Present and Future: Tendencies in Brazilian International Cooperation and the Role of Ecumenical Agencies 1
arquivo Inesc
Brasília, April, 2012.
1 The present text was elaborated by Nathalie Beghin, coordinator of the Political Advisory Body of the INESC (Institute for Socio-economical Studies), with the help of commentaries from: Iara Pietricovsky, member of the Faculty of Management of the INESC; Mara Manzoni Luz, Country Manager of Christian Aid in Brazil; João Paulo Vergueiro, Programme Funding Officer of Christian Aid in Brazil; Emma Donlan, Country Manager of Christian Aid in Bolivia, Susana Eróstegui, Executive Director of UNITAS (National Union of Institutions for Social Action Work) in Bolivia; Anivaldo Padilha, member of the advisory team of Koinonia, member of the Board of Directors of the Latin American Council of Churches (Brazilian Region), member of the Director’s Board of the Church World Service of the United States and member of the Coordination of the ACT Brazil Ecumenical Forum; and Kjeld Jakobsen, consultant in Cooperation and International Relations. For more information, see the methodological note, annexed. Translation: Ruth Barros.
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Research Present and Future: Tendencies in Brazilian International Cooperation and the Role of Ecumenical Agencies Brasília, April, 2012. Summary Executive summary....................................................................................................................... Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1. The contradictions of the sixth world economy ......................................................................... 1.1 A powerful Brazil ................................................................................................................... 1.2 Not all that glitters is gold ....................................................................................................... 1.2.1 Millions of Brazilians live in dreadful living conditions: Africa is here too........................... 1.2.2 Inequality as a structuring dimension of the Brazilian society............................................... 2. Brazil and received international cooperation............................................................................ 2.1 The changes in the international setting of Official Development Assistance (ODA)............... 2.1.1 Relative reduction of the ODA ............................................................................................. 2.1.2 Emergence of new priorities................................................................................................. 2.1.3 Inadequate criteria of distribution of the ODA...................................................................... 2.1.4 The Low effectiveness of the ODA ...................................................................................... 2.1.5 New donors on the scene...................................................................................................... 2.1.6 Emergence of new problems of a transnational character: the global public goods................ 2.2 The agenda of nongovernment cooperation in transformation.................................................. 2.2.1 The metamorphoses of solidarity cooperation....................................................................... 2.2.2 The growing participation of the business sector .................................................................. 2.3 International cooperation and Brazil........................................................................................ 2.3.1 Received official cooperation ............................................................................................... 2.3.2 Received solidarity cooperation............................................................................................ 2.3.3 Cooperation from businesses................................................................................................ 3. Offered International cooperation: the Brazilian partner ............................................................ 3.1 General panorama ................................................................................................................... 3.2 Advantages and challenges of Brazilian cooperation for international development................. 3.2.1 A cooperation marked by solidarity and by the search for sustainability ............................... 3.2.2 The ambivalences and ambiguities of the Brazilian ICD (International Cooperation for Development) ............................................................................................................................... 3.3 Brazilian non-governmental cooperation offered ..................................................................... 4. Impacts of the emerging economy of Brazil in South America .................................................. 5. Final Comments: elements to justify the continuing of ecumenical cooperation in Brazil and the 1
The present text was elaborated by Nathalie Beghin, coordinator of the Political Advisory Body of the INESC (Institute for Socio-economical Studies), with the help of commentaries from: Iara Pietricovsky, member of the Faculty of Management of the INESC; Mara Manzoni Luz, Country Manager of Christian Aid in Brazil; João Paulo Vergueiro, Programme Funding Officer of Christian Aid in Brazil; Emma Donlan, Country Manager of Christian Aid in Bolivia, Susana Eróstegui, Executive Director of UNITAS (National Union of Institutions for Social Action Work) in Bolivia; Anivaldo Padilha, member of the advisory team of Koinonia, member of the Board of Directors of the Latin American Council of Churches (Brazilian Region), member of the Director’s Board of the Church World Service of the United States and member of the Coordination of the ACT Brazil Ecumenical Forum; and Kjeld Jakobsen, consultant in Cooperation and International Relations. For more information, see the methodological note, annexed. Translation: Ruth Barros.
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Region of South American............................................................................................................ 5.1 Four arguments for the continuation of cooperation in Brazil .................................................. 5.1.1 Combating the relations of power that perpetuate inequality and poverty.............................. 5.1.2 Strengthening social movements and organizations that defend rights threatened by hegemonic power relationships ....................................................................................................................... 5.1.3 Influencing the global agenda of decision-making................................................................ 5.1.4 Replicating in other countries successful experiences of cooperation in Brazil ..................... 5.2 Proposed plan of action ........................................................................................................... 5.2.1 Influencing the Brazilian agenda .......................................................................................... 5.2.2 Influencing the global agenda via Brazil............................................................................... List of acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................... Bibliographical references and consulted websites ........................................................................ Annex: methodological note .........................................................................................................
Executive summary Global geopolitics has been shifting dramatically with the rise of new players, the so-called emerging countries. Brazil is one of these actors. In this context, international cooperation - whether official or non-governmental - is undergoing major changes, such as: Official Development Assistance (ODA) is facing both a qualitative and a quantitative crisis; new - governmental and non-governmental - donors have emerged and new cooperation practices have been adopted; social movements and civil society organizations have become increasingly active in global decision-making bodies; and new, hitherto unknown, topics have been included in the international cooperation global agenda, especially topics related to common goods. Brazil has gained a prominent role in this scenario not only due to its status as a “global power”, but also because it has become both a recipient and a provider of official international cooperation. Consequently, some actors believe that Brazil does not need external aid any longer, as it is now provided with sufficient resources to tackle its problems on its own. However, others have the opposite perception: they believe that their continued presence in Brazil is strategic to influence global governance and contribute to preserving a multipolar balance in power relations. Brazil is provided with key natural resources and political weight, and its participation in the global debate on universal access to common goods is therefore essential. However, despite its status as an economic giant, Brazil has failed to eradicate its main source of injustice, poverty and extreme poverty, namely, inequality. Clear social improvements have been registered in the country, but only marginally considering the size of its economy, as it still has millions of people living in extremely precarious conditions2. It is therefore feared that, as its economic and political power increases, Brazil could spread, on a global level, practices, ideas and beliefs that produce and reproduce extreme poverty. For this reason, strengthening national institutional mechanisms that promote fair access to a more inclusive development is required to fight the kind of power relations still prevailing in the country, which systematically nurture social exclusion processes that are not being dissolved by Brazil’s economic vigour.
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In Brazil, official data register that 36 million people live in poverty which is bigger than all Uganda’s population. And more: one third of Brazilians, that is similar to Myanmar’s population, face some degree of food insecurity every day. little bit less than half of the workforce is informal, which means that more than 40 million workers have no labour rights like minimum wage; maternity leave and maternity pay; vacation leave and vacation pay, sick leave and sick pay, pension, among others. Two million children from 5 to 15 years old are working: this is equal to Botswana’s entire population.
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Faced with these tensions and contradictions, Christian Aid’s programmes in Brazil and Bolivia and INESC have decided to carry out a joint reflection on the subject to come up with inputs for their strategies in the near future. For this purpose, INESC, with the support of Christian Aid Bolivia and Brazil and the collaboration of UNITAS/Bolivia, conducted a research on the topic based on a literature review, interviews and meetings with strategic actors between December 2011 and February 2012. One of the first facts that the study observed is that there is little information available on Brazilian cooperation, particularly on cooperation offered by Brazil. Additional studies are required to provide a better understanding of the magnitude and meaning of this cooperation and its impacts both in South America and in other regions of the planet. Given the scarcity of data and of more structured reflections on the topic, this research effort took the form of an essay mainly intended to contribute elements to this debate and to offer a few assumptions. It should be stressed that this document constitutes an interpretation of organizations working to promote democracy and grassroots participation, whose actions are therefore based on defending human rights and fostering the radicalisation of democracy and social justice. The document is structured in five sections. The first addresses ambivalences and ambiguities that characterize Brazil as well as the weakening process that civil society organisations are going through. It shows that the significant economic growth experienced in recent years in Brazil has not been able to do away with societal arrangements that produce and maintain social exclusion. Brazilian economy is going through a modernization process that has ensured better living conditions to some segments of its population, but continues to keep millions in poverty and extreme poverty in numbers equivalent to the entire population of some African countries. This process increases structural inequality. Given that Brazil has been increasingly playing a key role in the regional and international scenario, the question to be asked is to what extent an economic growth model that does not ensure universal citizenship rights could be disseminated elsewhere by means of foreign policy and international cooperation mechanisms, whether the cooperation is received, triangular or offered by the country? The second section deals with international cooperation received by Brazil. It begins by providing an overview of the situation internationally and then it analyses the behaviour of the cooperation received by Brazil, whether official or non-governmental. It notes that the Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocated to Brazil is quantitatively small, i.e. less than 0.02% of GDP. There is no evidence that it has decreased in recent years, but changes have been observed in its agenda and in the profile of donors: for example, contributions from Germany and Japan for energy and environment-related programmes have increased. As for non-governmental international cooperation, no consensus was found in the literature. Some authors believe that the availability of development assistance funds is decreasing, especially because Brazil has been ranked as a medium-to high-income democracy that does not depend on external funds to tackle its economic, social, cultural, environmental, climaterelated, and institutional problems any longer. Other authors believe that the non-governmental cooperation received by Brazil is not shrinking, but rather that a shift in its focus is underway (toward an agenda more specifically focused on fighting poverty and on reporting actual results), combined with foreign exchange-related factors, namely, appreciation of the Brazilian currency and depreciation of the euro and the US dollar. All authors seem to agree, however, that the economic crisis that has afflicted the North since 2008 is likely, at least in relative terms, to lead to a decrease in cooperation levels in coming years. It is worth noting at this point that, in general, ecumenical cooperation levels have not decreased in Brazil overall; actually, the situation is quite the opposite, as this kind of cooperation has remained true to its BASIC principles, preserving its historical relations with key partners in actions to defend human rights and economic, social, environmental and climate justice. Private sector, specially the trans-nationals, is an emergent actor in the international cooperation agenda, with the risks and opportunities that it carries out.
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The cooperation offered by Brazilian government is addressed in the third section, which is focused on understanding the new role Brazil has been playing in relation to South-South and triangular cooperation. Despite the scarcity of data and academic studies on the subject, cooperation flows are currently estimated at about 0.02% of the Brazilian GDP, most of which, three thirds, are allocated to multilateral organisations (UN, MERCOSUR and development banks). Although not very significant, the bilateral cooperation offered by Brazilian government has increased and has tended to focus on Latin America. Brazilian official bilateral cooperation affords several advantages in terms of promoting international development, such as that of being more in tune with the demands and needs of local organizations; of ensuring investments in productive sectors that promote changes of a more structural nature, as opposed to the more “paternalistic” government is addressed in the third section, which is focused on understanding the new role Brazil has been playing in relation to South-South and triangular cooperation. Despite the scarcity of data and academic studies on the subject, cooperation flows are currently estimated at about 0.02% of the Brazilian GDP, most of which, three thirds, are allocated to multilateral organisations (UN, MERCOSUR and development banks). Although not very significant, the bilateral cooperation offered by Brazilian government has increased and has tended to focus on Latin America. Brazilian official bilateral cooperation affords several advantages in terms of promoting international development, such as that of being more in tune with the demands and needs of local organisations; of ensuring investments in productive sectors that promote changes of a more structural nature, as opposed to the more “paternalistic” approach traditionally adopted by rich countries; and of not imposing conditions and “matched aid” rules linked to cooperation arrangements. It is seen as a more horizontal, partnership-based relationship under which shared goals are established by both parties. However, the technical cooperation offered by Brazil faces risks in the medium and long term if some emerging challenges are not satisfactorily addressed, such as: the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework, of social participation and accountability mechanisms. In addition, there are positive examples of Brazilian NGOs providing horizontal assistance to counterparts in Latin America. The fourth section explores the role of Brazil in South America beyond aspects related to bilateral and multilateral cooperation, with emphasis on Brazilian investments in the region and their consequences for regional integration. It exposes the ambiguous and ambivalent nature of Brazilian foreign policy, showing that, on the one hand, it supports integration processes in the region, while on the other it subsidises huge investments through BNDES (National Economic and Social Development Bank) that, in some cases, violate the human and environmental rights of peoples and communities lacking the means to defend themselves. Finally, in the light of data and considerations raised in previous chapters, the final considerations section mentions several arguments that justify the continuity of international cooperation in Brazil, particularly of ecumenical cooperation arrangements, and presents a proposal for an Action Plan for reflection. It argues that the cooperation received by Brazil should continue for four main reasons, namely: to fight power relations that perpetuate inequality and poverty in the country, so as to prevent this model from being exported to other regions of the planet; to strengthen social movements and organisations engaged in actions to defend rights threatened by hegemonic power relations; to influence the global decision-making agenda toward defending rights and social justice; and to identify and “export” successful experiences promoted by international cooperation in Brazil and that have the potential to be replicated overseas (innovation, technologies, good governance etc.). It is estimated that the presence of international ecumenical cooperation in Brazil and South America in coming years is strategic for their survival in the medium and long term. The withdrawal of international cooperation from Brazil on the basis of simplistic income criteria can only be supported by short-sighted and “short-term” perspectives. In response, alliances such as the Process of Articulation and Dialogue (PAD) between ecumenical agencies and Brazilian Partners, the Anglican Alliance and the ACT Alliance, among others, are becoming stronger, as they enhance the impact and 42
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effectiveness of different organisations by fostering links between them at the local, national, regional and global levels. Considering these four sets of arguments, it can be said that there’s room for international ecumenical cooperation to strengthen the work being carried out by Brazilian social movements, ecumenical organisations, NGOs and their networks with the aim of fostering much-needed changes both domestically and around the world. A summary of the proposed Action Plan is presented here: Shaping the Brazilian agenda: Keeping an agenda of development programmes, particularly to support the development and expansion of social technologies that can be replicated and adapted in Brazil and elsewhere. Supporting ecumenical organisations, social movements and NGOs in Brazil to enable them to carry out actions that can contribute to change power relations that lead to inequality, poverty and extreme poverty. Contributing to the enhancement of the economic and political sustainability of Brazilian social movements and organisations by consolidating an institutional framework as a structuring element for democracy in Brazil. Contributing to produce information and foster the establishment of Brazilian social movements and organisations to monitor Brazilian official cooperation arrangements and investments financed by Brazil - directly through its state enterprises and indirectly through BNDES - and to take part in the process of building a fairer and more inclusive and participatory Brazilian Foreign Policy, including a Brazilian International Cooperation Policy. Supporting efforts to train Brazilian organisations to engage in cooperation arrangements in other countries in the South. Supporting Brazilian organisations to deal with the consequences of the position of Brazil in the region, such as human mobility and migration. Shaping the global agenda through Brazil: With regard to the external agenda, Brazil, as a new global power, has a major role to play in the international cooperation arena. Supported by international agencies, Brazilian civil society has also gone global, expanding its activism on a global scale. Consolidating this movement is necessary not only to offset actions of a more “imperial� nature of the Brazilian government in developing countries, but also to strengthen civil society organisations in other countries in the South and to make progress in establishing a global movement that can truly contribute to eliminating environmental and climate injustices and threats that affect our planet. For these purposes to be achieved, it is necessary to: Support Brazilian civil society organisations for them to share their initiatives and projects with other countries through non-governmental, triangular cooperation mechanisms. Support Brazilian ecumenical organizations, social movements, NGOs and their networks to enable them to: (i) guarantee that Brazil maintain it propositive and leadership positions in the development cooperation, both to share and replicate experiences, technology as well as to absorb good practices and support from developed countries; (ii) monitor cooperation flows and their contents, both from OECD countries and emerging nations, in order to build a new architecture for a more transparent, effective and participatory development approach; (iii) press countries in the North to abide by their agreed-upon international cooperation target of spending 0.7% of their GDP on ODA and to identify 5
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and implement innovative mechanisms to finance international cooperation arrangements; (iv) challenge the operations of multilateral financial institutions and the role of new donors in those organisations, such as Brazil, so as to prevent them from reproducing the social exclusion schemes implemented over the past sixty years; (v) come up with information to expose problems caused by the operations of transnational corporations for discussion and propose global regulatory mechanisms in the economic, social and environmental realms; (vi) produce information and develop training processes on South-South cooperation in South America and on the current status of its institutional framework; (vii) influence global decision-making forums to ensure human rights universally, achieve greater equality in relation to common global goods, and regulate economic and financial globalization. Challenge the creation of blocks made up of artificial countries, such as the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa –, to the detriment of coalitions with a more solid cooperation agenda, such as IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa. . Introduction The international system is being profoundly altered by the new actors on the scene, the so-called emerging countries that are joined together in acronyms such as: BRICS, IBAS, BIC, Eagles, Civets, BASIC3 etc. These articulations involve countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam, to quote just some of the countries among those which are estimated to occupy the first 20 positions in the world ranking of economies by 2050 or even before. In this context, international cooperation – whether official or non-governmental – goes through profound metamorphoses, for example: the crisis of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view; the new donators coming on the scene (governmental and non-governmental) and new cooperation practices; the growing participation of social movements and organizations of the civil society in global decision-making authorities; and the inclusion on the agenda of debates of governments and organizations, of themes unheard of until now, especially those related to the idea of common good. Brazil has gained a growing role in this scenario, not only because of its condition as a “powerful country”, but also because today it is characterized as an actor that both receives and promotes international cooperation. With this in mind, some organizations in the field of international cooperation, both public and private, have been evaluating that the country no longer needs external support, because it already has the necessary resources (financial, institutional, human etc) to face its problems on its own. However, other groups have the opposite opinion: they understand that their remaining in Brazil is strategic, and for several reasons. From now on, the main decisions in the international field will go through Brazil. This is why it is important to establish lasting partnerships with a country that can influence the global agenda and contribute to maintaining a multi-polar balance between the power relations. Brazil has many natural resources, which are indispensable for the future of humanity, which means it should be included in the global debate on the universal access of common goods, also known as public goods. Despite being regarded as a huge economy – the country today is the sixth largest economy in the world – Brazil has not been able to eliminate the main source that produces injustice, poverty and absolute poverty, which is inequality. The social improvements are real but they are at the margins of the system and, because of this, millions of people still live in extremely precarious conditions. There is a fear, therefore, that with its growing political and economical strength, the country may spread 3
These acronyms refer to the following groups of countries: BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa; IBAS –India, Brazil and South Africa; BIC – Brazil, India and China; EAGLES – Emerging and Growth Leading Economies; CIVETS – Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa; BASIC – Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 26
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practices, ideas and beliefs that produce and reproduce absolute poverty. For this reason, it is important to reinforce national institutionalities that are capable of combating the relations of power in force, responsible for the systematic processes of exclusion, which are not dissolved by the so-called Brazilian economic strength. Facing these tensions and contradictions, the INESC and programmes of Christian Aid in Brazil and Bolivia decided to begin a reflection on the subject in order to improve its strategic actions in the near future. In order to do this they tried to answer a few questions such as: is it true that Brazil is able to resolve its social and environmental problems? What is the scenario of international cooperation and how does Brazil fit in to this field? Is there anything new? What is the impact of Brazil’s becoming an emerging country, especially for South America? What elements justify the continuation of government cooperation in Brazil and, especially, of ecumenical cooperation? This essay represents an attempt to answer these questions. Through a biographical revision together with interviews with those involved in this theme4 a narrative was elaborated an attempt to, more than anything else, bring elements to the debate and raise a few hypotheses. It is worth registering the openness and generosity with which those we interviewed received us, sharing information, comments and suggestions. However we point out that the text is the result of reflections of its authors, with no responsibility on the part of those interviewed for any errors or omissions or for the interpretation of the facts. It is important to highlight the fact that the present document represents a view of organizations that fight for public policies and for the guarantee of human rights, for the spread of democracy and for social justice. It is, therefore, an interpretation of organizations that define themselves as democratic, pluralist, anti-racist, anti-sexist and anti-homophobic and that fight against all forms of discrimination or of inequality, for the construction of sustainable forms of life and for the radicalization of democracy. In this sense, development is focused on the perspective of human rights. This approach represents an important tool for overcoming discrimination and the lack of individual prerogatives that women and men suffer as they do not benefit from the results of economic growth. This approach also enables us to recognize those responsible for the processes of social exclusion, for the discrimination in relation to access to productive resources, for the exclusion from decision-making mechanisms and for the exploration of vulnerable people. So, it is understood that strategies that are based on human rights are made up of powerful tools with the potential to empower others for political, social, economical, environmental and climatic transformations. Unless policies and practices adapt to these principals, and unless the unequal relations of power are challenged, it will be impossible to face problems of inequality, of social exclusion and of poverty. This is the understanding of the present research. The document is divided into another five parts, as well as this introduction. In the first part, the ambivalences and ambiguities that characterize Brazil are presented. It shows that the expressive economic growth experienced over the last few years was not able to eliminate the societal arrangements that produce and reproduce exclusion. The Brazilian economy is modernized and has 4
Between the months of December 2011 and February 2012, the following people were interviewed for this research: Milton Rondó Filho, coordinator of International Action Against Hunger (CGFome), of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE); Marco Farani, director of the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation, of the MRE; Marcos Cintra, director of Studies and International Economical and Political Relations of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA); Carlos Mussi, director of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL)in Brasil; Daniel Augusto Furst Gonçalves, Specialist in South to South cooperation of PNUD; Maria Cristina Araújo, advisor for the Programme of Cooperation of the European Union Delegation in Brazil; Simon Ticehurst, head of the Oxfam office in Brazil; Júlia Esther Castro França, executive coordinator of the Process of Articulation and Dialogue between European Ecumenical Agencies and their Partners in Brazil (PAD); Sandra Andrade, from Anglican Alliance; Kjeld Jakobsen, consultant in Cooperation and International Relations; and Marilia Schüller, Project Advisor for Koinonia.
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improved the living conditions of some segments of the population, but it continues to maintain million of its inhabitants in poverty and extreme poverty, contingents that correspond to entire populations of some African countries. Therefore, it can be affirmed that this is Africa too. In the second part, international cooperation is discussed. Firstly, there is a summary of the general situation in order to, then, verify how the cooperation received in Brazil is going, whether official or nongovernmental. After that, in the third part, Brazilian international cooperation is touched on, in an attempt to understand this new role that Brazil is taking on in South-South cooperation. In the fourth part, the participation of Brazil in South America beyond bilateral and multilateral cooperation is explored, with an emphasis on Brazilian investments in the region and their consequences for regional integration. The ambivalent and ambiguous character of Brazilian external politics is obvious as, on the one hand, it supports processes of integration of different peoples in the region and, on the other hand, subsidizes huge investments which often violate human and environmental rights of populations and communities who do not have enough resources to defend themselves. Finally, in the final comments, in the light of the reflections and the data gathered in the previous chapters, a series of points are listed that justify the continuation of international cooperation in Brazil, especially of ecumenical cooperation. 1. The contradictions of the sixth world economy 1.1 A Powerful Brazil Brazil is a paradoxical country, as it grows without really producing social inclusion. Just as inequality, in all its dimensions (social, economical, regional, racial and ethnical, generational and of gender), structures the Brazilian society, so too does this phenomenon allow the country to live with millions in poverty despite being the sixth economy of the world.5 Indeed, since the 1990s, the country has achieved economic stability, attracting foreign investment. In 2011, the Brazilian GDP passed the 2 trillion dollar mark, overtaking countries like Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. Between 2000 and 2010, the GDP grew at a rate of 40% in real terms, which is the equivalent of an average annual increase of 3,7%. In the same period, the wealth per capita grew in over 130%. Exports quintuplicated in the first decade of 2000, increasing from 50 billion dollars at the beginning of the decade to over 250 billion dollars in 2011.6 The international economic reserves are over 350 billion dollars. The country owns companies of international coverage in petroleum (Petrobrás), mineral exploration (Vale), aircraft building (Embraer), steel industry (Gerdau), telecommunications (Rede Globo), food and drink (Brasil Foods, AmBev) and engineering (Odebrecht), which offers the country a reasonable advantage in commercial penetration in various continents. With reference to the economic crisis that shook the world in 2008, Brazil managed to cope with it using a number of measures7 which softened its impact. The country is considered to be the “world’s granary”, as it stands out in its production and export of foods such as sugar, beef, coffee, orange juice, soy-bean and chicken. It is also one of the largest 5 On this subject, read the article in The Guardian: “Brazil overtakes UK as sixth-largest economy”, published on 26th December 2011.Available on web page: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/dec/26/brazil-overtakes-uk-economy 6
On this subject, consult the IPEA Data on the website:
<http://www.IPEAdata.gov.br>.
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The Brazilian government used a collection of anti-cyclical measures, such as: tax exemption and increase in liquidity (loans to financial agents, export companies and construction companies; more flexibility of rediscount, reduction in compulsory deposits, expansion of credit to agribusinesses and the amplification of financing of the export sector) in order to stimulate the economy; and the increase in social spending to raise consumption. It is clear, however, that Brazil benefitted from the good performance of China, its main commercial partner in 2009.
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producers of ethanol and minerals, such as iron, bauxite, manganese and niobium, Also from the point of view of natural resources, Brazil is the largest holder of fresh water on the planet and has the 9th largest reserve of petroleum in the world, after the recent confirmation of a stock of pre-salt in the basin of Santos (SP). The country has the largest reserve of uranium. Apart from this, its territory makes it the fifth largest extension of land in the world, with a large area available for agriculture. Brazil holds one of the wealthiest bio-diversities on the planet, with about 18% of the world’s biota, a coastline of over 7,000 km, which enables the easy flow of production to the Atlantic Ocean through several ports in the country, and a climatic diversity which enables a varied agricultural production. Brazil has the fifth largest population in the world, it has frontiers with ten countries8 and is governed, in the framework of democracy and of the rule of law, with political stability since the beginning of the 1990s and, presently presided, for the first time, by a woman of Bulgarian origin, Dilma Rousseff, who has an enviable popularity9. It is indisputable that a representative democracy has been consolidating itself in the Brazil over the last 30 years. The country has an institutional apparatus that guarantees legitimate, regular elections, with quick results and a political alternation in power. The country is still characterized by the presence of an active and diverse civil society which is renewed periodically with the emergence of new and vibrant social movements. The political institutionality, in construction since the end of the military dictatorship, around the 1980s, created the possibility of spreading democracy, which resulted in the recovery of liberties and of more democratic institutions, of the construction of areas of participation and political co-ordination (conferences, counsels, forums, committees, commissions), and of the formulation of demands of economic, social, environmental and cultural inclusion. In the social field, Brazil has seen improvements in terms of poverty and inequality in the distribution of wealth,10 which can be explained by demographic, social, economic and political factors. For example the demographic transformations that the country has been going through over the last few years have been decisive for this change, with the so-called “demographic bonus” created by the alterations in the age structure of the population pyramid, with the constant increase in the economically active population until 2030, which should generate a reduction in the number of inactive people that depend on the active. A greater participation of women in the labour market is another factor, in the sense that it contributes to an increase in the family income.11 Another relevant element is the more favourable performance of the economy in the decade of 2000, as seen earlier, which enabled the elevation of the levels of employment and income, especially among the poorest. It is also worth mentioning the participation of the State, which contributed to the amplification and implementation of policies and programmes that expand the spread of social rights acquired constitutionally in 1988. With this about 40 million people rose above the poverty line in the decade of 2000.12 The following is a list of some of the principle measures taken in this sense: (a) the real increase in the minimum salary, which has a direct impact on the workers’ income, both active and inactive, as on those who depend on benefit programmes;13 (b) the expansion of the coverage of 8
Brazil has frontiers with Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, British Guyana, Grench Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela. 9 According to the latest opinion poll, carried out by Datafolha in January 2012, Dilma Rousseff’s time in office is considered to be great or good for 59% of Brazilians. “The growth of 10% in six months means the president has reached the highest rate of approval at the end of the first year of government since the return of direct elections, in 1289”. Folha de São Paulo, 22nd January, 2012, cover. 10 On this subject, see: IPEA (2010). 11 On this subject, consult: IPEA, SPM, SEPPIR, UN Women (2011). 12 On this subject, see the data of the National Plan for the Overcoming of Extreme Poverty “Brasil Sem Miseria” on the web page: <http://www.brasilsemmiseria.gov.br/apresentacao-2> 13 In the decade of 2000, the minimum salary increased by over 70% in real terms. On this subject, see the website: <http://www.IPEAdata.gov.br>.
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financial benefits from welfare and programmes of income transfers (Family Benefit Programme, Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour – Peti, Continued Payment Benefits – BPC;14 (c) the relative increase in the efficiency of the public machine, which has contributed to incrementing the revenue and improving the labour and welfare inspection, decreasing – but not eradicating – work in slave-like conditions and child labour, as well as increasing the levels of formality in the labour market and, consequently, of social protection for the workers; (d) the expansion of the Brazilian System of Social Protection both from the point of view of the allocation of financial resources, as well as the coverage for beneficiaries. In this sense, for example, the State costs for social policies (welfare, social work, health, education, employment and income, agrarian development, sanitation, habitation, food and nutrition) are presently about 24% of the GDP (around the 1980s, shortly before the promulgation of the Constitution, this percentage was only 13%),15 and (e) the growth of subsidized credit destined for family agriculture and micro, small and medium businesses. 1.2 Not all that glitters is gold. Despite this encouraging scenario, Brazil faces a series of challenges, in particular: poverty, inequality, corruption, destruction of the environment and the emission of greenhouse gases. These ills could damage this apparently promising future. As Luz and Wolff point out: Predomina no exterior – e o governo brasileiro contribui em muito para exacerbar isso – uma imagem um tanto simplista na qual os problemas sociais brasileiros estariam em vias de resolução a partir de medidas governamentais como, por exemplo, o Bolsa Família ou, mais recentemente, o Programa de Erradicação da Miséria. Esta perspectiva, de certa forma ‘tecnicista’, do enfrentamento das questões sociais tem sido recebida com muita simpatia no âmbito internacional e, frequentemente, ofuscado esforços do campo não governamental para elaboração de um quadro mais completo e diferenciado da realidade brasileira que aponta a continuidade e mesmo o aprofundamento de problemas estruturais, e alimenta a argumentação em prol da necessária continuidade da cooperação internacional no Brasil (Luz e Wolff, 2011:7).16
1.2.1 Millions of Brazilians live in terrible living conditions: Africa is here too. The power described in the previous item is not capable of facing the serious social issues that remain in Brazil. As Loretta Minghella, director of Christian Aid, points out in an article published in the British media in the first few days of 2012,17 Brazil may have a larger economy than Britain, but its living conditions are far from being similar to those of the inhabitants of the island. In effect, there are still marginalized and excluded populations in Brazil that correspond to the entire population of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. According to official figures,18 the country still has 36 million poor19 – an amount that corresponds to 19% of Brazilians, which is larger than the whole population of Uganda20 – and 16 million extremely poor21 (8.5% of Brazilians), more than all 14
Studies carried out by Hoffman and by the IPEA revealed the importance of the policies of transference of income in the reduction of poverty of the inequalities in income distribution in Brazil. Simulations carried out by the IPEA for the year 2004 showed that, if the financial benefits transferred from the State were taken away from the family income of the extremely poor, then extreme poverty would double, from 11,3% to 22,6% of the population. In the case of poverty in general, the percentage would increase from 30,1% to 41,7%. On this subject, see: IPEA (2007) and Hoffmann (2005). 15 On this subject, see the lecture given by Márcio Pochmann, president of the IPEA (2011). 16 Translation: What is dominating abroad – and the Brazilian government contributes a lot in exacerbating this – is a very simplistic image in which Brazil’s social problems are on their way to a solution through government measures such as, for example, the Family Benefit, or, more recently, the Programme for the Eradication of Absolute Poverty. This perspective, somewhat ‘technical’, of facing social problems has been well received in the international field and, often, covering up efforts of the non-governmental field to elaborate a more complete and differentiated picture of the Brazilian reality, which points out the continuation and even deepening of structural problems, and feeds the argument for the continued international cooperation in Brazil. (Luz e Wolff, 2011:7). 17 Minghella (2012) 18 On this subject, consult: IBGE (a) and (b), as well as the website of Brasil Sem Miséria. 19 Here poor are those with a family monthly income per capita of less or equal to R$140.00 20 According to “Uganda at a Glance”, of the World Bank, the population of Uganda is around 33 million people. See the webpage: <http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/uga_aag.pdf>. 21 Here extreme poverty is understood as those with a monthly family income per capita of R$70,00 or less.
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those living in Niger22. Associated to this, a third of the population, which corresponds to 60 million people, that is, more than the population of Myanmar,23 live in homes considered to be precarious, because they don’t have access to running water, drains or a toilet, because they are built with walls and roofs made of non permanent material or because they are on irregular land. Illiteracy in people over the age of 15 affects 14 million Brazilians, the equivalent of the whole population of Cambodia24. Counting the number of young people between 18 and 24 years of age with 11 years of schooling is considered essential to evaluate the efficiency of the educational system in a country, as well as the ability of a society to eliminate poverty and improve social cohesion. In the case of Brazil, the proportion of youth with this many years of study is still extremely low, only 37.9% according to figures from the National Household Survey (PNAD) 2009. With regard to infant mortality, an excellent indicator of the general living conditions of a society, Brazil presents a rate a little over 22 deaths per thousand children born alive, a rate which is five times that observed in the United Kingdom. In the State of Alagoas, the infant mortality rate is 46.4 per thousand. Their daily struggle to put food on the table is still a problem for millions of Brazilians: a third of the population of the country is at some level of nutritional insecurity. A little less than half of the work force is still informal; so they don’t have access to workers’ rights, such as welfare, unemployment benefit, maternity leave, holidays, 13th salary, government severance indemnity fund, insurance against work accidents, among other benefits. As if that were not enough, 2 million children from 5 to 15 years of age, which is equivalent to the population of Botswana,25 are involved in the labour market, of which 44% are concentrated in the Northeast and 24% in the Southeast. It is clear that there is an enormous gap between the formal citizenship and real citizenship: millions of Brazilians are marginalized and excluded from the fruits of economic growth. And more: the precarious living conditions are not universally distributed among the poor populations. Sex, race, ethnicity and address are variables that increase the probability that women, blacks, indigenous, traditional peoples and communities, north easterners, peasants and inhabitants of the peripheries of the towns are the most vulnerable. They are elements based on ideas and beliefs that are linked to social, economic, and political processes to create systems of exclusion that have been affected very little, until now, by the growth of the country. 1.2.2 Inequality as a structuring dimension of the Brazilian society Inequality is a structuring element of the Brazilian society, as it is present in all the dimension of social life: between blacks and whites, between women and men, between poor and rich, between the different regions of the country, between the country and the city, between those who have no land and those who have a lot of land, etc. As Oxfam (2012) points out in a recent report, Brazil is the second most unequal country among the G20, coming second only to South Africa. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2010), Brazil is the third most unequal country in Latin America, behind Bolivia and Haiti. The theme of inequality in Brazil and in Latin America is so dramatic that the UNPD decided to dedicate a specific report to it, as it is firmly understood that if the inequalities are not confronted, sustainable development will never be reached. For UNDP: A desigualdade restringe as oportunidades de desenvolvimento de amplos segmentos da população, dificulta a formação de capital humano e limita as possibilidades de investir em educação e saúde, o que, por sua vez, compromete a capacidade de crescimento econômico. Além disso, ao preservar as instituições que privilegiam 22
According to “Niger at a Glance”, of the World Bank, the population of Niger is around 15 million. See the webpage: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ner_aag.pdf 23 According to “Myanmar at a Glance”, of the World Bank, the population of Myanmar is around 50 million inhabitants. See the webpage: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/mmr_aag.pdf 24 According to “Cambodia at a Glance”, of the World Bank, the population of Cambodia is around 14,8 million inhabitants. See the webpage: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/khm_aag.pdf 25 According to Botswana at a Glance”, of the World Bank, the population of Botswana is around 2 million inhabitants. s. See the webpage: http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/bwa_aag.pdf
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12 os setores dominantes, a desigualdade eterniza a maior acumulação relativa da riqueza nas faixas mais ricas da sociedade (...). Do mesmo modo, se existem níveis altos de desigualdade, a capacidade regulatória do Estado se vê debilitada e, nesse contexto de debilidade institucional, cresce a probabilidade de ocupação do Estado por parte dos grupos econômicos mais poderosos (...). A desigualdade também tende a provocar tensões sociais que podem acentuar a instabilidade política e institucional, o que afeta não apenas a governabilidade, mas também os incentivos para o investimento interno e externo, entre outros aspectos (...) (PNUD, 2010: 30).26
So it is clear that the main reason a significant number of Brazilian families still live in poverty is not the general lack of resources, but their unjust distribution. There has never been an effective inclusion of the poor in the history of the country, which developed maintaining expressive contingents of people in absolute poverty. This process of development that “administrates poverty” has been characterized by specialists as a “conservative modernization”: the State produces significant transformations in the economy without breaking (or even changing superficially) the established socio-economic order. That is to say, despite having entered the select club of the most wealthy nations in the world and having universalism as the basis of its public policies, the country is still not able to secure decent salaries and the minimum of social protection for a large part of its inhabitants. The societal arrangements that maintain inequality and exclusion feed on everyday processes of discrimination, especially sexual and racial/ethnical, on public policies with little effect and on a democracy under threat. Effectively, such arrangements are the result of pressure from conservative forces that operate in a way that the institutional apparatus in force in the country is not used to radically alter the dominant factors of inequality. In this sense, for example, the land and housing speculation in the large cities, associated with the absence of the State, in certain areas, oblige certain contingents of the urban population to live in unhealthy conditions, with no access to basic services (notably environmental sanitation, access to urbanized land and quality public transport), victims of social and racial segregation, as well as violence.27 In the rural areas, the agricultural production, one of the main motors of growth of the country and of its commercial leaders in the international scenario, is submitted to an excluding economic model, structured around agribusiness and the growing exportation of its products (soy-bean, meats, forest products, such as paper, cellulose and wood; alcohol; sugar and coffee, among others). This strategy benefits the companies much more than the rural population, since the latifundium, monoculture and monopoly of the productive chain by transnational companies contributes, on the one hand, to the expulsion of the family farmers from the country and, on the other hand, concentrates the wealth in a scale rarely seen in other countries. Another factor with a strong influence on the continuation of inequality in Brazil is the regressive taxing system, which charges, above all, consumption and labour and spares the large capital.
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Translation: Inequality restricts opportunities for development of ample sectors of the population making the formation of human capital more difficult and limiting the possibilities of investment in education and health, which, in turn, effects the capacity of economic growth. Apart from this, as it preserves institutions which privilege the dominant sectors, inequality eternalizes a greater relative accumulation of wealth among the wealthier members of society (...). In the same way, if there are high levels of inequality, the regulatory capacity of the State becomes debilitated and, in this case of institutional debility, the probability of the occupation of the State by more powerful economic groups grows (..). Inequality also tends to provoke social tensions that can accentuate political and institutional instability, which effects not only governability, but also the incentives for internal and external investments, among other aspects (...) (UNDP 2010:30). 27 The case of “Pinheirinho”, which took place recently in São José dos Campos (SP), is emblematic: 1.5 thousand poor families were violently expelled, with no urgent motive and using the riot police. Their property was taken from them and their homes destroyed using a surprise tactic of the military and without offering any alternative roof over their heads. On this subject see, for example, the article by Walter Maierovitch in Carta Capital on the 28th January 2012, entitled “No Pinheirinho, o Brasil das Trevas”. (In Pinheirinho, the Brazil of darkness) See the website; http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sociedade/no-pinheirinho-o-brasil-das-trevas
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According to data of the IPEA28, in 2003, the tax burden for the wealthy, that is, those who earned over 30 minimum salaries, was 26.3% of the family income. Yet among the poorer families with a monthly income of less than two minimum salaries, the percentage was almost double, 48,9%. What is most dramatic is that this difference has been increasing over time.29 In the case of social policies, there is a similar logic. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a mechanism began that allowed the Federal Government to detach 20% of the taxes and contributions originally foreseen for the area of social support, the so-called Divestment of the Union’s Revenues (DUR). Billions of BRLs, each year, are used for the realization of the primary surplus destined for the payment of interest and the settling of the debt.30 In other words, inequality is strengthened as, on the one hand, those who are well off (the creditors of the public debt) fill their pockets and, on the other hand, the poorer population are no longer attended. From a political point of view, the recent scandals of corruption that affect all powers accentuate the generalised disbelief in the efficiency of the government institutions. The political parties also got into a crisis, with less and less ability to unify the social sectors, or to guide the State and articulate government policies. The organizations of the Brazilian civil society of the so-called democratic field have been systematically weakened – from the point of view of their political, institutional and financial sustainability -, finding, in this sense, enormous difficulties in attempting to transform the power, the structure, the relations, the processes and the policies in which society was based and its economic development. As a result, Brazil accumulates the elements needed to become and emerging economy and a growing power in the world´s geo-politics, at the same time as it leaves almost untouched the conditions of exclusion and social inequality, particularly among women, blacks, indigenous, traditional peoples and communities, as well as peasants. In summary, despite the enormous gains, the Brazilian democracy fails when it concerns guaranteeing access to human rights to all Brazilians: the right to produce an economic base that is just, solidarity and sustainable; and to strengthen a more participative political power that is open to all citizens. The Brazilian civil society under threat Brazil has a complex organized civil society, which includes various organizations, such as: non-profit making philanthropic organizations, religious organizations, human rights organizations, social movements, workers’ unions, networks of organizations and movements, entities that promote the social responsibility of businesses, among others. The latest available data31 reveal that, in 2005, the country had 338 thousand non-profit making associations and foundations divided in the following way: (i) religious = 25%; (ii) development and human rights = 18%; (iii) professionals and business associations = 17%; (iv) cultural = 14%; (v) social support = 12%; (vi) educational = 6%; (vii) habitation, health and environment = 2%; and (viii) others = 6%. Some of these organizations and movements, especially those articulated around human rights and promoting democracy, take on the central role in pressuring the public authorities and also the private sector, to amplify the scope of human rights and to construct a model of development that is effectively inclusive and sustainable. This is not an easy task, as the challenges are immense, starting with the social debt itself which the country owes to its citizens. Apart from this, Brazilian public institutions – in the three powers and three levels of government – are immersed in schemes of corruption, of influence peddling and of the defending of corporative demands in detriment of issues of public interest. Another problem is the financial crisis that important 28
On this subject, see: IPEA (2010). On this subject, see: Salvador (2007). 30 As an illustration, between 2005 and 2006, around R$ 66 billion in resources were removed that were initially destined for the areas of social welfare. This is the equivalent of seven years of Family Benefit, whose annual budget at the time was R$ 9.2 billion. In education, it is estimated that, between 2000 and 2007, R$ 45 billion stopped being applied to the sector because of the Divestment of Union Revenue. (DUR). On this subject, see: Salvador (2007). 31 On this subject, consult: IBGE; IPEA; ABONG; GIFE (2008). 29
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14 organizations of the civil society are going through. This phenomenon is caused by several factors, such as the reduction and rearrangement of resources from international cooperation, as well and the inexistence of a culture of donation outside the spheres of the family, neighbourhood or religion. In effect, with the exception of the union movements,32 there is no articulated and coordinated public policy in the country for the financing of these organizations. There are different mechanisms, operated by different government bodies, which are generally not very transparent and have discretionary power in the State.33 The best example of this lack of a culture of donation can be shown by the project Criança Esperança (Children of Hope), 34 an initiative of the Rede Globo, (TV channel) in partnership with the United Nations for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO). Each year these two organizations promote a national campaign using the high time of the largest TV network in the country. Despite the label and the ability that these organizations have to form opinions and mobilize people, the resources raised in 2011 were only R$ 18 million. Another factor that affects this reality is related to the focus of the resources of businesses on organizations that offer social services. What the business sector mobilizes for the social work is also not that expressive: less that 0.5% of the GDP.35 And more: the vast majority of these resources is destined for organizations that directly attend the population through social support, food, health and education, among others. Very rarely resources are sent to support groups that defend human rights. Other problems that affect the perpetuity of this culture are the criminalization of the social movements and the constant attacks on the civil society’s organizations in defence of human rights, which confront daily the powerful interests of those who have the means of production and their allies.3637 The tensions present in the Brazilian society need to be more exposed, so that they may be confronted and so that solutions can be found. Without a civil society that fights for public policies and for the guarantee of human rights, for the spread of democracy and for social justice, it is impossible to face problems of inequality, social exclusion and poverty.
Taking into consideration that Brazil has a more and more central role in regional and international scenarios, the question now is: to what extent the model of economic growth that does not assure the universality of citizenship will be taken to other places, through external political tools and international cooperation, whether received, triangular or offered? 2. Brazil and received international cooperation 2.1 The changes in the international scenario of Official Development Assistance (ODA) The governmental international cooperation, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA), provided by traditional donors,38 has been going through a series of changes, because of various factors that are summed up below.39
32
According to Brazilian Law, the trade unions are financed annually by resources from the daily salaries of workers in the formal sector, irrespective of whether they are trade union members or not. It is the so-called “union dues”. 33 On this subject, see: Beghin et al. (2005). 34 See the site: <http://criancaesperanca.globo.com 35 On this subject, see Peliano (2006). 36 An example of this can be shown by the three Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry (CPI in Portuguese) on NGOs installed in the National Congress during the decade of 2000. Also important to mention is the recent attitude of Dilma Rousseff in suspending, indiscriminately, the passing on of resources of covenants to Civil Society Organizations, breaking public agreements, creating an environment of judicial insecurity and placing the focus of the mechanisms of corruption on NGOs and not on the politicians who benefit from illicit practices. On this subject see Durão’s article (2011). 37 On this subject, see the dossier elaborated by PAD in July 2010 on the theme entitled: “The repression of the defenders of human rights and social movements in Brazil”. Access the site:<www.pad.org.br>. 38 Traditional donators join together in the Committee for Development Assistance (CDA) of the OECD.(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The CDA is integrated by representatives of 24 member countries, which are: Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Korea, (member since 2010), Denmark, Spain, The United States, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and the European Union. Representatives of the World Bank, of the IMF and of the UNDP participate in the CDA as observers. 39 On this subject, see: Fordelone (2009), CEPAL (2010), Wilks (2010), Ayllón (2011), Ballón (2011), Fernández (2011a to b), Tomlinson (2009, 2010, 2011) and commentaries of those who were interviewed.
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2.1.1 Relative reduction of the ODA According to data from the Committee for Development Assistance of the OECD (CDA-OECD),40 the Official Development Assistance increased in the decade of 2000, from 0.22% of the GDP in 2000 to a little more than 0.30% of the GDP in 2010, which corresponds to an increase of 41% for the period. However, despite this improvement, a lot more could have been done. According to Tomlinson (2010: 30-31), in the last fifty years, a growing gap can be observed between the wealth of donor countries and the allocations of help per capital, particularly since the beginning of the 1990s. In this sense, for example, the GDP per capita of the donors grew over 200% between 1961 and 2008, while help per capita rose only 66% in the same period. The ODA of the donor countries had an increase of only US$ 1.00 per inhabitant; on the other hand, the national wealth of these countries rose by US$ 600.00 a year. In 1961, the help per capita represented 0.5% of the GNP per capita; in 2008, this percentage fell to below 0.3%. In addition to this is the fact that the donor countries are a long way from fulfilling their goals agreed to in the International Conference on Finance for Development, celebrated in Monterrey,41 in 2002, especially the goal of allocating 0.7% of the GDP to ODA. The disrespect towards the agreements caused a “deficit” of support of around US$ 150 billion. If the level of 0.7% of the GDP had been respected, the amount would have reached a sum of US$ 282 billion (Tomlinson, 2010: 24). In the near future, it looks like the situation will become worse as a consequence of the serious economic crisis that is affecting developed countries since 2008. 2.1.2 The emergence of new priorities Another thing to add to this scenario is the relative scarcity of resources for the emergence of new problems for developed countries. For example, after the “September 11th”, the United States have given priority to Iraq and Afghanistan. Huge resources from the European Union (EU) have been channelled towards processes of integration of new countries which have recently joined the EU, as well as towards assisting social needs in the poorer countries in the region. Apart from this, Japan has been giving special attention to the victims of the violent earthquake that shook the country in 2011. These problems tend to redistribute the funds of the ODA or compete for these resources, whether for countries considered to be strategic from a geopolitical point of view, of for the resolution of internal issues of the donor countries. 2.1.3 Inadequate criteria of distribution of the ODA The main criterion for defining the ODA of the donating countries is based on the so-called average per capita income of the countries, which benefits those who present low incomes (Low Income Countries – LIC). Although it is true that, in 1990, more than 90% of the poor were concentrated in these countries, today the tendency has inverted: three quarters of the poor live in Middle Income Countries – MICs.42 Nevertheless, these countries only received 40% of the ODA in the decade of 2000. Apart from this, the criterion of income per capital presupposes a homogenous distribution of resources, which is far from the reality. The low effectiveness of this indicator is shown by the Cepal (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2010: 13): the level of income per capita of the group of countries classified as of middle/low income, for the average for the years 2000 to 2008, oscillated between a minimum of US$ 1,943.00 and a maximum of US$ 9,077.00. The level of poverty of this group of countries, on the other hand, was between a minimum of 2% and a
40
On this subject, consult the webpage: http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33721_1_1_1_1_1,00.html Note that the first time the developed countries agreed to this goal was in the Annual General Meeting of the NU on the 24th October 1970, through the Resolution nº 2.626 (XXV). 42 On this subject, see IDS (2010) 41
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maximum of 84%.43 The same disparity can be seen in a group of countries of medium/high income, where the level of income per capita oscillated between a minimum of US$ 4,100.00 and a maximum of US$ 19,547.00. Yet the level of poverty varied between a minimum of 2% and a maximum of 43%. In Latin America and the Caribbean, where the majority of the countries are classified as having a medium/high income, the average levels of poverty for the period of 2000 to 2008 varied between a minimum of 2% and a maximum of 21%. So it is clear that, even if poverty has reduced in the countries of medium income, absolute poverty continues to be incompatible with the levels of development in these nations, which overturns the argument that these countries have enough resources (financial, institutional, human etc.) to face, alone, its social problems. The focus on poverty covers up the real problems, which are at the root of the precarious living conditions and the systematic violation of human and environmental rights which still prevail in these countries. There needs to be a closer look in order to recognize the complexity of social, environmental and climatic issues that afflict the planet. Considering this heterogeneity, as well as the disparities that exist in each country, the criteria for the allocation of resources of the ODA should be based on a more ample group of indicators that reflect the concrete peculiarities of the countries and make it possible to detect where the main needs and demands are of each specific case. 2.1.4 The low effectiveness of the ODA. After five decades of support, there is a growing understanding that this support has had a low effectiveness, since the donor countries tend to link its cooperation activities to its economic and political interests, much more than promoting the development of the communities and people benefitting from the ODA. Because of this, there was little concern: (a) for the real needs of the assisted communities; (b) for the strengthening of local democratic institutions; (c) for the empowering of national societies that received international cooperation; (d) for the promotion of human rights; (e) for gender equality; (f) for the defence of the environment; and (g) for the evaluation of the results. In addition to this is: (i) the predomination of an excessively assistencialist vision; (ii) the waste of resources because of the lack of coordination of agents promoting the ODA and the consequent superposing of actions; (iii) the lack of transparency in the allocation of resources; (iv) the insufficient accountability both of the donor societies and of the receivers; and (v) the excessive dependence on the ODA by some countries. Despite the agreements sealed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)44 and in the Accra Agenda for Action (2008),45 the advances observed since the middle of the decade of 2000 were small. Representatives of the global civil society that accompanied the meeting of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which took place in Bussan, in the Korean Republic, in November, 2011 revealed their concern, as they believe that the donors and the partner governments were not able to fulfil the majority of the commitments written 43
The data refer to the level of GDP per capita measured together with the purchase power parity. The level of poverty is measured using the limit of US$ 2.00 (two dollars) a day. The data come from the data base of the “World Development Indicators”, of the World Bank (CEPAL, 2010: 4). 44 The 2nd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in Paris, in 2005, and joined together traditional donors (bilateral and multilateral), new donors, civil society organizations and of the business sector with an aim to evaluate the state of art of international aid for development. The commitments taken on were translated into the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which is based on five presumptions considered as essential for the promotion of development: 1º) Appropriation: the partner countries exercise an effective leadership over the policies and strategies of development; 2º) alignment: the donors base their aid on their partners’ development strategies; 3º) harmonization: the donors coordinate their activities and minimize the costs related to aid; 4º) management of results: the donors and partners guide their activities in order to reach the desired results; and 5º) mutual accountability: the donors and partner countries promise to present the accounts of a better aid management. 45 The Agenda for Action resulted in the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The plan lists a series of actions aimed at accelerating and strengthening the implementation of the Paris Declaration. These actions are structured around three axels: the appropriation by the countries; the construction of more solid and inclusive partners; the management of results and mutual accountability.
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down in Paris and in Accra (Better Aid, 2011). As well as these agreements, it is urgent to incorporate in the agenda of central themes of debates, the promotion of effective sustainable development, such as, for example, commercial restrictions without compensation; fragile and recessive tributary systems; regulation of transnational companies, both in mercantile actions as well as in their so-called interventions of social responsibility; global public goods; climate changes; absence of the participation of social organizations and movements in decision-making mechanisms and processes, among many others. 2.1.5 New donors on the scene Recent years have been characterized by the appearance of new donors on the scene of international cooperation, especially in the emerging countries, such as Brazil, China, India, South Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, among others. It is estimated that the financial aid from these countries is about 10% of the total ODA of the traditional donors (Tomlinson, 2011: 59). Although the volume of resources mobilized by these new donors is small, these countries have contributed to alter the way of giving aid for development. New modalities are being designed, such as, for example, the SouthSouth cooperation and triangular cooperation. The South-South Cooperation was defined in the Resolution nº 64/222 of the Annual General Meeting of the NU, on the 21st December, 2009, as a common initiative in the Southern countries, stemming from shared experiences and affinities, based on common objectives and solidarity between them, and guided by, among other motivations, the principles of respecting national sovereignty and rights, free from any conditionality (apud CEPAL, 2010: 5). For the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB, 2011), the South-South cooperation (SSC) is a kind of cooperation between developing countries anchored on the following criteria: • The cooperation is based on horizontality, on solidarity and on establishing mutual interests. • The exchange of knowledge is considered to be more relevant than the financial factors. It covers an ample spectrum of fields of action that are applied in the areas of technical assistance or institutional support. • The SSC is marked by reciprocity, by mutual respect, as well as respect for the sovereignty of the countries involved. • The SSC aims to be efficient in the use of resources. • The South-South cooperation aims at building relations between partners in the same region, between countries in different continents, as well as establishing new alliances. It is true that there are comparative advantages in two countries with similar political, cultural and social histories establishing companion relationships between them, but it is also true that this alone does not guarantee the efficient promotion of sustainable development from the economic, political and social points of view. The so-called new donors, in the main part, do not submit themselves to the agreements of Paris, Accra and Bussan because they are not part of the Committee for Development Assistance of the OECD – with the exception of Korea, who joined the CDA recently – or because they don’t agree with the terms of the agreements. It is clear that there is little transparency in the information, apart from having little participation of movements and civil society organizations in decision-making processes, in the implementation and in the accompaniment of the cooperation activities. There is also no news on the results of the SSC. Triangular cooperation, in turn, is a kind of relationship that involves, in general, three parts: the traditional donor (a member country of the CDA of the OECD or international organ), an emerging country and a third, less developed country. Each nation contributes with its experience, all aimed at the construction of common objectives linked to the priorities of development of the third country. It can be seen that new formats of triangular cooperation are appearing, such as, for example, some 17
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which involve only countries from the South or that mobilize more than just the three partners (the socalled multiple cooperation. Notwithstanding the advances that this format of cooperation may bring, especially towards a more adequate agenda to the needs of the third country (the benefited country), and the involvement of non government organizations, there are still some questions about it, such as, for example: the increase in costs. Maintenance of a cooperation guided by the interests of Northern countries, which continue to be hegemonic in the international cooperation scenario, the tardiness of the implementation of the projects; the imposing of an agenda of emerging countries on the benefitting countries; greater difficulties in ensuring transparency and accountability; and the substitution, instead of complementariness, of the North/South ODA (bilateral and multilateral) for this kind of action. 2.1.6 The emergence of new problems of a transnational character: the global common goods. There are other elements that influence the movements of international cooperation which are related to the so-called â&#x20AC;&#x153;global common goodsâ&#x20AC;?, also known as public goods. These goods are the responsibility of the whole of the world community, as the future of humanity depends on their preservation. Examples of common goods are: water, the environment and climate, but, also, human rights, equality, peace, security, international justice, the fight against corruption and drugs, the eradication of epidemics, cultural diversity, economic and financial stability and the development of an international institutionality capable of adopting principles of equality and solidarity. In this case, Latina America and especially Brazil are strategic for the Northern nations, considering that they hold one of the main reserves of drinking water in the world, as well as biomes that are fundamental to the Earths balance, as in the case of the Amazon. Apart from that, the region has three members of the G20 (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and an emerging country, Brazil, showing that it has influential power in the international decision-making spheres both in the NU as well as in other multilateral areas of decision. 2.2 The agenda for nongovernmental cooperation in transformation 2.2.1 The metamorphoses of solidarity cooperation Government cooperation, also called solidarity cooperation when it is implemented by organizations, ecumenical bodies and social movements, has also been going through changes, especially concerning the international agencies from the Northern countries. Among the factors that explain these alterations it is worth mentioning the following46: a) Reduction of resources The international economic crisis that shook the Northern countries and the doubts that are risen on the effectiveness of aid contributed to the reduction in the distribution of resources, both from the ODA and from private donors (individual or corporate). As well as this, some developed countries changed their priorities and ways of action. This is the case of Norway, for example, where they promised to transfer US$ 1 billion to Brazil, more specifically to the Amazon Fund, through the BNDES bank. The government considered that their contribution to the country was fulfilled with this donation and so stopped supporting projects that were traditionally implemented by Norwegian ecumenical agencies in Brazil. The relative scarcity of resources has resulted in an increase of competition between the agencies and in the appearance of new organizations that use appealing messages of a more assistentialist nature. b) Changes in the agenda
46
On this subject, see: Luz and Wolff (2011), Caccia Bava (2011a and b), FernĂĄndez and Balbis (2011) and Croce (2010).
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Several international nongovernmental agencies have been altering their priorities because of a change in the strategic vision that the so-called developed societies concede to the role of international cooperation, based on the criteria of the average income of the countries that will benefit from their support. This posture results in the progressive reduction of resources destined for most Latin American Countries (evaluated as medium income countries) and on the reorientation of priorities towards other regions, considered to be less fortunate, such as Africa and Asia. Apart from this, projects that fight hunger presenting communicative results in terms of media are gaining more coverage, in detriment of actions that attack the causes of the production and reproduction of poverty. However, there are some exceptions and on this note it is worth mentioning the fact that the ecumenical agencies, in the majority, have not only not pulled out of Brazil and Latin America, but continue to base their agendas on working on the promotion of human rights and the fight against inequality and social injustice. They have also tried to strengthen their work creating new forms of interaction. This is the case, for example, of the Process of Articulation and Dialogue between European Ecumenical Agencies in Brazil47 (PAD). This is a new and innovative initiative that created a network today made up of six European ecumenical agencies (Christian Aid, NCA, EED, HEKS, ICCO, PPM) and over 160 partner groups in Brazil, whose objective is to create a new culture of multilateral dialogue and a space for reflection on the politics of cooperation, with the key themes of institutional sustainability of the organizations and human rights. Created in 1995, the PAD directed its actions towards the search for the promotion of a new culture of multilateral dialogue and towards the construction of a place for a comprehension of the politics of international cooperation. Ecumenism and multilateralism were always motivating values for this articulation. The interaction and the active partnership between agencies of cooperation and Brazilian partners are intrinsic values for the structure of the network, which is based on the search for a new solidarity between the South and the North. c) Alterations in the form of organisation Recently, the nongovernmental agencies have been looking for new ways of working in order to increase their results, to become more effective and to improve fund-raising. In this sense, it is worth mentioning initiatives such as: (i) fusions between agencies, as in the case of the EED with “Bread for the World” (BFW); (ii) the implementation of decentralized models of action, anchored to the creation of offices or regional or national representations, such as, for example, Christian Aid with its offices in Brazil and Bolivia; (iii) nationalization of its organizations, especially in emerging countries, as in the case of Greenpeace, WWF, Action Aid, Save the Children, Amnesty International and Oxfam, among others; (iv) the creation of networks and alliances in order to increase the capacity of international cooperation between agencies with a greater affinity, such as, for example, the ACT Alliance.48 d) Postures of more “interventionist” government supporters Several governments of the Northern countries, that finance most of their NGOs, aim to increase their level of influence on the politics of the nongovernmental agencies, often based on interests linked to external politics or on economic issues and the supposed need to concentrate efforts and resources on a few themes (“alignment and harmonization”) in order to generate more ample effects they call results.
47
For more information, access the site: <http://www.pad.org.br>.
48
The ACT Alliance brings together 125 churches and organisations that work together in areas of cooperation for development, political advocacy and humanitarian support. The ACT Alliance was founded in 2009 and today it is present in 140 countries, mobilizing resources annually of around US$ 1.6 billion. For more information, access the site: <http://www.actalliance.org>.
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e) A movement for the struggle for international cooperation for development understood as a common good. Recently civil society organizations have begun to develop a more pro-active role in the defence of an international system of cooperation for development that is considered as a public or common good, aimed at financing development, concretizing human rights for all people, as well as combating all and any form of exclusion or oppression. In this sense, cooperation is everyone’s responsibility and, therefore, requires the participation of the governments and of the organizations of the civil society. The discussion of the social movements and organizations also includes a reflection on their own work in the international system of cooperation, since almost 6,5% of the ODA is channelled through NGOs (Fernández, 2011a; Tomlinson, 2008). For this reason, social movements and organizations concentrated on initiatives such as: The Reality of Aid Network,49 Better Aid50 and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness.51 Thanks to this activism, today the official mechanisms for international cooperation (that is the CDA of OECD, The High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations Organization) recognise, more than ever, that the CSOs have a role in development which is relevant to (a): the improvement of the effectiveness of development; (b) the increase of the realization of human rights. (c) the optimization of the promotion of gender equality, social justice, decent working conditions, environmental sustainability and peace; and (d) the end of corruption and impunity as a mark of a democratic government. Thanks to this kind of organization and pressure, the global and regional instances that promote international cooperation have begun to involve the civil society organizations more in the decision-making processes, although this involvement still leaves a lot to be desired. 2.2.2 The growing participation of the business sector Another player that has been intensifying its role in international cooperation is the business sector. Its intervention, amply supported by the United Nations Organization and by the OECD, among other multilateral bodies, adopts various formats that can be grouped into Initiatives of Multiple Interested Parties (IMIPs) or Global Social Public-Private Partners (GSPPPs). Examples of IMIPs are certifications or seals (Fair Labour Association – FLA, Forest Stewardship Council – FSC, ISO 26.000 of Social Responsibility, Rugmark Seal) indicators of accountability and of the diffusion of good practice – GRI, Global Compact, of the NU), codes (Clean Cloth Campaign – CCC, Ethical Trading Initiative – ETI) and international agreements between trade unions and transnational companies. The Global Social Public-Private Partners involves transnational companies or their foundations, UN organizations and, sometimes, civil society organizations. This is the case, for example, of the global movement Education for All (EFA), of the Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunisation (GAVI Alliance), the Global Alliance for the Improvement of Nutrition (GAIN),
49
This is a network of nongovernmental organizations, from the South and the North, created in the beginning of the 1990s and based on analysis and on political advocacy and international cooperation practices and their impact on the reduction of poverty. For more information, access the site: <http://www.realityofaid.org>. 50 Better Aid, created in 2007, is an open platform that joins together over 700 organizations of the global civil society to challenge the effectiveness of international aid. Better Aid promotes an ample group of activities, such as the realization of internal consultations, studies and research, the monitoring of aid and accompaniment of meetings of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. For more information, access the site: <http://www.betteraid.org>. 51 The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness is an initiative promoted by various national, regional and global coalitions of civil society organizations and social movements, For more information, see the site: <http://www.csoeffectiveness.org>. In September 2010, in Istanbul, Turkey, the 1st Global Assembly of the Forum for Aid Efficiency of the CSOs was held. During the Assembly, the Principles of Istanbul were approved, according to which the CSOs promise to take proactive measures to improve their practices in favour of development and to account for those practices. For more information, see the webpage: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/-8-istanbul-development,067.html?lang=en. . In June 2011, the 2nd Assembly of the Forum, in Siem Reap, Cambodia, was held where the International Mark for the Effectiveness of the Contribution of CSOs to Development was approved. For more information, see the webpage: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_framework_for_cso_dev_eff_07_2011-3.pdf
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the Global Fund for to Combat Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), and the International Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour, among others.52 If, on the one hand, the arrival of these players on the scene brings advantages (additional resources, new technologies and new solutions for facing social problems, a growth in scale of particular actions, among others), on the other hand it raises a series of risks and concerns, namely: (i) the subordination of public interests to private interests; (ii) the alteration of the global public agenda, concentrating priorities on themes, regions and countries that present more chances of success, so avoiding the confrontation of structural challenges that produce and reproduce absolute poverty; (iii) the increase of political influence of transnational companies, in a sense that they end up gaining commercial advantages, such as the reduction of fees and taxes, fiscal exemptions, a greater acceleration on the register of new products â&#x20AC;&#x201C; especially pharmaceuticals and food; (iv) the presentation of social problems, such as technological problems that only need solutions in the technological field (such as, for example, educational problems solved with the distribution of low cost laptops; malnutrition eradicated by providing multivitamin food supplements that have no relation to the eating habits of the benefiting population; the agricultural problem being solved through transgenic seeds, etc.); and (v) the fragmentation of global governance, in the sense that the tools and actions multiply without any public coordination. 2.3 International cooperation and Brazil. In Brazil the international cooperation received â&#x20AC;&#x201C; both bilateral and multilateral as well as official and nongovernmental â&#x20AC;&#x201C; was never relevant from a quantitative point of view, although, inarguably, it had its rule from a more qualitative perspective (sharing knowledge, techniques, experience, equipments, products and services, among others; strengthening movements and civil society organizations in the democratic field, etc.). Perhaps this is one of the reasons why there are no extensive evaluations on the impacts of this cooperation in the country in the last few decades. In its turn, the official cooperation offered is a very recent phenomenon, about which there is also very little information. So because of this lack of data and more extensive analysis, this short preamble is aimed at explaining that the theme of cooperation will be touched on in this item and in the next few items with more of an idea to discuss the theme and to raise rather than to bring affirmations or defend theses. 2.3.1 Received Official Cooperation For Latin America and the Caribbean, there is evidence that the international cooperation is losing its breath. In fact according to data from Cepal (2010), in the decades of 1990 and 2000, Latin America saw received international cooperation reduced in proportional terms: in 1990, the ODA received corresponded to 0.5% of the GDP of the region. At the end of the decade of 2000, this percentage fell to 0.2%. Of the total ODA, 8% is destined for Latin America and the Caribbean. The region is a victim of its own success. It is the only developing region in which there are still democratic regimes and stable governments; where there are no military conflicts between the countries and where the vast majority of the countries are of medium income. As well as this, the impacts of the economic crisis at end of the decade of 2000 were relatively well absorbed. However, the Latin American countries present important needs that were not covered and a high level of vulnerability. The criterion of medium income adopted by the traditional donors for the distribution of the ODA does not take into account the complexity of the social issues in the region. Also, the countries in the region suffer the consequences of a crisis provoked by developed countries, but are not compensated: the flow of aid for development should, to a certain level, defuse the effects produced by the backwards and forwards flow of private capital and provide a stable source of financing to these countries. Even more so in the post crisis scenario, the flows of ODA should fulfil an important role of compensating the restriction
52 For more details on the participation of private companies in the fight against poverty in a global field, see: Beghin (2009: chapter 2).
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of external resources to Latin America in order to avoid real regression in the social situation of the region. In Brazil, there is no evidence that received cooperation has been reduced, at least not recently. According to the CDA of the OECD,53 the net support from the ODA to Brazil is around US$ 370 million a year, on average. In 2007, the amount was US$ 321 million. In the following year, it went up to US$ 460 and in 2009, it went back down to US$ 338. The amount would have been around US$ 300 million in the beginning of the decade of 2000. The main donors today are, by a long way, Germany and Japan, closely followed by France, Spain, European Union, The United States, GEF/UNDP, Italy, Norway and Special Funds of the IDB. It is clear, however, that the cooperation is small compared with the GDP of the country: it is less than 0.2%. It would be interesting to carry out an evaluation of the evolution of the contents of the agenda for received cooperation, as there is the hypothesis that it has altered over time, changing from a more traditional cooperation (in the areas of poverty, health, sanitation, education and environment, among others) to more strategic themes for the role of the global player that Brazil has occupied in the international scenario: climate change, the Amazon, security, energy, global forums of decision-making (G20, WTO, UN, IFIs, etc.) and triangular cooperation. Also, it is believed that the instruments of cooperation are also going through changes. For example, the European Union (EU) announced that it will end its bilateral cooperation with Brazil.54 However the Brazil/EU relationships have intensified since 2007, when Brazil became a strategic partner to the European Community. Since then, annual summits take place between the partners and three-year Joint Action Plans are written up. The last 2012-2014 Plan was agreed to in Brussels (Belgium), at the end of 2011, and contains proposals for action in areas such as: the promotion of peace and security; economic, social and environmental partnership; cooperation in science, technology and innovation; regional and triangular cooperation; exchanges in the areas of education and culture; and an approximation of the civil societies. Even though Brazil is not part of the group of “traditional donors” listed in the CDA of the OECD, the country has been participating in the High Level Forums of the OECD, but presents criticism of the way it works, as it considers that there is still a predominantly North-driven vision. Brazil believes that the concept of the system of world development is rigid, in which countries can only be classified as “donors” or “receivers”, as there is no understanding that the countries are “partners” and that the principles that should encourage cooperation for development are: equality between all parties, respect for independence, national sovereignty, diversity of culture and identity, the diversity of language and the non interference in domestic issues. Brazil also regrets that the South-South cooperation receives very little attention in the debates and defends a mechanism for a more ample articulation, in the NU (Campos et al., 2011). 2.3.2 Received Solidarity Cooperation In relation to cooperation received from international nongovernmental agencies, there is no consensus between specialists. With the lack of sufficient data, some speculate that the resources are being reduced, while others evaluated that there is no retraction, but an alteration of the contents on the agendas together with exchange factors. In fact, according to some authors,55 the resources of international cooperation for Latin America, including Brazil, are reducing. The explanations for this change of behaviour are diverse, such as, for example: 53
On this subject, consult “Brazil at a Glance”, on the webpage:http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/22/1868114.gif Note that this bilateral cooperation mobilized small scale resources. According to data from the European Union for the period of 2007-2013, the budget expected for bilateral cooperation was around 61 million euros. On this subject see the webpage:http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/eu_brazil/tech_financial_cooperation/bilateral_coop/index_pt.ht m
54
55
On this subject, see Croce (2010), Caccia Bava (2011a and b), Fernández and Balbis (2011), Silva and Vargas
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• The status of Brazil as an emerging country gives a simplistic impression that it is solving its social problems and, therefore, doesn’t need any more support. • The ecumenical organizations, the NGOs and the Brazilian social movements, as well as its networks, are victims of their own success. Their political force and action in the last few decades have contributed to the return of democracy and to the achievement of numerous rights. These elements make the context of international cooperation with Brazil more complex and offer a possibility of several different interpretations, which lead to, in some cases, the termination of historical partnerships. For example, there are increasing questions between some agencies on the pertinence of maintaining support to Brazilian parties, with capacity and abilities that other parties, in poorer countries, don’t yet have. There are also criticisms of the excessive proximity of certain organizations and movements to municipal, state and federal governments, as part of the winning political coalition of the decade of 2000, which means they don’t adopt a critical and autonomous position. There is also the somewhat simplistic questioning of the fact that the national CSOs did not make enough effort to raise funds for the Brazilian society. • The economic crisis that is affecting the developed countries, decreasing the capacity to mobilize public and private resources. • The criteria of sharing resources of the agencies are often centred on the theme of poverty and not on the causes that generate this ill, such as inequality. Also, the growing specialization of some agencies, that begin to concentrate their resources around specific themes, has not contributed to an adequate support of the demands of partner organizations facing the complexities and ambiguities of the present Brazilian context. • The growing competition between the international agencies and national organizations. Many international agencies are nationalizing or are in the process of nationalization (such as: WWF, Greenpeace, Action Aid, Oxfam, Amnesty International, Save the Children) and have begun to dispute resources with national organizations. It is an unequal dispute, since the international agencies have a comparative advantage, as they have financial resources, a label, technology, knowledge etc. However, note that this position is questioned by some specialists. For authors such as Ribeiro (2011), international cooperation in Brazil is not decreasing: what is happening is a change in the focus associated to exchange factors. According to the director of the Brazilian Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (ABONG), the strong valuation of the real, associated with the devaluation of the euro and the dollar, has resulted in an expressive loss of resources for Brazilian NGOs who depend on European and American cooperation for the development of their activities. It is estimated that the loss is of around a third over the last five years. This decrease in resources is not at all influenced by the decisions of the agents of cooperation or the evaluations of the governments in the developed countries with regard to Brazil’s ability to solve its problems alone. As a second factor, specialists mention the tendency towards a concentration of resources: external cooperation maintains a volume of resources that it offers to the country, but reduces the number of projects being supported, in favour of organizations with a greater impact capacity. Finally, new focuses and styles of relationships of the agents of cooperation with their partners correspond to an additional factor (that produces changes) and reconfigures the field. Agencies with which Brazilian organizations and social movements have built relationships of mutual trust and knowledge in the decades of 1970, 1980 and 1990 are changing, recently, for reasons of political issues in their countries of origin. Some European governments are inclined to the right, defending sectors that empathise with progressive agendas of external politics. The effectiveness of civil society organizations in the support for development is (2009), Luz and Wolff (2011) and Vargas and Ferreira (s/d).
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regularly questioned. For this reason, they begin to ask for, more and more, results that are measurable and a focus on the investment in fighting poverty. These demands are transferred to the counterparts in Brazil, which makes it more difficult to maintain strategic partnerships in the long term. Also according to Ribeiro, in this new scenario it is not all adversity. An important group of developed countries continues to identify in Brazil a strategic country, both for economic and for political reasons, and maintain a flow of resources of the ODA. In relation to the civil society, also an important number of agencies of cooperation remain in the country, affirming their political principles and searching for, together with their national counterparts, new strategies to make the achievements more effective and more visible in terms of empowerment of the more vulnerable social sectors and of the identification of alternatives of sustainable development. This is the case of many European ecumenical agencies, that are not reducing their presence in Brazil, nor are they concentrating their resources in larger organizations, but they are still strongly defending an agenda for the defence of human rights and social justice. For this reason, for example, it is a consensus in the ABONG that the alliance that has been built around the PAD is emblematic in this sense. Ribeiro concludes that there are sufficient elements that indicate that what there is today in the area of international cooperation in Brazil is not abandonment, but a dispute over the relevance of civil society organizations as promoters of development and on the principles, methods and objectives of cooperation. A study coordinated by Biekart (2005) for Latin America follows the same line of thought: according to the researcher, the main European agencies of cooperation did not reduce their resources destined for the region between 1990 and 2005: Primero, ha habido una reducción gradual de la asignación relativa de presupuestos a América Latina, especialmente después del año 2000. Pero como los presupuestos de las agencias también han crecido sustancialmente en los últimos años, el volumen de financiación para Latinoamérica en términos absolutos no parece haber decido significativamente. De hecho, se puede detectar más bien un leve incremento en el lapso de 1995 al 2000 (…). La segunda tendencia, muy notable es que la gran mayoría de agencias europeas no ha experimentado recortes en sus presupuestos dedicados a América Latina durante la década pasada (Biekart, 2005: 18).56
Although, in general, the resources have not decreased, changes of focus can be detected, both in the countries attended – for example Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have left the scene replaced by Bolivia, Colombia and Haiti – as well as in the reduction of Latin American partners: La reducción del número de contrapartes es especialmente visible en los 4-5 años pasados, debido a que las cifras estaban aun en aumento a finales de los 90s (...). El sistema (los donantes de los donantes) estimula la tendencia a apoyar programas de gran envergadura incluso con organizaciones más grandes, en tanto que estas minimizan el overhead por cada euro del donante gasto (Biekart, 2005: 21).57
In reference to future action, according to Biekart (2005), the agencies are reducing their support in terms of providing goods and social services and strengthening the area of campaigns to encourage the 56
Translation: First of all, there had been a gradual reduction of the assignment relative to proposals for Latin America, especially after the year 2000. But as the proposals of the agencies have also grown substantially in the last few years, the following of financing for Latin America in absolute terms doesn’t seem to have been significantly reduced. In fact, it is more likely that a slight increase can be seen between 1995 and 2000 (...). The second very clear tendency is that the vast majority of European agencies have not experienced cuts in their proposals dedicated to Latin American in the last decade. (Biekart, 2005: 18). 57 Translation: The reduction in the number of counterparts is particularly visible in the last 4-5 years, because the numbers were still increasing at the end of the 90s (...). The system (the donors of the donors) stimulates the tendency to support wide-ranging programmes with larger organizations, while these organizations minimize their overheads for each Euro donated (Biekart, 2005: 21).
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states of developing countries – at a national, regional and local level – to take on their responsibilities. At the time, in the decade of 2000, it was evaluated that private international cooperation would not decrease drastically, but gradually: “La tendencia es más bien a tener contrarpartes ‘estrategicas’ y a largo plazo, más que a alianzas orientadas a proyectos de corto plazo” (Biekart, 2005: 21).58 However, the crisis that affected the West in 2008, which, as far as we know, will have a much more long-term effect than was originally thought, may threaten the scenario. Note, also, that new positions and new themes of interest of the donating countries may alter the contents of agendas of agencies of private cooperation and the volume of resources offered. This is the case of the pressure that some governments in the North are putting on their NGOs: (i) to look for complementary sources of funds, such as, for example, in the European Union or the business sector (because these sectors have an influence on the future profile of action in solidary cooperation in Brazil); and (ii) to get involved in processes of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation. Also, new themes of geopolitical interest are appearing, such as the theme of public goods and new multilateral mechanisms of power (that is: G20, BRICS, IBAS, BASIC, UNASUL). In these cases, Brazil – as an emerging country - is fundamental for the influence on the global agenda. It seems that the tendency towards nongovernmental international cooperation is not clear with regard to the allocation of resources. However, what is common to all the analyses is the fact that the contents of cooperation are going through radical changes that could endanger established historical partnerships with Brazilian organizations which were crucial in the successes obtained by Brazil in the last 30 years. 2.3.3 Cooperation from businesses From what it seems, cooperation from businesses should grow in the near future, since all the large transnational companies have a headquarters in Brazil and are looking for political and social legitimacy, as well as new markets. Studies59show that the participation of businesses in the social field in a volunteer status is a result of several motivations that are sometimes contradictory: for some, private social investment aims to complement government resources, which today are insufficient to confront Brazil’s social problems. For others, it is a case of a demand of the consumers – from both giving and receiving countries – who are more and more aware, and who pressure businesses into incorporating in their negotiations, new dimensions that involve social and cultural life and the preservation of the environment. There are also those who understand private social investment as a resource for marketing used by the companies to minimize criticisms of the excessive power they have today. Finally, other analysts argue that the participation of businesses in the social field is part of the neo-liberal movement, which aims at breaking down the references to social rights, considered to be a hindrance to the accumulation of capital. Whatever the motivation, what is observed, in general, is that the business sector works in areas – such as welfare, food, health, education and culture, among others – which do not damage their image and which do not question the true causes of poverty, absolute poverty and inequality. Although there are some improvements in the living conditions of thousands of people, because of social investments from businesses, this action has contributed very little to the possibility of the poor becoming the authors of their own destiny.
58
Translation: The tendency is that it is better to have ‘strategic’ and long-term counterparts, than alliances directed at short-term projects.” (Biekart, 2005: 21).
59
On this subject, see Beghin (2005, 2008 and 2009) and Peliano (2006).
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3. Offered international cooperation: the Brazilian partner The Brazilian government has been making important steps in the field of international cooperation with other countries in the South and, especially, with Latin American states.60 With an aim to consolidate its strategy as a global participant, the resources allocated by the Federal Executive for international cooperation61 have grown in recent years. According to a study published by IPEA, in partnership with the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC), linked to the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE),62 Brazilian cooperation for international development was around US$ 1.6 billion for the period between 2005 and 2009. And more: in constant terms, the cooperation grew around 50% in the last five years. 63Yet the magazine ‘The Economist’ presents larger figures, although the methods used cannot be compared: in a report published in July, 2010, the seminary affirms that Brazilian cooperation could reach up to US$ 4 billion a year. Although they are from different amplitudes and origins, these figures allow us to formulate the hypothesis that, today, Brazil offers more resources to international cooperation than it receives. Additional studies need to be carried out in order to validate this hypothesis, or otherwise. In the last 30 years, the consolidation of democracy, the strengthening of organizations and of the social movements, the constitutional reform, the reformulation and consolidation of social policies, the international recognition of these and the greater economic and financial stability guarantee the growing consistence and viability of Brazilian cooperation, which intensified in the decade of 2000. Brazil has been projecting an international presence, in which it combines actions of humanitarian aid, programmes of horizontal cooperation and a military-police presence. This is what was revealed by the IPEA studied carried out in partnership with the ABC (2010), which represents an initial effort in the quantification of Brazil’s participation beyond the frontiers, as well as in the accountability to the society. Note that the data cannot be compared to the definition of the ODA of the OECD, as the IPEA only counted resources allocated to non-refundable aid.64 3.1 General Panorama As mentioned before, the study by the IPEA and the ABC (2010) reveals that the Brazilian cooperation for international development (CID) was about U$ 1.6 billion, according to the amount recorded, for the period of 2005-2009, which is equivalent to an average of U$ 320 million a year (see table 1). Note, however, that three quarters of this sum correspond to the contributions to international organizations and regional banks, with the final quarter going to the other modalities (humanitarian aid, study grants and technical cooperation. It is important to point out that, although the humanitarian aid represents the least amount spent (5% of the total), this item multiplied 58 times in five years, from U$ 750 thousand in 2005 to U$ 44 million 2009. A small increase in technical cooperation was also observed, rising from US$ 18 million in 2005 to U$ 48 million in 2009. These increases are an
60
On this subject see IPEA; ABC (2010); and Balanço de Governo 2003-2010. According to IPEA, there are five different modalities of international cooperation: humanitarian support; study grants for foreigners; technical, scientific and technological cooperation; contributions to international organizations; and peace operations. Nevertheless, other organizations calculate some actions (such as the cancelling of debts of poor countries and of subsidised interest on infrastructural works) as if they were cooperation resources. 62 IPEA; ABC (2010). 63 The Economist (2010). 61
64
According to IPEA; ABC (2010: 17), Brazilian cooperation to development refers to the totality of resources invested by the federal government, totally non-refundable, in other countries, in national organizations of other countries on Brazilian territory or in international organizations, with the purpose of contributing to international development, understood as the strengthening of the ability of international organizations and groups or populations of other countries to improve their socio-economic conditions.
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unmistakable sign of the growing importance that Brazil has been attributing to international cooperation, in a global mark of economic and social development.
Table 1. Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (2005-2009).
Items
Humanitarian aid Study Grants for foreigners Technical Cooperation Contributions to international organizations Total
Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (2005-2009) Total, constant US$ 81,042,825.42 160,093,340.18 136,770,694,52 1,230,488.257.73 1,608,395,117.85
(in constant US$) % in relation to the total
5.04 9.95 8.50 76.50 100.00
Source: IPEA; ABC (2010: 21) With regard to International Humanitarian Aid (IHA), it should be mentioned that its profile has changed drastically over the last few years, in that, today, it appears that countries prefer to offer a more direct aid to territories hit by calamities or by conflict, rather than to helping through international organizations. According to the IPEA and the ABC (2010), in 2009, 97% of the resources of IHA was channelled bilaterally, with no mediation from international organs. This percentage was about 42% in 2005. The geographical distribution of humanitarian aid from Brazil is mainly in countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, who receive 76% of aid sent directly to the benefitting countries, especially Bolivia, Paraguay, Haiti, Cuba, Jamaica, Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua. Asia benefitted from 16% and Africa 8%. The main areas of IHA are food and human rights. In terms of how these resources were used, what can be pointed out are the donations in kind (food and medicines), the distribution of resources to the Brazilian embassies to buy products on the local market, as well as freight costs, transport and accommodation, with the use of materials and equipment, spent with Brazilian technical professionals and with the administrative costs associated to IHA. Note, also, that the strategy for humanitarian aid is defined by an Inter-ministerial Working Group coordinated by the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), which counts on the participation of civil society organizations.65 To sum up, the Brazilian humanitarian aid is different to that carried out by countries in the North because it favours:66 • The buying of local foods, especially those, produced on family farms. • Responding actions that foresee a rapid socio-economic recovery. • The participation of the civil society in construction, execution and social control of projects.
65
This is a the Inter-ministerial Working Group of International Humanitarian Cooperation (IWG-IHC), created in 2006.It unites 15 ministries under the coordination of the General Coordination of Action Against Hunger (known as CGFome), of the MER Representatives of civil society organizations take part in the IWG as observers. 66 On this subject, see: MRE (2011).
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â&#x20AC;˘ The implementation of post emergency actions so that the countries and their people can overcome their vulnerabilities in the long term. It can be seen, then, that Brazil has tried to leave a different mark on emergency aid, which has influenced both governments of partner countries and also the multilateral organs themselves. This is the case, for example, of the World Food Programme (WFP), which moulded the programme Purchase for Progress (P4P), inspired by the Brazilian governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Programme of Food Acquisition (PAA). The PAA buys local products from family farms to donate them, through food parcels, to those on the other end of the scale in a situation of food insecurity (victims of floods or drought, all kinds of homeless, settlers of the agrarian reform, indigenous communities and quilombolas). The PAA also supplies institutional markets, such as schools and hospitals, as well as private markets (fairs and supermarkets). It is a programme that strengthens family farming, fights food insecurity and promotes the consumption of healthier food, as, in general, it uses basic products without chemicals or modified seeds. The concession of grants for foreign students studying in Brazil or abroad is one of the more traditional modalities of cooperation in the country. Compared to the amounts spent on other forms of international cooperation, the volume of resources for grants was constant from 2005-2009. In relation to the area of technical, scientific and technological cooperation, Brazil has considerable reserves of technologies, knowledge, techniques and experiences that can be shared with other partners in the South, which explains the expressive increase of this modality in the analysed period, as shown earlier. The absolute majority of resources (97%) is used in training and capacitating. The associated administrative costs and the activities are implemented bilaterally. The areas of action are diverse, namely: agriculture, health, income transfer, food security, education, information systems, among others. The contributions of the Brazilian government towards international organs and the destination of resources for the integration of the capital of regional banks is, by far, the main form of cooperation. Within the UN, the country takes part in peace operations, especially in Haiti, it welcomes more and more refugees and offers growing contributions to international organs such as: The World Health Organization (WHO), The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), among others. On a regional level, there should be a special mention of the contributions towards the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund (Focem). The Fund is constituted by an annual contribution of US$ 100 million, of which Brazil donates 70%. The other part of the contributions refers to transfers to development banks â&#x20AC;&#x201C; The World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) and the African Development Bank (ADB). These resources represent 37% of the contributions to international organs and 28% of the total Brazilian cooperation to development. . 3.2 Advantages and challenges of Brazilian cooperation for international development 3.2.1 A cooperation marked by solidarity and by the search for sustainability. According to declarations of Brazilian government officials,67 the horizontal technical cooperation (or South-South cooperation) is marked by the concept of the diplomacy of solidarity, in which Brazil offers other developing countries experiences and knowledge of specialised national institutions, with an aim to collaborate with the promotion of the economic, social, cultural and institutional progress of other countries. In promoting bilateral cooperation, Brazil takes particular care to act within the principles of respect of sovereignty and of the non intervention in internal affairs of other nations. 67
On this subject, see also: IPEA; ABC (2010) and MRE (2011).
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Also according to Brazilian authorities, in their relationships with developing countries, the federal government tries to be different through its commitment to create, together with the partner country, initiatives anchored in the effective development of local capacities, an approach that strengthens the practice of appropriation and stimulates the self esteem of the direct benefiters of the programmes, projects and actions. Also, more recently, the government has been aiming at involving social movements and organizations in the different ways of cooperation with the civil society, bringing their experiences of social participation into the debate. As Caccia Bava points out: Não é demais lembrar a importância e a projeção internacional que tem o OP, o Orçamento Participativo, como experiência inovadora de um governo democrático. Ele começou em Porto Alegre cerca de vinte anos atrás, e hoje é adotado por 13.500 municípios distribuídos em todo o planeta (Caccia Bava, 2011b: s/p).68
It is also important to mention the participation of civil society organizations in the Inter-ministerial Working Group of International Humanitarian Cooperation (IWG-IHC), coordinated by the MFR. The Brazilian experience that deserves highlighting is that of the National Council on Food and Nutrition Security (Consea), which was a reference for the reform of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which took place in 2009 and introduced, in an innovative manner, an official mechanism of participation of civil society organizations. 69 Brazilian cooperation presents a series of advantages in the promotion of international development,70 such as, for example, a more adequate response to the demands and needs of its partners. In fact, the proximity of the stage of development and the similarity of the economic and social dynamics facilitate the performance of Brazil in the countries in which it cooperates. Also, Brazil’s history is similar to that of many countries it supports. Therefore, it tends to finance productive sectors and those which promote more structural changes, rather than offering a more assistencialist kind of support, traditionally implemented by wealthy countries. Finally, Brazil is, simultaneously, a beneficiary and a promoter of international cooperation, which puts it in a better position to understand the needs of its partner countries. Another advantage of Brazilian cooperation is with regard to the absence of conditions and rules of “matched aid” (those through which the receiving countries are obliged to buy products and services associated with the support from the donor countries) linked to cooperation. It is about a more horizontal relationship with objectives shared by both parties. It is for all these reasons that the Brazilian South-South cooperation has grown, as well as the triangular cooperation. Brazil has benefitted Latin America,71even though its cooperative actions spread to the African and Asian continents too. Examples of triangular cooperation involving Brazil The Brazilian SSC is increasing its range of partners, involving more and more agencies and programmes from the NU and the cooperation departments of the OECD (such as, for example, JICA, GIZ, AECID and DFID) and of the European Union, which makes Brazil one of the main protagonists in South-South cooperation. Below are a few examples of triangular cooperation involving Brazil.72 68
It is worth remembering the importance and the international projection of the PB, the Participatory Budgeting, as an innovative experience in a democratic government. It began in Porto Alegre and is adopted by 13.500 towns distributed all over the planet (Caccia Bava, 2011b: s/p) 69 On this subject, see the pages of the Consea: <http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea/internacional> and of the Civil Society for the Committee on World Food Security: <http://cso4cfs.org/civil-societymechanism>. 70 On this subject, see: ODI (2010); ABONG (2011). 71 According to data from the SEGIB (2009: 11), the South-South cooperation in Latin America was around US$ 13 million in 2008. Of these 13 million, over 80% were donations from Brazil. 72 On this subject, see: Fordelone (2009).
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• • • • • • • • •
Brazil and France in work in the area of agriculture in Mozambique. Brazil and France in the development of agricultural projects in the Cameroons. Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Spain in the promotion of the construction of allotments in Haiti. Brazil and Spain in reforestation projects in Haiti. Brazil and Canada in immunization projects in Haiti. Brazil and Norway in the institutional strengthening of governments in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Brazil and Spain in sanitation projects in Bolivia. Brazil and Germany on the prevention and struggle against AIDS in Latin American countries. Brazil and Italy in urban mobility projects in Mozambique.
According to information from the Brazilian government73, in 2010, the ABC maintained 19 projects of triangular cooperation in negotiation or execution, with a total budget of US$ 49 million, of which the Brazilian agency financed at least 30%. With Japan, the project that stands out is for agricultural development in the tropical savannah of Mozambique (PROSAVANA), carried out by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), by the National Rural Learning Service (SENAR) and by the Brazilian Institute of Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (EMATER). Also in Mozambique, the project of support for technological innovation is carried out in partnership with The United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In the environmental field, following the bilateral experience with Germany, projects were written up to benefit Peru, for the dissemination of policies for the Amazon. The trilateral projects approved between 2003 and 2010 involve investments of approximately US$ 20 million from the Brazilian side, complemented by resources from the bilateral and multilateral counterparts.
Although timid, the Brazilian cooperation has been, in general, motivated by principles linked to visions of equal relations and social justice, making up an important tool of external politics. In fact, Brazil has accumulated significant results in the implementation of its social policies. At the same pace that these policies increased and consolidated internally, the government received a growing number of invitations to share its experiences and good practices with partner countries. The positive repercussion of these policies, in turn, guaranteed Brazil increased international recognition, consolidated, primarily, throughout the first decade of the 21st Century. Over a hundred Brazilian federal government institutions, among ministries and associated organs, are today directly involved in acts of international cooperation. However, despite the positive characteristics quoted here, Brazilian cooperation towards international development is still full of tensions and contradictions, which – if they are not approached appropriately – could damage its effectiveness in the near future. 3.2.2 The ambivalences and ambiguities of the Brazilian CID (Cooperation for International Development) The success of offered Brazilian cooperation could be risky in the medium and long term if certain challenges already appearing are not confronted satisfactorily. Below is a list of some of these constraints. a) Resources which are not very expressive According to what has been observed above, the funds allocated to cooperation for development are around US$ 320 million a year, corresponding to around 0.02% of the GDP of the country. There is still room for growth as – according to statements of representatives of the government and of international bodies that work in the country – there is still an enormous demand of projects coming from developing countries that are waiting for support from Brazil. Another example may be given of the relatively small support of Brazil to the FOCEM, considering, on the one hand, the financial 73
On this subject, see: :Balanço de Governo 2003-2010, on the webpage: http://www.balancodegoverno.presidencia.gov.br/insercao-no-cenario-mundial-e-soberania/1-politicaexterna/fcooperacao-internacional-seguranca-alimentar-e-assistencia-humanitaria
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position of the Brazilian economy and, on the other, the enormous asymmetries that exist between the members of the Mercosur. b) The transfers to international bodies, especially development banks, are predominant. In addition to the low availability of resources is the fact that bilateral cooperation only absorbs a quarter of the funds allocated to Brazilian CID. The rest, the vast majority, goes to international organizations and, especially to development banks, such as the World Bank, the IDB and the ADB, who, together, appropriate themselves of over one quarter of the resources (28%). The criticisms of the action of these institutions is well known, and they, in general, impose conditions, are not concerned with the real needs of the local communities, are not transparent and do not represent the interests of the countries they should be serving. c) The lack of an appropriate regulatory mark The Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC), of the Ministry of External Relations (MRE), has been trying to professionalise and improve their line of action, but faces difficulties due to the lack of adequate tools and the inexistence of a legal mark enabling the design, coordination and implementation of an effective strategy for Brazilian cooperation for international development. Initial surveys carried out by the government identify dozens of federal institutions that developed acts of cooperation with developing countries, not always in an articulated and integrated manner. As Hirst points out (in press), it can be seen that there is a â&#x20AC;&#x153;regulatory deficitâ&#x20AC;?, which generates as a consequence a situation of judicial insecurity and, often, provokes tardiness or improvised administrative solutions. If Brazil wants to take on an important role in the international scenario, especially aimed at introducing new values and practices in cooperation policies, it should, urgently, create institutionality capable of sustaining this protagonism. The absence of an appropriate regulatory mark adds to the difficulties that Brazil faces for its own strategies for reducing the risks of disasters and for reconstruction due to the increasing climatic catastrophes that hit the country every year. Each year hundreds of people die and thousands are left homeless because of droughts and floods. Although these are foreseeable events, little is done to prevent them such as with social and economic reintegration of the victims. Apart from a weak Civil Defence service, the lack of planning comes with, and exacerbates other errors, both administrative and environmental, not to mention the existence of systematic processes of corruption and the misappropriation of public funds into private ones. This internal picture is quite unnerving for international cooperation, as, if the country does not create specific policies and institutions, safeguards and mechanisms of monitoring of the application of resources, it runs the risk of exporting to other less developed countries models of Reduction Risks and Disasters (RRD) and the reconstruction of reproducers of poverty, absolute poverty and inequality. d) The often thin lines between public interest and commercial and politic interests The link between economic interests and the actions of international cooperation could become a sensitive theme for Brazilian SSC. In most cases, it is the Brazilian embassies in the countries that promote the acts of cooperation and, generally, tend to emphasize commercial interests, especially due to the lack of politics and tools for South-South cooperation. ABONG (2011) warns, the relations between Brazil and the Latin American, African and Asian countries, in recent years, have demonstrated the integration between the politics of cooperation, the intensification of commercial relationships and the investment of Brazilian companies (i.e: Petrobras, Vale, Odebrecht, OAS), especially in areas of mining and infrastructure. In this context, it is understood that it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of the Brazilian CID without assessing the coherence between these fronts: 31
32 Até que ponto as atividades envolvidas no comércio, no investimento empresarial em infraestrutura, a assistência técnica e a ajuda humanitária promovem, de fato e no conjunto, o direito das nações africanas ao desenvolvimento justo e sustentável? O mesmo raciocínio é válido com relação à presença do Brasil na América Latina e na Ásia (ABONG, 2011).74
Another link that could also raise questions is with regard to Brazilian international ambitions, which have achieved a greater visibility since Lula’s government. The country aims to project itself as a player with an influence on the configuration of the South-South agenda, in order to expand and consolidate its participation in regional and global places and processes of negotiation. In this sense, the cooperation offered by Brazil is, sometimes, filled with a sense of being a tool for external politics, making it identifiable as a tool of soft power (Hirst, in print). An example of South-South intervention rooted in ambivalence and ambiguity is the presence of Brazil in Haiti. The growing hostility in relation to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah) and the criticisms of the lack of results of international cooperation in the country seem to prove the exhaustion of this kind of cooperation.75 e) Insufficient accountability Despite the most recent efforts of the IPEA, the ABC and the CGFome, of the MRE, in spreading information on Brazil’s work in the field of international cooperation, the information is still insufficient, especially from a qualitative point of view. Very little is known about the actions that were carried out, which organizations and partner countries are involved, who are the beneficiaries and what are the results and impacts of these partnerships. f) Lack of social participation Although there are some initiatives of involvement of the Brazilian civil society in cooperation activities, especially in the area of humanitarian aid, in general, Brazilian cooperation for international development does not foresee the social participation in the design, implantation, monitoring nor in the evaluation of the actions. So, until now, there is no democratic appropriation of cooperation practices in Brazil for the strengthening of international development. For this reason the Brazilian Network for Peoples’ Integration (REBRIP) has been defending the creation of a National Council for External Politics.76 3.3 The Brazilian nongovernmental cooperation offered Since the end of the last century, the NGOs, ecumenical organizations and Brazilian social movements belonging to the so-called democratic and popular field, began to articulate with organizations and movements from other countries, shaping international networks that operated on the monitoring and questioning of the role of multilateral institutions, as well as in the accompaniment of the cycle of conferences promoted by the UN. In the beginning of this century, it was the World Social Forum (WSF) the most important face of international action of the Brazilian organizations, an event that joins its participants under the theme of “Another world is possible”. Born in Porto Alegre (RS),the 74
To what extent do the activities involved in commerce, in business investment in infrastructure, technical assistance and humanitarian aid promote, realistically and as a group, the right of the African countries to a just and sustainable development? Is the same reasoning valid in relation to the presence of Brazil in Latin America and Asia? (ABONG, 2011). 75 On this subject, see the letter which some winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, hundreds of NGOs, legislators and personalities of over 40 countries took to the General Secretary of the NU, in October 2011, demanding the immediate retreat of international troops from Haiti. For more information, access the webpage: http://www.dominionpaper.ca/weblogs/wadner_pierre/4207 76 For more information on the proposals of the REBRIP, access the webpage: http://www.REBRIP.org.br/_REBRIP/pagina.php?id=2621.
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World Social Forum spread its methodology and indignation throughout the international field, multiplying itself in regional, national, local and thematic forums and demonstrating the strength of the unity of civil society in its diversity of histories, agendas and practices.77 It is important to point out that the effective performance of Brazilian organizations is due to, for the most part, the efforts of solidarity of international agencies, among them the ecumenical ones, especially from Europe. It was the support of these bodies that enabled the construction and consolidation of technologies, practices and forms of intervention that resulted in the dynamism of the Brazilian civil society. This support should remain if the Northern agencies want to influence places of global decision-making. It is also worth mentioning the experiences like the Landless Workers Movement (MST)/Via Campesina, who have been in Haiti since January 2009, through the Dessalines Brigade. The work of the brigade takes place directly with the Haitian peasant movements and is centred on fronts such as: the production of seeds for grain and green vegetables, since the majority of these are imported; the construction of the National Centre for Agro-ecology Training; the reforestation, through the implantation of fruit and firewood trees; the creation of the Technical School of Agro-ecology, aimed at training and capacitating youth at high school level; the installation of cisterns and water tanks, among many other activities of cooperation between the peasant movements of each country. Now, new challenges emerge on the international scenario for the advocacy work of Brazilian NGOs, ecumenical organizations and social movements, such as the monitoring of emerging countries in the global geopolitics, including Brazil, on themes that vary from the model of development to the new format of international cooperation. As well as this, Brazilian organizations are being asked, more and more, by their cogenerates in the South, to share their experiences in the area of social participation, food and nutrition security, agro-ecology, solidarity and popular economy, public budgets, a reduction in the risks of disasters, political training for the leaders of social movements and trade unions, among others. As well as the themes, technologies and knowledge, the work together with Brazilian organizations is valued for the same reasons as the CID: cultural similarities, respect for the real needs of the partner, ability to adapt to adverse situations, understanding of the political dimension of local problems, etc. These demands are the start of a new phase in the operation of Brazilian organizations, which – more than just advocacy – should, from now on, promote efforts of solidarity with its less developed partners. Here, also, the continuing support of Northern agencies is essential, not only because the present Brazilian legislation does not allow national nongovernmental organizations to transfer resources to other countries, but also because the Brazilian organizations don’t yet have enough knowledge and expertise to operate outside the country. Note that there should also be an increase in Brazilian transnational social operations in countries in the South, because of the expansion of business of these companies. So it is urgent to develop and implement monitoring mechanisms of these operations. The support of international nongovernmental agencies in this field is equally crucial, because of their presence in several of these countries, which enables them to establish – in partnership with the Brazilian organizations, ecumenical bodies and movements and their networks – connections between local, national, regional and international fields.
77
On this subject, see the ABONG opinion article, by Sérgio Haddad, entitled “A importância da incidência política internacional de ONGs brasileiras”. (The importance of international political advocacy in Brazilian NGOs) available on the webpage: http://www.ABONG.org.br/informes.php?id=4708
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4. The impacts of an emerging Brazil on South America As was seen in chapter 1 of this document, Brazil is a strategic country in the international scenario from a geographical, political, economic and social point of view. These characteristics of an emerging country have contributed to the reorganization of global geopolitics, giving an effectively stronger voice to the countries in the South.78 The Brazilian government has given priority to South America, in an attempt to stop the international liberalizing forces – as was the case when it supported the creation of the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) in 2005 – significantly increasing its investments in the region and intensifying South-South cooperation. For this the country has been strengthening places of regional integration, such as the Mercosul and the UNASUL; offering enormous subsidies to large Brazilian companies that operate in South America through the BNDES bank; and promoting programmes of bilateral cooperation, especially in the areas of social work, family agriculture and security. The ever-enlarging role that Brazil has in the region is due, in part, to its growing economic power and, in part, to the relative decrease in power of the United States in the continent. According to Sorj and Fausto (2011), the factors that influence the vote for Brazil for South American integration are the following: a) The evaluation that regional integration is good for the primordial objective of obtaining more power and autonomy for Brazil in its ample strategy of insertion in the global economy and projection in the international system. b) The economic importance of the region for the country: South America absorbs around 20% of Brazil’s exports and is an important destination for its manufacturing. Also, there is an important potential for integration on themes such as energy, infrastructure and natural resources, as well as the Amazon. c) The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) and the failure of the FTAA consolidate the idea of “South America”, substituting that of “Latin America”. d) The increasing importance of the flows of trade and investment with China, today Brazil’s main trade partner – which reinforces its profile as exporter of prime materials and importer of manufactured materials as well as the fact that the great Chinese capacity in trade “steals from” the regional market in detriment of Brazilian products. e) The need for a greater control on the borders due to the development of criminal networks trafficking drugs, guns and people. Another factor can be added: the increase of immigration. The crisis in the Northern countries, associated with an image of a “powerful Brazil”, has pushed several immigrants towards Brazil. Research of the Justice Department shows that, around 2011, the number of foreigners living in Brazil was larger, for the first time in 20 years, than the number of Brazilians who left the country to live abroad for the same motives. According to the Justice Department, the number of legal foreigners in Brazil increased by 52.4% in the first semester of 2011, reaching around 1.5 million.79 There are no official statistics on the number of illegal immigrants in the country, but the main institutions and NGOs that operate in this area in Brazil calculate a number around 600 thousand, which would make 78
On this subject, see the leadership of Brazil in groups of countries such as the G20 WTO, the G20 Finance, the IBSA, the BSAIC, as well as its participation in global events, such as the Summits on Climate and Sustainable Development, among others. 79 On this subject, see the article in the newspaper “O Globo”, which can be accessed on the webpage: <http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/crise-global-crescimento-do-brasil-fazem-numero-de-imibenefitescrescer-52-no-anosuperando-2-milhoes-3079211>.
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the total number of foreigners living in Brazil today over two million, an amount that represents a little more than 1% of the Brazilian population.. One of the main tools of the Brazilian government to win power and influence in the world and in South America, in particular, is the BNDES. And more: this bank has been gaining territory in the international scenario. Recently, in September 2011, the bank took part in the creation of the International Development Finance Club80 created to coordinate the operation of development banks all over the world. The focus of the club is to promote a sustainable social and environmental development, innovation and investment in infrastructure. Apart from the BNDES, another 19 institutions are part of the club. The president of the BNDES is one of its four vice-presidents. The participation of the bank, through subsidised loans, aims to promote exports of Brazilian goods and services; stimulate the globalization of national companies; and to fill the gaps of credit in some countries. “A estratégia é que com os investimentos são criados fluxos de comércio com os países da região. É algo que os governos locais querem, porque gera emprego”, 81explains Luciene Machado, superintendent of External Trade of the BNDES. The financial institution has been increasing its credit to national businesses, allowing for an expansion never seen before in the Brazilian multinational companies in Latina America and the Caribbean. According to figures from the bank itself, its lending to finance operations of Brazilian businesses in the region grew over 1000% (a thousand per cent) between 2001 and 2010,82 the largest portion in South American The bank estimates that in 2011 its investments in the region will reach values around US$ 1 billion. The support of the BNDES for Brazilian companies represents a comparative advantage among the other Latin American countries that don’t have similar tools. It is mainly the companies from the building sector that receive support from the bank: Andrade Gutierrez, OAS, Queiroz Galvão and Odebrecht. The resources are destined, mainly, for the construction of hydro-electric plants, gas pipelines, roads and urban transport. The main countries that receive the investment of the bank are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. The power of the BNDES is so strong that the loans represent a practically risk free financing. So, for example, the line of credit for exporting for Latin America has a risk that is less than the bank’s average, because the contracts are guaranteed by the Reciprocal Credit Convention (CCR), a system of compensation between central banks. If, on the one hand, the BNDES has contributed to strengthen the leadership of Brazil in the region and implement projects of infrastructure that enable a greater economic integration of the South American countries, on the other hand, this process has left traces of violation of human rights and environmental degradation, showing the less noble face of Brazilian external politics. According to Rede Brasil, the strategy of internationalization of Brazilian companies, especially in South America, aims to monopolise Latin American markets and access the natural resources of these countries. Recently, in November 2011, a group of Brazilian organizations83sent a letter to the UN Human 80
For more information, access the site: <http://www.idfc.org/>. .Translation: “The strategy is that with the investments trade flows are created with countries in the region. It is what the local governments want, because it generates employment”. Declaration given on the “Terra” website on 9th September 2011:http://noticias.terra.com.br/interna/0,,OI5338969EI8177,00Desembolsos+do+BNDES+a+America+Latina+crescem+vezes+em+anos.html 82 Article of the newspaper “O Estado de São Paulo” of 9th November 2011. Access the webpage: <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/internacional,bndes-impulsiona-maior-presenca-brasileira-naamericalatina,796686,0.htm>. 83 Ágere, Conectas, Instituto Mais Democracia, Justiça Global, Plataforma BNDES, Rede Brasil and Repórter Brasil. For more information, access the site of the BNDES platform at: 81
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Rights Council with recommendations that the Brazilian government fulfils its international obligations and stops being emissive in the face of the violations of human rights, in national or foreign territory, committed by businesses, especially by those financed by the BNDES. “The Brazilian state is not fulfilling its obligation to ‘protect’, i.e., to prevent third parties (in this case the businesses) from violating human rights, and that includes its obligation to investigate and punish human rights violations, no matter who commits them”, affirms the text. The document discusses three main issues: barriers to the access of justice, especially in relation to damages caused by the extractive industry; the lack of control over the double standard of operation of the Brazilian businesses abroad; and, finally, the lack of transparency of the BNDES, made worse by a deficient evaluation of the socio-environmental impacts caused by the financed projects. Among the recommendations directly related to the bank is the need for the financial institute to inform which projects it finances abroad, with details of each item such as the list of beneficiaries, the objectives, the amount of financing, the financial conditions, the limit for repayment, the social and environmental impacts expected, among other information. Tipnis: chronicals of a forthtold tragedy The recent episodes that occurred in the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Tipnis), in Bolivia, are emblematic of the behaviour of the BNDES in the promotion of the so-called regional development. The Bank financed – at the request of the Bolivian government and through the Brazilian construction company OAS and the Bolivian Highways Agency – the construction of a road in Bolivia, part of which would go through the Tipnes, a reserve of a little over one million hectares, where around 10 thousand indigenous people live from the moxeño, yurakaré and chimane communities. After weeks of unfruitful debates with the Bolivian government, in August 2011, the leaders of Tipnis decided to obstruct the construction of the road. They came up with several arguments, pointing out here: the environmental impact from the arrival of colonials, coke planters, timber and hydrocarbon merchants, in the reserve, through the road; the non involvement of legitimate inhabitants of the reserve in the discussion of the project; and the denouncing of the over-invoicing of the operation. The Bolivian government’s response was brutal: it led to confrontations with peaceful manifestations, especially with women and children, as well as leading to the resignation of the country’s defence minister at the time, infuriated with the position of the government. With this, the president Evo Morales suspended the project. Organizations from Bolivia, Brazil and other countries, who met at the Platform of the BNDES,84 have been questioned on their co responsibility in the conflicts that took place in Bolivia. This disastrous incident reveals the other face of regional integration, which does not belong to the people, but to economic interests. In this case, Brazil and its institutions – the public development bank, the Ministry of External Relations and the private company OAS – did not contribute to the promotion of international solidarity and the respect for the rights of the indigenous people. It is true that the Brazilian government should respect the sovereignty of the Bolivian government, largely responsible for the construction of the road, but it is also true that it could have avoided the imposition of an agenda that resulted in the profound violations of human and environmental rights, reinforcing the “imperialist” image of Brazil, rather than the “partner” image, motivator of a new form of development.
Also, studies85 show that, to stimulate Brazilian exports and the external insertion of national companies, the BNDES, conditions the companies to the contracting of Brazilian services and products. The repatriation of the interest gained abroad is another important criterion; however there is http://www.plataformabndes.org.br/site/index.php/noticias/31-destaque/227-onu-recebe-recomendacoesda-sociedade-civilsobre-bndes 84
On this subject, access the webpage: <http://www.plataformabndes.org.br/site/index.php/noticias/104-cartaem-defesados-indigenas-na-bolivia>. 85 On this subject, see, for example, the Rosa Luxemburgo Institute (2009).
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no clear information on how this interest is reinvested in Brazil. The lack of transparency and public access in relation to what happens to the loans is a point of concern and complaint of Brazilian and South American social organizations.86 South America is the place for the legitimization of a new Brazilian international activism, as well as an amplified area of capital accumulation. This means that regional integration, as a privileged place for Brazilian external politics, that enables the formation of a political platform for the global pretensions of the country, is also a place for the spread of national businesses over the borders. More than the apparent results in the commercial field, the economic relationship between countries in South America has become more intense with the expansion of Brazilian investment in the region. 87 The ambivalences and ambiguities of Brazilian operation in the region are due to the fact that Brazil is still an emerging country on the international scenario: it knows it has responsibilities with others, but doesn’t know yet how to carry them out. However, the relationship between Brazil and the other countries in the region has been reproducing the same pattern of international division, which characterizes the classic situation of dependence, with Brazil increasing the exportation of manufactured goods to other countries in South America, who, in turn, have been increasing their supplying of prime materials to Brazil. In Brazil, according to Cepal (apud Porto-Gonçalves: 2011), there has been a reduction in the participation of primary products on the agenda of exports: the country is the only one in the South American region to reduce its imports from other countries in the region in relation to the inter-regional increase in its exports, above all with its industrialized products. According to Fiori (2010), Brazil’s differential in relation to the rest of the continent is growing and should grow even more after the economic crisis in 2008. In 2001, the Brazilian GDP was less than the sum of the GNP of the other South American countries. Eight years later, the relationship changed radically: the Brazilian GDP has grown and has reached a sum that represents double the sum of the GDP of all the other countries in the region. In the same period, the Brazilian economy gained substantial and increasing commercial surpluses with all the countries in the region – except Bolivia – parallel to the increase in Brazilian private investments in South America, that have been progressing constantly in almost all the region. According to Porto-Gonçalves (2011), the large infrastructure projects expected in the region, such as those that are linked to the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (Iirsa), are not intended for the physical integration of the capitals of South American states: their purpose is to link ports. The regional integration should fulfil the role of competitively articulating the region with world markets. In this sense, ignoring the land and the people that live on it and privileging the flows around specific areas, means reconfiguring, disabling and configuring blocks of power that are articulated around the nation-states. Also, when a regional integration is privileged from the perspective of opportunities that open up in world markets, it does not come from the local realities that should be considered. In this sense, the social groups that are formed on these scales are ignored, as they tend to be considered as obstacles to the project. The initiatives of regional integration in course remain in silence in relation to the biological diversity of areas such as ChacoPantanal, the Brazilian cerrado, the Venezuelan plains, the Amazon rainforest, the Andin-Amazonian foothills and the Darién, which are the areas described as having a very high biological diversity and supply of water, among which are the Guarani Aquifer, one of the largest in the world. They also remain silent about who occupies those areas. In this sense, while the direct Brazilian investments increase in the region, the risk of political tensions also tends to increase rather than decrease. Brazil is now seen by its neighbours as a “necessary” country. According to Sorj and Fausto (2011:18), there is, in the South American countries, both a fear and a resistance to the “Brazilian sub-imperialism” 86 87
On this subject, see the website of the BNDES Platform On this subject, see: Calixtre and Barros (2011).
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and to the excessive economic dependence in relation to Brazil. Note that in the Thematic Social Forum, which took place in Porto Alegre (RS), in the last week of January 2012, international orators – such as the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Souza Santos, the Venezuelan sociologist Edgardo Lander and the Uruguayan feminist Lilian Celiberti denounced a “hint” of neocolonialism in external Brazilian politics.88 The liberal style regional integration, based on the reforms of the market, in its integration of countries with unequal economies, tends to amply reproduce the social, racial, ethnical and regional inequalities that already exist. The market is not a place for the social redistribution of income and wealth. In order to revert this tendency, it is fundamental to have a clear definition of the political project that will command the integration, because even a liberal perspective, with “market reforms”, implies a strong support from public institutions. This can be seen in the work of the BNDES in the strengthening of large corporations with headquarters in Brazil. The vivid tension between the BNDES and the Banco do Sul is emblematic of the contradictory character of the regional integration in course Since the decade of 2000, there has been a political inflection in the region. Apart from the progressive strengthening of the representative democracy in the countries, there has also been an ascension of left-wing political formation in the absolute majority of the countries, with the exception, today, of Chile and Colombia. Along the same lines, the civil society movements and organizations are growing stronger, and are now defending political, economic, social and environmental agendas. They are movements and organizations that are gaining relevance beyond the national dimension, fulfilling their role in making clear how the relations on local, national, regional and global scales have become deeper and more complex. In this context, the territory and its occupation are a theoretical-political issue that cannot be ignored. The deepening of the processes of globalization and South American regional integration in the last few decades has complicated the world’s geopolitical game, not only because it has realigned the correlation of forces between the States, but also because it involves other protagonists. The demand for prime-materials, the technological revolution and the environmental and climatic debates encourage the emergence of social groups that until now were kept at the margins of political relations. And it is these groups that need to be strengthened to fight for an international cooperation for development that is effectively fair and solidary. 5. Final comments: elements to justify the continuation of ecumenical cooperation in Brazil and the South American Field. 5.1 Four arguments for continued cooperation in Brazil In the face of the discussion that preceded this last chapter, it is understood that there are four main sets of arguments that justify the continuation of nongovernmental cooperation in Brazil and, especially, ecumenical cooperation. 5.1.1 Combating the relations of power that perpetuate inequality and absolute poverty The first argument relates to the need to combat the present societal arrangements in Brazil, which, on the one hand, contribute to a superficial improvement of the living conditions of some segments of the Brazilian population and, on the other hand, maintain the perverse power relations that, until now, have produced and reproduced inequalities and systematically violated human rights. This is why, although it is the sixth economy in the world, Brazil presents social indicators that are barely compatible with its economic power and is home to marginalized populations the size of the entire 88
On this subject, see the article in Repórter Brasil on the webpage: http://www.reporterbrasil.com.br/exibe.php?id=1995
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population of several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the environmental and climatic issues tend to get worse with the economic growth, since the country has no strategic project of sustainable development and has its economy based on activities of low technology and high consumption of natural resources. In other words, what the Brazilian experience reveals is that the wealth of a country measured only by its income is a dreadful indicator for evaluating issues such as solidarity, justice and equality. On the contrary – it enables the covering up of perverse processes of subordinate relations, which – in the medium and long term – are unsustainable from an economic, cultural, social, environmental and climatic point of view. This scenario is frightening for a large part of the Brazilian population who are unable to make the most of the results of the economic growth. In other words, now more than ever, in order to undo once and for all the myth that wealth is synonymous to the universalization of well-being, it is necessary to support the voices of resistance within the country. This is because it is these voices that denounce the institutional arrangements responsible for the production and reproduction of inequalities, which, in turn, result in poverty and absolute poverty and prevent millions of people from being the authors of their own destiny and, so, from having access to full citizenship. That is why international cooperation, especially ecumenical cooperation, needs to help in the promotion of political articulation of social forces, in the production of knowledge, in the collaboration in training processes, in the support for an ecumenical field of churches and religions engaged in the struggle for rights and in the designing of alternatives forms of development. This support is all the more urgent because of the growing weakening of Brazilian organizations, whose existence is threatened due to the hegemonic power relations, that operate to maintain the status quo, to modernise the country in an exclusive manner. 5.1.2 Strengthening social movements and organizations that defend rights threatened by hegemonic power relations So this is the second argument, which is also related to the contradictions inherent in the apparent success of the Brazilian model of development, i.e., with the present weakening of the forces that once conquered democracy and the strengthening of the role of the State in driving the economy. Today the nongovernmental organizations are criminalized and marginalized, the ecumenical bodies and social movements that were central players in the process of re-democratization of the country (since the 1970s), in the struggle against the liberalizing agenda (which predominated the 1980s and 1990s) and in the defence of the installation in power of a political coalition in favour of more justice and equality. These processes of exclusion took place amidst physical persecutions (including murder, propagated by the threatened elite) moral persecution (with media campaigns of defamation) and financial crippling (when the government refuses to implement a legal framework that stimulates the participation of organizations – public, private and individual – in the strengthening of nongovernmental organizations that operate in the defence of human rights, of universal citizenship, of justice and of equality). On the other hand, the business sector, which is gaining more and more strength in the social field, is not prepared to support movements that question the violation of rights, which, in general, are their responsibility. Its actions tend to be limited to offering services in areas that don’t threaten their existence (welfare, health, education, sport and culture). In Brazil, the culture of donation and mutual help is widely advertised, but is limited to certain religious fields and to family and neighbourhood relations. In addition to this is the growing ill feeling due to the visibility of acts of corruption which spread through the three powers of the State – Executive, Juridical and Legislative – and in the three levels of government – (federal, state and municipal), so undermining the credibility of these institutions. And more: the political parties have not been capable of mediating the demands and needs of the population, discrediting the National Congress and its state and municipal counterparts as central pillars of a democracy. Therefore, in order to avoid the collapse of the Brazilian democracy (so bravely fought for), the solidarity of the international nongovernmental organizations is essential even for historical coherence, since they were the ones who contributed to Brazil’s release from the yoke of the military dictatorship. In this sense, the support of international 39
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cooperation is crucial: beyond the support of resources that strengthen the political role of national organizations, there needs to be transference of technology and know-how for the development of a national culture of recognition and valuing of the actions in defence of human rights and of growth with social and environmental justice.
5.1.3 Influencing the global decision-making agenda The third argument is directly related to the growing power of Brazil in the international scenario and to its capacity to promote changes which, as has been pointed out throughout this document, either increase human rights or, on the contrary, restrict them, spreading to other places, especially less developed countries, societal arrangements that produce and reproduce inequalities and, therefore, poverty and absolute poverty. It will be more and more difficult to influence the global decisionmaking bodies – the NU, multilateral financial institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO), G20, etc – without including Brazil. For this reason it is important to continue with the international ecumenical cooperation and to consolidate strong and long-lasting ties of partnership with Brazilian organizations and movements, so as to fight, together, for fairer global rules, that promote international equality and solidarity. And more: international nongovernmental cooperation has the comparative advantage of establishing bridges between the local, national, regional and global groups. The distancing of Brazil, as many talk about, could result to the progressive loss of power and of influence in the international NGOs in the global scenario, which would lead to its gradual delegitimization in their countries of origin. 5.1.4 Replicating in other countries the successful experiences of cooperation in Brazil Finally, the fourth argument is with regard to the enormous collaboration that ecumenical organizations can offer in the identification of successful experiences (resulting from cooperation received in Brazil) that have the potential for being replicated. These initiatives can be taken and adapted in other countries in the South (in the areas of innovation, social technologies, good governance, among others) and even in the North, as is the case of the “Budget and Rights” methodology, developed by INESC, which is on its way to being applied in Holland. It is understood that the presence of international ecumenical cooperation in Brazil and in South America over the next few years is a strategic issue for its own survival in the medium and long term. Only a short-sighted and “short-term” vision would defend removing cooperation from the country based on simplistic criteria of income. South America (and within that, Brazil) is a central region for the future of humanity, because of its water reserves, forests, and agricultural land, apart from holding vast renewable and non renewable energy sources. The region also offers ancestral knowledge, as well as a culture of close relations and respect of nature, especially among indigenous peoples and traditional communities, which are crucial when we think that “Another World is Possible”. In this sense, the articulations such as PAD, Anglican Alliance and the ACT Alliance, among others, as they allow for the increase of the impact and effectiveness of national and international organizations. 5.2 Proposal for a plan of action Considering the four groups of arguments, there is space for the international ecumenical cooperation to act in the strengthening of Brazilian organizations with an aim to promote changes both internally and in the rest of the world, such as those presented below: 5.2.1 Influencing the Brazilian agenda • It is necessary to maintain an agenda of development programmes, especially to support the development and expansion of social technologies which could be replicated and adapted both in Brazil and elsewhere, such as, for example: the methodology of obtaining drinking water for personal consumption and for production in the semi-arid regions of Brazil, adopted by the 40
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ASA; the methodology of “Budget and Rights”, written by INESC; the methodology of literacy of the Brazil Basic Education Movement (MEB); practices of solidarity economy and agro-ecology; activities of strengthening trade unions; and participative budget initiatives. The support for local projects is fundamental for taking successful experiences to other countries, so as not to lose contact with reality and, therefore, to contribute effectively, influencing the design, implementation and monitoring of public policies that ensure human rights. Moreover, the projects enable the participants to gain confidence in their own strength, to find solutions that can improve their living conditions and to strengthen their social, political and cultural identity. With the help of the projects, the social and ethnic groups are included in the society as autonomous subjects with rights. From the projects new experiences and focuses begin, which become references for the national and international public policies. • It is indispensable to support Brazilian organizations, ecumenical bodies and social movements so that they may operate in a way that contributes to the warnings on the power relations that generate inequality, poverty and absolute poverty (such as, for example, the political and tax reforms, affirmative action, alternative models of production and consumption). For this it is necessary to strengthen the communities that are affected by the impact of the large operations: the indigenous peoples; the traditional communities; the women’s movement, the black movement; the peasant movements; the populations that live on the streets; the urban movements; the workers’ movements; and the platforms that defend structural reforms, such as the political and tax reforms. It is also important to produce information in the perspective of universalization of human rights, popular education, social and ethical transformations. • It is fundamental to contribute to the increase in economic and political sustainability of the Brazilian ecumenical organizations, NGOs and social movements, as well as their networks, through the consolidation of an institutionality that is a structural part of Brazilian democracy. This means: Improving the capacity of relating to a wider public and developing new and creative forms and contents of communication that show, in a transparent, intelligible and clear way, the importance of their work. It is about creating conditions of legitimacy and credibility that consolidate public support for their actions and makes possible new ways of raising funds together with the Brazilian society. Supporting the elaboration and implementation of the legal framework that regulates the relation between the State and the civil society organizations, following Weber’s principles of state bureaucracy (legality, impersonality, morality and publicity) and guaranteeing judicial security for those involved in partnerships. Searching for a relationship with government bodies and authorities at local, state and federal levels, in order to make possible sustainable forms of cooperation, with the preservation of institutional autonomy. Obtaining a balanced relation with the more enlightened emerging participants from the Brazilian private business sector, without damaging the terms of its institutional mission. • It is extremely important to contribute to the production of information and training processes of Brazilian ecumenical organizations, NGOs and social movements, so that they can monitor the Brazilian cooperation and the investments financed by Brazil directly (through state bodies) and indirectly (through the BNDES). For the civil society of our country, its participation is fundamental in the construction of a Brazilian External Police, including a Brazilian Policy of International Cooperation that is fairer, more inclusive and participative. In this case, the international ecumenical cooperation has a lot to contribute, helping to elaborate or design a new South-South cooperation different to the North-South model adopted until now. There also needs to be a differentiated humanitarian aid.
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• It is essential to support the capacitating of Brazilian organizations to carry out cooperation in other countries in the South. The ecumenical agencies have accumulated a vast experience in this field. • It is necessary to support Brazilian organizations so that they can face, in a qualified way, the consequences of Brazil’s position in the region in areas such as human mobility and migration. 5.2.2 Influencing the global agenda through Brazil As far as the external agenda is concerned, the new “Powerful Brazil” is a relevant participator in international cooperation. The Brazilian civil society, supported by international agencies, has also globalized, expanding its activism on a planetary scale. This movement needs to be consolidated not only to avoid a more “imperialist” action from the Brazilian government in other developing countries, but also to strengthen civil society organizations in other countries in the South and move forward in the constitution of a global movement that contributes to the elimination of injustices and environmental and climatic threats that affect our planet. This means: • Supporting Brazilian civil society organizations so that they share their initiatives and projects with other countries, through mechanisms of triangular nongovernmental cooperation. From the experience acquired over years of work in the international field, not only influencing national public policies, but also policies of cooperation and of humanitarian aid, the international agencies of cooperation can now pass on this know-how to Brazil. • Supporting ecumenical organizations, social movements and NGOs, as well as their networks to: Guarantee that Brazil maintains its position of proactive leadership in the field of international cooperation, in order to share and reproduce successful experiences and absorb good practices and support from the ODA, within the perspective that international cooperation for development is a common good. In this sense, all countries should cooperate with each other and should do so to combat: the causes of absolute poverty, of poverty and inequality; the violation of human rights; and the destruction of the environment, wherever these phenomena may occur. This is why it is important to horizontalize practices of cooperation between countries. It is necessary to pull out of a system articulated around the donor-receiver relationship in favour of an international system of co-operators. Monitor the flows of cooperation and their contents, both in the countries of the OECD as well as in emerging nations, in order to construct a new, more transparent, efficient and participative architecture, for development. Pressure the Northern countries into complying to the goals agreed to in the field of international cooperation (among them, the goal of allocating 0.7% of its GDP to the ODA) so that they identify and implement innovative mechanisms of financing in international cooperation, such as, for example: the taxation of financial operations between countries; the end of tax havens; or even the prohibition of mechanisms of tax evasion used by transnational companies with headquarters in poor countries. Challenge the performance of the multilateral financial institutions and the role of the new donors in these organizations, as in the case of the Brazilian government, so that they don’t reproduce the schemes of social exclusion implemented in the last sixty years. Produce information in order to question the action of transnational companies and the BNDES in South America and to propose mechanisms together with global regulation in the economic, social and environmental fields. Produce information and training processes on the South-South cooperation in South America and on the present stage of institutionality. Influence the global decision-making spaces, in order to universalize human rights, reach a greater equality in relation to global common goods and regulate economic and financial globalization. The creation of artificial articulations of the countries, like, for 42
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example, the BRICS, in detriment of the coalitions that have a concrete agenda of cooperation, as in the case of IBAS. List of acronyms and abbreviations ABC – The Brazilian Agency of Cooperation ABONG – Brazilian Association of NGOs AECID – Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation ALCA – Free Trade Area for the Americas ALOP – Latin American Association of Development Promotion Organizations ASA – Articulation of the Brazilian Semi-Arid. ADB – African Development Bank BIC – Brazil, India and China BNDES – National Bank of Social and Economic Development BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa BASIC – Brazil, South Africa, India and China CEPAL – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean CFS– UN Commission on World Food Security CIVETS – Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa CONSEA – National Council on Food and Nutrition Security CSO – Civil Society Organization DAC-OECD – Development Assistance Committee of the OECD DFID – Department for International Development/UK DRU – Disconnection of Union Income EAGLES – Emerging and Growth Leading Economies EED – Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Service) EMBRAPA – Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation EU – European Union FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization FDI – Foreign Direct Investment FOCEM – Fund for the Structural Convergence of the Mercosul GDP – Gross Domestic Product GIFE – Group of Institutes, Foundations and Enterprises GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit IBSA –India, Brazil and South Africa ICD – International Cooperation for Development ICCO – Inter Church Organisation for Development Cooperation IDB – Inter-American Development Bank IFIs – International Financial Institutions IHA – International Humanitarian Aid IMF – International Monetary Fund IMPI – Initiatives of Multiple Interested Parts INESC – Institute of Socio-economic Studies INGO – International Nongovernmental Organization IPEA – Institute for Applied Economic Research IIRSA – Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America ISDR – International Strategy For Disaster Reduction JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency MERCOSUL – Southern Common Market MINUSTAH – United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MIST – Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey MRE – Ministry of External Relations 43
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NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement NCA – Norwegian Church Aid NGO – Nongovernmental organization ODA – Official Development Assistance OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development FAP – Food Acquisition Programme PAD – Process of Articulation and Dialogue between European Ecumenical Agencies and their Brazilian Partners UNDP – United Nations Development Programme BFDW – Bröt Für Die Weld (Bread for the World) GPPPs – Global Public Private Partnerships REBRIP – Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples SEGIB – Ibero-American Secretariat SENAR – National Rural Training Service SEPPIR – Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality SPM – Secretariat for Women’s Policies SSC – South-South Cooperation TIPNIS – Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory UNASUL – Union of South American Nations UNESCO – United Nations Organization fot Education, Science and Culture UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNITAS – Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social/Bolívia (National Union of Institutes for Social Action/Bolivia) UNO – United Nations Organization USAID – United States Agency for International Development WFP – World Food Programme WHO – World Health Organization WSF – World Social Forum WTO – World Trade Organization
Bibliographical References and consulted websites ABONG. Nota pública: Por uma política de cooperação internacional brasileira efetiva e participativa. Published on the 29th September 2011 on the site: http://www.abong.org.br/lutas_e_acoes.php?id=412&it=4357 ALOP; The Reality of Aid. Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa. América Latina al 2009: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. Editores: Rubén Fernández Andrade y Jorge Balbis, ALOP: México: September 2009. ALOP; The Reality of Aid. Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa. América Latina al 2010: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. Editor: Rubén Fernández Andrade. ALOP: México: August 2011. ARMANI, Domingos. Breve mapa do contexto das ONGs brasileiras. Mimeo, s/d. Can be found at: http://www.pad.org.br/content/breve-mapa-docontexto-das-ongs-brasileiras APRODEV. Desenvolvimento alicerçado em direitos: uma perspectiva fundamentada na fé. Posicionamento conjunto do Grupo Desenvolvimento e Direitos – Pão para o Mundo, ACI-ICCO, Fundação Luterana Mundial, Ajuda da Igreja Norueguesa). Aprovado pela Assembleia Geral da APRODEV, junho de 2008. AYLLÓN, Bruno. Cambian los tiempos, cambian las voluntades: Motivos para celebrar la cooperación Sur-Sur. Fundación Carolina, dez. 2011. Available on the website: http://www.fundacioncarolina.es/esES/nombrespropios/Documents/NPAyllon1112.pdf BALBIS, Jorge; FERNÁNDEZ, Rubén. Por que manter a cooperação com a América Latina? In “Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional”. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, Encarte Especial, Ano 5, Número 49, agosto 2011.
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45 BALLÓN, Eduardo. La crisis endémica de la cooperación y la urgencia de responder desde el Norte y el Sur. In Rubén Fernández (Ed.) Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa – América Latina al 2010: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. ALOP; The Reality of Aid: Mexico, August 2011. BANCO MUNDIAL; IPEA. Ponte sobre o Atlântico – Brasil e África subsaariana: parceria Sul-Sul para o crescimento. Brasília: Banco Mundial; IPEA, 2011. BEGHIN, Nathalie; JACCOUD, Luciana; BARBOSA, Frederico. Políticas sociais no Brasil: participação social, conselhos e parcerias. In Luciana Jaccoud (Org.). Questão social e políticas sociais no Brasil contemporâneo. Brasília: IPEA, 2005. BEGHIN, Nathalie. A filantropia empresarial: nem caridade, nem direito. São Paulo: Cortez, Coleção Questões da Nossa Época, n. 122, 2005. BEGHIN, Nathalie. Notas sobre Responsabilidade Social Empresarial no Brasil – Subsídios para a Discussão. Oxfam Internacional, abr. 2008. Mimeografado. BEGHIN, Nathalie. Parcerias e pobreza no Brasil: as contradições dos arranjos realizados entre entidades governamentais e empresas privadas para combater a pobreza no Brasil dos últimos 20 anos. Tese de Doutorado. Programa de PósGraduação em Política Social. Universidade de Brasília – UnB. Thesis defended and approved on August 2009. BfdW; EED. Brazil Strategy Document 2010-2014. Bonn, November 2009. BETTER AID. Civil society statement to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Busan, Republic of Kores, November 28th 2011. Available on the website: http://betteraid.org/en/news/high-level-forum-on-aid-effectiveness-/524civilsociety-statement-to-the-fourth-high-level-forum-on-aid-effectiveness.html BIEKART, Kees. Políticas de las ONGs europeas para America Latina: Tendencias y perspectivas recientes. ISS: Netherlands, 2005. CACCIA BAVA, Silvio. O que é e o que pode ser a cooperação internacional. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, N º 49, Agosto de 2011 (a). Encarte Especial: Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional. CACCIA BAVA, Silvio. A cooperação internacional brasileira. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, N º 52, Novembro de 2011 (b). Editorial CALIXTRE, André Bojikian; BARROS, Pedro Silva. Além da circunstância: caminhos da integração sul-americana – do MERCOSUL à UNASUL. In VIANA, André Rego; BARROS, Pedro Silva; CALIXTRE, André Bojikian (Orgs.). Governança global e integração da América do Sul. Brasília: IPEA, 2011. CAMPOLINA, Adriano. Novos paradigmas para a cooperação internacional. In “Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional”. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, Encarte Especial, Ano 5, Número 49, agosto 2011. CAMPOS, Rodrigo Pires de; LIMA, João Brígido Bezerra; LOPES, Laura Landulpho Alves. Os Fóruns de Alto Nível da Organização para a Cooperação e o Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE): Limites e perspectivas da posição brasileira na agenda sobre efetividade da ajuda internacional. Boletim de Economia e Política Internacional, Nº 8 (Out-Dez 2011). Brasília, IPEA/DINTE: 2011. CEPAL. A cooperação internacional no novo contexto mundial: reflexões desde América Latina e Caribe. Notas da Secretaria. Junho de 2010. Access the site http://www.eclac.cl/pses33/noticias/paginas/7/39037/2010-223-SES3311_Cooperacao_internacional.pdf CINTRA, Marcos Antônio Macedo (Org.). Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2005-2009. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação. Brasília: IPEA: ABC, 2010. CHRISTIAN AID. Documento de política e estratégia para o Brasil 2010-2012. São Paulo, December 2010. CHRISTIAN AID. Annual report and accounts 2010/11. Christian Aid: London, 2011.
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46 COUTINHO, Marcelo. Movimentos de mudança política na América do Sul contemporânea. Rev. Sociol. Polít., Curitiba, 27, p. 107-123, nov. 2006. CROCE, Alberto. Challenges in EU-Latin American development cooperation. Reality of Aid 2010 report. The Reality of Aid, 2010. Available on the site: http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/375/Aid-andDevelopmentEffectiveness-Towards-Human-Rights-Social-Justice-and-Democracy DESIDERÁ NETO, Walter Antonio. Integração Sul-Americana: oportunidades e desafios para uma maior participação do continente na governança global. In André Rego Viana, Pedro Silva Barros e André Bojikian Calixtre (Orgs.). Governança global e integração da América do Sul. Brasília: IPEA, 2011. DURÃO, Jorge Eduardo Saavedra. Inépcia do Estado nas relações com as ONGs. Artigo publicado pela FASE, em 16 de dezembro de 2011. Available on the site: http://www.fase.org.br/v2/pagina.php?id=3625 EL PAIS. La cooperación no es una causa perdida. Reportaje, Vida & Artes, 22/11/2011. EYBEN, Rosalind. Vantagens da assistência mútua entre Brasil e Reino Unido. In “Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional”. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, Encarte Especial, Ano 5, Número 49, agosto 2011. FERNÁNDEZ, Rubén. Tendencias de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo con América Latina. In Rubén Fernández y Jorge Balbis (Eds.). Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa – América Latina al 2009: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. ALOP; The Reality of Aid: Mexico, setiembre 2009. FERNÁNDEZ, Rubén. Por otros caminos: Tendencias de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo con América Latina. In (Ed.). Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa – América Latina al 2010: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. ALOP; The Reality of Aid: Mexico, agosto 2011 (a). FERNÁNDEZ, Rubén (Ed.). Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa – América Latina al 2010: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. ALOP; The Reality of Aid: Mexico, August 2011 (b). FERNANDÉZ, Rubén; BALBIS, Jorge. Por que manter a cooperação com a América Latina? Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, N º 49, Agosto de 2011. Encarte Especial: Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional. FIORI, José Luis. Brasil e América do Sul: o desafio da inserção internacional soberana. Texto para Discussão Nº 42. Brasília: CEPAL; IPEA, 2010. Available on: http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/2/43452/CEPAL_42.pdf FORDELONE, Talita Yamashiro. Triangular co-operation and aid effectiveness: Can triangular co-operation make aid more effective? OECD, 2009. Available on the website http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/37/46387212.pdf FRERES, Cristian (Dir.); MARTÍNEZ, Ignacio; ANGULO, Óscar. La inserción de América Latina en el cambiante sistema internacional de cooperación. Documento de Trabajo Nº 46. Fundación Carolina: Madrid, Diciembre de 2010. FUNDACIÓN CAROLINA; ALOP; CCONG. La eficacia de la ayuda y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil: una mirada al caso latinoamericano. Serie Avances de Investigación, Nº 55. Fundación Carolina: Madrid, mayo de 2011. Available on the website: http://www.fundacioncarolina.es/esES/ publicaciones/avancesinvestigacion/Documents/AI55.pdf. HADDAD, Sérgio. A importância da incidência política internacional das ONGs brasileiras. Artigo de Opinião. Informe ABONG 493; 20/12/2011 brasileiras. Artigo de Opinião. Informe ABONG 493; 20/12/2011 – 02/02/2012. Available at: http://www.abong.org.br/informes.php?id=4708 HIRST, Mônica. Aspectos conceituais e práticos da atuação do Brasil em cooperação Sul-Sul: os casos do Haiti, Bolívia e Guiné Bissau. Brasília: IPEA, in print. IBGE; IPEA; ABONG; GIFE. As fundações privadas e associações sem fins lucrativos no Brasil – 2005. Estudos e pesquisa: informação econômica Nº 8. IBGE: Rio de Janeiro, 2008. IBGE. Síntese de indicadores sociais: uma análise das condições de vida da população brasileira – 2010. Estudos e pesquisas – Informação demográfica e socioeconômica Nº 27. IBGE: Rio de Janeiro, 2010 (a).
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47 IBGE. Segurança alimentar 2004 – 2009. Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios. IBGE: Rio de Janeiro, 2010 (b). INSTITUTO ROSA LUXEMBURGO (Org.). Empresas transnacionais brasileiras na América Latina: um debate necessário. São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 2009. IPEA; ABC. Cooperação brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2005 – 2009. Brasília: IPEA; ABC, 2010. IPEA; SPM; SEPPIR; ONU Mulheres. Retrato das desigualdades de gênero e raça – 4ª edição. IPEA: Brasília, 2011. IPEA. Políticas Sociais: Acompanhamento e Análise, N° 13. Edição especial. Brasília, 2007. IPEA. Pobreza, desigualdade e políticas públicas. Comunicados da Presidência, Nº 38 janeiro de 2010. IPEA. Cooperação internacional: ajuda ao próximo e ao distante. Revista Desafios do Desenvolvimento, Ano 8, Nº 68, 2011. Access the website: http://desafios.ipea.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2491:catid=28&Itemid=23 LIMA, Maria Regina Soares. A política externa brasileira e os desafios da cooperação Sul-Sul. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 48(1): 24-59, 2005. LUZ, Mara Manzoni; WOLFF, Luciano André. O Brasil e a cooperação internacional não governamental: desafios de agências ecumênicas européias e suas entidades parceiras. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, Encarte Especial, Ano 5, Número 49, agosto 2011. HOFFMANN, Rodolfo. As transferências nãosão a causa principal da redução da desigualdade. In Econômica, v. 7, Nº 2, pp. 335-341, dez. 2005. MINGHELLA, Loretta. Why we should still give to rich Brazil. Church Times, 6th, January, 2012. Access the website: http://www.churchtimes.co.uk/content.asp?id=122814. MRE. Cooperação humanitária internacional: balanço 2006 – 2010. Coordenação Geral de Ações Internacionais de Luta contra à Fome (CGFome). Brasília: MRE, 2011. MÜLLER, Alberto. O globo. Página12, domingo 08 de janeiro de 2012. Pode ser acessado no site: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/suplementos/cash/17-57122012-01-08.html. ODI. Brazil: an emerging aid player. Overseas Development Institute, Briefing Paper Nº 64, October 2010. OXFAM. Left behind by the G20? How inequality and environmental degradation threaten to exclude poor people from the benefits of economic grow. Oxfam Briefing Paper 157, January 2012. Available on the site: http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/left-behind-by-g20. PAD. A repressão aos defensores de direitos humanos e movimentos sociais no Brasil. PAD, julho de 2010. PELIANO, Anna Maria T. Medeiros (Coord.). A iniciativa privada e o espírito público: a evolução da ação social das empresas privadas no Brasil. Brasília, IPEA: Mimeo, julho de 2006. PNUD. Informe regional sobre Desenvolvimento Humano para a América Latina e o Caribe – 2010: Atuar sobre o futuro: romper a transmissão intergeracional da desigualdade. Resumo Executivo. Nova York: PNUD, 2010. POCHMANN, Márcio. Palestra proferida no Fórum Direitos e Cidadania, em Brasília, no dia 12 de julho de 2011. Available on the site: http://www.secretariageral.gov.br/.arquivos/arquivos-novos/arquivosnovos2011/Marcio%20Pochmann_MudancasSociais.pdf. PORTO-GONÇALVES, Carlos Walter. Ou inventamos ou erramos – Encruzilhadas na integração regional sul-americana. In André Rego Viana, Pedro Silva Barros e André Bojikian Calixtre (Orgs.). Governança global e integração da América do Sul. Brasília: IPEA, 2011. PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA DO BRASIL. Balanço do Governo Federal 2003 – 2010. Access the site: http://www.balancodegoverno.presidencia.gov.br.
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48 REBIRP. Em defesa dos rumos atuais da política externa brasileira. Outubro de 2010. Access the site http://www.rebrip.org.br/rebrip/pagina.php?id=2646. RIBEIRO, Vera Masagão. Alô, alô Brasil com W. In “Brasil, América Latina e a Cooperação Internacional”. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, Encarte Especial, Ano 5, Número 49, agosto 2011. SALVADOR, Evilásio. Os bilhões que nos tomaram. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil, novembro de 2007. Diplomatique Brasil, novembro de 2007. SEGIB. Report on South-South cooperation in Ibero-America 2009. Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), SEGIB Studies Nº 4: Madrid, November 2009. SEGIB. Report on South-South cooperation in Ibero-America 2010. Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), SEGIB Studies Nº 5: Madrid, November 2010. SILVA, Rogério; VARGAS, Ana Carolina. Efeitos da crise econômica 2008/2009 sobre as agências de cooperação internacional que atuam no Brasil. Instituto Fonte: São Paulo, 2009. SORJ, Bernardo; FAUSTO, Sergio. O papel do Brasil na América do Sul: estratégias e percepções mútuas. Política Externa, Vol. 20, Nº 2, Set/Out/Nov 2011. SOUZA, Amaury de. A agenda internacional do Brasil: a política externa brasileira de FHC a Lula. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier; CEBRI, 2009. SUMMER, Andy. Global poverty and the new bottom billion: What if three-quarters of the world’s poor live in middleincome countries? IDS Working Paper 349. Brighton/UK: IDS, 2010. THE ECONOMIST. Brazil’s foreign-aid programme: Speak softly and carry a blank cheque. July 15th 2010. Access the site: http://www.economist.com/node/16592455
TOMLINSON, Brian. Civil society and development effectiveness: North/South challenges. The Reality of Aid, August 2008. Available on the site: http://www.realityofaid.org/userfiles/publications/roareport_1e45f1e008.pdf TOMLINSON, Brian. Crisis Management: An analysis of global aid trends. In Reality of Aid 2010 Report. Aid and development effectiveness: Towards human rights, social justice and democracy. The Reality of Aid, 2010. TOMLINSON, Brian. Análisis de las tendencias mundiales de la Ayuda al Desarrollo. In Rubén Fernández (Ed.). Mito y realidad de la ayuda externa – América Latina al 2010: Una evaluación independiente de la cooperación internacional al desarrollo. ALOP; The Reality of Aid: Mexico, agosto 2011. VARGAS, Ana Carolina; FERREIRA Luiza Fernandes. Investigações sobre a conjuntura dos investimentos das organizações internacionais no campo social brasileiro no período de 2008-2010. D3; Instituto Fonte, s/d. VIANA, André Rego; BARROS, Pedro Silva; CALIXTRE, André Bojikian (Orgs.). Governança global e integração da América do Sul. Brasília: IPEA, 2011. WILKS, Alex (Ed.). Aid and development effectiveness: Towards human rights, social justice and democracy. Reality of Aid 2010 Report. The Reality of Aid, 2010. Available on the site: http://www.realityofaid.org/roareports/index/secid/375/Aid-and-Development-Effectiveness-Towards-Human-Rights-Social-Justice-and--DevelopmentEffectiveness-Towards-Human-Rights-Social-Justice-and-Democracy
Other consulted sites • • • •
ACT Alliance: http://www.actalliance.org Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC): http://www.abc.gov.br Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo (Alop): http://www.alop.org.mx 48
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Associação Brasileira de ONGs (ABONG): http://www.abong.org.br Balanço do Governo 2003-2010: http://www.balancodegoverno.presidencia.gov.br Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (Cebri): http://www.cebri.com.br Christian Aid: http://www.christianaid.org.uk IPEA Data: http://www.ipeadata.gov.br Núcleo de Pesquisa em Relações Internacionais – Nupri/USP: http://www.usp.br/nupri Observatório Político Sul-Americano (Opsa): http://www.opsa.com.br OECD – Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD-DAC): http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_33721_1_1_1_1_1,00.html Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness: http://www.csoeffectiveness.org Plataforma BNDES: http://www.plataformabndes.org.br Processo de Articulação e Diálogo (PAD): http://www.portalecumenico.net Rede Brasil sobre Instituições Financeiras Multilaterais: www.rbrasil.org.br Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos (REBRIP): http://www.rebrip.org.br The Anglican Alliance: http://www.aco.org The Lutheran World Federation: http://www.lutheranworld.org The Reality of Aid: http://www.realityofaid.org UNITAS: http://www.redunitas.org World Council of Churches (WCC): http://www.oikoumene.org
Annex Methodological note The study “Presente e Futuro: Tendências na Cooperação Internacional Brasileira e o Papel das Agências Ecumênicas” (Present and Future: Tendencies in Brazilian International Cooperation) is the result of a partnership between Christian Aid and INESC programmes in Bolivia and Brazil. The study took place during a period of two and a half months (from the beginning of December 2011 until February 2012) and included the participation of UNITAS, a partner of Christian Aid in Bolivia. The general objective of the study was to analyse the context in which the financing of international cooperation, with Brazil as both donor and receiver of these resources. This analysis tried to show the practices and policies implemented in the field of international cooperation for development, in order to identify tendencies that could guide the actions of ecumenical agencies and its coalitions – especially with Christian Aid – and its partners both in Brazil and in the rest of South America. Because of this, the following objectives were agreed on: 1. To identify the ambivalences and ambiguities of an emerging Brazil: showing up to what point its position as a wealthy economy was unable to solve its social and environmental problems as had been expected. 2. To make an assessment of international cooperation in Brazil – received and offered, official and nongovernmental. 3. To analyse the more relevant implications, especially for South America, of the growing role of the Brazilian government as a promoter of international cooperation and the place of the BNDES in the region. 4. To list the key elements that justify the continuity of ecumenical cooperation in Brazil. This study was carried out through the realization of interviews, bibliographic reviews and debates with specialists. 49
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With regard to the interviews, key players were identified in the field of international cooperation who were called to respond to a semi-structured survey organized around the following questions: • What are the factors that influence received international cooperation in Brazil? • What is the perspective of received international cooperation in Brazil, both official and nongovernmental? • What are the implications of Brazil becoming a donor or partner country? What is the impact of this new role on South America? • What is the future of offered Brazilian cooperation? • What are the impacts of the Brazilian investments in South America, especially those financed by the BNDES? • What should be done to improve international cooperation in Brazil and from Brazil to other countries with which it cooperates, especially in South America? • What are the reasons that justify (or not) the continuation of international cooperation in Brazil, whether official or nongovernmental? In order to obtain a wide range of views and interpretations, representatives of various institutions and organizations were identified, such as: from the federal government, international organizations, research institutes, networks of ecumenical groups and international nongovernmental organizations that operate in Brazil. Unfortunately, because of the short space of time available for the research, and also the due to the time it was carried out (during New Year festivities and annual leave), it was not possible to contact professionals from bodies and organizations relevant to the study, such as: representatives of Parliament, bilateral governmental donors, professionals from the business sector and from BNDES. The interviews were filmed and organized. Note that the contribution of the key-participants was a subsidy to guide the discussion and, therefore, the statements will not be shown, as the interviewees were assured that their interviews would not be published. In this sense, it is important to make clear that the final result of the study is the fruit of the reflection of its promoters, with no responsibility on the interviewees for any possible mistakes or omissions through the interpretation of the facts. In all, eleven interviews were carried out, which made up about nine hours of conversation. In Chart 1 is a list of the interviewees and the dates of the interviews.
Field of work Federal Government
International Organizations
Chart 1. Information on the interviews: who and when Key-information Date of Contact details of interviewee Interview 08/12/2011 milton.rondo@itamaraty.gov.br Milton Rondó Filho: General Coordination of International Action Against Interview Hunger/CGFome, of the MRE in Person (Brasília) 15/12/2011 Ana Elena Vale – secretary Marco Farani: Director of Brazilian Agency of ana.vale@abc.gov.br Cooperation of the MRE (Brasília) Interview in Person Daniel Augusto Furst Gonçalves: 25/01/2012 daniel.furst@undp.org Specialist in South/South (61) 3038-9187 Cooperation of UNDP (Brasília) Interview in Person 14/12/2011 carlos.mussi@cepal.org Carlos Mussi: Director of Cepal in Brazil (61) 3315-5473 50
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(Brasília)
Interview in Person 25/01/2012
Maria Cristina Araújo: Advisor for the Cooperation Programme of the Delegation of the Interview European Union (Brasília) in Person International 08/12/2011 Simon Ticehurst: private Head of the Oxfam Office in Brazil organizations (Brasília) Interview of cooperation in person that were nationalized or are in the process of nationalization International 24/01/2012 Júlia Esther Castro França: ecumenical Executive-Coordinator of PAD organizations (Goiânia) Interview that operate in in writing Brazil 11/01/2012 Sandra Andrade: Anglican Alliance (Brasília) Interview in person
Studies Research
Soraia Barbosa – secretary soraia.barbosa@cepal.org cristina.araujo@eeas.europa.eu
STicehurst@oxfam.org.br (61) 3321-4044
pad.pad@terra.com.br
sandrade@ieab.org.br (61) 3443-4305
14/02/2012 marilia@koinonia.org.br Marilia Schüller: (21) 3042-6445 Advisor for Projects from Koinonia ACT Alliance Interview (Rio de Janeiro) by phone 10/01/2012 kjakobsen@uol.com.br and Kjeld Jakobsen: Consultant in Cooperation and Interviewed International Relations (São Paulo) on skype 23/01/2012 Marcos Cintra: Director of Studies and Interview International Economic and in person Political Relations for IPEA (Brasília)
marcos.cintra@IPEA.gov.br (61) 3315 5173
The bibliographical revision was based on an extensive modern literature, as can be seen in the “Bibliographical References and consulted sites” of the research document. The materials used were official documents, texts and reflections from both Brazilian and international civil society networks and organizations, as well as documents from multilateral organs. (United Nations Organization, the European Union and the OECD. Finally, the reflection was complemented with the realization of a workshop, in São Paulo (SP), on the 9th and 10th February 2010. Present at this event were representatives of Christian Aid in Brazil (Mara Manzoni Luz, representative; and João Vergueiro, Financial Advisor), from INESC (Iara Pietricowski, member of the Collegiate; and Nathalie Beghin, coordinator of Political Advisory body) and from the executive management of the Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social 51
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da BolĂvia (National Union of Institutes for Social Action) -UNITAS, a partner of Christian Aid in that country. Two specialists on the theme also took part: Kjeld Jakobsen, consultant in Cooperation and International Relations and Anivaldo Padilha, member of the team of advisors of Koinonia Ecumenical Presence and Service, member of the Board of Directors of the Latin American Council of Churches (Brazilian Region), member of the Board of Directors of the US Church World Service and member of the Coordination of the ACT Alliance Ecumenical Forum, Brazil. The result of the debates was incorporated to make up the final version of the text. It is worth mentioning that the document from the research is more of an essay than a thesis. It focused on questioning a theme and raising a series of hypotheses and suggestions that could be looked at more deeply in later studies.
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