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Cuito Cuanavale
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Cuito Cuanavale Frontline Accounts by Soviet Soldiers
Edited by Gennady Shubin, Igor Zhdarkin, Vyacheslav Barabulya & Alexandra Kuznetsova-Timonova and translated from the Russian by Tamara Reilly
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First published by Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd in 2014 10 Orange Street Sunnyside Auckland Park 2092 South Africa +2711 628 3200 www.jacana.co.za Š The editors and authors, 2014 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form and by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without permission in writing from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-4314-0963-1 Also available as an e-book: 978-1-4314-0964-8 d-PDF 978-1-4314-0965-5 ePUB 978-1-4314-0966-2 mobi file Cover design by publicide Set in Minion 10.5/14pt Job no. 002194 See a complete list of Jacana titles at www.jacana.co.za
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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Sergei Vladimirovich Shkarinenko. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Pyotr Pavlovich Bondarenko. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Sergei Petrovich Demidchik. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Alexander Ivanovich Kalan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 The diary of Alexander Kalan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Valentin Fyodorovich Mozolev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Dmitri Anatolievich Streltsov. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Alexander Vladislavovich Shulga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Viktor Ivanovich Chalenko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Igor Kuzmich Bakush . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Oleg Arkadyevich Gritsuk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Alexander Petrovich Sergeev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Vladimir Ivanovich Dedeshko. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Mikhail Gennadyevich Margelov. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 Four Soviet veterans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 Appendix: List of Major Weaponry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
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6 Cuito Cuanavale
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Introduction
Introduction 7
Introduction
In July 1987, the Angolan army began an operation against armed units of UNITA near Cuito Cuanavale in the province of Cuando-Cubango. The operation, which had been prepared with the help of Soviet military advisers, was called ‘Salute October’. Its goals were the total defeat of the enemy in the south-east of the country; the destruction of the enemy’s established supply routes from Namibia into central Angola; the seizure of UNITA’s advance base, the town of Mavinga; and the capture of Jamba, situated on the border with Namibia, where Jonas Savimbi’s headquarters were located. Cuban forces, brought to Angola at the request of its government for the defence of the country from foreign aggression, did not participate in the operation. The Angolan brigades, which included several dozen Soviet advisers and specialists, were able to press their advance successfully. When they reached the Lomba River, the position of the enemy became critical. And after they overcame the river’s formidable natural obstacles, there was very little left to do for the units of FAPLA, the Angolan army, which had attacked from several directions, with only 30 kilometres remaining to Mavinga. There appeared a real threat of its capture. With the fall of Mavinga, the direct road to UNITA’s ‘capital’, Jamba, would be open. In order to prevent the defeat of UNITA and the seizure of 7
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Mavinga, units of the South African army moved into Angola at the end of August 1987. A powerful South African force, including armoured vehicles, was deployed both by land and by air to Mavinga. They launched a surprise assault upon the advancing FAPLA units. Fierce battles took place over the crossing of the Lomba River. After the invasion by the South African army, the balance of forces changed. The South Africans and UNITA possessed not only a numerical advantage but, crucially, superiority in firepower. The last battles of the war that took place in south-eastern Angola ranged over a period of almost a year and a half. A large and diverse assortment of South African military units took part in these battles and they were constantly replaced with fresh units as the war dragged on. These included troops from 32 Battalion and other South West African Territorial units like 101 Battalion and various reconnaissance or Special Forces regiments. Various mechanised infantry groupings consisting of regular conscripted South African troops operated alongside UNITA’s 4th, 5th, 18th, 118th and 275th regular infantry battalions, trained and prepared by the South African Army (each battalion possessed a group of advisers and instructors from the South African Defence Force). The South African artillery was represented by multiple rocket launcher batteries (utilising the Valkiri system) and long-range howitzers – the new G-5 155-mm howitzer and the self-propelled G-6 155-mm field gun were used extensively. Tank squadrons from various South African Citizen Force regiments were also employed and were supported by air defence units, maintenance specialists and rear echelon and reserve troops. These ground troops were supported by more than 80 military transport planes, fighterbombers and helicopters. All in all, South African forces on Angolan territory and in
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Introduction 9
adjoining Namibia included, not counting UNITA units, more than 20,000 soldiers and officers, employing about 150 tanks and armoured troop carriers, approximately 400 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers. At the initiative of the USSR, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory. But the USA used its right of ‘veto’ and blocked this resolution. As a result of battles during October–November 1987, Angolan brigades suffered major losses in personnel and military equipment and were forced to withdraw. In November 1987, the South African army sent into action Olifant tanks and regular UNITA battalions, reinforced by South African armoured personnel carriers, and tried to seize the key base of the Angolan government forces: the town of Cuito Cuanavale. The Angolan government appealed to Cuba for help in dealing with this potentially catastrophic situation. Cuba made a decision to offer immediate help to Angola, to send supplementary armed units and military equipment, and launch a decisive blow at the South African army. A Cuban brigade was urgently sent to help the Angolans. By 16 November 1987, the South African advance was stopped only 15 to 20 kilometres from Cuito Cuanavale. Thereupon, the Angolan forces, reinforced by Cuban battalions, went on the offensive. Meanwhile, UNITA detachments cut off the Menongue–Cuito Cuanavale road. The garrison at Cuito Cuanavale found itself practically surrounded and a siege began. After reinforcing and rearming the UNITA battalions that had suffered great losses, as well as regrouping and reinforcing their own units, the South Africans launched their assault on Cuito Cuanavale in January 1988. Using Olifant tanks, they stormed
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the defences of Cuito Cuanavale methodically and from various directions at regular intervals. Long-range G-5 howitzers regularly bombarded the positions of the defending brigades and the houses of the inhabitants. The siege lasted five months. The Angolan forces created an in-depth defence around Cuito Cuanavale. The 25th infantry brigade, together with Cuban battalions, consolidated its hold on the eastern bank of the Cuito River. The 13th airborne assault brigade took up defensive positions facing south. The 66th brigade and units of the 21st and 59th brigades, withdrawing from the eastern bank, defended Cuito Cuanavale from the west. Cuban battalions manned the defences in the northern sector in the same way. The 8th infantry brigade (a convoy escort brigade) remained as a reserve. Three tactical units of Cubans manned the defences in all possible directions against an attack along the Cuito Cuanavale–Menongue highway, and in the districts spanning the Luassinga, Cuiriri and Maseka rivers. This motorised infantry was reinforced with a tank company, artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft defences and sapper units. Around the town of Menongue, units and detachments of the 6th military district HQ, two territorial battalions and a section of the Cuban 70th tank brigade were entrusted with the defences. On 23 March 1988 a final decisive assault was undertaken. Having lost a number of tanks as well as armoured personnel carriers while facing the military positions of the 25th brigade, the South Africans retreated, unable to overwhelm the defences of Cuito Cuanavale. But, using long-range guns, South African artillery continued periodically to bombard military positions as well as private houses, right up to August 1988. The battle for Cuito Cuanavale was the most important confrontation in the entire course of the Angolan conflict. The scale
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Introduction 11
of warfare is shown by the fact that Angolan and Cuban planes completed approximately 3000 sorties out of the airfields of Cuito Cuanavale and Menongue. More than 1100 of these succeeded in their task of inflicting rocket strikes on enemy ground troops. According to South African data, the South African air force accomplished over 1000 armed sorties, dropping on the enemy’s positions more than 3000 high explosive and anti-personnel shrapnel bombs of approximately 700 tons in total mass. Despite the fact that the government of the USSR declared that Soviet military forces were not participating in the battles in Angola, this particular operation set a record in terms of the number of Soviet military advisers, specialists and translators taking part. Along the entire front, at every point of contact with the enemy, Soviet military personnel were present in Angolan brigade battle formations at advance command posts. Parallel with their defence of Cuito Cuanavale, the joint Angolan–Cuban forces prepared an offensive. Units of the elite 50th Cuban tank division, equipped with Soviet T-62 tanks, landed on the Angolan coast. Experienced Cuban pilots also arrived in Angola. From the USSR, new consignments of arms, spare parts and ammunition were received. Simultaneously, Cuban units stationed in the central districts of the country were moved in the direction of Matala, Cushi and Menongue. A powerful force was assembled in south-western Angola, 800 kilometres from Cuito Cuanavale, amounting to 28,000 Cuban soldiers and approximately 30,000 Angolan and 2000 SWAPO soldiers, more than 600 tanks, hundreds of pieces of artillery and multiple rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft installations. Cuban MiG-23s provided air support. At the end of May 1988, these Cuban and Angolan units would move to Angola’s border with Namibia. Planes from the Angolan air force, flown by Cuban pilots, carried out a massive bombing
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attack on the positions of the South African forces near Calueque, 11 kilometres to the north of the Angolan–Namibian frontier. Within a few hours after this attack began, the South Africans blew up the bridges over the Cunene River so as to prevent Cuban tanks from crossing in order to invade Namibia. Praising these events in one of his speeches, Fidel Castro said that the Cuban forces had acted ‘like a boxer who checks his opponent with his left hand while beating him with his right’. The failure of the South African offensive near Cuito Cuanavale and the appearance of units of the Cuban forces at the Namibian border forced the South African government to call off its military actions and to begin negotiations. As a result, on 22 December 1988 in New York, a three-sided agreement was signed between South Africa, Angola and Cuba. South Africa agreed to end its occupation of Angola and to withdraw its forces from Namibia by July 1991. (The main forces of the South African army withdrew in April 1989, while Cuba withdrew its own armed forces from Angola by May 1991.) A direct result of this agreement was the granting of independence to Namibia and the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa. In Angola itself, a negotiation process began between the government and UNITA. In 1991, the number of Soviet military advisers and specialists still in Angola was sharply reduced. In 1992, Russia unilaterally stopped all military aid to Angola, shut down her military mission and recalled all military advisers and specialists (though during 1993 military cooperation was renewed).
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Sergei Vladimirovich Shkarinenko
Sergei Vladimirovich Shkarinenko 13
Sergei Vladimirovich Shkarinenko Military translator and retired major
I served twice in Angola as a military translator. For this we were prepared by undergoing an intensive one-year course into which we crammed a three-year programme of spoken Portuguese. In 1979, we were sent to Angola for two years. Before my joining the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, I had served a full term of two years as a conscript and finished as a junior sergeant at a rocket installation. I arrived in Angola in September 1979. For three months in Luanda, I served as a translator of technical documents to do with fighter aircraft stationed there. I also worked with physicians, with the conductor of the military orchestra of the presidential regiment, with the soldiers serving in the rear, as an errand boy, and as a novice. But early in 1980, the senior mission translator (at the time, Major Yuri Klyukin) sent me to Lobito as a replacement. For about a year and a half, things remained more or less quiet, but already towards the end of my posting the situation had begun to heat up from about March 1981. From intelligence reports we were expecting a strike from the South African side. The South Africans were carrying out intensive reconnaissance, and incidents of ambush on sections of the Lubango–Cahama–Xangongo– Ondjiva road were becoming more frequent. South African aerial reconnaissance planes, Mirage and Impala, were constantly flying 13
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over Angolan brigades. Just at this time it was decided to reinforce those districts earmarked for defence (the 11th brigade in Ondjiva, the 19th brigade in Xangongo and the 2nd motorised infantry brigade in Cahama); to set up strong anti-aircraft defences there so as to impede South African support for UNITA units; and to fortify defences in case of South African raids aimed directly against FAPLA. The Angolans, it must be pointed out, treated this problem quite seriously. (The commander of the 5th military district was at the time Lieutenant-Colonel Ngongo, now general of the army and a former Minister of Internal Affairs in Angola.) They efficiently brought together the necessary construction equipment, delivered construction materials and even succeeded in achieving some of their plans – in Ondjiva, for instance, they constructed dugouts and reinforced trenches. In Xangongo, the equipment barely worked, while in Cahama they could only hack out clearings in the forest, construct reserve command posts (they even used a bulldozer to construct a rampart on the roof of a command post while under air attack), and build false and reserve artillery positions. In Cahama the brigade commander was the intrepid Major Farrushko, a former Portuguese commander. Subsequently he became director of a training centre near Luanda and after that rose to the rank of general and occupied the post of commander of the Luanda garrison. When the South Africans realised that these reinforcements amounted to a really serious threat, which could cut off their support for UNITA, they prepared an offensive operation under the pretext of a battle with SWAPO and began to make a reconnaissance of the districts where FAPLA brigades were located. They also sought to disrupt SWAPO’s supplies (SWAPO was located in the southern
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Sergei Vladimirovich Shkarinenko 15
districts of Angola), as well as to organise ambushes on the routes between Lubango and Cahama, and Xangongo and Ondjiva. They started to send sabotage and reconnaissance groups, they mined the roads in places chosen for ambush, and they destroyed passing cars, both military (FAPLA and SWAPO) and civil. Simultaneously, raids by the South African air force became more frequent not only on the supply routes (to the rear), but also with the direct shelling of districts where FAPLA units were stationed. Prior to the 1981 operation, we travelled in our brigades to and from the district for conferences. Already at that time, the South Africans did not allow us to pass through easily. We would travel at night with our search lights switched off, moving in a UAZ-469 jeep, Volga GAZ-24 sedan and an RAF-2203 minibus. The South Africans also flew by night. Night reconnaissance was particularly effective: with lights, it is possible to see clearly where something is located, which you wouldn’t see in the daytime. In August 1981 I was in Cahama with the 2nd motorised infantry brigade. It was a Sunday morning, around 9 a.m. We didn’t expect anything. A communiqué suddenly reached us. Apparently fighting had just broken out in Xangongo but the adviser to the brigade chief of staff did not succeed in obtaining any further information. We were still talking in the radio room when shelling began. We were caught completely unawares. Our first reaction was peculiar: the adviser to the brigade commander suddenly ran off into the dugout, but I, young and inexperienced, sat on a small veranda and watched what was happening. Naturally, everyone ran while the shrapnel from the bombs was flying about. Then we realised what they had destroyed with this first aerial strike – they had struck the radar station, paralysed the anti-aircraft defences and made their own air force safe from possible rapid reaction by FAPLA and Cuban fighter
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planes from their air bases in Lubango. While bombing Xangongo and Ondjiva (the point furthest south), they had simultaneously pinned down our brigade in Cahama from the air. This had been done so as to prevent a counter-strike from our own side. We had in fact made preparations for a possible South African attack. There was a very intelligent adviser attached to our artillery named Petrovich (I don’t recall his actual surname). And he was an Angolan (if I recall correctly, they called him Anga), a young fellow who learnt everything very quickly. Although he wasn’t officially a senior artilleryman or commander of the artillery, he in fact filled the role of commander of the brigade artillery. We began to work out a plan of how to close the approaches to our brigade. In line with the general defence of the area, we marked out the direction of possible tank attacks and mined everything that was not covered by our artillery fire. We laid out our artillery in three rows so that our long-range guns would cut off the points which ordinary artillery could not reach and at the same time we took note of the various ranges at which it would be possible to launch massive firepower from all kinds of long-range weapons available to us (cannons, howitzers and multiple rocket launchers). For this purpose we had sent groups of artillery spotters to work out the ranges in order to target the advancing South Africans. By August 1981 this system had in fact been worked out and so our plan was ready. The idea was that wherever we actually saw their gunfire, we would strike with our own artillery and they would vanish. We also had minefields and tank attacks planned. According to the reports of fellows who were there later on, when in 1983 the South Africans repeatedly attempted to storm Cahama, everything we and previous generations of our specialists had prepared helped very much to blunt the attack of the enemy forces.
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Just as the strikes against Xangongo began, the South Africans completely isolated our brigade from the air. We had at our disposal only ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns as well as a Yugoslav triple-barrel rapid-fire weapon. Otherwise there was nothing of much weight in our anti-aircraft defences. When enemy aircraft flew over our brigade and we opened fire, they would, particularly at night, make note of all these locations and would right away put our radar installations out of action. They would of course also strafe our anti-aircraft defences but only from a relatively high altitude of four to five kilometres. We had mobile Strela anti-aircraft installations but at that time these could only attain a height of 1800 metres. In other words, the South Africans were completely in command of the air. By day, we could for all intents and purposes not move: every 15 to 20 minutes, one or two of their planes would be over us. We estimated that every 15 to 20 minutes, these would fly away, to be replaced by new ones. It was a constant patrol. All this continued for seven to ten days. Subsequently we awaited the arrival of those of our men who had been able to escape from Xangongo and Ondjiva. The South Africans did not call off their patrolling. Whenever there was a break, we would quickly board our jeep and drive along the front lines to look at our preparations, but our spare command centre had still not been constructed. The walls were in place and a roof had actually been built, but it was not yet covered with sand. After the raids began, we rapidly brought across our only bulldozer and threw sand from above, as a light camouflage. Then we moved into the premises. If there was any movement (a reflection from some piece of glass, for instance), the South Africans would launch a series of rockets in that direction, and target individual cars. That is to say, they would not let us move at all. We prepared our meals only at night, and plugged up all the little holes in our dugouts so as
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not to emit any light. And we painted over any mirrors or glass in our cars to avoid any reflections. Just as we moved into the spare command centre, the South Africans bombarded Cahama once again. At the very entrance, to the left, stood the staff building, the cubicles of the medical units, the brigade commander’s dwelling and, further on, those of the adviser to the brigade commander and the chief of staff, and finally our own house. We were not able to unpack any of our bags. The second air raid struck on the left side of Cahama. First, the medical units were severely damaged, then they struck the brigade commander’s house as well as our own, just as I arrived: the roof disappeared and collapsed inside. I fished my luggage out of the dirt and dust and recovered some of my possessions. And then they came in again, from the right side. Shortly before the South African planes struck, we had driven off to the safety area. As we were returning, along a country road, passing through a ravine parallel with the main road, the whooshing sound of aeroplanes forced us to make a sharp turn under some trees and bushes. We jumped to the ground, while overhead howling planes whizzed by. Then and there, the earth trembled from explosions and, after a moment, the crash of more powerful shells against the ground, falling from above but in a different direction. We have, as they say, a sixth sense. At first, I jumped to the ground and lay down where I had fallen; but then something inside me urged me to crawl one or two metres to the side. When more shells began to land from above, a large, jagged piece of shrapnel pierced the ground, exactly where I had just crawled from. I looked at it and inside me felt a disagreeable chill to think that it might have stuck in my back, had my instincts not forced me to move away just then.
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