Taliban 2.0: Dark times ahead for women

On August 15, 2021, the world watched in sheer incredulity and dismay as the Taliban stormed back into power and took over Kabul. The return of the Taliban has laid bare the myopic policy of the United States and the failure of the western coalition to understand the Afghan system as it was, as it is. One of the outcomes of this imbroglio is the fate of the women of Afghanistan.

Afghan society is a multi ethnic society with Islam as the predominant religion. What is important is that the basic social matrix of the land is that of a tribal society wherein honour is a very critical component of social status of the various groups especially the Pashtuns. Women constitute the key ingredient of honour and that is reflected in the way the purdah relegates them into social oblivion. They are segregated from their male counterparts and confined to the domestic as a part of the drive to see them as protected and their honour preserved. It is thus upon the men to interpret honour and limit women through proscriptions. However the purdah system is not strictly practised by many of the ethnic minorities.

Throughout Afghan history, tribal mores and religious authority have challenged the central authority; it applies to the issue of women.. Every time there were attempts to introduce reforms to liberalise the ‘protected’ women of the country, there was fierce opposition from both tribal systems and religious authorities. Nonetheless, the reforms of the 1920s, the 1950s and particularly of the communist regime of 1970s emancipated and empowered women through constitution but reforms remained confined primarily to the urban young women. A substantial section of the Afghan society remained as feudal, as tribal and as fiercely resistant to women’s advancement as before.

Further, fate of Afghan women was sealed in 1992 with the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan; they were required to use hijab (the head scarf) but could continue with their respective professions. They did not enjoy equal economic and legal rights. During the mujahedeen period, women were subjected to rape, forced marriages and torture. The point here is that the Taliban took the responsibility of a society where women were already objectified, violated and repressed drawing from tribal cultural traits and religious beliefs. The Taliban with no exposure to liberal systems, deeply ingrained in Quaranic discourse and the cadre largely belonging to rural-peripheral background believed in the brutal use of force to enforce a Shaira-based administration. In the name of discipline and moral rigour, Taliban administration used force and crude penalizing methods to provide justice and prevent crimes within society. During the first phase of the Taliban rule Human Rights Watch have reported the systematic violations against women and girls in complete contradiction to the rights provided to them in the Afghan Constitution.

In the post Taliban period, the elected governments have tried to bring about a political system that reinstituted women’s rights, gave them education and brought them to the forefront of professional life. Again, urban areas like Kabul reflected this empowerment of women but beyond that, there was not much transformation. As the Taliban returned to the rural areas, the sting of the harsh dictums of regulation and corporal punishments were back and women were again the subjects of religious regimentation.

One may wonder why women are of such concern to the Taliban. Reasons are far more practical than ideological. A large section of the recruits of the Taliban are young males from rural background with least exposure; the Taliban leadership fears that softening stance on women will lead to alienation of that large rural base and create indiscipline within rank and file. One must also realise that the Taliban emerged as a regulatory force not an administrative force. With no certain idea about administration, their policy towards government was also a policy to deal with women particularly. Women were seen as vulnerable and were subjects of the prohibitive Islamic policies. Moreover, the Taliban preferred a rentier economy and depended on a few outside agencies and a state or two like Pakistan, UAE and Saudi Arabia for trade and recognition. Thus they were not bothered about whether the international community condemned their policies towards women.

Limited research has revealed that Taliban did employ some women to act as informers, domestic supervisors (to ensure that household ran according to Taliban directives) and control female prisoners. Whether such women supported Taliban or had other reasons, data on that is very limited, but scholars like Povey and De Leede have indicated that there may be some subtle ideological support for these radical Islamists. Cristiansson exposed the role of women (particularly women related to Taliban fighters) in support of the recent Taliban insurgency vis-a vis international forces, but that was more to protect family. This aspect needs further intellectual probing. Earlier women have played supportive role to the Mujahedeen fighters during Soviet control. Yet the Taliban do not entertain the idea of women in the as frontline and would prefer to confine them in homes.

Afghan women have also put up resistance against religious discrimination and have learnt to deal with various adversities, through self-help and community support system. The decades between the Taliban regimes have empowered women and now in Kabul, they are marching for their rights. How the Taliban will respond? There is a view that Taliban has had a better international exposure and have seasoned politicians and statesmen who can think flexibly about women. However these soft views are constantly outbalanced by the hard liners and the field commanders who are trained to regulate and dominate.

Much of the verbal commitments about women are directed towards the international audience in search of recognition and aid rather than out of true realisation about treating women as equals. Thus women of the land will either have to flee or struggle to survive; such fear and scepticism grips women’s rights activists in Afghanistan. But herein is the catch. Unlike the popular understanding, Afghan women are not a monolith and they do not share a common platform vis-a vis the Taliban. Only time will tell if this amorphous approach of Taliban 2.0 towards Afghan women turn into a humane one and how they will react to it.

By Professor Ishani Naskar

Professor Ishani Naskar is based at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India