Indo-Pacific: the Quad and beyond

The enigma called QUAD has trod a tumultuous path since 2007. This informal gathering of four like-minded nations—Australia, India, Japan, and the United States— is known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with the term Security viewed by Track 1 and 2 analysts in many hues, from premature to apt. If one can call the QUAD a legacy of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe, his recent resignation raises questions on the path that Japan will follow to support the QUAD.

It was in 2007 that Abe first pushed for the QUAD; it was also the time we saw the introduction of the term “Indo-Pacific”, as a confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, into the global diplomatic and strategic lexicon. Unfortunately for Abe, the dynamics of Japanese politics saw him out of office, and it was only in 2012 that he could return with the “Democratic Strategic Diamond” concept. This, as per some analysts, laid the foundation of the present-day QUAD. Although the acceptance of both terms, that is, the QUAD and the Indo-Pacific, has been slow and not sans voices, a symbiotic link between the two terms was nonetheless born. The effervescency of the link has oft broadcast a view where perhaps none existed, maybe unintentionally. For example, during the 2018 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, the session on “Unchartered Waters: In Search for Order in the Indo-Pacific” saw the Chiefs of Navies from Australia, Indian, and Japan as well as the Commander US PACOM share the stage. The presence of these persons in uniform sort of qualified the “Security” angle of the QUAD and the fact that a former diplomat from Indonesia was also onstage was overlooked. The presence of the former diplomat, perhaps to avoid a “total QUAD” picture can, in hindsight, be viewed as an inadvertent inclination to QUAD Plus.

The year 2007 also saw two Malabar series of naval exercises. The navies of India, Japan and USA participate in these series regularly, and over the years this series has seen considerable changes in degree of participation and complexity. Malabar 2007-02 was held in the Bay of Bengal and saw six navies (Australia, India, Japan, Singapore, United States, and the United Kingdom) with 25 ships and their integral air operating in a planned complex scenario, with the ships divided between two Carrier Battle Groups. All ships were given equal opportunity to control various exercises, which were aimed at enhancing interoperability. Unfortunately, due to various reasons, this sort of an exercise has not been repeated. One reason could be that the QUAD lost its impetus as Australia withdrew, and India and Japan sought to engage China.

After a hiatus of a decade that witnessed a spurt in China’s engagement across the globe with a more assertive approach in the Indian Ocean, and in the South and East China Seas, the QUAD flame was rekindled on the side-lines of the 2017 ASEAN summit. From 2007 onwards bilateral and trilateral relations between the QUAD nations witnessed a change with India, specifically, signing several agreements. These include the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US. The India-US Ministerial 2+2 Dialogue that started in 2018 will monitor and guide the workings of these agreements. Most recently, on 9 September 2020, India and Japan signed the “Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Armed Forces of India and The Self-Defence Forces of Japan”, which can be considered the equivalent of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). India has signed similar logistics agreements with Australia Singapore, South Korea, and France. It must be noted here that Japan and Australia are formal allies of the US while India is a global strategic partner.

France was the first European nation to publish its Indo-Pacific Strategy followed recently, in September 2020, by Germany. However, presence in the region is considered vital to make a significant contribution. As a resident Indo-Pacific nation, France has significant military and diaspora presence in the region, while Germany will take some time to stake a cogent presence. The importance of France as an Indo-Pacific player was brought to the fore by the recent virtual trilateral meeting between Australia, France, and India on 9 September 2020.

These growing relations and recently signed agreements have, in the present security environment, laid the bedrock for the QUAD to sanctify its “Security” aspect. It also appears that the QUAD is progressing, and the forthcoming “in person” meeting, scheduled later this year, either in New Delhi or Tokyo, is a step in the right direction.

The joining of the first four responders of the 2004 Tsunami as the QUAD has come a long way since 2007. The existing security situation in the Western Pacific, specifically in the South China Sea, is extremely tense, and there is always the risk of overflow to the adjoining regions, such as the Indian Ocean. The building of cooperative mechanisms, stemming from bilateral and trilateral agreements, needs to be extended to willing nations. Though the idea to extend the QUAD to a “Plus” arrangement might appear to be premature at present, it is an idea whose day will come. Some nations that could be initially considered are France, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Till then there is a need to keep the QUAD afloat. A lot hinges on Abe’s successor and the result of the US elections in November 2020.

Captain Sarabjeet Singh Parmar is a serving Indian Naval Officer and is presently the Executive Director of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. He can be contacted at execdir.nmf@gmail.com. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position or policies of the Indian Navy or the Government of India.

Captain Sarabjeet Singh Parmar