Ride to Reform

process is—on national commitment,” she said.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was not the only one voicing caution regarding the reform process, with “reform is reversible” seeming like a constant refrain. These days, however, such doubts are heard less and less.

But even as the government’s efforts to overhaul the political and economic system of the country picked up speed, a sudden obstacle very nearly threw us off the road completely. The outbreak of deadly communal violence in Rakhine State in June threatened to revive the ugly image of Myanmar as a nation of endemic strife. At least 90 people were killed in the first wave of clashes between ethnic Rakhines and Rohingya Muslims, and in October, nearly 100 more lost their lives in a cycle of violence that also left tens of thousands homeless.

Ironically, perhaps, this episode won U Thein Sein praise from many Myanmar people—the very same people who spent decades loathing all generals—when he came out on the side of the Rakhines, who regard the Rohingyas as illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh. By contrast, international rights groups condemned his government’s stance of refusing to recognize the Rohingyas as an official minority.

As for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, she received some unprecedented criticism last year for not speaking out on the Rakhine conflict or the fighting between government troops and Kachin rebels in the country’s far north. Human rights groups have condemned her silence, while others lament that she has now become a pragmatic politician.

Of course, her current role is undoubtedly different compared with when she was previously detained under house arrest. She is now an elected MP, despite both former and current military officials maintaining their dominance in the legislature. Myanmar’s reform process is just taking off and she might want to be sure that this current trend does not reverse. Perhaps that is the “bigger picture” of her present political strategy, but is seems to have cost her international credibility to some degree.

More positively, last year saw the passing in Parliament of several bills, including a long-awaited law on foreign direct investment, that could help to revive the country’s long-term prospects. Even sensitive issues seem to have been actively debated, which is more than was originally expected from the military-dominated legislature.

But the main goal of opposition and ethnic parties—to amend the undemocratic 2008 Constitution—has been conspicuously absent from the discussion. All parliamentarians seem to understand that to raise this topic would be premature as the nominally civilian government is still, in effect, run by the powerful ex-generals.

As Myanmar’s leaders try to weave their way around all of these issues without colliding, there is a growing sense that the world’s eyes are very much upon us. It’s not just the international media that has begun to pay greater attention: other foreigners—tourists, investors and dignitaries—are also lining up to get a glimpse of this long-closed country and assess what it has to offer.

Meanwhile, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent dissidents are also spending more time abroad, while many exiled activists and journalists who were once persona non grata are returning. Myanmar’s interaction with the outside world is fast accelerating after decades of isolation, making it more difficult to retreat into its shell, or to backslide into the repressive habits of its not-so-distant past.

Nonetheless, there have been a number of disturbing incidents that have served as a reminder that the bad old days are not completely over yet. The heavy-handed crackdown on protests against the Letpadaung copper mine in Sagaing Region late last November was tragically reminiscent of the brutal crushing of the 2007 Saffron Revolution: in both cases, Buddhist monks were the chief victims of the state-sponsored violence.

The war in Kachin State is also doing enormous harm to the government’s efforts to distance itself from the practices of Myanmar’s former dictators. The use of fighter jets and attack helicopters against Kachin rebels in late December and early January represented an extremely dangerous escalation of the conflict. The indiscriminate shelling of targets near the Kachin Independence Army’s headquarters of Laiza, in some cases claiming the lives of civilians, also demonstrated a shocking disregard for the rights of ordinary citizens.

What do such offensives mean for the ceasefire attempts initiated by U Thein Sein’s peace committee? Critics wonder if the government can really control its military, or if it is in fact engaging in a “good cop, bad cop” strategy to subdue ethnic armed groups.

What is certain is that there are still many challenges on the road ahead for Myanmar, and that only real leadership and a commitment to national reconciliation will pave the way for nationwide peace and prosperity. There is undoubtedly a long way to go.