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Crossing the Line When Cops Become Criminals
Liza Grobler
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Published by Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd in 2013 10 Orange Street Sunnyside Auckland Park 2092 South Africa +2711 628 3200 www.jacana.co.za Š Liza Grobler, 2013 All rights reserved. ISBN 978-1-4314-0812-2 Also available as an ebook dPDF 978-1-4314-0813-9 ePUB 978-1-4314-0814-6 mobi 978-1-4314-0815-3 Cover design by publicide Set in Sabon 10.5/14.5pt Job no. 001987 See a complete list of Jacana titles at www.jacana.co.za iv
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To the many dedicated, hardworking, ‘clean’ SAPS members who toil under very challenging conditions – both inside and outside the organisation To the ‘dirty’ cops – you know who you are
Thank you to all who shared their invaluable insights and experiences regarding police criminality – on both sides of the line
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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Police Corruption across the Globe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Facts and Fears about Corruption in the SAPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Drugs: Users Get Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Can Corruption ever be Noble? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Maximum Force: Assault and Brutality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Syndicate Criminals in Police Uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 In the Pockets of Gangsters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Informers: A Murky Relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Sabotaging Prosecutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 “Buy me a Cool Drink”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Cops Are Robbers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Crime and No Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Rape: A South African Scourge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Anger Fuels Police Murders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Misconduct Leads to Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 A Fish Rots from the Head. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
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The Slippery Slope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Managing Bad Apples and Bad Barrels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 How Low can Morale Go?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Employing and Creating Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Counting the Cost of Police Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Curbing Police Corruption and Criminality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Help for Ticking Time Bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 The Wheels of Discipline Grind Slowly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Moving up the Ladder or Stuck? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Investigating Crime and Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 A Perspective from Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 True Police Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
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Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Across the world, police corruption and criminality is a problem policing agencies face in varying degrees. The extent of the scourge is determined by the efficacy of interventions designed to minimise it. The mistrust and lack of confidence citizens have in their police services as a result of criminality and corruption is universal. What is police corruption and criminality? Policing expert Professor Maurice Punch describes corruption in a narrow, legalistic sense as “an officer knowingly doing or not doing something that is against his or her duty for some form of financial or material gain or promise of such gain”. He also says police crime is “serious offences that have little to do with almost any police-related ends but are a gross abuse of power, such as gratuitous violence, armed robbery, rape and murder”.1 A New York Police Department (NYPD) officer testifying at the Knapp Commission, which investigated corruption in the NYPD in 1972, coined the phrases grass-eaters, meat-eaters and birds when describing his colleagues’ propensity for corruption. Grass-eaters “did not look for graft or kickbacks” but passively accepted them as the natural perks of the job that were spontaneously on offer. “Well, they’ll accept a cup of coffee or a free meal or a television wholesale from a merchant, but they draw a line,” the officer said. Having no qualms about the widespread practice of accepting free food and discounts on goods, officers who refused these offers were perceived as deviant for foolishly rejecting “easy money” and “easy pickings”. Meat-eaters, the officer told the commission, “were proactive carnivores; they went after the graft in order to organise and regulate arrangements. The meat-eaters are different. They’re out looking. They’re on a pad (the organised system of graft payments from criminals for protection against law ix
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enforcement) with gamblers, they deal in junk (drugs), or they’d compromise a homicide investigation for money. “They set out to make deals either of mutual benefit to the parties involved or in aggressive forms of extortion such as enforcing the ‘licensing’ of illegal enterprises in return for payments and/or offering protection from enforcement or from harm from competitors.” The NYPD officer said that birds glided above without looking down and without taking part in the deviance of their colleagues. “Birds tend to be forgotten, yet this is an interesting category because it conveys a class of officers who avoid deviant practices,” he said. “The birds just fly up high. They don’t eat anything either because they are honest or because they don’t have any good opportunities. “These officers doubtless had reasons for consciously or instinctively keeping their hands clean and their consciences unsullied; perhaps it was serious moral or religious convictions or else sensitivity to long-term career prospects.”2 The South African Police Service (SAPS) has lurched from one scandal to the next in the past few years, including the high-profile arrest, trial and conviction of former police commissioner Jackie Selebi in 2010 for fraternising with a convicted drug dealer and crossing the line into his criminal world. This was followed by the dismissal of Selebi’s successor Bheki Cele – another political appointee – for his involvement in a dodgy multi-million rand lease deal. Senior officials in the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division have been accused of squandering millions of rands from a police slush fund on vehicles, holidays, furniture and groceries. They are also accused of siphoning off informers’ fees and out-of-control nepotism. Crime intelligence officers are accused of tapping the phones of investigative agencies, such as the Hawks, to get information on the status of investigations into their buddies in organised crime. A crime intelligence officer’s firearm was used to murder a king of sleaze. Included in this toxic morass is the police shooting of thirty-four striking miners, the killing of a service delivery protester and two incidents of men being dragged behind police vehicles, one of them beaten to death by police thugs after being hauled to a police station. On 14 February 2013 internationally admired athlete Oscar Pistorius fatally shot his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp, apparently mistaking her for an intruder. Not only did the tragedy make headlines across the globe, so too did x
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Introduction
the fact that the investigating officer, Hilton Botha, was facing seven charges of attempted murder. At Pistorius’ bail hearing Botha, who subsequently resigned from the SAPS, admitted contaminating the crime scene and failing to secure critical evidence. “Botha’s brief moment on the international stage has exposed the sorry state of detective work in the South African Police Service,” a Sunday Times editorial proclaimed.3 A DNA expert interviewed by a radio station attempted to defend Botha, saying that very often SAPS detectives are not provided with the most rudimentary crime scene equipment. There are more than 500 police members presently facing criminal prosecution, accused of crimes ranging from murder to assault and rape.4 This is testimony to the fact that the SAPS is arresting their own, which is heartening. However, this is probably all they are doing to combat the extensive deviousness in their ranks. A senior manager at a police station in Cape Town recently asked me for information on police corruption. He says he knows that he has corrupt members under his command, but does not know how to identify them. The SAPS creates much awareness about its Code of Conduct that is supposed to guide the behaviour of officers, but it contains precisely one line on corruption… “and work towards preventing any form of corruption and to bring the perpetrators thereof to justice”. What can this teach new recruits about the nature of corruption in a policing environment? The lack of understanding of corruption will follow the rookies throughout their careers – do they even know that it’s wrong to ask a citizen for a “little something” because they are “hungry”? Caught in the middle are the “birds” of the SAPS – the dedicated, honest officers who are at the coalface of South Africa’s battle to bring down its hideous crime rate. These members of the SAPS work daily in dangerous situations with very poor remuneration, but understand that their task is to serve the community and keep them safe. These many officers must be recognised, rewarded and thanked for placing ethics and integrity above succumbing to the opportunistic temptations readily available in a policing environment. This book is not about the honest and dedicated cops in South Africa. Its only focus is the crooks and criminals in the SAPS. The police ministry and the management of the SAPS will probably react to the publication of this book with a defensive and vitriolic backlash. Most xi
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of this work is based on research for a PhD thesis on police criminality. In 2007 an excerpt of the thesis was published and was immediately followed by a personal attack on me and an obligatory request by SAPS management to focus only on the good cops. My phone was tapped. South African citizens and the rank and file and management of the SAPS need to know how, why and when police corruption and criminality occurs as we are all affected by it. Following another flurry of media attention in 2012 on the relationship between corrupt police officers and gangs – which is a big feature of the PhD thesis – there was a welcome change of attitude from the Western Cape Provincial Commissioner General Arno Lamoer, who admitted that the SAPS has a problem. This book explains and attempts to understand police criminality – what crimes they commit, why and how and what needs to be done to fix the problem. The research prepared for the thesis was recently extensively updated and is presented here in a more popular form. It is important to take this work out of academia and make it accessible to all South Africans. Police wrongdoing affects each and every one of us, whether we have been directly affected by a policeman soliciting a bribe or being a victim of a wrongful arrest, or whether we have lost faith and trust in the people we are supposed to depend on to keep us safe from harm. It is essential that citizens understand this often rapacious and deeply sinister behaviour. When police officers ask you for a cool drink, you can be sure that they are not thirsty – they are on the take. Experts who gave of their time to share their experiences and expertise for the research included serving members of the SAPS including detectives, psychologists, deputy commissioners, commanders of specialised units, officers at crime intelligence, personnel in discipline management and legal services. Former SAPS staffers interviewed include the former national commander of the disbanded Anti-Corruption Unit, the former provincial commissioner of the Western Cape and a former commander of the erstwhile Murder and Robbery Unit. Specialists who shared their knowledge include researchers in the field of policing and police criminality affiliated to non-governmental organisations and universities, a senior manager at the National Prosecuting Authority, a criminologist, a journalist, the executive director of the Independent Complaints Directorate (as it was known then) and members of a police union. xii
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Introduction
These specialists did not only provide pertinent information on police procedures, policies and training, but also shared their views on police criminality. The information they provided is thought provoking and highly informative. Interviews were also conducted with three international specialists. In London a former assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and former director of investigations at the Independent Police Complaints Commission, provided a wealth of information. The commander of the New South Wales Police Employee Management Branch was interviewed in Sydney. A digital conference was held with the chief of the New York Police Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau and the commanding officer of the Internal Affairs Bureau’s Corruption Prevention Division. In six prisons in the Western Cape, eleven former policemen and two highranking gang members shared details of police officers’ descent into criminality and the measures they believe would have deterred them from their fate. The information they provided about police criminality is invaluable and pivotal to this publication. Their openness and honesty when providing quality, firsthand information is commended. There is correlation between the specialists and the offenders when detailing the crimes police officers commit and the methods they use. Both groups agree that there is poor supervision in the SAPS, with management either in denial, untrained to combat the problem or in cahoots with criminals. SAPS management all tended to have a similar approach to questions about criminality in their ranks, expounding on the virtues of the organisation and relating what they should be doing. All the other interviewees were a tad more realistic. The information gathered from the specialists and literature on police criminality provides a vital context within which to interpret the offender interviews. All of the interviews were conversational and wide-ranging. All of the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity for the research and the book because of the real possibility of victimisation for speaking out about a problem the SAPS is loath to confront. The specialist interviews were conducted primarily in the Western Cape and the offender interviews took place exclusively in this province. Permission was obtained from the former MEC of community safety and the former provincial police commissioner in the Western Cape. It would have been ideal to conduct research across the country to gain a holistic view of criminality in the SAPS and to devise a corrective policy xiii
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accordingly, but the book contains many illustrations of crimes committed by police officers across the country, providing insight into what needs to be done nationally to rectify the situation. Information was gathered on the many risk factors contributing to police criminality, including individual and organisational – particularly managerial – contributing factors. The vital role good recruitment and training policies and procedures have in reducing criminality is also explored. The consequences of police criminality include a disconcerting rise in vigilante activities in South Africa. The interviewees recommend several interventions to reduce corruption and crime in the SAPS. SAPS policies and procedures, disciplinary processes and promotions policies are discussed with the specialists, managers and policemen behind bars. The current problems in the SAPS must be viewed within the context of South Africa’s socio-political history and the unique challenges this presents. It functions in a developing country that has experienced significant political transformation since 1994. Within decades the SAPS transformed and now employs and promotes people from all cultural, ethnic and racial groups to reflect the “rainbow nation”. Affirmative action has caused discontent amongst white and coloured police members, who are especially angered and demoralised by the promotions system. These issues cannot be ignored. The interviewees brought them up repeatedly. Because the primary focus of the empirical study was the Western Cape, the contribution of gang-soaked environments to police criminality is explored and illustrated. The high levels of police criminality in this social environment are a cause for concern. Many SAPS employees are easily drawn into corruption by gangsters luring them with offers of an easy and continuous supply of cash in return for protection against arrest. In developed countries such as Australia, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, policing is a status position and a conscious career choice, staffed by people with suitable qualifications and a high level of professionalism. In South Africa, which has a significant unemployment problem and where job opportunities are scarce, people join the SAPS merely for a source of income, rather than as a conscious career choice. Because of this, one cannot in all respects compare the extent and causes of police criminality in other countries with what is experienced in South Africa, and import all of the foreign agencies’ interventions. Both local and xiv
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international experts agree, however, that a common denominator in reducing police crime is excellent management. The SAPS is a structure that has to be properly managed. Police management can play a pivotal role in both encouraging and reducing deviance in their ranks. It is unfair to blame all the woes of any police organisation on its management, but many of their actions facilitate, enable and perpetuate police criminality. As highlighted often in this study, police misconduct, corruption and criminality exist in all police organisations, varying only in extent and the determination of leaders to deal with the problem. The SAPS has a distinct disadvantage. The last three national police commissioners have been political appointees without a clue about policing, who did and do not understand the complex organisation and were or are probably set up to fail. In established democracies, it is unheard of that a political appointee is trusted with running a policing organisation. It is understood that this allows politicians to direct the decision-making of the police force and to abuse the organisation. It is essential that SAPS management learn from other police organisations such as the Metropolitan Police in London and the NYPD, which have been down the very long road of dealing with corruption scandals and implementing preventative measures. The managements of these organisations have addressed the problem. They have blown the lid off and cleaned out the contents. Corruption can never be eradicated but it can be managed. The SAPS urgently needs to make a start by implementing an effective anti-corruption strategy – there has been one on the table in different forms since 1999 and it needs to be fully implemented – as well as establishing an independent anti-corruption investigative unit. Immediate interventions must include establishing an independent judicial commission of inquiry into the SAPS. Although there has been a clarion call for a commission of inquiry into police brutality as a result of many recent attacks on citizens, these are only the symptoms of the general malady within the organisation. What is required is an inquiry into all aspects of policing – from SAPS management to its lowest ranks and an understanding of the pervasive criminality within the organisation before recommendations to stem the scourge are made and enforced. Liza Grobler, April 2013
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Police Corruption across the Globe
Police Corruption across the Globe
Police Corruption across the Globe
A New York Police Department (NYPD) captain, a strict disciplinarian, reported all wrongdoing he had heard about or uncovered to the department’s Internal Affairs Bureau. He was moved to thirty-eight commands during his career and his reputation preceded him to every precinct to which he was posted. His locker was burned, his tyres slashed and he received threats of physical harm. Another NYPD officer, transferred from the Internal Affairs Bureau to a detective squad, was harassed by his new colleagues. Dead rats were placed on his windscreen, his property was stolen or damaged and his colleagues made it clear that they would not help if he was in danger. There have been instances where officers have taken the blame and punishment for the deviant actions of their colleagues – fearing that the penalty for breaking the code of silence would be far worse than the penalty for misconduct.5 Then there is Frank Serpico, the iconic cop who blew the whistle on widespread corruption in the NYPD in 1971. He was shot in a drug raid in 1971, under suspicious circumstances. Colleagues with him at the scene refused to provide back up or to get medical attention for him after he was shot in the face. Serpico survived the shooting and testified against his colleagues at the Knapp Commission into police corruption in 1972. He was the first police officer in the history of the NYPD to report and testify in public about systemic corrupt payoffs to officers from criminals amounting to millions of dollars. Police criminality is not unique to South Africa. A New York police officer was convicted in March following a bizarre plot to kidnap, torture, kill and eat women. 1
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There was no evidence that Gilberto Valle harmed any of the women he was accused of plotting to kill. But prosecutors argued that the officer took actual steps to further his plot, like conducting surveillance on potential victims. Valle faces life in prison for one count of kidnapping conspiracy. The NYPD fired him when he was convicted.6 Extreme crimes such as cannibalism are rare among police officers, but they certainly do kidnap, rape, torture and murder. Police organisations in developed democracies estimate that between 0.5 per cent to one per cent of officers are engaged in criminal activity. Unearthing the extent of police criminality is a good place to start; many police organisations across the globe fail to deal with the problem adequately. Australia’s New South Wales Police Service, London’s Metropolitan Police and the NYPD all grapple with criminality in their ranks. During interviews conducted with senior officials in these organisations, they shared details of the extent of corruption in their ranks; the types of crimes committed; their preventative measures to combat corruption; investigative capacity and the disciplinary and judicial measures used to punish police offenders.
NEW SOUTH WALES: IDIOT OFFENCES ARE THE NORM The commander of the Employee Management Branch of the New South Wales Police Force in Sydney estimates that about two per cent of the service is corrupt. Its staff complement is 19 879 – there are 15 977 police officers and 3 902 civilian staff. Common crimes committed by police officers include driving under the influence, theft, shoplifting, assault, perverting the course of justice and misusing police computers, often to dig up information about an ex-wife or girlfriend’s new partner. Bribery is not a big problem and there are rare prosecutions for perjury. It is practically unheard of in the force for police officers to accept payment in return for a favour. The commander says most officers are prosecuted for minor, “idiot” offences, although there is occasionally a major corruption case. According to the Police Integrity Commission’s annual report for 2011/2012, most investigations undertaken against police officers in the New South Wales Police Force ranged from the improper association with criminals (twenty-one cases) to accessing information to sell or for personal gain (six cases). 2
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Police Corruption across the Globe
There were also investigations into unspecified offences punishable upon conviction by a maximum sentence of five years or more (sixteen cases), and the unauthorised or improper disclosure of information (fifteen cases) – actions that resulted in, amongst other things, investigations being compromised and officers and the community being placed in danger. There were twelve cases of misuse of authority for the personal benefit of an associate, including obtaining sexual favours. There were ten cases of covering up inappropriate conduct and eight of bribery. Ongoing investigations into serious police misconduct in the New South Wales Police Force, some which started in 2007, include probes into fraud, money laundering, involvement in illegal immigration activity and drugrelated allegations. Drug-related investigations are relatively common and some have exotic code names, such as Operation Shabti which was launched in 2011 and probed allegations of drug use, drug supply, improper associations with criminal elements and the release of confidential information. Criminal charges were laid against a police officer and two civilians after the investigation. Operation Lantana nabbed an officer who was sentenced to a minimum prison term of thirteen months. The sentencing details of another person caught in this investigation for stealing and selling drugs have been suppressed. The operation also uncovered offences relating to stealing and selling tobacco, using criminal associates. The Police Integrity Commission’s report also noted that 1 005 complaints of misconduct were assessed in 2011/2012 against current and former New South Wales Police Force officers. There were 187 investigations and five full investigations that led to referrals to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. In three of these cases, prosecution has commenced.7 The commander says there is usually a strong denial by officers of wrongdoing even in the face of overwhelming evidence, such as audio or video recordings made during integrity testing. Many corrupt officers who are caught blame their actions on stress or the pressure of the job. Personal problems are also blamed for deviant behaviour. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder prevails among officers in the New South Wales Police Force. Violent crime is frequently committed against police officers. The force permanently loses approximately seventy-three officers a month due to stress and about 1 100 officers are absent from work each day because of stress. The commander says that he does not believe that deviance amongst 3
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officers is linked to financial gain because these officers are the highest paid in Australia. The New South Wales Police Force has good grievance procedures and its managers are tasked with distinguishing between a misconduct complaint and a grievance about events in the workplace. They are encouraged to settle minor workplace complaints as quickly as possible. Matters that need to be reported or investigated are those that may result in action that includes a reduction of rank, reduction in salary grade or a deferral of salary increase. At station level, managers may reprimand officers or order increased supervision or counselling. Misdemeanours may also result in transfers, restricted duties or shift changes. The skills level amongst commanders responsible for managing conduct and performance is low, which is being addressed with training. But, the commander points out that an inadequate grievance procedure leads to heightened stress levels and increased sick leave, not criminality. The New South Wales Police Force’s promotions policy is a huge source of dissatisfaction. Police officers are allegedly promoted on merit, not seniority, and they can only apply to become commissioned officers after nine years’ service. Officers can study as much as they like, this does not influence promotion. They are responsible for the costs of their training. Promotion procedures are not always followed, which leads to dissatisfaction. For example, Internal Affairs selected and promoted their own staff, which is totally against the rules. All criminal allegations levelled against officers in the New South Wales Police Force must be investigated as criminal matters. Police officers investigate allegations against their colleagues, but serious offences have to be assigned to another region. Crimes can be dealt with departmentally and in the courts, but only after a criminal investigation has been completed. Officers who are not punished at a criminal trial will face a departmental hearing. If there is enough evidence against a police officer, but a decision is made not to prosecute, permission must be obtained from a superior – above the rank of assistant commissioner. A decision not to prosecute may be discretionary, based on questions asked according to the New South Wales Police Force’s Decision Making Framework. An ombudsman oversees all investigations. The Professional Standards Command is responsible for investigating all serious criminal and corruption allegations against police officers. They are also responsible for conducting integrity tests and promoting professionalism. 4
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The Police Integrity Commission’s functions and powers include the prevention, detection and investigation of serious police misconduct. It manages other agencies in the detection and investigation of police misconduct.
LONDON’S MET: BREAKING THE CODE OF SILENCE An attempt was made to measure the extent of corruption and criminality at the Metropolitan Police in London about ten years ago. At that stage, deviance at the Met was acquisitive, officers made money from activities such as stealing drugs, recycling drugs, selling information, stealing money during searches and taking bribes for favours. There is an understanding in the United Kingdom that public-consent policing requires an answerable and transparent system. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) brings this philosophy to its investigations of major incidents of corruption and crime involving the police. When it was established in 2004, the IPCC began its task by compiling a list of names of officers suspected of being corrupt. Through their surveillance on corrupt associates, they estimated that between 0.5 per cent and one per cent of officers had gone bad. Approximately one per cent of staff of a major police force is engaged in criminal activity and corruption, one per cent of staff deal with the problem and it costs one per cent of the police budget to bring them to book. “This was pretty accurate ten years ago, but in the Met today, this figure is probably not accurate because corruption has again gone from being organised teams to solitary people,” says a former director of investigations at the IPCC. “Organised gangs of internal corrupt officers are easy to see because of the nature of their interactions, it is relatively easy to deal with and relatively easy to wipe out. Today, it is single individuals responsible for most of the corruption, which is more difficult to detect. The process has metamorphosed.” Typical crimes committed by police officers at the Met include ripping off drug dealers and recycling the drugs through informers for money. One crew gave dealers an option: “we can leave here now with you and the drugs, or we can leave with just the drugs.” The dealer will attempt to act the innocent: “what drugs? – don’t know what you are talking about.” Stealing cash from criminals and selling information are crimes commonly committed by corrupt officers. Two major scandals involving Met officers 5
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selling information recently hit the headlines across the world and one sparked a commission of inquiry. A Scotland Yard detective and three former Met officers were arrested in May 2012 following an investigation into allegations that serving officers had collected £20 000 in bribes from private investigators. In exchange, they provided information about a police inquiry into a Nigerian politician who had allegedly defrauded his government of more than £150 million.8 The phone-hacking scandal precipitated a criminal investigation and a commission of inquiry. A senior detective from Scotland Yard’s Counter Terrorism Command was convicted in January 2013 of trying to sell information about the investigation into the phone-hacking scandal to the tabloid News of the World. The detective solicited funds in exchange for information, but the newspaper did not print the story offered and no money changed hands.9 The Los Angeles Times later reported that two other Met officers – both serving in the Specialist Crime and Operations command – were arrested in Operation Elveden on suspicion of corruption after they had provided information to the Sun newspaper in exchange for money.10 The former director believes that taking bribes and shakedowns are not a significant problem at the Met, but they do happen. An officer will, for example, accept £30 in exchange for not giving a breath test for driving under the influence of alcohol. The units most susceptible to corruption and criminality include those working with drugs and intelligence. There is major corruption in units dealing with organised crime. The Met call informers Covert Human Intelligence Sources. An affinity, akin to the Stockholm Syndrome, can develop between informers and their handlers. This can manifest in several problems, such as allowing informers to become agent provocateurs, giving them a licence for criminal behaviour and taking kickbacks on rewards. This relationship is now heavily regulated and the Met’s police forces have dedicated source-handling units. “The complaints department in the Met a few years ago was not equipped to deal with the type of arrogant group of experienced and able detectives who thought they were untouchable,” says the former director of investigations at the IPCC. “They had people handling complaints with no detective background and even the investigators were not skilled in investigating. The people who worked there were tired and they were looked upon as inept, there was no fear by corrupt officers. The philosophy was that if someone complained 6
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about corruption, they would investigate – but obviously not too many people complained because it usually benefits both parties involved.” The IPCC receives only the “top end” of complaints against officers. Up to ninety per cent of complaints throughout the forty-two police forces in England and Wales are dealt with by the forces themselves. Investigations into complaints of assault, corruption, deaths in custody and discriminatory behaviour are managed by the IPCC. In 2004, the year the IPCC became operational, they investigated thirty serious cases, including three police shootings and twenty-one police-related deaths. In 2012 the IPCC investigated 126 serious cases including two fatal shootings by police officers; fifteen deaths in, or following, police custody and forty-seven deaths following contact with police officers. Most of the deaths were as a result of drink, drugs and mental health issues, not police conduct. The IPCC has a staff complement of 425 – there are 121 investigators (including investigators, deputy senior investigators and senior investigators). It uses police resources for investigations, but remains in charge of inquiries, giving the investigators daily instructions. In 2004 the IPCC managed 126 cases and supervised about 600 cases. In 2012 it managed thirty-three cases, conducted 130 additional independent investigations and supervised 171 cases. Many complaints are returned to the police forces when the IPCC declines to investigate and proposes that they are handled at police station level. The Police Reform Act mandates that serious matters must be referred to the IPCC immediately after they occur. There are six managers on call day and night to attend to situations that arise and to provide police officers with assistance in dealing with them. There is little confrontation; the police appreciate the IPCC’s expertise. But the relationship is hardly cosy; police officers know that the IPCC is a hard taskmaster. The former director believes that people join the service for the best of reasons, not to be corrupt. During his policing career, he estimates that he has come across only about twenty cases where his suspicions were aroused that there had been intent from the start to commit corruption. Factors that lead to deviance at the Met include the erosion of officers’ norms and values, moral rot, and downward cycles of behaviour and greed (although not as a result of poor wages). Police officers become cynical and justify their behaviour through the 7
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belief that, “‘I’m a £40 000 (a year) constable, and I’m raiding the houses of criminals who are virtual millionaires. They have everything and when I charge them and take them to court, clever lawyers get them off. Where’s the justification in this? I can have some of that’,” the former director says. Drinking has become less of a problem at the Met, but drugs are an issue. “Pills are the new pints,” the former director says, particularly among young male and female officers. The police recruit from society, which has an ambivalent attitude towards the social use of drugs. Macho attitudes are also an issue. The former director says that when he was dealing with corruption at the Met, in all but one instance the suspects were men. The case involving the woman was peripheral corruption that was never proven; 99.9 per cent of allegations made are against men. This is largely due to the male police culture, which includes hard living, aggression, hard drinking and womanising. The former director suggests that an anti-corruption team consisting only of women should be established. “There is something really macho about being known by a small group of guys that you know and trust, that you are a big player, you just had off £20 000. There is credibility in that,” he says. “When you are introduced to new officers, they test you. If you are not of the same persuasion as them, they out you – get rid of you.” He says he experienced this form of pressure as a young constable. Good and bad police officers cannot work together. The code of silence among officers is diminishing in the Met. “Recently a guy was arrested and handcuffed behind his back, on the ground, for stealing a car,” the former director says. “A member walked up to him and kicked him in the head. The officer’s two colleagues virtually arrested him on the scene and reported him. They are prepared to go to court and give evidence against him. This is happening more often.” The culture is changing because the former director and his colleagues introduced a strategy giving officers methods, systems and the security to testify against deviants in the force. As it becomes understood that there is no space for the “stupid, schoolboy code of silence, it becomes far more difficult to do anything devious, therefore opportunities diminish,” he says. Bad apples, lone rangers and organised crime networks all exist in the force. When the Met lost control of their transfer policy this made it easier for corrupt members and their colleagues in crime networks to be transferred together to another police station. When the former director was an assistant commissioner at the Met, he 8
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“got flack” from everyone. Senior officers denied that there was a problem, or suggested that he was wrecking the force’s reputation. Initially, the Met’s leadership was disbelieving of the extent of the problem. The corruption exposed ranged from sharing envelopes containing £10 amongst vice officers in the office on a Friday night to being far more covert, with a much higher price. Police crime was buried deep and the vast majority of the force did not know what was happening. The mafia was not the only organisation with omerta, it existed at the Met as well – among corrupt officers. The former director says the Met’s leadership is generally not good at dealing with corruption. The leadership generally denies that the problem exists; attempts to dismiss it as something that does not involve them, or are such poor leaders that they are incapable of dealing with it. He says that every police agency has a corruption problem – they should be honest enough to admit to this. Speaking in general terms, corrupt police officers have a profile, he says. They are usually in their late twenties or early thirties; probably divorced at least once; womanisers; heavy drinkers; overweight; unfit; and probably highly experienced detectives. One detective recorded how he descended into crime, and his account was subsequently used to train rookie members and officers joining special squads. He had a stressful private life, two incomes became one when his wife fell pregnant. Mortgages rocketed at the same time and his debt grew. The detective joined an elite drugs squad consisting mainly of “macho men” who drank heavily after their shifts and went home late. Naturally, his wife became aggrieved, and he turned to his male friends for support – which of course led to more late nights, more drinking and financial problems. Along came temptation and he took it. In a matter of months, he was running his own racket. The most valuable commodity a police force has is its reputation. In any society that polices by consent and values, a valuable reputation determines the consent of the population to be policed. Police criminality has direct consequences on all of society. It has financial consequences as well. The estimated cost to the UK public following a drug sting that involved “noble-cause” corruption, was £40 million in failed prosecutions and in compensation for people who could make a case for being wrongfully prosecuted. Police organisations risk their futures by allowing downward spirals of behaviour to continue. The challenge that faced the former director and his colleagues was how 9
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to get the Met’s management to accept the obvious problem of corruption. “I often hear the phrase that corruption is ‘cyclical’. It is not cyclical; it is there all the time. It seems to raise its head in cycles and the police react to it in cycles and push it down again to the level where the service says ‘it has gone’. They think it has gone and they take away those resources (to deal with corruption) and use them in dealing with other policing priorities,” he says. Periodic deployment of resources to deal with corruption is futile because it is expensive and not strategic. The Met employed a strategy, so that when there was an erosion of resources because there was greater need elsewhere, something was in place to detect corruption and prevent it happening. One strand of their strategy is inclusion: to communicate to senior and middle management that they are part of the response that will from time to time deal with suspected problems in their units. “How you deal with it is up to you, but you will be watched and tested and measured on it and your future advancement will take how you dealt with these matters into account,” the former director says. He was also instrumental in reversing the pervasive philosophy that complaints investigation was for the “slightly off the pace, tired, backwater people. ‘This became the place to invest your upwardly mobile people, the chief constables of tomorrow. This has come to be. People have been seen to be rewarded for their success in dealing with corruption. This goes back to the importance of reputation,’” he says. Officers suspected of being corrupt are given targeted integrity tests (the two types of integrity tests are explained on page 15). The Met began with random integrity tests, the only way to judge the honesty of the average officer, “to put temptation in their way and see how they react. We did a series of random integrity tests that are still continuing today,” the former director says. “These tests were not done in a connived manner. They were done with public oversight. On almost every occasion the officers passed with flying colours. For example, if they found £50 on the pavement they would hand it in, if somebody said there were drugs behind a dustbin in the street, they would hand them in.” A specialist unit from the Professional Standards Department conducts the integrity tests. “This is a change from a sleepy, reactive, off-the-pace, retrospective, don’t-bother-us-too-much-we-are-snoozing department, into an aggressive, forward thinking, dynamic, proactive, innovative organisation,” the former director says. The Met’s integrity-testing strategy is aimed at both the corruptor and the 10
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corrupted, because this is not just a problem in the police force. Criminals who lose access to a corrupt police officer who is arrested will recruit another officer. A successful sting followed a tip-off from two officers who had been approached with an offer and reported it. They were told to go along with it under strict conditions, with a tape recorder and a video. The corruptor was arrested and charged. Complaints are checked carefully as they are warning signals that can indicate that there is a problem officer. The former director cites an officer against whom there had been several complaints of assault. This policeman was “huge”. When doors needed to be kicked open, he was used. He waded through people to stop them from flushing drugs down the toilet; he was effective. “Tough cops do tough jobs, and get tough complaints,” the former director says. Complaints must be handled fairly. He believes police forces need Professional Standards Departments, equipped to respond adequately to the reactive and proactive work required. A member of the drug squad, for example, cannot possibly investigate a colleague in his unit. By insisting that corruption is “everybody’s problem”, the Met expects that when officers discover that a colleague is corrupt, they realise that it is their duty to report it. A “ghost squad” created by the former director and colleagues in the 1990s to establish the extent of corruption at the Met, and to deal with it, did not testify in court when its work was done. It was an intelligence-gathering outfit. Traditionally, the police would bring officers suspected of being corrupt into the station, tell them that they were not obliged to say anything and ask, “you are corrupt, aren’t you?” at the outset. “This is pathetic, this doesn’t work,” the former director says. And so a ghost squad was conceived. The layers of secrecy that protected it while it set about its task was unprecedented. Officers of undoubted integrity were recruited into the squad. They “resigned” from the police force; they were even removed from the payroll before they regrouped at a secret location. For three years, they conducted intelligence in all its forms: they spent hours conducting surveillance and intercepting communications. They began to establish how corruption worked in London. What were the commodities, the methods on both sides? Which police officers were involved? Who were the corruptors? 11
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The ghost squad did not react to the information it amassed. They built up cases until the Met knew with certainty who was corrupt: which police officer and which criminal. They established how the corruption was committed, and what the scams were. Then they handed the information over to an overt squad, who used it to gather evidence to take to court. More Met officers are being convicted for corruption now than ever before, and they are receiving custodial sentences ranging from ten years to eighteen years. Pensions are forfeited by those found guilty, except when they are married. The Met is in a far better position to detect and deal with corruption today because they have controls in place, but the problem has not gone away. The Met has a drug-testing regime, premised on a carrot and stick approach: if an officer declares a drug problem, it will be treated as a medical problem. If the organisation detects a drug problem, it is treated as misconduct. The UK police are considering introducing drug testing for officers, especially in the specialised units, but they have to consider issues including human rights and privacy. Counselling is a local police management option if the alleged offence is not too serious. Officers formally charged with misconduct appear before a tribunal. It is constituted according to the gravity of the misconduct. The tribunal has penalty options, which might stop short of a dismissal or requiring the member to resign. Officers charged with the gratuitous assault of a prisoner are entitled to legal representation at the tribunals, because they face the loss of their livelihoods. If serious charges are brought, Met officers can be suspended with immediate effect before the hearing. The disciplinary system in the UK police is terrible. It is based on a military court martial regime and is very legalistic. There have been two studies about the failures of misconduct inquiries at the Met, the Taylor Review and the Morris Review. In a recent case, Queen’s Counsel (QC) appeared for two police officers charged with misconduct offences. Because the defence had hired QCs, the Met also instructed a QC. �This is crazy,� the former director says.
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NEW YORK: ACTING CLASSES TO WEED OUT CROOKED COPS The chief of the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) believes that when corruption becomes a problem in a police organisation, it is very difficult for commanders to control their officers. This also results in the community losing confidence in the police force; which in turn undermines the ability of the police to fight crime. The NYPD experiences a major “corruption-eruption” approximately every twenty years. After some of these scandals, commissions of inquiry were established and suggested a wide range of reforms to be implemented. The Mollen Commission in the 1990s found that the police corruption and crime it uncovered was worse than what was exposed by the Knapp Commission twenty years earlier. As a result of this, it recognised that corruption is inherent in policing and that there is a need for sustained efforts to combat the problem. The IAB was formed in 1993, as a result of a recommendation by the Mollen Commission. Its mandate is to investigate allegations of corruption and serious misconduct against NYPD officers. The IAB only investigates complaints considered serious, defined by the question: “if the complaint is found to be true, will the officer in question lose his or her job?” International research was conducted as part of the process of establishing the IAB. A pertinent finding that emerged was that a proactive approach is necessary if police corruption is to be addressed effectively. Most police organisations wait until they receive a complaint of corruption or crime before they take any action. They do not implement change until there is a crisis. Reactive approaches are not adequate to deal with corruption, primarily because it involves two guilty parties, neither of which will want to report on the other. There are often no witnesses to some corruption, such as theft from a crime scene. Sometimes, when complaints are received, investigators only have the complainant’s word against the officer. Lie detector tests are not used in IAB investigations, as they are not admissible in court. The NYPD believes that an independent and well-resourced internal investigative police unit is the most effective and efficient structure for addressing police corruption and crime. These structures have to be staffed with police officers who are intimately familiar with the culture of the organisation. Such officers are best placed to identify and collect evidence against corrupt colleagues and to ensure that necessary criminal or disciplinary processes are instituted. 13
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Over the past ten years, the NYPD has grown by forty-two per cent to a force of 55 000 officers – 34 500 of them in the uniformed component – as other policing agencies in New York were merged into it. During this decade, there has been a fifty per cent decrease in complaints of serious misconduct and corruption and a sixty per cent decline in police shootings, despite the massive increase in the size of the force. Complaints received by the IAB after its launch related mainly to narcotics, such as officers stealing and using drugs, and associating with known criminals. The bureau introduced measures to rectify the problem, including drug-screening tests as a requirement for all new recruits to the NYPD. Drug tests are conducted on all officers who are promoted or transferred. Random drug testing has been introduced into all precincts with the aim of testing at least twenty per cent of all officers at all levels of seniority every year. By 2005 the chief of the bureau had been tested five times since his appointment seven years earlier, as a result of random selection. Since these measures were introduced, drug-related allegations against NYPD officers have declined. There is an emerging trend of NYPD officers’ involvement in organised crime such as accident insurance fraud. This involves attorneys, medical practitioners and people who stage accidents or submit insurance claims when there has been no accident. Officers involved in this type of fraud receive kickbacks to fill out false accident reports and enter them into the system; assisting people to submit fraudulent insurance claims. The IAB has conducted substantial research into why police officers are corrupt by conducting surveys and interviewing officers who have been caught. After officers are nabbed for corruption they are given an opportunity to cooperate with the bureau. This can include an agreement to be interviewed about their motives, methods and who else is involved, and assisting with undercover operations against corrupt colleagues. Many officers who are caught choose to cooperate, as this will be taken into consideration when they are sentenced. The interviews conducted with corrupt officers reveal that the predominant reasons for their criminality include greed, an opportunity that presented itself and the belief that they will not be caught. From the research into officers involved in deviance, only one significant correlating variable emerged: corrupt police officers who are found guilty of their crimes are unlikely to have much formal education. A lack of higher 14
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education was the only factor that directly correlated with being found guilty of corruption or police brutality. Factors such as race, gender, ethnicity, age and length of service did not significantly correlate with being found guilty of corruption. A unit was established by the IAB to respond both proactively and reactively to corruption. The reactive approach is receiving and investigating all serious complaints against police officers. To do this, the bureau has a team of investigators on standby twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year. They analyse information from complaints and other sources to identify problem officers or units where there is problematic behaviour. After officers suspected of corruption have been identified and their modus operandi established, integrity tests are conducted with the intention of securing evidence against them. An integrity test consists of creating an artificial situation replicating the normal, day-to-day situations police officers face that tests their honesty. Officers are presented with an opportunity to commit misconduct or corruption without realising that they are being secretly and closely monitored. There are two types of integrity tests. A targeted test is conducted against specific officers or groups of officers when information becomes available about problematic behaviour. Random integrity tests are conducted at any place or time against any officers. The tests range from once-off engagements to more sophisticated, longer operations. Officers are never informed that their integrity is being tested and these tests happen at every precinct within the NYPD at least once a year. The IAB does not inform officers if they pass integrity tests. If they fail, they will find out when the evidence is presented to them. The consequences of failing a test depends on the offence committed. It may lead to internal disciplinary steps or additional training if police regulations were not followed. Criminal acts discovered during integrity tests will be prosecuted in court. An example of a random integrity test is staging a car accident, and one of the drivers is taken away from the scene for medical attention. The officer being tested is left behind with the vehicle, given the responsibility of listing an inventory of its contents and ensuring its safekeeping. Items of value will be placed in the car, such as money or narcotics – anything IAB agents believe police officers have a propensity to steal. A hidden camera is placed in the car to monitor whether the officer succumbs to temptation. These tests help establish baselines for the conduct of officers. Perfunctory 15
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random tests, such as an undercover agent handing to a police officer a “lost wallet” containing a large amount of money, no longer work – most officers suspect these incidents are integrity tests. A key to the success of integrity tests is that officers are not aware that they are being tested. A random test that worked followed geographical mapping of complaints against police officers, which suggested that there were property-related thefts near a hospital in a precinct. Several items were placed in a bag, including a local newspaper, a book, shopping coupons and cash. An undercover officer dressed as a nurse approached a police officer passing the hospital and handed him the bag. She pretended that it had been left at the hospital and that she wanted to hand it to the police for safekeeping. This allowed the bureau to identify police officers predisposed to theft and to catch them red-handed. Targeted tests take longer to set up as the IAB may have to monitor suspected officers before they pounce. One example is the bureau renting an apartment and placing two of its officers there, pretending to be a married couple. The bureau’s officers established themselves for a while before the sting was set in motion, so that their neighbours could attest to any police officer – the target of an integrity test may check – that they had been living together for a while. Over the course of a few weeks the undercover officers staged several domestic disputes. Initially, the officers who attended the scene could diffuse the situation, establishing a sense of familiarity with the squabbling couple. One day, the officers arrived at the apartment after being called out to find that the woman had been assaulted and the man had fled. The woman found an excuse to leave the officers alone in the apartment. Valuable items and cash were left lying about. This was a very successful operation; the corrupt officers did not know that they were being recorded. Site surveys are conducted at different times of the day before an integrity test is carried out. This allows IAB officers to establish whether plainclothes officers in the vicinity will uncover their intent – no one must be aware of an impending test as they could tip off fellow officers. The bureau’s undercover officers, known as ghost officers, and their protectors have to ensure that they blend in to the demographics of the areas in which they are operating. The bureau always informs prosecutors of their integrity tests, to receive legal advice and ensure that their undercover operations do not break entrapment laws. In New York, you may provide an opportunity for people to commit crimes, but cannot entice or coerce them into it. 16
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The prosecutors also assist when undercover officers are arrested along with the suspects. They will be held in cells and charged as though they are also suspects so as not to tip off the rogue police officers that have been caught in an integrity test. The head of a police union once complained that his members were unhappy with the tests and demanded that they stop. “We told him that we would not stop and that we were going to increase the number of tests conducted,” says the chief of the IAB. The union boss then threatened to tell his members that these tests were happening and that they should always only act in accordance with the regulations (the implied threat was that the bureau would have no purpose). The IAB did not object to this message being spread among police officers. The bureau does not like to reveal how many integrity tests it conducts each year. They prefer to be feared as omnipresent. They want to make it impossible for officers to tell whether they are being tested or not during their daily activities. Columbia University conducted a survey in which they asked NYPD officers how many integrity tests they thought were conducted each year. The officers believed that there were about 6 000 tests annually. The actual amount is closer to 1 000 annual tests. The integrity tests allow the IAB to detect on average about twelve to thirteen criminal failures (where a police officer breaks the law during the exercise) every year. Due to the conclusive nature of the evidence collected against them – often video evidence – most of these officers realise they have little chance of being acquitted. They plead guilty to the charges and resign from the NYPD. There are about twenty-three to thirty administrative failures (where officers fail to follow regulations and are guilty of misconduct) detected annually. These are prosecuted through the internal disciplinary system with a ninety per cent to ninety-five per cent successful conviction rate. About six to seven supervisory failures (where commanders fail integrity tests for not fulfilling their supervisory responsibilities) are detected each year. These are referred to the internal disciplinary system, and there is currently a 100 per cent conviction rate. The IAB seeks to recruit investigators with high levels of integrity. Police officers cannot volunteer for the bureau; they can only be drafted into it. The bureau attempts to recruit the most qualified, talented and diverse people. Officers selected are subjected to a stringent screening process. This includes 17
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financial checks for debt or other financial problems that could be used to weaken them to undue influence. Their lifestyles are also examined and they are given drug tests. The IAB recruits investigators who can fit into any neighbourhood. Ideal candidates are people who can think on their feet and are able to role-play or act out different characters. The bureau has also recruited an acting teacher who works with undercover officers and prepares them for their roles before they go undercover. Much of the learning process of new recruits into the bureau is by trial and error. They are constantly evaluated to determine what kinds of roles they can play and what types of assignments they handle best. It is important that they are able to look and act like a person who is not a police officer. People who speak different languages or employ different accents are valued. “There was one officer who could speak with a thick Jamaican accent and he was very successful in trapping corrupt officers,” says the chief of the IAB. New recruits are trained at an academy for six months. One week is dedicated to training on ethics, which includes ethical decision-making, ethical dilemmas, integrity, discipline, law and receiving gifts. They are also taught to make decisions about the use of force and how the NYPD’s disciplinary system works. Police regulations on the use of force are more restrictive than those that apply to the rest of society. Officers are taught about “graduating levels” of force in response to various situations. IAB recruits are also trained to conduct integrity tests and are shown videos of successful operations against corrupt officers. Before they graduate, recruits must score 100 per cent in two examinations, on the use of force and on handling ethical dilemmas. The tests may be rewritten if the high pass mark is not achieved. Although the IAB believes that only a small percentage of police officers are bad apples who commit crime and corruption, it is still a huge problem for the NYPD. With a force of 55 000 officers, one per cent represents 550 problematic officers. The IAB’s task is to let these officers know that there is a real chance of them being caught. When the warning is not heeded, the bureau’s job is to catch those involved in serious misconduct and corruption. Training on ethical conduct does not end when recruits leave the police academy. NYPD officers receive in-service training throughout their careers. Every time officers are promoted they receive training to ensure that they can handle the increased responsibility. New managers learn about ethical 18
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dilemmas they may face in a programme called “It’s your move, Sarge!” The course includes screening footage of integrity tests performed on managers who failed to act ethically. An Integrity Review Board meets periodically to determine which officers display a high level of integrity (potentially, by repeatedly passing random integrity tests). These officers are brought before the board and offered choice assignments or transfers that could lead to promotion into more senior positions. No financial or tangible rewards are offered to prevent suggestions that officers need to be paid to have integrity. When gifts are offered to officers, it must be ascertained whether there are ulterior motives. The NYPD has an internal mandate that, in the course of duty, gifts cannot be accepted. A Board of Ethics will make a ruling before a gift can be accepted. A judgement has to be made when being offered a cup of tea while on police business and when invited for a meal at a fancy restaurant. A distinction must be made between normal social interactions and trying to persuade officers to do something unethical in the performance of their duties. The chief of the IAB believes that increasing police salaries will not reduce corruption. Both the Knapp and Mollen commissions of inquiry into police corruption recommended that salaries be increased. These were the only recommendations of the commissions that were not implemented. Officers in the NYPD who are not able to make ends meet on their salaries take second jobs. The starting salary for a NYPD police rookie is $34 970 a year. There is, of course, a small minority that will attempt to steal or become involved in corruption to make extra money, hence the need for the IAB. The board uses several indicators to determine the public’s perception of police corruption. Citizen satisfaction surveys are conducted regularly and include questions about interactions with police officers that may be perceived as corruption or is, in fact, criminal behaviour. The surveys are supplemented by officer engagements with community structures that the bureau attends to gauge perceptions of the public towards the police. The IAB uses field associates – regular police officers in each of the New York City precincts – who are contacted once a month by an IAB officer and quizzed about their perceptions of, and the activities of, officers at their stations. The NYPD’s internal disciplinary system is a formal system for correcting the behaviour, or dismissing, problem officers. As they are paramilitary structures, policing organisations are typically very rule-driven and the 19
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disciplinary system has to ensure that the rules are taken seriously. There is command-level discipline that holds supervisors responsible for ensuring that the general regulations are upheld. There are two schedules of offences at this level. Schedule A offences are minor violations (for example losing police property or dress-code violations). Schedule B offences are more serious and include losing a police badge (which a criminal could use to impersonate a police officer). For more serious offences, formal charges are drafted by an in-house advocate and presented to accused officers. Serious misconduct includes offences such as police officers associating with known criminals. The officers who are charged are afforded an opportunity to obtain legal representation for their defence. Formal hearings are held, presided over by an administrative judge. The presiding officers of internal disciplinary hearings report only to the chief of the NYPD. In some instances police managers instigate disciplinary hearings, but most are convened by the IAB. When convicted of criminal offences, police officers will immediately be dismissed. For minor crimes, an internal “court martial” will be held. The disciplinary system plays an important role in training, correcting behaviour and removing criminal officers from the department. The system is in place to protect the interests of the organisation. Discipline must be fast, equitable, sure and certain. The Commission to Combat Police Corruption reviews all disciplinary cases that involve uniformed members of the NYPD to ascertain whether the penalties imposed match the misconduct committed. It reviewed 614 disciplinary cases adjudicated between October 2010 and September 2011. Serious off-duty misconduct cases included sixty-one alcoholrelated cases, nineteen firearm-related cases and eighty-four domestic incidents. The commission expressed concern about discipline imposed in falsestatement cases because officers who commit perjury, make an official false statement or falsify documents impair the NYPD’s credibility. Not only does this negatively affect their usefulness as witnesses in court; when civilians become aware of these crimes the integrity of the entire police department is affected, the commission says. It reviewed 128 of these cases and hoped that the severe discipline imposed served as a deterrent to other officers contemplating lying to cover up the misconduct of their colleagues – a huge step taken to pierce the “blue wall of silence”. 20
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The Commission to Combat Police Corruption monitors the IAB to ensure that it sticks to its mandate. The commission has not yet had to conduct an investigation into the bureau, but reviews its activities. They have prepared twenty reports on the standards of the bureau’s policies and practices and occasionally point out areas where improvements may be possible. Where the bureau agrees with the recommended improvements, these are implemented. They can present arguments about why they do not agree with recommendations and suggest alternative measures to deal with the issues raised.11 The IAB is not allowed to make their annual reports public, statistics can only be provided by the Commission to Combat Police Corruption. The commission’s annual report does not include information such as the number of complaints received by the IAB, the number of investigations conducted and their outcome. Attempts to access this information from both the IAB and the New York Mayor’s office proved fruitless. The commission only reviews select cases to ascertain whether the IAB is fulfilling its mandate. In 2011 it reviewed 164 disciplinary cases, sixty-three pending investigations and sixty-four closed-case investigations. It also examines pending IAB cases to monitor progress on investigations and to make recommendations – at a time when it is of most use. Pending IAB cases reviewed include missing property (thirty), criminal association (seventeen), excessive force (four), fraud (two), larceny (two), rape/other sex offences (two), driving while under the influence, off-duty employment, disclosing confidential information, drugs and perjury. The commission reviews closed cases to assess IAB investigations and to make recommendations for future investigations. Closed-case investigations include: missing property, criminal association (fourteen), planting evidence (four), excessive force (three), drug offences, robbery, driving while under the influence, making false statements, larceny, rape or other sex offences.12 The IAB reports only to the chief of the NYPD. No one else has any authority to interfere with its work. There are only two structures in the NYPD where the IAB is prevented from investigating cases of corruption or criminality: The office of the chief of the NYPD and the bureau itself. The Civilian Complaint Review Board is the largest civilian police oversight board in the United States with a staff of over 100 investigators and lawyers. The board is responsible for investigating complaints from the public and issuing policy recommendations. The NYPD has taken ownership of ethical problems; their managers 21
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are also subjected to integrity tests on the decisions they make. Managers’ advancement in the organisation is dependent on how they handle corruption problems.
TAKING ACTION The New South Wales Police Force, the London Metropolitan Police and the NYPD have similar experiences regarding the extent of corruption and criminality in their ranks and types of offences committed by members – predominantly drug-related crimes and theft. Greed and personal factors such as the erosion of morality and integrity, invincibility, personal problems and stress, elements of police culture and poor management contribute to corruption and crime. These police organisations all believe that salaries are not a contributing factor. Disciplinary procedures at police organisations are not merely instruments for corrective behaviour, but they also enable the agencies to get rid of corrupt members. Interventions focus primarily on practices such as integrity tests and drug testing. These three police forces recognise the importance of an internal independent investigative police unit. They all ensure that only the best candidates are selected for these units and trained to handle complaints and investigations against their colleagues. It is possible to reduce the incidence of police corruption and criminality if the problem is uncovered and dealt with, and suitable controls are put in place. These agencies have all weathered their corruption scandals, convened commissions of inquiry to examine them, identified the police crime in their ranks, identified those responsible, taken legal action and implemented controls. If they are honest, all police agencies will admit they have problems with corruption. It is how they deal with these problems that will determine the success of the organisation. Managers in these three police agencies have taken responsibility for, and ownership of, corruption and crime problems in their commands. These police agencies have accepted that corruption is an inherent part of policing and is perpetuated by individual, managerial and organisational weaknesses. Although police wrongdoing can probably not be totally eradicated from any police agency, it can be managed. 22
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Police Corruption across the Globe
Instead of treating whistle-blowers with contempt or denying corruption problems for fear of a scandal, these agencies have changed their mindsets towards police deviance. They have empowered staff to report corrupt colleagues by putting systems in place to enable this, and by supporting and encouraging this positive behaviour. This attitude has diminished negative elements of police culture such as the code of silence (although it certainly still exists) and, together with adequate controls, has lessened the opportunities for deviance. This is in sharp contrast to the SAPS’s response to criminality, which will be highlighted in the following chapters.
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