IPS Update - November 2011 by Wee Chen Gwee

IPS Update November 2011

This is a collection of the articles that were released in the November 2011 issue of IPS Update, the monthly newsletter of the Institute of Policy Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. The current IPS Update can be read here

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election 1

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election, 1 November 2011 By Dr Gillian Koh IPS Senior Research Fellow

The Institute of Policy Studies conducted its fifth POPS survey on voter attitudes in the Presidential Election and launched its main findings at its Forum on the Presidential Election on 1 November 2011 at the Orchard Hotel, Singapore. The presidential election was held on 27 August 2011 and was only the second since 28 August 1993. In the run-up to Polling Day, there seemed to be confusion over the role of the Elected President (EP) and debate about whether candidates over-promised in their campaign for the Office. For this reason, the survey set out to check how voters viewed the role of the EP as its first target and found that the understanding of this role as on the official government interpretation of it, was limited. The 2025 respondents, who were citizens of voting age randomly selected out of the residential phone book were taken through a list of statements and were to respond if each was indeed a role of the EP or not. 42% of the sample was able to label at least six or more statements out of eleven correctly as either being a role or not a role according to that official interpretation of it, as shown by charts 1 to 3.

Roles of the Elected President Number of statements...

%ages

42% cited 6 or more correctly Likely to be Service class, middle-middle income group, highlyeducated, Chinese, males and people living in private housing.

58% cited 5 or less correctly Likely to be 65 years & above, Working class, low-income group, lesseducated (PSLE or below), Malay, females, and people living in HDB 1-3 room flats. BASE: All respondents (2025)

Chart 1 Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election, Gillian Koh, IPS Update, November 2011

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election 2

Chart 2

Chart 3 Source: IPS POPS (5) Presidential Election Survey 2011 Research Team. Note: These charts are part of the survey findings. Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election, Gillian Koh, IPS Update, November 2011

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election 3

At the Forum, speakers and participants mulled over why these results were so, their implications and what can be done about the level of understanding that was reflected in the data. One of the speakers, Dr Kevin Tan, a constitutional lawyer, reminded participants of the claims that candidates had made about what they would do if they were in office, and said that several of these claims had seemed to fall in a large grey area of things that had not been specifically disallowed. There was indeed confusion among voters partly as a result of this. There was also a disjuncture between the large expectation placed on the institution that had been naturally built up through the election process and the actual role as specified and strictly interpreted by government leaders. Assistant Professor Eugene Tan of the Singapore Management University added that a spillover of the political mood from the May General Election in which there was an electoral breakthrough by the political opposition made it conducive for candidates not associated with to the People’s Action Party (PAP) to emerge and believe they had a fighting chance of taking the office in the Presidential Election. He said that a good part of the electorate was in no mood for ‘constitutional niceties’. Attempts by government leaders to explain the role of the EP might have succeeded with some but not with those who were skeptical and preferred not to accept some notion of a heavily circumscribed president. What the latter group of voters was looking for in the political ecosystem was a stronger check and balance between the government and the presidency to make governance more robust. Singaporeans had reinterpreted ‘good governance’ earlier discussed by the PAP as a strong mandate, with the idea that having a system or a situation where there is a check on power and greater public accountability of state institutions and leaders is more desirable. Another speaker, Mr Goh Sin Teck of Lianhe Zaobao indicated that the readership level of his newspaper and that of The Straits Times -- two examples of traditional media -increased significantly during the presidential election. Even with the emergence of Internetbased new media, these facts suggested that the rise of one form of media did not mean the demise of another. As Editor of Lianhe Zaobao, Mr Goh was glad that the paper invested the effort in designing and putting out attractive and accessible full page spreads on the role of the elected presidency and other important information relating to the institution and the election. Not many people would go and seek out such information on the Internet, but when they referred to a hard copy of the newspaper, this information would find its way to them. The traditional hard copy newspaper still presents a great deal of potential as a public education channel. How can citizens’ understanding of the role of the EP be improved upon? Different methods would be needed to reach different audiences. One suggestion was to produce a compelling drama series on Channel 8 that revolves around the relationship between the President and the government –something in the realm of popular culture. This would certainly address the profile of citizens who scored lower on the measure of knowledge in the data. Another would be for the President to take up the idea in some manner of putting out annual reports documenting his activities. Members of the audience said they were struck by how many times the reserves had been used under the former president, S.R Nathan’s presidency, with little publicly available information to understand how these presidential approvals took place. Instances such as these would be ideal opportunities to improve public understanding of the Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election, Gillian Koh, IPS Update, November 2011

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election 4

Office. However, who or what provides such educational messages must enjoy high levels of trust from the general public or targeted audiences for them to be receptive to those messages. The level of trust is higher for those channels or sources of information that have no direct interest in the outcome of a campaign or the running of the Office. In that regard, public intellectuals, academic institutions and organisations like IPS must do their part in promoting the development of an informed citizenry even as the country witnesses an increased desire for political pluralism and competition. ***** Many other issues were examined in the survey and discussed at the Forum. A report of the Forum will be published in the next IPS e-Newsletter along with audio-clips of the presentations by the speakers at the Forum. The POPS(5) survey data is available now at: http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/Forum_Presidential_Election_011111.aspx. It is based on a sample that has been weighted according to the distribution of the resident population of Singapore on the basis of age, gender and ethnicity. Another version of the data will be released shortly based on data that is weighted according to the distribution of the citizen population. Readers are invited to look up these resources on the website and send us your feedback.

If you have comments or feedback, please email ips.enews@nus.edu.sg

Highlights from the IPS Forum on the Presidential Election, Gillian Koh, IPS Update, November 2011

WELCOME REMARKS Mr Janadas Devan Director Institute of Policy Studies It is customary on occasions such as this, a conference on the Internet, to speak of the rapidity with which our world is changing. And of course like most clichés this has the merit of being true. If one compared life in the 16th century with say life in the first century before Christ, one wouldn’t notice much change. Julius Caesar, who died in 44 BC, would not have found say the Elizabethan court of late 16th century England astoundingly different from his Rome. Indeed, he might have noticed a slight deterioration in standards of living. Shakespeare’s London was a dump compared to classical Rome. Between 1600 and 1900, however, we would find quantitative as well as qualitative changes of staggering proportions; and between 1900 and now, even more staggering. But all this is over deep time – over hundreds, if not thousands of years. How about the short and medium term? Things change fast indeed – the Singapore of today is very different from the Singapore I remember of the 1960s, for instance. But still, I think it would be true to say that things in general change more slowly than we might initially have expected. Some of you my age might remember the Jetsons, a cartoon series of a space age family. People zoomed around in little personal aeroplanes, which they flew as we would drive cars; and everyone had a personal jet-pack. You would strap it on as you would a backpack – and off you go. I remember being addicted to this cartoon series, not least because I thought it was a perfectly realistic portrayal of what life might be like in the 21st century. Well, it is 2011 now, and I’m still waiting for my jet-pack. I don’t mean to be facetious. Consider this: By the time the Jetsons was created in 1962-63, Yuri Gargarin had already orbited the Earth in Vostok 1 in April 1961. By the time we saw the Jetsons in Singapore – around 1967-68 in my memory; we got TV late in Singapore in those days – by that time, the Apollo programme was well on its way. Soon, on Christmas Eve 1968, we would get our first glimpse of planet Earth from space (the famous “Earthrise” photograph that astronauts of Apollo 8 took from moon orbit – I can’t describe to you how exciting it was to see the blue planet thus for the first time, hovering out there in the distance: us seen from elsewhere); and soon after that, just seven months later in July 1969, man walked on the Moon. 1

From earth orbit in 1961, to moon orbit in 1968, to the moon landing in 1969 – barely eight years. Do you see now why it should have seemed altogether reasonable to a teenager watching all this in the 1960s to assume that man would have got to Mars by now, begun colonising space – and each of us would be equipped with a personal jet-pack? But alas, there is still no jet-pack and man is still stuck in this tiny corner of the universe, our little solar system. And it is not only the jet-pack that I’m peeved at not possessing. There is also the personal airconditioned suit I was told was a cinch, just round the corner. This may be the air-conditioned nation – but there is alas still no personal air-conditioned suit. And, more seriously, how about the green Sahara – which I remember reading was a distinct possibility, with nuclear plants powering desalination plants to produce enough water to drench the vast African desert? Never happened. How about the solar powered car? Not yet. How about superfast planes – they would take off vertically from Singapore, zip through space 3-4 miles above Earth, and land in London within three hours? Still on the crank’s drawing board. And again, I emphasise, I don’t mean to be facetious. There is a serious point here. And the serious point was first made by Arthur C. Clarke, the great futurologist and science fiction writer: The short-term impact of any new technology, he said once, tends to be grossly overestimated; while its long-term impact tends to be vastly underestimated. The examples I gave earlier bears out the truth of this insight: We overestimated how far space technology would take us in the short term. We overestimated the possibilities of nuclear power. We overestimated solar power. And so and so forth – the examples can be easily multiplied. Even the great master, Arthur C. Clarke was off. You remember Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 movie, 2001 Space Odyssey, the screenplay for which Clarke wrote? Well, it is 10 years since 2001, and we still don’t have that or anything that resembles the technology that seemed possible in 1968. Life, they say, is stranger than fiction. Yes, in the long run. But in the short run, fiction is stranger than life. And I believe one might say the same of the Internet – and its effect on culture, on politics, the subject of this conference. As the results of the survey that IPS conducted will suggest, we may well have exaggerated the impact of the new media on our culture and politics. But equally important, the survey results also suggest that there are a couple of powerful, long-term, secular trends, which leads one to emphasise the other half of Arthur C. Clarke’s insight: We cannot predict as yet what the long-term impact of this new communications technology might be, for we lack the imagination to do so. And it is worth remembering that this wouldn’t be the first time we overestimated the short term impact of a new communications technology and underestimated its long term impact. When Johann Gutenberg developed the movable type in 15th-century Europe – the Chinese did so earlier in the 11th century, during the Song Dynasty – the initial reaction in Europe was one of horror in many quarters. Print will destroy 'the invisible cathedrals of memory', it was said, for the wide availability of printed books would make unnecessary the representation of ideas and stories in images, like those seen in the stained-glass windows, frescoes and mosaics of churches. Nobody could have imagined then the universal education that we have today – impossible to conceive without print – the vast repositories of knowledge that is the modern library, newspapers, books and what not. 2

Or go back further in time, to the invention of writing itself. In Plato's Phaedrus, we find the very invention of writing faulted. The King of Egypt reproaches Thoth, the god who invented writing, telling him: 'This discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust in the eternal written characters and not remember of themselves.' Well, the alarmist King of Egypt overestimated the short-term impact of writing – and underestimated its long-term impact. I would suggest we may be doing the same with blogs, Facebook, Twitter – the latest writing technologies: vastly over-estimating, in panic perhaps, their short term impact; and under-estimating their long-term consequences, for we cannot predict where they might lead to, for better or worse. Given their rapid growth, it is not surprising that the new media should vary widely in quality. But then we might say the same of books, too – not to mention, newspapers and television stations, even of writing itself. In each instance, the lousy and indifferent far outnumber the good and distinguished. Would anyone wish one could disinvent writing as a result? It would I think be fair to assume that this is going to take a while to shake out – for the online media to find its footing, for traditional media to get used to the new kids on the block, for consumers of media to learn to distinguish between varieties of online sites and make value judgments of each, to disaggregate the different sites according to quality and reliability – just as we today would distinguish, say, the New York Times from The Sun – time for the pattern to become obvious. In the meantime, there will be tussles and conflicts, some pushing and shoving, alarums. It is to get a sense of the lie of the land now that the Institute of Public Policy set in train this massive study of the Internet and the GE – the largest such project that IPS has coordinated, involving more than 15 researchers from four universities. One part of the study consists of a survey of 2000 people, with questions coming from the various researchers involved in the study. The other part of the study involved the gathering of a vast archive of all that was said or written online about the GE, and subjecting these to analyses. There are altogether eleven sub-studies in the whole project. Some used the survey findings, others the archive of Internet material on the GE, some both, some their own data. This conference will be only the first appearance of these papers, for they would be revised after this conference and collected in a book scheduled to appear by May next year. I invite you, the conference participants, to subject each of the speakers today to tough scrutiny. Challenge them, push, probe – beginning with the first speaker, Tan Tarn How, a Senior Research Fellow at IPS, who will present the exceedingly interesting headline findings of the survey. Thank you.

PUBLIC LECTURE CHINA FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNIVERSITY 20 OCTOBER 2011, BEIJING, PRC

Topic:

China and the United States: A View From ASEAN

Lecturer:

Prof Tommy Koh Co-Chairman, China-Singapore Forum Chairman, Centre for International Law, Special Adviser, Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore

1 Professor Qin Yaqing, Ambassador Cai Jinbiao, distinguished professors and students, ladies and gentlemen.

2 I would like to begin by thanking the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) for inviting me to deliver this public lecture. I feel privileged to speak at the CFAU, the leading education institution on foreign policy in China. Founded in 1955, on the initiative of the much loved and respected Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, the CFAU has groomed generations of ethically qualified and professionally competent personnel for the Chinese foreign service. Under the wise leadership of Ambassador Zhao Jinjun and Professor Qin Yaqing, I am certain that the CFAU will continue to "serve the needs of the nation, open itself to the changing outside world, look into the future, and train generations of worthy talents."

3 I would also like to thank Professor Qin Yaqing for chairing my lecture. Professor Qin has made many important contributions to the scholarship of international relations and politics. He has taught at many leading universities, at home and abroad.

4 I am in Beijing as the leader of the Singapore delegation to the Sixth China-Singapore Forum, a track 1.5 dialogue. The Forum was held on 19 October and was very successful. We discussed the flourishing bilateral relations between China and Singapore; the 20 year old and mutually beneficial relationship between China and ASEAN; and the relations among the major powers in Asia and the role of ASEAN in that context. Some of my colleagues are here this morning. If you have any questions about the Forum, I will request them to help me to respond to your questions.

I will now turn to my lecture.

What is the Nature of the World Order?

6 For nearly half a century, from the 1950s until the end of the 1990s, the world was dominated by two superpowers: the US, backed by NATO; and the USSR, backed by the Warsaw Pact. The world order was bipolar. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended. Russia, without her former empire, has been reduced to a major power although it still has a superpower’s arsenal of nuclear weapons. With the Soviet Union gone, the world is left with one superpower, the USA. The question is whether the world is still unipolar or have we entered a new paradigm.

Are We Living in a Post-American World?

7 Fareed Zakaria has argued in his brilliant book, “The Post-American World” (2008), that the brief moment in history when the world was dominated by one hegemon has passed and that we are now living in a post-American world. I do not agree with the Zakarian thesis.

8 I think we are still living in an American world. America possesses a totality of economic, military and soft power, which is unmatched by any other country or combination of countries. The EU has a larger economy than the US, but the EU lacks America’s military power and the capacity to act as one on the world stage. The EU project of a common foreign and security policy is a work in progress. In any case, the EU’s foreign and security policies are generally aligned to those of the US. The US does not see the EU as posing a threat to its hegemony. None of the other countries, whether in G7/G8 or G20 or BRIC, has the capacity or the will to challenge the US domination of global affairs. It is, of course, true that as other powers rise, the power of the US, in relative terms, is not as weighty as in the past. Increasingly, the US has to mobilise the support of its allies and friends in order to succeed in its endeavours. It can lead but cannot dictate. It is, however, still an American world because few initiatives will succeed without American leadership or participation.

Is the US in Terminal Decline or Will it Bounce Back from its Current Crisis?

9 Asians who are knowledgeable about the US do not agree on the answer to this question. In Singapore, for example, Kishore Mahbubani and I, who have spent many years in the US, hold opposite views. I commend Kishore Mahbubani's book, “The New Asian Hemisphere: the irresistible rise of the East”,

to your attention. I also recommend Prof Simon Tay's book, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Asia Aloneâ&#x20AC;?.

10 Kishore Mahbubani is of the view that the US is in a state of terminal decline and will, sooner rather than later, lose its pole position to China. I believe that, as in the past, the US will bounce back from its current crisis and will retain its pole position for the next 20 to 30 years. Simon Tay has taken a more nuaunced position, somewhere between Kishore Mahbubani and me.

What are the reasons for my optimism?

12 First, history. America has faced many adversities in the past, such as the Civil War, the Great Depression, the oil embargo, stagflation, the savings and loan crisis, etc. The record shows that America has always bounced back, each time, leaner and stronger. One should, therefore, not underestimate Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s resilience and capacity for re-generation.

13 Second, American dominance in science and technology. American scientists and technologists continue to lead the world. The fact that, each year, the majority of the Nobel Laureates are Americans confirms my point. Another indicator is the number of patents granted each year to Americans or US-based inventors.

14 Third, the quality of US universities, research and development. American universities continue to dominate the annual rankings of the best universities of the world. In a knowledge-intensive world, this is a significant achievement. It is also significant that the US continues to invest more in research and development than any of its rivals.

15 Fourth, the ability to attract and retain global talent. There is a global competition for talent. There is no country which is a bigger magnet for attracting global talent. Unlike Europe and Japan, foreigners find it very easy to assimilate in America. US brainpower is, therefore, being constantly augmented by a brain transfusion from the rest of the world.

16 Fifth, a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship. America has a culture of encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship. This is reinforced by a conducive eco-system, including a legal system which protects intellectual property and the availability of venture capital and angel capital.

17 Sixth, tolerance of failure. In many Asian countries, there is no tolerance for failure. A person whose venture has failed is stigmatised. In America, there is

no stigma for an honest failure. You are expected to pick yourself up and try again.

18 The answer to the question, is America a declining power, has an impact on how America views the world. A strong and competitive America will be self-confident and not see the rise of other nations as a threat to its prosperity and security. A weak and declining America will be defensive and may turn inward and become more protectionist and nationalistic. An insecure and nationalistic America may seek to contain the rise of potential rivals, such as China.

How do Americans View the Rise of China?

19 It is easier to say how Americans view the rise of China than to say how the American government does. This is because polls are regularly taken by Gallup, Pew, the Chicago Council of Global Affairs and all the major American TV networks and newspapers.

20 Two academics, Prof Benjamin Page (USA) and Prof Tao Xie (PRC), have co-published a very valuable book, “Living with the Dragon: how the American public views the rise of China” (2010). After analysing all the polls, Page and Xie conclude: “… most Americans oppose efforts to limit China’s rise …. A large majority of Americans want to avoid conflict, favouring cooperation and engagement with China.” (page 111).

21 On China’s economic competition, Page and Xie report: “… most Americans now recognise that China’s economy is likely to grow to equal the size of the US economy and is likely to do so rather quickly – perhaps within twenty to thirty years. Reactions to that prospect tend toward the negative. And many Americans – though happy to get inexpensive goods from China – worry about the quality and safety of those goods, about China’s trade practices (widely seen as unfair) and especially about the impact of trade and investment with China on the jobs and wages of American workers. Yet there is no evidence so far of an upsurge in protectionist sentiment, just support for measures like environmental and workplace safety provisions in trade agreements plus opposition to major investments in the United States by Chinese or other sovereign wealth funds.” (page 111, emphasis added).

22 Finally, on China’s growing military capabilities and influence in the world, Page and Xie report that, “Many Americans are concerned. The average American has not been very favourably impressed by China’s diplomatic activities and would prefer that China have less rather than more influence in the world.” (page 111).

23 To sum up, the American public do not have a hostile attitude towards China. They prefer cooperation and engagement over conflict. However, they do not trust China and therefore view the prospect of China catching up with the US economically and wielding more influence in the world as a negative development. The American people feel that China is not bearing its fair share of responsibility as a major global power in terms of maintaining the global order. In the American democracy, the attitudes of the electorate is an important factor in the making and practice of US foreign policy.

24 It is harder to answer the question, how does the US government view the rise of China. Why? First, because different US Administrations have articulated different views on China. Second, the concept of the “government” is more complex than in most other countries. Of the three branches of the US government, two of them, the Administration and the Congress, share power. The Congress is made up of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Even when the same political party holds the presidency and the majority in the two houses, they do not always work in tandem. The President has to negotiate with Congress in order to arrive at a decision. The situation becomes more difficult when the majority in one or both houses of the Congress is controlled by the opposition party. In the American democracy, other actors also wield power and influence over the making of the China policy. The following are some of the most important: the business community, the human rights lobby, organised labour, the religious lobby, the intelligentsia and the mass media. In formulating his China policy, every US President has to take into account the laws of the land, the views of Congress, the demands of the various interest groups and public opinion. It is important for China’s leaders and scholars to understand the complexity of the process of decision-making in Washington. Such an understanding will enable China, not necessarily to accept, but to understand better why the US President has no choice but to do certain things which are viewed by Beijing as unfriendly, such as meeting with the Dalai Lama or selling arms to Taiwan. I am sure that much of this is well-known to Chinese diplomats and policy-makers, but it might still be worthwhile reminding ourselves of the complexities of decision-making in a democracy like the United States.

25 Third, US policy towards China will always be subject to the tussle between the importance of interests and values in the making of foreign policy. In most countries, realism guides the making of policy. A country’s foreign policy is exclusively or primarily based upon the pursuit of its national interests. In the US, however, its foreign policy is often described as a reflection of American values and ideals. A constant refrain in American rhetoric is that it shall be the policy of the United States to promote individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the free market in the world. The idea that US foreign policy should be valued-based rather than interest-based is part of the American discourse. In practice, of course, US policy makers will usually give greater weight to US interests rather than US values. However, in other cases and, at other times, US domestic politics may elevate values over interests. The US policy on China will inevitably have to

be a compromise between the pursuit of US interests and the pursuit of US values. The consequence is that the US policy towards China will be based, partly, on cooperation and competition, and, partly, on dialogue and agreement to disagree.

What are the Convergent Interests of China and the US?

26 Do China and the US share any convergent interests? In my view, they share many convergent interests, such as the following:

(a)

They wish to maintain peace and prevent conflict in the Asia-Pacific region;

(b)

They wish to promote free trade and investment globally and, especially, in the Asia-Pacific region;

(c)

They share a responsibility to help manage the world economy, being the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s two largest economies, and with China serving as a major engine of growth of the world economy;

(d)

They support the growth of Asian regionalism and regional architecture;

(e)

They cooperate to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile materials and missile technology;

(f)

They cooperate to combat terrorism;

(g)

They cooperate in the various institutions of global governance, such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, IMO, ICAO, UNEP, WHO;

(h)

They cooperate in dealing with many non-traditional threats to international security, such as epidemics, piracy, drug and human trafficking, etc; and

(i)

They seek to foster better mutual understanding through education, culture and people-to-people exchanges.

What are the Divergent Interests of China and the US?

27 At the same time, we must acknowledge that there are issues which divide China and the US. I enumerate below some of the most important: (a)

Human rights and democracy;

(b)

North Korea and Iran;

(c)

Tibet and the Dalai Lama;

(d)

US sales of arms to Taiwan as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act;

(e)

China’s military modernisation;

(f)

China’s foreign exchange policy;

(g)

China’s treatment of US companies and their intellectual property rights;

(h)

Differences between China and the US in the climate change negotiations;

(i)

US restrictions on Chinese investments in the US; and

(j)

US “mismanagement” of its economy and currency.

The Way Ahead

28 It is not an exaggeration to describe the China-US relationship as the most important bilateral relationship in the world. It is a relationship between the world’s two largest economies. It is also a relationship between the incumbent superpower and a rapidly rising power which has the potential to challenge the former. To make matters more complicated, the PRC is viewed by many Americans with distrust because it is not a democracy but is ruled by the Communist Party of China (CCP). Most Americans, however, do not know that the CCP is no longer in the business of exporting revolution but of goods and services, and that it has jettisoned a centrally planned economy in favour of a market economy with Chinese characteristics.

29 The management of the Sino-American relationship requires great wisdom on both sides. The world is fortunate that for the past nearly 40 years, American and Chinese leaders have focused on expanding the areas of convergent interests and gradually reducing the areas of divergent interests. Nixon’s vision of bringing China out of isolation and socialising it into the international community has guided his own and the administrations of Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, Bush (43) and Obama. Will a future US President discard that vision and seek to contain China’s rise? Will a future Chinese President seek to challenge US leadership in the Asia-Pacific? Will a more powerful China continue to pursue a policy of good neighbourliness towards the region or adopt a more aggressive posture in asserting Chinese interests, for example, in the South China Sea? Is it

possible to avoid a future conflict between China and the US over Taiwan, North Korea, the South China Sea or Pakistan? The future is full of promise and uncertainty. China and the US stand at the fork of two roads. One road leads to cooperation and competition. The other road leads to confrontation and conflict. Which road will they choose?

A View From ASEAN

30 ASEAN has a stake in good relations between China and the US. First, because ASEAN wishes to have good relations with both and does not wish to have to choose between them. In the event of a confrontation or conflict between China and the US and ASEAN is forced to choose sides, this would pose a challenge to ASEAN unity and could result in its fracture. Second, ASEAN’s agenda of building peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific through the various ASEAN-centred institutions and processes would be aborted if China and the US were in conflict. Third, ASEAN’s ambition of promoting prosperity in the region through free trade and regional economic integration would similarly fail in such an eventuality. One of the most important reasons for inviting the US to join the East Asian Summit is to encourage China and the US to work with each other and with the rest of the region. ASEAN welcomes China’s rise and seeks to deepen its comprehensive engagement with her. At the same time, ASEAN values the constructive role which the US plays in the region, both economically and strategically. ASEAN does not wish to see the region come under the domination of any major power. For this reason, ASEAN seeks to engage all the major and middle powers and to give all of them a stake in the region’s stability and prosperity.

31 Speaking from an ASEAN perspective, I would encourage China and the US to choose the road which leads to cooperation and competition and not the road which leads to confrontation and conflict. First, there are no fundamental contradictions of interests between the two countries. Economically, the two economies are more complementary than competitive. They are also increasingly inter-dependent. China needs the US market for its exports. The US consumers benefit from the affordable prices of Chinese exports. It is true that China is running a huge trade surplus with the US. It is, however, also true that China has become America’s largest creditor. There are, of course, issues which divide the two countries, but these can be gradually resolved through dialogue and negotiation.

32 Second, although China’s economy is likely to overtake that of the US in the next 10 to 15 years or even sooner, this should however be viewed in perspective. China is still a developing country with a huge population of 1.3 billion and great disparities. According to the World Bank (2010), China’s per capita income is $7,570 whereas that of the US is $47,120. It will take time before China catches up with America in terms of the standard of living of the people,

although in major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, incomes are rising rapidly. Although Americans frequently express concerns about the opacity of China’s military expenditures and China’s rapid military modernisation, the reality is that US military power is without peer. The US continues to outspend the rest of the world put together, in military expenditures. It will take China even longer to catch up with America militarily. As for soft power, the competition has just begun. In recent years, China has made tremendous progress in developing and projecting its soft power through its Confucius Institute and by hosting the highly successful Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, the Shanghai Expo in 2010 and the Asian Games in Guangzhou in 2010. In sum, I believe that for the next 20 to 30 years, China is in no position to challenge America even if it wants to. However, I see no evidence that China wishes to do so.

33 Finally, I think that China and the US need each other more than ever before. In an increasingly globalised and inter-dependent world, the boundary between domestic and international is becoming less and less relevant. For example, the US cannot resolve its fiscal crisis without the help of China. For example, China cannot gain acceptance by the West as a market economy without the help of the US. For example, the current climate change negotiations will not succeed unless there is an agreement between the two largest emitters of carbon dioxide, China and the US. Rationally, the US needs China and China needs the US. It is logical for them to cooperate where their interests coincide and compete where they do not. It is not logical for them to embark down the road of confrontation and conflict. History, however, teaches us not to under-estimate man’s capacity for irrational behaviour. On that sober note, I conclude my lecture and look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you very much for your attention.

. . . . .

Japan still has what it takes to thrive Tommy Koh The Straits Times, 11 October 2011 THIRTY years ago, Japan was admired by the world as a stable, democratic, prosperous and highly competitive country. The eminent Harvard scholar Ezra Vogel captured that moment in his best-selling book, Japan As No. 1. There were, however, some Americans who felt threatened by Japan. They demonised Japan and falsely identified it as America's new enemy. This culminated in the Plaza Accord of 1985 when Japan capitulated to the pressure of America and Europe and agreed to a drastic revaluation of the yen. The strong yen posed a huge challenge to Japan's export industries. At the same time, the strong yen gave the Japanese a heady sense of being super-rich and being flush with money. This led to reckless spending abroad and an asset bubble at home. When the bubble burst in the early 1990s, it nearly brought Japan down. It has taken Japan many years to clean up the mess. Japan has just elected its sixth prime minister in five years. This is obviously an abnormal and unsatisfactory situation. The problem should, however, be viewed in its proper perspective. For many decades after World War II, Japan was ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japan was a de facto one-party state. The LDP's monopoly of political power came to an end when it became corrupt and lost the support of the electorate. For a few years, the Hosokawa, Hata and Murayama governments provided Japan with alternative leadership. They were, however, unequal to the task, and have faded away. In the meantime, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has emerged as the alternative to the LDP. It will take a few more years before Japan evolves a stable two-party system. But I have no doubt it will do so. In the long term, such a situation would be more sustainable and better for Japanese democracy than to rely solely on one political party to rule Japan. The year 2011 will go down in the history of Japan, a country prone to natural disasters, as the annus horribilis. The triple disasters of earthquake, tsunami and a damaged nuclear power plant have tested the moral fibre of the Japanese people. They have come through with flying colours. The best qualities of the Japanese people were on display: resilience, determination, courage, discipline, unity and civic-mindedness. The first reason for my optimism about the future of Japan is its people. I believe the people of Japan will overcome the many challenges which beset their country. The second reason for my optimism is the high quality of the Japanese workforce. The Japanese workforce is one of the best educated, trained and productive in the world.

The third reason for my optimism is Japan's work ethic and culture of excellence. The people of Japan are extremely industrious. You don't see idle people in Japan. In addition, there is a pervasive culture of excellence. Every worker, no matter how humble his job, seeks to achieve excellence in his work. They seem to take pride in their work. The competition among the advanced economies is increasingly driven by technology and innovation. Japan has a strong track record in innovation and new technology. Japan used to dominate the world in consumer electronics and white goods. It is a world leader in building hybrid, electric and other fuel-efficient vehicles. It is also a leader in green technologies, robotics, aeronautics, game technology, anime, photographic technology and so on. In the corporate world, Japan has produced some notable global champions. There are 68 Japanese companies in the Fortune Global 500. Companies such as Toyota, Panasonic, Sony and Hitachi are world class. Other companies, such as Rakuten and Uniqlo, are poised to join the club. These two companies use English which will make them more competitive internationally. It is important for Japan to produce more global champions because such companies are profitable, attract talented employees, and generate good jobs and innovation. Japan is viewed favourably by the world. The world admires Japan as a peaceful and beautiful country. It is immaculately clean and takes excellent care of its environment. It has a long and rich history and its heritage in arts and crafts is carefully preserved. Japanese society is viewed as both prosperous and socially harmonious. The quality of life is high and Japanese cuisine has become part of the world's food culture. The Japanese people are viewed as polite, gracious and considerate. They are also admired for their inner strength and their never-say-die attitude. This was best exemplified by the victorious women's soccer team in the Women's World Cup in July. Japan faces many challenges. Among the most important are the following: recovery from the March 11 triple disasters; the need to restructure and globalise Japanese companies; and the need to deal decisively with demographic trends, attract foreign talent and integrate more closely with Asia. There is one more challenge which is fundamental to Japan's future. This is the need for a revolution in the Japanese mindset. Japan has been embraced by the world. It is time for Japan to open up and embrace the world. If Japan makes this transition, it could have as profound an impact on Japan's future as the Meiji Reformation did in the past. The writer is ambassador-at-large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and special adviser to the Institute of Policy Studies. This commentary first appeared on the website of Japanese think-tank, the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). www.rieti.go.jp/en/

张俪霖：新中合作连续及更新张俪霖联合早报，2011 年 11 月 1 日

今日的中国已经成为世界第二大的经济强国。在解决欧美的经济危机当中，中国的角色举足轻重，跟 21 年前与新加坡正式建交的中国已大不相同。两国之间不对称之处会越来越大，因为中国的发展空间几乎无限，而面积只有北京昌平区一半的新加坡，难免受面积与资源所限制。经过近 20 年的交流，中国派了各阶层的访问团及官员到新加坡来认识和了解新加坡的管理系统。中国已经把他们能运用的新加坡经验，调适转用在中国。因此，在最近北京举行、由两个智囊机构参与的第六次中新论坛上，有学者问，新加坡还能为中国提供什么，新加坡现在的价值定位（value proposition）是什么？当然，从经贸数额方面做比较，新中两国关系密切。中国是新加坡第三大贸易伙伴。到了 2010 年底，统计数据显示交易量达到 953 亿美元。中国也是新加坡投资者的首选地，以资金计算排名第一；去年到新加坡的中国人将近 117 万人次。在 2010 年，人口仅 500 万的新加坡是中国第 11 大贸易伙伴。为加强经贸关系，新加坡与中国七个省份成立了经贸理事会，由部长，省长担任联合主席。继苏州工业园区后，两个政府启动了新一代的城市发展，融入了维护环境及绿化的概念，在天津联合推动第二个项目——中新天津生态城。这是一个新中如何在原来的合作基础上求新求变的例子，也让新加坡能体现它的不同价值。不过，如果要让新中两国的合作得以延续，未来的方向不单要包含经贸方面和其他硬体项目，也必须加入非硬体因素，比如加强发挥两国的软实力（soft power）方面，就大有可为。在教育方面，新加坡用了新的模式——“新中+1”。新加坡在开办第四所大学时 ——新加坡科技与设计大学，同时邀请了浙江大学与美国的麻省理工学院联办课程。三国合作，希望能汇聚中美新教育的实力，提炼各自的精华，给新一代的学生不同的学习体验。论坛中，有人提议两国可以在文化、创意产业，甚至媒体方面，做长期性的规划，以更大规模来更新两国的合作模式。在软实力方面，两国可以寻求新的机遇，发掘合作的潜力。就软实力加强合作中国跟新加坡领导人最近刚好用不同的表达方式，分别强调了软实力对各自的重要性，尤其在政府与人民之间的关系。新加坡访问团抵达北京时，为期 4 天的中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第六次全体会议（六中全会）刚闭幕。六中全会会议通过关于中国文化体制改革、推动文化大发展大繁荣的决议。

新加坡总理李显龙在刚休会的第十二届国会发言当中，提到国家应该采纳更开放的政策与治理模式。李总理为普遍提高人们生活水平锁定了三个目标：建设没有人落在后头的包容性社会、打造改进所有人生活的蓬勃经济，以及采纳“新加坡人优先” 的政治模式。在某种程度上，中国与新加坡政府面临的问题是类似的，虽然轻重缓急不同，但要维持及加强人民对政府的信任是相同的。两国也受到新科技的冲击。透过新媒体，现在信息只要在手机键上一按就马上传开，有时候虚的也变成真实的，因为官方或当事者来不及澄清回应。两国政府可以考虑分享它们个别如何对待这个课题。新加坡新闻、通讯及艺术部长雅国博士在国会总结该部的相关政策时提到，会通过多方面来提高利用新媒体及媒体内容的素质。从这次的双边论坛中，笔者也注意到论坛焦点仍然是放在两个政府主导的新中关系上。或许是探讨的课题主要围绕在新中与东盟（亚细安），还有相关的国际关系问题，双方并没有机会讨论政府以外，譬如非政府机构、民间组织，私人企业等的合作。事实上，它们在推动及巩固新中关系扮演一定的角色，尤其在软实力方面。软实力的来源不单是来自政府，也来自其他方面，如艺术、媒体工作者等。如果我们把新中政府建立的关系，看成一座大的桥梁，那企业、学者、一般老百姓要怎么样搭这座桥，他们之间建的其他“桥梁”要如何配合，有些什么影响等，值得研讨。明年，新加坡将会迎接中国的大熊猫，凯凯与嘉嘉，这是新中友好关系的另一个重要指标。不过，无论新中两国官方关系多好，我们也要从两国人民的角度，关注他们怎么样看待新中关系。从个人观点及经验，人民眼中的中国及新加坡是什么？政府所塑造的中国与新加坡的形象，与人民接触的有差异吗？譬如在新加坡，提到中国就可能联想到从中国来的外来人才，新移民等。在中国，谈到的新加坡时或许就会联想到政府效率，系统性的城市规划等。但两国人民如何对待他们在生活中接触到的“中国”及“新加坡”，无形中也会影响他们对政府主导的双边关系政策的观感及支持度。而实际上，如果双方对彼此的观感和原来的认识有距离，也表示两国从不同的层次及渠道可以有更多机会交流，增进认识，拉近距离，减少误会。预计 2012 年竣工的中国文化中心，应该也可以起促进了解的作用。在这次论坛中，来自新加坡的演讲者提醒与会者，早在 100 年前，新加坡土生土长的华人在开始推动本身的社会改革之外，也关心中国的时局发展，并且参与其中。新中关系有历史的基础，再加上近年来的紧密的经贸关系，如何延续这良好的关系，就要看接下来两国政府及人民的创意。作者是政策研究院助理院长，她在 10 月 19 日至 20 日出席由新加坡东亚研究所与中国人民外交学会联办的第六届中新论坛，文章仅代表个人意见。