Cognitive components of ingroup projection prototype projection contributes to biased prototypicalit by Irakli Kavtaradze

Original Article

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Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection Prototype Projection Contributes to Biased Prototypicality Judgments in Group Perception Maya Machunsky and Thorsten Meiser Department of Psychology, University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract. This research investigated whether relative ingroup prototypicality (i.e., the tendency to perceive one’s own ingroup as more prototypical of a superordinate category than the outgroup) can result from a prototype-based versus exemplar-based mental representation of social categories, rather than from ingroup membership per se as previously suggested by the ingroup projection model. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a prototype-based group was perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than an exemplar-based group supporting the hypothesis that an intergroup context is not necessary for biased prototypicality judgments. Experiment 3 introduced an intergroup context in a minimal-group-like paradigm. The findings demonstrated that both the kind of cognitive representation and motivational processes contribute to biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup settings. Keywords: group judgments, mental category representation, prototype, ingroup projection

Ingroup projection refers to the phenomenon that people perceive groups to which they themselves belong (i.e., ingroups) as more prototypical of a superordinate category that includes both the ingroup and the outgroup than groups to which they do not belong (i.e., outgroups). For instance, Germans perceive their ingroup of Germans as more prototypical of the superordinate category of Europeans than the outgroup Italians. Furthermore, Germans perceive Europeans as more hardworking and efficient, whereas Italians perceive Europeans as more warm and sociable, so that both Germans and Italians perceive Europeans as more similar to the stereotype of their own group (Bianchi, Machunsky, Steffens, & Mummendey, 2009; Bianchi, Mummendey, Steffens, & Yzerbyt, 2010). The tendency to perceive a superordinate category more ingroup-like than outgroup-like can be observed even at the visual level, as was recently demonstrated by Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, and Wigboldus (2011). These authors showed that visual representations of superordinate category faces by ingroup members are more similar to ingroup faces than to outgroup faces. In general, ingroup projection has attracted particular attention because relative ingroup prototypicality seems to be particularly relevant for intergroup attitudes, inasmuch as relative ingroup prototypicality is a reliable predictor of negative outgroup attitudes and ingroup bias, denoting © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

preferential evaluations of an ingroup relative to an outgroup (Bianchi et al., 2009; Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). In fact, the aim of an advantageous evaluation of the ingroup relative to the outgroup is considered to be causal for ingroup projection (see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Hence, ingroup projection is attributed to the motivation to attain a favorable evaluation of one’s ingroup in comparison to an outgroup (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003). This assumption is inherent in the ingroup projection model inasmuch as the model builds on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and its premise that people strive toward positive social identity. However, recent research showed that ingroup projection occurs even at an implicit level (Bianchi et al., 2010), that the activation of ingroup compared to outgroup information results in a speed advantage when making judgments about the superordinate category (Machunsky & Meiser, 2009), and that ingroup projection occurs under conditions known to elicit heuristic processing (Rosa & Waldzus, 2012). These results may be interpreted as pointing toward a cognitive rather than a purely motivational basis of perceived ingroup prototypicality. The present research outlines and tests a theoretical model that may serve as a first draft for a more cognitive approach to biased proSocial Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30 DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000156

M. Machunsky & T. Meiser: Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

totypicality judgments. We analyze the role of elementary principles of category learning and memory for the perception of relative group prototypicality. In particular, we hypothesize that differences in the kind of mental representation can be sufficient to induce biased prototypicality judgments. In contrast to a primarily motivational account of ingroup projection, the cognitive approach pursued here is not restricted to intergroup contexts, but can be applied to any kind of hierarchical categorization. Though we focus on learning and cognition and emphasize the generalizability of these processes, we believe that motivational and cognitive processes are strongly intertwined. Thus, the present research does not exclude the role of motivational processes for relative ingroup prototypicality, but rather provides evidence for previously underanalyzed cognitive processes.

Ingroup Projection Several studies have yielded support for the core assumption of the ingroup projection model that ingroups are usually perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than are outgroups (e.g., Machunsky, Meiser, & Mummendey, 2009; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). In particular, Waldzus, Mummendey, and Wenzel (2005) provided evidence for the expected causal direction of projection from the ingroup to the superordinate category by showing that the activation of different ingroup stereotypes changes the representation of the superordinate group (see also Bianchi et al., 2010). In accordance with the motivational assumptions of the ingroup projection model, which rest on the social identity framework, it was further demonstrated that perceived ingroup prototypicality is especially pronounced for individuals who are highly identified with both their ingroup and the superordinate category (Waldzus et al., 2003; Wenzel et al., 2003). These individuals are presumably very prone to striving for a positive ingroup evaluation and to taking the superordinate category as a relevant standard for intergroup comparisons. The implication of the ingroup projection model that enhanced ingroup prototypicality should be related to more biased intergroup judgments was given support in studies showing that higher degrees of perceived ingroup prototypicality are associated with more negative outgroup evaluations (Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; Waldzus et al., 2003). This relationship, however, is restricted to cases in which the superordinate category is positively valued and thus provides a desired standard of reference. In contrast, the relationship between relative ingroup prototypicality and outgroup evaluation is reversed in the case of a negative superordinate category, where perceived prototypicality indicates a fit to an undesirable standard (Wenzel et al., 2003). Moreover, participants who are highly identified Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

with their ingroup show less ingroup prototypicality relative to outgroup prototypicality for a negatively valued superordinate category. These findings were interpreted as reflecting a motivation to make positive superordinate categories more similar, and negative superordinate categories more dissimilar, to the ingroup in order to form a basis for ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation in either case (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003, 2007). While the previous studies on ingroup projection were built mainly on motivational assumptions in the tradition of social identity research, in the following we outline an alternative perspective toward ingroup projection focusing on the mental representation of categorical information and emphasizing the role of elementary cognitive processes for biased prototypicality judgments. As mentioned above, motivational and cognitive processes are not mutually exclusive, and in many situations both kinds of processes contribute to the same phenomenon in concert. Nonetheless, a cognitive perspective has the advantage of theoretical parsimony, inasmuch as it aims at general processes of learning and memory that are not specifically dedicated to intergroup settings. This makes a closer investigation of the role of purely cognitive processes for relative ingroup prototypicality promising.

Mental Representation of Ingroup and Outgroup Information as a Basis of Ingroup Prototypicality The core of the suggested cognitive perspective on ingroup projection lies in the mental representation of categorical information in long-term memory. Cognitive and social psychological models of category acquisition and memory distinguish between prototype-based and exemplar-based representations of categorical knowledge (e.g., Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Smith & Zárate, 1990, 1992). Prototype models assume that information about a category is stored in terms of a feature vector containing the average values on relevant attribute dimensions across the elements of that category. Exemplar models, in contrast, suggest that instances of a category are stored, and that a sample of exemplars is retrieved from memory when a categorical judgment is formed. As a consequence, attribute judgments on relevant dimensions can be directly “read off” from an activated category prototype, whereas an exemplar-based representation requires more demanding retrieval and integration processes concerning a sample of exemplars to form attribute judgments. Although the two kinds of representation are markedly different, they can be assumed to coexist, so that prototype and exemplar information are used in a flexible manner depending on the characteristics of the category, the situation and the individual (Park & Hastie, 1987; Sherman, 1996; Smith & Zárate, 1990, 1992). © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

M. Machunsky & T. Meiser: Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

Turning to the mental representation of categorical knowledge about ingroups and outgroups, several fields of research have indicated that ingroups and outgroups are stored differently in long-term memory. More specifically, the kind of representation is determined by an interaction of category (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup) and valence of the attribute dimension, such that positive ingroup and negative outgroup information is stored in a more prototypebased format, whereas negative ingroup and positive outgroup information is stored in a more exemplar-based format. Evidence for this interaction comes from research on intergroup attributions, which revealed that positive behaviors of ingroup members and negative behaviors of outgroup members are perceived to reflect stable and generalized behavioral tendencies, whereas negative behaviors of ingroup members and positive behaviors of outgroup members are interpreted as more situational and externally caused episodes (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Pettigrew, 1979). In a similar vein, research on the linguistic intergroup bias (e.g., Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989) showed that people use more abstract and trait-like descriptions of positive behaviors of ingroup members and negative behaviors of outgroup members, compared to more specific and concrete descriptions of negative behaviors of the ingroup and positive behaviors of the outgroup. These findings corroborate the notion that positive information about ingroups and negative information about outgroups is represented in terms of generic features that constitute a prototype of the category, whereas negative information about ingroups and positive information about outgroups is represented in terms of individual episodes and exemplars. This interpretation gained further support from research on spontaneous trait inferences, which revealed that traits are spontaneously inferred from positive ingroup information but not from negative ingroup or positive outgroup information (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000). Additional evidence was provided in a study by Haslam, Oakes, Turner, and McGarty (1995), who found that the ingroup was perceived to be more homogeneous than the outgroup when judgments were made on positive traits, suggesting that a prototype-based representation of positive ingroup information was used, but that the outgroup was perceived as more homogeneous when judgments were made on negative traits, suggesting use of a prototype-based representation of negative outgroup information. The most direct evidence for the different mental representations of ingroups and outgroups as a function of valence stems from research by Sherman, Klein, Laskey, and Wyer (1998). Using a task facilitation paradigm, the authors demonstrated that group judgments can be made without retrieval of individual exemplar information in the case of an ingroup judgment on positive traits and in the case of an outgroup judgment on negative traits, which indicates that these kinds of information are stored in a prototype-based format. At the same time, the authors showed that group judgments involve the activation of individual ÂŠ 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

exemplar information in the case of ingroup judgments on negative traits and in the case of outgroup judgments on positive traits, indicating an exemplar-based representation.

A Cognitive Approach to Biased Prototypicality Judgments The different mental representations of categorical knowledge as a function of ingroup versus outgroup and positive versus negative valence constitute one building block of our cognitive perspective on biased prototypicality judgments. Another building block is given by the qualitative differences of stored category information on different hierarchical levels of categorization. As Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) demonstrated in their seminal work, categories on higher levels of inclusiveness (i.e., superordinate categories at the upper part of the hierarchy) are less clearly defined, and their attributes are less readily available, compared to categories on an intermediate level of inclusiveness, so-called basic categories. Inasmuch as clear-cut representations of higher-order categories are not available, representations of more inclusive categories initially have to be generated. Various studies in cognitive psychology revealed that hierarchical categorization enables people to infer features from one category to another category at a higher or lower hierarchical level (Coley, Hayes, Lawson, & Moloney, 2004; Markman & Wisniewski, 1997), so that we may conclude that information from subordinate categories are used to characterize weakly defined superordinate categories. If we apply this rationale to the hierarchy from the proximal level of categorization into ingroups and outgroups to the more inclusive level of a superordinate category, we are assuming that the attributes of the superordinate category are not directly available, but rather have to be inferred by accessing information from the proximal level. Given that taking the attributes directly from a stored prototype is less cognitively demanding and more efficient than retrieving a sample of exemplars and integrating relevant attribute information across the retrieved exemplars (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Sherman, Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000), prototype-based representations should be accessed with priority to generate an impression of the superordinate category. Then, if one proximal group is represented in a prototype-based format and the other in an exemplar-based format, the prototype-based group should be the source of projection onto the superordinate category. As delineated above, a prototype-based representation can be accessed for the ingroup in the case of positive attributes and for the outgroup in the case of negative attributes, whereas exemplar-based representations prevail for negative ingroup information and positive outgroup information. The cognitive view that prototypes are taken as the Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15â&#x20AC;&#x201C;30

M. Machunsky & T. Meiser: Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

source of projection therefore accommodates the central finding of enhanced ingroup projection in the context of a positively valued superordinate category (Waldzus et al., 2003, 2004, 2005; Wenzel et al., 2003) and of enhanced outgroup projection in the context of a negatively valued superordinate category (Wenzel et al., 2003) – if it is assumed that people search for easily available positive information (i.e., usually the ingroup prototype) for a positive superordinate category and for easily available negative information (i.e., usually the outgroup prototype) for a negative superordinate category. To summarize, according to the cognitive model suggested herein, biased prototypicality judgments between two groups with respect to a superordinate category can be determined by prototype availability rather than by group membership alone. One prediction that can be derived from the cognitive model is that differential prototype availability for two groups should be sufficient for biased prototypicality judgments to occur, and that an intergroup setting with an ingroup and an outgroup is not necessary. We tested this prediction in Experiments 1 and 2, where participants were presented with information about two artificial groups without any indication whether the participants themselves belonged to one of these groups. Another implication of the cognitive model is that prototype availability should moderate the effect of perceived ingroup prototypicality in intergroup settings if the availability of a prototype-based representation is de-confounded from group membership. In Experiment 3, we therefore introduced a categorization into an ingroup and an outgroup, and provided prototype information either about the ingroup or the outgroup. Experiment 3 thus aimed to disentangle the effects of motivational processes that come into force in intergroup scenarios and the effects of cognitive processes that are driven by prototype availability.

Experiment 1 The first experiment was conducted to demonstrate that biased prototypicality judgments occur for two proximal groups with respect to a superordinate category if a prototype-based representation is induced for one group and an exemplar-based representation is induced for the other. Following the procedure by Medin et al. (1984) and Smith and Zárate (1990), exemplar information was presented for both proximal groups in terms of individual trait-related behaviors, and the underlying prototype of traits was also provided for one of the groups. The presentation of prototype information in addition to exemplar information has been shown to elicit a prototype-based representation of physical and social categories, whereas the presentation exemplar information alone leads to an exemplar-based representation (Medin et al., 1984; Smith & Zárate, 1990). Based on the cognitive model of biased prototypicality judgments, we therefore predicted that the proximal group Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

for which the prototype was given is perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than the proximal group for which the prototype was not given. To isolate the role of cognitive processes, and to preclude any motivational influences that may contribute to biased prototypicality perception, we used an artificial group scenario without any reference to participants’ group membership.

Method Participants Forty students from various departments of a large university volunteered in the experiment for financial compensation.

Materials A set of six bipolar trait dimensions (e.g., sociable–withdrawn, reliable–unreliable, technically skilled–unskilled) was created with pools of 10–12 behaviors for each pole on each dimension. The behaviors were moderately traitrelated according to a pretest, in which the selected behaviors were rated as reflecting the respective trait (e.g., sociable). Behaviors that obtained extreme ratings in the pretest were excluded. An additional pool of 25 filler behaviors was used which did not refer to the trait dimensions. For each participant in Experiment 1, three trait dimensions were randomly assigned to each of the two target groups. For two of the dimensions within each target group the more positive pole was selected (e.g., sociable, reliable), and for the remaining dimension the other pole was selected (e.g., technically unskilled). The resulting triples of traits formed the hidden prototypes of the two target groups. For each target group and trait, a random set of four behaviors was drawn from the pool of trait-related behaviors. An additional random set of eight behaviors was drawn for each group from the pool of filler items, resulting in a total of 20 behaviors for both target groups. The random selection of traits and behaviors ensured that the two target groups were characterized by distinct prototypes for each participant, and that there were neither evaluative differences of the behaviors between the groups nor any other systematic material effects. Moreover, the choice of only moderately trait-related behaviors and the use of filler items aimed to preclude prototype extraction on the basis of the behaviors alone.

Procedure At the beginning of the experimental session, a cover story was presented to introduce the group scenario of two artificial groups belonging to a joint superordinate category. The cover story first explained that background noise can have different effects on performance in simple tasks. More specifically, © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

M. Machunsky & T. Meiser: Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

participants were told that there is evidence for a performance decrement under noise conditions for some people, but that an improvement in task performance can be found for other people. It was further explained that the improvement goes back to an increase in neuronal activation elicited by background noise in the subpopulation of performance improvers. The subpopulation of performance improvers was then subdivided into two groups, one of which was introduced to be especially sensitive to low-pitch tones, the other of which was introduced to be especially sensitive to high-pitch tones. The participants were informed that they would see a series of behaviors demonstrated by members of the two groups of performance improvers with sensitivity to low-pitch tones and high-pitch tones, respectively. The two groups of performance improvers thus formed the proximal groups for which information was presented, and the population of performance improvers in general formed the superordinate category for which no information was available. Participants were asked to form an impression of the two groups of performance improvers with sensitivity for high-pitch and lowpitch tones. After the cover story had been introduced, the behavior information was presented concerning the two groups of performance improvers for high-pitch tones and low-pitch tones. For either group, the 20 behaviors were distributed across four group members. Each group member was introduced with a male first name and his membership in the group of performance improvers for low-pitch or high-pitch tones, respectively. Then, a sequence of five behaviors of that person was displayed on the screen with a presentation time of 4.5 s per behavior and a 1 s delay between adjacent behaviors. The sequence of five behaviors contained one trait-related behavior for each trait of the underlying prototype and two filler behaviors in random order. The presentation of the target persons was blocked by group, so that all four group members of one group were displayed with their behaviors before the group members of the other group were displayed. To induce a prototype-based representation for one of the groups, the traits that defined the prototype for that group were presented before the four group members and their behaviors were introduced (Medin et al., 1984; Smith & Zárate, 1990). For this purpose, participants were informed that they would be presented with some traits typical of the members of the following group. The three traits were then displayed on the screen until the participant pressed a key to start the sequence of behaviors. For the other group, the four group members and their behaviors were presented without any explicit trait information. Therefore, a prototype should be available for one group, whereas the other group is expected to be represented solely on the basis of exemplars. The assignment of the groups of performance improvers for high-pitch tones and lowpitch tones to the prototype and exemplar conditions was counterbalanced across participants, so that half of the participants received the prototype information for the group of performance improvers for high-pitch tones and the other half for the group of performance improvers for low© 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

pitch tones. Orthogonal to the assignment of the group to the prototype manipulation, we counterbalanced the order in which the prototype-based group and the exemplarbased group were presented.

Dependent Variables After the presentation phase, participants were asked to list as many capital cities in Europe as possible in 3 min. Following this filler task, the dependent variables were assessed. First, trait ratings were assessed to examine whether participants were able to form valid impressions of the two target groups. For that purpose, the six bipolar trait dimensions were presented for the group of performance improvers in general, the group of performance improvers for high-pitch tones, and the group of performance improvers for low-pitch tones. For each dimension, participants judged the respective group on a scale from –4 (e.g., Very withdrawn) to 4 (e.g., Very sociable). Next, typicality ratings of the two proximal groups with respect to the superordinate group were assessed to test the hypothesis that the prototype-based group is perceived as more prototypical than the exemplar-based group. In a first step, participants gave separate ratings of how typical and representative the groups of performance improvers for highpitch tones and low-pitch tones are of the superordinate group of performance improvers in general. Ratings were made on scales ranging from –4 (= very untypical) to 4 (= very typical). In a second step, participants made a comparative judgment concerning which of the two groups is more prototypical of the superordinate category on a joint scale from –4 (e.g., the group of performance improvers for high-pitch tones is more typical) to 4 (e.g., the group of performance improvers for low-pitch tones is more typical). To rule out that the experimental manipulation of prototype availability was confounded by a possible spontaneous identification of participants with one of the two proximal target groups, identification ratings were assessed in the end of the experiment. Participants rated on scales from –4 (= does not apply at all) to 4 (= applies completely) whether they believed to be a member of the group of performance improvers for low-pitch tones, for high-pitch tones, or of the group of performance improvers in general. Finally, participants were debriefed about the goals of the study and about the fictitious nature of the cover story, and they were paid and thanked.

Results and Discussion In all experiments an α level of .05 was chosen as criterion for statistical significance, and one-tailed tests were used to test the directional hypothesis that the prototype-based group is judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate group than the exemplar-based group. Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

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Trait Ratings

Prototypicality Judgments

The trait ratings were recoded so that positive scores reflect the poles of the trait dimensions used to construct the underlying prototypes of the two target groups. Then we computed two indices for each group to examine whether valid impressions were acquired of the target groups. The first index averaged the ratings on the three traits specific to the given group, whereas the second index averaged the ratings on the three traits not specific to the given group but to the other target group. With these indices, a valid impression of a group is revealed by a high value of the first index for traits specific to the given group in combination with a low value of the second index for traits specific to the other group. Table 1 displays the means and standard errors of the two indices for the prototype-based group and for the exemplar-based group.

The separate and comparative prototypicality judgments were analyzed in order to test our crucial prediction that the prototype-based group is judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate category than is the exemplarbased group. The separate typicality ratings for the two target groups supported the prediction: The prototype-based group was rated as more prototypical of the superordinate category (M = 1.58, SE = 0.20) than the exemplar-based group (M = 0.95, SE = 0.18), t(39) = 2.45, p = .01 onetailed, R2 = .13. Our prediction was also corroborated by the comparative judgments of prototypicality for the two groups. The comparative judgments were recoded so that positive scores reflect higher perceived prototypicality of the prototype-based group relative to the exemplar-based group for all participants. The resulting index was significantly larger than zero (M = 0.68, SE = 0.27), t(39) = 2.51, p = .01 one-tailed, R2 = .14, indicating that the prototype-based group was judged to be more typical of the superordinate category in direct comparison to the exemplar-based group. Thus, the different measures of perceived prototypicality of the two target groups with respect to the superordinate category consistently revealed the expected prototypicality bias as a function of prototype availability.

Table 1. Means and standard errors of the rating indices for the prototype-based and exemplar-based group in Experiment 1 Target group Prototype-based

Exemplar-based

Traits

Specific for given group

2.18

0.22

1.78

0.22

Specific for other group

0.50

0.21

–0.12

0.25

Identification A 2 (Traits: specific for group vs. specific for other group) × 2 (Target group: prototype-based vs. exemplarbased) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on both factors showed a significant main effect of the kind of traits, F(1, 39) = 45.61, p < .001, R2 = .54. As can be seen in Table 1, this main effect indicates that ratings on traits specific for the given group were consistently higher than ratings on traits specific to the other group. The participants’ trait judgments thus reflected valid impressions of the two target groups. The main effect of the target group was also significant, F(1, 39) = 4.68, p = .04, R2 = .11, revealing that overall the ratings were somewhat higher for the prototype-based group than for the exemplar-based group. Importantly, the effect of kind of traits was not moderated by an interaction with target group, F(1, 39) < 1, R2 = .011, so that the difference between ratings on group-specific and nonspecific traits can be assumed to be equal for the prototypebased and the exemplar-based target groups. We may thus conclude that the manipulation of mental representation was not contaminated with a different accuracy of group impressions due to differences in salience, attention allocation, etc., during the presentation phase. 1

In order to rule out that the manipulation of group representation was confounded with a differential spontaneous identification by the participants, we analyzed the ratings of participants’ perceived group membership for each target group. There was no difference between the ratings of subjective group membership for the prototype-based group (M = 0.05, SE = 0.34) and the exemplar-based group (M = 0.15, SE = 0.31), t(39) = 0.19, p = .85, R2 < .01, nor did the identification ratings differ from zero, for both groups t(39) < 0.50, p > .60, R2 ≤ .01. The results confirm that participants did not spontaneously identify with one of the groups more than with the other, so that the difference in perceived prototypicality between the prototype-based group and the exemplar-based group cannot be accounted for in terms of a difference in identification. To summarize the central finding of Experiment 1, the data showed that the target group for which a prototypebased representation was induced was judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate category than the group for which an exemplar-based representation was induced. The experiment thus demonstrated biased prototypicality judgments for two groups with respect to a superordinate category as a function of prototype availability. The ob-

Note that the uncorrected measure of effect size R2 in a given sample overestimates the true effect size in the population. In particular, for empirical F < 1 the best estimate of the population effect size is zero, so that the observed positive value of R2 reflects the bias of the effect size measure in the sample (Voelkle, Ackermann, & Wittmann, 2007).

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served prototypicality bias cannot be explained by motivational processes in the tradition of social identity theory, because the artificial target groups were not related to an existing or pretended ingroup/outgroup distinction, and because there was no difference in subjective identification with the two groups. Experiment 1 therefore yields strong support for the hypothesis that biased prototypicality judgments can be elicited by different modes of mental representation alone. One could object, however, that the manipulation of mental representation in Experiment 1 included the presentation of more information for the prototype-based group than for the exemplar-based group, since trait information was provided in addition to the behavioral information for the prototype-based group but not for the exemplar-based group. This difference in the total amount of information could have led to increased salience of or increased familiarity with the prototype-based group, or to other effects that may spoil our interpretation of the prototypicality bias in terms of prototype availability. Although differences in salience, familiarity, or related effects appear unlikely in the face of the equally accurate impressions that were observed for the prototype-based group and the exemplarbased group, the potential problem was addressed in our next experiment in which the amount of information was held constant across the two proximal groups.

prevail for the group with few trait-relevant behaviors. According to the cognitive model of biased prototypicality judgments, the group for which more trait-relevant information was presented should be perceived as more prototypical of the superordinate category than the group for which less trait-relevant information was presented. Importantly, by providing the same amount of information for both groups and only varying the proportion of trait-relevant behaviors, we are able to exclude the possibility that the effect of increased prototypicality of the prototypebased group is attributable to varying amounts of group information (with more information for the prototypebased group as compared to the exemplar-based group). Another possible objection is that the trait-rating task may lead to the construction and potential storage of a prototype even for the target group that was initially represented in an exemplar-based format, because the trait-rating tasks requires a judgment formation process across the set of activated exemplars. As a consequence, the trait-rating task could interfere with the induction of differential mental representations for the two target groups. To avoid any effects of the judgment processes in the trait-rating task on the central measures of prototypicality, the trait ratings were assessed after the prototypicality measures in Experiment 2.

Method

Experiment 2 To the best of our knowledge, Experiment 1 was the first demonstration of biased prototypicality judgments between two groups without an intergroup setting, that is, without a distinction between an ingroup and an outgroup. This finding supports our prediction that different mental representations of two groups are sufficient for a prototypicality bias, and that intergroup motivations are not necessary. Because this prediction is an essential implication of the cognitive model of biased prototypicality judgments, Experiment 2 aimed to replicate the central result of the first experiment. In order to rule out any alternative interpretations due to the specific kind of experimental manipulation, we used a different manipulation of prototype availability in the second experiment. In particular, only behavior information was presented for two proximal groups, and the number of behaviors was identical for both groups. However, the sequence of behaviors contained more trait-relevant behaviors for one group and fewer trait-relevant behaviors – and thus more trait-irrelevant behaviors – for the other group. As earlier research showed, prototype extraction is enhanced if the amount of trait-relevant information is increased (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman, 1996). Therefore, a prototype-based representation should be formed for the group with more trait-relevant behaviors, while an exemplar-based representation should © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

Participants A sample of 36 students at a large university volunteered in Experiment 2.

Materials The same pool of trait dimensions and behaviors was used as in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the random construction of the underlying prototypes with three traits for each target group was identical to Experiment 1. Due to the new manipulation of mental group representation, however, the number of trait-relevant behaviors that were randomly drawn from the behavior pools of the respective traits differed between the target groups. For the group for which a prototype-based representation was to be induced, six traitrelevant behaviors were randomly selected for each trait of the prototype, together with a random sample of six unrelated filler items. For the group for which an exemplarbased representation was to be induced, only three trait-relevant behaviors were selected for each trait, together with a random sample of 15 filler items. Consequently, each target group was described by a total of 24 behaviors. Among these 24 behaviors, however, there were either 18 trait-related behaviors (i.e., six for each underlying trait) or nine trait-related behaviors (i.e., three for each underlying trait). As in Experiment 1, the random selection of traits, trait-reSocial Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

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lated behaviors, and filler items for the two target groups was carried out for each participant anew.

nate category preceded the trait ratings. By shifting the order of the dependent measures, we aimed to rule out carryover effects that may stem from a spontaneous construction of a prototype as a result of the trait rating task.

Procedure The cover story with the target groups of performance improvers for low-pitch tones and high-pitch tones and with the superordinate category of performance improvers in general was taken from Experiment 1. Following the cover story, a sequence of six group members was presented for each target group. Each group member was described by four behaviors. For the six group members of the target group with many trait-relevant behaviors, the four behaviors contained one trait-related behavior for each trait of the underlying group prototype and one filler behavior in random order. For three members of the group with few traitrelated behaviors, the four behaviors contained a trait-relevant behavior for two traits of the underlying prototype and two filler behaviors in random order. For the remaining three group members, the behaviors contained a trait-relevant behavior for one trait of the prototype and three filler behaviors. Thus, for the group with few trait-related behaviors, the relevant behaviors were dispersed over the six target persons so that each trait was represented by two persons in conjunction with a trait-relevant behavior for one other trait and by one person without trait-relevant behavior for another trait. Because twice as many trait-related behaviors were presented for one target group as for the other, prototype extraction should be facilitated for the group with many trait-related behaviors relative to the group with few trait-related behaviors.2 The presentation rate of the stimuli was identical to Experiment 1, and the assignment of many or few trait-related behaviors to the groups of performance improvers for lowpitch tones or high-pitch tones was randomly determined for each participant. Likewise, the order in which the two groups were presented was randomized for each participant.

Results and Discussion Trait Ratings As in Experiment 1, indices were computed for ratings on those traits that were specific to the given target group and on the remaining traits that were specific to the other group (see Table 2). An ANOVA with the within-participants factors kind of traits (specific for group vs. specific for other group) and target group (prototype-based vs. exemplarbased) revealed a significant main effect of kind of traits, F(1, 35) = 19.58, p < .001, R2 = .36, indicating that ratings on group-specific traits were higher than ratings on traits that were specific to the other group. Moreover, the main effect of target group was significant, F(1, 35) = 11.93, p = .001, R2 = .25, because ratings were higher for the prototype-based target group. Importantly, there was no interaction between kind of traits and target group, F(1, 35) < 1, R2 = .02. The significant main effect of kind of traits together with the absence of an interaction shows that valid impressions were formed for the prototype- and exemplarbased groups that were of comparable strength for the two target groups. Table 2. Means and standard errors of the rating indices for the prototype-based and exemplar-based group in Experiment 2 Target group Prototype-based

Exemplar-based

Traits

Specific for given group

1.50

0.28

0.54

0.21

Specific for other group

0.24

0.16

â&#x20AC;&#x201C;0.44

0.19

Prototypicality Judgments Dependent Variables The dependent variables were identical to Experiment 1 except for their order. In Experiment 2, the typicality ratings of the two target groups with respect to the superordi2

The separate ratings of typicality of the superordinate category that were made for the prototype-based group and the exemplar-based group showed the predicted prototypicality bias. As expected, the prototypicality ratings were

One may argue that the prototype-based and the exemplar-based group differ not only with respect to mode of representation, but also with respect to group variability. Specifically, the members of the prototype-based group show more similar behaviors in that they all show behaviors that represent the three defining traits. In contrast, the members of the exemplar-based group may appear more heterogeneous as the fewer trait-relevant behaviors are dispersed across the six members so that all members also show more trait-irrelevant behavior and are, thus, more dissimilar to each other. This confound would be avoidable only by introducing more group members for the prototype-based group so that the trait-relevant behaviors can be as dispersed across the members as in the exemplar-based group. Then, however, we would have introduced more information in the case of the prototype-based group (i.e., more members) which is exactly the confound we aimed to avoid in Experiment 2. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the mode of representation in terms of prototype-based versus exemplar-based group is correlated with the perception of group variability such that prototype-based groups appear typically more homogeneous (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Ford & Stangor, 1992; Mullen, 1991). Hence, the confound between mode of representation and group variability may be to some extent inevitable.

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higher for the prototype-based group (M = 1.08, SE = 0.23) than for the exemplar-based group (M = 0.08, SE = 0.26), t(35) = 3.11, p = .002 one-tailed, R2 = .22. In the same vein, the comparative judgment of typicality for the two target groups showed that the prototype-based group was perceived as more typical of the superordinate category as compared to the exemplar-based group. This result was revealed by a positive value of the comparative judgment index that was significantly larger than zero (M = 0.72, SE = 0.28), t(35) = 2.60, p = .01 one-tailed, R2 = .16.

Identification The observed difference in perceived prototypicality between the prototype-based group and the exemplar-based group was not associated with a difference in participants’ spontaneous identification with the two groups. Subjective group membership did not differ between the prototypebased group (M = –0.11, SE = 0.37) and the exemplar-based group (M = –0.33, SE = 0.31), t(35) = 0.48, p = .64, R2 < .01. Moreover, the identification ratings for both groups did not differ from zero, both t(35) < 1.10, p > .28, R2 < .04. As in the previous experiment, the identification scores thereby confirmed that the two target groups were perceived as rather irrelevant for participants’ own identity. Differences in the prototypicality judgments of the groups can thus be interpreted in terms of the induced modes of cognitive representation. Overall, Experiment 2 successfully replicated the essential findings of Experiment 1 with a different manipulation of mental representation between the two target groups. The two experiments provide converging evidence that a prototypicality bias occurs if a prototype is available for one group and if only exemplar information is available for another group. The results thus support a key implication of the suggested cognitive approach to understanding biased prototypicality judgments. Another implication of the cognitive model is that biased prototypicality judgments are effectively moderated by prototype availability even in intergroup settings with a salient ingroup and outgroup if prototype availability is disentangled from ingroup membership. In Experiment 3, we therefore analyzed biased prototypicality judgments in an intergroup context and manipulated prototype availability between the ingroup and the outgroup.

Experiment 3 The aim of Experiment 3 was to de-confound group membership (i.e., ingroup versus outgroup) and the availability of a prototype-based representation to separate motivational and cognitive components of biased prototypicality perceptions. So far, our findings have supported the hypothesis © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

that biased prototypicality perceptions can result from different mental representations of two proximal groups, in that groups for which a prototype-based representation prevails were judged to be more prototypical of a superordinate category than groups for which an exemplar-based representation prevails. In contrast to previous theorizing on ingroup projection in the social identity framework, we observed these effects in the absence of an intergroup context, so that we may conjecture that biased prototypicality judgments also result from more general processes of category learning and memory rather than being limited to ingroup/outgroup distinctions. In any real-world intergroup setting, motivational and cognitive processes are intertwined. That is, group membership and mode of mental representation are usually confounded so that cognitive and motivational processes work in the same direction with respect to relative ingroup prototypicality. Hence, the unique influence of each process can only be analyzed under conditions in which motivational and cognitive processes impact biased prototypicality judgments in opposite directions. Such a condition was realized in Experiment 3, in which participants were categorized either as members of a prototype-based ingroup with an exemplar-based outgroup or as members of an exemplar-based ingroup with a prototype-based outgroup. The categorization was accomplished in a minimal group scenario in which participants were given bogus feedback about their ostensible group membership. The predictions were clear-cut: In the condition in which the ingroup is represented in a prototype-based and the outgroup in a exemplar-based format, motivational and cognitive processes should impact on prototypicality judgments in the same direction so that the ingroup should be perceived as more prototypical than the outgroup. However, if the ingroup is represented in an exemplar-based format and the outgroup in a prototype-based format, so that the usual assignment of mental representation to ingroup and outgroup is reversed, motivational and cognitive processes should work in opposite directions. In particular, the motivational account of biased prototypicality judgments in terms of ingroup projection assumes that the ingroup is judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate category irrespective of the kind of mental representation for the ingroup and the outgroup. In contrast, the cognitive account assumes that, in the case of an exemplar-based ingroup and a prototype-based outgroup, the outgroup is judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate category. Of course, motivational and cognitive processes should not be construed as mutually exclusive. Therefore, the typical pattern of relative ingroup prototypicality cannot necessarily be expected to reverse if the ingroup is represented in an exemplar-based format and the outgroup in a prototype-based format. Instead, we predicted the typical pattern of ingroup prototypicality if a prototype is induced for the ingroup, because motivational and cognitive processes work in concert in this situation, but an attenuated or eliminated pattern of ingroup prototypicality if a protoSocial Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

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type is induced for the outgroup, because motivational concerns and cognitive mechanisms work in opposition in this situation. Finally, Experiment 3 extended the two previous experiments in that we also considered the consequences of biased prototypicality judgments for intergroup evaluations. As for prototypicality judgments, we expected that the difference between ingroup and outgroup evaluation is moderated by the manipulation of mental group representation such that the ingroup is evaluated more positively if an ingroup prototype is induced compared to when an outgroup prototype is induced. In line with the original Ingroup Projection Model we assumed that prototypicality judgments and group evaluations are positively correlated so that higher levels of ingroup prototypicality go together with a more positive evaluation of the ingroup compared to the outgroup.

Method Participants and Design Ninety-six students participated in the experiment and were randomly assigned to the two conditions of the betweenparticipants factor Prototype (i.e., induction of a prototypebased ingroup representation versus a prototype-based outgroup representation).

Materials Because of the intergroup context and the associated selfinvolvement, we decided to use only positive traits. Thus, two new sets of traits (i.e., sociable, tidy, and intelligent versus friendly, reliable, and patient) and the respective behaviors were generated for the intergroup scenario of Experiment 3. The two trait sets were perceived as similarly positive according to pretests. Each group was described by 12 trait-relevant behaviors and also by eight trait-irrelevant filler behaviors. For each participant, the two trait sets were randomly assigned to the ingroup and the outgroup.

Procedure In the beginning of the experiment, a cover story was presented that introduced two groups with two subgroups each. In particular, participants were informed that people differ in the way they mentally structure their environment, and that recent research had revealed that people can be reasonably categorized as either belonging to the group of figurative information processors or the group of analytical information processors. The figurative processors were said to focus particularly on the surface characteristics of information, whereas analytical processors were said to foSocial Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

cus particularly on the structural characteristics of visual information. Then it was explained that both groups can be further differentiated into subgroups. Specifically, the analytical processors were further subdivided into the groups of propositional processors and relational processors. The propositional processors were characterized as focusing on the structure of individual elements whereas the relational processors were characterized as focusing on the relation between elements. The figurative processors were further subdivided into the groups of basal and focal processors. Participants were told that basal processors first examine the general picture of some information and then focus on the details, whereas focal processors first focus on the details of some information and then examine the general picture. To emphasize the meaning and the relevance of the intergroup context, it was further outlined that research had found evidence for a development of these processing characteristics at an early stage in life as well as for an influence of these characteristics on everyday activities. After this general introduction, participants were informed that the goal of the study was to investigate how the kind of processing style influences the processing of social information, and that we would therefore assess their personal processing style in a first step. For the diagnosis of processing style, we used a minimal group procedure in which participants worked through a number of tests and were given bogus feedback about their group membership on the basis of their responses. The first test was applied to categorize participants as figurative versus analytical processors. The test consisted of ten trials in which participants had to indicate, under time pressure, which of eight geometrical figures was identical to a previously presented rotated figure. They were informed that the task is rather difficult, and that errors are especially diagnostic. After ten trials the computer ostensibly calculated participants’ group membership. All participants were categorized as members of the group of figurative processors. Next, they were assigned to the test that was supposed to determine their membership in either the subgroup of focal or basal processors. In a sequence of ten trials, participants saw an ambiguous, Rubin’s vase like picture for 5 s and then had to decide whether they perceived predominantly the one or the other interpretation of the picture. After 10 trials, the computer again calculated participants’ fictitious group membership. All participants were categorized as members of basal processors. After the categorization task, participants were informed that they would see behavioral information about four members of the group of focal processors as well as about four members of the group of basal processors, and that they were supposed to form an impression of the two groups. Altogether participants saw five behaviors from each group member. Each group member showed three trait-relevant behaviors, one from each of the three groupdescriptive traits, and two irrelevant filler behaviors. The behaviors of each group member appeared in a fixed random order, and presentation time was 5 s for each behavior. © 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

M. Machunsky & T. Meiser: Cognitive Components of Ingroup Projection

Table 3. Means and standard errors of the rating indices for the ingroup and the outgroup as a function of prototype availability in Experiment 3 Prototype Available for ingroup

Ingroup

Available for outgroup

Outgroup

Ingroup

Outgroup

Traits

Specific for given group

6.04

0.13

5.72

0.13

5.70

0.13

5.91

0.13

Specific for other group

5.44

0.13

4.60

0.13

5.10

0.13

5.13

0.13

The presentation of behavioral information was blocked by target person, so that participants saw all five behaviors of one person before the next target person was presented. Similarly, all four members of one group were presented before the other group. The order of ingroup and outgroup presentation was counterbalanced orthogonally to the manipulation of prototype-based versus exemplar-based representation. The experimental manipulation of a prototype-based versus exemplar-based mental representation was realized by providing explicit trait information in addition to the behaviors for one of the two groups (see Experiment 1). In particular, half of the participants obtained relevant trait information for the ingroup and half of the participants obtained relevant trait information for the outgroup prior to the presentation of the behaviors. Following the presentation phase, participants had to work on a 3-minute filler task in which they were supposed to list as many European capitals as possible. In the final phase of the experiment, the dependent measures were assessed and participants were fully debriefed and paid for participation.

Dependent Variables All judgments were made on 7-point rating scales from 1 (= agree not at all) to 7 (= agree completely); the order of ingroup and outgroup assessment followed the order in the presentation phase. First, participants had to indicate the extent to which each of the six traits that formed the basis of the behavioral information characterized the ingroup, the outgroup, and the superordinate category. Next, we assessed biased ingroup and outgroup prototypicality judgments directly by asking participants how typical they perceive the groups of basal and focal processors to be, respectively, for the superordinate category of figurative processors. Three verbal items (e.g., “In sum, I regard the group of focal/basal processors as positive”) and a thermometer scale from 0 (= not agreeable) to 100 (= very agreeable) degrees were used to assess ingroup and outgroup evaluation. Finally, identification with the ingroup was measured with five items (e.g., “I feel as a member of the basal-figurative processors”) to assure that the effect of the experimental manipulation on prototypicality judgments and in© 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

tergroup evaluations were not due to variations in ingroup identification.

Results and Discussion Trait Ratings To examine the degree to which participants formed an ingroup and outgroup impression built on the information presented, we analyzed the trait ratings for the ingroup and the outgroup. As in Experiment 1 and 2, separate indices were formed by averaging the ingroup ratings on ingroup descriptive traits, on the one hand, and on outgroup descriptive traits on the other. Likewise, outgroup ratings were averaged on ingroup and outgroup descriptive traits, respectively. The means and standard errors of the rating indices for the ingroup and the outgroup are given in Table 3. A 2 (Prototype: prototype available for ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (Target group: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (Traits: specific for group vs. specific for other group) mixed-model ANOVA with the first factor varying between-participants and the last two factors varying within-participants revealed the expected main effect of traits, F(1, 94) = 85.15, p < .001, R2 = .48. The main effect indicated that a group is rated higher on traits that are descriptive for it (M = 5.84, SE = 0.07) than on traits that are descriptive of the other group (M = 5.07, SE = 0.07). There was also a main effect of target group, F(1, 94) = 4.99, p = .03, R2 = .05, such that the ingroup was rated higher than the outgroup. This effect was moderated by the factor prototype, F(1, 94) = 11.62, p = .001, R2 = .11, indicating that the ingroup was rated higher when the ingroup was represented prototypebased, and that the outgroup was rated higher when the outgroup was represented prototype-based (see Table 3). The target group effect was also moderated by the factor traits, F(1, 94) = 7.72, p = .01, R2 = .08. Inspection of the means in Table 3 revealed that the difference between specific and unspecific traits was more pronounced for the outgroup than for the ingroup. Most important, no three-way interaction emerged between prototype, target-group, and traits, F(1, 94) = 1.67. p = .20, R2 = .02. The absence of a three-way interaction indicated that the groups’ characteristics were no better learned for the prototype-based group (i.e., the ingroup in the ingroup-prototype condition and the outgroup in the outgroup-prototype condition) compared to Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

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the exemplar-based group (i.e., the outgroup in the ingroup-prototype condition and the ingroup in the outgroupprototype condition). Hence, we conclude that participants formed the impressions of the two groups on the basis of the behaviors presented irrespective of the induced mental representation.

Prototypicality A 2 (Target group) × 2 (Prototype) mixed-model ANOVA for prototypicality judgments revealed a main effect of target group, F(1, 94) = 6.60, p = .01, R2 = .07, indicating that the ingroup is perceived as more prototypical (M = 5.19, SE = 0.12) than the outgroup (M = 4.85, SE = 0.12). The main effect of prototype was not significant, F(1, 94) = 1.22, p = .27, R2 = .01. More importantly, the analysis yielded a marginal interaction, F(1, 94) = 2.09, p = .08 onetailed, R2 = .02.3 Supporting our hypothesis concerning the role of prototype-based mental representations in biased prototypicality judgments, simple comparisons indicated that the ingroup was judged to be more prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup in the ingroup prototype condition, F(1, 94) = 8.06, p = .003 one-tailed, R2 = .08, and this difference was eliminated in the outgroup prototype condition, F < 1, R2 = .01. The means displayed in Table 4 (upper panel) reveal that mainly the perception of outgroup and not ingroup prototypicality varied as a function of the prototypicality manipulation. In particular, the outgroup was perceived as significantly more prototypical when represented prototype-based compared to when represented exemplar-based, F(1, 94) = 2.80, p = .049 oneTable 4. Means and standard errors of the prototypicality judgments and ingroup and outgroup evaluations as a function of group membership and mental representation in Experiment 3

tailed, R2 = .03, whereas perceived ingroup prototypicality did not vary as a function of whether the ingroup or the outgroup was represented prototype-based, F < 1, R2 < .01.

Intergroup Evaluations The analysis of the verbal intergroup evaluations (Cronbach’s α = .69 for the ingroup and α = .85 for the outgroup) yielded a strong ingroup bias, F(1, 94) = 20.56, p < .001, R2 = .18, showing that the ingroup was evaluated significantly more positive than the outgroup as indicated by the means in Table 4 (lower panel). Neither the main effect of prototype nor the interaction approached significance, Fs < 1. The analysis of the thermometer scales also revealed a strong bias in favor of the ingroup, F(1, 94) = 28.03, p < .001, R2 = .23. The main effect of prototype was not significant, F(1, 94) = 1.54, p = .22, R2 = .02. However, with the thermometer scales as dependent variables, we obtained a marginal interaction, F(1, 94) = 2.01, p = .08 one-tailed, R2 = .02. If we consider the means in Table 4, a similar pattern emerged for the thermometer values as for prototypicality judgments: The difference between ingroup and outgroup evaluation was more pronounced in the ingroup prototype condition than in the outgroup prototype condition.

Identification The analysis revealed that ingroup identification (Cronbach’s α = .89) did not vary as a function of prototype induction for the ingroup versus outgroup, F < 1. Furthermore, participants were moderately identified with the ingroup as indicated by a mean identification score (M = 4.09, SE = 0.13) that did not differ significantly from the midpoint of the scale, |t| < 1.

Prototype Available for ingroup

Available for outgroup

Prototypicality Ingroup

5.17

0.18

5.21

0.16

Outgroup

4.65

0.20

5.06

0.15

Ingroup

5.83

0.14

5.88

0.11

Outgroup

5.22

0.19

5.49

0.14

Ingroup

79.65

2.14

80.96

1.66

Outgroup

69.88

2.79

75.31

1.95

Evaluation Verbal

Thermometer

Prototypicality-Evaluation Link We tested the relations between prototypicality judgments and the evaluation of the two groups in terms of correlations between ingroup prototypicality and ingroup evaluation and outgroup prototypicality and outgroup evaluation. In line with the ingroup projection model, perceived ingroup prototypicality was significantly related to verbal ingroup evaluation, r(96) = .27, p = .008. The correlation between outgroup prototypicality and verbal outgroup evaluation was also positive, albeit not significant, r(96) = .15, p = .15. Using the thermometer scales as indicators of ingroup and outgroup evaluation, both correlations were

Note that one-tailed statistical tests can be performed for F-values with one numerator degree of freedom (see Maxwell & Delaney, 1990, p. 144), because in such cases the F-test is equivalent to a t-test. In the present context, the one-tailed test of the F-value for the interaction reflects the directional hypothesis that the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality was larger in the ingroup prototype condition than in the outgroup prototype condition.

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significant, r(96) = .23, p = .02, for ingroup prototypicality-ingroup evaluation and r(96) = .21, p = .04, for outgroup prototypicality-outgroup evaluation. To summarize, Experiment 3 showed that overall participants perceived the ingroup to be more prototypical of a common superordinate category than the outgroup. It is remarkable that this overall effect also emerged in this minimal-group-like scenario (see also Rosa & Waldzus, 2012). More important in the present context, however, not only did biased prototypicality perceptions result from ingroup versus outgroup membership, they were moderated by the mode of mental representation, with a significant difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality in the ingroup prototype condition and a diminished difference in the outgroup prototype condition. This pattern supports the hypothesis that, besides motivational factors, cognitive processes also play a role for biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup situations. Last but not least, Experiment 3 extended the two previous experiments by showing that the kind of mental representation affects not only prototypicality judgments, but also intergroup evaluations, such that ingroup bias was less pronounced when the outgroup was represented prototype-based.

General Discussion The present research serves to show that the commonly found bias – that ingroups are perceived as more prototypical than outgroups with respect to a jointly superordinate category – may at least partly be explained by the differential availability of ingroup and outgroup representations. In contrast to the motivational processes postulated by the ingroup projection model (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003), we suggest a cognitive approach to biased prototypicality judgments. Such an approach has the advantage of theoretical parsimony, by building on elementary cognitive processes, and thus has a broader scope than intergroup contexts. Our cognitive approach builds on early research by Rosch et al. (1976) and assumes that higher order categories are less clearly defined than are more proximal categories. We further suggest that a weakly defined superordinate category is efficiently characterized through the use of easily available information from a proximal category that is part of the superordinate category. In other words, the easier group information at the proximal level is retrieved from memory, the more likely this group is perceived as representative of the superordinate category. We attribute the common finding that the ingroup is perceived as more prototypical of the superordinate category than the outgroup (e.g., Machunsky et al., 2009; Waldzus et al., 2004) to the prevalent type of mental representation for the ingroup and the outgroup. More specifically, previous research found that the mode of mental representation as prototype-based or exemplar-based and group membership are usually confounded, such that, in generally posi© 2013 Hogrefe Publishing

tive contexts, ingroup information is represented in terms of a prototype, whereas outgroup information is represented in terms of exemplars. Because it is more efficient to use directly accessible prototype information than to integrate information from retrieved exemplars (Macrae et al., 1994; Sherman et al., 2000), usually the ingroup should be perceived as representative in a positive context. For a critical test of our hypothesis that biased prototypicality judgments are a function of the mode of mental representation, we used a category learning paradigm and a minimal group paradigm to deconfound type of mental representation and the distinction into ingroup versus outgroup. In Experiment 1 and 2, participants received information about two artificial groups that had no relevance for the participants’ own group membership. Both experiments supported our hypothesis that a prototype-based group is perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than an exemplar-based group, indicating that different mental representations can be sufficient to elicit biased prototypicality judgments, and that an intergroup context is not necessary (see also Rubin, 2012, for the relationship between group status and group prototypicality in the absence of an intergroup context). Another implication of the cognitive model proposed here is that the common finding of enhanced prototypicality of an ingroup relative to an outgroup should be moderated by prototype availability. In other words, we expected that biased prototypicality judgments do not result from motivational concerns related to an ingroup-outgroup setting alone, as suggested by the ingroup projection model, but also from the type of mental representation. To test this implication, in Experiment 3 we employed a minimal group paradigm. The results indicated that prototypicality perceptions varied as a function of mode of representation even when participants themselves were categorized as members of one of the groups. However, a main effect of group membership also emerged, which is interesting for two reasons: First, we observed biased ingroup prototypicality judgments even under the arbitrary conditions of a minimal-group like scenario (see also Rosa & Waldzus, 2012, for a similar finding). Second, the results suggested that motivational factors come into play together with cognitive processes when participants are categorized to belong to one of the groups, so that we concluded that the present research extended previous research in showing that cognitive and motivational factors jointly contribute to ingroup prototypicality perceptions. Considering the effect sizes (i.e., the effect size of target group versus the interaction), however, we acknowledged that motivational rather than cognitive factors may play a larger role. An interesting extension of the present research would be the variation of superordinate category valence. In particular, we suggested that people search for easily available (i.e., prototype-based) positive information if the superordinate category has a positive connotation, and for easily available negative information if the superordinate category has a negative connotation, so that the prototype-based Social Psychology 2014; Vol. 45(1):15–30

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proximal group that is also evaluatively congruent with the superordinate category appeared most prototypical. From the empirical data presented here, however, we would expect such a pure pattern only for a context in which participants were not members of one of the groups. More specifically, the results of Experiment 3 suggest an interplay of motivational and cognitive processes in biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup contexts. Hence, in line with the dual process assumptions made here, we expect an additional increase in ingroup prototypicality in the case of a positive superordinate category and of outgroup prototypicality in the case of a negative superordinate category as suggested by the original ingroup projection model. The suggested model of prototype projection further implies that relative ingroup prototypicality increases under conditions eliciting heuristic processing such as time pressure, cognitive load, and positive mood. This is because the cognitive model suggests that a bias in prototypicality judgments originates in a heuristic processing of an available group prototype. Hence, fostering heuristic processing should increase the prototypicality bias. In fact, Rosa and Waldzus (2012) showed that relative ingroup prototypicality increases when people have only limited time for making group ratings or have to memorize a nine-digit number. Likewise, in another study we manipulated the participants’ current mood states and found that heuristic processing elicited by positive mood increased relative ingroup prototypicality (Machunsky & Meiser, 2012). Taken together, the present research as well as related work on heuristic ingroup projection strongly support the assumption that biased prototypicality judgments result not only from a motivation to perceive one’s own group in a positive light, but also from a mainly cognitive process. The present research thus contributes to the understanding of ingroup projection processes by providing initial evidence for a cognitive mechanism that may underlie the heuristic prototypicality judgments observed by Rosa and Waldzus (2012) and Machunsky and Meiser (2012). Central to our approach of biased prototypicality judgments was the notion of cognitive efficiency (e.g., Sherman et al., 2000). In particular, we claimed that people rely on prototype-based information concerning proximal groups in order to efficiently characterize a superordinate category. It would thus be interesting to provide evidence for the proposed efficiency of the suggested projection process in future research. One way to investigate this hypothesis would be to use a dual task paradigm that allows assessment of whether more resources are left for a second, unrelated task when a prototype is used to make a superordinate category judgment (e.g., Macrae et al., 1994). More specifically, we expect a better performance on a secondary task that is performed simultaneously while superordinate category ratings are made if there is prototype-based subgroup information available, compared to a condition in which only exemplar-based subgroup information is available. Such a 4

paradigm would allow direct assessment of the efficiency of prototype projection. A number of empirical findings were not predicted by the ingroup projection model as originally formulated (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). For instance, Waldzus et al. (2004) report that minority members agree with majority members about the higher prototypicality of the majority for the superordinate category (see also Devos & Banaji, 2005, for a similar though not significant finding). The model proposed here may be able to explain this finding by assuming that more information (as provided in the case of many majority members compared to relatively few minority members) facilitates the formation of a group prototype and therefore increases prototypicality perceptions of the majority group (see Experiment 2 for a similar reasoning). However, if we assume that minority groups are represented prototype-based as suggested, for instance, by Mullen (1991; see also Mullen & Johnson, 1993), then the cognitive model of projection would predict an increase of the minorities’ relative prototypicality. Further research may show the extent to which prototypicality judgments in minority/majority contexts are a function of mental representation, a need for a positive social identity, or are simply adjusted to (social) reality (Wenzel et al., 2007) – which of course suggests higher prototypicality of majority groups. A limitation of our studies is that the mode of mental representation did not influence more indirect measures of prototypicality. More specifically, previous research (e.g., Machunsky et al., 2009; Wenzel et al., 2003) used Euclidean distances (reflecting profile dissimilarities) between ingroup and outgroup trait ratings, respectively, and superordinate category trait ratings as indirect indicators of ingroup and outgroup prototypicality, respectively. Using these more indirect measures of group prototypicality, we found no effect of mode of representation on relative group prototypicality (p = .38 in Experiment 1, p = .5 in Experiment 2, and F < 1 for the relevant Target group × Prototype interaction in Experiment 3). This finding may give us some interesting insights into to the judgment process. From the cognitive model of projection delineated above, one may have expected to find a differential use of traits depending on whether the traits characterize a group represented prototype-based or exemplar-based. The empirical finding that the mode of representation only biased the direct, but not the indirect prototypicality, ratings may point to another cognitive process. One possibility is that the mode of representation and thus the availability of prototype information serves as a heuristic cue and indicates high group prototypicality.4 Clearly, more research is needed for further insights into the process of cognitive ingroup projection. To conclude, we provided original evidence for the hypotheses that cognitive processes of prototype availability can be sufficient for biased prototypicality judgments, and that cognitive processes moderate biased prototypicality

We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this interesting interpretation of the effect.

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judgments in intergroup settings. Our model suggests that a group with a prototype-based representation is more likely to appear representative of a common superordinate category than a group with an exemplar-based representation. The research presented only marks a beginning in the investigation of cognitive processes and of the interplay of cognitive and motivational components of biased prototypicality judgments and intergroup evaluation. Aside from the original evidence for the role of cognitive components of biased prototypicality judgments, the present experiments point to interesting future research questions in the field of group projection and intergroup attitudes.

Acknowledgment This research was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG; ME 1918/2-3).

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Received October 7, 2011 Final revision received September 26, 2012 Accepted February 1, 2013 Published online April 22, 2013

Maya Machunsky School of Social Sciences Department of Psychology University of Mannheim Schloss Ehrenhof 68131 Mannheim Germany E-mail machunsky@uni-mannheim.de