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Brazil

Key Points111

Funding:

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The space budget for 2022 is less than $32 million.

Organizations:

• Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) • Aerospace Technology and Science Department (DCTA) • National Institute of Space Research (INPE)

Capabilities:

• Alcântara launch site

International partners:

Russia, Europe, China, United States.

S U M M A R Y

Brazil’s Alcântara Launch Center is only two degrees south of the Equator, 300 kilometers closer than any other active launch site in the world. With a legacy in space spanning from the 1960s, Brazil has its sights set on becoming a global space leader. However, Brazilian launch capabilities are underutilized, with most Brazilian payloads taking off from Chinese or Russian launch sites. A fatal accident on the Alcântara launch site in 2003 killed 21 people, including many essential technicians. This tragedy saw the death of many scientists and engineers and had an impact on the development of launch capabilities.112 There have been several successful launches from Alcântara in recent years, including projects in collaboration with the German Space Agency and Italy-based Thales. Today, the Brazilian economy grapples with a considerable downturn in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government is seeking out international investment and collaboration with US-based private companies to boost the space industry and economy. However, expansion plans for Alcântara could have an impact on the regional environment and local communities. Brazil has considerable space ambitions for the future, and geographically, its launch site holds a lot of promise. However, it remains to be seen how these goals can be met within constrained government budgets and amid challenges to training and retaining talent.

111 Map: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brazil_on_the_globe_(South_America_centered).svg 112 Melo, Michele & Paulo Vasconcellos (2020) High hopes for Brazil’s space ambitions. Astronautics 3(25). https://room.eu.com/article/high-hopes-for-brazils-space-ambitions

N A T I O N A L S P A C E O V E R V I EW

The Brazil space program has been in development since the 1960s. The

Aerospace Technology and Science Department (DCTA) was founded in 1953, and the National Institute of Space Research (INPE) in 1971; both were established for space research to advance national space capabilities. The founding of a formal Brazilian space mission in 1981 and the development of launch vehicles culminated in the successful test of a Sonda IV sounding rocket in 1984, launching from Barreira do Inferno site in the Northeast region of the country. In 1993, the SCD-1 data-collecting satellite marked the first system developed by INPE, although it was launched from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida with a Pegasus launch vehicle developed by American company Orbital Sciences Corporation.113

Brazil’s efforts towards self-sufficient launch capabilities are considerable and include pursuing autonomy in the production of solid fuel for launch, ammonium perchlorate.114 The 1994 creation of the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) saw the establishment of a semi-autonomous civilian agency. The new agency represented a significant transition from the previous military leadership of the Brazil space program. Such a shift requires institutional adjustment and cooperation between all members of the emerging space network, from military branches such as the Air Force to academic space institutes.115 This shift to a civilian space agency signaled de-militarization to other international space actors, including the United States, thawing relations between the two countries.

In the late 1990s the Brazilian space program initiated development of the VLS-1, a launch vehicle designed to deliver 350 kg payloads into low Earth orbit (LEO) from Alcântara launch site on the Northern Atlantic coast.116 However, investment in the program faltered, which combined with a series of errors led to the failure of two launches in flight, and a third rocket exploding on the launch pad in 2003, killing 21 people.117 This tragedy saw the death of many scientists and engineers, which had a considerable impact on the development of launch capabilities.118 A series of government enquiries and comprehensive review of the VLS-1 initiated a rehaul of technical components, system design, as well as onboard electrical and pyrotechnical networks.119 However, some of the same funding shortages remain.

Today, Brazil is in a deep recession, partially sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused a 5% drop in GDP.120 Although vaccination efforts have

113 ESA (2022) SCD (Satélite de Coleta de Dados) - Data Collection Program of Brazil. https://earth.esa.int/web/eoportal/satellitemissions/s/scd 114 National Photographic Interpretation Center (1982) Brazilian Space Launch Vehicle Program. Missile Ranges: Strategic SSm Space Facilities. https://www.thespacereview.com/archive/2050.pdf 115 Melo & Vasconcellos (2020). 116 Melo & Vasconcellos (2020). 117 Space Daily (2003) Brazilian Rocket Explodes On Pad: Many Dead. 23 August 2003. https://www.spacedaily.com/news/rocketscience-03zu.html 118 Melo & Vasconcellos (2020). 119 IAE (2014) VLS-1 Satellite Launch Vehicle. 5 November 2014. https://iae.dcta.mil.br/index.php/projects/vls-1-satellite-launchvehicle 120 OECD (2021) Economic Forecast Summary, December 2021. Accessible: https://www.oecd.org/economy/brazil-economicsnapshot/#:~:text=Economic%20Forecast%20Summary%20(December%202021,restarted%20as%20restrictions%20were%20lifted

Alcântara Launch Center is located just two degrees south of the equator, 300 kilometers closer to the equator than any other active launch site in the world ”

seen an upswing in the economy, funding for the space sector remains limited. In the height of the pandemic, the AEB significantly cut back the research, development and human capital budget.121 2021 saw a considerable drop in the AEB budget, down to $27 million from $36 million before the pandemic. However, the budget for 2022 ($33 million) indicates an increase after the main impact of the pandemic.122 Nonetheless, in comparison to other spacefaring countries, this budget remains low. However, Brazil is showing dedication to its space program in the pursuit of international partners and investors.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O O P E R A T I O N

Brazil has longstanding cooperation with several countries including Germany, Ukraine, Russia and China. In 1988, a China-Brazil agreement set forth objectives on the joint development of Earth-imaging satellites to be launched from Shanxi. However, the lack of economic investment from Brazil saw these plans stagnate. Ukraine-Brazil cooperation in 2003 aspired to use Ukrainian the Tsyklon-4 rocket to launch satellites. However, these efforts also ceased in 2015 due to a lack of funding.

There have been a number of joint successes, including the Microsatellite Launch Vehicle (VLM) program with the German Space Agency, which led to the successful launch of VSB-30 on 23 October 2004 from the Alcântara Launch Center, despite the VLS-1 tragedy in the year prior. A series of successful programs since include the GEO satellite built with Italian Thales, which took off in 2017. However, the latter launched from French Guiana.123 Brazil’s Alcântara Launch Center is located just two degrees south of the Equator, 300 kilometers closer to the Equator than any other active launch site in the world.124 This location could allow for larger payloads and lower cost rocket launches.125 In theory, this could position the site as a close contender to French Guiana for space business. In reality, even Brazil continues to utilize launch sites overseas. Despite its promise, Alcântara remains behind, due to years of poor management and a lack of adequate resources and funding.126

Relations with Russia are largely positive, strengthened by military-technical

121Valor (2020) Agencia Espacial Brasileira zera orcamento do pesquisa em 2021. 17 August 2020. https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2020/08/17/agencia-espacial-brasileira-zera-orcamento-do-inpe-para-pesquisa-em-2021.ghtml 122 Protal da Transparência (2022) Agência Espacial Brasileira. http://www.portaldatransparencia.gov.br/orgaos/20402?ano=2021 123 Milani, Livia Peres (2019) Brazil’s Space Program: Finally Taking Off? Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blogpost/brazils-space-program-finally-taking 124 Henry, Caleb (2020) Brazil looks abroad for small rockets seeking a little extra boost. SpaceNews. 13 August 2020. https://spacenews.com/brazil-looks-abroad-for-small-rockets-seeking-a-little-extra-boost/ 125 Reuters (2021) Virgin Orbit among new operators for Brazil's Alcântara spaceport. 6 May 2021. https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/science/virgin-orbit-among-new-operators-brazils-alcntara-spaceport-2021-05-06/ 126 Mier, Brian (2017) Alcântara Spaceport: Race, Land Rights and National Sovereignty. Brazil Wire. 4 February 2017. https://www.brasilwire.com/alcantara-spaceport/

cooperation. In 2005, Brazil and Russia signed an agreement on cooperation in space, which established a strategic alliance between the two countries, with the intention to explore more opportunities for cooperation.127 A year after the agreement was signed, the first Brazilian astronaut travelled to the International Space Station onboard a Russian Soyuz launcher. It was reported that Russia only charged $10 million, half the usual price for such a launch.128 In 2008, the two countries signed an additional agreement on defense technology cooperation, which includes the joint development of a launch vehicle. Brazil is involved in the development and implementation of the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), the Russian GPS equivalent. In 2015, Brazil announced plans to partner with Russia on the Aster mission, the first Brazilian deep space mission to explore an asteroid between Mars and Jupiter.129

The United States is becoming an important space partner to Brazil, in a dynamic that may increasingly compete with Russian interests in space. A 2015 agreement between the AEB and NASA resulted in Brazil participating in programs such as the Global Learning and Observation to Benefit the Environment Program (GLOBE), in which 300 Brazilian schools contribute to science projects.130 US-Brazil cooperation in space also includes the 2018 Space Situational Awareness Agreement, the 2019 Research Design Testing & Evaluation Agreement, the 2019 designation of Brazil as a Major NATO Non-Ally, and space weather sharing.131 In February 2021, NASA and the City of Rio de Janeiro renewed their agreement to cooperate and share data, models, and space knowledge for an additional five years.132 On 15 June 2021, Brazil became the first Latin American country to sign the Artemis Accords, a NASA-led agreement which seeks to generate a shared vision of principles to promote a safe space environment for exploration, science and business.133 Increasing cooperation with the United States may prove beneficial to the Brazil space sector, which is in need of foreign investment.

Potentially the most transformative agreement to the Brazil space program, the 2019 Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) set forth shared principles between Brazil and the United States, namely promoting a safe and space environment for exploration, science and business.134 The Agreement marked a new step in the two countries’ relations, with the potential to deliver significant benefits to both parties. Permitting US launches from Alcântara could open the center to the global market for space launches and an array of commercial actors. This agreement sits at the heart of plans to capture a portion of the projected $18 billion small satellite launch market by 2029.135 In turn, US companies

127 Ionescu, Imanuela (2018) Brazil-Russia Military-Technical Cooperation: A Fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order. Military Review. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/IonescuBrazil-Russia/ 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 US Embassy & Consulates in Brazil (2022) Fact Sheet: U.S.-Brazil Space Cooperation. https://br.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-u-sbrazil-space-cooperation/ 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Reuters (2021).

could benefit from the site’s vicinity to the

Equator. Four companies seek to operate from the Alcântara launch center, Canadian company C6 Launch, as well as US-based companies Hyperion, Orion AST and Virgin

Orbit.136 Virgin Orbit’s LauncherOne systems may be the first to reach orbit from

Brazil, launching from modified a

Boeing 747 taking off from Alcântara’s 2.6kilometer runway.137 This would transform

Alcântara into the second orbital-class launch site in South America, and the fifth in the Southern Hemisphere.138

“US launches from Alcântara could open the center to the global “ market for space launches

F U T U R E

The TSA offers promise towards overcoming Brazil’s space challenges by increasing investments and space revenue. The Alcântara Launch Center presents a competitive opportunity due to its location near the Equator, which is easier for rockets to achieve the necessary velocity to reach orbit, allowing for fuel savings.139 Moreover, the AEB has a solid foundation of expertise to facilitate future engagement and space industry growth. A detailed Brazilian Space Industry Roadmap could help inform the strategic direction and establish viable opportunities to boost the Brazilian space industry. 140

There is still work to be done to accommodate private companies seeking to access Brazil’s space industry and launch capabilities. For one, the wider region around Alcântara lacks the infrastructure to support liquid-fueled launch vehicles. Future plans may seek to transform the launch site, but challenges remain. For example, the expansion of Alcântara’s base poses a significant threat to local communities and the surrounding environment. In the 18th and 19th centuries, tens of thousands of enslaved people were brought to the region surrounding Alcântara to work in the cotton industry.141 Shortly after Brazil’s cotton economy crashed, free black communities were established throughout the region. When the spaceport was built in the 1980s, 1,500 people from these communities were resettled further inland without enough land to maintain them.142

Alcântara expansion plans have generated local opposition, as it could take even more land from vulnerable communities such as these.143 Increasing space collaboration with the United States has also generated concern among the public regarding the perceived threat to Brazil’s sovereignty in the Amazon.144 Any expansions to Brazil’s space capabilities must take into consideration the wider environmental and societal impact, particularly any threats to

136 US Embassy & Consulates in Brazil (2022). 137 Reuters (2021). 138 Virgin Orbit (2021) Virgin Orbit selected to bring Orbit Launch capabilities to Brazil. https://virginorbit.com/the-latest/virgin-orbitselected-to-bring-orbital-launch-capabilities-to-brazil/ 139 Milani (2019). 140 Melo & Vasconcellos (2020). 141 Mier (2017). 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.

local communities and the Amazon rainforest.

Brazil also faces challenges in motivating younger generations to pursue Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects to keep up with the anticipated growth of its space sector. A number of initiatives, such as the Mars Society Brazil community, hope to enable wider outreach and awareness raising of the Brazilian space program. The Mars Society at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte shares scientific NASA and ESA public tools to promote learning about Space. The group uses social media platforms, such as Facebook, as well as messaging service WhatsApp to generate a sense of community, promote public outreach and support international space collaboration.145 Grass-level initiatives such as these may prove useful to boost motivation within regions, contributing to knowledge sharing and greater support for national space initiatives and international collaboration.

145 Rezende, Julio, Alvara Oliveira, Davi Souza and Dalmo Santos (2020) Motivating for Space in Brazil. ICES. https://ttuir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2346/86489/ICES-2020-444.pdf?sequence=1

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