Malabar manthan: Naval churning embraces Australia in the Indo-Pacific

A Australia, India, Japan and the US would conduct exercises in the Indian Ocean. These exercises, dubbed as Malabar series, have been held since 1992, first between Indian and the US Navy, and later in 2007 included navies of Australia, Japan and Singapore. The Malabar grouping was suddenly disbanded, ostensibly due to Chinese pressures, but was partially restored in 2015 after the Japanese Navy rejoined. Now, after a hiatus of over a decade, the Australian Navy has been readmitted to the grouping, however, little is known whether the Singaporean Navy would join in the future.

Notwithstanding various reasons for respective powers for leaving or rejoining the Malabar exercises, these engagements had paved the way for greater understanding among the naval forces and helped develop broad frameworks for operating together. At its inception, the exercises were basic in nature but improved progressively in content and complexity. The introduction of advanced surface ships, aircraft carriers, submarines including nuclear propelled platforms, and long range maritime patrol aircraft acted as a catalyst for an advanced naval cooperation. This also helped familiarity with each other’s communication procedures, rules of engagement, and aircraft operations, also known as ‘interoperability’.

The formative Malabar exercises between the Indian and the US navies were conducted largely to counter non-traditional security threats and challenges; but there has always been a ‘China overhang’. Beijing had carefully monitored these events. In the current instance i.e. Australia’s re-entry into the Malabar exercises, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed, “military cooperation between countries should be conducive to regional peace and stability,” which is a mild observation unlike in 2007 when Beijing issued ‘demarche’ to the participating countries to ascertain the reasons for Australia, Japan and Singapore joining the Malabar exercises.

Be that as it may, since 2019, the Indian and the Pacific oceans are churning with naval exercises. For instance, warships from India, Japan, US and the Philippines conducted maneuvers in the South China Sea. It is not unusual for three of the above navies to operate together, however the inclusion of the Philippines Navy is noteworthy. Likewise, navies of Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US held military drills designated as Pacific Vanguard off Guam to showcase their combined strengths and commitment to ensure a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. The deployment by the Canadian Navy in South China Sea and its transit through the Taiwan Strait is an example of independent operations which other navies may imitate in the future.

While much of the above naval activity has been dominated by the Asian and Pacific powers, European navies too are exercising or operating in the region. France spearheaded the exercise La Perouse in the Bay of Bengal involving Australian, French, Japanese and U.S. navies. These high-end naval exercises featured French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, JMSDF’s helicopter carrier Izumo and Australian submarine Collins. Likewise, British naval presence in the South China Sea has increased since early 2019 and deployment by aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in the South China Sea in the coming months has been announced.

Chinese strategic and naval planners are keeping a close eye on the ongoing operationaltactical engagements between the western and Asian navies. Perhaps the biggest worry for China is their collective naval capability that can overwhelm the People’s Liberation Army Navy. China has no Asian partner or friends to call upon and join hands to counter these maneuvers; however, the Russian Navy, which is making a strong comeback in the Pacific Ocean, is the best bet for China. A six-day joint naval exercise, codenamed Joint Sea 2019 between PLA Navy and the Russian Navy may be a modest consolation. Similarly, the PLA Navy joined Iran led naval exercise codenamed Marine Security Belt, (MSB) that included Russia and was held amid tensions between Iran and the US. Also, Chinese naval units including a submarine rescue ship Liugongdao participated in Pakistan Navy’s annual Sea Guardian 2020 exercises raising doubts about the possibility of a Chinese submarine lurking around.

By all counts, the focus of current Malabar exercises is on the growing combat power of the Chinese Navy as also its aggressive posturing in the South China Sea and in the Himalayas against India. It merits attention that the current Malabar grouping is also the architect of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) which has called for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. Beijing calls it an anti-China alliance, labelling it an “Asian NATO”, and terming it a representative of the ‘Cold War mindset’.

The QSD members have also conceptualized initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network, a joint regional infrastructure scheme, more recently the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative (RSCI), as also digital connectivity particularly the 5G in support of their Indo-Pacific strategy or vision. Beijing sees these initiatives as attempts to challenge its flagship global project, the Belt and Road Initiative, in which China has invested trillions of dollars.

The QSD is aligning notwithstanding the fact that Quad members do not have any territorial claims in the South China Sea but are concerned about the safety and security of maritime trade that transits through the region. In particular they have reaffirmed their shared commitment to uphold international law, freedom of navigation and over flight.

In essence, the Indo-Pacific waters are witnessing an unprecedented contestation which can potentially create Blocks (US led or China driven) that will likely shape the geopolitical dynamic of the Indo- Pacific region and a variety of pathways along which the Asian security architecture may evolve in the future.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is former Director National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.