INDIA NEWS
EDITORIAL
Why Sino-Pak collusion could Unlearning first is become a reality the key to learning the Aussie way of life in Ladakh
Syed Ata Hasnain
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o most of us who migrated to Australia, a common advice from ordinary Australians has been to ‘bring the good things with us and leave the bad things behind’. It is a very sound and well-founded advice, which not only applies to the Indian community, but also to other communities who have come from all corners of the world and made Australia their home. In this context the recent Harris Park brawl between two Indian groups, allegedly triggered by a TikTok spat over the Khalistan issue, has come as a brute reminder of our inability to shed our prejudices and historical baggage after we leave India. Who all are involved in the incident, and who instigated the brawl are all issues of police investigation. We should have full faith in the law enforcement agencies and judicial system and allow the law to take its course. In the meantime, it is time for a collective reflection on the incident and how it impacts the Indian community at large. Initial, fallout suggests that the incident has had an impact on ‘Brand India’ in the Harris Park business precinct where Little India Australia brand has been nurtured and built by a large number of Indian businesses and community leaders for a long time. For many years, the local businesses and community leaders have been pushing for the Little India Australia to be declared formally, something which would be put on the backburner for sometime after the incident. Questions would be posed by the local government and Australian community stakeholders over the rationale behind Little India Australia if the community members display such outrageous conduct in public. There is no denying the fact that incidents like these certainly have an adverse impact on the image of the larger Indiancommunity members
who have been working hard for decades in various positions as hard-working, law abiding and happy-go-lucky IndianAustralians. It will also have an impact on the future of Indian students, many of whom are still back in India and dreaming of coming to Downunder for studies. These incidents also reflect poorly on India itself, whose stature and soft power in the international system has been widely respected and acknowledged due to the contributions Indians have made in various sectors inter alia, politics, education, business, sport, philanthropy, defence, arts, culture and more. In Australia, Indians have for decades worked tirelessly and made their way to the top in various fields and earned immense respect for their contributions to the Australian system, way of life and multicultural ethos. This should be preserved at all costs, and such incidents cannot be allowed to tarnish the image of the community. The community must play its requisite role in working with the law enforcement agencies and the government in cracking the incident and bringing to book all those responsible. Perhaps there was never a more appropriate time to emphasize for the students and the Indian community members who have arrived not so long ago in Australia that before learning the Australian way of life it is important to unlearn a number of things which impede becoming a vibrant, responsible and law-abiding member of the Australian society. After all Advancing Australia Fair requires we all walk together, leave no one behind, and not let our individual identities, prejudices and historical baggage undermine the core values and foundation on which this multiculturally thriving country rests.
If push comes to shove, India will go to all-out war on the entire western border without a worry towards conventional or nuclear escalation
T
he debate regarding India’s capability to fight a war in which there is full collusion between China and Pakistan has generally remained inconclusive. Most detractors of the belief regarding China’s military operational support to Pakistan, in the event of the latter’s adventurism against India, have leaned heavily on the argument that China will adopt a policy only to suit its interests. In fact, both in 1965 and 1971 it made some promises to Pakistan but chose to stay away. Of course, those were Cold War times with a completely different international strategic environment. From 2005 the process of rapid military modernization saw China more aggressive in the pursuit of its strategic interests, including border management on land and sea. Limited and fairly benign experiments with ‘walk in’ operations across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) began after 2008. Enhanced expression of increased mutuality of strategic interests with Pakistan came with the reported presence of 11,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in GilgitBaltistan (GB) in 2011. Post 2013 Pakistan ramped up its proxy campaign in Jammu and Kashmir ( J&K) almost in sync with two China-related trends; first, a noticeably enhanced PLA assertiveness, and second, the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the latter being Xi Jinping’s ambitious and almost personal project. The BRI projected as only an economic and trade outreach in essence is a strategic measure to secure for Beijing strategic influence through ostensible economic cooperation. A progressively altering Chinese attitude towards the Kashmir issue commenced as early as 2008-09 with the issue of stapled visas to Indians residing in J&K; the denial of visa to the Northern Army Commander in August 2010 was with the clear intent of expressing increasing support to Pakistan. This support was also witnessed on issues involving the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan’s involvement in global terrorism and recently on the abrogation of Article 370. BRI and China’s expansionist policies
Chinese soldiers seen carrying spears and other sharp edged weapons near Mukhpari hill north of Rezang La (IANS)
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China’s BRI, a dream project which though stamped with Xi Jinping’s ownership was probably long in the making. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) with massive initial Chinese investment is the one part of BRI which is far less economic in orientation than it is strategic; it is classified by many as the flagship of BRI. It
is also a part of China’s Indian Ocean strategy and in its current avatar is little more than just a shaky communication artery with some additional projects thrown in. BRI is a far more ambitious project the survivability of which in the post Covid-19 setting has been questioned by experts. Yet, China’s long-term strategic vision is not something that the international strategic community is adept in assessing. Indian Prime MinisterModi’s observation on expansionism having no place in the modern era was an indirect message to China with the backdrop of the clear understanding that this is what China wishes to execute as it gets stronger. Thus, commencing 1978 we are somewhere midway through the period that China has set for itself to rise to a position of greatness for which it is increasingly employing coercion. Its strategic understanding is quite clear and is seeking a spurt towards that milestone on a faster track, post the devastation of the world by Covid-19. Therefore, it is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around. Mutuality of interests has enhanced and in this context military coordination has become a key component of the overall strategy. Till now it has remained rooted more in the psychological domain to force Indian perception of expanded fronts but could move towards realization of that strategy. After recent Indian moves to wrest a part of the initiative, China may force further escalation this season, contingent upon how the world progressively responds to its renewed expansionist military vigour. Yet it may also cut back to a posture which prepares it, along with Pakistan, towards a future ‘pincer approach’ in Ladakh. This does not presuppose limitation of Chinese intent to just Ladakh, with Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and the Central Sector very much under the scanner as part of the expanded collusive strategy. However, it is Ladakh where the effect is intended most for good reason, and it is there that the pincer approach may prove more challenging for India. Currently, India may not be optimally prepared for such a contingency but the Chinese may neither. This is because they have tried setting the stage too early in the clamour for surprise and could in turn be surprised, especially after the turn of events after August 30 which saw the Indian Army secure heights of tactical advantage in the Chushul Bowl. That is where Pakistan comes in as a force multiplier to keep the
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options open as far as timing is concerned; the options being the current campaigning season or a postponed one. In postponing it the Chinese will seek greater Pakistani activism in J&K and Ladakh, including attempts to keep the LoC alive along with terror in the hinterland to dilute Indian optimization in Ladakh. Options before India to thwart Sino-Pak aggression Assuming that confrontation with the Sino-Pak combine is inevitable now or later, one of the ways for India to offset this is to project sufficient capability to prevent the creation of a psyche of inevitable success in the minds of the adversaries. The diplomatic and military domains have to play out this effectively. India cannot be seen to be alone or militarily weak. It has tremendous support internationally which must translate into a higher level of strategic support. Militarily Pakistan should never be able to perceive that it will be allowed to fight as per choice and conceived strategy. If push comes to shove, India will go to all-out war on the entire western border without a worry towards conventional or nuclear escalation. China’s success or failure in such adventurism will set course its future strategy against the multiple adversaries who are lined up against it. That is the psyche which India must exploit to prevent escalation and win this and impending standoffs without fighting. It needs rapid emergence and all out national effort with highest priority accorded to it, including budgeting. China has made a major mistake of creating a faceoff that it thought it could win without fighting as per its doctrine but it is now mired in a situation that it did not think through; quite unlike the deep and long term thinking it usually does. Extending this faceoff will be a logistics nightmare for both countries. An exit strategy for China without loss of face as suggested by some can best be achieved by the US as part of the larger exit strategy from the threat-based situation in the Indo Pacific. On its part India cannot afford complete focus only on the northern borders. A firm and full strategy to deal with Pakistan in all contingencies has now become an imperative. Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain is a leading Indian defence analyst and former corps commander in Jammu and Kashmir
SEPTEMBER 2020
22
