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PSYCHOLOGY 45 (2014) 5 - 2 6

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Empathy Training from a Phenomenological Perspective Magnus Engländer Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden magnus.englander@mah.se

Abstract The purpose of this article is to outline a phenomenological approach to empathy training developed over the past ten years in the context of higher education. The theoretical justification for this empathy training is founded in the phenomenological philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of empathy, whereas the application of empathy as a skill is theoretically based upon entering the phenomenological attitude. The phenomenon of empathy is described as a unique intentionality as part of the self-other relation and contrasted to mainstreams views such as simulation theory. It is argued that the phenomenological attitude can open up for the possibility of empathy and interpersonal understanding to occur. The consecutive steps of the phenomenologically based empathy training are described as relating to theoretical and pedagogical issues as well as to student's experiences.

Keywords empathy - phenomenology - supervision

Introduction Frans de Waal (2009), the famous primatologist, claims that we now live in "The Age of Empathy," whereas leading philosophers on the subject matter, like Karsten Stueber (2006), calls for a "Rediscovery of Empathy" (showing a demise of the topic throughout the 20th century, especially in terms of its epistemic status). In the fields of clinical, counseling, and social psychology, empathy has been a prevalent topic, although, on a critical reading, one could claim

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tbat tbe pbenomenon bas been vaguely defined or described (Copian & Goldie, 2011). Also, like most psycbological pbenomena in the past century, it bas been deemed to be a pbenomenon to operationally define and measure, even by bumanistic psycbologists sucb as Carl Rogers (1989, 226-227). Empatby bas probably received its most notable, critical examination in tbe theory of mind debate in pbilosopby between tbe so-called tbeory-tbeorist and tbe simulation tbeorists (see for example, Zabavi, 2005; Gallagber & Zabavi, 2008). Tbe contemporary debate in tbe pbilosopby of social cognition between tbe so-called tbeory-tbeorists, simulation tbeorists, and pbenomenologists can be traced back to an old dispute in tbe beginning of tbe 2otb century (Zabavi, 2010) and is, if one is not convinced by any of tbe three alternatives, still unsettled. Tbe discovery of tbe mirror neurons (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992) bas set tbe stakes even bigber for tbe most reasonable interpretation of tbis pbenomenon. Even tbougb tbe simulation tbeorists seem to be controlling tbe mainstream view, contemporary pbenomenological pbilosopbers like Gallagber & Zabavi (2008) are convincingly rejecting tbeir interpretation. Explaining or describing empatby as a pbenomenon is one tbing, but teacbing it as a skill in bigber education is another. For example, tbe mainstream view explains empatby in terms of simulation and activation of tbe mirror neurons, but bow would we teacb tbe students to perform sucb simulations and activate tbeir mirror neurons? First of all, and as Sartre (1956) bas made clear, we do not encounter tbe body of tbe other sucb as tbe body as described by pbysiology, making tbe finding of tbe mirror neurons quite limited in terms of, for example, supervising a student during practicum. Nevertheless, even if we leave out tbe possibility of activating tbe student's mirror neurons, tbe mainstream explanation provided by simulation tbeory (be it implicit or explicit simulation tbeory) are still "sbortcuts" to tbe more laborious descriptive account of wbat is taking place in tbe processes wben one understands tbe otber (Zabavi, 2012). Wbat seems to be needed is a more descriptive pbenomenological account of empatby in order to aid tbe student in making explicit wbat is actually going on wben one understands tbe otber well. Hence, it is my attempt bere to provide an outline of an understanding of empatby from a pbenomenological perspective meant as a foundation for a pbenomenologically based empatby training for students studying towards a profession in wbicb tbe buman encounter is a vital constituent. Tbe focus will be on empatby as a particular pbenomenon in its own rigbt and also empatby as a deliberate professional activity, acbieved by entering into a specific type of attitude (i.e., tbe pbenomenological attitude). It is wortb mentioning tbat a few years ago tbere was an attempt by Englander & Robinson (2009) at making a very brief sketcb of tbis particular type of empatby training in a nursing

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journal in the Swedish language, making its availability limited to the Nordic countries and to the field of nursing. In contrast, this is the more fully developed attempt and the result from ten years of practical, pedagogical work in higher education across several disciplines (e.g., psychology, social work, nursing, physical therapy, occupational therapy, organizational studies, etc.).

Background There has been an unsettled dispute for over loo years within the field of philosophy in regard to the phenomenon of empathy. The disagreement seems to have started with Theodor Lipps' famous critique of John Stuart Mill's argument that we know others from analogical inference (Stueber, 2006). Lipps pointed out that analogical inference was not the base for how we know others, but instead imitation or projection was the foundation for knowing other minds (Zahavi, 2001). The English term Empathy was originally coined by Edward B. Titchener in an attempt to translate Theodor Lipps' German word EinĂ&#x;hlung (Copian & Goldie, 2011). Phenomenologists such as Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein welcomed Lipps' critical remarks of analogical inference, although they disagreed with him on the account that empathy was about imitation or projection (Zahavi, 2010). Scheler, Husserl, and Stein, although disagreeing among each other on some of the aspects of empathy, can still be united in viewing the phenomenon as an intentionality directed towards the other's experience (Zahavi, 2010). Importantly, Mill, Lipps, and the phenomenologists did agree on one thing, which was the fact that it is impossible to have somebody else's primary experience. Consequently, Mill and Lipps explained how we knevi' others based upon a process relating to oneself; that is, inference or imitation/projection. However, the phenomenologists came to a different conclusion. Because of the fact that we can not enter into another person's stream of consciousness, we are automatically faced with the fundamental distinction between self and other, and in understanding the other our intentionality must include the relation self-other and cannot simply be accounted for in terms of inference or imitation/projection. The phenomenological critique against both these accounts is that empathy is a distinct intentionality (and thus has its own unique quality) characterized by the context self-relating-to-the-other (which is where the phenomenon appears), and not as an explanation of what is going on in the self-relating-to-the-self as characterized both by inference and imitation/projection. Mill's position has in some ways been taken over by today's so-called theory-theorist, with the term theory having replaced the term inference,

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whereas Lipps' account of imitation/projection has been replaced by simulation by the simulation theorists (Zahavi, 2010). Now, this is a simplified account due to the many hybrid versions as well as the disagreements between the explicit and the implicit simulation theorists (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008); however, it provides the necessary background for our purposes here. The position of the phenomenologists is basically the same today and their critique is lately directed towards the simulation theorist. Contemporary phenomenological philosophers, such as Dan Zahavi (e.g., 2001, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012), have written extensively on the issue. As mentioned above, Zahavi (2010) is lately trying to make a fruitful attempt at integrating the positions of Scheler, Husserl, and Stein, and to focus on perhaps the strongest argument, which is that empathy is a unique intentionality of its own and directed towards the other's experience. By doing so, the phenomenological account can provide an alternative interpretation for the mirror neurons in relating it to the phenomenology of perception, instead of acts of implicit simulation (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). The problem with the simulation interpretation is that it directly points to the self-relating-to-one's-self, which is not the self-relatingto-the-other that we are trying to understand by empathy. As Gallagher & Zahavi (2008,177) write, "If I project the results of my own simulation on to the other, I understand only myself in that other situation, but I don't necessarily understand the other." As mentioned earlier, empathy has also been a prevalent topic within fields such as clinical, counseling, and social psychology as well as within ethology. In social psychology, theories of moral development, psychometrics, and in a sense even in ethology, empathy has been viewed as some basic trait relating to altruism (Copian & Goldie, 2011). Clinical and counseling psychology has mostly portrayed empathy as seen from Heinz Kohut's and Carl Rogers' interpretations, and these, I would say, are a continuation of Lipps' view, although Rogers' account is at times bordering on the phenomenological position (Copian & Goldie, 2011). Nevertheless, as Spiegelberg (1972) has pointed out, Rogers was never a phenomenologist in a Husserlian sense. Rogers clearly sought the operationalization of empathy, even though he also has made attempts to describe it within the context of psychotherapy. According to Rogers' (1989, 226) empathy is, "To sense the client's private world as if it were your own, but without ever losing the 'as if qualityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;this Is empathy, and this seems essential to therapy." Now, such a statement can be interpreted in many different ways, but they would all imply "as if" as a mode of simulation. In other words, we are still on the relation between self-relating-to-self. Phenomenological speaking, I would say that the shortcoming of the Rogerian approach to empathy along with mainstream psychological

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approaches, for example, cognitive-behavioral psychology, is that such theories are characterized hy a representational theory of mind in which the self is relating to self, may it he through imitation/projection or cognitive inference. In other words, if one looks at empathy from the mainstream psychological perspective, one would not he ahle to "leave" the self and relate to the other (or to the world), but everything must be explained in terms of a representational theory of mind. As Husserl has written, The ego is not a tiny man in a box that looks at the pictures and then occasionally leaves his box in order to compare the external objects with the internal ones, etc. For such a picture-observing ego, the picture would itself be something external; it would require its own matching internal picture, and so on ad infinitum. (Husserl, 2003, p. 106 and quoted on p. 92 in Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). Therefore, the representational theory of consciousness seems to be the problem with most mainstream psychological theories of empathy, including Carl Rogers', as well as the simulation theorists' interpretation in neurobiology. Nevertheless, even though the contemporary neurobiologists seem to favor the implicit simulation interpretation of empathy, some scientists, for example Gรกllese, have made attempts to merge with the phenomenological interpretation (Zahavi, 2012). In other words, the interpretation of empathy still seems to be heavily debated, although there is a mainstream view holding on to the simulation metaphor; hence, denying empathy to be understood as a distinct intentionality between the relation of self and other. The problems with such fundamental differences in the understanding of empathy becomes obvious the moment we try to use the word in higher education, supervision, and empathy training and assume that we all talk about the same phenomenon. This observation alone has also caused the work of psychologists trying to show the importance of empathy for the therapeutic process to be heavily critiqued (Copian & Goldie, 2011). How can psychologists evaluate and measure something with which they are not in agreement? In fact, most explanatory models of empathy seem difficult to exercise in practical pedagogical situations such as the context of supervision or empathy training. As mentioned earlier, how would we teach empathy as simulation? Even if we were successful in such an attempt, would such a simulation be perceived by the other as an intentional act being directed towards their lived experience? In other words, the overall problem with the natural scientific perspective on lifeworld phenomena is that it is taking the human quality out ofthe phenomena and making them abstract and inaccessible. The quality of an experience

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is constituted by meanings as expressed in the context of the lifeworld and they are not tangible like physical objects and it seems that there is no real reason, except that we would like to be natural scientific, for a justification for a representational theory of mind or a simulation theory of empathy This is not to say that we should not be natural scientific and disqualify an important discovery such as the mirror neurons, but we should be careful not to prematurely naturalize the lifeworld (Zahavi, 2005). In other words, if we aim at teaching something so valuable such as empathy and interpersonal understanding for our future health related professions, we also need to make the phenomenon accessible in terms of the lifeworld. Obviously, there are many types of empathy trainings discussed in the literature. For example, in prevention of adolescence aggression (e.g., Feshbach & Feshbach, 1982; Pecukonis, 1990), in terms of improving health care (e.g.. La Monica et al., 1987), and to increase the ability to recognize emotions in others (e.g., Kremer & Dietzen, 1991), and in terms of counseling psychology (e.g., Duan, C. & Hill, C. E., 1996). However, there seems to be no indication that there is an empathy training that is systematically based upon a Husserlian phenomenological perspective.' It is well worth noting that in an attempt to establish a phenomenologically based empathy training, I have relied heavily on the work of phenomenological philosopher Dan Zahavi (e.g., 2001, 2005, 2007,2008,2010, 2011,2012).

The Phenomenology of Empathy What is empathy? Empathy is an intentionality directed towards the other's experience (Zahavi, 2010,291). In other words, it is qualitatively different from let's say remembering something, or thinking about something, or simulating something, or making inferences about something, or sharing someone's emotions, or being caught up in emotional contagion, or seeing something, or feeling something. Empathy is characterized by a certain quality of experience with a relation to what is experienced, that is, the other, that is unlike the relation to one's self or to an inanimate object (Zahavi, 2012). Obviously we are unable to enter the stream of consciousness of another person and to perceive 1

There is a previous attempt to apply the Husserlian perspective to praxis by Barbro Giorgi (2005), although her work was aimed for the specific context of psychotherapy, whereas the attempt described in this paper is motivated to work across disciplines and also specifically worked out in terms of the phenomenology of empathy.

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tbe Otber person's primary experience. Hence, empatby is always constituted in tbe absence of tbe direct perception of tbe otber's experience, resulting in an irreducible form of co-presence, tbat Husserl calls analogical apperception witb tbe term analogy referring to tbe fact tbat we are present to anotber consciousness. Tbe analogical appresentation of tbe otber can also be constituted by a passive syntbesis tbat Husserl calls pairing, meaning tbat "patterns of understanding are gradually established tbrougb a process of sedimentation and tbey thereby come to influence subsequent experiences..." (Zabavi, 2012, 235).

However, tbere migbt be an objection bere in terms of tbe previous arguments against simulation. Is not tben pairing or analogy anotber way of saying simulation? Tbe answer is no, because Husserl is referring to sometbing more fundamental and tbus indicating tbat we are, on a pre-reflective meaning level, present to anotber lived, animate object (Zabavi, 2012). Take for example Meltzoff's and Moore's classic studies in wbicb tbe infant already at tbe age of 72 bours are able to imitate tbe experimenter's facial expression, witbout tbe knowledge or awareness wbat tbeir own body looks like (see for example, Gallagber, 2005,70-71). If one considers tbe pbenomenological interpretation of empatby as analogical apperception, tben it must be accounted for in terms of a distinct type of intentionality tbat is directed towards tbe otber, and not a relation to oneself as in tbe acts of so-called simulation. Tbe fact tbat "previous meaning" as in pairing is part of tbe act of analogical apperception is not enough to say tbat simulation is tbe foundation for empatby. According to Zabavi (2010), Pbenomenologists would typically not dispute tbat self-experience is a pre-condition for otber-experience. But tbere is a decisive difference between arguing tbat tbe former is a necessary condition (and tbat tbere would be no otber-experience in its absence) and claiming tbat selfexperience somebow serves as a model for otber-experience, as if interpersonal understanding is basically a question of projecting oneself into tbe otber. (295) Hence, simulation is not tbe same tbing as analogical apperception. In understanding empatby, it is also important to consider tbe distinction between empirical fact versus meaning and intentionality. We migbt be able to question tbe factual (empirical) aspect of somebody's experience of sometbing, but we can't question tbe experience as it presents itself to consciousness. For example, if somebody bad tbe experience of being followed at work.

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we could put up cameras to see if he or she was empirically right or wrong, but this does not take away that the person's experience of being followed at work still has meaning. Thus, phenomenological empathy demands of a person that he or she directs his or her intentionality towards the other person's meaning expression, and not so much to the empirical facts (although this could be part of the intentionality and thus cannot be completely ruled out). In other vv^ords, the empirical perspective leads us to an explanation of the other whereas a focus on the intentionality of the other helps us to understand the other. The same holds true of the distinction between agency and ownership (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). For instance, when a person is in need of professional help, be it in nursing, social work, clinical psychology, etc., such a person is usually in a state of a loss of agency (e.g., a broken leg, addiction, hallucinations, etc.). Gallagher & Zahavi (2008,160) writes. In schizophrenic symptoms of delusions of control or thought insertion, the sense of ownership is retained in some form, but the sense of agency is missing. The schizophrenic who suffers from these delusions will claim that his body is moving but that someone else is causing the movement; or that there are thoughts in his mind, but that someone else is putting them there. (Italics in original) In other words, by approaching the person's ownership, instead of the loss or lack of agency, we are also approaching the person's intentionality (i.e., an experience of something) and we thus make an attempt at understanding the other. Explanations, on the other hand, would focus on causality of the condition, diagnosis, and plausible treatment of the symptoms. Interventions based on explanations are obviously also useful in working with others, however, it is not the same as understanding. As stated earlier, empathy is a distinct form of intentionality and is not to be confused or fused with closely related phenomena such as, sympathy, caring, being nice, providing service, helping somebody to solve a problem, etc. Scheler, Husserl, and Stein all agreed that empathy is distinct different from sympathy, emotional contagion, and emotional sharing already in the beginning of the 20th century (Zahavi, 2010). According to Zahavi (2010), Thus, for Scheler as well as for Stein and Husserl, empathy is a basic, irreducible, form of intentionality that is directed towards the experiences of others. It is a question of understanding other experiencing subjects. But this doesn't entail that the other's experience is literally transmitted to us. Rather, it amounts to experiencing, say, the other person's emotion

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without being in the corresponding emotional state yourself. We might of course encounter a furious neighbor and become furious ourselves, but our empathie understanding of our neighbor's emotion might also elicit a quite different response, namely the feeling of fear. In either case, however, our emotional reaction is exactly thatâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a reaction. It is a consequence of our understanding of the other's emotion, and not a precondition or pre-requisite for this understanding. (291) In other words, empathy is a unique form of intentionality that can open up for something even more fundamental such as intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 2001,2005).

But let us also take a look at Husserl's use of the phenomenological reduction in understanding empathy and see how this can lead us further into the essence of the phenomenon. According to Husserl (2006), I, who in the natural attitude find myself vis-Ă -vis another lived body and another 1-subject, which is related to the same surrounding as my own, perform the phenomenological reduction, which yields the following: When the natural objects, which I have experience, are subjected to bracketing and reduction they yield certain subjective connections of consciousness along with the pertinent systems of motivated possibilities of consciousness... The apperception... through which the body is constituted for me, is connected to appresentations. And they are connected by way of a legitimating motivation, in the unity of a self-legitimating apperception of a higher level ("apperception of a human being"). On this higher level is posited a human being and, through empathy, a second I. The second I regards internally this other animated body over there as his lived body. And organized around his lived body, which is given to him by impressions, he looks at a particular part of nature, which is the very same for me, although to him it is given in different forms, through which it appears, and through other forms of consciousness. (154) As we can see, by performing the phenomenological reduction, empathy reveals "a second I" or as Husserl (1989, 239) states in Ideas II, "Here it is an other Ego." This particular notion of empathy is also present in the work of Husserl's student Edith Stein (1989). Meneses and Larkin (2012, 176) have recently shown in their review of Stein's work that, "The direct implication of the nature of empathy is that selfness and otherness are never absent or confused." As Zahavi (2010, 291) writes, "That is, the distance between self and other is preserved and upheld." In other words, the intentionality should have

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its focus on the other as other if it should count as empathy in a phenomenological sense. Hence, apperception is unlike perception in that we never have the possibility of perceiving the other side as with an inanimate object, but instead, it is characterized by an indisputable absence. Now such limitations to the other person's primary experience does not mean that we should not try to understand other people's experiences in terms of the self-other relation and instead aim for simulation or making inferences. Nevertheless, it seems like empathy's connection to altruism in social psychology and ethology (see for example. Copian & Goldie, 2011) could be a merger between sympathy and empathy, which is problematic since these are two distinct intentionalities. This is not to say that they cannot be fused together making it a particular intentionality of its own. However, I would say that fusing empathy and sympathy makes it difficult to teach or supervise students, because the difference between the two helps students to more clearly see the usefulness of empathy as it can relate to sympathy. Other questions also arise here, such as, if one needs to care in order to help somebody (i.e., understanding is not enough) or if one needs to understand the other in order to help somebody (i.e., caring is not enough). Such a discussion would be lost if we fused empathy and sympathy. In addition, imagine the loss ofthe important discussion in regard to ethics in supervision if we merged empathy with, for example, emotional sharing. The point here is to see the value of essential philosophical distinctions and the phenomenological perspective in explicating lifeworld phenomena. We know that empathy can happen pre-reflectively as explicated and described by phenomenological philosophers, but we need to figure out how to do it in order to be able to train students to become better at it. There is the phenomenological attitude that can help us in order for empathy to unfold in terms of praxis. Remember that all other theories of empathy (e.g., theorytheory and simulation theory) emphasize that our focus is a relation to our self (inference, simulation, projection, etc.), which is qualitatively a different type of intentionality. In other words, by adopting the phenomenological attitude philosophers can provide us with a description of empathy, but the praxis perspective also demands a similar shift in attitude that can be used in a pragmatic sense so we can be involved in deliberate professional empathy when we need to. This is not to say that empathy needs to be deliberate to occur, but it can be and this is where we need to start if we are to teach it. The phenomenological attitude will serve as our point of departure for a deliberate professional empathy to be possible. One could say that the phenomenological attitude can open up for empathy to occur in praxis.

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Let US take a closer look at the phenomenological attitude and how it relates to doing empathy. Giorgi (2007) describes thisfirststep in Husserl's method as follows, With Husserl's method, the key step is the first one—the assumption of the transcendental phenomenological attitude. To assume the transcendental perspective means to adopt an attitude of consciousness that transcends the orientation toward the human mode of being conscious and that is also free from worldly and empirical assumptions. To be in the phenomenological attitude means two things: performing the epoché (or "bracketing") and the reduction, which refrains from positing the existence of whatever is given. To bracket means to put aside all knowledge of the phenomenon being explored or investigated that is not due to the actual instance of this phenomenon. Thus all past knowledge derived from readings or other secondary sources, as well as one's former personal experiences with the phenomenon, are meant to be excluded. The reduction refers to the fact that one has to refrain from positing the existence of the given that is encountered as normally happens in the natural attitude. One considers the given, even if it is real, simply as something present to one's consciousness without affirming that it exists in the way that it presents itself It is taken to be something present to one's consciousness—a phenomenon, not a reality. It is a reduction from existence to presence. (64) As we can see, bracketing and the phenomenological reduction provides us with the openness to the presence to irreal aspects in the other person's expression, without having to affirm existence of what we are being present to. Through somebody's expression we can be co-present to the other's experience of something. An expression does include the act-object relation. For example, 1 saw a woman at the train station the other day crying in a sad way while she was talking to somebody on her cell phone. Her object was not known to me, but I still knew something about it from her expression. I could see that she cried in a sad way (as opposed to crying because she was happy), hence providing me with some of the meaning about the object. In other words, through her expression I knew something about the irreal qualities about the object. Hence, even though the object is not entirely known to me, it is still possible that I could empathize with this person. Thus, expression unfolds some of the experiental life of the other and it is possible through the phenomenological attitude for me to be present to

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meanings by directing my intentionality to tbe experience of tbe otber, tbat is, to empatbize.

Phenomenological Theory in a Practical Pedagogical Context Tbe road to establisbing a pbenomenologically based empatby training bas been difficult since I was forced to make certain difficult cboices in terms of tbe pbenomenological position. How was I to teacb tbe student to perform analogical apperceptions in a practical situation? Obviously, I was not in a strict pbilosopbical or buman scientific context. Instead, I was in a teacbing situation and I wanted to facilitate students to be able to deliberately direct tbeir intentionality toward tbe otber person's experience in order for interpersonal understanding to occur. Even tbougb I was not in a pbilosopbical context, tbe pbenomenological attitude seemed like a good place to start, altbougb some modifications was necessary in order for Husserlian pbenomenology to fit tbe context I was in as well as being relevant to empatby. First, one was to bracket one's existential assumptions about tbe content tbat was expressed by tbe otber. Second, tbe otber's expression was to be reduced to presences, wbereas tbe otber is to be reduced to co-presence. However, tbe act of tbe otber cannot be reduced, and bence one could say tbat I was working from a modified version of tbe psycbological reduction as far as tbe expression of tbe otber was concerned, similar to its use in human science (Giorgi, 2009). If notbing else, tbese modifications are in need of furtber clarification and sometbing tbat will be worked on in tbe future. Pragmatically, I created tbe scenario that the other should start the encounter with the experience of a problem, wbicb is usually tbe reason one is in tbe context of psycbological, medical, social, or otber "belp" situations. (Obviously, one does not bave to experience a problem witbin tbis context; bowever, tbis was a practical way to start.) Now, since tbe otber experienced a problem, tbe students were faced witb dealing witb anotber I wbo experienced an intentional object (i.e., tbe problem). In order to create a sense of openness toward tbe otber, I started witb introducing tbe pbenomenological attitude. Tbe student needed to use bracketing and tbe psycbological reduction in order to suspend tbe existential assumptions about tbe otber's expression in order to be present to meanings. For example, if tbe otber said tbat be or sbe was feeling depressed, explanations were not sought, but instead tbe student was instructed to understand tbe experience of tbe otber. In otber words, I began tbis project by teacbing tbe pbenomenological attitude in order to open up for a sense of co-presence towards the otber's experience. Nevertbeless, one could

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at least say that I was trying to facilitate empathy through the phenomenological attitude, although, at first, it was done in a rather sketchy way. By using the phenomenological attitude as our point of departure in order to open up for empathy, might seem problematic. In particular, in trying to direct a student's intentionality towards the other's experience might indicate that one has direct access to the other's primary experience; however, this is not the case. Husserl (1999,109) reminds us that "If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same." What is it then that we are supposed to be co-present to within the phenomenological attitude? Since the body of the other is not perceived as a physical object in apperception, but as a lived body expressing something. Now, there are a lot of different takes on what expression means depending upon which phenomenological philosopher one consults (see for example Zahavi, 2010). However, since we are trying to teach or supervise students how to adopt the phenomenological attitude in order to understand the other, we at least have to look at the expressed meanings of the other. In other words, if somebody is experiencing and expressing something there is meaning that rest on intentionality that one can be present to. Zahavi (2010, 294) drawing from Edith Stein's work provides us with an example, ... let us consider a situation where a friend tells me that he has lost his mother, and I become aware of his distress. What kind of awareness is this? I obviously don't see the distress the same way I see the colour of his shirt rather I see the distress 'in' his pained countenance... In this case, it makes sense to say that I experience (rather than imagine or infer) his distress, though I certainly do lack a first-person experience of the distress; it is not my distress, (italics in original) Now, there is much more to be said about the relation between the phenomenological attitude, expression, and empathy; however, this is not the place to go further into this issue. Let us conclude this section by answer the following question: What then theoretically justifies a phenomenological approach to empathy training? First, the experiential understanding of empathy as a lifeworld phenomenon makes training possible. Second, the phenomenological attitude can help us to provide the student with a starting point in order to make empathy possible. Third, a phenomenological account of empathy as a distinct type of intentionality also gives the student a clear sense of whose experience they are dealing with. All the other approaches towards empathy seem to blur this last point.

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making it difficult for the student to clearly see the difference between, self, other, empathy, sympathy, emotional sharing, emotional contagion, etc.

Empathy Training The practice of empathy training from a phenomenological perspective consists of three steps that build upon each other. These steps can also be repeated at different educational levels, for example, as part of a freshman course and later in a senior pre-practicum, to continue as part of supervision during practicum, and also as part of a graduate course, etc. Because of its foundation in phenomenology, the empathy training can be used by any discipline in which understanding the other is seen as a vital ingredient. In step l, the student is presented with the whole (i.e., the phenomenology of empathy, the phenomenological attitude, the steps of the empathy training, etc.). Then during step 2 the student work through the empathy training in which recordings of interpersonal encounters are used. Step 3 which is a theoretical task as it relates to the individual student's own development through the training in step 2. Let me go through each of the consecutive steps. The first step provides the student with the whole picture, that is, the phenomenology of empathy and some necessary aspects of Husserl's phenomenology. This can be achieved using the traditional lecture format presenting phenomenology and empathy, covering the theoretical content as described above. Although it is important that one puts the phenomenological position in contrast to the empirical perspective since this will make the phenomenological perspective clear for the student. The introduction to intentionality and the phenomenological attitude is essential as well as the use of distinctions such as meaning versus fact, understanding versus explanation, skepticism versus trust, etc. Even if the subject matter of phenomenology is complicated, it does not automatically mean that it is difficult for the teacher in relating the material in a traditional lecture to practical examples in the lifeworld. Methodologically speaking, the first step is meant as a background going into the empathy training in the second step, much like the figure-ground relation, to use an analogy from Gestalt psychology. The meaning of the content provided in the first step will become explicit and more embodied for the student in Step 2 and Step 3. The first step is usually experienced as abstract, whereas the succeeding steps bring the material closer to the individual student's own reflections and lifeworld perspective. In addition, the first step also includes providing the student with the first task to be finished before the second step can begin. The first task is stmc-

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tured in a particular way so that focus should emphasize the phenomenology of empathy rather than disciplinary content. The essential aspect of the first task is to confront the student's own understanding of empathy with the phenomenological approach. Hence, the first task is for the student to (using their own interpretation of empathy), empathize with another person's (usually another student's) everyday type of problem for about ten minutes. Note that the problem should be trivial to such an extent so that focus will be on the process of empathy instead of the meaning and nature of the problem. For example, the person that the student is conversing with might talk about being stressed while driving to school or annoyed that the subway is too crowded, etc. 1 have noticed that it becomes essential for the training to remove focus from the disciplinary perspectives such as nursing, psychology, social work, etc., in order for the student to stay better focused on the lived experience of the other, instead of specific professionally related issues. The practical aspects of this first task is designed in very much the same way as in Carl Rogers' (1989) traditional method of training psychotherapists; that is, the student will record a conversation and then transcribe it verbatim, as well as making copies of the transcriptions to the facilitator and the other group members. The groups in which empathy training takes place should not exceed 6-7 students, in order for students to feel safe to explore their own personal experience. The recording could be video or audio, however, it is advised to start with audio, because it can be overwhelming with the visual aspect at the beginning of the training. If steps 1 to 3 are repeated, video is an excellent way of addressing the distinction behavior versus meaning expression (see for example, Zahavi, 2007) as well as the visual embodiment involved in doing empathy. Step 2 consists of empathy training in small groups in which the students bring their recordings to the sessions along with the transcription. When the students enter the classroom, they have already made a reflection on their encounter with the other in terms of empathy. In other words, by transcribing the recorded session, there is little room for avoiding the confrontation between one's own understanding of empathy and the phenomenological approach that one has grasped intellectually during Step 1. Even though some ambitious students try hard to follow their new intellectual understanding from the lecture, they are usually unable to transcend their previous embodied understanding of empathy while completing the task. The first session is characterized by, for instance, students trying to defend their work, or students willingly admitting their previous lack of listening to somebody, or students not showing up, or students just trying to get through the session. In other words, this first session is a challenge for the facilitator

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and it is essential to overemphasize that there are no rights or wrongs in regard to this task (unless there are offensive expressions involved). The development that the student has to get through is to be confronted with the phenomenological understanding of empathy. This is sometimes experienced as difficult, but mostly the first session is seen as enlightening. Seeing the phenomenological perspective in the recordings is a way of understanding that Step l was not that abstract after all. Let us consider an example from the first training session. Because of the paper format, the examples are limited to the text. Video or real life demonstration would obviously be more superior catching the tone of voice, and other embodied aspects of the expressions. Nevertheless, I have created an example that we can follow throughout. The nature of the example could be interpreted as coming across as psychological; however, it could easily fit into, for example, palliative care or social work. Also, note that I am not using an everyday type of problem in this example as would be more appropriate for the training sessions. Client/Patient: I feel nothing. There is just no point in getting up in the morning. Professional: How long have you felt this way? Even though this is an appropriate question to ask, the professional's intentional act is not aimed at understanding the meanings as expressed by the other. Instead, it is an inquiry into the condition as such, perhaps trying to find the onset or the cause of the condition. Even though such an inquiry is clearly motivated in order to help the other person, this is not the same as being empathie. Clearly students are here faced with the difference between their own interpretations of empathy as opposed to the phenomenological. The most common ways to interpret empathy seems to be to explain the client/patient condition and then try to solve their problem based upon this explanation. The first session ends with instructions for the second task in preparation for the second session. The second task is similar to the first; however, the actual recording time can be reduced from ten minutes to five and the student now has to try the phenomenological approach to empathy. This is difficult and many students can experience the task as impossible, especially those students who interpreted their performance on the first task as a failure. In addition, the facilitator should also point out that this is training and that there is no judgment in terms of a grade involved in relation to the student's

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performance (tbe grade follows tbe completion of step 3). Besides, tbe facflitator also needs to emphasize the training aspect of the task, that is, being empathie for ten or five minutes is not typical in real life situations. A helpful metaphor that has been used for tbe last several years is to say tbat football players do certain repetitions during practice, but tbey obviously do not do sucb repetitions wbile playing tbe actual game. Tbe leadersbip of tbe facilitator as a role model in bow to adopt tbe pbenomenological attitude is essential in tbe first and second training sessions. Tbe facilitator needs to provide specific examples of bow to verbalize one's understanding of tbe otber, which is a specific goal of the second step of the training. Verbalizing one's empatby, as I call it, is a skill tbat is developed tbrougb tbe training and necessary if one views tbe relation to tbe otber as reciprocal as well as values tbe otber's participation of tbeir understanding of tbemselves. In contrast to an explanation, in wbicb tbe participation of tbe otber is limited or at times characterized by determinism, an understanding of tbe otber could be seen as opening up for participation. Because of tbe possibility of empatby opening up for intersubjectivity, by verbalizing empatby one can also open up for a sense of participation. Verbalizing empatby is descriptive pbenomenology in terms of working from witbin tbe pbenomenological attitude and tbus staying witb wbat is given to tbe consciousness of tbe person trying to understand tbe other. It is essential here not to just interpret this as repeating what the other person says, but instead tbe meaning of verbalizing empatby sbould "sbow" the other tbe intentional aspect of understanding at work, tbat is, wbat one is present to. Focus should not be on language aspects, sucb as training to summarize or parapbrasing wbat tbe patient or client is saying. Hence, tbe primary focus is on understanding tbe otber's lived experience. Verbalizing empatby is to explicate tbe meaning expression of tbe otber and tbus to invite tbe participation of tbe otber to direct bis or ber intentionality to my understanding, resulting in a reciprocal empatby and clearly paving tbe way for intersubjectivity. Now, verbalizing empatby can at times result in a summary or a parapbrase wbat tbe otber person is saying, bowever, it is essential to understand the difference in terms of the intentional act. Let us get back to our previous example and see bow verbalizing empatby migbt look in tbe training session. Client/Patient: I feel nothing. There is Just no point in getting up in the morning. Professional: How long have you felt this way?

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Facilitator: Let us pause the recording. Now, "How long have you felt this way?" is a good professional question, however, itisnotan attempt at understanding the other persons experience. The client/patient says that he/she feels nothing and that there is just no point in getting up in the morning. What type of intentionality of the other are we present to here? The person experience emptiness and that there is no purpose in life. How can we verbalize our presence as professionals? In otherwords, howwouldwego about verbalizing our empathy? Perhaps we could say: "You feet empty and you seem to have lost a sense ofpurpose in life." Hence, in providing facilitation and example in how to be present to the other person's experience as expressed (in this case verbally) and also how to verbalize empathy, the student will have a better chance at developing the ability to stay focused on the other. The second session is usually one in which the students defend themselves even more so than in the first session, because now they were supposed to try to do empathy from a phenomenological perspective. In other words, they were trying to bracket their own existential assumptions about the phenomenon that the other person was talking about and they were trying to direct their intentionality towards the other's experience. However, understanding all this theoretically, and trying to do it are two very different things. In fact, the students are so caught up in how they are supposed to act that they lose their presence in regard to the other's meaning expression. This becomes a crucial and valuable lesson in preparation for the third and final session. The second session is characterized by trying to do empathy from a phenomenological perspective as a technique, which is an error that the students will overcome in the following session(s). In other words, too much focus on oneself leads to an intentional relation to oneself. As stated earlier, empathy should be self in relation toward the other. The second session thus also helps the students to see clearly that the other theoretical perspectives on empathy are not about the relation to the other and that "communication techniques" are limited in terms of understanding the other. Here it becomes essential for the facilitator to encourage the students for the upcoming third session to try to primarily have their focus on the other and not so much on their own performance. In addition, the preparatory task for the third session is the same as the task for the second. Verbalizing empathy also needs to be encouraged in order for the other to be able to correct your understanding, which tells you that your presence towards the other's meaning expression is "misaligned" and which will engage

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your eidetic variations to get a better aim. Let us take a look at a situation in which the client/patient feels understood. Client/Patient: I feel nothing. There is just no point in getting up in the morning. Professional: You have a difficult time finding a sense ofpurpose inyour life. Client/Patient: Yeah, you know it is not worth going on afler my wife died and I have such a hard time doing simple things like making some dinner for myself and the kids. When she was sick I was strong and now it isjust as if I bst my strength. Now I want it back, but I can't seem to find it. However, a situation might also occur in which the understanding is "misaligned." What happens is interesting, because the attempt to empathize creates a sense of trust to correct the professional, which is an insight already familiar to most psychotherapists. And I would say that this is one of the most important aspects of the training, because the client/patient is then showing that they have understood the professional's attempt to deliberatively do empathy. Let us see what this might look like: Client/Patient: I feel nothing. There is just no point in getting up in the morning. Professional: You have a difficult time finding a sense ofpurpose inyour life. Client/Patient: No, it is not really that I lack of purpose in my life, but it is more the everyday tasks that become so difficult to handle. It is almost as if I have lost a basic sense of strength. If one is corrected, it signals that the deliberate attempt to understand the other has been "seen" by the other, and a reciprocal empathie relation has been made possible. In other words, the focus here is on empathy and not explanation of a condition, disease, behavior, or a social problem. What if the patient or client in some respect does not respond to verbal communication? This is not a problem when one is following the phenomenological approach, because empathy is not limited to the narrative aspects of intersubjectivity. As a matter of fact, all that is required is a person having an experience of something and that some form of expression ofthat experience is available in the world. By the time of the third session, most students are capable of entering the phenomenological attitude (to some reasonable extent) and thus are able to be involved in deliberate professional empathy (from a phenomenological perspective). Now, the students' performance is far from perfect, and it is advised

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to have five sessions scheduled and to tell students that they have to do a minimum of three. This enables the students who want more practice to attend all five. Such teaching strategies also creates a dynamic and overlapping of the individual student sessions, making the development ofthe learning involved clear for the students. For example, a student might miss the second session and come in with their second recording for the third session, showing everybody in the group (who did not miss the second session) the different developmental stages in learning how to adopt the phenomenological attitude. Obviously, the integration of practical exercises and theory is a valuable part of this training, especially in terms of Step 2 (and Step 3). The fact that each session starts out with recorded material from the lifeworld, is a way of shifting the figure-ground relationship, in which the theoretical material has hecome part of the horizon. Now it is time to integrate theory and practice with the student's own development. This is Step 3, and here 1 have the students write a paper (and make an oral presentation) about their own development through the training by relating it to the phenomenological literature. A persistent problem for the last ten years has heen to find literature on phenomenology that can be understood by students traditionally not well versed in philosophy.

Conclusion It has been my attempt to provide an overview of a phenomenologically based empathy training that aims at providing the students with the skill of empathy through by entering the phenomenological attitude. The training has developed over the course of the last ten years and has shown itself to be useful in many disciplines in which work with humans is the main focus. The theoretical justification for the empathy training is grounded in the phenomenological philosophical understanding of empathy, whereas the theoretical justification ofthe application of a deliberate professional empathy in the context of empathy training is based on adopting a phenomenological attitude.

References Copian, A. & Goldie, P. (2011). Empathy: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. de Wall, R (2009). The age of empathy: Nature's lessonfor a kinder society. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.

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Di Pellegdno, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gállese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 91,176-180. Duan, C. & Hill, C. E. (1996). The current state of empathy research. Joumal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 43(3), 261-274. Englander, M. & Robinson, P. (2009). En fenomenologiskt grundad vârdpedagogisk metod for utbildning i empatiskt bemötane (A phenomenological pedagogical method for ducating nurses and caregivers how to increase their own sensitivity to their empathie abilities). Nordic Journal of Nursing Research, No. 4, Vol. 29, 38-40. Feshbach, N. D. & Feshbach, S. (1982). Empathy training and the regulation of aggression: Potentialities and limitations. Academic Psyckoiogy Bulletin, Vol 4(3), 399-413Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. (2008). The phenomenological mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and cognitive science. London, England: Routledge. Giorgi, A. (2007). Concerning the Phenomenological Methods of Husserl and Heidegger and their Application in Psychology. In Thiboutot, C. (Ed.) Essais de psychologie phénoménologique-existentielle réunis en hommage au professeur Bernd Jager, Collection du Ci>;p, Volume 1, pp. 63-78. CIRP. Giorgi, A. (2009). The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A modified Husseriian approach. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Giorgi, B. (2005). Reflections on therapeutic practice guided by a Husserlian perspective.Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 36/2,141-194. Husserl, E. (2006). The basic problems of phenomenology: from the lectures, winter semester, igio-igu (trans. Farin & Hart). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Husserl, E. (1999). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology (trans. Cairns). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenoiogical philosophy, second book (trans. Rojcewtcz & Schuwer). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Kremer, J. F. & Dietzen, L. L. (1991). Two approaches to teaching accurate empathy to undergraduates: Teacher-intensive and self-directed. Journal of College Student Development, Vol 32 (1), 69-75. La Monica, E. L, Wolf, R. M., Madea, A. R., Oberst, M. T. (1987). Empathy and nursing care outcomes. Research and Theoryfor Nursing Practice, Vol 1, No 3,197-213. Meneses, R. W. & Larkin, M. (2012). Edith Stein and the contemporary psychological study of empathy. Journa/ of Phenomenological Psychology, 43/2,151-184. Pecukonis, E. V. (1990). A cognitive/affective empathy training program as a function of ego development in aggressive adolescent females. Adolescence, Vol 25(97), 59~76.

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