Australia and India: Architects of the Indo-Pacific security

The inaugural Australia India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue between the Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton, Foreign Minister Marise Payne and their Indian counterparts Rajnath Singh and S. Jaishankar was held when the constellation of bilateral and strategic determinants could not have been more favorably placed. Bilateral ties, elevated to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2020 have reached a historical high, emerged as an important cog in the rapidly evolving world hierarchy, as S. Jaishankar once argued in an interview.

New Delhi and Canberra have hitched on to the tide that propels their bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral engagements. The very fact that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Scott Morrison have met five times in less than 18 months is itself a testimony to the transformation this partnership is undergoing currently. During the Modi and Morrison virtual summit in June 2020, nearly a dozen MoUs were signed in education, agriculture, energy, resource, tourism, healthcare, financial services and infrastructure.

To further boost bilateral business and trade, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has initiated a timely and well-advised review of the 2018 Peter Varghese’s report An India Economic Strategy to 2035 in the context of altered international diplomatic and economic settings. While much of the recommendations of the Peter Varghese report still hold ground, there was certainly a need to recalibrate bilateral business and trade strategies and diplomatic engagements. On the other hand, India’s Australia Economic Strategy authored by Anil Wadhwa has been launched at the right time, covering the post covid economic scenario. The two reports together are critical for recalibrating and realigning business and trade strategies amidst rising bilateral tensions with China. Peter Varghese believes that it is in Australia’s interests to diversify business and trade ties, which also resonated during Australian Senator Simon Birmingham’s New Delhi visit in early 2021 when he said, “Australia must look into alternative markets in the European Union and India.” DFAT believes that India’s youthful population and diversified growth trajectory beholds significant opportunities for Australia, and bilateral trade must be doubled and India elevated into Australia’s top five trading partnerships by 2035 (currently 8th).

There is no denying that bilateral bonhomie to a great extent has been driven by Covid’s impact and Australia’s growing tensions with China over the treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, Hong Kong crackdown, alleged foreign interference in Australia’s internal political functioning, tariff wars and impact of Covid-19 pandemic on the one hand, and India’s troubled ties with China, especially military conflict in Doklam and Ladakh, on the other hand. Marise Payne has been a vociferous critic of China over Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and Peter Dutton unsparing in accusing China for cyberattacks on Australia. Although S. Jaishankar has reiterated that ties are independent of their respective relationships with China, and both sides have dismissed Quad as a future “Asian NATO”, their differences with China have certainly been the catalyst for growing strategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific. The agenda for the inaugural Quad virtual summit hosted by US President Joe Biden was consciously kept wide to include Covid-19 strategy, vaccine production, climate change, supply chain disruptions, critical and emerging technologies and maritime security, to avoid making it a purely military alliance and also downplaying any "anti-China" signaling.

Both US-India and India- Australia ties are seen as “natural” partnerships, for upholding democracy, peace for all peoples, freedom of navigation, rulesbased, free and open global order, respect for territorial sovereignty and unrestrained access to the global common goods. In the G-7 Summit in May 2021, PM Narendra Modi had emphasized that preventing future pandemics would rest on ‘democratic and transparent societies’— a recurring phrase in bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral proclamations.

What is encouraging for New Delhi and Canberra is the realization, for the first time, that bilateral ties cannot be seen in isolation with their larger strategic interests. Quad’s evolution as a rising ''concert of democracies", which Australia has described as an "anchor of peace and stability in the region" has bolstered bilateral understanding. The 2+2 joint press statement reaffirms this realization, while anchoring the defence ties on three Cs — comfort (of the bilateral relationship in strategic and security spheres), convergence (over security matters) and commitment (to free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific). The reentry of Australia in the Malabar exercise and the Mutual Logistical

Support Agreement are two key developments denoting fresh thinking emerging in not only New Delhi and Canberra, but also in Washington and Tokyo on the Indo-Pacific.

At the trilateral front, their threeway relationships melds mutually complementary visions, inter alia India’s ‘Act East’ policy, Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-up’ and Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ (GMF). India employs to elevate its Act East policy based on commerce, culture and connectivity, in sync with the seven-point Indo-Pacific Vision that PM Modi articulated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, and vision SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region). Act East policy complements Australia’s 2018 Pacific-Step Up too in addressing challenges related to states’ sovereignty and regional stability, security and prosperity. Similarly, Indonesia’s 2014 GMF affirms Indonesia’s vital interests as an archipelagic state at the crossroads of contending major power interests. The GMF prioritized the strengthening of the regional architecture to prevent the hegemony of major powers and promote comprehensive maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

Similarly, the Australia-Japan- India (AJI) trilateral that germinated in 2015 and the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral launched in May 2021 at the G-7 Summit sidelines also adhere to the Quad based commitments to free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo- Pacific, rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and uphold ASEAN's centrality and Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and India's Indo- Pacific Oceans Initiative.

In sum, while Australia and India turned a new leaf in the early 2000s in bilateral engagements, but what has changed in 20 years is a growing convergence of bilateral and strategic interests and a realization that in the evolving post-covid order, US alone may not be able to guarantee international peace and security, for which they will have to step-up their desired role.

Dr Ashutosh Misra

The Author is the CEO, Institute for Australia India Engagement; National Chair for Sport, Australia India Business Council; and Editor-in-Chief, India News Australia.