Indic Journal of International Law, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2021)

e-ISSN: 2582-8398 Volume: 1 Issue: 1 March 7, 2021

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Indic Journal of International Law e-ISSN: 2582-8398 Volume 1, Issue 1 (March 2021)

© Indic Journal of International Law, 2021.

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e-ISSN: 2582-8398.

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Volume: 1 Issue: 1 Date of Publication: March 7, 2021

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Preface International Law is a field of specialized development and transformation towards how diplomacy and foreign policy is to be made. The role of international law in a multipolar order is subjected to instrument and gauge countries towards the realm of self-reliance and a reformed multilateralism, where trust triumphs internationalization, and conflict resolution is based on the principles of true competence instead of the abstract dynamics of power and prejudice.

The Indic Journal of International Law is a biannual law journal covering international law in a combination of theoretical and practical approaches – with its space open for global and Indic (Indian/Dharmic/Indic/Indo-Pacific) perspectives on global governance. It also provides coverage of the relationship between law and international politics in businesses, education, research and innovation practices.

I would like to express my deepest of gratitude to our esteemed Managing Editors, Associate Editors and the team of extraordinary Peer Review Board Members for their contribution towards the Journal and its efforts.

Abhivardhan Editor-in-Chief Indic Journal of International Law.

Indic Journal of International Law

Acknowledgments Mr Kartikey Misra Lawyer and GLIA Advisor, Internationalism Ms Dhakshayanee Srinivasan Programme Coordinator, Internationalism

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Table of Contents Analytical Articles.

1. Chinese claim to Market Economy Status under WTO Pratham Sharma 2. Evaluating Economic sanctions from the lens of war crimes: The perspective of international humanitarian law Shivani Chaudhary Review Articles.

3. Analysis of Commentaries by parties to the Convention to Certain Conventional

Weapons on the guiding principles developed by Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Weapons Autonomous Systems Divyansh Singh &Avishi Pateriya 4. Avenues of an International Anti-Corruption Court and UNGASS 2021 Yashna Walia & Yashvi Agarwal 5. Geopolitics of Energy Issues and Emerging Trends in International Relations: A Critical Review Chitrika Grover

Indic Journal of International Law

The Journal Team Editorial Board (Core).

Abhivardhan, Editor-in-Chief Akash Manwani, Chief Managing Editor Manohar Samal, Managing Editor Agni Das, Managing Editor Mridutpal Bhattacharya, Consulting Editor Shawaiz R Nisar, Managing Editor Editorial Board (Associate).

Swachita Ravi, Senior Associate Editor Nikita Mulay, Junior Associate Editor Aman Kotecha, Junior Associate Editor Adrija Ghosh, Junior Associate Editor Hriti Parekh, Junior Associate Editor Nishi Kothari, Junior Associate Editor Harsh Singh, Junior Associate Editor Prateek Singh, Junior Associate Editor Bulbul Khaitan, Peer Review Board Member Shobhitabh Srivastava, Peer Review Board Member

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Chinese claim to Market Economy Status under WTO

Pratham Sharma Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, New Delhi, India

Abstract. The work is an adaptation of a similar policy brief published accepted under the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction A Market economy is the economic system wherein the economic decisions are largely independent of influence from the state or the government. The decisions regarding investment, production and distribution are not taken by the state but are rather regulated through the forces of supply and demand. This is a general understanding of what market economy constitutes; however, some states perceive the concept of a market economy differently than the majority. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the apex body for the regulation of international trade and also sets the standards for such regulation. Even when the organization is being ridiculed and undermined, it continues to hold importance in terms of settlement of disputes regarding international trade practices between two or more states.

China approached the WTO concerning a dispute with the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). The case with the EU was able to proceed further to an advanced discussion while the one with the United States is still in the pipeline. The dispute was primarily regarding the treatment of China as a Non-Market Economy by the European Union in anti-dumping on Chinese goods. The Chinese have contended that the agreement signed at the time of its admission to the organization reflects that China was bound to be recognized as a Market Economy, 15 Years from the date of signature. The Protocol of Accession signed in 2001, clarifies the revocation of the treatment as NonMarket economy after 15 years in Clause 15(d) (Accession Protocol, 2001). On the other hand, the EU has claimed that China should not be recognized as a Market economy for its failure to fulfill the Market economy criteria as in use by the European Union. Both the

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EU and the USA have argued against the substantial state control in the Chinese economy as one of the core reasons to oppose their Market economy status within the global trading system.

Evaluating the Chinese economy for state control The Chinese have indicated clearly that their faith is in the ‘social market economic’ system.

This is understood as an economic system which operates somewhere between the freemarket system and an entirely state-controlled economy. The economy of China is currently identified to be in a transition to an innovation-driven market from the investmentdriven export economy by many experts. Thus, it is evident that the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) wouldn’t be able to survive the competition without the perks laid down in the system for them by the Chinese government. To substantiate the point made above, it is important to understand that the regulations for the banking system in China are laid down as such that can afford the SOEs in china with loans at a priority (Guluzade, 2019).

This system of preferential loans to the SOEs gives these enterprises an undue advantage in terms of economic competition, considering the preferential loans would also impact the capacity of banks to lend to the private enterprises. The banks do not have a pool of unlimited resources to distribute and thus the government is effectively ruling out competition for SOEs. In addition to the aforementioned, the SOEs also often end up lobbying with other SOEs for formulation of certain regulations which further drives the private companies out of the competition (Guluzade, 2019). This ‘privileged loan’ system gives gravitas to the claims made by the West in respect of the Chinese economy to a substantial degree.

The Chinese economy is also expected to be taken aback due to the Anti-corruption campaign launched by President Xi Jinping. As a direct result of the campaign, many highranking officials of the SOEs have been relieved from their duties. For example, Cai Xiyou who served as the President of Sinochem group and Chang Xiaobing who served as the Chairman of China Unicom/Telecom were both subjected to investigation and subsequently removed from their respective positions. It is a positive to be free of corrupt officials, however, there also emerges a lack of coherent strategy for the SOE which loses its leader and the overall impact of this is evident on the performance of the enterprise. The corruption in China has been attributed to this system of state control due to the discretionary power that it brings along.

The Chinese government has eroded the private corporations and has attempted to place the public servants and the members of the communist party of china in private corporations at influential positions. The department of central organization under the communist party had reported that 68% of private companies in china had party members placed in them by 2016. The level of control exerted by the Chinese government can be clearly exemplified from the case of Jack Ma. He is the founder of Alibaba Group and it is said that he was forced or compelled indirectly to step down from his day to day role of the group

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for his firm belief in open market economy which was coinciding with his party’s ideology (McGregor, 2019). This intolerance of the ideology within the Chinese setup seems to award the weight to the arguments raised by the Western faction about the Chinese economic structure.

Steps taken by China to make progress The West has clarified that unless reforms are introduced in the Chinese system, the treatment of their goods shall be on similar parameters as was decided back in 2001. The EU and the USA both have expressly stated that China hasn’t made effort to bring about a change in the situation of their economic system and its structure. However, this claim does not represent the entire scenario. The Chinese government had established the StateOwned Asset Supervision Administration commission (SASAC) in 2003, which is two years after the Protocol of Accession, was signed. The commission had been tasked to supervise the structure of the SOEs and bring changes to the same. The commission implemented the ‘Zhuada fang- xiao’ approach with the respect to the state-owned enterprises. The approach was about introducing changes to the stringent state control system through privatization, mergers and acquisitions (Guluzade, 2019). The effort by the commission was targeted to bring a gradual change in the economic structure in China. The SASAC is currently working on transforming the organizational setup of SOEs of China.

The reorganization of the SOEs is being carried out to improve the internal governance standards in the aftermath of the anti- corruption campaign and to bring about more independence from the state control of Chinese government. All the entities overseen by the SASAC or under its supervision have been structured as corporations with Board of Directors who possess more independence from state control (Guluzade, 2019).

The questions raised by the European Union and the United States to the legal framework of China allowing for such state control seems to be valid. However, it seems to be blown out of the water when one notices the changes initiated by the government in Beijing. The entire process has been gradual and has slowed down in the past few years due to Chinese conservatism. It seems China was willing to take the steps to transform from state control to more open markets, but the trade war against the Chinese has not helped the cause.

China chose to prefer security over efficiency as a response to threats and one cannot entirely blame them for adopting an ideology that has got them the results in terms of progress when threatened. The arrival of Donald Trump at the international stage has further deteriorated the situation in terms of their transition to a more open market. The trade war declared by Trump has only added fuel to fire and not paved the way for progress.

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Disregard of Rules and Misleading documentation The main contention of the consultations requested by China was to raise concerns about the enforcement of the Protocol of Accession and Clause 15 under the agreement. As per the claims by China, Clause 15(d) lays down that “In Any event, the provision laid down in subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of Accession” (Protocol of Accession, 2001).

The claim so made by China is valid as far as the text of the Protocol is concerned. However, the European Union is not entirely incorrect when they derive their power to use different methodology under Clause 15 still.

Clause 15(d) says that “Once China has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession.” The subparagraph (a) states that “In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti- Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China.” The subparagraph (a) of clause 15 also lays down the similar provision as to (a)(ii). The document becomes misleading the moment it allows for expiry of the provision in one clause while protects its existence in the other. Now both claims are accruing out of one single provision and both seem to have standing prima facie.

There could have been clarity over the interpretation of the Protocol if the dispute resolution process could have gone through and a report could have been obtained from the Panel established. However, China has been denied the opportunity to further their claim for the procedural issues which warrants the resumption of proceedings of the panel within 12 months from its suspension as requested by one of the parties to the dispute. However, it is important to review the dispute resolution process as it unfolded considering there is something to take into consideration.

Article 12.8 of the document explaining the rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes has laid down that the period from composition of the panel and agreement over terms of reference to the final report should not exceed six months. The Article 12.9 states that if the panel considers that it will not be able to submit the report within the stipulated time then by a written communication of reasons for the same, they can seek an extension and specify the estimated time period for the submission of the report. The Article 12.9 also states that “In no case should the period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the report to the Members exceed nine months” (Document of Rules of procedures governing dispute settlement, 1994). The communication from Panel to DSB for extension dated 11th December 2017, highlights that the report shall be submitted in the second half of 2018 (Communication from Panel, 2017). The panel was established on 3rd April 2017

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as substantiated by the communication of the Panel itself. Clearly, the period of nine months from 3rd April 2017 which is the date of establishment of panel was not given consideration and the report was delayed. The Panel further delayed the report to 2019 by a notification in 2018 (Communication of Panel, 2018). The rule laid down in Article 12.9 has been clearly disregarded in this case and the procedures as laid down haven’t been followed by the World Trade Organization. Owing to such disregard and the importance of interpreting the protocol, it is important that WTO finds a way to reopen or reinitiate the consultation with due consideration of established procedure.

European Union Free Trade Agreements and their significance in this case The European Union has signed many Free trade agreements to boost their economic partnerships; however, they seem to have an indirect bearing over this whole case and the treatment of Chinese goods with hostility. At the beginning of the proceedings, Canada initiated a request to join the consultations so initiated by China against the EU and claimed to have an interest in the decision since their exports are in direct competition with Chinese exports in Europe as per their communication from the delegation of Canada (Communication by Canada, 2017). Canada also mentioned in the same communication that the exports from Canada to European Union are to increase further shortly due to the CanadaEuropean Union Comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA). As per the general understanding of the agreement, there will be removal of trade barriers from both parties on the goods from the other and promotion of free trade will be the main objective of the agreement. In addition to the dynamics surrounding the agreement, it is interesting to note that European Union is the second largest trading partner of Canada and has been trying to improve the Trans-Atlantic trade. If Chinese goods are comparatively expensive in the European markets and they fail to compete with other goods, the direct advantage will be accrued by Canada. They had mentioned that their exports are in direct competition with Chinese in the European Market. Thus, it seems important for European Union to adopt the different methodology in order to also create this advantage for their strategic trade partner. An advantage to Canada will only return as an advantage to European Union since they will be afforded more relaxations on exports to Canada under their agreement.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the other parties (Australia, Mexico, and Vietnam) requesting to join the consultations have vested interests in the pricing of Chinese goods.

All these countries are parties to current or potential free trade agreements with the European Union. To improve the performance of their exports to Europe, they need to compete with Chinese exports and the current European Union Policies give them this opportunity on a plate. While questions about the intentions of China have been raised concerning the fulfilment of the principles of Marrakesh Agreement and its supplements, it seems more

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pressing to raise questions to the intentions of the West of fulfilling the provisions of the principles laid down in the WTO agreements which call for fair trade practices and respect for the terms of accession.

Conclusions The Panel established to deal with the claim made by China has closed the case owing to the failure of resumption within 12 months of suspension. However, the proceedings were not exactly conducted as per the procedure set by World Trade Organization. The Dispute Settlement Board needs to reinitiate the process considering the Protocol of Accession is grossly misleading and accommodates claims from both parties. The decision to close work for now still seems to be politically relevant considering the European Union will continue their anti-dumping practices against China and not recognize China as Market Economy.

China needs to try and bring about the changes more rapidly concerning the liberation of markets. The trade war declared by the United States does not seem to help in this case since it forces China to give preference to security over efficiency. In totality, the Chinese government, for the time being, will have to settle with their Non-Market Economy status and try to approach the World Trade Organization again in their consultations with the United States and stake their claim regarding the Protocol of Accession and domestic market reforms. Canada, Mexico will try to make the most of their agreements with the European Union, while Australia and Vietnam will hope to complete negotiations and then exploit the current situation between Europe and China.

References • Amir Guluzade, “The role of China’s State owned companies explained”, World Economic Forum, 7th May 2019, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state- ownedcompanies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/> • Richard McGregor, “How the state runs business in China”, The Guardian, 25th July 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communistparty-state-private-enterprise-huawei#:~:text=From%20the%20Mao%20era%20onwards,a%20role%20inside%20private%20businesses.> • Protocol of Accession – China, World Trade Organisation, 10th November 2001, <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm> • Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, World Trade Organisation, 1994, <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#12> • Marrakesh Agreement, 1994, <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf> • Communication from Panel, World Trade Organisation, 11th December 2017, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%40Symbol%3d+

e-ISSN: 2582-8398 | internationalism.in/journal 13 wt%2fds516%2f*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true> • Communication from Panel, World Trade Organisation, 27th November, 2018, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%40Symbol%3d+ wt%2fds516%2f*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true> • Request for joining Consultations by Canada, World Trade Organisation, 5th January 2017, <https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%40Symbol%3d+ wt%2fds516%2f*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true>

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Evaluating Economic sanctions from the lens of war crimes: The perspective of international humanitarian law Shivani Chaudhary Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab, India

Abstract. It is believed that economic sanctions can be used as a diversion from the path of war and bloodshed, to convey disapproval to the policies and activities of the regime that is being sanctioned. But these sanctions seldom achieve their projected purposes and so, the consequences of imposing economic sanctions are felt by the unintended parties. This article discusses the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations and United States. We have authorities like the United Nations and European union which shoulder responsibility to look after the sanction regimes imposed by them and individual countries. In this article I will broadly discuss economic sanctions considering the provisions under United Nations Charter with the economic sanctions and the emergence of smart sanctions as been conferred and elaborate on the fact that the humanitarian ethics of economic sanctions are discoursed from the perspectives of the rights of civilian population. The sanctions act as a punishment for the party that should not be directly involved in the conflict and in this regard, the cases of Iran and North Korea are discussed in this article. How these sanctions have affected the population of Iran and North Korea with respect to certain parameters like economy, healthcare, quality of life, hunger, poverty and unemployment etc. is discussed while deliberating the questions about the feasibility of these economic sanctions and if they are just being used as a politically coercive tool.

Economic Sanctions and the Emergence of Targeted Sanctions The very first case of economic sanctions was observed about 2400 years ago in the ancient Greece. On the face of it, international law doesn't explicitly define economic sanctions and hence we cannot put a finger on the regulatory authority that can act as a universally accepted amenable machinery to enforce these sanctions. Economic sanctions being a milder version of economic warfare is a withdrawal of trade relations and commercial

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penalties. These can be in the form of trade sanctions, embargoes, commodity interdiction, asset freezes, etc. These sanctions are imposed in order to bring about a change in the policies and activities that are not in sync with international peace and security. Economic sanctions are the most commonly used sanctions in the international community. Articles 41, 52, 34, 35, 39 of the United Nations (UN) charter directly or indirectly talk about economic sanctions.

If weighed on a moral compass it is believed that targeted sanctions or smart sanctions are a shift away from the typical sanctions regimes, as they have emerged as a result of humanitarian considerations. The traditional sanctions may have had some effectiveness, but the ill effects of these sanctions outweighed its effectiveness and this would stand true at any given day in the history. The experience of the most comprehensive sanctions regime on Iraq from 1991 till 2003, made UN rethink its decision and planning with regards to economic sanctions. The Iraqi sanctions, which caused a lot of loss concerning human lives, including child deaths, starvation and inhuman living conditions making smart sanctions necessary. “An approximate of 1.5 Million Iraqis, including 5,00,000 children lost their lives during this 13-year embargo (Whitty, Michael, Suk Kim, and Trevor Crick, 2020)”1After irreparable damage in terms of human lives and the economy was done to the civilian population in Iraq, this example was seen as a cautionary tale of how dangerous comprehensive economic sanctions can be. The sanctions on Iraq lasted till 2003, after which the United Nations and the United States of America, started to think about smart sanctions and ethically analyse the effects of comprehensive sanctions and the damage that they brought. The comprehensive sanctions regime proves that the effect of such sanctions is never on the targeted parties. It is also a result of a corrupt belief of punishing the civilians to get out the desired outcome from the people who hold the power, but due to such regimes, what happens is that the sufferers suffer more and the people at fault, continue being the wrongdoers. Power gets even more concentrated and the situation gets worse.

Smart sanctions were set to target the individuals who are responsible for doing or inducing some wrongdoing to the authority who is imposing the sanctions. Specific industries or individuals can be targeted under the smart sanctions regime. Usually, the sanctioned individuals or industries are those who have a lot of power concentrated in their own hands.

Smart sanctions also aim to reduce the ill effects of sanctions on the civilian population of the country. But as good as it seems in theory, it is as difficult as it can get when we come to apply the smart sanction regimes. Different types of difficulties arise with regards to implementation, due process, conflict of interest, logistical challenges, etc. Smart sanctions seemed like a perfect solution to counter the ill effects of traditional economic sanction regimes. They were seen as a powerful solution for the failings of broad economic sanctions. A lot of refinement had to be done in broad sanctions regime to bring about this change of smart sanction. Still, even after the application of these targeted sanctions, economic sanctions as a concept are problematic on diverse levels, especially with regards to

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humanitarian grounds. Some scholars are of the view that just because smart sanctions are impacting or trying to aim at specific individuals or goods, that doesn't mean that they are more effective and efficient than the traditional trade sanctions. The goal for imposing smart sanctions should be very specific and definitive as there's no scope for ambiguousness in smart sanctions because then it will defeat the whole purpose of their existence in the first place. Smart economic sanctions also have inadvertent consequences like, high economic cost for the neighbouring countries adverse humanitarian effects on civilian populations, criminalization of basic economic activities, and strengthening of target governments authoritarianism, corruption and most importantly the persistent violation of human rights.

The concluding annotations about targeted sanctions would be that no matter what they aim for, the impact is seen in the civilian lives as frequently as it was seen in the regimes of traditional trade sanctions. Humanitarian damage or ethical challenges have not been overcome in a manner which was desired from the specific sanction regimes. In a practical sense, the targeted sanctions regime, which is a smarter descendant of the traditional regime, is not very different from it. Some impactful and essential questions are still unanswered when it comes to smart sanctions regimes. In the coming parts of this article, I will discuss such issues in detail.

Policy Constraints on Economic Sanctions Article 25 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945), states that “The UN member states agree to carry out the decisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in accordance with the charter”, it can be interpreted to mean that states are obliged to carry out those decisions of UNSC which conform with the charter. Article 24(2) (United Nations, 1945) “obliges the UNSC to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” These two clauses show that the powers of the UNSC must be exercised in compliance with the aims and values of the UN, not without them. Whereas, if seen from the perspective of the predicament of civilians due to the economic sanction regimes, this is counter-intuitive to the Articles 1, 8, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76.2 (Syed Ali Akhtar, April 2019) of UN Charter that refers to human rights in the Preamble. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter talks about the prohibition of the threat or use of force International relations, but there is no explicit prohibition to levying economic sanction regimes.

Article 1(3) (United Nations, 1945) specifically refers to the promotion of human rights as one major purpose of United Nations and Article 55(c) (United Nations, 1945) states that the United Nations shall “promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. The UN Secretary-General himself in a supplement to an agenda for peace, called “economic sanctions, as a “blunt instrument” and demanded inter alia that more effective

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team position Impact Assessment be devised, as well as an enhanced instrument for providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups” (Reinisch, August, 2001). The Martens Clause which was introduced into the preamble in 1899 Hague Convention II, also puts limitations on the economic sanctions regimes, it reads that, “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.” Directly or indirectly, Humanitarian impact can be seen in economic sanctions regimes, but still, there is no clarity in theory and practicality of the provisions under the UN charter or provisions of humanitarian law itself. It either depicts that the suffering of civilians this not fall under the mentioned provisions and hence, cannot be redressed or it means that the UN is waning to comply with its promises.

Humanitarian ethics & Economic Sanctions International humanitarian law is codified and developed in four Geneva conventions of 1949, and two additional protocols of 1977 (Reinisch, August 2001). International humanitarian law does not explicitly talk about economic sanctions, there are certain codes of conduct, which can be kept in mind while talking about economic sanctions in relation to the civilian population. For that matter article like 54, 69,70 of protocol-1, article 14 of protocol-2 or article 21, 22 and 23 or Geneva convention,1949; General Assembly resolution 3318 (XXIX); all of them put limitations on economic sanctions from the viewpoint of human rights and Humanitarian Law. It is said that economic sanctions are feasible if compared to military conflicts as It is a concession on the cost of lives which is paid by the country which is being sanctioned. It is also believed that these economic sanctions are a humane alternative to war, but, due to economic sanctions, the civilian population is adversely affected and Article 50 of the Hague Convention and Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 states that “No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible”. Concern is expressed about the right to life in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but there is a significant violation of the right to life by failing to prevent the deprivation of life as a result of lack of nutrition, basic healthcare and medical services (Reinisch, August, 2020). An innocent civilian population wasn't ever a danger to world peace and security, and although certain organisations, persons or sectors can be, a general populace does not present a threat to the global community. What is troubling however, is that only the general civilian populace is adversely harmed by economic sanctions regimes.

In nations where civilians are still struggling because of the government's illegitimacy, international sanctions are simply serving as an additional danger to their lives. Access to

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clean water, medication health facilities, adequate education and nutritious food, all of these aspects are essential for normal and stable human life, and economic sanctions have an effect on all of these components and have a direct impact on the civilian population. Those citizens could seldom petition their government for any support, because they are already corrupted and oppressive. In such situations, sanctions do not lead to an improvement in the regime, as the regime itself was responsible for the sanctions to be imposed in the first place. So the effect of these sanctions on people is twice the pain and suffering that should not have existed in the first place. All of this act as a reinforcement to an already illegitimate situation.

A group of scholars conducted an empirical analysis with regards to the efficiency and results of sanctions. They did not find any evidence that suggested sanctions lead to human rights improvement and nor do these sanctions pass any necessity test in those cases, in which sanctions aimed at an improvement of human rights. On the contrary, they found that the sanctions lead to further deterioration of human rights in the targeted country (Gutmann, Jerg, 2018). Sanctions have typically failed to bring about the desired behavioural or economic improvement within the target state. There is a risk that sanctions will be used opportunistically by strong nations against small and disadvantaged countries. The imposition of restrictions offer ascent to the risk that the sanctioned state may resort to the use of force, as a result of the damage inflicted on innocent citizens of the State. (Whitty, Michael, Suk Kim, and Trevor Crick, 2006).

Impact of Sanction Regimes on Civilians: The Case of Iran and North Korea In the Hague Convention of 1907 Regulations, Article 22 says that "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited". In my point of view, when we see the conditions of the general public in countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, or North Korea, it communicates the crossed limits which have been talked about in Article 22 of the Hague convention. What we see in economic sanctions regimes, is that they give us a compelling viewpoint to think about the loopholes in their implementation. Although there are a lot of examples of human rights violations in economic sanction regimes, in this paper I have briefly discussed the plight of people in Iran and North Korea, which make economic sanctions share the same stage as war crimes.

Iran Sanctions continue with increasingly tenuous political ties, terrorist funding, and debates about uranium enrichment, Iranian economic sanction regime continue to be a hotly debated subject. The story started from the year 1979 after the American Embassy was seized

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by some students in Iran and officials were taken as hostages, since that incident, the imposition of economic sanctions has been on and off between USA and Iran. In May 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from Joint Comprehensive Plan (JCPOA) of Action and re-imposed all the secondary sanctions on Iran, which were lifted after the Iran Nuclear deal, later in November 2018. In 2019, President Trump said that the sanctions regime on Iran now would be the “toughest ever sanctions” by the US. Iran's market and economy have fallen into severe recession due to the sanctions. Following the easing of international sanctions in 2016 under the nuclear agreement known as the JCPOA, Iran experienced a booming rise of more than 13%, with oil sales of $57.4 billion (€ 51.6 billion) in 2017 at the basis of its increased export volume, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Shora Azarnoush, 2019).

The IMF predicted Iran's economy to sink down to-9.5 % in 2019 from an estimated4.8 per cent in 2018, and the new World Economic Outlook report by the IMF suggests that the country will undergo zero percent economic growth in 2020 (Financial Tribune, 2020). We can see that there is a direct connection of sanctions, with worsening of Iran's economy. When the nuclear deal was implemented and the sanctions were lifted from Iran.

From 2016 to 2018, there was a high rise in the GDP growth rate of Iran, after decades of economic isolation, Iranians were looking forward to a future where their nation would enter into the global marketplace. But, as soon as the US sanctions were fully reinstated, the GDP declined in 2018 and 2019. “Oil shipments in Iran fell from a high of 2.7 million barrels per day to 1.7-1.9 million barrels per day (Stephanie Segal and Dylan Gerstel, 2018).” In an economic update published on 9 October concerning Iran, “The World Bank came up with a comparable statistic of 8.7% contraction for the Iranian economy in 2019 attributable to the "plummeting" of oil and gas exports, as well as new sanctions against Iran's steel, mines and maritime sectors (Shora Azarnoush,2019).” Companies with US specific concerns or influence will most likely choose to continue to comply with the US primary and secondary sanctions on Iran. Companies with legal capability and appetite for risk to engage with Iran will also face a range of logistical and operational challenges, especially in the banking and insurance sectors (Control Risks, 2019). The currency of Iran is drastically depreciating. A report by Reuters tells the story of Hosseini, she talks about growing poverty and helplessness among Iranians. She states about her daughter’s misery of not being able to continue her study abroad and having to come back because they cannot afford it anymore, due to a sharp drop in Iranian currency against the US dollar.

This depreciation in the currency has a really bad impact on the civilian population of Iran (Parisa Hafezi and Davide Barbuscia,2020 ).

Despite being sanctioned the development of missile capabilities force and providing arms and support to a broad array of armed factions operating in Iran has continued. But the bone of contention here is that imposing these sanctions is bringing a change in the activities of the Iranian regime, or is it just serving as a means to destroying the life of civilians in Iran (Kenneth Katzman,2020).

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Mahdi Mahmoudi in an interview said “we are asking those countries who claim to champion human rights, and those who claimed to be founders of human rights, why they are silent about this violation of human rights, and how refugees can tolerate these hardeconomic conditions as a result of unfair US sanctions. The US sanctions and economic pressures are affecting refugee’s livelihood (Iran Press News Agency, 2020).” Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York said, "The sanctions are designed to harm the general public, particularly the vulnerable people like women, children, elderly and patients”. The most vulnerable faction of civilians is the one that is suffering the most (Zein Basravi, 2019)”.

US sanctions which are meant to punish the Iranian regime, are only punishing the civilians of Iran. Due to such hard-hitting impact of us sanctions on the economy Iranians are facing difficulty in affording the basic means of livelihood. There is deterioration in basic health care facilities, availability of medical supplies, quality education etc. the patients who need medicines which can only be imported do not have any redressal to their misery.

There is high poverty due to unemployment, and the prices are also rising due to the inflationary pressures. What happens to the standard of living of Iranian people can only be imagined from the lens of sympathy and regret. There is a catastrophic impact of all these factors on Iranians. Although, Iran is an agriculture-based economy, the global integration of the Iranian economy in recent years has made things even worse because of the increasing dependency on imports and exports. The devastation of common lives should be taken into account. And these high impact sanction regime by the US should be immediately reconsidered in the international community. Prima facie, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found authority over the re-imposition of sanctions against Iran by the US. The court has also suggested provisional pro-Iran initiatives. For the first time, this case is going to offer judicial scrutiny to the act of coercive economic sanctions. This case may potentially shed some light on existing non-UN sanctions policies and their legal implications under international law (Syed Ali Akhtar,2019).

North Korea North Korea was sanctioned by the US in the 1950s. After that, North Korea was sanctioned by the UN in the year 2006 after conducting the nuclear missile test. Military containment, diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions were levied against North Korea after the end of the Korean War by the US. But the Korean regime has still not been stabilised or operated according to the wishes of the international community.

Due to the combination of the sanctions by the US and the UN, there are severe repercussions with regards to humanitarian conditions in North Korea. The sanctions banned the export of coal, iron ore iron lead, lead ore, and seafood for punishing the intercontinental ballistic missile test by the country’s regime. North Korean labourers are also prohibited for the purposes of giving employment.

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“The banking system used to get funds into the country to cover day-to-day running expenses has been discontinued since September 2017. Attempts to find a substitute channel have so far been unsuccessful. Despite this challenge, humanitarian agencies have continued to carry out their activities. Some 90% of humanitarian expenditure is spent outside the country. The comparatively limited amount of funds needed in the country is primarily to pay running expenses, including rent, service costs and local wages (DPR Korea Needs and Priorities report,2019).” The collapse of banking channels is not being compensated by finding a replacement, since the attempt to find a replacement have been unsuccessful, it is having an adversely limiting impact on the population of North Korea.

It was explicitly discussed in one of the reports by the UN sanctions committee that there would be no effect on the civilian population of North Korea and the activities related to the humanitarian assistance, would not be restricted or negatively impacted. The UN appealed for the urgent humanitarian need in North Korea, but it is still not appropriately funded. UN agencies had decided to provide North Korean people with improved water sanitation and hygiene, but due to delays concerning sanctions, the process lagged for an extended period. It was found out in the study that North Korean children who are under the age of five are experiencing severe malnutrition and vitamin A deficiency. Although United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) tried to reach a lot of children in 2018, due to the funding gaps and delays the process became difficult and a lot of North Koreans were not reached and “people died due to preventable diseases and infections. Some of these deaths can also be attributed to the delays in approvals from the UN sanctions committee for a basic facility like delivery of water purification equipment (Kee B. Park, Miles Kim And Jessup Jong, 2019),” US’s strategy of putting pressure and isolating North Korea creates political tensions, so organizations like UNICEF and the World Food Programme lack funds to provide nutrition and food to the North Korean children. “According to the DPR Korea, Needs and priorities report 2019, there is a total of 25 million population, out of which 10.9 million people require assistance and aid. The targeted population is of 3.8 million, and there is a requirement of 120 million US dollars. This situation right now has 12 humanitarian partners”. According to this study, 43.3 per cent of the population is undernourished by chronic food insecurity and an estimated 16,000 Tb related deaths are registered in North Korea each year. According to a survey by Multiple Indicator of Cluster Services (MICS), it is estimated that 39 per cent of 9.77 5 million people do not have access to healthy drinking water in North Korea. (DPR Korea Needs and Priorities report,2019).

Due to a tedious approval process in UN sanctions against North Korea, a lot of damage was caused because of the delay in providing humanitarian assistance. “Providing wheelchairs, walking sticks walkers hearing aids, etc to people with disabilities; providing safe shelters to people was delayed by months. Construction of Canals against floods was not facilitated, 1.50,000 women who are pregnant had no access to safe abortion and 22,000 at-risk patients had no access to blood transfusions (Jessup Jong and Kee Park,2019) (Jeongyoon Kim And Kee B. Park, 2019) (South China Morning Post, 2017). In North Korea, “fishermen died in a greater number last year is an evidence of the fact that sanctions

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imposed on North Korea are becoming a success and the country is under severe economic pressure, but it is also evidence of the fact that pressure is not on the North Korean leader, but instead, it is on the people who are poor and powerless. (Patrick Cockburn, 2018).”

Conclusions If seen from the lens of human rights, economic sanctions can only be perceived as an act of coercion and aggression or to put in other words, War crimes. Looking at the frequency at which the sanctions regimes are being implemented, for example by the US, it is imperative to look at the ethical context of economic sanctions. Criminalising the exchange of goods and services on which the livelihood of the marginalised population depends, is a display of antagonism. The non-council members should be consulted inclusion of an international community, and the presence of global media should be increased, there should be a creation of a platform on which the victims of these sanction regimes can express their hardships and suffering, and bring the attention of the international communities to it. The organisation within a particular country should help such victims, put forth their point in the international community. There should be transparency in the procedures and meetings of sanctions, answerability should be created for specific institutions to maintain humanitarian standards in the international community. Such institutions should not just work on paper, but point out and close the loopholes between the laws and reality.

Clarity should be brought in the theoretical objectives of the UN with respect to human rights and humanitarian law, and what happens when there comes a time when these theories need a practical application. The six-prong test (Marc Bossuyt, 2012) submitted by the sub Commission on 16th August 2000, should not just be a theoretical suggestion, but should also have practical applications. These sanctions should only be imposed for valid reasons. The target goods and services under sanctions should be monitored.

Concerning the parties affected, there should be a time limit on the economic sanctions imposed, and the effectiveness of the sanctions should be checked. The efficacy of sanctions is a big factor to consider because this is one factor that can place a time limit on the suffering of the civilian population. The approach of targeting the regime, through the civilian population should never be justified as an argument in favour of economic sanctions. Formation of economic sanctions and procedures should be in such a way that humanitarian aid is provided to the people who require it.

The most efficient economies in the world and countries like the US should not have the scope to exercise their discretionary power to such an extent that it becomes a humanitarian tragedy. Even if the international community recognises that undue power is being exercised in imposing these sanction regimes, not much can be done if collective efforts are, not all undertaken in this regard. For instance, the recent sanctions imposed by US President Donald Trump against Iran is seen as propaganda by countries like Russia, China and Europe for the upcoming presidential elections. There should be a strict check on the political motives of the sanctioning country and they should be held accountable if their

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motives are inconsistent with the provisions of the UN or the international community's welfare.

It is to be made sure that economic sanctions do not become a hegemonic instrument to be used by the powerful economies of the world or by some people in power of that economy, to maintain dominance in the international community, while simultaneously devastating, the civilian population of the international community.

References • Whitty, Michael, Suk Kim, and Trevor Crick. "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of North Korea." North Korean Review 2, no. 1 (2006): 50-65. Accessed September 3, 2020.

Available from < http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908677> • Syed Ali Akhtar, Do Sanctions Violate International Law? ENGAGE EPW, 8 April 2019, Available form < https://www.epw.in/engage/article/do-sanctions-violate-international-law > • Reinisch, August. "Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions." The American Journal of International Law 95, no. 4 (2001): pp 851-872. Accessed September 3, 2020. doi:10.2307/2674632.

• Gutmann, Jerg; Neuenkirch, Matthias; Neumeier, Florian; Steinbach, Armin, Economic sanctions and human rights: Quantifying the legal proportionality principle, ECONSTOR (Provided in Cooperation with: University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)), May 2018, Available from <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/178615/1/ile-wp-2018-12.pdf > • Whitty, Michael, Suk Kim, and Trevor Crick. "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of North Korea." North Korean Review 2, no. 1 (2006): 50-65. Accessed September 3, 2020.

Available from < http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908677> • Shora Azarnoush, economy plummets under weight of sanctions, DW (DW.COM), 23 October, 2019, Available from < https://www.dw.com/en/irans-economy-plummets-under-weight-of-sanctions/a-50950471 > • Financial Tribune, IMF Expects Deeper Slowdown in Iran Economy, 5 September, 2020, Available from < https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/100376/imf-expects-deeper-slowdown-in-iran-economy> • Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions, Congressional Research Service, Updated July 23, 2020, Available from < https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf > • US sanctions adversely affect humanitarian activities: Official, Iran Press News Agency, 9 January,2020, Available from < http://iranpress.com/content/14049> • Zein Basravi, The economic impact of US sanctions on Iran's streets, Aljazeera News, 7 Jul 2019, Available from <https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2019/07/economic-impact-sanctionsiran-streets-190706190053896.html > • Stephanie Segal and Dylan Gerstel, The Economic Impact of Iran Sanctions, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 5 November,2018 Available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-iran-sanctions >

Indic Journal of International Law 24 • Shora Azarnoush, economy plummets under weight of sanctions, DW (DW.COM), 23 October, 2019, Available from < https://www.dw.com/en/irans-economy-plummets-under-weight-of-sanctions/a-50950471\ > • Parisa Hafezi and Davide Barbuscia, Currency crisis impoverishes Iranians strains economic defences, REUTERS, July 7, 2020, Available from <https://in.reuters.com/article/us-iraneconomy-rial-analysis/currency-crisis-impoverishes-iranians-strains-economic-defenses-idINKBN2480M3 > • 2019 DPR Korea Needs and Priorities, credits: OCHA/ Anthony Burke, March, 2019 Available from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DPRK%20NP%202019%20Final.pdf > • CONTROL RISKS, Navigating the global sanctions landscape in 2020, October 2019 <https://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/c0114454-5fbc-4870-ae83936b64328d83 > • Kee B. Park, Miles Kim And Jessup Jong, The Human Costs of UN Sanctions and Funding Shortfalls for Humanitarian Aid in North Korea, 38 North,AUGUST 22, 2019 Available from <https://www.38north.org/2019/08/parkkimjong082219/> Jessup Jong and Kee Park, Humanitarian exemptions for North Korean aid work: crunching the numbers, NK News, July 16, 2019, Available from <https://www.nknews.org/2019/07/humanitarianexemptions-for-north-korean-aid-work-crunching-the-numbers/> • Jeongyoon Kim And Kee B. Park, How Sanctions Hurt North Korea’s Children, Global Health NOW, August 5, 2019, Available from <https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2019-08/how-sanctionshurt-north-koreas-children > • SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, North Korea sanctions, 2017 Available from <https://www.scmp.com/topics/north-korea-sanctions> • Em. Prof. Dr. Marc Bossuyt, THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,2012 Available from <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WCM/MarcBossuyt_WorkshopUnilateralCoerc iveSeminar.pdf > • Patrick Cockburn, It’s Time to call Economic Sanctions what they are: War Crimes. counterpunch. January 22, 2018. Available from <https://www.counterpunch.org/2 018/01/22/its-time-to-call-economic-sanctions-what-they-are-war-crimes/> • United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 1945.

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Analysis of Commentaries by parties to the Convention to Certain Conventional Weapons on the guiding principles developed by Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Weapons Autonomous Systems Divyansh Singh Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, India

Avishi Pateriya Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab, India

Abstract. This work is adapted from a policy brief submitted for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction The conundrum on development of Lethal Autonomous Weapons, which though capable of reducing casualties in conflict torn situations through algorithmic targeting of adversaries without having “human in loop”, also raises questions on legality of targets engaged when such anthropological presence is absent. Moreover, in a situation wherein the machine itself makes the decision to engage a target, it becomes difficult to apply the “Doctrine of Effective Control” postulated by the International Court of Justice, which holds that State must be shown to have had “Effective Control” over the State Actor that the Affected Party attributes the attack to. These considerations gave rise to the mandate on such Lethal Autonomous Weapons (hereinafter referred to as LAWS) in 2013, under the aegis of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (hereinafter referred to as CCW).

A series of meetings on the issue of LAWS materialised into the decision to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (hereinafter referred to as GGE on LAWS). This mechanism of engaging experts, comprising of High Contracting Parties to CCW, Non-State Parties to CCW, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations to give guiding principles to the Convention, compounded with

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Commentaries giving Political and Legal verification to the principles envisaged by the experts has been described as an example of Track-II Diplomacy.

The Guiding Principles provide a relevant overall guidance to the work of the GGE on LAWS and for the High Contracting Parties to take into account when designing and implementing internal law and policies on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS (UNODA, 2020 p. 1) They provide an excellent basis from which to develop a normative and operational framework to address emerging technologies in the area of LAWS (UNODA, 2020). They act as a foundation for the GGE’s future aspects and can also direct states in the responsible development and the use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. They are a cohesive framework with each principle bolstering the other.

The 2019 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW saw the recognition and the affirmation of the 11 ‘Guiding Principles’ on the Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon System by the GGE. These guiding principles have been under development since the year 2018 and the existing version that has been adopted in the year 2019 is not much different from the former, except the addition of one single paragraph (Paragraph ‘C’). After the espousal of these principles by the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, parties to CCW were asked to submit a paper regarding the National Commentary on these guiding principles. Member Nations like Venezuela, Portugal, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Spain, Italy, Switzerland etc. and Non-State Parties like Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons(hereinafter referred to as iPRAW) and Non-Governmental Bodies like International Committee of the Red Cross hereinafter referred to as ICRC) submitted their detailed opinion and comments on each one of the 11 guiding principles on the Emerging Technologies in the areas of LAWS and tried to provide a comprehensive yet brief account on the various ways in which the use of LAWS can be supervised by each State, in addition to them being in accordance with the provisions of the International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter referred to as IHL).

The provisions of IHL include elements such as principle of distinction, principle of proportionality and principle of precaution in attack. Other principles like that of Humanity, given in the Martens Clause developed in 1899 Hague Conference and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I to Geneva Convention providing for enforcement mechanism also underline the virtues upon which the Guiding Principles have been drafted by the GGE on LAWS. Below mentioned is a brief analysis of each individual principle with respect to commentaries submitted by the Parties to the CCW, each describing their own stance and the steps taken to act on the principles to ensure meaningful control over critical functions of weapons systems:

a) International humanitarian law continues to apply fully to all weapons systems, including the potential development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems.

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It is extremely significant for all the States to keep in mind, while deploying or developing, that any autonomous weapon system must be used and worked in absolute compliance with the International Humanitarian Law. Usage of an autonomous weapon during military conflicts can be incredibly dangerous and harmful, hence the correct use of these automated weapons is only possible when these are well programmed to distinguish between civilians and combatants and, civilian objects and property and military objectives. The predictability of AWS, contextual awareness, qualitative judgements or potential self-learning capabilities are cases in point (UNODA, 2020). The necessity of sufficient predictability and reliability was emphasised upon in the light of the “Black Box Problem”, which refers to the lack of understanding of how an autonomous weapon goes from point A of engaging with the target to point B of eventually pulling the trigger, and everything that lies in between. Complex systems of Artificial Intelligence use thousands of programming constraints to eventually make this decision to attack, understanding the layers of which is analogous to looking through a Black Box (Cress, 2019). Other Technical elements like Data Bias, Cognitive Limitations, Programming Shortfalls and Epistemological Limitations also exacerbate the unpredictability of already complex systems (UNODA, 2020).

The elements of such systems thus require a significant amount of human control as the functionality of an AWS cannot be limited as per the requirements of the IHL. This is the reason why there are countries like Israel which believe that operationalization of the converging 11 guiding principles of the GGE should be based on existing framework of IHL (Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, 2020). Moreover, there are member nations like Austria that believe questions concerning effective human control cannot be answered only within the existing framework of IHL. To this end, Austria has raised two questions concerning IHL compliance. These are, first, the legality of a weapon per se and second, the question of lawful use of a certain weapon. Austria believes that level of autonomy in regards to the aforementioned questions needs to be addressed during the development phase of any potential weapon, to ensure basic principles of IHL, such as distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. However, Austria also recognises that circumstances on battlefield are evolving in nature and human control and human judgements are necessary prerequisites and mere compliance with IHL cannot ensure that the guiding principles are achieved. The best example of this is the concept of Lethality of weapon stated by Austria in its commentary, which is per se not a concept in IHL (Permanent Mission of Austria to United Nations, Geneva, 2020).

Those parties which base their understanding of the guiding principles on existing frameworks of IHL, have taken some proactive steps towards enforcing the same. For instance, Australia has incorporated Law of Armed Conflict training in the courses it gives to its military, and its Department of Defence offers courses along the lines of IHL to military personnel from all States (UNODA, 2020).

The United States in its commentary specified three general scenarios for the use of autonomous functions in weapon systems:

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1) using autonomous functions to effectuate more accurately and reliably a commander or operator’s intent to strike a specific target or target group; 2) using autonomous functions to inform a commander or operator’s decision-making about what targets he or she intends to strike; 3) using autonomous functions to select and engage specific targets that the commander or operator did not know of when he or she activated the weapon system (UNODA, 2020).

If these autonomous weapons are consistent with IHL, their functions and capabilities can be used to effectuate more accurately and reliably a commander or operator’s intent to strike a specific target or target group. Their consistency with the IHL can be strengthened if it reduces the likelihood to harm any civilian or any civilian object or property. The expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects is to be informed by all available and relevant information, including information about: (i) the presence of civilians or civilian objects within the area and during the time when the weapon system is expected to be operating; (ii) the performance of the weapon’s autonomous functions in selecting and engaging military objectives; (iii) the risks posed to civilians and civilian objects when the weapon engages military objectives; (iv) the incidence of military objectives that could be engaged by the weapon system in the operational area; and (v) the effectiveness of any precautions taken to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects (UNODA, 2020 p. 3).

In order to further reduce the unexpected harm to the civilians and civilian property, measures like warnings, monitoring the operation of the weapon systems, and activation or the employment of self-destruct or self-deactivation mode must be programmed in the AWS.

b) Human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines. This should be considered across the entire life cycle of the weapons system.

Autonomous weapon systems cannot be granted with the accountability to render attacks or specify enemy targets during armed conflicts or military operations. The LAWS and the Artificial Intelligence are just mere tools to assist the humans in fulfilling their purposes and operations during a military skirmish. Some countries presuppose degree of human control over the course of design, development and use of LAWS. Australia explained the modus operandi to execute this control, which includes setting parameters, conducting tests, carrying out legal reviews, training operators, setting rules of engagement, taking decision to deploy them, evaluating their effectiveness after use and taking decision to decommission them (UNODA, 2020 p. 2).

The decision and the will to use force must be retained with the human beings at all times, just like in the use of other weapon systems. The use of force must be planned and executed in such a way that it can always be retraceable to the human being operating the

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machine, in order to prevent any accountability gaps for violations of international law (UNODA, 2020 p. 3). Humans are acquired with conscious decision making ability regarding the use of weapon systems, even if they are autonomous, and can base their decisions on the assessment of all the relevant information and evidences available to them at the correct time during a crisis. Human mind is the best way to control the threatening and stressful situations which require presence of an agile mind during any existential crisis. A machine cannot be conceded with the sole responsibility of this as even if it is well engineered and programmed with all precautionary measures taken, it cannot be held liable for anything wrong that may take place due to any technical problem. Meaningful human control is absolutely necessary to handle the operative framework of the LAWS and must be implemented during the life cycle of each autonomous weapon.

This concept of Human Accountability and Responsibility needs to be applied at State and Individual levels. This is because IHL is applicable on State Parties and Individuals and cannot be enforced on machines. ICRC, in its commentary has proposed a combination of three types of control measures to satisfy legal and ethical obligations transferred from machine onto the individuals and the states: (ICRC, 2020) • Controls on Weapon Parameters-can inform limits on types of autonomous weapon systems including the targets they are used against, as well as limits on their duration and geographical scope of operation, and requirements for deactivation and fail-safe mechanisms.

• Controls on Environment-can inform limits on the situations and locations in which autonomous weapon systems may be used, notably, in terms of the presence and density of civilians and civilian objects.

• Controls through Human-Machine Interaction-can inform requirements for human supervision, and ability to intervene and deactivate autonomous weapon systems, and requirements for predictable and transparent functioning.

c) Human-machine interaction, which may take various forms and be implemented at various stages of the life cycle of a weapon, should ensure that the potential use of weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems is in compliance with applicable international law, in particular IHL. In determining the quality and extent of human-machine interaction, a range of factors should be considered including the operational context, and the characteristics and capabilities of the weapons system as a whole.

This principle recognizes that human-machine interaction should ensure IHL compliance and as well as the need to consider human-machine interaction comprehensively, across the life cycle of the weapon system. The GGE should elaborate on good practices in human-machine interaction that can strengthen compliance with IHL (UNODA, 2020 p. 5). Since the accountability of the decision making cannot be retained with the autonomous weapon systems alone, the process of human-machine interaction must be in

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compliance with IHL, for which factors like operative context, and the characteristics and capabilities of the weapon system as a whole must be kept in mind at all situations. The compliance with IHL and also the Human Rights Law is to make sure the avoidance of any kind of unintended engagements and minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects and property. This can be effectuated through the following measure, according to the United States commentary: • Weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS should be engineered to perform as anticipated. This should include verification and validation and testing and evaluation before fielding systems.

• Training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures should be established for the weapon system. Operators should be certified by relevant authorities that they have been trained to operate the weapon system in accordance with applicable rules.

• User interfaces for weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS should be clear in order for operators to make informed and appropriate decisions in engaging targets (UNODA, 2020 p. 6).

The iPRAW has however, raised an important challenge that military encounters while practicing the human-machine interactions. In autonomous systems, the extent of interaction when it comes to human interventions finishes at a very early stage of operation. This is because in practical situations, IHL principles of proportionality and distinction are legally obligatory until the operation stage only, and after that any such intervention hinders the feasibility in attack, thus defeating the purpose of rapid response for which LAWS are put to place (ICRC, 2020).

In contrast, in 2018 a number of Parties to CCW have recommended launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful control over all the critical functions of weapon systems, with 30 countries calling for ban on Autonomous weapons altogether. A virtual Berlin Forum on lethal autonomous weapon systems was attended by more than 60 countries on 1-2 April 2020.Similiarly, the Rio Seminar on autonomous weapons highlighted on significance of human control. In this respect, one needs to focus on the opinions of dissenting parties like the USA and Russia in CCW’s Sixth Review Conference in December 2021 (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, 2020; International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2020).

d) Accountability for developing, deploying and using any emerging weapons system in the framework of the CCW must be ensured in accordance with applicable international law, including through the operation of such systems within a responsible chain of human command and control.

This guiding principle recognizes that State and individual responsibility must be ensured through the effective implementation of accountability measures, including the military chain of command. The accountability for any unlawful use of the LAWS by any commander, personnel, engineer, programmer, designer, etc. must be retained on the State itself rather than exacerbating the responsibility on any individual. Though, this must be done in

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accordance with the IHL. According to the Russian Federation, it is mandatory to reaffirm the commitment to the need to maintain human-machine interaction and control over the LAWS, even if they are highly advanced machine systems. It is human responsibility to ensure the compliance with IHL norms during the combat use of the so-called LAWS (UNODA, 2020).

In compliance with this principle, investigations into allegations of war crimes potentially perpetrated by armed forces and nationals through LAWS should be carried out by the High Contracting Parties (UNODA, 2020). A responsible chain of Human command is also necessary for ensuring that the level of Autonomy does not get altered at any point in operation of the LAWS. To enable proper functioning in compliance with IHL, clear pre-defined boundaries need to be set. These include geographical coordinates, the allowed time window and environmental conditions for authorised operations, but also system specific limitations, preconditions, rules of engagement etc. A set of such multidimensional parameters form a kind of virtual box-of-operation for the LAWS in question. If the box of operation is “broken” in any dimension, it will affect the choice of functions available for the operation. This will lead to integrity of planned operation being compromised and level of autonomy would have to be altered in accordance to new situations. This is the reason why Mission Planning and defining the box of operation is necessary (LAWS Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2020).

e) In accordance with States’ obligations under international law, in the study, development, acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, determination must be made whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by international law.

All the states must compulsorily have a standard legal review process for all the new weapons, means or methods of warfare acquired by them for armed conflicts and military operations. This should be done to ensure that the usage of all these autonomous weapons is in line with Article-36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Such reviews are a good practice to facilitate the implementation of international law applicable to weapons and their use in armed conflict. Even Nations that are not parties to the Additional Protocol like Israel view legal review applications as a useful instrument for a State to ensure it uses only lawful means of warfare during armed conflicts (Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, 2020 p. 3).

“Emerging technologies” are novel by definition and thus may be construed as “new” under this principle. The use of autonomy in weapon systems, however, is not necessarily new (UNODA, 2020 p. 7). The legal review of the weapons can be done in these ways: • Legal advisors must be consulted regularly for the development or the acquisition of these autonomous weapons.

• The nature of the legal review and advice should be tailored to the stage of the process of developing or acquiring the weapon.

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The legal review must consider the international obligations applicable to the state acquiring the autonomous weapon, to keep a check on any prohibition or restriction regarding their usage provided in the IHL. • The legal review must consider the illegality or the restricted use of any weapon.

• Measures must be taken to mitigate the harming of any civilian or civilian object or property.

• Persons conducting the legal review should understand the likely effects of employing the weapon in different operational contexts.

• States should share good practices on weapon reviews or legal reviews of particular weapons where appropriate.

Such legal reviews are not necessarily bound by Article 36 Systems of Control. A Nation can engage in the abovementioned review even if it is not a party to the Protocol. However, iPRAW contends that Article 36 is necessary and legal review following it is the only way to ensure that a commander understands how a system works and evaluate whether it will be lawful to use it in a given situation, which in absence of a supplemental review or process cannot be ensured (International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2020 p. 4).

f)

When developing or acquiring new weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, physical security, appropriate nonphysical safeguards (including cyber-security against hacking or data spoofing), the risk of acquisition by terrorist groups and the risk of proliferation should be considered.

This guiding principle directs the states to opt for apposite measures while deploying, developing or acquiring new weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in order to ensure the mitigation and avoidance of harm to civilians and civilian objects, the risk of acquisition by terrorist groups and the risk of proliferation. There should be a standardised reviewing and acquisition process for the adoption of any new warfare weapons during which the entire life cycle of the weapon should be considered including an assessment of the level of physical and non-physical security measures that have to be applied. The key criteria to determine the required physical and cybernetic security levels are the attractiveness of a system for unauthorized actors and the potential consequences of the systems misuse. The degree of autonomy of a system, in this regard, is one among several characteristics of a weapon system relevant when assessing the level of security required (UNODA, 2020 p. 5). According to the Portugal commentary on principle ‘e’, The unpredictability and ambiguity that may be entailed in the use of LAWS could result in an erosion of the traditional dichotomies in defence and security narratives (internal v. external; non-combatant v. combatant; civilian v. military; armed conflict v. peace) upon which conventional means and methods of warfare are built.

For these reasons, it is advisable to understand LAWS as possible hybrid tools of disruptive power and, as such, to expect them to gradually become a part of the conceptual and analytical framework of hybrid threats (UNODA, 2020 p. 5).

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Germany in its commentary has stated the measures it has taken to ensure compliance with this principle. This involves all current and future procurement and development of weapons systems running in accordance with a detailed guideline. “Physical Security” and “Non-Physical Safeguards” are important elements of every project work. Moreover, concepts like information security are also in development to mitigate future risks (Federal Foreign Office Germany, 2020).

g) Risk assessments and mitigation measures should be a part of the design, development, and testing and deployment cycle of emerging technologies in any weapons systems.

Autonomous Weapons Systems and Artificial Intelligence are used to assist human beings in carrying out different tasks effortlessly and should not be authorised to become a liability instead of an asset. Risk assessment and mitigation measure should be taken by every state at each stage of the life cycle of a newly acquired weapon system in order to reduce the probability of any glitches, technical or not, while operating them during military manoeuvres or armed conflicts. They are useful tools to address the uncertainty in the anticipated pace and trajectory of the future development of emerging technologies. Risk assessments allow for a weighing of the benefits of the emerging technologies against potential risks and allow for adjustments to be made as further research and development occurs (UNODA, 2020 p. 9). With the development of emerging technologies in the field of LAWS, comes the increase in the scope of progressions and advancements in the weapon systems. A setback that comes along with it is the increased possibility of risks and glitches while operating them. High Contracting Parties should maintain constructive exchanges on emerging technologies in any weapons systems with other relevant stakeholders – e.g. other States, international organisations, academia and relevant industries (particularly defence and security industries and industries dedicated to advancing technology, particularly artificial intelligence). This is especially important when considering that emerging technologies in the area of LAWS and other weapons systems will rely on dual-use technology (UNODA, 2020 p. 5).

Another element that needs to be factored in considering LAWS is the phase between which it transitions to higher level of Autonomy. Migrating from mode A to a higher mode of Autonomy B should be subject to direct human intervention, and even then the failure of human element cannot be neglected. However, cases where human fails and the machine takes over (for example- in anti-locking system of cars), machine needs to be designed very carefully to avoid undermining this principle (International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2020 p. 5).

h) Consideration should be given to the use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems in upholding compliance with IHL and other applicable international legal obligations.

This guiding principle authorises that the use of autonomous weapon systems and the emerging technologies in its area provides us with aids such as reinforcement in the applications and implementations of IHL and a reduced risk of civilian causalities and loss of

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civilian property and objects. This principle should be implemented during legal reviews of new weapons, during the formulation of military strategies and plans, and during the planning and conduct of military operations. Citing a commentary by the Netherlands regarding this guiding principle, “States must ensure that the use of their weapons, means and methods of warfare are compatible with their obligations under international law. Prohibitions in treaty and customary law to employ certain weapons, means and methods of warfare and the obligation to respect and apply international law in good faith include an obligation to review (new) weapons, means and methods of warfare.”

Australia in its commentary also has upheld development of LAWS, and according to them, apart from such disruptive technologies having functions in civilian sectors like those of medical analysis, genomics, logistics, automotive and aerospace manufacturing, in the military sector it helps in reducing civilian casualties or collateral damage, improves the accuracy of weapons, reduces the risk to the defence personnel and provides enhanced situational awareness (UNODA, 2020 p. 1).

i)

In crafting potential policy measures, emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems should not be anthropomorphized.

The emerging technologies in the area of LAWS are to be used to aide and assist human beings in difficult situations. The AI cannot be anthropomorphised at all as the creation of an AI, similar to humans, can cause negative consequences because of social and technological changes that come with the progression of the AI and the AWS technologies. Anthropomorphizing emerging technologies in the area of LAWS can lead to legal and technical misunderstandings that could be detrimental to the efficacy of potential policy measures. As remarked by the United States in its commentary on the guiding principle ‘i’, “from a legal perspective, anthropomorphizing emerging technologies in the area of LAWS can obscure the important point that IHL imposes obligations on States, parties to a conflict, and individuals, rather than machines. “Smart” weapons cannot violate IHL any more than “dumb” weapons can. Similarly, machines are not intervening moral agents, and human beings do not escape responsibility for their decisions by using a weapon with autonomous functions. Anthropomorphizing emerging technologies in the area of LAWS could incorrectly suggest a diminished responsibility of human beings simply by the use of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.” (UNODA, 2020 p. 10) Israel has explained this very succinctly, by stating that LAWS are merely tools to effectuate human intent, and imparting such systems with decision making capabilities tantamount to that of humans will be not viable, as they can never factually or legally be equivalent to humans (Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, 2020 p. 5).

j)

Discussions and any potential policy measures taken within the context of the CCW should not hamper progress in or access to peaceful uses of intelligent autonomous technologies.

Emerging technologies in the field of autonomy are dual-use technologies which have significant potential to advance humanity in various sectors. CCW High Contracting Parties should make sure that any potential measure it adopts does not hamper peaceful uses of

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these technologies. In this regard, the inclusion of the private sector, alongside with the academic community, in the CCW discussions are of relevance (UNODA, 2020 p. 5). The reason behind making risk assessment plans and taking mitigating measures is just to ensure that all the safety protocols are appositely followed by each and every state deploying AWS. This does not mean that the use of technology and the AI in the military conflicts must be censured. These technologies possess remarkable potential in improving the state of the warfare weaponry during armed conflicts and can be efficaciously used to assist human beings in controlling out of hand situations.

k) The CCW offers an appropriate framework for dealing with the issue of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems within the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, which seeks to strike a balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations.

The CCW is strongly supported and affirmed by mostly all the member states in their respective commentaries and is also highly acknowledged and appreciated for designing these guiding principles to act as a foundation for the deployment, development and the usage of autonomous weapons systems. As remarked by the United States in its commentary while bolstering the work done by the CCW, it recognised the CCW GGE as ‘the appropriate multilateral forum for States to address emerging technologies in the area of LAWS because States can use the GGE to engage in a substantive, non-politicized dialogue on IHL issues. The GGE allows States to send technical, legal, policy, and military experts as part of their delegations, submit working papers, and exchange State practice. The High Contracting Parties to the CCW have successfully put this framework to use in their consideration of emerging technologies in the areas of LAWS as reflected in GGE’s substantive reports and the guiding principles.’ (UNODA, 2020 p. 11)

Conclusions Thus, it can be inferred that regulation and not restriction of LAWS should be the way forward. In order to ensure a uniform regulation mechanism, calls have been made for legally binding instruments from various multilateral organisations. In 2018, the NonAlignment Movement emphasised on this idea of a legally binding instrument which was backed by countries like Austria, Brazil and Chile. However, under enhanced investments into such autonomous systems for self-preservation by nations like China, Israel, USA, UK, South Korea, Russia, Turkey etc., the possibility to enter into such deliberations also remains a challenge. Moreover, decision of CCW is taken by a consensus, which is hard to reach in the prevailing circumstances when there is not a clearly defined definition of Autonomy in Military Science, unlike in Political Science. A step towards reaching a consensus towards what constitutes Autonomy could help in achieving the goal of a legally binding instrument, also agreed to, by all the High Contracting Parties.

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References • Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. 2020. Commentary for the Convention on Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons. [Online] June 5, 2020.

[Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200605-Campaign-to-Stop-Killer-Robots.pdf.

• Cress, Matthew. 2019. THE BLACK BOX PROBLEM. http://artificialintelligencemania.com/.

[Online] January 10, 2019. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] http://artificialintelligencemania.com/2019/01/10/the-black-box-problem/.

• Federal Foreign Office Germany. 2020. German commentary on “operationalizing all eleven guiding principles at a national level as requested by the chair of the 2020 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS. [Online] 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200626-Germany.pdf.

• ICRC. 2020. ICRC commentary on the ‘Guiding Principles’ of the CCW GGE on "Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems". United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. [Online] September 2020.

[Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200716-ICRC.pdf.

• International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons. 2020. Commentary on the Guiding Principles. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/iPRAW_Commentary_GuidingPrinciples.pdf.

• LAWS Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 2020. Considerations on the appropriate level of human involvement in LAWS-Food-for-thought paper by Finland. [Online] June 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200706-Finland.pdf.

• Permanent Mission of Austria to United Nations, Geneva. 2020. Contribution of Austria to the Chair`s request on the Guiding Principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20200901-Austria.pdf.

• Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. 2020. Israel Considerations on the Operationalization of the Eleven Guiding Principles. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20200831-Israel.pdf.

• UNODA. 2020. Commentaries by Portugal on “Operationalising all eleven guiding principles at a national level ". UNODA. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 6, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20200831-Portugal1.pdf.

• —. 2020. Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems-National Commentary – Australia. UNODA. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/20200820-Australia.pdf.

• —. 2020. Operationalization of the 11 guiding principles at national level - Comments by France.

[Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200610-France.pdf.

e-ISSN: 2582-8398 | internationalism.in/journal 37 • —. 2020. Switzerland’s commentary on operationalizing the guiding principles at a national level.

UNODA. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 6, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/20200825-Switzerland.pdf .

• —. 2020. U.S. Commentaries on the Guiding Principles. UNODA. [Online] September 2020.

[Cited: October 6, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20200901-United-States.pdf.

• —. 2020. UK commentary on the operationalization of the LAWS guiding principles. UNODA. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 6, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/20200901-United-Kingdom.pdf.

• —. 2020. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs Meetings Place. [Online] United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, September 2020. [Cited: October 10, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GGE20200901-Austria-Belgium-Brazil-ChileIreland-Germany-Luxembourg-Mexico-and-New-Zealand.pdf.

• —. 2020. Working Paper of the Russian Federation: National Implementation of the Guiding Principles on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems.

UNODA. [Online] September 2020. [Cited: October 6, 2020.] https://documents.unoda.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Ru-Commentaries-on-GGE-on-LAWS-guiding-principles1.pdf.

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Avenues of an International AntiCorruption Court and UNGASS 2021

Yashna Walia Panjab University, India

Yashvi Agarwal Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab, India

Abstract. This work is adapted from a policy brief submitted for the Indian International Law Programme.

Introduction Grand corruption has become one of the most significant challenges of our times. It sometimes affects more people than war may. It has severe and global effects. It also holds back countries from achieving their developmental goals. Grand corruption is the abuse of power for the wrongful benefit of the few at the expense of the many. It harms the whole society, yet goes unpunished. This illicit enrichment of the few is made possible with the help of cross-border networks of accountants, lawyers, anonymous shell companies, and banks. People involved in it include senior officials of the government, police officials, relatives of political leaders, the head of the states and government, people of the judiciary, top people in business, and other people in power (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

Grand corruption is one of the most significant threats to the goals of sustainable development. It hampers the growth of the entire country, leads to injustice, an increase in inequality, more unsatisfactory living conditions for people of the country. It takes away the funds allocated for the development of essential services like hospitals and educational institutions, and as a result, the services provided are of low quality (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?,2016).

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The government sometimes abuses its power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts to buy loyalty from cronies. This is one of the most widespread forms of grand corruption. This practice is also called clientelism. The prominent and senior government officials abuse their power to appoint their cronies to a position in the civil services (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

Grand corruption leads to the distortion of sound financial practice and clean business, on a domestic, as well as, international level. It also increases poverty and exclusion and leads to the violation of human right. People are deprived of what they deserve because the government officials that were elected to serve the people are busy stuffing their pockets with the government’s money (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

In earlier times, grand corruption was carried in a very secretive manner, and there was not much information and resources available to the people to detect corruption. But today, all thanks to globalisation, investigative reporting and advanced technology, it is almost impossible to hide anything for a long time. Now, people see new scandals of corruption being exposed on a daily basis (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?,2016).

Loopholes in the current legal framework But the people exposed are still not punished or put to a trial. Their cronies and they have impunity because of the lack of a well-established legal framework. It is high time now that the people and the governments become stricter and make some mechanisms to hold these influential people involved in the corruption accountable. In most of the nations, these kleptocrats go unharmed and continue to live their life of luxury on the money that they have stolen from the people of their country and people of foreign nations. This is because the government is unwilling or unable to hold them accountable. Also, there is a want of anti-corruption laws, both on a domestic and international level (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

These lacking and loopholes have to be mended with urgency; otherwise, we shall fail to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the UN. Many times, the government and its departments are corrupt themselves; thus, refusing to acknowledge the existence of grand corruption and hold the people involved accountable. Even when the government is not involved, it is unable to do much because of the absence of laws and evidence. There are even pieces of evidence available now that the powerful and influential people are indeed involved, but there is no action taken against them. The Panama Papers in 2016 revealed names of some big players like the king of Saudi Arabia, Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto, Malcolm Turnbull, Vijay Mallya and many more. None of them was held accountable, and no investigation was carried out in the matter. They all continued to have impunity. Due to the lack of an investigation, no further evidence was found, and the issue was buried (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

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The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), formed in 2003 is still the only legally binding international anti-corruption treaty. The UNCAC has worked hard to establish legislations and institutions to prevent and combat corruption, but it has its shortcomings. The UNCAC does not contain any laws on grand corruption. Countries that have agreed to and implemented UNCAC still face the problems of grand corruption. This shows that there is an urgent need to improve the legal framework and add specific obligations related to grand corruption (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?,2016).

The heads of countries like Columbia and Peru have been very vocal about the need for a robust anti-corruption legal framework. These countries have long suffered from domestic corruption for several years, and they understand how corruption can hollow out an economy. They also understand the need to have a strict legal framework to catch the people involved in grand corruption. Once there is a robust legal framework in force, the accountability and checks on the people in power would increase manifolds, and the chances of corruption would be reduced (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC) Some countries, like Peru and Columbia are in favour of defining grand corruption as an international crime and establishing an international court to support prosecutions.

These countries have long suffered corruption at a national level in their territories. They have not been able to manage corruption and have found that the anti-corruption laws available on a national or domestic level are not strict enough. Therefore, they believe that the existence of an anti-corruption court on the international level would push the governments to improve national justice systems. The proposed International Anti-Corruption Court would be formed on similar lines as the International Criminal Court (ICC). The court has an extraterritorial jurisdiction and the powers to impose criminal sanctions on the convicted. The IACC would intervene only when the national government is unable or unwilling to carry out investigations in good-faith, fair trials and prosecutions (Stephenson & Schütte, 2019).

The supporters of IACC say that IACC would break the cycle of corruption-impunity by empowering an external body, that is, the IACC. The establishment of IACC would have a deterrent effect. The existence of a body that has the powers and jurisdiction to arrest, try, convict and imprison even the topmost official of the states would deter potential wrongdoers from committing grand corruption. The court would also serve as an incentive for national governments and justice systems to show to the international community that IACC is unnecessary, and that would require them to make prosecutions and convictions at the domestic level itself. Also, the establishment of IACC would show the intolerance of the international community towards corruption, and that would encourage

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reformers and activists to press for other steps to end impunity (Stephenson & Schütte, 2019).

Criticism and concerns regarding IACC But there are several concerns and criticisms regarding the establishment of IACC. A country is required to voluntarily agree for the IACC to have jurisdiction over that nation.

The top leaders have impunity because they do not let their governments hold them accountable. Therefore, these leaders would also not allow their countries to agree to IACC. If some methods are imposed to get these countries to agree to IACC, like making membership to the IACC a prerequisite for membership to UNCAC, or a requisite for receiving international aid, there would be problems with that also. The state members of the UNCAC must agree to amend it, and countries who do not want to submit to IACC would vote against such amendment. If the majority of the members vote against the amendment, it would not be possible to establish IACC (Stephenson & Schütte, 2019).

Furthermore, if these coercive measures are applied, the top leaders of the countries would let their country suffer rather than agree to an international anti-corruption body that can prosecute and punish them. Also, it will be the innocent people who will suffer if these threats are followed through by cutting off countries that refuse to join IACC from international development aid. Cutting off the aid and international trade has the potential of worsening the problems of corruption. The establishment of IACC may only target the marginalised, third world countries and the big countries and their allies might escape liability yet again due to their veto power (Stephenson & Schütte, 2019).

Also, for the collection of shreds of evidence, the authorities have to depend upon cooperation from the countries, which would not be provided when the investigation can lead to the prosecution of the top leaders of the country. Even if the information or evidence is provided, the question of whether the evidence can be considered admissible will be there. Moreover, the operating of IACC may not be economically viable. There is no guarantee of catching and holding people involved in grand corruption accountable. It would be difficult to pay the operating cost of IACC. The cost of operating ICC was $160 million in 2019. Instead of spending such vast amounts of money on trying to catch the corrupt leaders, who may still escape, the amount can be used for development. As a result, most states prefer bilateral cooperation on such matters because the lesser the number of countries involved, the lesser would be the cost of deciding on corruption matters. Moreover, the interests and ideologies of each state do not match. So, the countries that have a good understanding among them prefer to deal with corruption issues among themselves.

Also, there is no guarantee that the stolen money would be recovered. Therefore, the operation of IACC is not economically viable (Stephenson & Schütte, 2019).

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The United Nations General Assembly Special Session of 2021 (UNGASS 2021) on anti-corruption, the first such session, would discuss such issues and the possible measures, which are also practical and can be adopted to prevent and combat corruption.

Measures to eliminate grand corruption The depth at which grand corruption affects us all reminds us of the pressing need to eliminate it. Evolving a legal definition of grand corruption and its possible designation as an ‘international crime’ is seen as the first step towards such elimination. Such a designation is seen as imperative so as to get grand corruption treated at an equal level of seriousness as war crimes (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

Effective law enforcement at the domestic level is seen as pertinent to end grand corruption. This involves having strong and independent judicial systems, strong laws and accountable law enforcement agencies. However, in reality, the people involved in grand corruption enjoy impunity as they are usually at the helm of affairs in the country. Public prosecutions hardly take place, and if they do, they are usually not convicted (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

It’s also pertinent to strengthen the role auditing agencies have in a country. They should be independent and devoid of political and monetary influences so that they are able to do their work effectively. Similarly, financial management should be reformed in such a manner that citizens can hold people in power accountable. On such measure could be the disclosure of budgetary allocation (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

Transparency is the key to achieve success in this matter. Citizens should be empowered by giving them as much access as possible to governmental activities and initiatives. This keeps misappropriation of resources in check and increases public participation in governance. Mutual trust between citizens and the government can be increased through community monitoring initiatives as well. These can help detect corruption, reduce leakage of funds and improve the quantity and quality of public services (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

External and internal pressures can bring about change in a nation. The role of civil society in getting kleptocrats indicted cannot be emphasised upon enough. While external pressure is built by international organisations, NGOs can create a powerful internal pressure mechanism. As they represent the needs and aspirations of people, they can give legitimacy and credibility to the anti-corruption agenda. It is also pertinent to ensure that anti-corruption strategies are feasible and culturally accepted, which the NGOs can do.

NGOs promote vertical accountability and are a watchdog of the government’s actions and policies, all of which promote the anti-corruption agenda (Chêne & Dell, 2008). Anticorruption NGOs can take part in criminal procedures and represent a broad range of

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victims. Teodorin Obiang, the Vice-President of Equatorial Guinea was convicted by a French court for embezzlement. The conviction came after the anti-corruption campaign launched by Transparency International and Sherpa (an NGO) (What is Grand Corruption and how we can stop it?, 2016).

Yet, there are various constraints while working with NGOs. NGOs ultimately have their funding and in turn, their donors to consider. Although they would deny it, it does influence their outlook and ultimately, who to call out for doing corruption. Also, donors demand monthly or so reports from the NGOs which drives them to measure their endeavours into quantifiable outcomes. Thus, the perspective of the NGOs narrows down from the larger picture they were working on, in this case, corruption (Godrej, 2014).

An anti-corruption agenda requires the contribution of a variety of actors having different interests. This applies to NGOs and civil society organisations as well. It would be difficult to keep them together for a very long time. Effective cooperation and coordination of efforts would be challenged (Chêne & Dell, 2008).

There are also concerns about which NGOs must be involved in the process. While there are a lot of NGOs which genuinely contribute to bringing anti-corruption reforms, there are some which are politically motivated. They get into such movements only to be able to grab power later on. Thus, it is imperative to look out for engagements that may bring harm to the reformation process (Chêne & Dell, 2008).

NGOs may also be incompetent, owing to their lack of capacity and resources. They may be institutionally weak, fragmented and dispersed. At the same time, support provided to them can be labelled ‘motivated’, thus undermining their credibility (Chêne & Dell, 2008).

The measures of effective law enforcement, transparency, strengthening of auditing agencies and positive role of civil society will be effectively strengthened if international loopholes pertaining to corruption are addressed.

UNGASS 2021 The resolution to hold a session to address corruption was initiated and drafted by Columbia, Peru, Norway, Belize, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. This resolution was adopted on 17 December 2018. The assembly resolved to strengthen international cooperation on combating corruption and to adopt an action-oriented political declaration on the same.

The ingredients of the declaration would be decided in advance by the States through the Conference of the State Parties (CoSP) to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) ("UNGASS 2021 – UN General Assembly Special Session against Corruption", 2020).

The UNCAC Coalition is said to have batted for the inclusion of civil society organizations in the conference as well as its preparation. NGOs have been allowed to get involved in the intercessional meetings at Vienna. NGOs with or without ECOSOC consultative

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status would be able to participate in the special session ("UNGASS 2021 – UN General Assembly Special Session against Corruption", 2020).

However, the engagement between NGOs and the UN hasn’t always been smooth.

NGOs in the 1990s felt that they were unfairly criticized by member states who would exaggerate the actions of a very small number of NGO representatives. They also encountered restrictive security rules at the UN Secretariat, which they alleged were changed suddenly with minimal consultation, little apparent justification and no advance notice. There were also discussions back then that NGOs should pay for the services they received at the UN, which clearly dissuaded NGOs because they had their own financial crunches ("NGOs and the United Nations", 1999).

Delia Ferreira Rubio, the Chairperson of Transparency International highlighted three reform areas in her address to the first intercessional meeting of the COSP. The first reform area was about ‘Justice instead of impunity’. She called on member states to evolve a new international enforcement structure and national measures too. The second one was about ‘enablers’ wherein she urged the states to endorse public registers of beneficial ownership as a global standard. Thirdly, she talked about infusing political integrity at the top of political systems by checking uneven political financing and redefining the terms of corporate political engagement ("Three ways UNGASS 2021 can create a pathbreaking legacy in addressing grand corruption", 2020).

Conclusions Grand corruption affects us deeply and severely, operating through cross border networks and associations. It is thus important to have an international framework to illicit the same and act as an external pressure mechanism for member states. The UNGASS 2021 which is being perceived as a huge step must not remain confined to just one political declaration having no repercussions. Thus, all concerns like NGO engagement, the cooperation of member states and economic viability must be taken into consideration and possible solutions should be devised for them. If these concerns are addressed, the UNGASS 2021 shall surely be a huge step in the removal of grand corruption.

References • Chêne, M., & Dell, G. (2008). UNCAC and the participation of NGOs in the fight against corruption. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://www.u4.no/publications/uncac-and-the-participation-of-ngos-in-the-fight-against-corruption/.

• Godrej, D. (2014). NGOs - do they help?. New Internationalist. Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://newint.org/features/2014/12/01/ngos-keynote.

e-ISSN: 2582-8398 | internationalism.in/journal 45 • NGOs and the United Nations. Globalpolicy.org. (1999). Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/176-general/31440-ngos-and-theunited-nations.html.

• Stephenson, M., & Schütte, S. (2019). An International Anti-Corruption Court? A synopsis of the debate.

U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://www.u4.no/publications/an-international-anti-corruption-court-a-synopsis-of-the-debate.

• Three ways UNGASS 2021 can create a pathbreaking legacy in addressing grand corruption. Transparency.org. (2020). Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/three-reform-areas-grand-corruption-ungass-2021.

• UNGASS 2021 – UN General Assembly Special Session against Corruption. UNCAC Coalition. (2020).

Retrieved 30 September 2020, from https://uncaccoalition.org/ungass/.

• What is Grand Corruption and how can we stop it?. Transparency.org. (2016). Retrieved 21 September 2016, from https://www.transparency.org/en/news/what-is-grand-corruption-and-how-canwe-stop-it.

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Geopolitics of Energy Issues and Emerging Trends in International Relations: A Critical Review

Chitrika Grover Independent Researcher

Abstract. Energy demand and supply has shifted the international politics. The politics and security of energy are shaped pursuit to gain access to energy. There has been a long-term shift in the investment into energy supply in line with resource and environmental needs. Within geopolitics of energy, states are impacted by factors like change in demand and supply, as well as, the effect of environment and economic needs. There are two major debates that have gained prominence, first, the geopolitics role of energy within international relations seeks to change the energy pattern, and second, the environmental concerns have made renewable energy area of co-operation.

This is a review paper to discuss the basic development of the policy literature in the field as of now.

Literature Review The literature on geopolitics and energy issues comprise a part of the international relations study. This paper gives an overview of energy issues of the past and the present within the international relations domain. It aims to evaluate emerging trends and the shift within them, towards renewable energy. The various trends and debate which are emerging within international relations and based on usage, availability, demand, etc. This literature review gives an overview by mapping the changing patterns and trends of energy exchange among states.

As Saul B Cohen describes the “condition that is likely to bring geopolitical changes”, by bringing together, the ‘classical’ and ‘contemporary’ geopolitics within international relations. The Geopolitics in broad terms sets opportunities and structures independent of any agency. The geopolitics is currently broadly understood through physical location and based on manmade structures. Taking the geopolitical scholar Cohen’s argument which

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aims at conceptualizing and analyzing patterns and conditions that were likely to bring change and not over predicting events can be evaluated through foreign policy and international relations behaviour of states. This approach could help us understand geopolitical patterns using geopolitics dimensions to evaluate patterns and bring change within international relations.

Cohen’s writing emphasizes co-operation especially within the field of international relations, over the use of resources. The same is likely to become the driving factor of geopolitical goals. Cohen defines it as the ‘equilibrium’ between the two opposing forces, i.e. the resources and strategic location. They are considered the fundamental basis for encouraging co-operation on a regional level and enable to balance against the security threats. Thus, a transition within the energy system is likely to affect, the geopolitical system.

The geopolitical factors and international relations play a key role in evaluating, the state’s power, and its ability to purchase resources (Scholvin, 2016). They are based on the three interrelated factors, such as political, environmental factors, and the response to change in demand and supply. The current energy transition is marked by a shift from fossil fuels to energy-based systems, i.e. towards renewable energy.

Some of the key features for geopolitical analysis, are assessed based on the context in which it is situated. The current narrative of key scholars like Saul Bernard Cohen, focuses on the dynamic view, involving geopolitical outlook and international relations (Scholvin, 2016). It consists of factors useful in determining and evaluating the geopolitical networks among states, which connects them. The contemporary debate goes beyond the specific geopolitical issue, within the energy domain. The changing environmental dimensions capturing attention in international relations, it contributes towards the emerging trends. The literature on geopolitics gives an overview of the geopolitical factors of the past and the way it sets the trends for future energy debates. The effect of demand for renewable energy on international relations, and the disruption in energy exchange, have caused a shift in the energy supply chain. For example, discoveries into energy and rapid technological advancement are likely to set up a new supply chain and bring rapid improvement in renewable energy and alternative energy technology and capacities. For this reason, the energy exchange has become important, to secure its continuous access within the geopolitical and international system. It seeks to create value based on interdependence.

Energy for long has played a key role in international relations, colliding with issues like great alliance for power, which helped in determining the outcome of wars. Initially, coalrich countries were ahead in the industrialization process. They used traditional energy geopolitics to gain an advantage based on the accessibility of those resources. The current trend has sorted for a shifted reliability in the energy domain and sort to create a new energy system.

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In this debate, the decision around energy influences the world of tomorrow. The security characteristics of today are the key determinant of the transition in energy consumption and production of the future. The current nature of energy is a step ahead from the erstwhile system which was organized to serve present purposes. For example, discoveries and technological innovation would set winners and losers based on the availability of energy supply.

However, the geopolitics is making a transition from traditional, towards new forms of Energy. The producers of energy like Oil are facing a slowdown in their demand, which has led to the prevalence of renewable energy and removed traditional sources from attaining monopoly. For example, the energy intelligence report points out that the low carbon transition will dominate industry narrative and investment to market, remove issues like sanctions and outrages.

This expands the debate of geopolitics beyond availability and accessibility with the advancement in technology. The evolution from prior geopolitical study to the emergence of “New Geopolitical” has attained prominence due to a change in energy dependence. How energy is obtained is shaped by the current nature of transition made by new geopolitics and energy sectors. This change is set through movement from natural gas to renewable energy. The old practices of energy security functioned with a zero-sum perspective. The current energy consumption is based on competition, which would see the same pattern in renewable energy, as each country seeks to gain an advantage. As Klare points out, that resource-driven conflicts is not only influenced by the dependence of the resource-scarce country, but also by the ability to substitute them with technology ( Kardan, 2010).

Thus, the corresponding geopolitical impact resultant into changes in the relations among states. It gave rise to various trends. Thus, this paper aims at evaluating those trends, especially within geopolitical and international relations. It evaluates the “new geopolitics” which has transformed the conception of energy, within the contemporary debate.

For example, the “Journal Geopolitics of energy” described “Politics of energy” as the top propriety within international relations. The shift of geopolitical attention towards renewable energy and common patterns of energy sharing has caught the attention of geopolitics debate. For instance, the emphasis on co-operation over conflict, and the use of innovation advocates for an increase in demand in renewable energy. Thus, subsequently moving towards energy diplomacy. This is interwoven within International politics and shaped the state’s relations with contention, competition among major players, shaping geopolitical interest in energy. Therefore, the current geopolitics of energy seeks to make a transition towards renewable energy and seeks to challenge the old system with the potential to affect adversely the fossil fuel producing countries.

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The international relation has swayed the geopolitical debate and shaped due to the emerging demand for clean fuels and energy. It has increased sensitivity towards the energy supply chain and has a corresponding environmental effect. Currently, China and the USA are ahead in the struggle to make most geopolitical gains from energy. This has given space to first, struggle among states to capture more renewable energy market, and second, shifted the nature of energy diplomacy. The intention to capture the diffused energy market of renewable energy requires strategizing international relations, and the use of energy diplomacy.

The geopolitical struggle has given rise to a debate over energy co-operation and competition. The scope of the present energy debate includes increased energy demand, i.e. for renewable resources, clean energy, which has occupied an essential position in the geopolitical debate.

The international relations on the geopolitical effect of energy shapes the interstates relations seek to create an advantage for those countries looking for alternative fuels. The energy debate is likely to shape around the notion of interdependence, and towards the nationalist perspective.

For example, ‘we forum’, describes the energy-based system shaped against interdependence and its moving towards competition changing the supply chain system. Another report suggests that the OPEC countries are losing price-setting monopoly as, the new supply of renewable energy is shaped by countries such as china, transitioning with renewable energy and advancement in technology. These trends by renewable energy and the development of alternative fuels impact the world's energy situation and international relations.

On the contrary, as States become affected by the geopolitics makeshift of energy, from noninterference to market-oriented exchange, it has subsequently shifted the market in favour of renewable energy. This new vigor towards renewable energy is catching attention, and it’s likely to result in an energy transition, similar to that made in the past decade. We are currently at the cusp of transforming energy consumption patterns by adapting to the new addition making renewable energy more acceptable. At the same time, the evolution within the international system has made a significant contribution to the geopolitics of energy as geographical factors have undergone various trends.

For example, as Robert D Kaplan, discusses geopolitics through space and power. He describes that every international order and early modern history is being based on energy security. He describes it through elements like consumers, trade routes, access to natural resources, and to ensure accessibility to those resources, associate with energy security.

Geopolitics focuses on geography and trade routes to bring those resources. The geopolitics of energy seeks to become decentralized and interdependent, bringing changes to the

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geopolitics of energy. For example, subtle changes brought in transport, refining of oil, and consumer markets to be controlled by the non-OPEC industrialized countries, and change in the energy supply chain. This can make the international oil industry which was previously dominated by multinational oil companies of the United States, Britain, and other Western countries, to lose out.

The Journal on “Energy Politics and Security Conception from a multidimensional perspective” describes the current trends as changing and diverging away from the past pattern. This constitutes continuous contestation, through the embargo against import and violence around acquiring more oil, it perceives energy scope as expanding in the horizon and adapting to a new reality. This is similar to the period after the oil crisis of the seventies when oil became concentrated in the hands of a few countries. With the lack of alternative, it enhanced the self-confidence of the oil-producing developing countries. This new pattern is set apart with renewable energy and aims to influence transitioning, from fossil fuel to renewable energy and clean fuel. The current trajectory seeks to balance against the recurrent practice involving “the exploitation of oil”. The new geopolitics seeks to create an alternative energy supply chain with renewable energy.

The countries are expected to become more energy independent by utilizing renewable energy, describes Economist, Richard, Murillio Bill, for the condition in Europe. He pointed correlations between increases in consumption of renewable energy, could increase the potential for entry of renewable energy in the supply chain of the energy route (GILL, 2020). This would result in the exploration in energy supply with new partners and strengthens the pre-existing ties however, international relations forged through energy source will continue to change. With more efficient use of technology and commitment to renewable energy, will make them more energy reliable.

Unlike the previous pattern where, the urgent needs for oil among the industrialized countries and the lack of immediately available for alternatives fuels, enhanced the self-confidence of these oil-producing developing countries. The current trend at the international level is moving towards clean energy and renewable energy. For example, Europe is shifting its expense from oil and gas to renewable energy. However, Europe has its doubts, because of uncertainty over the viability of the technology. Moreover, despite the speculation over renewable technology, being conspicuous with uncertain the trend towards acquiring renewable energy resources is unlikely to change.

For example, the NATO trade in the energy exchange holds hope that it would foster interdependence. This would lead to a nuanced and country-specific policy so that each state can strategize based on their capability and resources. It also holds the promise of bringing the EU and NATO together, co-operates to domestically replace oil rather than spend it on the wellbeing of the people (VÁCLAV BARTUŠKA, 2020).

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The Energy Intelligence report base the geopolitical debate on energy, and describe the transformation its undergoing based on various factors. First, with increased sensitivity towards, the system governed by competition, which unleashes a new frontier of energy exchange i.e. resulting from the energy transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy. This reinvigorated interest in renewable energy and encouraged countries to expand their reach to revise their strategic goals. Second, the change in energy supply would create new winners and losers. Within the production chain, winners would be those who can adjust and, losers are those which are stuck on the old mindset. While renewable energy may not cause wars, however, it may increase competition.

The geopolitics of energy is changing and transitioning to low carbon energy. This could resolve some old issues like sanction and outrage which are used as tools to hinder energy exchange. A report by the Energy Intelligence Group, forecast a shift in energy co-ordination due to the use of solar, hydrocarbon, and EVs resulting in drop demand for fossil fuel.

However, uncertainty prevails if renewable energy may suffer from a loss in geopolitical significance, due to wars or disruption in the distant future, over policies, carbon pricing, etc. Renewable has started to catch attention and currently, it's accelerating through change, thus it would require time to adapt (BHARDWAJ, 2020). Thus, these concerns towards the environment give rise to the need for clean energy and have set forth a path for the future renewable energy market.

Introduction This paper discusses the role of International relations, and geopolitics study over energyrelated issues and emerging trends. The focus would be on the geopolitical influence of renewable energy within International Relations.

Based on the series of transitions made towards clean fuels, the de-carbonization mission, and to reduce dependence on fuels are the central goal for securing renewable energy.

These trends impact energy-producing and dependent countries. For example, as the trends towards renewable energy continue to revive momentum, it seeks to reform the energy system in favour of a potential energy revolution where, cooperation in the field of energy exchange could set new relationships, based on shared concerns. This could either avert the energy crisis or potentially reinvent itself with energy revolutions. The strength lies in International co-operation and to improve their exchange mechanisms. The International Renewable Energy Agency, director, Adan Amin wrote, that “The potential of renewable energy to improve energy access spur energy sustainable, economic growth, and create jobs not only for necessity but to set a common path towards peace and prosperity”.

The role of the energy market in international relations has become significant, to broaden its scope of accessibility. This may also cause the movement of the market from north to

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south, leading to lopsided gains. As a result, the fuel-producing nation may suffer turmoil resulting from reduced demand. However this doesn’t indicate an inevitable demise of fossil fuel, rather it marks a shift towards renewable energy. There lies a long road and trying road ahead to make the energy transition successful (LINDSAW, 2020). Gauging by the current trend of the energy transition, the probability of success and potential weaknesses can result from the level of synthesis among key players. It may lead to bring countries into groups of likeminded states and create new allegiances. It could mark a transition from the old collaboration of energy-related exchange towards new ones, based on renewable energy (INTELLIGENCE, 2020). However, international energy cooperation seeks to broaden its scope of growth in renewable energy and adds new connotation, to improve their corresponding mechanisms. The success in this field would determine the movement of the market i.e. whether in the global north or south. The race for accessing renewable energy could lead to disparities. This would result in disparities due to lack of access to energy and technology, causing those countries to lag behind. This could lead to new partnerships in the pursuit to create a single market for energy exchange or it could wedge a gap between those relying on fossil fuel, and those lagging behind technology and innovation. The increased use of renewable energy could economically hurt the OPEC countries and cease the oil and petroleum market. This could economically hurt those countries. The outcome of wavering and subsequently ceased demand for fuels like Oil and petroleum would shake the international status of oil-exporting countries.

The countries that import oil and natural gas will become risk aversive, resulting from expenses endured for energy import of those fuels. However, countries that will be able to reap the benefit of renewable able energy with innovation and investment in batteries and such storage devises would create a niche for the renewable industry, and be able to generate jobs in that sector thereby contributing towards economic growth. On the other hand, unpreparedness for the upcoming renewable industry could create a gap among countries within international relations. International relations are inconspicuously driven by energy concerns. The current debate is oriented towards low carbon emission technology due to impending environmental issues. Renewable energy demands seek to shift the market towards a secure energy network.

Countries with diverging energy security agenda may face a gap in the study of International relations may suffer a gap. This may cause states to approach with diverse methods and strategy, through innovation to improve energy security. The counties may forge a partnership with like-minded states and may infuse in areas of overlapping interests. The strategic interests are to acquire energy, and with a finite supply of fossil fuel, which puts energy front and centre in today’s geopolitics and international diplomacy.

International relations have a quintessential role in making the transition to renewable energy a success. However, for success in international relations, the energy geopolitical

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requires to make co-operation conspicuous for its success. This would require to view the geopolitics a positive-sum game rather than a zero-sum game (Power-technology, 2020).

Currently, energy diplomacy has taken the form of climate diplomacy since the predominance of fossil fuels is fading has led to the growth of the international partnership in renewable energy development. Alliances are shifting to accommodate the change in renewable energy with advancements in solar energy. For example, the ISA (International Solar Alliance) mark the inception of energy diplomacy and creating new partnership by countries like Japan and India recognize the importance of energy diplomacy to make a shift from fossil fuel to renewable energy.

The analysis by Power Technology, indicate the use of carrot and stick in energy diplomacy.

It hopes that the use of carrot and not stick, in the energy debate, would encourage collaboration and reduce conflict. The international actors like states, with oil-producing and consuming companies, can become participants by investing in the technology and respect the competition rules (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2020).

The geopolitical effect on energy importing countries and the power shift is noteworthy.

With the rapid growth of infrastructure projects, which give assent to cooperation, especially in pursuit to create new links. However, instance arises where co-operation may give way to ambitiousness and would provoke tension. For example, the trade-related tension could disrupt the regional and global harmony, and expose International relations to geopolitical risk. This would create hindrances for a unified or global response. Other factors like small state politics, major power tension, and small state disruption could deteriorate energy interdependence and lead to a disorderly world. By establishing an energy network would help in the liberalization of trade and consolidation basis on economic growth.

However, hindrances may be caused by the state’s response to the energy issue, which sets the trend for determining the success or failure of energy geopolitics. In international relations, the state competition and domestic politics is the key feature in the geopolitics of energy. Therefore, competition in the energy market faces contestation over access to resources, resulting from its scarcity and ultimately may escalate into resource wars. The scarcity of energy resources with the depletion of oil and essential energy resource sets the debate for resource nationalization. Resource nationalization is an antithesis to globalization and international relations and it’s a source of the underlying issue in geopolitical relations among major players (BAZILIAN, 2020). Yet the government’s controls over energy security, rather than the market, shape the energy geopolitics. Depending on who controls the energy market sets the pace for growth. The nationalist occupation of energy resource in international relations, favoring domestic produce, over-dependence on fossil fuel import.

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The changing trends in energy consumption would result in of shift of energy debate from First, moving away from oil exporters, towards renewable energy producers. Second, globalization may result in new competition among major energy producers.

The fossil fuel producing nations are, as per the IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) report, economies that produce oil and gas could lose the US $ 7trillon in 2040.

The fossil fuel importing states like China and the USA would have the advantage to dominate the clean technology sector and this might even replace the OPEC countries. On the other hand, innovation has led to the creation of renewable energy like wind and solar energy to become part of the geopolitics. Thus, leaning towards a possible “Clean-tech War”. It seeks to mark the onset of a new race governed by new geopolitical, i.e. the race to capture the energy market. This market would constitute environmentally friendly and economically benefiting fuels.

However, it also gravitates towards a looming energy race. China and the USA are ahead in the race towards becoming self-reliant. Since sources of renewable energy, i.e. water, wind, and sun are readily available, it could create an open-source development and sharing of technology thus creating a collaborative effort to halt global warming. This would benefit enhanced access to energy via solar panels and revolutionize the power dynamic by decentralizing it and rather empower regions by building on their resources.

This system is deficient too. Since the future is precarious, the dependence on the traditional source of energy isn’t sustainable and this empowers the debate in favour of renewable energy. With the rising energy demand use of electricity is expected to become handier.

This may cause a shift from “Pipeline Politics” to be replaced with “Grid politics”. Thus, exposing the countries to different types of threats i.e. cyber-attacks, and set new forms of geopolitics with energy to prevail. Countries like, EU, China, and the US are all set to revolutionize international relations with low-carbon and clean energy.

The decarburization mission i.e. low carbon economy could shape geopolitics trend, either way, i.e. it could either continue to use oil and other fossil fuel as the main energy resource or, it could uphold the use of renewable energy. This is especially true since, it could take a long time for the fossil fuel industry to phase out, and for the energy transition to increased user consumption in renewable energy and reduce dependence on fossil fuel. Simultaneously, it’s becoming difficult to impose a single pattern of rules governing the behavior of energy-producing and consuming countries. For example, the use of traditional fuel like coal ensures the thermodynamic balance, which ensures that energy flows for social production (Tricks, 2020). The progress in renewable energy would require transforming the entire methodology of production on a worldwide scale.

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The energy expansion into a new area of geostrategic significance, resources such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth which are expected to gain importance to mitigate the de-carbonization process (WILLUHN, 2020). For this purpose preparing infrastructure and empowering industry compatible within the electricity-based energy sector is important, for the success of low carbon energy.

The geopolitics trends set for transitioning towards renewable energy of renewable energy have become contested and have received criticism. The renewable resource like EV’s despite being accessible through subsidies aren’t able to provide the perceived benefit. The renewable energy might face issues within geopolitics which would shape a pronged debate over the efficiency of renewable energy in the future setting Winners and Losers in the geopolitics and even exposing the country to cyber conflicts and trade conflict (Sapelli, 2020). Thus, the geopolitical debate is divided over the potential of renewable energy to bring peace, and accessibility to supply clean energy.

Conclusions The demand for renewable energy has given rise to various issues. The changing trends away from fossil fuels as the main source of energy and need for renewable energy, has brought many important issues to the forefront. This paper seeks to evaluate the shift in the debate in favor of preparing cleaner fuels and reduce dependence on nonrenewable resource and the effect of growth in innovation and technology. However, the process of transitioning towards renewable energy has exposed the international system towards various risks and has created new set of challenges. This paper tries to compile the current narrative shaping the transitioning towards renewable energy and the issues which cause hindrances to the process. The paper places the importance of co-operation for the success in the upcoming renewable energy sector and at the same time highlight the problems and apprehension which are exposing the energy sector and prevent a smooth transition. The paper gives a brief insight into the ways in which the international system is preparing to make the transition to renewable energy and its probable effect on diplomacy and international relations.

Recommendations In areas aligning with the issues in the geopolitics of energy, may enable to create a group of likeminded states, with allegiances to support the transition from the old collaboration of energy-related exchange towards new ones. This area could be dealt with in-depth Second, Energy nationalism has regained prominence, and this may hinder exchange in renewable and which can be studied to understand factors shaping the demand and supply based on the shift in energy needs.

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Lastly, the future of fuels can be shaped by renewable energy. The geopolitics of energy, in the past, has witnessed an exponential use of oil and gas in international relations, it has played a key role in determining the fate of countries. Similarly, those states, which are energy-dependent for example, on fuel or on oil-producing countries, could suffer loses with the introduction of renewable energy. For example, Countries like the USA relation with Saudi Arabia may suffer. However, with shifting energy demand would also affect the demand of those resources required in the preparation of infrastructure of renewable energy source those required for winds solar, hydro etc. for production, and usage at a mass scale. This could become a separate area for research.

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