ELECTION 2014
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ELECTION 2014 SOUTH AFRICA The campaigns, results and future prospects
edited by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg and Roger Southall
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Election 2014
First published by Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd in 2014 10 Orange Street Sunnyside Auckland Park 2092 South Africa +2711 628 3200 www.jacana.co.za and by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 60 Hume Road Dunkeld 2196 South Africa +27 11 214 2900 www.kas.de/www.kas.org.za Š The authors and editors, 2014 All rights reserved. ISBN 978-1-4314-2018-6 Also available as an ebook: 978-1-4314-2068-1 d-PDF 978-1-4314-2069-8 ePUB 978-1-4314-2070-4 mobi file Cover design by publicide Set in Bembo 10.9/14pt Job no. 002240 See a complete list of Jacana titles at www.jacana.co.za
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Contents
Contents
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Statistical note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1. The context of the South African election of 2014: Prologue to change? Roger Southall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Trends in electoral participation, 1994–2014. Collette Schulz-Herzenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3. The ANC’s campaign in 2014. Anthony Butler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4. The Democratic Alliance election campaign: ‘Ayisafani’? Zwelethu Jolobe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5. The Economic Freedom Fighters: Birth of a giant? Jason Robinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 6. Inkatha Freedom Party: The elephants’ graveyard. Laurence Piper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 7. The smaller parties: Between a rock and a hard place. Cherrel Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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8. Women and the election: The ‘not so good story’ to tell. Amanda Gouws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 9. The media and the 2014 elections: Competition without diversity. Jane Duncan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 10. Black professionals and the ANC in the 2014 election: Loosening ties? Amuzweni Ngoma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 11. The 2014 election and South African democracy. Robert Mattes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 12. The 2014 national and provincial results. Collette Schulz-Herzenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 13. The party system and political prospects in the wake of election 2014. Roger Southall & Collette Schulz-Herzenberg . . . . . 228 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
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Contents
Preface
This book is a sequel to Zunami! The 2009 South African Elections, and has been put together in the conviction that each and every democratic general election in South Africa deserves its own special, contemporary study. A number of the authors who wrote for Zunami! (the two editors, together with Anthony Butler, Zwelethu Jolobe and Jane Duncan) have again contributed chapters, allowing for a valuable continuity of analysis. In turn, a changing electoral and party scene has required a reshaping of chapter topics, and there are contributions by newcomer authors (Amanda Gouws, Amuzweni Ngoma, Cherrel Africa, Jason Robinson, Laurence Piper and Robert Mattes). As with the previous volume, we have sought to work extremely speedily, so as to allow for early publication after the poll. This has been facilitated by careful preparation and debate among the editors, contributors and external academic reviewers. We are confident that we have been able to put together a text that will both please and inform our immediate readers while standing the test of time. As with Zunami!, the project has been sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which has provided generous financial support, use of its premises for our pre-election workshop, and general encouragement. Our particular thanks go to the director of the South African office, Dr Holger Dix, and as ever to the Foundation’s local administrator, Nancy Msibi, who laces her efficiency with much charm and humour. We are again indebted to Jacana Media for agreeing to publish the book, and we would particularly like to thank Russell Martin for his enthusiastic support and rigorous editing. Jacana have been exemplary in the way they have cleared the decks to allow for timely publication, and we are enormously grateful to them. vii
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Finally, we would like to thank Professor Paul Maylam of the History Department of Rhodes University and Professor Joergen Elklit, Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University and the 2014 Van Zyl Slabbert Professor in Political Studies at the University of Cape Town, for serving as external reviewers. The timetable imposed upon them for responding to draft and final chapters was extremely demanding, but both provided enormously detailed and constructive comments to the editors and contributors. This book is offered as the latest in what is already a formidable record of the electoral history of South African democracy, and we trust it will prove a worthy successor to the excellent volumes that have covered all the previous elections. Collette Schulz-Herzenberg Roger Southall
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Contributors
Contributors
Contributors
Cherrel Africa is Head of the Political Studies Department, University of the Western Cape. Anthony Butler is Professor of Political Studies, University of Cape Town. Jane Duncan is Professor of Journalism, University of Johannesburg. Amanda Gouws is Professor of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch. Zwelethu Jolobe is Lecturer in Political Studies, University of Cape Town. Robert Mattes is Professor of Political Studies, University of Cape Town. Amuzweni Ngoma is completing her MA in Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand. Laurence Piper is Professor of Political Studies, University of the Western Cape. Jason Robinson is a Doctoral Candidate in History at the University of Oxford.
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Collette Schulz-Herzenberg is a Research Associate, Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch. Roger Southall is Professor Emeritus of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand.
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Statistical Note
Statistical Note
Statistical note
The election results are sourced directly from official figures provided by the Electoral Commission (IEC).The figures quoted in text are rounded to the nearest whole number and in tabular form are rounded to one decimal place.The book deviates from this rule only in Chapter 7, where discussion of the differences between the results of the smallest parties requires the fractional part of percentage results.Throughout the volume the figures that appear in text are based on the actual values and may therefore differ from figures that appear in tabular form.The number of registered voters is based on the IEC’s certified voters’ roll for the 2014 elections, as of 5 March 2014. The number of spoilt votes recorded for the 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections was small, but was critical in calculations of voter participation and turnout. The percentage share of the vote recorded for political parties refers to valid votes only and excludes spoilt votes. In 1994 the number of spoilt votes was not recorded, rendering calculation of voter participation for that year problematic. In 1994 there was no formal registration and hence no voters’ roll. Since total votes cast, including spoilt ballots, are not available for 1994, the number of valid votes cast has been used to generate turnout figures for 1994. All official statistics produced by statistical agencies are best estimates. Calculations concerning voting age population (VAP) are derived from national census figures, and yearly estimates, but not from the figures provided by the IEC (see Chapter 2 by Collette Schulz-Herzenberg). The xi
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VAP figures for the 2014 elections are based on Statistics South Africa’s 2013 population estimates. The VAP figures for earlier elections are quoted from previous publications: the 2009 VAP figures are based on Stats SA’s Labour Force Survey, 3rd quarter 2008; the 2004 figures are based on Stats SA’s Census 2001 data; the 1999 figures are based on the 1996 census figures; and the 1994 figures are based on estimated electorate figures supplied by the interim electoral commission.
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Abbreviations
Abbreviations
Abbreviations
ACDP African Christian Democratic Party AEB Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (Afrikaner Unity Movement) Agang SA Agang South Africa AIC African Independent Congress AMCU Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union ANC African National Congress ANCWL African National Congress Women’s League ANCYL African National Congress Youth League APC African People’s Convention AZAPO Azanian People’s Organisation B-BBEE Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment BCP Black Consciousness Party BEE Black Economic Empowerment BRA Bushbuckridge Residents Association CCR Centre for Conflict Resolution CCT Central Command Team CFD Collective for Democracy CGE Commission for Gender Equality CONTRALESA Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa COPE Congress of the People COSAS Congress of South African Students xiii
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COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions CP Conservative Party CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research DA Democratic Alliance DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation DP Democratic Party EFF Economic Freedom Fighters EE employment equity FA Federal Alliance FF+ Freedom Front Plus GAP Gender Advocacy Programme GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme ICASA Independent Communications Authority of South Africa ID Independent Democrats IEC Electoral Commission of South Africa IFP Inkatha Freedom Party KISS Keep It Straight and Simple KZN KwaZulu-Natal MDDA Media Development and Diversity Agency MEC member of the executive council MF Minority Front MKVA Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association MMA Media Monitoring Africa MP member of parliament NA National Assembly NACTU National Congress of Trade Unions NCF National Consultative Forum NDI National Democratic Institute NDP National Development Plan NDR National Democratic Revolution NEC national executive committee NFP National Freedom Party NGP New Growth Path NMBM Nelson Mandela Bay metro NMMU Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University xiv
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Abbreviations
NMP NNP NP NPA NUM NUMSA NWC PAC PCSA PDMSA PMDTT PR SABC SACP SADTU SAIRR SANES SARS SOPA Stats SA UCT UCDP UDM US VAP WASP
New Movement Process New National Party National Party National Prosecuting Authority National Union of Mineworkers National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa national working committee (of the ANC) Pan Africanist Congress of Azania Press Council of South Africa Print and Digital Media South Africa Print and Digital Media Transformation Task Team proportional representation South African Broadcasting Corporation South African Communist Party South African Democratic Teachers Union South African Institute of Race Relations South African National Election Study South African Revenue Service Socialist Party of Azania Statistics South Africa University of Cape Town United Christian Democratic Party United Democratic Movement United States of America voting age population Workers and Socialist Party
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The
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1 The context of the South African election of 2014: Prologue to change? Roger Southall
The African National Congress (ANC) entered South Africa’s fifth democratic election on 7 May 2014 against a background of predictions that its grip on power would be loosened. Widespread labour disputes, a deeply troubled mining sector, mutual suspicion between business and government, a rising cost of living and a sharp fall in the value of the currency all contributed to declining confidence in a faltering economy. Politically, too, the ANC was facing severe difficulties. The death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013 symbolised for many the end of an era, reinforcing narratives that the ANC had lost its idealism, and had become home to a political class out of touch with its historic constituency among the poor especially. A surge of popular protests among communities around the country highlighted deep-seated discontent with government performance on the ground.The coalition of forces which had elevated Jacob Zuma to the presidency had imploded, and the president himself, a major asset in the general election of 2009, had become an electoral liability.The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), partner to the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) within the tripartite alliance, was openly divided, with forces centred around the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) threatening a breakaway to the left. Furthermore, while the Democratic Alliance (DA) was expecting to consolidate its position as the leading party of opposition, the ANC was now also faced by new challenges in the form 1
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of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), appealing to black workers and the poor, and Agang SA (‘Let Us Build’), a party initially credited with a particular appeal to the rising black middle class. In short, the ANC entered the election campaign on the defensive, under widespread attack for having failed to reap the dividends of democracy. The ANC’s response was to argue that South Africa was a much better place to live in than in 1994. The opposition parties agreed, but then went on to insist that so much more could and should have been done. A large body of opinion seemingly concurred.ANC candidates suffered unexpected defeats in various by-elections at local government level (notably in North West province) throughout 2013; and some months before the election, before the campaign had really got going, the ruling party also found itself lagging behind in polling data. One survey, conducted by Ipsos-Markinor, reported that support for the ANC among the voting age population had fallen from 63% in November 2009 to 53% in November 2013. The drop had been most marked over the previous twelve months during which the ANC government was besieged by the political fall-out from the killing by armed police of 34 striking platinum miners in August 2013, controversies around the expenditure of public funds upon the president’s private home in Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal, popular protests at local level around the country and the associated launch of the EFF. The same poll reported that 51% of registered ANC voters wanted Zuma to resign, and that the ruling party might lose its majority status in Gauteng, the hub of the country’s economy.1 Notwithstanding methodological issues about how such surveys should be interpreted,2 the general drift of the polling data was simultaneously a worry for the ANC and an encouragement to its opponents. Certainly, it was enough for veteran commentator Allister Sparks to conclude that even if the polls were only partially right ‘it means the name of the game is changing, albeit gradually, from the politics of singleparty dominance to the politics of potential transition’.3 This was a strong claim, but that it was not implausible was acknowledged by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe, who had challenged Zuma for the party leadership at its five-yearly national congress in Mangaung in December 2012. In his first newspaper interview after his defeat, he acknowledged that voters were no longer prepared to assess the party simply on the basis of its ‘glorious history’, but rather were judging it ‘on the basis of what they experience’.The ANC, he argued, had become tainted by the trappings of power, its internal democracy subverted by vested personal interests.4 2
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Even if the ANC hierarchy chose to publicly ignore Motlanthe’s misgivings, many shared his view that the forthcoming election would present the party with its biggest challenge since 1994. However, before the rationale for this widely held belief is examined, it is necessary to sketch out not only the rules under which the electoral game was to be played, but also the changing nature of the electorate, which many felt was likely to play a significant role in determining the election’s outcome. South Africa’s electoral game The electoral system chosen to structure the transition to democracy had been one of list proportional representation which set no threshold of votes for successful candidates to be elected. In line with extensive electoral systems theory,5 this was presented as maximising the extent of diversity of representation of political opinion within legislatures, which was deemed highly desirable for overcoming the country’s past of division along lines of race, nation and class. Accordingly, elections since 1994 have featured horse races between lists of candidates drawn up by the various political parties for 400 seats in the National Assembly, and for seats in the legislatures of the nine provinces, the number of which varies according to the size of provincial populations. In the 2014 election, there were a total of 430 seats at stake in the nine provincial contests, with Gauteng, the most populous province, having 70 seats up for grabs, and Northern Cape, the least populous, having just 30. In the national contests, 200 MPs are elected from national party lists, and 200 from provincial party lists in each of the nine provinces. There is no separate election for the president, who is elected by the National Assembly after the general election. Voters, who vote within the province in which they are registered, receive two ballots, one for the national, the other for a provincial election, although overseas voters (who are required to register with embassies or consulates in the countries in which they are temporarily resident), and those who, on election day, vote at a polling station outside their province of residence, are restricted to a vote in the national election. The elections are administered by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (formerly the Independent Electoral Commission), which somewhat confusingly still uses the acronym relating to its former title (IEC). The IEC is responsible for registering voters, finalising the electoral register, registering political parties, managing elections, counting the vote and allocating seats to parties. 3
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Prior to the 2014 election, the IEC had been widely credited with having administered elections that were ‘free and fair’. Even so, in each and every election, complaints have been made by individual opposition parties at particular times about the IEC’s allegedly favourable disposition towards the ANC. Often, these have referred to the conduct of individual officials (often in voting stations), rather than to any apparent systematic bias towards the ruling party.6 In 2014, however, the IEC was rocked by controversy, with its chairperson, Pansy Tlakula, facing accusations of conflict of interest for having presided over a R320-million lease agreement for office space, while having had a business and close personal relationship with ANC MP Thaba Mufamadi, chairperson of parliament’s finance committee, who had benefited from the deal. It was an allegation subsequently backed by a damning report issued by the public protector, Thuli Madonsela. This was in turn subject to a legal challenge by Tlakula, and more controversy was aroused by the IEC’s allocation of funding to cover her legal costs. Although Tlakula refused the calls made by smaller political parties that she should resign, her critics argued that her failure to do so compromised the reputation of the IEC for political neutrality ahead of elections in which the ANC was the dominant player.7 Interestingly, the DA joined the ANC in opposing the calls for her to resign, indicating recognition of a distinction between queries about Tlakula’s personal integrity and that of the IEC itself. The 2014 election saw a total of 29 political parties contesting the national election, an additional 140 standing in the provinces, with many smaller parties taking the opportunity to punt particular interests. Nonetheless, only a small number of parties could expect to gain any sort of representation (only 14 parties gained one or more seats in the 2009 National Assembly election). In any case, as time had moved on, South African elections had increasingly taken on the character of a battle between the ANC, as a party regularly winning up to nearly two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly and control of seven or more provinces, and the parties of opposition seeking to make inroads into its electoral dominance. Of the latter, the DA had by 2014 established itself as by far the most significant, previous elections having seen the demise of the formerly ruling National Party (NP), the steady decline of other established rivals (notably the Inkatha Freedom Party, IFP) and the limited capacity of newcomers to make a lasting electoral impact.To some extent, therefore, the four previous elections had seen a shift towards a de facto two-party system, with the smaller parties playing bit-parts in the overall political drama. In turn, the 4
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dominance of the electoral arena by the major players was supported by the electoral funding regime. The multiplicity of political parties is facilitated by the low cost (R500) of registering a party with the IEC. However, beyond this, the party funding terrain is considerably more demanding. In terms of the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997, political parties are entitled to proportional allocations of state funding according to their levels of representation in the National Assembly or provincial legislatures, in addition to which they may obtain funds from their members or other sources, whether foreign or local. Because this regime is said to reinforce the dominance of the larger parties, and, further, because private funding of parties is unregulated (no limits are set to the amounts which may be received, and parties are not required to publish details of who has given them funding), it has long been the subject of public (and, indeed, legal) contestation. In March 2014, the EFF – the most vocal of the party newcomers – sought an interdict before the High Court against having to pay a deposit to the IEC in order to contest seats in the forthcoming election. The deposit for contesting seats for the National Assembly was by this time R200,000, up from R180,000 in the previous election, while parties contesting provincial legislatures were required to pay R45,000 (up from R40,000) per province. The total cost for contesting the national and all provincial elections was therefore R605,000. However, Julius Malema, leader of the EFF, argued that the level of the deposit was unconstitutional, as it violated the right to vote and to be voted for, and discriminated against the interests of the poor. Rather than being dominated by ‘capitalist ideas’, the electoral process should seek other mechanisms for verifying the seriousness of political organisations. In the event, ‘capitalist ideas’ won hands down, with the court roundly rejecting the EFF’s application. A changing electorate Since 1994, the South African population has become larger, younger and more urban. Firstly, the population has increased from some 39.5 million to 51.8 million at the time of the last census in 2011. Secondly, whereas in 1996 36% of the population was in the 15–34 age category and 24% in the 35–64 category, by 2011 the former proportion had increased to 44% and the latter had decreased to 21%. Thirdly, whereas the proportion of the population living in ‘urban’ areas was 52% in 1990, by 2011 it had increased 5
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to 62%, with better work and living prospects offered by the towns being the major draw from rural areas.8 These highly significant changes are reflected in the changing composition of the electorate, which is composed of citizens of 18 years old and above (the voting age population,VAP) who are registered to vote with the IEC. However, while the electorate has indeed become larger, younger and more urban, the level of correspondence between the overall population statistics, the voting age population and the registered electorate has varied considerably. According to the IEC, the VAP had grown from around 22.7 million in 1994 to 31.4 million for the election of 2014, of whom some 25.4 million (or 81%) had registered to vote. Given lower levels of registration (75% in 2004 and 77% in 2009), this improvement was to the IEC’s credit, even though it meant that around 6 million potential voters remained unregistered. However, as Collette Schulz-Herzenberg argues (Chapter 2), by basing itself upon the 2011 census, rather than updated population estimates provided by Statistics South Africa, the IEC is underestimating the size of the VAP and overestimating the level of registration. In contrast, if 2013 estimates were employed, then the VAP increased to 32.7 million, and the registration level fell to 78%. In other words, on this latter basis, almost a quarter of the VAP and around 7 million potential voters were not eligible to vote. Although more investigation is required, it is widely reckoned that South Africans who fell into lower socio-economic categories (the poor) were disproportionately represented among those potential voters who remained unregistered. The majority of those potential voters who remained unregistered were in the more youthful age categories. Hence the IEC reported that by early March 2014, with the registration process complete, only 33% of potential voters in the 18–19 age category had registered, and only 64% in the 20–29 age category. In contrast, in age bands from 30 years upward, the percentage of registered voters increased rapidly. Despite major attention being paid by political parties to capturing the ‘born-frees’ (voters who had never lived under apartheid), and intense speculation about whether they were likely to vote differently from their parents, their impact was always going to be limited by their low rate of registration. Notwithstanding increasing urbanisation, voters from rural areas were more likely to have registered than those from urban areas. What counts as ‘urban’ and what counts as ‘rural’ is highly contested. However, in noting 6
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that registration patterns per municipality varied from province to province, the IEC remarked that ‘generally speaking the percentage of registered voters in rural municipalities tends to be higher than is the case in urban and in particular most metropolitan municipalities’.9 The relevance of this was that, as one commentator remarked, South Africa remains ‘a country with a massive political divide over the urban/rural split, and that rural areas matter hugely in our politics’.10 With the political discourse largely shaped by urban concerns, this highlighted the importance of how political parties would campaign in rural areas, where overall ANC dominance was most marked. This was notably the case in ‘communal areas’ (former homelands), where traditional leaders were deemed to be a conservative influence, and one that had been largely captured by the ANC.11 Rural bias in voting patterns was also likely to be shaped by the preponderance of women among the registered electorate (55%), notably in the areas subject to the influence of chiefs. Schulz-Herzenberg discusses in Chapters 2 and 12 how these and other factors played out in the course of the elections. However, if previous elections had been largely fought around issues of history and identity, with the ANC the undoubted victor as the party with the most powerful claim to have liberated the country from apartheid, then the 2014 election registered greater concern with issues of class. From this perspective, the greatest threat to the ANC was presented by the troubled state of the economy. A troubled economy Twenty years into democracy, economic concerns were pressing more heavily upon South Africans, and it was these which the political parties foregrounded in their manifestos. The ANC chose to present a good news story which told of an economy that had been turned around since 1994. It had received backing from a report issued in November 2013 by the Goldman Sachs investment bank. After numerous consultations with government, this had offered a cautiously favourable review of its economic stewardship. Growth had averaged only 1.4% between 1980 and 1994 but had reached 3.6% since then, and inflation had fallen from an average of 14.2% to 6.3%; government debt had stood at 50% of GDP in 1994 but had fallen back to 42% by 2013; and an $80-billion economy had become a $400-billion economy. Ordinary people had reaped the benefit, experiencing a rise in real GDP per capita from $4,300 in 1995 to $6,000 in 2012. Some had 7
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experienced upward mobility into the middle class (reckoned to have increased from 7.3 million to 12.3 million), while 16.1 million people were by 2013 receiving social grants in the form of old age pensions, child support grants, disability and other grants, and massive improvements had been made in the provision of housing, electricity, water and sanitation. South Africa, concluded Goldman Sachs, had been well served by the ANC government’s prudent fiscal policies. Furthermore, the bank offered strong backing for the National Development Plan (NDP), released in November 2011, whose proclaimed objectives were to eliminate poverty and significantly reduce inequality by 2030.12 The significance of this was that by prioritising the NDP, which placed strong collaboration between the state and business at its core, the government appeared to be quietly sidelining the earlier New Growth Path (NGP), which had espoused a more forceful developmental role for the state. However, as the Goldman Sachs report also pointed out, there was a less rosy side to the story. Above all, the government’s policies had failed to make any significant dent in the extent of unemployment, which had remained at the high level (23%) which had obtained in 1994. Indeed, if people who had given up looking for work were included in the formal ‘narrow’ definition of unemployment (that is, those who were actively looking for jobs), then it shot up to 36%. Worse, over half of those who were unemployed were in the 15–34 age group, the majority of them unlikely ever to secure formalsector jobs. Furthermore, 85% of the African population remained poor, some 15 million people continuing to live on less than $2 a day. Meanwhile, the demons of unemployment and poverty were matched by South Africa having become the most unequal society in the world, with inequality heavily overlaid by race (87% of whites were reckoned to be middle or upper class, compared with 14% of Africans in 2008).13 Goldman Sachs placed major responsibility for these alarming statistics upon the government’s own shoulders. Instead of creating an enabling environment for business, it had imposed a formidable regulatory burden upon the corporate sector, with increasingly heavy demands for compliance through legislation regarding taxation, black economic empowerment (BEE), health and safety, environmental standards, and labour law and practice. As a result, South Africa had failed to take full advantage of the commodity boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially because the mining industry had been peculiarly circumscribed by new legislation and rising wage inflation. 8
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The ANC’s riposte was that the high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment reflected underlying continuities in the economy inherited from the apartheid era. However, critics argued that these continuities had been deepened by the government’s ‘neo-liberal’ policies which, early in the democratic era, had seen the adoption of the market-oriented GEAR macroeconomic framework. These policies, they said, explained the increasing ‘financialisation’ of the economy and the decline of the productive sectors, notably mining and manufacturing (from 38% of GDP in 1986 to 23% in 2012), with an associated loss of jobs (only partially compensated for by a rise in public sector employment).14 This was a debate that had run and run, and was no nearer conclusion at the beginning of the election campaign than at any time previously. However, despite many criticisms about its strategies from within its own ranks as well as from outside, the ANC had never yet suffered serious electoral damage on account of its failure (or limited capacity) to tackle deep-seated crises around unemployment and poverty. In essence, it had always previously proclaimed that, in the face of huge difficulties, it had done its honest best, and no other party was equipped to do better. However, the immediate problem was that the economy was seen to be deteriorating under President Zuma. In the Zuma era, the country’s growth rate had fallen to 2.3%, while inflation had increased to 6.5%. Business complained that the rise in the cost of the employed workforce was overtaking gains made in productivity. Government debt had been reduced from 50% of GDP in 1994 to 28% in 2007, but by 2013 it had shot back up to 42%. South Africa was spending more than it was earning, with the current account deficit, kept to around 2% of GDP during 1994–2003, having risen to 6% in 2012. Rather than inward foreign investment, the capital account was crucially dependent upon borrowed money, much of it short-term, which rendered the economy extremely vulnerable to portfolio flows, as indicated by the dramatic fall in the value of the rand during 2013. While a cheaper rand made life easier for exporters, it raised the costs of imports and repayment of foreign debt, which fed into a rising cost of living. Meanwhile, it was not only the government that was living beyond its means, for household debt as a ratio of disposable income had increased from 57% in 1994 to 76% in 2012. Both the poor and the middle classes were suffering. In delivering his budget at the end of February 2014, finance minister Pravin Gordhan gave assurances that the government would contain 9
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state expenditure in order to address South Africa’s fragile fiscal situation (although he did manage to combine modest increases in social grants with equally modest relief to lower-wage earners). Nonetheless, in acknowledging sluggish growth, he blamed the country’s recent woes upon the global economic slowdown. In line with the official mantra, he stressed the government’s determination to lay the basis for improved growth over the next few years.15 While all this offered reasonable assurance to the business community, commentators observed that rising debt was narrowing the government’s capacity to fund its ambitious social and infrastructural plans as outlined in the NDP.16 The ANC’s response was to emphasise that overall it had ‘a good story to tell’, and to downplay contrary economic indicators. However, in appealing to the electorate, it was not helped by the unflattering political image it had presented under Zuma. The ANC: the costs of Polokwane Jacob Zuma had risen to the presidency on the basis of an internal revolt within the tripartite alliance against its own political establishment, which under President Thabo Mbeki was viewed as distancing the ANC from its largely poor constituency. The Zuma ‘tsunami’, so called because it was presented by its proponents as an unstoppable force of nature, was driven by an unlikely alliance of the dominant players within COSATU, the SACP, and the ANC Youth League alongside black businesspersons and other individuals who, for one reason or another, had felt marginalised under Mbeki. In essence, this was an alliance of convenience, for it papered over significant ideological differences and interests behind Zuma, who had emerged as a uniting figure, in part because there was no one else willing to take on Mbeki, in part because at the time he was involved in an extended campaign against charges of corruption which had been levied against him, and which in 2005 had cost him the deputy presidency. As Zuma battled his way through one court case after another, his supporters had mobilised behind him, overlooking any evidence of his complicity in corrupt dealings in favour of a narrative that presented him as the victim of a politically driven conspiracy by Mbeki, who had wanted to secure for himself a third term as ANC president at the party’s national congress in Polokwane in December 2007. Zuma’s popular image and style of campaigning led not only to his triumph at Polokwane, but his eventual ousting of Mbeki as the country’s president in September 2008, 10
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following a High Court judgment (later overturned) which concurred that his prosecution had been politically motivated.17 Thereafter, with Kgalema Motlanthe serving as president on an interim basis, Zuma as leader of the ANC campaigned adroitly as a man of the people, and the ANC proceeded to a handsome electoral victory in 2009 – although its capture of just under two-thirds of the popular vote rather obscured the fact that it had lost support in eight of the nine provinces, and it had been saved by a surge of support in KwaZulu-Natal (Zuma’s home province) and its retention of a high level of backing (69%) in Eastern Cape, the third most populous province.18 It was not long after Zuma’s becoming president that the coalition began to unravel. Initially, Zuma had appointed an enlarged cabinet to ensure wide representation of interests, notably by appointing two members of the SACP to key economic portfolios (Rob Davies at the Department of Trade and Industry and Ebrahim Patel at a new Department of Economic Development), moves which seemed to confirm the hopes of COSATU and the SACP that his government would initiate a move to the left.19 However, it soon became clear that power within the ‘economics cluster’ of ministries continued to lie with the Treasury, where the new minister, Pravin Gordhan, rapidly showed himself to possess a conservative pair of hands. In a relatively short space of time, the NGP, hailed by the left within the alliance as the foundation for a developmental state, was to be outpaced by the government’s prioritising of the NDP. Although Zuma was to retain the firm support of the SACP (powerful members of which held leadership positions within COSATU), the NDP was soon to become the butt of bitter criticism from within COSATU as the latest vehicle of ‘neo-liberalism’. Disappointment in the failure of government to change its economic direction was soon to lead to renewed revolt from within an alliance widely portrayed as riven by factionalism. Zuma made it easy for his critics by becoming deeply entangled in a scandal around the apparent diversion of public funds to build himself an over-the-top palace amid his poverty-stricken followers at Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal. Although efforts were made to dissociate Zuma from the scandal by devolving responsibility upon unnamed officials, these stretched public credulity, and most of the dirt stuck to the presidential name. In any case, by now Zuma had already established an unsavoury reputation for advancing the pecuniary interests of his family and friends, and advancing favours to powerful backers, of whom the Gupta family, from India, gained particular notoriety. 11
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While criticism of his cronyism and lifestyle from outside the alliance was tolerated, Zuma proved ruthless with those who opposed him from within. Julius Malema, who as president of the ANC Youth League had been one of his most vocal supporters, learned the hard way. After initially enjoying the president’s protection, despite his own apparent deep involvement in corrupt dealings in Limpopo, Malema was eventually expelled from the party when his rash public statements had become an embarrassment and he had openly voiced criticism of Zuma. Similarly, when growing disaffection coalesced around a challenge to his leadership of the party by Kgalema Motlanthe at the ANC’s national congress at Mangaung, Zuma used his domination of the party machinery (underpinned by the support of the intelligence services) to guarantee his victory even before the gathering had begun. Although thereafter Zuma sought to gloss over internal differences by retaining Motlanthe as deputy president, the latter was shuffled towards the political margins.20 These and other such developments within the ANC seemed to place Zuma at the centre of a political establishment which was more concerned about preserving its own interests than in serving the nation. Criticisms of the ANC as having deviated from the path of struggle became commonplace, the deterioration in its moral standing highlighted in 2013 by the death of the iconic Nelson Mandela. When Zuma was repeatedly booed by large segments of the crowd at Mandela’s memorial at the FNB Stadium, ANC apparatchiks foisted the blame upon a handful of malcontents. Critics responded that the highly vocal discontent seemed to emanate from urbanbased members of the lower middle class, many of them potential firsttime voters falling within the younger age categories whom the ANC was anxious to please.21 Thereafter, Zuma’s appearances were carefully marshalled (albeit not wholly successfully) to avoid further embarrassment. However, the ANC was to be shaken by the extent to which revolt had spread throughout wider reaches of the alliance. The changing face of opposition politics The consolidation of ANC dominance over four successive elections since 1994 had been matched by the steady rise of the DA as the major force of opposition. Although eleven other parties had secured a total of 68 seats in the 2009 election, none of them came close to matching the DA, which had secured 67 seats on its own. Indeed, by 2014 the prospects for these other parties seemed increasingly dim.The Congress of the People (COPE), 12
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formed by pro-Mbeki elements who had left the ANC after Polokwane, was riven by leadership disputes since its genesis. Internal divisions had seen it lose members (most, apparently, back to the ANC), and it appeared highly unlikely to win anything like the 30 seats it had obtained in 2009. The IFP had seen its base in KwaZulu-Natal whittled away by the ANC over the years, its performance worsening with each election, and with the 85-yearold Mangosuthu Buthelezi still at its helm, it offered little to suggest that it could reverse its decline (see Chapter 6 by Laurence Piper). Of the rest – a motley collection of parties based around ethnicity, Christianity, Africanism or socialism – none showed significant signs of life, save perhaps the United Democratic Movement (UDM) of Bantu Holomisa, who made a valiant effort to build upon past popularity in order to re-establish a significant base in the Eastern Cape (see Chapter 7 by Cherrel Africa). In short, the DA appeared to have little to fear from the other parties in parliament, and rather more to gain if it could make inroads into their fragmented territory. The DA’s national vote had increased from the miserable 2% of its predecessor, the Democratic Party (DP), in 1994 to nearly 17% in 2009.22 In 2014, after initially punting hopes of gaining 30%, it had sensibly pruned back its publicised expectations to securing over 20%, with the view (it said) of offering a challenge that could unseat the ANC (or at least force it into coalition) in 2019. There were strong grounds for believing that it would attain its immediate objective. Over the years, it had used its parliamentary skills to demand accountability from government. Under Tony Leon, the DP had transmogrified into the DA after a shortlived coalition with the formerly ruling NP. This had collapsed when the NP’s leadership exited the new alliance, yet they failed to take the large body of their party’s supporters with them (opening the way to the DA’s later successes in the Western Cape). Under the successor leadership of Helen Zille, the DA had sought to re-engineer its unwanted image as a party of white privilege into a party that was open to all. Major efforts had been made to attract black voters through critiques of the ANC as a party of crony capitalism and to present the DA as the harbinger of an ‘open, opportunity society’. Aggressive campaigning efforts in the townships had underpinned vigorous attempts to recruit black members and promote blacks to prominent positions in parliament. Furthermore, since 2009 the DA had built upon its victories in the Western Cape and Cape Town to position itself not merely as a force of opposition, but as a party of government, and one which would run the country better than the ANC.23 13
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Above all, in a land of unemployment, it sought to outflank the ANC by promising jobs – its 2014 manifesto promised 6 million more over the next ten years. Despite the DA’s steady advance, its moves into hitherto uncharted territory had upset many in the party’s old guard, not least because a cohort of feisty younger blacks put noses out of joint by capturing leadership positions and demanding changes in the party programme. Notable divisions within the party surfaced around issues of race (a botched attempt by Zille to sign up Agang leader Mamphela Ramphele as the party’s presidential candidate, and whether the party should openly embrace BEE). With the right wing objecting that any endorsement of race-based policies amounted to a desertion of liberal principles, Zille responded by arguing the need for interventionist policies if historical racial inequalities were to be overcome. Even so, for all that the DA under Zille had moved towards the political centre to compete with the ANC, it continued to struggle with ANC representations of its image as ‘a party for whites’.24 Equally, while Zille claimed to be taking the party in a social-democratic direction, its commitment to business-friendly economic policies – whatever their merit – lacked appeal to the broad mass of black South Africans, who looked for vigorous state action to improve their livelihoods (see Chapter 4 by Zwelethu Jolobe). If the DA was set to make further inroads into the ruling party’s share of the vote, it at least offered a threat that for the ANC was predictable. However, what transformed the political scene, and made the contest in 2014 more than just another election, was the appearance of two newcomer parties. Each had a very different profile, but each threatened to eat further into the ANC’s support base. Agang was initially presented as appealing especially to the black middle class, and the EFF to workers, the poor and the unemployed. Mamphela Ramphele, former Black Consciousness leader, medical doctor, community activist, businesswoman, academic, and one-time World Bank director, had in her later years become a strident independent critic of what she saw as the ANC’s political degeneration. In February 2013 she formed Agang as a ‘political forum’, before launching it as a party a few months later. Agang presented itself as offering clean, competent and responsive government, tackling the corruption that scared away investors, strengthening watchdog institutions, ensuring greater access to high-quality educational and health systems, and building an inclusive economy.25 14
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With its senior positions staffed by mainly black professionals, the new party seemed designed to appeal to elements of the black middle class alienated from the ANC yet unable to overcome a reflex antipathy to the DA, even though its policies were more than a little similar. One such was Vanessa Hani, the daughter of Chris Hani, the former leader of the SACP who was assassinated by right-wingers in April 1993, who accused the ANC of betraying her father’s legacy. However, Agang’s promising beginning faltered rapidly. Ramphele, a critic of BEE, made a show of disclosing her wealth, claiming a net worth of R55 million, only for media reports to dig out an article by Forbes magazine which maintained her riches were ten times more than that and, worse, partly made through her involvement in a BEE deal with a firm called Circle Capital Ventures.26 The party rapidly lost momentum. Vanessa Hani soon left for COPE. This was followed in early 2014 by the ill-fated deal struck with Zille whereby Ramphele agreed to become the DA’s ‘presidential candidate’, only to withdraw almost immediately when faced by strong opposition from within her own party.The incident severely damaged Agang’s credibility, leaving the votes of significant elements of the black middle class up for grabs (see Chapter 7 by Cherrel Africa and Chapter 10 by Amuzweni Ngoma). In policy terms, the differences between the DA, COPE and Agang were minimal, and they were all competing to occupy the centrist ideological terrain which had long been dominated by the ANC. For its part, the ANC regularly and ritually presented its pragmatic centrism in revolutionary terms in order to solidify its alliance with the SACP and COSATU. However, since Polokwane, the SACP and COSATU had become paralysed by internal divisions.27 For its part, the SACP, under Blade Nzimande, who combined his party leadership with a place in the cabinet as minister of higher education, aligned itself strongly with the Zuma ascendancy, as did numerous union leaders who were themselves members of the Communist Party. On the other hand, long-standing ‘workerist’ tendencies within COSATU, notably within NUMSA, developed an increasingly articulate critique of South Africa’s ‘neo-liberal’ capitalist trajectory under the ANC–Alliance hegemony, gaining support from workers from diverse unions across the federation. Dissidence within COSATU then became tangled up with the suspension by COSATU’s hierarchy of its general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, for sexual and alleged financial improprieties, although the political 15
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motive was transparently that he had become a vocal critic of ANC venality and was aligned with the NUMSA rebels. By early 2014, it was widely expected that NUMSA would break away from COSATU. In late 2013, it had resolved not to campaign for the ANC in the forthcoming election, before it announced in early March that it was forging solidarity with popularly based organisations in civil society to form a new workers’ party, to be called the United Front and Movement for Socialism. However, although the ‘NUMSA moment’ was hailed by its sympathisers as heralding a radical break from the ANC’s collaboration with neo-liberalism, NUMSA general secretary Irvin Jim indicated that the new party would be launched only later, and would not be contesting the 2014 election. This left the space to the left of the ANC open for occupation by the EFF. The EFF was formed at a meeting in Soweto on 27 July 2013, attended by a thousand ‘fighters’ to discuss the ANC’s deviation from the Freedom Charter. With Julius Malema as its head, it took the immediate decision to constitute itself as a political party and to contest the forthcoming elections, styling itself a militant movement for economic emancipation which was radical, leftist and anti-imperialist. Subsequently, the EFF was officially launched at Marikana on Sunday 13 October 2013 at the site at which 34 mineworkers had been shot and killed by the police in 2013, following which the EFF formally unveiled its election manifesto at a rally in Tembisa on 23 February 2014. The EFF’s manifesto outlined a programme of radical nationalism. The state would be empowered to take over all land without compensation; it would assume 60% ownership of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy; the Reserve Bank would be nationalised; state-owned enterprises would be placed under worker control; BEE and affirmative action would be vigorously pursued, although the enrichment of the few would be prevented; sustainable development would be promoted by local beneficiation of mineral resources and the building of one million small enterprises by 2019; a minimum wage of R4,500 per month would be instituted for all full-time workers; salaries of public servants would be increased by 50%; existing social grants would be doubled; free quality education, health care, houses and sanitation would be provided for all; privileges for politicians would be curbed; and the EFF would enhance the accountability and efficiency of state institutions.28 The EFF was a product of two intersecting events: Malema’s expulsion 16
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from the ANC and the Marikana massacre.When his final efforts to remain in the ANC had failed, Malema was freed from political constraints and enabled to use his undoubted talents to present himself as a champion of the poor.While the striking mineworkers at Marikana had repudiated ANC politicians, they lionised Malema, who had yoked support for their wage demands to the need for radical economic transformation. The EFF soon positioned itself as the vehicle for all those who had lost patience with the ANC. Initially it looked as though it would target the youth, particularly after the collapse of ANC Youth League structures. But soon it cast its net much wider, appealing to ‘people discouraged through unemployment to workers who cannot break the poverty barrier and professionals frustrated with people being unable to rise in the workplace’. Appropriating a populist-militarist persona, with Malema its ‘commander-in-chief ’ at the head of an army of red-bereted foot soldiers, the EFF proclaimed itself a government-in-waiting.29 The rise of the EFF sent shock waves throughout the establishment. Representatives of international investors hurried to meet with Malema in Alexandra township, the conviction being that, whatever its immediate performance, the EFF was a force to be reckoned with.30 Meanwhile, the EFF was regarded with deep suspicion by varied bodies such as the (Trotskyist) Democratic Socialist Movement, which had been particularly active in providing support to the striking miners at Marikana, and the Democratic Left Front, which enjoyed close relations with NUMSA and saw itself as undertaking groundwork for the formation of a broadly based socialist movement. Such organisations viewed the EFF as ‘petty bourgeois lumpen’ and populist, and Malema as fraudulently radical. Nonetheless, they appreciated the need to take the EFF seriously, for it clearly had significant appeal for constituencies whose support they themselves coveted. For all its political visibility, the EFF seemed unlikely to make a major impact in terms of the vote. Its support was concentrated within Malema’s home province of Limpopo and across the platinum belt in North West. Malema’s credibility was undermined by the allegations of corruption that dogged him, as well as his being pursued for a massive R16 million debt by the taxman. In any case, the EFF appeared to appeal most to categories of people – the youth, the poor and unemployed – disproportionate numbers of whom were not registered to vote. Indeed, an Ipsos poll on the eve of the elections suggested that the EFF would obtain at best no more than 5% of the vote. 17
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For all its limitations, the appearance of the EFF pointed to a wider disenchantment among those whose commitment to the ANC had hitherto been solid. However much the ANC was able to recover lost ground (by early May, Ipsos was reporting that it would obtain some 63% of the vote), suspicion remained that, come what may, the foundations of the ruling party’s support base was beginning to give way. This was signalled by the announcement in mid-April of Sidikwe! Vukani!, a campaign by – among others – former ANC ministers Ronnie Kasrils and Nozizwe MadlalaRoutledge, who proclaimed that the liberation movement had lost its way, and that the substantial advances of the last twenty years had been undermined by ‘corruption, cronyism and control over the public debate’, which had spread like a cancer through the ANC and ‘because of this through government and state institutions’. They therefore urged people to ‘Vote No’ by spoiling their vote or voting for a party of opposition (although not for the DA, which they cited as sharing the ANC’s commitment to neoliberalism).31 The ANC countered by dispatching Cyril Ramaphosa to patch up a truce between COSATU and Vavi, although Vavi was subsequently only lukewarm in his public support for the party. Election 2014: prologue to change? Even though, by the eve of the election, polls suggested that the ANC would again win a handsome victory, there was a strong sense that the political landscape was changing. Above all, this raised a series of questions about how the ANC would respond now and in subsequent elections to challenges to its electoral and political dominance: • W hat tactics and strategies would the ANC employ in its campaigning to counter threats posed not only by the DA but more particularly by dissidents from within its own camp? • To what extent, if any, would it use its state resources to tilt the electoral playing field in its direction? Further, when pressed by challenge in long-established ANC areas, would it allow free campaigning by other parties, or would it seek to close it down, either by misuse of state powers or by resorting to violence? Would the independence and integrity of the IEC remain intact? • How would it seek to counter political threats by appealing to particular constituencies, such as segments of the working class and the black middle class and, more broadly, the ‘born-frees’? 18
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Related questions concerning the shape of the party system followed on: • F or all that the DA seemed set to further consolidate its position as the leading party of opposition, would its performance provide evidence of its ability to transform itself into a party able to appeal to black voters as a viable alternative to the ANC, while at the same time retaining its support among minorities? • What was the likely longer-term significance of the rise of the EFF, apparently set to be the third-largest party in parliament, in a wider context where small parties were being squeezed between the ANC and DA? • What effect would what many deemed to be the most competitive election since 1994 have upon voter turnout? In particular, what appeal would the EFF have for important vital constituencies such as the unemployed, black youth and the poor, not to mention disaffected members of the black middle class? Would the performance of the EFF provide greater or lesser opportunity for any new, post-election party of the left? The answers to such questions would prove vital to assessing not merely the health and shape of South African democracy, but also whether the ANC’s long-term capacity ‘to regenerate itself in power’32 was at risk. To reiterate the question posed by Allister Sparks: would Election 2014 indicate that South Africa was on the cusp of a potential political transition?
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