireland allows nationality on proof of one Irish grandparent. In 1961 the United Nations Organisation fostered the Convention on Statelessness. In view of the number of refugees left without homelands after the Second World War, it had become necessary not only to protect such people but also to make States recognise their duties as well as insisting on their rights. Thus expulsion of a citizen and leaving him to the good offices of other States is illegal.

Naturalisation unlike birth is something sought after by the individual himself and the States have absolute discretion whether to grant it or not. Of course it may be

by E. McCluskey

against municipal law to become naturalised in another State but International Law only considers the law of the receiving State in such cases. In 1929 there was a case where a Turkish citizen was naturalised French without conforming to Turkish Law but his naturalisation was upheld in International Law. Naturalisation does not necessarily entail loss of the original nationality. A British subject for example, in order to lose his nationality, must make a denouncement to the Home Secretary who can if he so wishes refuse the denouncement. Dual nationality however infers that the individual cannot be protected by his other parent State against the one in which he happens to be.

A subject who has had another nationality may be regranted his nationality. This is reintegration. When territory is transferred from one State to another the inhabitants automatically acquire the nationality of the new State (except United Nations protectorates) but normally provision is made for those who wish to retain their old nationality. When Chira Fils had his case against Czechoslovakia heard in 1930, it was maintained that by opting to retain Hungarian nationality at the time of the session treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, he had never lost Hungarian nationality. Nevertheless when a person has two nationalities, disputes can arise and the active nationality takes precedence. In 1912 there was arbitration on the Canevaro Case where because of his parents, Canevaro born in Peru and one time candidate for the Peruvian Senate claimed to be Italian and therefore in Peru entitled to treatment as an alien. It was ruled that he was Peruvian.

There are certain standards for States even in the treatment of their own nationals. The Great Powers in the 19th Century frequently intervened in the Turkish Empire to prevent atrocities. The Treaty of Versailles recognised that there must be some protection of minorities; however at that stage no standards of Human Rights were laid down. Nevertheless some protection of workers was provided for under labour conventions of the International Labour Organisation which of course has recently published a report on Conditions of Employment and Service of Air Traffic Controllers. The atrocities of the Second World War led to the movement to protect Human Rights internationally mainly through the United Nations Organisation and the Council of Europe. The latter has in fact a Commission and a Court of Human Rights and what thirty years ago would have been considered intervention in the internal affairs of another State can be brought before the Court. Greece has twice raised matters concerning Cyprus and Italy was investigated in a case brought by Austria regarding matters in the Alto Adige. In the Lawless Case the question of detention without trial in the Irish Republic was examined.

The problem of minorities was examined by the World Court in 1921 when the Albanian Constitution was changed to nationalise education. Private schools including those of the Greek population were closed. By building schools on a sum per head basis the Greek population in many areas was too small to have a separate school provided and there was a danger not only of their culture being lost but

33

also of the chi ldren falling far behind the other children by changing to a new system . It was he ld th at in some cases minorities must be given more than just equality.

Jurisdiction of a State over its c itizens may extend outside its territo ry in that nationa ls on return may be called to account for acts done abroad. Some States also use the method of ,.Act of State " to protect their ci tizens by recognis ing thei r acts committed abroad. An alien cannot be t ried for an ac t committed abroad so the United Kingdom had to find a constructive allegiance to the Crown th rough a passport to try W illiam Joyce in 1946. Joyce was born i n Ireland when Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and had resided in t he United States. It w as claimed that by seeking t he protect ion of a British passport he owed a duty to the co unt ry providing the passport and therefore was g uilty of t reason by making subversive broadcasts from Germany during the Second World War. It is doubtfu l Intern ati onal L aw as of course is the recent amend ment to A rt icle 4 of the German Crim in al Cod e al lowing G erm any to assume jurisd i ction over hi-jackers of any nationali ty wherever the hi-jacking takes place.

Unless G erman l ives o r p ro p erty a re involved , a case under this Article might lead to a c ase at International Law. A l ien s are al l persons w ho are n ot nationals of the State. There is no ob li gation to admit them at all but if only pe rso ns f rom one o ther State are excluded this is an unfriendly act und er Internat ional Law. Unless an extradition Treaty exi sts w ith co ntrary provis ions, th ere is absolute right for any State to grant asyl um to an al ien but there is no righ t for an i ndividual to cl ai m it. It is an unfriendly act to grant asylu m when this is used to prepare attacks o n the oth er State. A n a lien m us t comply w ith the laws of the State and as we have seen th is may be applied even after he has left it if he st ill a pparently c laims protection. Of cou rse an alien has no rights such as voting unless ag reed

by Treaty ( Irish citizens resid ent in th e United Kingdom) , but he has rights more so than the nat ionals of the State in that he may be p rotected by h is home State ; he may not be outlawed an d must have the protection o f the host State from corrupt officials or inefficient law enforcement which may not be t he case for citi zen s. Once he has paid all his taxes and debts, he must be al lowed to leave and taxes may not be levied on the prope rty he ta kes with him . A rec ent prob lem of th is nature arose in Ug anda. Of course fo r man y reasons he may be ex pel led but the reason must be stated and be held by a n intern ational court, if necessary, to be reason able. A lso he must be g iven reasonable time to leave properly. Alth o ugh most States insist o n official pass po rts o r id entity card s fo r aliens, there is no international legal backi n g fo r such docu ments. Proof of identity s uffi ces. O ne ca n b e fo rced to have a passp ort w hen a visa is req ui red , usua lly when diplomatic relatio ns do n ot exist between States. s in c e a visa is always put in a passport.

It is now fraught w ith d ifficulty to trave l without a pass port however and the Engli sh man c annot n ow present his visiti n g card to the French pol ice with the address o f a hotel in N ice written o n the back as w as norma l prac tice at the turn of the century.

Some aliens are by their em ployment bette r p rotected than o th ers. Dip lomatic immunity exists for Heads of State, Ambassadors . Embassy Officials , Cou riers, Consuls , M embers of Fore ign Armed Forces, Members o f Internatio nal Organ isations i n varying degrees. Di plomatic Immunity beca me fu lly recognised at the Vienna Convention of 1961 .

Contrary to popular belief Embassies a re no t always invio-

34

late. The head of mission is not all powerful even with respect to his own nationals. In 1896, Sun Yat Sen, a political refugee in the United Kingdom, was induced to enter the Chinese Legation and detained to be sent back to China. The United Kingdom Government refused to accept that the Legation was Chinese te rrito ry and d emanded the release of Su n Yat Sen. This was granted.

The nationality of individuals seems at first g lance fairly straight-forward and yet numerous anoma lies have had to be decided by International Courts. So it is not surpris ing to fin d that the position of a Corporation is even more complicated.

It was because of the complicated position of a Corporation in International Law that do ubts were throw n on the legal stat us of our Federation which led Wa lter En dli ch, the previous Editor of " Th e Controller' ', to raise the whole question of the indemni ty of th e Execu ti ve Board. His wo rries on this su bject led to the idea of forming Standing Committee VI I to in vestigate this an d other Lega l Matters and the Comm ittee wrestled with the problem for a year and final ly proposed chang es to the Con sti tution for the D irecto rs to examine at the 13th Annual Conference. It is hoped th at as a result of the work of Standi ng Committee VII, the Federation will shortly have a watertight position as far as this is possible for an Internation al Federatio n like o urs under International L aw. As far as International Law is concerned the Federation is ei ther a number of individuals of various nationalities or a number of Corporations of various nationalities o r it is a Corporation itself. It is this last possibility th at Standing Committee VII has ai med for in its report to Conference.

A corp oration is an artificial leg al entity with rights and duties distinct from the individuals who are its members or in the case o f o ur Fede ration distinct from the "corporation s" whi ch are its Member Associations. IFATCA has all the qualities to be a corporation agg regate but to ob tain the advantages and to avoid individual members bei ng responsible in law it must be either granted a Charter b y a State or be registered as a company with l i mited liability. As IFATCA is not an International Organisation set up by States, the Cha rter or registration must be ti ed to one State.

The Federat ion must therefore comp ly with as many condi tions for incorporation in that one State as possible to avoid any doubt and the refore protracted legal proceed in gs of proof o f nationality should the Federation eve r be in vo lved in any court action. There were many reasons w hy Standing Committee VII decided that Switzerland should be the State of incorporation. Already the siege social is in Switzerland under the Constitution and the Swiss franc is the currency used . The Swiss franc remains one of the wo rld's stable curren cies . Sw itzerland is probably the only State in the wo rld which has never been in breach of International Law and by Switzerland 's d iplomatic policy a nd its permanent neutrality, a corporat ion incorporated the re is very unlikely to become an enemy corporation should any declared war break out. These consideratio ns are extremely important and we sha ll now proceed to exa min e w hy.

The principle of th e corporation aggregate being an independent person was set up in 1897 in England in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co. Salomon formed a limited company with his wife and chi ldren. He sec u red a charge of ÂŁ 10 OOO on the assets and one year late r the company was wound up with liabil it ies ex ceeding the assets.

Th e creditors claimed that the busi ness belonged to Sal omon and not to the company and that he sh o uld indem nify

the c o mpany and that debts to h i m pe rsonally should be wi theld until the su ms d ue had been paid . T he cou rt main tained that the company was legally formed and was an ind epend ent person so the bu sin ess belonged to it and n ot to Salomon. So by being recog nised as a legally fo rmed co rporation, IFATCA immediately wo uld make immune the assets of Member Associatio ns and of members. A defi nite legal position in one State gives the protection of the State if necessary and could avoid the prot racted proc eed i ngs of estab lishing nationality.

Nationali ty may be decided in several ways. Every munic ipal law has diffe ren t rules for corpo ratio ns inside and outside thei r j urisdic tion, national and foreign corpo ratio ns, corpo rations subject to taxation and enem y corpo ration s.

T he fi rst imp ortant test is siege social, or " legal seat" as it was w ritten i nto the IFATCA Constitution. We have already menti oned th e Canevaro c ase. Onc e the Permanen t Court of A rb itration had d ec ided that Can evaro was not Ital ian, it co uld then ascribe Pe ruvian Nationality to th e firm Jose Caneva ro & Son bec ause of the s iege soc ial and the natio nality of its mem bers. Nevertheless if the c o mpany had n ot been regarded as a co rporation under Peruvian law , the c ase would have rested solely on the natio nality of the mem bers. Slightly d ifficult in the case of IFATCA? In 1923 in La Suedoise G ra mmont v Roller , th e siege so cial was Belgium. The c ompany's administration w as in Pari s and all th e shareh olders and exec utive off ic ers were French. T he Be lgo-German Mixed A rbit rat Tribunal saw no reason to depart fro m " the generally accepted rul es regarding the nationality of corporations". T he co mpany was held to be Belg ian.

Another test applied is do mi ci le. One of th e important cases here is the Sti rlin g Cl aim 1895. The c laimant had been inco rpo rated in London bu t traded in Chi le. T he Ang lo-Ch ilean Comm ission dec ided th at the company was a c reatio n of Engl ish law. It cou ld n ot c laim lega l existence in Chi le un less it complied w ith C hil ean Law. T he c om pany had received recognitio n by the Pres iden t of Ch i le unde r the Co mmercial Cod e of Chi le permitting fore ign compani es to establish b ranches in Chile. The case was dec ided by d o mici le fo r the purposes of national ity. This was not the plac e of exploi tat ion o r business ac tivities abroad but th e cent re of the c ompany's administratio n and management.

At present this method wo uld still tend to t ie IFATCA to Switzerland i n view of the national ity of the Presi dent, the T reas urer and th e Fin ance Stand ing Co mmittee if we conside r the exploitatio n to be do ne by the Executive Secretary and the busi ness activi ties to be done b y Standing Com mittees, 1, II, IV and V. However it mu st be remembered that the links with Switzerland by Offi cers and a Standing Comm ittee are not a perm anent arrangement and coul d chan ge overn ig ht so hence the reaso n for Standin g Committee VII sug gestin g in vestig ation of any req ui rem ents to have Sw iss nati onals always o n th e Exec utive Board if i nco rpo ration in Switzerland is achieved .

The thi rd test is inco rpo rati on. Th e main case in t his test is the case of Standard Oil Company Tankers 1926. In accord ance wi th the T reaty of Versa illes, Germany ceded to the A llied Powers all German Merchant Ships of 1600 tons gross and above. These incl uded all vessels entitled to fly the German Merchant flag or owned by any German natio nal or corporation . Germany delivered nine ta nkers be longing to Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft incorporated in Hamburg. The Standard Oil Company owned p ractically the whole of the company. The United

States c laimed beneficial own ership for Standa rd Oil Co mpany. It was held th at Germany had c ommitted no international tort but had co nfiscated the tan kers un der an intern ational und ertaki n g. L ega l interests i n the co mpany were vested in the company itself and Standard Oi l C ompan y had on ly a shareholder's right in the shares but this d id not co nfe r a right of ownersh ip in the assets or in the earn ings of the co mpany wh ich were the rights of the company itself.

From the point of view of trading and the economic interests of States the con trol test does not concern us i n IFAT CA, but th is is the test applied to establish w hether a Cor porat ion is an enemy c orporation in time of war. In IFAT CA, Standi ng Com m ittee VII has pressed in its reports to Co nferen c e that to avo id indemnity problems the Co nstitution sh ould under line that control in the Federat ion remains in the hands of the D irectors and not in th e hand s of the Exec utive Board. The Committee sees this as a safeg uard both to the Executive Bo ard and to the M ember Associ atio ns. Thu s nation ality of those in contro l is d iverse and the Cou rts wo uld have to reve rt to the other tests.

Hence the decis ion of the Standing Committee to recommend in co rporation in a recog nised neut ral State.

Th e last o bject o f Inte rn atio nal Law to be discussed is ships which is of interest as the laws of aircraft as we shall see i n a later article d evelo ped fro m the rules for ships.

Under In te rnation al Law sh ip s are all ocated to States. Once rul es of nat ional ity a re establi shed it is relatively easy to decide whether a ship is ent itled to f reedom of the seas; in status mixtus (between peace and war) whether it is an o bject of reprisals and i n war w hether it is neutral or en emy. It is by the fixed rules also that it can be decided, whether a ship is entitled to innocent passage through the terr ito rial sea , or reaso ns for access to national ports. In the Muscat Dhows Case 1905 it was stated: " Generally spea k in g it belong s to every sovereign State to decide to w ho m it w ill ac c o rd the r ight to fly its f lag and to prescribe the rules govern i ng such grants." The prob lem in this case was n ot so straightforward because it contravened a T reaty. We shall examine treaties in the next article. The signatories of the General Act of B russels 1890 agreed not to g rant flags to native ships un less they belon ged to proteges. France had agreed with the Sultan of Muscat to let some of his sub jects fly the French flag on dhows eng aged in coastal an d slave trade. It was held that France was in b reach of th e Treaty as the person s were not p roteges. In t ime of status mixtus an enemy State cannot t ran sfe r ships to a neutral power nor can a neutral power transfe r sh ips to a belligerent in time of war. Such a transfer can be construed as anything from an unfriendly act to an act of war an d the principle of self-defence may be invoked.

The L otus Case 1927 decided that " a corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that a ship on the high seas i:; assim ilated to the te rritory of the State, the flag of which it fl ies .. . A ship is p laced in the same posit ion as national territory. " Registratio n may be a veil for other benefits as we all know with the flags of convenience so much talked of in the press. Liberia, Costa Rica and Panama are well known flags of convenience. In doubtful cases the courts w ill revert to the beneficial interests test.

The interesting case in this field is the 'I' m Alone ' in 1933 and 1935. During prohibition in the U.S.A., the Uniteq States used an agreement with the Uni ted Kingdom permitting her to board private vessels under the British flag outs id e U.S. territorial waters but within defined limits. The

35

'I'm Alone', a British ship registered in Canada, was almo~t completely controlled by U .S. citizens and was engage~ in smuggling alcoholic liquor to the United States. Hailed within the agreed distance, the ship refused to stop and was chased and sunk by a U.S. coastguard vessel more than 200 miles from the coast. It was held that no compensation was payable for the ship or cargo but that nevertheless sinking was illegal. The U .S.A. was directed to recognise the illegality, apologise to Canada, pay $ 25 O~O to the Canadian Government and compensate the captain and crew.

In Article 2 we already referred to the rules on ships under construction.

Now that we have examined the subjects and the objects of International Law and State Jurisdictio~, shall look in the next article more closely at the principles of sovereignty, recognition, consent , good faith and international responsibility as they are affected by treaties or as we shall call the article International T ransactions.

v:e

For further study: International Law Chambers Chap. 3 and 4; Sweet & Maxwell The Law of Nations B ri erly Part VI; Oxford U P International Law Vol I Schwarzenberger Ch. 11, 16, 20, 21 22; Stevens Oppenheim's Internationa l Law Lauterpacht Pl. I Ch. 3, Pt. 11 Ch. 3, Pt. Ill ; L ongmans ..

Recueil des arbitrages internationaux Lapradelle-Pol1tos Vol I I.

News from Member Associations France The Annual Sympos ium of the French Association (APCA) - Le Colloque de !'Association Profess io nnelle de la Circulation Aerienne - was held in the Conference Room of Air FrancP. Headquarters in Paris on April 19 1974, and was attended by many well-known personalities from the Aviation World in France. IFATCA's Executive Secretary, Mr. T . H. Harrison, attended on behalf of IFATCA. As a mark of its great interest in the steady growth of Civil Aviation , the theme of the Colloque as chosen by APCA was "Le Cont r61e du Trafic Aerien a l'heure du Transport supersonique" ("Air T raffic Control on the eve of the introduction of the SST " ). APCA, being in charge of IFATCA Standing Committee I's studies into ATC developments connected with SST operations , presented a paper on important operating aspects of su personic flights as far as they concern ATC. A spokesman from Aerospatiale, the French Concorde Manufacturer, outlined the Concorde's commercial operations, and representatives from France's Civil

Aviation Adm inistration presented aspects of international rules and procedures for SST flights, the possibilities offered by satellites used as communicat ion aids and the implications of " Data-Link" in the future of Air T ransport.

The necess;ty of thorough pre-planning of such flights was insisted upon by Messrs. H. Edon and Ph. Vui llermet, APCA Members, and the spec ial needs of SSTs in the Air Traffic Control Services environment were stressed. Mr. J . Audy from Aerospatiale stressed the need for p recision regarding air navigation by Concorde which is prov ided by means of three inertial airborne platforms. Many slides were used by way of illustration , and Mr. Franchi, the French Concorde's Test Pilot, participating in the debate, made the Colloque particularly interesting from the point of view of practical operating experience.

Mr. R. Pascal of the French Civil Aviation Authority, described the main international aspects of the procedures regardi ng this new mode of air travel; the SST-Panel in charge of this work has come up with some twenty amendments to "Rules of the Air", "Ai r Traffic Control Services" and " PANS-RAC ". Mr. J . Villiers, Directo r of the Northern Civil Aviation Region in France, went over the h istorical events during the past seven years regarding t he research, in ternational negotiation s and other con ferences prior to the introduction of aerospace techniques in the f ield of civi l aviation; a mammoth task. Mr. 0. Carel, Civi l Aviation Engineer, presented a paper on air-ground automated data exchange. In his conclusion he po inted out the difficulties in this field for chosing the relevant system, for equipping aircraft, and other problems. The "Data-Link" will not be available to controllers befo re 1985.

APCA's 1975 Colloque The Association 's 1975 Colloque will be held at T oulouse on th e 27th February, 1975. Theme : ' Recruitment and Training of Air Traffic Controllers'. APCA's Colloques are of a high profess ional standard, and IFATCA, i n congratulating the French Association with its achievements in this field, urges members and non-members not to overlook this annual event.

Hungary M embers of APCA talking to Mr. Franchi , the French Concorde's Tesl Pilot (w ith briefcase) .

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The Hungarian and Au strian Associations held the ir now customary - working meeti ng in Budapest last May.

Executives of the Hungarian and Austrian Associations in discussion at Budapest, with Mr. E. Voit, President of HATCA, in the centre seat.

Topics of mutual interest were on the agenda, and it was concluded that the meeting had served its purpose and would be organised every year.

At the meeting AATCA was represented by Mr. Helmuth Kihr, President; and Mr. Alfred Nagy, IFATCA's RLO for Eastern Europe. The HATCA delegation consisted of Mr. Erik Voit, President; Mr. Bela Felfoldy, Vice-President; Mr. Kornel Metzner, Secretary General; Mr. Stephen Zerkovitz, Executive Secretary; and several HATCA members. The meeting was followed by an outing to North-East Hungary.

Canada Visit of Delegation from the Civil Aviation Workers Union, USSR Three members of thi s organization, Mr. Vladimir Nikitin, Secretary; Mr. Anatoli Kolmakov, International Affai~s; and Mr. Vikenti Smetanin, Air Traffic Controller at Leningrad, visited Canada from July 4- 10 on CATCA's invitatio n.

With the co- operation of the Ministry, arrangements were made for th em to observe ATC facilities in Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal. PATCO President John Leyden and Executive V-P Robert Poli j oined the group in Ottawa on July 8. in add ition PATCO Regional V-P Robert Meyer who is also a Vice Pr~sident of IFATCA joined CATCA President Jim Livingston in welcoming the group on th eir arrival in Montreal and remained w ith the party until July 9.

The visitors were particularly interested in the JETS system in Canada (Joint En Route Terminal System co_m_puters). Leyd en said that in the future he hopes to v1s1t Russia in a reciprocal ag reement, while Meyer noted that next to the United States, Russ ia has the larg est controller work-force in th e world.

Runway Foaming The Canadian Ministry of Transport (MOT) has issued a NOTAM advising that a foamed runway surface wi ll not be provided at MOT airports. This decision was _made on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis, the Executive Summary of which follows: "Executive Summary - There is no evidence that foaming a runway has ever: 1. decreased the damage to an aircraft landing with undercarriage problems ;

2. prevented a fire from starting; or 3. prevented an injury or death.

"The only positive factor involved is that of confidence.

Passengers and crew feel better when preparing for an emergency landing if they know some one on the ground is doing something positive to help them.

"These conclusions were reached as a result of reviewing accident reports both civilian and military. The cost of providing adequate foam laying equipment at an adequate number of MOT airports would be $ 3,060,108 in cap ital costs and $ 60,000 per year in maintenance costs. In addition each time foam was laid for a larger ai rcraft, the cost would be $ 5,200 or about one half of that for a smaller aircraft. At presP.nt, the Ministry has no equipment suitable for laying the even two-inch deep foam blanket that objective tests have indicated is the most effective in suppressing sparks.

"ICAO attachment C to Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Guidance Material on Rescue and Fire Fighting Service) makes no mention of runway foaming."

Canada's Bi-lingual Policy The Canadian Supreme Court recently restated the co untry's policy that government agencies s hould be bilingual, using both Englis h and French. On an experimental basis, Quebec controllers have started communicating in French with pilots from French-speaking countries (Air France, Swissair and Sabena).

CATCA is strongly against thi s move which not only violates MOT regulations, but also does not conform with the official ICAO position that English or the language of a particul ar country may be used on domestic f lights , but the use of English is recommended at all times as a safety precaution since it had been adopted as the international language for aviation co mmunications.

The action by the Quebec controlle rs is supported by their colleagues at Baie Comeau, Sept lies and by some 30 people at Montrea l/ Dorva l. CATCA's standpoint is that the use of French could cause accidents.

English has long been the international language of the air world . To keep it that way, the Canadian Air Line Pilots Assoc iation and IFALPA have let it be known that its members will accept nothing but instructions in Engl ish. The

37

IFALPA stand is fully sup ported by French pilots, and also has the support of IFATCA.

United States PATCO 's Annual Convention John F. Leyden was re- elected, without o pposition, as President of PATCO fo r a three-year term at the Organisati on's May 12-16 1974 Annual Convention, held at the Hilton Hawaiian Village, Ho nolulu. Max Winter was elected as Central Region Vice President, replacing Noel Keane who resigned that position to become PATCO's nation al Direc tor of Labour Re lation s.

The an nual Presidential Citation for the person who has done the most to pro mote air safety in th e past year was presented to Rep. T haddeus Dulski, Chairman of the U .S. House of Rrepesentat ives' Civil Service Committee and of the C ont roller su bcommittee. A report o n serious controller shortages was released b y Rep. Dulski during the Convention, based on findings of his committee.

T he Conventio n drew a record 1,000 controllers, families and friends at th e final Banquet. In addition to a number of resolu tio n s from PATCO Standing Committees, the Co nvention had a heavy lin e-up of key personalities as speakers. Among those w h o atten ded were Sen. Daniel Inouye of Hawaii; Rep. Sparky Matsunaga; MESA President Jesse Calhoon ; President of Aviation Safety Institute John Galipault; Director of Federal Mediation Services Ken Moffett; Aviatio n Consu ltant Glen A. Gilbert; Presid ent of the Airline Pilots Association J . J. O'Do nnell ; and the President of IFATCA, J.-D. Monin, w h o indicated that PA TCO's helpf ul ness to the Federation was a matte r of consi derable appreciation. PATCO represents the largest group of controllers in the world and is by far the biggest component of IFAT CA, Monin said. Th e IFATCA President added that the Federation was taking an ever more active role in inte rnational affairs and problems, and he also outlined the expansion of IFAT CA over the years.

PATCO Testifies Before U.S. Senate Th e followi n g are exce rpts from testimony presented by PATCO before the Senate Appropriations Committee :

One of the primary concerns of cont rollers is manpower.

Aviation is growing at a considerable rate in spite of the fuel shortage; from this we may co nclude that we cann ot look to the fuel shortage to relieve the controllers' workload.

Moreover, while ai r traffic operations at the towers have increased by over forty percent, and aircraft handled at the centers have in creased to c lose to fifteen percent fro m 1971 to 1974, the number of men in the contro ller workforce has actually decreased in the same period . In June, 1971, there were 16,501; while in M arch, 1974, there we re only 15,870. Thus, there are fewer men moving more ai r traffic than before.

While this cont roller shortage has added unnecessary strains and pressures in the past and present, the future is considerably bleaker. It takes approximately three years to train a controller to full journeyman status; a man hired i n 1975 will not be of full use until 1978. But the majority of the present air traffic control workforce entered the system upon the end of the Korean Conf lict, app roximately 1954-1955. Because of the early burnout of ai r traffic controllers, c ausing unsafe retention of this personnel, t his large segment of the workforce wil l be entitl ed to reti re after twenty-five years of duty, in 1979-1980. Since it is neither practical nor possible to hire between th ree to five thousand contro llers at one time, a reasonable amount of foresight would suggest an open pipeline system of hiring, movin g a workable amount of people into the system yearly in preparation for this great exodus at the end of the decade. Even if it were possible to hire five thou sand men at one t ime, the train i ng facil ities would not be able to handle them; the new hirees would not be competent to handle live traffic; and the journeymen controll ers remaining, besides being incredibly overworked wo ul d have to be utilized in the training of the newly hi red. In short, the ai r traffic system would become unmanageable.

Throughout the 1960s, a shortage of qual ifi ed controllers causing unsafe conditions, was apparent and yet was allowed to go untreated. By 1969, the pos ition was criti cal and emergency measurers, in t he form of cash hiri ng, had to be undertaken to relieve t he situation. The same symp-

VIPs on scene at the Convention. left to right : John Galipault, President. Aviation Safety Institute; Jean-Daniel Manin. President, IFATCA; Spark Matsunaga. U.S. House of Representatives. State of Hawaii ¡ Robert E. Poli. Executive V ice-President' PATCO; Robert E. Meyer. Great Lake~ Vice-President, PATCO . and Vice-President, IFATCA.

38

toms are under the surface today but will again appear if they are allowed to go untreated. A relapse would necessitate vast expenditures at breakneck speed, and make for a good deal of waste.

PATCO believes that preventive medicine, in the form of an expanded hiring program to systematically provide for future needs, is essential. The present FAA budget request for a mere 786 new controllers for terminal facilities is simply not adequate in the light of these facts. Although the importance of budgetary economy is realised, it is hoped that agreement exists that there can be no economizing on safety; human lives cannot be priced.

PATCO's second greatest concern is automation. The controller is in favour of automation if it will facilitate his work, but, again, not at the expense of safety or efficiency.

The ARTS Ill program in the towers has been a great boon to controllers as has the Flight Data Processing System in the canters. But the FAA has rationalized reduced controller hiring as a productivity gain from the implemen-

tation of automated equipment in the Air Traffic Control Centers, especially Radar Data Processing (RDP) equipment. Last year the Agency alleged that RDP would deliver five percent productivity; this figure has been lowered to three percent this year. At this point, any prediction would be questionable as the system has only been in full operation in two canters since March, 1974; and, to be included in the present budget request, the calculations must be at least a year old. But this is a minor point.

PATCO's major objection to RDP at present is that it is unsafe and inefficient. The system was rushed into operation to justify the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on the system in years past.

There are various reasons for the problems associated with RDP, the primary one being the radar itself. The longrange radar used for canter traffic separation is 20 years old, out of date and inefficient. Feeding an archaic radar system into a space-age computer can only multiply the problems that previously existed.

A Commonality of Interest

By John F. Leyden, President, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization *

Not so very long ago, a blue-ribbon seminar group, at an internationally famous university, came up with the astounding conclusion that too much money was being spent on air safety. The impression was given that the Federal Aviation Administration was unnecessarily fanatic on this score and that the number of human lives that were potentially saved were not worth the cost of the present Air Traffic Control system. It would be hard to find a better example of the crackpot approach to the urgent, very real, and only partially realized needs of air travel today.

The university seminar report is not really surprising.

Air safety has always suffered because of the pseudoauthority and the vested interest, often with seemingly high credentials.

At the heart of things, there are only two real experts in this uniquely demanding field - those who fly the planes and those who give them guidance from the ground. Not only are they the most knowledgeable people but they have the freedom to speak out with the truth without compromise.

To give a voice to one of these groups of experts, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization was formed in June 1968. We have passed through a number of traumatic experiences in the intervening years. We have always found, however, that those who were most helpful, who had the greatest understanding of our many crusades for air safety, were invariably airline pilots. On the other hand, we have respected ALPA's many fights for better air-

â&#x20AC;˘ About the author: John F. Leyden has been President of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization since April 1970. In 1958, after four years service (1952-56) In the U.S. Air Force as an airborne radar operator, he joined FAA as a controller in the New York Air Route Traffic control Center, and was named in 1969 as the Agency's nominee for Government employee-of-the-year honors.

When PATCO was formed in 1968, Leyden worked actively in various union positions, including the presidency of the New York Center. the largest ATC facility.

port equipment and reduction of such hazards to flight as dangerous cargo.

Today, PATCO is the exclusive voice of the 18,000 controllers of the United States, with a binding labor contract with FAA. Our membership has passed the 12,000 mark, and we have achieved many benefits for controllers.

In our various activities, one truth has emerged loud and clear. Controllers and pilots simply cannot know too much about one another's business. The more each knows about the other's problems and needs, the more that can be done to solve and meet them. This is one reason why PATCO has made a major issue of increased familiarization trips for controllers. Our 1973 labor contract allows each controller up to eight a year. Such trips give him a unique and necessary insight into the other side of the control instructions he issues.

I anticipate far greater communications between PATCO and ALPA members in the near future. The pipeline has already been opened at a number of PATCO seminars held over the country. Many pilots have attended, and I can say that the interchange of information was an eye-opener for every person in the audience.

I also urge pilots to take it upon themselves to learn the full score about what happens on the ground. Visit the Tower or radar room; get to know personally those disembodied voices with whom you deal daily over the mike.

Find out why so many of the things a controller could do for a pilot are classed as "optional", and the many deficiencies in equipment, staffing, and FAA concern for pilot needs with which he must contend during his working tour. I think you will find a tremendous commonality of interest. I know that the cause of safer flying can only benefit.

As to PATCO itself, a number of pilots have asked me what happened to the organization in the last few years.

Following the front-page headlines of the 1970 "sickout", PATCO dropped out of journalistic sight. What we have done is reorganize our internal structure and change our

39

tactics. We have spent three years building a new reputation for responsible leadership. In this way we have won not only the respect of people in FAA, Congress, and the Administration, but gained an overwhelming victory when almost 90 O/o of the controllers of this country some time ago voted us their exclusive representative. We are also now financially stabilized, with a majority of members paying their dues through the FAA salary-checkoff system.

Confrontation policies with FAA are not a daily occurrence as in the past. In fact, the Agency has hired back all 114 controllers originally fired because of alleged sickout activities.

What does our new stature mean to pilots? For one example, let's go back a while. Based on administration directives to cut costs to the bone, FAA had instituted a total freeze on the hiring of new controllers. Not one was taken on for some eight months. Nationwide ATC facilities were becoming more critically shorthanded, because when a man left a facility, it just had to live with one controller less. As a result, PATCO stimulated and participated in a hearing by the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee on controller shortages. One of the strongest PATCO supporters was ALPA First Vice-President Al Bonner, who made a stirring presentation supporting controller needs.

In this instance, PATCO did not engage in propaganda or inflamatory statements. Instead, we dealt with hard facts.

We gave to the committee and Chairman Thaddeus Dulski (D-N.Y.) an exhaustive compilation of staffing shortages at all FAA facilities. The table of organization of each was clearly spelled out. The weight of information was enough to change the minds of many committee members who had previously been told by FAA that shortages were exaggerated or non-existent. The result was an immediate program of hiring new controllers. There is still a major fight here - for far too few are being brought in. But we were able to break the freeze and open the hiring pipeline again.

PATCO now works at many levels on behalf of the air traffic controller. We deal directly with FAA mangement as the controller's legal representative, and with the Civil Service Commission, the Labor Department, other aviation groups, and other involved federal agencies and organizations. We will be participating more strongly in FAA technical decisions. As I mentioned earlier, the expertise of controllers, as well as pilots, is essential in developing new equipment that works.

We also will go to the courts when that appears the best course of action. Last year we were able to get a temporary injunction against the downgrading of controllers at the Oakland Center. In this case, FAA tried to reduce the salaries of a number of controllers because of an alleged reduction in the number of air traffic movements at the facility - one of its many cost-saving tricks, of which pilots are only too aware. The court ruling is a historic one. It is the first time the federal system of setting pay scales has been challenged successfully. Other work we are doing can mean, eventually, a better understanding of the skills required to control air traffic, and an increase in what the government pays such skills.

Few groups in aviation, I believe, have proven as politically effective in Congress as PATCO in the past three years. One instance was passage of the Controller Second Career/Early Retirement Bill in 1972. It is a milestone in retirement benefits for any type of federal employee. The controller may now retire with full pension benefits after 20 years of service. But that is only half the story. He is

also entitled to a full two years of retraining for another profession, with both his past regular salary and the training costs paid for in full by the government.

More and more, we are beginning to hit the bullseye in our projects for ATC improvement. Presently, we have several priorities that are of direct interest to airline operations: 1) FAA's present method of training "developmentals" is a hazard to every plane in the sky. Each journeyman controller is drafted as a qualified instructor. He receives eight hours of training, a book, and that is that. Not only is he then considered by FAA an expert instructor, but he is so superior that he often can train and monitor a developmental while he still handles live traffic fulltime.

If this were not bad enough, the developmental himself must work with live aircraft. There is no target simulator.

This lack is even more foolish because controllers have found a means of using presently automated radar systems to generate false targets. FAA does not have to spend a fortune researching and buying special simulators, and it could start simulated training today.

2) There is a perilous need for more airports to siphon off high-density traffic and for full equipment at every airport under FAA authority.

3) ATC facilities must reach their full staffing complement.

Present shOrt$iges causes traffic back-ups and considerable inconvenience to pilots, as well as crisis safety conditions.

4) Stopgap measures at facilities to make up for controller shortages must be stopped. The most typical is having a controller work two scopes at the same time handling the normal workload of two people.

5) Automation computerized services cry out for improvement. Expansion of automation means that present bugs in the system can multiply. Flight plans simply must not get "lost".

6) Implementation of restrictive, too demanding or potentially dangerous flight procedures must be stopped.

Many of these problems can be traced to one initial source - the lack of adequate funding for ATC and airports

by FAA. An all-out campaign is essential to ensure that these needs are properly financed in the next FAA budget.

At the core of things, 1974 may be a year of critical decision for the maintenance of our safe skies. Aviation is being buffeted by every negative national event, from fuel shortages to Watergate, and by the stepped-up activities of its inherent adversaries, the government costcutter, the environmentalist, the opportunist, the ignorant, the vested interest, and the crackpot.

It will be a very good year for pilots and controllers to work together in every way possible to support their mutual desire for ever safer flight.

(Airline Pilot Magazine)

A Real Newfie Joke Jack Pinsent was telling us in Quebec of a leg-pull perpetrated successfully by one of the OX controllers. A pilot px'd at 30,000 plus and, after acknowledging, the controller asked if he'd seen any geese. The pilot replied, "No _ 1 didn't think they could fly this high." To which came the reply, "Pressurized ones do."

(CATCA Bulletin)

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News from Corporation Members International Aeradio Limited The Government of Somalia has placed a contract worth more than $ 328,000 with International Aeradio for radio communications equipment, airfield lighting and navigational aids for a new international airport now being built at Kisimanyo in the south of the country.

The radio communications equipment includes HF/SSB transmitters and receivers with a control system to provide speech communications for the air traffic services and telegraph communications for the aeronautical fixed telecommunications network which will link Kisimanyo with the Flight Information Centre at Mogadiscio.

Approach, aerodrome and surface movement control will be carried out by controllers working from an IAL Series 6 air traffic control console, which will be connected with HF and VHF ground-to-air equipment and ancillary units including a multi-channel voice recorder.

The airfield lighting equipment to be supplied under the contract includes full approach lighting for both runways supplemented by runway and taxiway lights and floodlights for the apron area. Visual approach slope indicators will be provided for the approaches at both Kisimanyo and Mogadiscio airports. Long range, locator and VHF omni-range beacons are included in the contract which also covers complementary radio equipment for the Flight Information Centre at Mogadiscio.

Under previous contracts, International Aeradio recently supplied air traffic control and telecommunications equipment to Somalia for Mogadiscio and Hargeisa airports and members of the company's staff have been based in the territory for the last 18 months to provide technical assistance and training facilities.

of information - such as inbound and outbound aircraft in different colours. Marconi says that the object of using colour in this way is to present a greater density of data in a form that can be more quickly and readily understood.

Mechanical Features The basic framework of the display unit is designed to accomodate telescopic runners so that no extra width is required when mounting the unit in a console. Fitted into the basic framework are a tube housing, a printed circuit board unit, an extra-high-tension switching unit and a power unit, all individually removable.

The tube housing acts both as an electrical screen and as a mechanical support for the cathode-ray tube and its associated coil assembly. The housing is attached to the front panel by bayonet fixings. Knurled thumbscrews adjust clamps to hold the tube firmly within the housing. The panel carries the implosion guard, filter as required and immediate controls. The complete panel/housing assembly latches into the front of the framework.

The printed circuit board unit has a capacity of nine boards, using 136-way plug-in edge connectors. The power unit plugs into the frame below the board unit. Mounted within the frame are the extruded aluminium heat sinks for the deflection amplifier output stages and the mains connector panel.

Overall, the unit measures 460 mm (1ft 6 in) high, by 460 mm (1ft 6 in) wide and 796 mm (2ft 73 /a in) deep and weighs 63.7 kg (140 lb). Protection against the hazard of implosion is provided by a well-tested combination of a clear, flat, plastic screen and a cathode-ray tube with a jacketed cone.

Cathode-ray Tube and Coil Assembly

Marconi Introduces Two New Types Of Radar Display Colour as an Aid To the Air Traffic Controller The Type S 3016 Presentation of inbound and outbound traffic in different colours, to give just one example how colour ma.y aid the Air Traffic Controller, is now possible by the introduction of two new types of radar display, in which colour is used to improve data presentation. They ha~e been developed by our Corporation Member, Marconi Radar Systems Ltd. Britain's Civil Aviation Authority has bought one of these displays, the s 3016, for its Air Traffic Co~trol Evaluation Unit at Hurn. The Marconi Type S 3016 1s one of a range of cathode-ray tube display units, built up from common electronic modules and mechanical assemblies.

It operates in an analogue mode with m?dula~ video a~d deflection facilities, and is capable of d1splaymg data m up to three colours simultaneously.

The unit uses a special cathode-ray tube with multicoloured phosphors. It accepts alphanumeric labels and synthetic reference data, and can present different classes

The cathode-ray tube is 400 mm (16 in) in diameter, electrostatically focused and electromagnetically deflected.

It has two separate phosphor layers with a transparent barrier layer between them. The rear phosphor gives red light and the front layer green light; the former is excited by low electron-beam velocity and the latter by high velocity.

Colour change is achieved by electronically switching the extra-high-tension (E.H.T.). When the E.H.T. is low, the electron beam excites only one phosphor. At an intermediate E.H.T. level, some penetration of the barrier layer occurs and both phosphors are energized. At a high E.H.T. level, the output from the second phosphor, which is of higher efficiency, predominates. Quite distinctive colours can thus be generated, typically red, orange-yellow and green. The spot size is not more than 0.7 mm (0.028 in) at 50 microamps beam current at any part of the useful screen with the deflection circuits live and all inputs shorted. Preset controls of bias and focus are produced for each colour. An overall brightness control is also provided.

The deflection coil uses printed windings and employs the latest printed circuit techniques, thus ensuring a very high standard of performance and repeatability.

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L

This provides three preset levels of extra-high-tension with a switching t ime of less than 20 microseconds/ kV over t he g to 14 kV required fo r a fu ll colour range, at a rate not greate r than 250 Hz. The power supply unit is prog ramm able and may be used in both the d isplay and rack-mounted equipment. It has two channels, variable between 5V and 30V positive, negative or floating, acco rd ing to the wiring of the connector. It uses a switched regulation system to achieve both high efficiency and stab ility.

Operational Features The clear flat plastic implosion screen is rotatab le and has a cursor line for use with a bearing ring. A circular po larizing filte r may be f itted as an option.

The immediate display controls for video gain etc., are fitted into the f ront panel. Alternatively, these c ould be fitted into a separate control panel fo r incorporating into a desk. The cursor and co ntrol calibration are illuminated, using an edge lighting system.

The Type S 3018

Rear-Port Display Un i t Type S 3018

Deflection Amplifiers and Video Amplifier Each co il is driven by an amplifier incorporating a boost system. Thi s enables high speed transitions to be made, taking less than 15 microseco nds per d iameter to w ithin 0.1 D/o of the diameter. The average rate of movement of the beam is limited to 25 microseconds per diameter. The amp lifier has a bandwidth suff ic ient to hand le high-speed character writing waveforms and hence only a single deflection syste m is necessary. The switching of the extrahigh-tension causes changes in deflection sensitivity which are compensated for by a gain switch ing ampli fier preceding the defl ection amplifi er.

The cathode-ray tube is protected by scan fai lure circuits, which blank the t race if the main deflection fails.

The deflection system can accept a television raster scan of 625 lines, 25 frames per second.

The video amplifier board contains three channels, one per colour, each having independent gain, controlled by a voltage level, which enables the co ntrol to be situated remotely if requ ired. A ll inputs are differential to minimize crosstalk effect du e to cables. With in an input pulse varying from 1 mi croseco nd to 3 mi lliseconds width at a 4m illisecond period , the form of the video amplifie r output does not vary by more than 100/o from that of the input.

All channels have edge response times not greater than 30 nanoseconds.

Britain's C.A.A. has also purchased three units of the other display, the S 3018, one of which is being evaluated by the Royal Radar Establishment at Malvern.

This is a rear-port displ ay in which the CRT phosphor is used as a rear-projection screen; multi colo ur im ages can be projected through an optical port in the rear of the tube cone . Full-colour airways maps and procedural charts can be superim posed on live radar situations, to give more detail than can be achieved even by computer-g raphic techniques.

The S 3018 operates in an analogue mode with modular video and defl ection facilities, and is capable of displaying raw radar, a television raste r scan and alphan umeric data. In addition, the unit is capable of displ aying static data optically projected on to the rear of the cathode-ray tube screen through a window in the cathode-ray tube bul b.

The cathode-ray tube is 400 mm (16 in) in d iameter, electrostatically focused and electromagnetically deflected.

The phosphor may be either long persistence for raw radar alone or medium pe rsistenc e for marked raw radar.

Other phosphors can be supplied to special order. The spot size is not more than 0.7 mm (0.028 in) at 50 pA beam current at any part of the useful screen wi th the deflecti on c ircuits live and all inputs shorted. The focusing is preset and extremely stable.

The cathode-ray tube is protected against switching transients and failure of d . c. powe r within the displ ay, and by octagonal blanking c ircuits wh ich in hibit the tu be brightness when the beam is deflected beyond the boundaries of a regu lar octagon enc los ing t he useful sc reen area, thus preventing bloom ing .

The projector control unit contains th e power supply and circuits required for the film strip projector lamp and motor control.

Optical Features Extra-high-tension Switching Unit and Power Supply The E.H.T. switch ing unit consists of a free-running osc illator, the output of which is rectified and multiplied using a ladder network, foll owed by a switched regulator.

42

The optical system design is based on the use of 35 mm film strip. The t ransport mechanism is designed to locate each fi lm frame accurately within the projector gate.

Up to 1024 film frames are contained on one film strip.

The film spools are motor driven for automatic film take up.

A wide-angle lens is used as the major optical component. In order that the display shall not be rendered unserviceable by a single lamp failure, a turret containing four projection lamps is fitted.

A neutral density wedge-filter is fitted to provide a wide range of optical brilliance adjustment. The control for this filter is mounted on the display front panel. Provision is also made for the fitting of coloured filters in the optical system.

Operational Features Protection against tube implosion is provided by an armoured shield bonded to the faceplate of the cathoderay tube.

A flat plastic screen is fitted, which may be tinted to serve as an amber filter. It is rotatable and has a cursor line for use with a bearing ring. A circular polarizing filter may also be fitted. A bearing ring surrounds the tube face and is adjustable for zero position. It is calibrated 0° to 360° in 1° steps.

The immediate display controls for video gain, display power on/off and projector power on/off are fitted into the front panel or alternatively, these can be fitted into a separate control panel for incorporating into a desk. Optical brilliance and lamp selection are controllable from the front panel only.

Racal-Thermionic's ICR Recorders in Heavy Demand Orders in excess of £ 1/2 million in recent months for the company's International Communications Recorders (ICR) - most of these from overseas customers - continues the success story of Racal-Thermionic's recording system.

Against strong international competition, the company has broken into the Scandinavian Air Traffic Control market and, after exhaustive evaluation, the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority ordered five ICR 8-track and four 32track recorders, reproducers and spares, as the basis of a re-equipment programme. Stringent tests on the equipment by the Norwegians included continuous running over five weeks to simulate up to 5 years usage. The company says that ICR is the only equipment on the market, designed from the outset to use triple play tape, and that the satisfactory completion of these tests emphasise that the original concept was correct.

Export marketing manager "Dan" Boon is delighted with the growing overseas demand for the ICR, "which more than matches our forecast", he said. Half of the current export order book is from new customers from all points of the compass. Norway joins overseas customers using ICR equipment in communication roles, from Italy, the Lebanon, Barbados, Brazil, Yemen, Tahiti, Malagasy, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon and Senegal. One of the latest on the new customer list is The Armada (the Argentine Navy); others include such diverse users as police forces in Australia and New Zealand; electricity authorities in Syria, civil aviation in Mozambique and Spain, Ministry of Communications in Uruguay, and air forces and civil aviation users in the Middle East. These new customers are backed by repeat orders for ICR recorders from French civil avia-

tion authorities, Venezuela and countries in the Arabian Gulf.

The ICR fully meets the mandatory requirements for airport logging, and offers continuous recording facilities which pack 24 hours recorded information on a standard 8-inch spool. It is available in 8, 16 and 32 track versions, suiting the customer's precise requirements, by provision of a wide range of optional facilities.

Comments by Air Traffic Control Spokesmen across the World Dr. J. W. H. Kalsbeek, at the 'Stress in Air Traffic Control' Symposium, Manchester, October 1973: We speak about air traffic control in terms of so many microdecisions per minute and take into account so many elements per decision; that is the input stress for the central nervous system but we have to measure it and state the capacity of an individual. When growing older, can he still make so many micro-decisions per minute? The problem of responsibility is also very vague but if we wish to handle it in a more exact way, then we have to state the degree of uncertainty; if programmes already exist can he respond to the situation in an adequate way?

To make a detailed analysis of the job we have to speak in the terms of human capacities and the influence of age and then compare them with the norm in order to establish if it is an acceptable load. Only recently the neurophysiologists discovered that the recovery curves following a peak mental load of three minutes influenced the central nervous system, measured by its physiological potential, for 12 to 45 minutes. This gives an idea of how these kinds of problems are handled by the work physiology approach.

And Comments by Aviation Spokesmen at the 13th IFATCA Annual Conference, Tel Aviv, May 20-24 1974: Mr. Aharon Yariv, Israeli Minister of Transportation: I would like to acknowledge the vital contributions made

by Air Traffic Controllers all over the world without which the aviation industry could never have hoped to achieve its present s~atus and success. In addition, I want to take this opportunity to express to you all my sincere admiration of the skill and devotion exhibited in the performance of your duties, and I have been able to watch it at close range.

Modern technology, with all its advances is unlikely ever to surpass or indeed equal your accomplishments as dedicated, responsible members of an elite corps of dynamic individuals, or in other words, there is still no replacement, and I don't think there ever will be any replacement for the human being, no matter how successful and sophisticated your gadgets may become.

Mr. J. R. Adderley, Principal Consultant, Software Sciences Limited: Our company's operational planning group of which I have the privilege to be principal consultant has evolved from the original air traffic management group of General Precision Systems. We are now an independent British

43

company providing airport, airspace and ATC system consultancy in the form of planning and design studies and evaluations and system architecture. In this role since 1959 we have successfully completed more than 70 aviation related projects for 30 different government agencies in many countries throughout the world. Now we do not manufacture equipment nor do we construct airports or facilities and therefore we only offer our skills and experience as former controllers in our consultancy and planning role.

However, as our company name implies, other groups within the company specialize in software applications, most relevantly in the architecture of automated ATC systems and in the design and utilization of computer based fast time simulation models. It is our use of these tools of the trade which perform contract simulations of future environments, combined with our operational experience, that qualifies us to undertake the planning and desire of airport, airspace and ATC systems. Now as you will appreciate, our technique is to evaluate the operational requirements before specifying the technical performance required for equipment and facilities in the system. As corporate members of IFATCA we are invited to contribute to your deliberations. I would like to offer from my rather advantageous position of being able to assess air traffic system performances without being in it, to what I hope are some constructive comments. Firstly, automation in the form of computer technology is available to serve you. It is vital that you, the operators and users of the system define the tasks you require automation to perform. Use the computer as your servant; do not let it become your rnaster; do not assume that automation of current manual techniques necessarily leads to increased efficiency. The real potential application of automation can only be achieved by firstly defining the operational requirements of the system and then by designing and producing the black boxes that match these requirements.

It is you, the controllers who are suffering the shortcomings of the present systems and can best justify the needs for new applications of automation, for example, to assist flow regulation. Secondly, you are dedicated to providing safety and expedition and I personally applaud the manner in which air traffic is safely handled and I commend the constructive and forward-thinking policy toward flow control, but equally I do beseech you to appeal against system constraints such as fixed point navigation which - although this is not your responsibility - prevents you in some cases from achieving the most efficient use of the airspace. The fact remains that until area navigation procedures are implemented, the air space will include a number of bottlenecks that will prevent even your most valiant efforts from attaining your stated objectives.

This is my first IFATCA Conference, and I have been sincerely impressed by the professional attitude and dedication of the delegates, the volume and quality of work achieved by the Committees and by the many friendships created on and off the Conference floor. I pledge my company's willing support to the aims and aspirations of IFATCA. Mr. E. Lener, I. L. 0. Representative: It is with particular pleasure that I bring to your Conference the greetings of the Director-General of the International Labour Office. The I. L. 0. is based on a particular tripartite structure which is reflected by all the work

undertaken by the I. L. 0. The International Labour Conference, the Committees and other meetings are not limited to delegates of governments, but always include representatives of national employers and workers organizations. One of these bodies is the I. L. 0.'s Inland Transfer Committee whose activity extends to all branches of non-maritime transport. The main goal of the industrial Committees are to develop mutual understanding between management and labour in order to achieve the largest possible measure of agreement on effective ways of improving working and living conditions. All I. L. action for specific branches are integrated in a general program known as the I. L. 0: program of industrial activities. The principal means of action of the I. L. 0. to carry out this program are research and fact-finding, dissemination of the results of these activities, technical co-operation activities, standard setting activities in the field of social problems, the holding of industrial committee sessions and tripartite technical meetings to exchange experience to review and evaluate the activities carried out between ~es­ sions under the program, to advise the I. L. o. in preparing programs of action, and so on.

In its enquiries into the conditions of employment in civil a~iation _and in particular into the conditions affecting the Air Traffic Controllers, the I. L. 0. published in 1963 a first study and in 1972 a second one with assistance from the Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization. In view of the fact that despite the growing size of civil aviation and the increasing urgency of its social programs, the I. L. 0. has so far held only two meetings on civil aviation and in view also of the fact that there is not a single international labour convention or recommendation dealing specifically with civil aviation the I. L. 0. has been invited to consider providing machi,ne for building efficiently and regularly with the condition~ of employment for workers in this branch. A preparato meeting for civil aviation will be held in Geneva in OctobZ this year. Its task will be to identify the social and labo problems in civil aviation and scope for the 1· L . 0 . act·ion ur in this field, and another task will be to propose the agenda for a major meeting of civil aviation. In order to help the meeting, the I. L. 0. prepared a report on social and labour problems in civil aviation which will be despatched shortly.

o.

Close co-operation was maintained in this matter with the International Civil Aviation Organization. Besides th Organization which has a consultative status with th: I. L. 0., several non-governmental Organizations were 1 · · d a so invite to be represented. I understand that your Federation accepted this invitation. I think that you will have a good chance to present your views on your social and labour problems and on the scope for the I L a t· · · . c ion in this field.

o

. Heard on sector 6 at Sydney ... "Kilo Oscar Mike, this 1s Sydney Control, climb to 6500 area ONH is 1014. Wh en . convenient advise estimate Katoomba." ."Eh ... Sydney Control, this is Kilo Oscar Mike ... we estimate Katoomba ONH to be 1016 ... ("Cocodoodledoo")

44

News from the Federation Meeting of the Executive Board, Oslo, September 17-20, 1974 The customary autumn meeting of the Executive Board was held in Oslo, Norway, from 17-20 September, 1974, and was held simultaneously with a meeting of Scandinavian Member Associations of IFATCA who discussed matters of regional concern. With the exception of the Editor, for whom no travel arrangements could be made on this occasion, and the Profession al Vice-President, whose presence at the time was required in the USA, all members of the Executive Board attended the meeting.

Main items on the heavy agenda were: Discussion of reports by the Officers, Standing Committees, Regional Counc illors; membership difficulties and national disputes; relations with non-member Associations; review of liaison with Corporation Members; 1974 Conference Tel Aviv Debriefing ; IFATCA 1975; further Conference venues; European Airways Plan; co-operation with Intern ational Organisations; etc.

The Executive Board was impressed by the various arrangements and is grateful to the Norwegian Association for again getting the opportunity of meeting with representatives of the National Civil Aviation Authorities, National Airlines, the local association and the local industry. Th ere is no doubt that meetings of this kind are useful to both the local association and the Federation.

On 20th September the Ex ecutive Board and delegates of the Scandinavian Member Associations of IFATCA attending the Nordic Meeting were invited to a luncheon at Gustav A. Ring Company, Oslo. A presentation given by Mr. Tomm Hauger, Product Manager, and a tour of the factory not on ly made the IFATCA group familiar with the various Ring products, but also impressed the visitors with most modern production methods, excellent working conditions and other environmental factors. Undoubted ly Gustav A. Ring would be a considerab le enrichment to the ranks of the Federation 's Corpo ration Members.

Obituary The Federation has been unfortunate in losing three loyal friends in the space of a few months.

Jose D. Roulin, Tower/Approach Controller at Geneva Airport, who was to have led the Swiss delegation to IFATCA '74 in Tel Aviv, lost his life in an aircraft accident last May wh ile on a training flight. Jose was an influential member of the Committee of the Swiss Association for many years and more recently had been very active in the medical sub-committee of IFATCA's SC IV. He was 33 years old. Jose will be rem embered by his many friends all over the world.

Spyros Christophides, Area Controller at the Nicosia Ai r Traffic Control Centre, founder member of the Cyp rus Association, Chief Flying Instructor of the Cyprus Aero Club and Examiner for Cyprus and Brit ish li cences, was killed in August by a mortar shell close to his home. He was 37.

R. Shipley, Manager - Central Marketing and Export Services, Cosso r Electro nics Limited, who was IFATCA's Corporation Members' Coordinator, died of a heart attack in September. Bob, who, as a former colleague, knew the international ATC scene inside out, had been engaged in some pa~ticu l arly burdensome tasks for his company recently, which may well have played a part in his departure from our scene, and wh ich has shocked the IFATCA family the world over. He was a firm believer in the cause of the Federation and no IFATCA Conference will ever be the same without hi~ cheerful presence.

The Federation offers its sincere condolences to the fam ilies of three of its truest friends.

Exchange of Telegrams with the President of ICAO As a result of an approach by the Cyprus Association, a telegram was sent to Mr. W. Binaghi, Presid ent of ICAO, requesting the President to use his good offi ces and those of his Organisation to help and ease the dangers to which air movements and ai r traffic control personnel we re sub-

The IFATCA Group in front of the entrance to the Gustav A. Ring Company.

45

jected in the Nicosia Flight Information Region. The following telegram was received in reply on August 13, 1974: "President Monin. Reference your cable 9th August have been making efforts to obtain return to normal conditions and hope present situation will improve. Binaghi, President ICAO Council."

Mr. Monin has replied that he received the President's answer with satisfaction and that the Federation is pleased by the decision. IFATCA's President went on to express the hope that it will be the beginning of a new era of co-operation between the French Government and its Air Traffic Controllers in the continued interest of Safety, Regularity and Economy of aviation.

Amnesty for French Controllers Mr. Monin wrote to President V. Giscard d'Estaing of France on June 5 1974 on the subject of an amnesty for the French controllers who were involved in the ATC dispute in that country in 1972 and 1973, and on the 27th July 1974 a reply was received to the effect that an amnesty had been granted as contained in the official F~~nch Government Publication of the 17th July 1974 under Law No. 76-643 Article 12, dated 16 July."

Visit to South American Member Associations Following the decision at IFATCA '74 in Tel Aviv of the Uruguayan Association's request for a member of the Executive Board to visit their country to make an on-thespot observation of conditions prevailing in the ATC environment, President J.-D. Monin is preparing to visit Uruguay and the Argentine in December 1974 or January 1975.

The Pilot's Point of View Vertical Separation One of the most important technical decisions taken by the recent 29th Annual IFALPA Confere~ce in Carac.as, Venezuela, concerned the subject of vertical separation and is contained in the following statement: " ... IFALPA policy is to be maintained, no matter what pressure is applied to reduce th~ vertical separ~tion i~­ crements as a means of increasing route capacity, until it has been adequately demonstrated that any relaxation thereof would be both statistically and operationally safe.

IFALPA should continue to participate in the activities of the ICAO RGCS and UUM Panels to this end."

The "pressure" referred to by Conference h~s since intensified and there is now no doubt that a major effort is being exerted through ICAO channels to reduce the present vertical separation minimum of 2000 ft. above FL 290 to 1500 ft. or even 1000 ft. The Air Navigation Commission of ICAO has, in fact, directed the Review of the General Concept of Separation (RGCS) Panel to give high priority to the early "determination of feasibility" of such a reduction and the Panel is already looking at the possibilities of obtaining the necessary height-keeping data from high precision lock-follow radar measuring techniques and SSR Mode C. The motivation for this is to improve airspace utilisation, especially in high density areas wher~ availability of flight levels causes flow control restrictions and delays. In such cases where, for instance, FL 310 might be a flight level in continuous demand, it would obviously be an attractive solution to the State concerned to be able to use FL 300 and FL 320 as well.

IFALPA's policy, in essence, calls for the use of 2000 ft. vertical separation increments above FL 220 (IFALPA acceptance of FL 290 as the datum level is conditional on regional agreement and is not accepted as a worldwide standard). This policy, now re-affirmed by Conference, reflects the absence to date of substantial evidence that any lower value than 2000 ft. could be safely applied to all aircraft. Data on aircraft height-keeping capability produced by such trials and studies as have been carried out

46

so far have tended to support the IFALPA attitude and there are as yet no grounds for supposing that there is a general improvement in altimetry and associated operational practices significant enough to warrant any change in this attitude.

In this matter, as in all cases affecting flight safety, IFALPA is like the man from Missouri and says "Prove it!"

Meanwhile, as one experienced Captain has said: "the thought of aircraft at FL 370 and FL 380 frightens me, even if they have both got autopilot altitude hold and automatic altimeter correction systems" I V. H. King (U. K.)

More Finger Trouble?

Flight training in the Olde Navy was conducted in an aeroplane infamous for transmitting things one wanted kept on intercom. For this and other reasons, one of the Tower inhabitants at training fields was a junior officer detailed to insure proper military decorum on the air. As the following series of transmissions demonstrates, it wasn't an easy task.

(Instructor, obviously chewing out his student.) " ... a rotten recovery. Here, watch me demonstrate. (Pause). o. K., you try it again. (Brief pause). No! You're still screwed up!

Etc., etc."

At this point, the Tower duty officer tried to break in with, "Screwed up, you're transmitting." Obviously unaware, the instructor gave his student another outburst, and, " ...

No, no, NO! You're so screwed upl" Tower came back with, "Aircraft 'screwed up', IDENTIFY YOURSELF!" Silence.

After a while, some wag added, "Nobody is that screwed up!"

(Journal of Air Traffic Control)

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REGISTER WITH BRIAN HOPLA CHAIRMAN IFATCA'75 REGISTRATION COMMITTEE BOX 789F GPO MELBOURNE , 3001. AUSTRALIA. : PICTURE COURTESY VICTORIAN

FLY QANTAS OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL CARRIER FOR IFATCA'75

FISHERIES & WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT

47

I FATCA '75 14th Annual Conference of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations

Programme: Mo nd ay 14 April:

Official Open ing and Fi rst Plenary Session

Tuesday 15 A pril:

Committee Sessions

Wed nesday 16 April:

Committee Sessions

Thu rsday 17 Ap ril :

Co mmittee Sessions

Fr id ay 18 April :

Fi nal Plenary Session and Closing Ceremony

Pre and Post Tours: A comprehensive range of pre and post tou rs wi ll be planned to enab le delegates to see the maj o r attractions of Australia.

Social Programme: An extensive social programme is being organised fo r D elegates and Assoc iates. An interesting and comprehensive progra mme is also being planned for lad ies. Th is will inclu de some of the historical, geographical and cultu ral features of the city of Melbourne and its env ironments.

Registration: A fin al an noun cement brochure detai ling reg istration fees, programme, accomodation forms, post-Congress tou rs, etc., w ill be c irculated in due cou rse.

Photo by Courtesy - The Herald and Weekly T imes Ltd. , Melbourne

Melbourne/ Australia:

IFATCA '75, Melbourne, Australia, 14-18 April 1975, Hilton Hotel.

Host Association: Civ il Air Operations Officers' Association of Australia; Box 789 F . GPO M elbo urne, 3001, Australi a.

Phone: 67 56 61.

Melbourne (population 2,5 million) is the capital city of the State of Victoria and is Australia's second largest c ity. It is renowned for its dignified charm, parks, gardens und t reelined streets, art galleries, small boutiq ues, and also has the largest department store in the so uthern hemisphere.

Australia's maj or financial centre, Melbourne has a concent ration of industry on its outski rts, a major seaport and internat ional air terminal and has been described as a cosmopolitan city with international standard hotel s and restaurants.

Venue: The Congress w ill be held at t he Melbourne Hilton Hotel Melbourne's newest International hotel, overlooking the famous a nd historic Fitzroy Gardens. The Hilton Hotel is located 5 minutes fro m t he city cent re.

Official International Carrier for Conference participants: QANTAS. Attractive a ir fare discounts wi ll be available to all delegates. Further details will be supplied in the final brochure.

48

Weather: The average Apri l temperature in Melbourne is 20 C maximum and 10 C minimum. It is Autumn and the days are usually sunny.

Australia is an continent of contrasts. One thi rd is tropical, but then it also has a vast inland desert. The more fertile count ry is either side of a mounta in range wh ich is snow capped for almost half of the year and ru ns the length of the eastern seaboard. Australia is th e land of sophisticat ed c ities, large grazing and small farm ing properties and a unique flora and fauna in its seven States.

Corporation Members of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations v AEG-Telefunken, Ulm/ Donau, Germany

v Air Vision Industries, Inc., Montreal, Canada J The Air Transport Association, Washington D. C., U.S.A.

v Wolfgang Assmann GmbH., Bad Homburg v. d. H., Germany ./ Cossor Radar and Electronics Limited, Harlow, England i/ Dansk lmpulsfysik A . S.,

Holte, Denmark

v Ferranti Limited, Bracknell , Berks., England Glen A . Gilbert & Associates, Washington D. C., U.S.A. Ground Aid Group, Esbjerg , Denmark Intern ational Air Carrier Association Geneva, Switzerland L-

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Intern ational Aeradio Limited, Southall, Middlesex, England Jeppesen & Co. GmbH., Frankfurt, Germany

v Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc ., Plainfield, N. J ., U.S.A. The Marconi Radar Systems Limited, Chelmsford, Essex, England N. V. Hollandse Signaalapparaten, Hengelo, Netherlands .; The Plessey Company Limited, Weybridge , Surrey, Engl and Racal-Thermionic Limited , Southampton, England .; Se lenia - lndustrie Elettroniche Associate S. p. A. Rome, Italy Software Sciences Ltd., Farnborough, Hampsh ire, England Space Research Corporation , Inc. Quebec, Canada v Th e Solartron Electronic Group Lim ited, Farnborou gh, Hants., Eng land Stansaab Elektronik AB, Jarfalla, Sweden

l

Th omson - CSF, Paris, France Th e International Federation of Ai r Traffic Controllers' Assoc iations would like to invite all corporations, o rg anizations, and institutions inte rested in and concerned with the maintenance and p romotio n of safety in air traffic to join their organization as Corporation Members.

Corporat ion Members support the aims of the Federation by supplying th e Federation with technical information and by means of an annual subscri pt ion . The Fede ration 's international jo urnal "The Contro ll er" is offered as a platform for the discuss ion of technica l and p rocedura l develo pments in the field of air traffic contro l.

selenia air traffic control systems Selenia offers very advanced equipment for Air Traffic Control, including:

e

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e

e

ATC RADARS BROAD BAND AND NARROW BAND LINKS DIGITAL DISPLAY SUBSYSTEMS COMPUTERS PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RADAR EXTRACTORS SIMULATORS AND DIGITAL INTERFACE EQUIPMENT

together with wide experience in:

e e e

SYSTEM DESIGN SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND INTEGRATION LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

....