INFOCUS|INDIA-CHINA|MARITIME
China’s Grand Strategy for
High Seas
In China’s dream of establishing ‘Indo-Pacific era’ with India, the interests may not be shared. The architecture of China-backed Maritime Silk Route does not augur well with India’s strategic interests. Find out how. Akshita Mathur
C
hina has proposed to revive the centuries’ old ‘Silk Road of the Sea’ into a 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The MSR initiative is a channel for Beijing’s grand strategy; MSR aims to seize the opportunity of transforming Asia and creating space for itself. The success of the MSR initiative or China’s ‘maritime renaissance’ will be extremely consequential to the region’s future stability and global peace. The thrust on reviving ancient maritime routes is Beijing’s first global strategy to improve connectivity with Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and even Africa. By building a network of port cities along the Silk Route, China is seeking to link to the economic hinterland. The idea of MSR was first mooted when President Xi Jinping presented the concept in a speech to Indonesia’s Parliament in October 2013. The five key elements of the MSR are policy coordination, connectivity, trade and investment, peopleto-people links and finance of growth.
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India’s Concerns of MSR India has shown apprenhensions towards China’s invitation of MSR proposal, primarily because of lack of clarity about the economic and trade designs, infrastructural linkages and above all the larger strategic motivations. India’s concerns to the China’s MSR is in the background of its own broader security and economic impact and their implications for the overall national interests. MSR conceptually intertwines with India’s vision of an Indo-Pacific neighbourhood and even though it lies in the economic maritime boundary vision of India, the lack of clarity and the regional strategic implication is a concern for India. China is attempting to create economic relationships with ASEAN countries through trade, port and continental land bridges to counter the US influence and draw ASEAN and littoral Indian Ocean within its sphere of influence. Infrastructure investment and maritime commerce is important for China to stimulate its domestic economic growth. From Indian perspective, the concern is related to broader geo-stra-
tegic implications particularly in the Indian Ocean. The strategic objectives of MSR raises questions on Chinese real intentions. China has steadily expanded its influence in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea by building ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. It is helping build Sandia Deep Sea port in Bangladesh and is carrying other Indian Ocean littoral engagements through a strategy generally referred to as ‘String of Pearls’. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has pledged support to MSR initiative as part of the overall Asian Security Plan. India is concerned that countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will get drawn into the Chinese orbit. One of the reasons for the regional outreach of India is to prevent such a potentially disturbing development by restabilising Indian credibility with its neighbours. Indian concerns emanate from the architecture of MSR and its proposed linkages to Chinese land bridges that would push India to straddle from West to East. On the West, is the proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that would link the restless Xinjiang province of China with Chinese developed deep sea port at
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INFOCUS|INDIA-CHINA|MARITIME
Southeast Asia, the idea is receiving greater acceptance. If Corridor project fructifies, it would mean enhanced trade and connectivity. It will also mean that China will upgrade infrastructure and port facilities in Bangladesh and Myanmar. This later could become important trading hubs. With three major neighbouring countries coming incrementally within Chinese influence and Myanmar becoming a major energy transport hub security of the Bay of Bengal, might create major strategic challenges on the Eastern sea board of India and may lead to a direct confrontation with the PLAN.
Gwadar. Indian apprehensions centres around the proposed corridor passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), a disputed Indian territory. The road rail communications will allow China to make strategic moves in PoK. Given its military and nuclear collusion, this would be a serious development with major impact on India’s security. Once the corridor develops (year 2019-20) Gwadar will become an important commercial hub for both China and Pakistan. This provides China an access to the Persian Gulf and is in proximity of the proposed Indian developed Iranian port, Chahbhar (40 NM) which will increase its ability to support both naval as well as commercial activities in both the South Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. In all likelihood, it might be developed as a possible future naval and communication base engaging the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) directly into the Indian Ocean. Therefore, despite the Chinese map showing MSR bypassing Pakistan, geopolitical realities and huge infrastructural investments clearly indicate it to be a part of the overall strategy of China, Pakistan not
being highlighted on the MSR map could have been a deliberate effort by the Chinese to prevent fierce Indian reaction. High Tensions on Western Sea Board Chinese facilities along the Western Sea board has the potential of presenting naval threat scenario, together with the Chinese forays in Bay of Bengal. This will force India to
in the backdrop of chinese ‘Msr’ proposaL, india wiLL need to spend More on Long hauL vesseLs to ensure greater endurance and sustainabiLity for its power projection and expeditionary roLes. this wiLL Lead to not onLy a Major recasting of pLans froM the existing force, but a nuanced shift in the focus
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develop additional access points and facilities astride the proposed Chinese Silk Road including Gwadra/Mekran Coast. India will have to work with Iran to upgrade facilities in Chahbhar and work closely with regional countries along the proposed route to ensure credible Indian presence and safeguard commercial interests. Lastly, it also means that India will need to spend more on long haul vessels to ensure greater endurance and sustainability for its power projection and expeditionary roles. This will lead to not only a major recasting of plans from the existing force, but a nuanced shift in the focus. These reasons deter India from being enthusiastic for the Chinese MSR proposal. The BCIM Corridor (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) proposed to connect India’s north-east with China’s Kunming province through road and then railway, packs in several security concerns too. The corridor’s connectivity is through India’s restive Northeast. Earlier, India was lukewarm on this project but with Prime Minister Modi’s push for improved economic and cultural linkages and connectivity with the Northeast and
Maritime Distress MSR is couched largely as an economic initiative, however, maritime space in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) is likely to be contested despite being conceived as ‘Global Commons’. Important regional and extra-regional actors such as India, China, Japan, Korea and the US among others, would like to ensure that sea lanes of communications which are vital to national growth and development remains open and not manipulated by contending powers. The logic of IOR becoming a contested space is also dictated by views of Chinese leaders who believe that the growth of the economy and continued dependence on natural resources would have to translate into expansion of Chinese naval power in the long run, requiring capabilities to accomplish missions in the IOR as well. This in fact, is the rationale that is driving the PLAN to extend its operational range from ‘near’ and ‘middle’ seas to ‘far seas’ that stretch to the East of Indian Ocean extending to the East coast of Africa. It is this broader strategy of projecting power up to and beyond 1000 nautical miles from its territorial waters that is behind the growing focus on maritime force development. What not is ruled out is the possible deployment of nuclear attack submarines and carrier based task forces in IOR by 2020, along with potential naval base set-ups in the Indian Ocean.
india is apprehensive of china’s invitation on Msr proposaL, priMariLy because there is aMbiguity with regard to econoMic and trade designs, infrastructuraL Linkages and above aLL, the Larger strategic Motivations. india’s concern is reLated to broader geo-strategic iMpLications particuLarLy in the indian ocean For India, these projections are by no means small. The Indian political and strategic establishment sees the Indian Ocean as an area of Indian domination and influence. Just like the Chinese, India needs to protect its core interests such as trade, economy and resources. Chinese influence over a period, could extend up to Western Pacific, South China Sea, Eastern
Mediterranean, the Central and Southern Indian Ocean, on islands such as Diego Garcia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles. It could also be inclusive of South Africa and Australia as they dominate the Southern approaches of the Indian Ocean. As India begins to interact with the IOR powers off its own coast, shaping of future maritime environment competition will be manifested. Given the dilemma sourrounding India’s position on the MSR, maritime cooperation between the two countries seem bleak. India has proposed and alternative “Project Mausam” which aims to re-construct maritime linkages in antiquity and has a geopolitical context to it. India could follow a two-pronged strategy. It could deepen its economic linkages through MSR and draw China into major infrastructural investments. Second, it could hedge the MSR strategy and continue to engage China in benign exercises in the maritime domain.
Akshita Mathur is an Associate Researcher at National Maritime Foundation, Delhi.
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