Fall 2017 by The Consul

FALL 2017

TH E I N TE R N ATI O N A L A F FA I R S A SSO C I AT I O N / UN I V E R SI T Y O F P E N N SY LVA N I A

CATALONIA’S

FIGHT

FOR INDEPENDENCE 15 Brieﬁng the Mexican Elections

24 The Rohingya Crisis: What the World Should do

27 The ICC: A Global (In)justice system? THECONSUL.ORG

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

GENOCIDE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Kavi Munjal

THE TOUGH NEW REALITY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS: HOW GERMANY MAY HAVE HALTED MACRON’S VISION Ethan Woolley

NUKE OR NOT? THE DILEMMA OF KIM JONG-UN Sherry Tseng

THE FORGOTTEN CIVIL WAR Bradley Smith

MEXICO’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Nick Palombi

CATALONIA: THE RICH SECESSION Brook Jiang

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THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: A DANGEROUS GAME Andrew Noh WHY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST PROTECT THE ROHINGYA Pat Wilson THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL (IN) JUSTICE SYSTEM? Leslie Hicks

KILLED IN KASHMIR: THE STORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST CONTESTED REGION Shravan Balaji

THE CASE FOR A KURDISH STATE Jordan Dewar

AMERICAN-CUBAN RELATIONS: THE IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT Maria Turner

CENTRAL ASIA 101 Sofiya Pavlova

THE BREXIT DEADLOCK: THERESA MAY’S CONSERVATIVE PARTY Joe Pires

AMERICA IN NIGER: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY Jake Cohen

COLUMBIA’S POLITICAL SNAPSHOT Valentina Losada

ISIS’ MAOIST INSURGENCY Sophie Pu

MACRI’S ARGENTINA: THE END OF PERONISMO? Claire Reardon

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

STAFF

EDITOR IN CHIEF Claire Reardon

CHIEF OF DESIGN Ilana Wurman

CHIEF OF STAFF Ethan Woolley

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS Angie Ra

CONTENT EDITORS

Latin America: Nick Palombi Europe: Joe Pires Asia: Sherry Tseng Middle East: Jordan Dewar Africa: Kavi Munjal

Dear Reader of The Consul, I am pleased to present you with the Fall 2017 edition of The Consul. In this issue, we explore a variety of news stories and events from around the world. I’m especially thrilled to highlight the cover topic, the Catalonian independence movement. From Catalan’s original referendum to the deployment of Spanish troops, the tension between Catalonia and the rest of Spain heightened at a shocking rate as The Consul went to press. In her article, Brook Jiang analyzes the movement from start to finish in order to understand the complicated forces at play. In addition to Catalonia, Consul writers investigate the Rohingya crisis, the Mexican general elections, and the justice of the International Criminal Court (or lack thereof ). We strive to provide our readers with diverse perspectives on a diverse range of topics, and I am particularly proud of our efforts this season.

LAYOUT EDITORS

The Consul also had the good fortune to work with four accomplished guest columnists. Shravan Balaji and Bradley Smith from the IAA’s Intercollegiate Model United Nations Team report on the Kashmir conflict and the Yemeni Civil War, respectively, Valentina Losada examines Colombia’s election trends, and Maria Turner covers U.S.-Cuba relations. We’re excited to showcase these insightful pieces.

STAFF WRITERS

The Consul is dedicated to providing an outlet for students from a variety of backgrounds to share their knowledge and opinions on international current events. I hope that, in reading, you continue to develop your interest in and understanding of global affairs. I also encourage you to read our online blog at theconsul.org, where writers publish up-to-date content on an ongoing basis.

Ami Feng Spencer Swanson Valeria Zeballos Doubinko Margaret Zhang

Christian Butts Jake Cohen Maria Formoso Leslie Hicks Brook Jiang Andrew Noh Soiya Pavlova Sophie Pu Pat Wilson Anish Welde

I have greatly enjoyed the privilege of working with The Consul’s talented writing and layout staff this season and could not be prouder of my team’s efforts. Thank you, and enjoy The Consul! Claire Reardon Editor-in-Chief

THE CONSUL is a publication of the University of Pennsylvania International Affairs Association. The print issue is published twice a year, while there is constant new content being published online at theconsul.org. The Consul team is made up of Penn undergrads who are also members of the International Affairs Association. For inquiries, please email theconsul@penniaa.com.

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EARLY WARNING SIGNS? Genocide in the Central African Republic BY: KAVI MUNJAL

have seen the film “Hotel Rwanda” three times, in three separate educational settings. In each, the audience—myself included—was horrified by the scenes of systematic genocide, disgusted by the implied avoidance and lack of concern from the rest of the world, and ashamed for not having been more aware of the atrocities suffered by hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. Certainly, such evil would never be

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able to rule in any corner of the world again. Certainly. The fifty-seven-year history of the Central African Republic has been riddled with the unconstitutional elections of political leaders, most of whom have been overthrown in an even less constitutional manner. The most recent conflict began in late 2012, when groups who were displeased with the progress of a previous peace deal began to

form a mainly Muslim alliance called the Séléka. Throughout the following year, the group captured, burned and looted cities around the country, advancing toward the capital (Bangui) as Christian militias called the anti-Balaka (antimachete) struggled to halt the rebels. In December of 2012, nervous and angry Bangui civilians protested a lack of assistance to fight the rebels at the French and American embassies.

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The seven hundred troops sent from a coalition of African countries could do little to stop the Séléka, and the six hundred French troops deployed to the country were tasked only with protecting French nationals. (Sound familiar?) President Francois Bozize fled the country in early 2013, and the Séléka leader Michel Djotodia declared himself President. Djotodia soon disbanded the Séléka in order to slow the looting and lawlessness that had taken hold in the country, but even he no longer controlled the rebels. They further split into ExSéléka factions and fought both each other and the anti-Balaka. By the end of 2013, the sectarian violence began to draw comparisons to both the Rwandan and Bosnian genocides two decades prior. Over 1,000 people were killed in December, with reports of mass killings and the beheading of children. Unlike during the Rwandan genocide,the international community has fairly responsive, However, the effectiveness of its intervention has been highly controversial, and violence in the country has continued for far longer. In early 2014, the European Union sent 500 soldiers and the French upped its troop count to 2,000 to join the 6,000 African Union soldiers struggling to keep peace in the CAR. Two months later, the United Nations deployed nearly 12,000 peacekeepers. But the approximately 20,000 foreign troops in the country did little to quell the rampant killing and destruction of the rapidly shifting sectarian alliances. Throughout 2015, accusations of rape and sexual exploitation of minors brought humiliation to UN peacekeepers and French troops. In the 2015 release of the Human

Development Index (HDI), a measure of livability calculated by the United Nations through indicators of life expectancy, education and income, the CAR ranked 188th—last, for the third year in a row. Former Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was peacefully elected in 2016; later that year, the French claimed success and announced they would end their peacekeeping mission. Outside of Bangui, however, little has changed since the peacekeepers originally entered the country. Ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka militias, continuously reforming alliances along various sectarian lines, fight for control of cities while the government can do little besides observe. In places like the northern town of Ndele, an ExSéléka faction has set up its own governance, collecting taxes and implementing its own judicial system while government officials have no choice but to cooperate. Ironically, these towns are amongst the country’s most peaceful, while brutal violence continues elsewhere. The insignificance of the impact of the international community’s attempted peacekeeping is remarkable in the most horrific way. Unlike with Rwanda, there has been no political motivation to deter action in the CAR; the missions there have simply been unable to change the everdeteriorating situation. In January 2017, the Central African Republic was declared the most dangerous nation for aid workers, with more security incidents reported than Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. In the heavily contentious city of Bambari, the World Food Program can provide food for only half of the population,

and government offices such as the courthouse are totally deserted. Most amazing, however, may be the recent claim by UN aid chief Stephen O’Brien that there are “early warning signs” of genocide in the CAR. For a country that has been drawing comparisons to Rwanda and Bosnia since 2013, that comment can only be felt as a stinging insult to the thousands who have been witness or victim to the brutal war crimes of the last five years. Rape, sexual slavery, and child soldiery have been employed by all belligerents throughout the fighting. If it is genocide, then it has already been genocide for some time. The United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide visited the Central African Republic last week and “strongly condemned provocation of ethnic and religious hatred armed groups and politicians” in the country and called on all parties to commit to dialogue and “condemn the unacceptable manipulations that seek to divide the society.” Yet, astonishingly, the violence remains absent from even the sub-headlines of most news sources. At this point, most of the warring Ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka militias are fighting each other, with the government and civilians as helpless bystanders. They fight not for any specific ideologies, but instead for resources like mines which they can use to fund the purchase of necessities and more weapons. Many find that joining these factions is the only way to access resources, and to eat. Half of the country’s population suffers from hunger and requires humanitarian aid. The UN peacekeeping mandate is set to expire in November. I am horrified, disgusted, and ashamed.

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THE TOUGH NEW REALITY

IN EUROPEAN POLITICS

How Germany May Have Halted Macron’s Vision for Europe BY: ETHAN WOOLLEY

n September 24th, Angela Merkel was reelected to a fourth and final term as the Chancellor of Germany in elections which shocked much of Europe. Merkel’s party, the Christian Democrats, had its worst result since 1949, winning only 33% of the vote. While it was enough to keep Merkel in office,

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she will have to form a coalition government with parties deeply opposed to her and her Christian Democrats, a troubling result for Emmanuel Macron. Two days after the German elections, the 39-year-old French president laid out his vision for the future of the European project in a speech at Sorbonne, in

Paris. Macron, a pro-EU former investment banker, spoke on the need for a “renewal of a sovereign, united, and democratic Europe” on a number of issues, including taxes, immigration, intelligence and defense coordination, and financial stability. Macron supports the creation of a “joint intervention force, a common

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defense budget, and a joint doctrine for action” for the EU. Just over a year after the United Kingdom voted to withdraw from the EU, France began pushing the European project towards further integration. Macron was counting on driving said integration by jumpstarting the powerful Franco-German engine. Germany’s elections, however, may force France’s idealistic new president to face a difficult political reality in his most important continental partner. Because Merkel’s Christian Democrats failed to win a majority, she will have to form a coalition government with the Free Democrats (FDP), who are opposed to many of Macron’s proposals. For one, the fiscally conservative party opposes the creation of a Eurozone budget or any institution which may cause financial transfers from wealthier Eurozone countries to poorer ones. In his speech, Macron set a goal for France and Germany to completely integrate their markets and corporate rules by 2024. Macron also wants to turn the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) bailout fund into a European Monetary Fund, whereas the FDP wants to phase out the ESM completely. Alexander Lambsdorff, an FDP member of the European Parliament, said in a statement that “the problem in Europe is not a lack of public funds, but the lack of reform. A Eurozone budget would set exactly the wrong incentives.” The other party which

Merkel will be forced to form a coalition with is the Greens, who line up with Macron on many issues. However, after inter-party talks October 19th, a Greens politician told Reuters that all of the parties involved were opposed to Macron’s proposed Eurozone budget. Instead, the new government is likely to proceed down a path towards further fiscal discipline. Nonetheless, the Greens have expressed their interest in working with Macron and EU President Jean-Claude Juncker to tackle fiscal, defense, and migration problems through further cooperation. Merkel expressed tepid support for Macron’s proposals, which include the creation of an EU finance minister and a microparliament for the Eurozone.

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be used for “French public spending or fixing Berlusconi’s mistakes” in Italy. In a speech after the election, but right before Macron’s speech at Sorbonne, Merkel stressed the need to move beyond “slogans”, adding that she would be discussing this with Macron. Macron did offer a concession to Berlin, which opposes underwriting the debt of weaker economies, by saying that there was no need to mutualize existing debt. The Telegraph reported that sources in the Élysée Palace said that French officials are optimistic about the situation because Merkel will remain Chancellor for the next four years, signaling four years of government stability between France and Germany. What they may be missing,

Just over a year after the United Kingdom voted to “Brexit” from the EU, France is pushing the European project towards further integration.”

Christian Lindner, the head of the FDP, said that his party had a “strong interest” in the strength of France, but expressed opposition to the idea of a centralized Eurozone budget because, in his view, German money shouldn’t

however, is just how helpful Merkel will be. Being forced to appease her governing coalition with the FDP is just part of the battle that the German Chancellor will face in her fourth term—the far-right AFD, or Alternative for

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Deutschland, has now become the main opposition party in Eastern Germany and, after winning 13% of the vote, a far-right party will have representation in the German Parliament for the first time in 50 years, having won over 90 seats. The AFD has now become the third-largest party in Germany, despite having been formed only four years ago. Initially an anti-euro party in favor of reinstating the Deutschmark, the AFD has shifted its focus

neighboring France and Belgium. Macron’s EU reforms have hit other roadblocks as well. Latvian Prime Minister Maris Kucinskis criticized the French president’s proposal to establish a uniform corporate tax rate within the Eurozone by 2020. The prime minister argued that a country like Latvia, with only two million inhabitants and a living standard two-thirds of the EU average, requires its own tools to attract investment, saying “they can’t be the same ones that old Europe

has been fueled “ ThebyAFD a growing anxiety within Germany over Islam and Merkel’s policies regarding refugees and asylum seekers.”

towards immigration and Islam in Germany. This shift began in 2015 when Merkel decided to admit roughly 1.3 million primarilyMiddle Eastern undocumented migrants and refugees. The AFD has been fueled by a growing anxiety within Germany over Islam and Merkel’s policies regarding refugees and asylum seekers, fears which have been heightened by the recent spate of terrorist attacks in Germany and

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uses.” AfterMacron’s overwhelming victory over far-right candidate Marine Le Pen in France’s presidential elections in May, many observers concluded that France had finally stopped the populist movement that swept Donald Trump into the White House and caused the United Kingdom to part ways with the EU. The results in Germany, however, may indicate

that Macron’s election was the exception, not the rule. The only differentiating factor between the outcomes in Germany and France may be their electoral structure. In France, the president is directly elected by the voters and then there is a second round of legislative elections a few months later; in Germany, however, the Chancellor is elected by a majority of members of the Bundestag, the lower house of parliament, making the head-of-state’s election dependent on the outcome of the legislative elections. This institutional difference may have shielded Macron from the populism which was on display in Germany’s elections. In Foreign Policy, Matthias Matthijs and Erik Jones compared the first round of legislative elections in France with their German counterparts and identified a startling similarity. Macron’s centrist movement En Marche! garnered around one-third of the vote, just like Merkel’s Christian Democrats. Marine Le Pen’s farright Front National received roughly 13%, like the far-right German AFD, and the far-left in France got 14% compared to the German far-left’s 9%. The populist surge hasn’t spared France, its president was simply insulated from its effects. If the legislative outcomes in France and Germany are indicative of sentiments on the continent as a whole, then Macron may have a more daunting fight than expected if he wants to push his reforms through, and a weakened Merkel will not be much of a help.

NUKE OR NOT? The Dilemma of Kim Jong-Un: Why North Korea is seeking a nuclear program

BY: SHERRY TSENG

n December 28, 2011, after the death of his father Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un was declared the Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, making him the Supreme Leader of the country. Like with any change in regime, North Korea had the nervous eyes of the international community on it. Would this mean a continuation of Kim Jong-il’s policies? An overturn? In particular, what did this mean for the future of the nuclear missile program? The North Korean nuclear program began in 1962 with a campaign of “all-fortressization,” during which it set the groundwork

for its hyper militarization as seen today. In doing so, it requested assistance from the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons. Though the USSR turned down this particular request, it did agree to another proposal: a peaceful nuclear program. For this, the Soviet Union began to train nuclear scientists in North Korea. Clearly, North Korea did not take the rejection from the USSR as a deterrence. By the 1980s, it began to develop nuclear weapons of its own. It was then that, over the protests of the international community, the nuclear missile program was born. Time and time again, foreign powers attempted to pressure North Korea, both economically

and diplomatically, to abandon its nuclear plan. On certain occasions, Kim Jong-il conceded to the negotiations, agreeing to halt its progress in the nuclear arms. However, missile and nuclear tests only proved his verbal agreements were futile. With the ascension of Kim Jong-Un to the position of Supreme Leader, the nuclear missile program has since only accelerated. Of all tests conducted since 1984, half of them have been under Kim Jong-Un’s reign. In 2017 alone, tests occurred on nine separate occasions. In one of these, on August 29, 2017, North Korea launched three short-range ballistic missiles over the Japanese archipelago. Shortly after, on

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September 15th, it fired another missile over Hokkaido. Travelling 3,700 kilometers and reaching up to 770 kilometers, this missile traveled the longest distance any of any thus far. As these tests continue, it becomes hazier and hazier under the gaze of the international community why exactly these tests are occurring. The first thought may be perhaps that North Korea is accruing a stockpile of nuclear weapons in preparation for a nuclear war, reminiscent of the arms race during the Cold War, in which the world stood on the brink of an all-out nuclear war. Such an idea is not completely inconceivable, particularly given the recent rhetoric exchanged between Kim Jong-un and the Trump administration. In the inaugural address to the U.N. General Assembly, Trump declared, “The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” In response, KNCA, the North Korean state news agency, released Kim Jong-un’s remarks, warning that that threat will be countered with a serious consideration of a “corresponding, highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history.” In the speech, Kim Jong-un continues on, saying that he “will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech calling for totally destroying the D.P.R.K.” and that he “will surely and definitely tame the mentally deranged U.S.

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dotard with fire.” However, when it comes to considering the implications of a nuclear war, many experts agree that the possibility of it occurring is actually excruciating low. Each conversation regarding the imminent breakout of a nuclear war is built on the assumption that North Korea would be the one to initiate the war. But experts agree that this is unlikely because to do so would essentially be a pushing a suicide button. In the event that North Korea does play the offensive card, the United States and its allies are sure to retaliate, which could mean complete annihilation for the D.P.R.K. But if not to engage in nuclear war, why build up a nuclear missile program in the first place? FEAR OF FOREIGN ATTACK North Korea, since its inception, has been the subject of so much international condemnation that it is no secret that it is far from being the most popular country. In the 1980s, it was mocked by even the Eastern bloc as the quintessential Stalinist irrationality. As a regime that maintains nearly total control over all aspects of daily life, it is constantly under scrutiny as more and more countries succumb to the threats of democracy. But these falls to democracy never occur quite spontaneously. Most involve foreign intervention, particularly that from the United States and its allies. In assessing the possibility of foreign intervention to the authoritarian

FEB 1956: USSR sends scientists and technicians to train North Koreans to develop a nuclear program.

1991: Koreas sign the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1994: North Korea repeatedly denies the International Atomic Energy Agency access to nuclear waste sites, prompting suspicion over a potential nuclear weapons program

APR 2003: Six-Party Talks with China, the US, Japan, Russia, and South Korea to negotiate the future of North Korea’s nuclear program

OCT 9 2006: North Korea claims to have conducted another nuclear test OCT 14 2006: UNSC Resolution 1718 is passed, imposing a series of economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea

2017: Series of nuclear tests take place with the ultimate goal being to launch an intercontinental missile

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regime, there appears to be no happy ending for the standing leaders. Take the examples of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban leaders of Afghanistan, all of whom were ousted violently. However, perhaps the most relevant precedent for North Korea is the example of former Libyan President Gaddafi. In 2003, Gaddafi agreed to surrender his nuclear weapons development program in exchange for economic benefits. Not long after the deal occurred, the Libyan revolution broke out, causing NATO to lead a military intervention – purportedly as a response to the United Nations’ call to end crimes against humanity in Libya. As to Gaddafi, the last anyone saw of him was his body strung across a car bonnet. INTERNATIONAL RESPECT Going hand in hand with the paranoia of foreign intervention is Kim Jong-Un’s need to command international respect, lest he too fall vulnerable to the United States. Given that the international system is largely dominated by the United States and its allies, Kim JongUn certainly feels as if his voice is unheard and disrespected. The nuclear program forces the international eye onto North Korea, serving to remind the rest of the world that North Korea is not just another small, passive country. This is also reflected in the North Korean theory of selfreliance crafted by Kim Jong-Un’s grandfather, otherwise known as

Byungjin. The theory consists of both economic construction and the development of a nuclear arsenal. To prop up North Korea in the international arena means to prop up its military might. With this, Kim Jong-Un also has much more bargaining power; the nuclear power plants keep other countries cautious of North Korea’s capabilities, curbing the extent of intervention and involvement in the country. CULT OF PERSONALITY Perhaps one of the most distinguishing factors of the North Korean ruling family is its long-established cult of personality. North Koreans are meant to essentially worship and be completely devoted to the Supreme Leader – even more so than to their families. So why is this nuclear program so pivotal? Because Kim Jong-Un promised it. To go back on his word then is to admit fault and lose credibility on his future promises. Furthermore, in a personal statement, published on state newspapers and national television, Kim calls Trump out for “deny[ing] the existence of and insult[ing] me and my country in front of the eyes of the world.” With this recent exchange of rhetoric, it is clear that Kim JongUn now has even more of a reason to continue his nuclear program and to brush off the insults. This is propagated by Kim’s reaction to the 2014 film The Interview, a mockery of the supreme leader, in which he issued a threat to attack the United States on a 9/11 scale.

ADVERTISING Others argue that one of the reasons for North Korea’s numerous missile tests is that they are meant to be a marketing ploy. Given that North Korea pours the majority of its GDP into the military, it has an enormous supply of weapons and small arms. That said, because the international community consistently imposes new sanctions on Pyongyang, the nation must find a way to boost its economy. According to a report by the Small Arms Survey at the Geneva Graduate Institute, the country is one of the leading illicit exporters of small arms and light weapons. What data can be found is only based on weapons seizures. For example, in August 2016, Egyptian officials intercepted 132 tons of arms cargo, including approximately 30,000 rocketpropelled grenades. The report found that clients of the D.P.R.K. include Iran, Syria, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Yemen. ***

The reasons North Korea has nuclear weapons are many, and from the perspective of Kim JongUn, almost justified to maintain his regime and place both domestically and internationally. However, only in due time, North Korea must choose between two options: to relinquish and abandon the nuclear program, or to unleash the nuclear power in all its fury.

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THE FORGOTTEN CIVIL WAR BY: BRADLEY SMITH

country located in the oil-rich Gulf of Aden, the Republic of Yemen is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. For decades, the country faced a harsh religious and cultural division between the North and South. It wasnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t until the 1990s that unification

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was achieved; however, this unification did not last for long. Along with southern separatism, Yemen has faced problematic and troublesome insurgencies from a number of factions, including a Sunni group known as the Houthis, Northern Shiites, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP), and ISIS. The Houthis effectively forced President Hadi to resign and flee to South Yemen. This resignation symbolized a shift in power in favor of the Houthis; it acted as a catalyst for the rise of extremist groups such as AQAP and ISIS. South Yemen in particular, under the

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leadership of Hadi, is filled with quasi-autonomous tribes that, if combined with Hadi’s loyal forces, could potentially fight for secession. Furthermore, international players who have historically aided Yemen financially, such as Saudi Arabia, threaten to withdraw if the Houthis maintain power, a threat that could result in the collapse of the state. The United States has also become increasingly concerned, as it had strong ties with Hadi. For the U.S., this represents a loss in the nation’s fight against terrorism. To date, the U.S. has withdrawn military forces from the country but continued drone strikes. Despite this, the AQAP and ISIS have continued to thrive. Such unstable political conditions could have a great impact the political dynamics of the Middle East and beyond. On a civilian level, millions are facing famine, malnutrition, outbreaks of disease, and displacement. As is true for many civil wars, the civil war in Yemen began with a territorial dichotomy. In fact, until 1990, the nation was split into two territories: the Yemen Arab Republic in the north, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. These two regions differed not only in geography but also in religion, culture, and political structure. For instance, North Yemen predominantly practiced Zaidiyyah, a sect of Shia Islam, and was ruled by tribal confederations. In contrast, South Yemenis were Sunnis, ruled by a radical MarxistLeninist political group called the Yemeni Socialist Party. On May 22nd, 1990, Yemen was unified under Ali Abdullah Saleh, the

Northern president, and officially named the Republic of Yemen, with its capital in Sanaa, a northern city. In 2011, in the midst of the Tunisian revolution, Yemeni insurgents began to protest, demanding that Saleh leave office. They cited corruption, lack of democratic and economic reform, and human rights abuses during his nearly three decades in office. By April of 2011, Saleh was forced to step down, and his Vice President, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a Sunni Muslim, was elected in his place. One of the main insurgent groups involved in the 2011 Yemen Revolution was the Houthis. The Houthis are a Shiite faction located in the Saada Province in Northern Yemen. They are modeled on the traditional “imamate” form of governance, in which positions of leadership are both confined to Shia Islam and focused on Imamah, also known as the divine institution. The Houthis were among the strongest military forces in Northern Yemen and ended up unifying with the loyal military units of former President Saleh against President Hadi, effectively shifting from their previous alliance. The group claimed that its rejection stemmed from the November 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council deal, which lacked provisions for fundamental governmental reform. Furthermore, the Houthis described it as a “conspiracy” against the group, as the deal split Yemen into six federations, which they argued would “[divide] Yemen into poor and wealthy regions.” In their eyes, dividing the areas they controlled would effectively lessen their influence. On

September 21st, 2014, the Houthis stormed the Yemeni capital, and, with little opposition from the Yemeni Army, forced the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa. In response, the UN intervened, attempting to mediate. The ensuing Peace and National Partnership Agreement attempted to form a “unity government.” However, on January 20th, 2015, Houthi forces staged a coup d’état, seizing the presidential palace, key military bases, parliamentary power, and most significantly, forcing the resignation of President Hadi. Mr. Hadi fled and sought refuge among his many supporters in the southern Sunni city of Aden. Meanwhile, the Houthis declared their control, working with Saleh to establish the Supreme Political Council as a governing body despite growing tensions throughout the nation and backlash from the UN. March 21st, 2015 marked the start of the Yemeni Civil War. Subsequent to the usurpation of the Sana’a and Yemeni government, the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee announced its intent to mobilize, overthrow President Hadi, and expand its forces into the Southern provinces. By the next day, the Houthis, combined with troops loyal to Saleh, traveled to the Lahj governorate; by March 25th, the territory was under Houthi control. Now in the outskirts of Aden, Houthi forces began nearing Hadi, but he fled the country that same day. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, under a coalition with intelligence aid from the United States, worked to launch military strikes on the country, with the goal of subduing

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the Houthi uprising and ultimately restoring the former Yemeni government under Hadi. With Iran’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and concurrent support of the Houthis, tensions between the two nations

entered the country, proclaiming its rule over many of its provinces and urging its supporters to vehemently oppose the Houthis and Zaydi Shias. These ISIS militants have bombed much of the country, often

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In order to mitigate the negative effects seen in past interventions, international actors will have to reanalyze several aspects of their countries’ policies toward Yemen.

have fueled action within Yemen. The Hadi government in Yemen is internationally supported and recognized by many nations such as the U.S. The Saudi-led coalition has targeted the Houthis in the Southern regions of the country, performing over 8,000 air raids. As a result, vital infrastructure has been decimated, and thousands of civilians have been injured or suffered death. In addition to international intervention in the conflict, the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has entered, fighting to eliminate all remnants of the Hadi regime. To make matters worse, ISIS has

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targeting mosques in Sana’a. As of March 2017, since the commencement of the Yemeni Civil War 16,200 have been killed, including over 10,000 civilians and 785 children. In addition, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in August 2015 alone, over 100,000 people fled Yemen. These individuals seek refuge in nations such as Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. In total, the UNHCR approximated that the Yemeni Civil War has caused the displacement of over 2.4 million with 120,000 seeking asylum. Within the country itself, 14 million require humanitarian assistance such as

food, water, fuel, and medicine but are constrained by limited resources and skyrocketing prices. Most recently, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that would effectively place sanctions on Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, call for a Houthi arms embargo, and demand that the Houthis exit Sana’a and other seized areas. The Houthis criticized the resolution, and mass protests followed. With peace talks currently being held in Kuwait, diplomacy has yet to bridge the gap between the insurgent parties, and any attempt at a ceasefire has yet to be enforced. The UN now has an opportunity to aid Yemen and its neighboring nations in reaching a peaceful resolution to the current armed conflict in the short term, as well as to play a constructive role in Yemen’s future and set the backdrop for longterm stability. In order to accomplish this, and to mitigate the negative effects seen in past interventions, international actors will have to reanalyze several aspects of their countries’ policies toward Yemen and aim to enable the development of effective pragmatic solutions that respect the civil and human rights of the Yemeni people. Bradley is a sophomore in the Wharton School majoring in Finance and minoring in Consumer Psychology. He is currently a member of the Intercollegiate Model United Nations team, and is interested in security and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and Africa.

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MEXICO’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BY: NICK PALOMBI

uring Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and throughout his administration, Mexico has been a constant theme. He began his campaign by labelling Mexicans as drug dealers and rapists; he continued with promises of building a wall along our southern border and renegotiating NAFTA because of its disproportionate benefits to Mexico. With all of Trump’s prattle grabbing the headlines, most Americans have ignored or maybe forgotten that significant political processes are occurring within Mexico. Next July, the country will hold elections for the presidency, as

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well as both houses of its congress. representation in a nation-wide So, here’s the lowdown of how this constituency. election works and the “who’s who” An important caveat on the of the candidates and parties. Chamber of Deputies elections is that the Mexican constitution HOW DOES IT ALL WORK? explicitly forbids any single party In July 2018, roughly 80 from obtaining more than 300 million registered Mexican voters seats. This safeguard exists in will go to the polls to elect a new order to prevent a single political president to a six-year term. They party from attaining the “qualified will also elect 500 deputies to majority” (or two-thirds control) in the lower chamber of Congress the Chamber, which would allow and 128 senators to the upper said party to approve constitutional chamber. In presidential elections, reforms. the candidate with the most votes The Senate has 128 members

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The main focus of this election will be fighting corruption, protecting citizens from drug cartel-related violence, and providing tangible economic benefits to citizens.” wins outright; it is not necessary to win a majority of the votes, and there is no runoff. Elections to the lower house of Congress function with a mix of first-past-the-post (what we use here in the U.S.) and proportional representation methods. In the Chamber of Deputies, 300 members are elected by relative majority in singlemember districts, and the other 200 are elected via proportional

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obtains the second largest number of votes in order to prevent any single party from having a super majority. The remaining 32 senators are appointed by means of proportional representation which uses voter rolls in a single national multi-member district. These conditions and various methods of electing officials are the result of Mexico’s extensive electoral reforms in the 1990s. From 1929 to 1999, a single political party, the centrist Partido Revolucionaria Institucional (PRI), ruled Mexico. Although elections were held throughout the 20th century, they were fraudulent and allowed the PRI to maintain a dictatorial grip on power. After the reforms of the 90s, Mexico began a transition to democracy. The first truly free and fair presidential elections were in 2000 and resulted in the victory of the center-right opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Since then, the PAN and PRI have each held the presidency at different points; the current president, Enrique Peña Nieto, is from the PRI. However, a string of corruption charges and a perceived inability to improve the lives of average Mexicans have tarnished the reputations of both the PAN and the PRI. With new political parties and increasing numbers of independent candidates, the outcome of next year’s election is far from clear.

that are elected through similar methods. Each of Mexico’s 32 states elects 3 senators by the majority formula; however, within this system, there are two formulas. Two senators are elected through the relative majority principle, that is, they belong to the party that obtains the largest WHO’S IN THE RUNNING? number of votes. The third It is still too early in the senator is appointed through the election cycle for parties to have first minority principle, meaning officially declared their candidates the seat goes to the party that

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for president, but there are indicators in most parties as to whom may be chosen. There are a number of potential candidates for the PRI, which is a relatively new phenomenon for the party. When the PRI exercised full control over the government, incumbent presidents would usually pick their successors. This has changed in recent years as party members have exercised a greater say. A key contender for president is the current secretary of finance, Luis Videgaray. He is the righthand man of President Nieto and oversaw many of the current administration’s structural reforms. His candidacy will depend on the benefits of those reforms reaching the average Mexican, which they have not yet. Another possibility is Minister of the Interior and former Governor of Hidalgo Miguel Angel Osorio Chong. He has championed victories against organized crime in Mexico and is another close ally of the president. Both men are party insiders with a strong chance of running. However, recent corruption scandals and the PRI’s failure to offer tangible gains to Mexican citizens put them at a serious disadvantage in the upcoming election. Beyond the candidates, the PRI as a party currently polls third amongst Mexicans. The traditional opposition, the PAN, faces internal division as party members are split between supporters of former President Calderon and supporters of the party’s current president, Gustavo Madero. These opposing

camps are currently unable to reconcile differences and agree on a candidate. The wife of former President Calderon, Margarita Zavala, was the most likely candidate for the PAN that could satisfy both sides of the party. However, in early October, Zavala officially announced that she would run as an independent because the party base had been subordinated to the interests of its leadership. Her departure and the new cross party-alliance between the PAN and the center-left opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) create even more uncertainty in the selection process. In a recent poll, the PAN/ PRD coalition polled around 21% in terms of favorability, which places it second to a new insurgent party. The Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (MORENA) is a newly founded left-wing nationalist political party led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Obrador has twice run for president and twice lost as a candidate for the PRD. After his failure in the 2012 elections, Obrador left the PRD and in 2014 founded MORENA. He is the undisputed leader of the party, which among Mexicans polls ahead of both the PRI and PAN. Given the dissatisfaction towards the two traditional parties, MORENA led by Obrador stands a very good chance of winning this presidential election. However, his path to the Palacio Nacional is not guaranteed. There are seven independent candidates, including Margarita

Zavala, that could take away votes from Obrador, who brands himself as the anti-establishment candidate. The most notable is Jaime Rodriguez, the current governor of the wealthy northern state of Nuevo León, who made history as the first politician to win a gubernatorial election without belonging to a political party. However, his former connection to the PRI, which he left in 2015, could prove to be his downfall. There are a number of smaller parties in Mexico, like the Greens and the Partido Trabajador, which stand no chance of winning the presidency or gaining a majority in Congress. However, these smaller parties can be vital in building coalitions with larger parties to secure a majority. So, while these smaller parties never get the limelight, they have the potential to wield considerable influence. WHAT’S NEXT? In the coming months, the candidates will be solidified and the campaigning will officially begin. While relations with the U.S. will play a role, the main focus of this election will be fighting corruption, protecting citizens from drug cartel-related violence, and providing tangible economic benefits to citizens. Sadly, given Mexico’s institutionalized corruption, these changes will be difficult to achieve. And even if MORENA wins the presidency, it’s unlikely that Obrador will be able to enact his agenda and provide the change he wants to see. For most Mexicans, it will be “la misma mierda, otro presidente.”

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CATALONIA

The Rich Secession

BY: BROOK JIANG

pain is currently facing its largest political crisis in forty years, due to a referendum in favor of Cataloniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s secession on October 1, 2017. After a long and drawn-out attempt at negotiations with the central government in Madrid, the president of Catalonia, Carles Puigdemont, officially declared independence from Spain on October 27, 2017. It all started with the referendum. 2.3 million people successfully voted in Cataloniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence referendum. This was 42% of about 6 million eligible voters. Of those who voted, 90% voted for independence. However, 6 in 10 registered voters stayed home, so many experts question the legitimacy of this right to secession. The high absenteeism rate suggests a silent opposition to outspoken separatists. In Barcelona on October 7th, thousands of protestors wearing white shirts came together in support of Spanish unity. These non-voters voiced their

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opinion that the Catalan referendum was not conducted in a fair and just manner. While opposed to the violent police action against voters, they believe that the Catalonian government cannot base secession off of an invalid referendum. Just before polls opened, the Catalan government allowed voters to vote at any polling station. Poll officials were told to use digital voting lists, which immediately suffered technical difficulties. These issues with the online system also placed the vote’s legitimacy in doubt. Some people voted as many times as they liked in the midst of confusion and police attacks. No one was clear about the steps involved in or ramifications of splitting from Spain. Activists may support the idea of a democratic referendum, but they want the regional government to conduct a proper one instead of allowing it to happen so quickly. Minutes after the first few thousand votes were posted, Puigdemont declared Catalonia’s right to independence and asked Europe for its support. This is not the first time that Catalonia has caused debate over its status. In 2014, the region held a nonbinding vote on independence that was declared illegal by the constitutional court but was not prevented by the central government and the police. Its pro-independence result was dismissed by Madrid as unlawful as well. 2.2 of 5.4 million eligible voters made it to the polls. 80% of voters backed complete secession, but only 32% of the electorate turned out. This current referendum is binding, which changes the situation quite a bit and has led to the current deadlock.

EMILIO MORENATTI / ASSOCIATED PRESS On the day of the Catalonian independence referendum, the Spanish police as well as military troops were sent to block polling stations.

On October 10, Puigdemont sought further negotiations with the national government in Madrid and suspended the secession process — a surprise turn from his previous stance. However, Spain’s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has refused to talk with Catalonia as long as it continues to assert independence. This failure in negotiations led to the regional parliament’s eventual vote in favor of independence a few weeks later. Friday evening on October 27, Rajoy enacted Article 155 of the Constitution, the “nuclear option” which has never been used before. That is, he suspended the regional parliament, dismissing all current officials including Puigdemont, and declared new elections to be held on December 21. He acquired full administrative control over

Catalonia’s police force and public broadcasting and filed criminal proceedings against secession leaders. The head of the regional police force, the Mossos d’Equadra, was also removed for sympathizing with separatists. Rajoy wasted no time in enforcing Article 155 after MPs in the 135-seat Catalan regional parliament voted for independence. The margin of 70 to 10 votes shows how close the vote was, considering many opposition MPs boycotted and left the chamber in indignation. The Vice President, Oriol Junqueras, and seven Catalon government ministers were arrested and have been held in custody since November 2. Orders have been issued to detain the rest of the Catalan government. Carmen Lamela, a judge

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in Spain’s nation court, jailed the eight former ministers on possible charges of sedition, rebellion, and misuse of public funds. Puigdemont spoke out against this act, saying that: “Imprisoning political leaders for fulfilling an electoral commitment breaks down the basic principles of democracy.” After fleeing to Belgium with four other Catalan politicians, Puigdemont was taken into custody on a European arrest warrant but soon released by a Belgian judge. According to his lawyer, he will stay in Belgium and cooperate with Belgian authorities. The whole extradition procedure could take more than 60 days in the Belgian judicial system, which would offer a chance for Puigdemont to rally support in the new December elections. If extradition is successful, Puigdemont and the other Catalan officials could face the same fate of their colleagues in jail – 30 years in prison. His next hearing before a Belgian court is on November 17. Lemela also ordered the jailing of two pro-independence leaders in late October, instigating thousands of protests in Catalonia. Jordi Sánchez, the president of the Catalan National Assembly (ANC), and Jordi Cuixart, the president of Òmnium Cultural, are both facing pending charges of alleged sedition due to the referendum. Puigdemont wrote in an opinion article that “the state has demonstrated its determination to strip public officials of their rights, and Spanish justice has been placed at the service of the government’s political agenda.” He believes that Catalan officials

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will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the Spanish judicial system. The executive government can enforce any legal case against Catalan leaders with the backing of the courts. In an almost surprise concession to the Madrid government, politicians in Catalonia are planning for their campaign in the new December elections. Prounification parties are hoping to win back control of the regional parliament, while pro-independence parties unfortunately were not able to register a coalition in time for Tuesday’s midnight deadline. The secessionist parties will be running on separate platforms since Esquerra Republicana backed out of the alliance two hours before midnight. Esquerra Republicana is led by Junqueras who is currently in prison. The rising popularity of this party could symbolize a political shift in voters from Puigdemont’s dominating Catalan Democratic party to a new kind of pro-independence narrative. Nevertheless, it will be a tight race, with 68 seats required for

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Does the strife in Catalonia reflect the internal conflict and tension lying within all of Europe?

majority. An opinion poll released by Barcelona’s La Vanguardia on Sunday revealed a race too close to predict. Pro-secession parties are forecasted to win between 66 and 69 seats, compared to the 72 seats they won two years ago. On November 7, Puigdemont held a rally in Brussels that brought together around 200 Catalonian mayors who happily cheered during his speech. He announced to the jubilant crowd that he would continue the fight for independence from Spain and asked for the European Union to help free democraticallyelected Catalan officials held in jail. He defiantly hopes that the EU will step in and support Catalonia’s independence movement. However, the European Union has voiced its support of the national government, while cautioning Madrid against the use of further violence. The constitution is the word of law, and politicians should not be breaking their own policies. Both the EU and the UK have announced that they do not recognize Catalonia as its own independent entity. At this standstill, the people of Catalonia have to decide if it is worth it to continue down the path to secession and face further retribution by the Spanish government, or if they should instead look for an advantageous compromise. Finally, does the strife in Catalonia reflect the internal conflict and tension lying within all of Europe? We shall see in how the December elections play out.

A DANGEROUS GAME The Iran Nuclear Deal

n October 13th, President Trump announced that he would decertify the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Though the decertification does not pull the U.S. out of the deal completely, it passes the issue to Congress, where lawmakers could potentially impose more restrictive requirements on

BY: ANDREW NOH

Iran. Trumpâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision takes a step toward fulfilling a campaign promise and signals a major potential change in U.S. foreign policy toward Iran.

Iran, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany in 2015, after years of painstaking negotiations. One of the landmark foreign policy achievements of the Obama administration, it BEHIND THE DEAL effectively restrained Iranâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s nuclear The Iran nuclear deal program from producing weaponswas reached by United States, grade uranium for ten years. Iran

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had been dangerously close to achieving nuclear capability, with some experts estimating that Iranians were mere months away from obtaining enough uranium to create a functional nuclear weapon. The Iran deal targeted the installations and materials necessary to reach this level. Prior to 2015, Iran had nearly 20,000 centrifuges (which are used to enrich uranium to the isotope used in weapons), but under the deal, it was limited to just over 5,000. A facility used to produce weapons-grade plutonium was restructured so that this could no longer be done. Iran also agreed to unprecedented levels of monitoring and inspections from the IAEA, a nuclear watchdog affiliated with the UN, to ensure that it was complying with the terms. Under the deal, the Iranians allow IAEA inspectors access to any sites and facilities deemed suspicious by the organization. The President of the United States must certify that Iran is complying with the terms of the agreement every 90 days, often relying on findings from these inspectors. In return, the UN, U.S. and EU agreed to lift sanctions they had placed on Iran in retaliation for its nuclear arms program. The sanctions had severely weakened Iran’s economy; it’s estimated that under the sanctions, Iran lost $160 billion in oil revenue between 2012 and 2016. With the deal, Iran can now sell oil on international markets and access over $100 billion in frozen assets. If Iran were to breach any part of the deal, UN sanctions would immediately be

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RICK WILKING / AFP Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in 2015.

reactivated for a period of ten years. nuclear weapons. Additionally, the agreement only has provisions TRUMP’S TAKE to curb Iran’s behavior regarding Despite being hailed by nuclear development. Other issues, experts as vital for international such as Iran’s testing of ballistic security, the deal was fiercely missiles and support for Hezbollah criticized by a remaining domestic and various other terrorist groups, audience. Most prominently, then- were untouched by the nuclear deal. candidate Trump vociferously Yet, while in office, Trump opposed the deal, calling it “the has twice certified the deal and did worst deal ever” and vowing to not revisit the issue until recently. renegotiate it to achieve favorable White House aides and Cabinet terms. members, including Secretary of Trump’s concerns with State Rex Tillerson and Secretary the deal mainly center around of Defense James Mattis, have thus the problem of relative gains. far restrained Trump and persuaded Though the deal prevents Iran him of the value of retaining the from obtaining nuclear weapons, agreement. this is only in the short run. When the deal expires, Iran will be able THE EFFECTS to continue large-scale uranium It is currently unclear what enrichment. The concern is that the long term effects of Trump’s in ten years, Iran will emerge decision to decertify will be. If economically stronger, thanks to the Republican-held Congress the lifting of its sanctions, and will does take advantage of this be able to continue on its path to opportunity to renegotiate or pull

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out of the agreement, the results could be catastrophic. Yet, even if Congress ultimately declines to levy sanctions or impose more restrictive terms on Iran, Trump’s rhetoric and approach have already have had wide-ranging effects. The decertification puts U.S.-Iran relations on dangerous footing. Regardless of whether or not the decertification is a largely symbolic move, it is a step in the wrong direction that has set off negative reactions from Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei has vowed that Iran will not violate the deal but threatened to “cut it in pieces” if the U.S. reneges on its side of the agreement. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has similarly warned that he will revive its nuclear program if the U.S. levies more sanctions. Iranian moderates will have a more difficult time persuading the public to stick to the deal now that the possibility of Washington pulling out has been raised. When the deal expires in ten years, it will be difficult to repair the breach of trust and persuade the Iranians to commit to another deal. The current actions of the U.S. are playing into the narrative of Iranian hardliners, raising the danger that Iran will no longer have faith in the U.S. and will take off running toward a weapon as soon as it is freed from the deal. The recent developments with regard to the Iran deal are emblematic of a broader trend of a retreating U.S. foreign policy that puts America at odds with the rest of the West. Indeed, U.S. relations with European states have become frigid relative to the high degree

of cooperation and goodwill that has existed in the past. After the U.S. backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change earlier this year, European leaders expressed dismay at America’s lack of leadership and willingness to break previous commitments. And as rumors circulated in policy circles that Trump was considering decertifying the deal, European leaders urged the U.S. to reconsider. The European nations involved in the crafting of the deal have vowed to continue to uphold their end of the bargain, even without

ability to negotiate with rogue states. Indeed, the decertification will have a major effect on the credibility of the U.S. with regard to upholding international agreements. All the parties involved in the deal are in agreement that Iran is in compliance with the terms. Even Secretary Tillerson himself has publicly stated that Iran is in “technical compliance” with the terms of the deal. Thus, Trump’s decision to decertify the deal and open the possibility of sanctions on the basis of insufficient evidence severely

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With the deal, Iran can now sell oil on international markets and can access over $100 billion in frozen assets.”

American participation. As Trump has pointed out, part of this may be related to economic interests, as European countries scrambled to open trade relations with Iran, a potentially lucrative market, when economic sanctions were lifted. By decertifying the deal, Trump raises the specter of a new round of sanctions, thus putting Europe’s economic interests at risk. Another explanation for Europe’s frustration with Trump’s actions is the effect on the West’s

undermines the U.S.’s legitimacy. When the time comes to sit at the negotiating table with the likes of North Korea, Japan, China and South Korea, major concerns will be raised about the potential for American cheating. In the past, the U.S. had used its power to be the guarantor of international deals, making sure that all parties abide by the agreements. The U.S. is now pivoting to using its power to cheat on the deals it makes, undercutting the credibility of diplomacy.

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OF CRISES AND

CONSTITUTIONS Why the international community must protect the Rohingya

tretched across the Eastern edge of the Sea of Bengal, the Rakhine’s beautiful landscape belies its bloodstained past. As Burma’s Westernmost state, the Rakhine has long served as the staging ground for one of the world’s most infamous ethnic conflicts: the seemingly intractable violence between Burma’s Buddhist majority and its Rohingya Muslim minority. In spite of their shocking regularity and viciousness, clashes between Burma’s Buddhists and Rohingyas have largely flown under the radar of Western nations. Year after year, a few hundred Rohingya will die; hundreds of thousands will flee; and, millions more will endure the daily difficulties of living as what some have called “the world’s most persecuted minority.”

ASIA

BY: PAT WILSON The roots of this conflict date back to World War II, when Britain promised Rohingya Muslims an Islamic state in return for their help maintaining colonial control against the wishes of the local Buddhist population. Following Burma’s independence in 1948, the newly organized, Buddhist-dominated Burmese government refused Rohingya Muslims citizenship and supported institutionalized discrimination on the grounds that Rohingya Muslims were not actually Burmese. This claim is only partially untrue: many Rohingya Muslims arrived in Burma as migrant workers, required to serve the needs of British colonialists, but others had lived in the Rakhine long before Britain’s arrival. The Burmese government maintains to this day that the

Rohingya are foreigners. Shortly following independence, an Islamic insurgency erupted in the Rakhine. Some insurgents fought merely for equal treatment as citizens of a Burmese state, while other, Pakistanisupported insurgents sacrificed their lives to create an Islamic state within the Rakhine. Similar, fractured insurgencies persist to this day; in late August of 2017, one insurgent group launched an assault on 30 Burmese government targets, taking twelve lives in the process. This most recent attack provoked violence and 400 resulting deaths from Burma’s military, which claims that the lion’s share of its victims were insurgents. Even if that statistic is true, however, the military cannot deny that the bulk of the estimated 540,000 Rohingya

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refugees are innocent civilians. Violence has further escalated in recent months, and one UN Official wonders whether Burma – like Rwanda in the Spring of 1994 – is teetering on the brink of genocide. The international community must put a stop to this crisis, but it must do so delicately. Repugnant as the actions of Burma’s government may be, their motivation – stemming a separatist tide – is not entirely unreasonable. Though no data exists for Burma, polling throughout South and Southeast Asia supports the notion that Rohingya Muslims are not interested in living within a secular state; 82 percent of Bengali, 77 percent of Thai, 72 Percent of Indonesian, 84 percent of Pakistani, and 86 percent of Malay Muslims support theocratic rule.One Rohingya group, the Arakan (Rakhine) Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) has attempted to allay

these concerns by insisting that the Rohingya desire peaceful coexistence alongside Burma’s Buddhist population. However, the ARNO’s simultaneous demand for Rohingya “self-determination” complicates

separatism and theocracy? No one can say for sure, but with each passing day, the likelihood of peace diminishes. As repression persists, the belief that the Rohingya must have their own state becomes

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The international community must put a stop to this crisis, but it must do so delicately.”

matters, as does its insistence that the Rakhine’s citizens focus on their common Arakanese identity. Do the Rohingya actually wish to live peacefully, as citizens of a secular, Burmese state? Or do they desire

increasingly justifiable. However, Burma will never voluntarily surrender any portion of the Rakhine. Apart from causing international humiliation, this action would leave the Rakhine’s Buddhist population

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CNN Protestors in Bangladesh in early September criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for her inaction towards the Rohingya crisis.

at risk of Rohingya reprisals. The slight majority of the Rakhine’s inhabitants are also Buddhist, so Islamic separatism makes little sense even from a democratic perspective. Yet the biggest barrier to resolving this crisis is not the complex history of Rohingya separatism, or the Burmese government’s history of repression, or the Rakhine’s religious diversity. This conflict seems intractable primarily because Burma’s government is fractured between civilian and military rule. Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counsellor (Prime Minister) of Myanmar, must balance the development of democracy with the protection of human rights, two surprisingly disharmonious objectives. A once-lauded human rights activist, Aung San Suu Kyi’s public comments on the crisis have ranged from dismissive to denying, and her government has shirked

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entirely its responsibility to protect Rohingya civilians, largely to avoid a confrontation with the military. The Burmese democracy is young. Its first elections were held in 2010, and the international community widely criticized this early democratic step as a fraudulent sham, meant to protect military powerbrokers from criticism. In 2015, however, the tides turned. The National League for Democracy won absolute majorities in both houses of parliament and gave activists hope that Burma might be in the midst of a successful democratic transition. But the military remains a powerful player in Burmese politics, and, given a proper justification, it could seize power from Aung San Suu Kyi and ignite a new era of repression and bloodshed. Moreover, Min Aung Hlaing, the commanderin-chief of Burma’s Armed Forces, retains sole discretion over military

actions, and he has used these powers to abuse the Rakhine’s Rohingya population. Burma’s constitution effectively nullifies the civilian government’s ability to prevent these sorts of human rights abuses and leaves Aung San Suu Kyi with little, if any ability to fulfill the promises of her activist past. This constitutional structure means that even if Aung San Suu Kyi wished to bring an end to violence in the Rakhine – and she may – she would be unable to do so. Therefore, international pressure and intervention are essential prerequisites for the protection of the Rakhine’s Rohingya population. The United Nations Security Council ought to dispatch peacekeepers to the Rakhine and task them with maintaining peace between Rohingya insurgents and Burmese soldiers. Aung San Suu Kyi has already publicly protested such a move, and successfully blocked the United Nations from taking significant measures to maintain peace. For this reason, if the Security Council were to redouble its efforts to dispatch peacekeepers, Aung San Suu Kyi could save face with Burma’s military leaders, the Rohingya population could benefit from international protection, and Burma’s nascent democracy could be spared. Otherwise, there is little the international community can do but wait. Bit by bit, the Rohingya will crumble under the pressure of Burma’s military. They will become a diaspora people, haphazardly strewn across the globe, the story of their suffering little more than a historical footnote.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:

A GLOBAL (IN)JUSTICE SYSTEM? International Crime, Bias, and Power Politics BY: LESLIE HICKS

he International Criminal Court, brainchild of the United Nations and the first judiciary body of its kind, was established to “guarantee lasting respect for…the enforcement of international justice.” The Rome Statute of 1998, which outlined the system, grants the Court “jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international

community as a whole.” Although not officially in operation until 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was favorably received at the time and subsequently signed by 120 countries, from Senegal in 1999 to El Salvador as late as 2016. Recently, however, the ICC has faced criticism from the international community, which posit that rather than acting

as a neutral legal system, the Court unfairly targets certain regions such as Africa while bending to the will of others. The ICC specializes in “trying individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity” and aims to impartially identify and condemn such acts. Seated in The Hague, in the western region of the

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Netherlands, the ICC has tried over 20 cases meeting these criteria to date. Besides its official location, it operates several field offices in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Central African Republic. Per its statute, the ICC is designed to be an apolitical legal system that will not supersede the authority of individual nations, as it is dependent on these very nations to enforce its decisions. 124 countries are currently recognized by the ICC as state parties, meaning they have accepted the jurisdiction of the

been accused of operating under the influence of the most powerful nations while targeting certain others. In particular, the ICC’s role in African matters has been questioned for its legitimacy and fairness. The ceremonious seat of the Court in the Netherlands evokes vestiges of European powers asserting their authority in Africa in the colonial era. Besides this arrangement, the Court has maintained a singular focus on African issues. Even the ICC’s ability to remain impartial is up for debate, due to its primary target of African

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The ICC’s ability to remain impartial due to its primary target of African crimes and citizens can be debated, based on its decision to pursue these crimes and not others.”

Court and allow their citizens to be prosecuted for qualifying crimes. Despite its ideals, the ICC is summoned only in specific circumstances: when referred a case by the United Nations Security Council, when a state party’s government is unwilling or unable to prosecute a case, and when a sufficiently atrocious crime has been committed in a state party or by a national of a state party such that intervention is deemed necessary. In recent years, the ICC has

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crimes and citizens. In 2013, there were eight ongoing cases involving over twenty defendants in front of the ICC. Today, there are ten cases involving fifteen defendants. In both examples, all defendants are African, and all crimes being pursued have been committed on African territory. Not surprisingly, African leaders decry a lack of fairness and a tendency to cater to rich nations while punishing weak ones. In fact, three African states – South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia – have

submitted applications to withdraw from the Rome Statute, aiming to limit the Court’s jurisdiction over their territories. South Africa and Gambia have since retracted their requests to secede, but Burundi officially exited the agreement last month. Additionally, it is interesting to note that some of the world’s most powerful, influential, and arguably militaristic nations have chosen not to become members of the assembly of state parties. This includes the United States, Russia, China, Israel, Indonesia, and France. More coincidentally, four out of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, France, China, Russia), who have veto and voting powers to invoke the ICC, are not state parties and thus are not subject to the investigation of crimes committed on their territories or by their citizens. Their positions on the UNSC protect their interests as well as the interests of their allies in the face of significant crimes. Critics argue that as a result, human rights violations in these powerful countries often go unpunished. Such violations, as declared by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, include the U.S.A’s treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, NSA surveillance, and drone strikes, as well as Russia’s annexation of Crimea and torture in Ukraine. Yet, all cases pursued in Africa and concerning African individuals have met the criteria for the most brutal crimes outlined in the Rome Statute. The Court investigates crimes relating to crimes against humanity, defined as large attacks against civilian populations; war

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crimes, or humanitarian breaches of war tactics as outlined in the Geneva Conventions; crimes of aggression between states; and genocide. Genocide is defined by the ICC and the United Nations as the “specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing its members or by other means; …[or] inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction.” This is perhaps best exemplified in the crisis in Darfur, Sudan beginning in 2003. In 2008, a case was opened against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for his involvement in the murder, rape, and displacement of the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit peoples. The conflict, which has left nearly 3 million displaced and 500,000 slaughtered, has been at the center of several aid missions and peacemaking attempts in the region and internationally. However, in solidarity with the Sudanese President and possibly in defiance of the ICC, both the African Union and the Arab League have refused to honor the

the war-torn area due to their strong economic interests in the country’s oil reserves and military. Critics of the International Criminal Court claim a bias in favor of the world’s most powerful nations and against those that are most vulnerable. Based on the cases brought before the Court, there is a striking focus on African conflicts and leaders. While there have indeed been grave human rights violations in these African countries, it is clear that a small group of powerful nations heavily influences the Court. It is these nations – who are in fact immune from investigations into arrest warrant and deliver al-Bashir to illegal activities – that dictate the be judged in front of the International proceedings of the Court, from their Criminal Court. Because Sudan influence as permanent members of never ratified the treaty, it does not the UN Security Council to their recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC strong lobbying efforts to protect their and must be referred by the United

first international “legalThesystem of its kind, the

ICC specializes in “trying individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity”

Nations Security Council or aided by the international community. Notably, Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto powers, have attempted to block international peace missions and investigations in

own interests. Unfortunately, while the International Criminal Court’s venerable mission to investigate and punish the world’s worst crimes is entirely necessary, it is hindered by limits, restrictions, and power politics that unfairly target Africans.

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KILLED IN KASHMIR The story of the world’s most contested region

mountainous region in SouthCentral Asia, is home to some of he conflict in Kashmir is the world’s most beautiful sites as one that has long captured well as some of the world’s most the imagination of those treacherous violence. In this piece, both in the West and in the we’ll explore not only the history East. Kashmir, a picturesque, of the conflict, but also what

BY: SHRAVAN BALAJI

T ASIA

seems to be the most reasonable solution for the region. First, it’s important to note that throughout its history, Kashmir really was like many provinces in the northern Indian subcontinent – eternally having

its rulers replaced by new leaders from different religions. Kashmir cycled through Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic rule consistently throughout the first two Millennia C.E., before finally settling down under the rule of Sikh Rajs as part of the British Colonial Structure in the 19th century. Throughout this time period, Kashmir was a relatively prosperous region, though it did suffer its fair share of religious violence and oppression. The Indian Independence Movement eventually led to what we now know as “Partition,” in which Hindu majority and Muslim majority regions were carved up by the British Empire to form new states. Kashmir was a Muslim-majority state ruled by a Sikh, who instead of putting the decision to join either India or Pakistan in the hands of his people through a plebiscite, attempted to remain neutral. However, after Pakistani forces attempted to invade Kashmir, the Maharaja Hari Singh sought help from the British Lord Mountbatten, who offered him assistance if he agreed to join the Republic of India. As a result, Pakistan and India immediately went to war, beginning the first of three wars over the region. As of now, India controls half of the region, China controls about one-sixth, and Pakistan controls one-third. Today, we see Kashmir as a volatile situation because

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Despite the presence of a UN Peacekeeping Mission, Kashmir has seen little to no progress from international actors”

quite frankly, there’s very little international progress in addressing the issue. Despite the presence of a UN Peacekeeping Mission, Kashmir has seen little to no progress from international actors, and China, India, and Pakistan are all locked in a stalemate. The fact these countries also have nuclear weapons doesn’t make the situation much better, as these weapons have essentially served as long-run deterrents from more drastic action in the region. The growth of fundamentalist terrorism in the region made Kashmir more of a worry for both India and China, with the former country being quick to blame Pakistan for funding these groups (which include Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that carried out the Mumbai attack). Pakistan has

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countered by simply saying that it is simply fighting for democracy, an ideal which India has purposefully avoided in Kashmir. Meanwhile, China occupies a portion of the Siachen Glacier, biding its time until it can make a more meaningful room. More protests over the last few years have called into question the management of Kashmir by the Indian government. Many believe that too many civil liberties are being oppressed for the sake of freedom. A significant population counters that by saying that India’s interests in the region are too great for it to back down now. Still others insist that the region be left to its own devices through coordinated by efforts by the more powerful nations. It’s hard to see how this situation will eventually break down. However, one can call attention to the fact that the region’s violence, combined with al-Qaeda’s stated mission to expand into India, puts it in a position where it may be the hotbed for the next war in South Asia. One can only hope that this time, cooler heads prevail before lives are lost. Shravan is a student studying a mixture of International Studies and Finance at the University of Pennsylvania. A lifelong enthusiast of international affairs, he is excited to be discussing the situation in Kashmir.

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THE CASE FOR A

KURDISH STATE The ICJ Advisory Opinion “On the Condition of Statehood,” Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Politics of Recognition BY JORDAN DEWAR

he International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion “On the Condition of Statehood” laid out the four main components for being classified as a state according to international law. The first component is a permanent population holding a unified allegiance. The second is a defined territory. The third is a unified government. The fourth is the capacity to enter into relations with other states (which is frequently exemplified through a new state entering into official diplomatic relations with other

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states or being offered official recognition). Regardless of the political aspects of international acceptance of statehood, fulfillment of these criteria, according to international law, grants a territory and government the international legal definition of a state, the international legal personality that comes with it, and the rights and obligations provided to states thanks to said legal personality. Despite some questions regarding its capacity to enter into relations with other states, the independent state

proposed through the recent referendum conducted by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq fulfills the requirements for statehood and should be recognized as such. The first and one of the most easily met requirements for Kurdistan to be considered a state is that of the question of their population. In terms of a permanent population holding a unified allegiance, the Kurds do fulfill this component as, for one thing, the Iraqi Kurds are a recognized distinct ethnic group

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that have been residing in the area known as Iraqi Kurdistan for a long enough period of time to be considered permeant. They are not migratory and the region does not feature a high enough population turnover for residency there to be seen as temporary. Furthermore, the distinct cultural identity of the region and the actions of the population demonstrate that for the most part (as evidenced through the recent referendum) they hold allegiance to Kurdistan, not to Iraq. In this area, the Iraqi Kurds do meet this condition for statehood. A more murky area is that of a defined territory, but it is not so contentious that the criteria cannot be met. The area of the autonomous Kurdish region is defined and acknowledged by Iraq, the Kurds, and the international community as the region was given a defined area and autonomy years ago. While there are some disputes over the integration of certain cities into Iraqi Kurdistan, as exemplified by the current conflict over the oil-rich area of Kirkuk, which the Kurds claim should be part of Kurdistan and was allowed to vote in the referendum and Iraq believes should not be part of even the Kurdish autonomous region of Iraq, the overall territory is recognized. The issue is not so much in the definition of the Kurdish region solely in Iraq but of the idea of Greater Kurdistan. Some Iraqi Kurds believe that a Kurdish state should not be limited to Iraqi Kurdistan but rather to the Kurdish regions in

Iraq, Syria, and possibly Turkey and Iran as well. However, others would be satisfied with solely the region of Iraqi Kurdistan as a new state, and nearly all seem to believe that a state made up of

or clearly defined borders when it first achieved statehood, and there are many other examples of similar situations. While Iraq does not recognize these boundaries as those of a state,

â&#x20AC;&#x153;

Despite the ICJ opinion and any international legal instructions, the question of recognition has always been a largely political, not legal, one.â&#x20AC;?

solely Iraqi Kurdistan would be acceptable. Furthermore, a completely accepted territorial boundary is not completely common in new states or even in states nearly universally recognized. North Korea continues to claim the entirety of the Korean Peninsula as part of its territory and South Korea does the same. India and Pakistan also frequently have border conflicts over regions such as Kashmir and Jammu, Venezuela claims 2/3rds of Guyana, which Guyana disputes, and all of these states have been seen as fulfilling the criteria for statehood firmly enough to have been admitted into the United Nations and many other international organizations. Even the United States did not have permanent

only of an autonomous region, it is not necessary for a state the potential state is seceding from to recognize the secession. Given that there is a recognizable territory that would be known as Iraqi Kurdistan and this territory has boundaries that are not in constant flux, it can be said that the Kurds in Iraq meet this condition about as thoroughly as many other internationally recognized states do. The third criteria is a unified government. This is another one where the alreadyestablished autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region assists the Iraqi Kurds in fulfilling another criteria for statehood. Given the establishment of this autonomous region, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan has been operating

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relatively independently from Baghdad by running its own elections (including the recent referendum, which has a high voter turnout), government services, educational system, and other functions of a standard functioning government. This has been especially true with the rise of ISIS, which limited the influence Baghdad could have over the region. Furthermore, the Peshmerga have taken over defense of the region when the Iraqi Security Forces were unable to do so, and in doing so the government of Iraqi Kurdistan has also demonstrated its ability to maintain its own defense and

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protect its population. The voter turnout and high approval for independence also demonstrates that the Iraqi Kurdish population recognizes the government in Erbil, not Baghdad, as having governmental authority over their region. Thus, the Iraqi Kurds fulfill the requirement of having a unified government as well. The difficult criteria for the Iraqi Kurds to meet is the final criteria of having the ability to enter into relations with other states. Only one state has indicated its official willingness to offer de jure recognition to an independent Kurdish stateâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that state being Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;with other

likely Kurdish allies being more hesitant about the possibility. Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have all come out strongly against the potential Kurdish state and have left open the possibility of military intervention. Western states that might be seen as allies of the Iraqi Kurds have been ambivalent about Kurdish independence, worrying that it might harm the ongoing fight against ISIS. However, despite the lack of de jure representation, there have been actions by foreign states that could indicate de facto recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan, or at least the capacity for it to have relations with foreign states. In

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its part in the fight against ISIS, the United States has negotiated separately with the governments in Erbil and Baghdad and provided the Peshmerga with weaponry through nearly the same procedure that would be needed to justify the transfer of weapons to a foreign state. The US, UK, and about 20 other nations also operate consulates in Erbil that function apart from their embassies in Baghdad and have not shut down their diplomatic missions to the area despite the growing likelihood of secession. The US, UK, and UN also offered to mediate between the Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish governments in the weeks before the referendum, indicating that they saw the two governments as belligerents or close to it (thus allowing them both the rights of states and giving Iraqi Kurdistan a legal personality and the opportunity to participate in international arbitration, which are not granted to groups without legal personality), and not simply as a government and an insurgency (which would be simply subject to Iraq’s domestic laws and thus the United Nations would not participate in arbitrating any conflict). The Western states, especially the US and UK, also never requested that the referendum be scrapped completely the way the EU asked of the Catalonian referendum, only that it be postponed until a later point in the fight against ISIS, suggesting that the delay in recognition of an Iraqi Kurdish

state is only a delay, not a refusal to do so. Given that these actions indicate that Iraqi Kurdistan has the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states, Iraqi Kurdistan does fulfill this requirement, even if it is one of the more weakly satisfied ones.

towards Kurdistan being able to more completely fulfill this requirement. In addition to this, the Iraqi Kurds do fulfill the conditions of having a unified government, a permeant population with a common allegiance, and defined territory.

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With the loss of Kirkuk and continuing Iraqi movements to restrict Kurdish control of border crossings, the fact remains that while Kurdistan might meet the legal definition of a state and may have a historic claim to statehood, the KRG is slowly losing the resources it needs for Kurdistan to be self-sufficient economically.”

While the Kurdish Regional Government’s capacity to enter into relations with other states is still debatable, the recent actions of Israel and others demonstrates that while Kurdistan may lack widespread de jure recognition, it does enjoy a degree of de facto recognition and an international legal personality. Furthermore, the current relationship between the Kurdish Regional Government and other states demonstrates that there is significant progress

The Kurdish people have been a loyal ally of the United States and others in the continued fight against ISIS, have fought to establish a democratic government in an often fractured and authoritarian region, and have fulfilled the requirements under international law to be considered a state. It is time to stop delaying the inevitable and grant the Kurdish people the ability to exercise their right to self-determination.

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CUBA TRAVEL NETWORK

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AMERICAN-CUBAN

RELATIONS

The importance of diplomatic engagement BY: MARIA TURNER

or nearly a year, several US diplomats working in Cuba have been complaining of symptoms of mysterious illnesses, nearly all of them citing hearing loss, balance issues, headaches, and nausea. A few of them even claimed to have sustained hearing loss from sudden influxes of noises similar

LATIN AMERICA

to those created by insects buzzing or metal scraping the floor. The diplomats now suffer a variety of long-term effects including brain injuries, blood disorders, and more permanent hearing loss. The most popular theory touted by the media regarding the cause of these socalled sonic attacks is a Cuban espionage plan gone wrong. Other theories include another

country attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Cuba, or even the Cuban government wanting to destabilize AmericanCuban relations in an effort to keep Cuban citizens under its political control and limit their economic freedom. The U.S. State Department seized on these theories and accused the Cuban government

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of sonic espionage. Cuban officials, on the other hand, dismissed the State Department’s accusations as “slander” and “science fiction.” They denied even the possibility of such attacks, stating that they would have been aware if it had been another country attacking the United States and calling the argument “unsustainable.” There is evidence to back up their assertion, as an analysis of the recordings of the supposed sounds showed there to be no frequencies or levels of noise even potentially harmful to human health. Furthermore, only two of the three diplomats complaining of sudden influxes of buzzing noises experienced a loss in hearing, which, had this truly been some sort of sonic attack, would have been a symptom all three diplomats experienced. Ultimately, even top American neurologists agreed that a sonic attack was highly unlikely. Investigators concluded that the most probable cause of this strange phenomenon was a functional nervous system disorder of sorts; these disorders arise quite commonly under stressful circumstances. President of the International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology Mark Hallett pointed out that “psychosomatic disease is a disease like anything else.” He said that it was feasible for larger groups of individuals to be affected, especially if they were working together in a tense and hostile environment. If the US State Department had accepted Hallett’s analysis, it would have boded well for continued American-Cuban diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, this revelation either was ignored or simply came

ALEXANDRE MENEGHINI / REUTERS The U.S. Embassy in Cuba was reinstated in July 2015 after President Barack Obama restored diplomatic connections between the countries.

too late. In late September of this year, the State Department, under orders from the Trump administration, recalled over half the US diplomats in Havana. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also spoke of plans to close the embassy completely. The decision to reduce the presence of American diplomats in Havana preceded an order by President Trump for fifteen Cuban embassy officials to leave the United States. Slowly but surely, the US has begun to cut off lines of diplomatic communication with Cuba. Even those who don’t know much about international relations know that historically, the United States and Cuba have not gotten along. The United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba during the Cold War as a public statement against Castro and his alliance with the Soviet Union. Then-President Obama only recently restored relations in 2015, in what is known as the “Cuban Thaw.” On the one hand, Cubans have had plenty of reasons to resent

American interference. From the failed Bay of Pigs invasion to past American military rule of Cuba to our longstanding trade embargo, the U.S. has a history of acting against Cuban interests. The United States even has a policy against remittances sent home to Cuba by American Cubans; the result is a poor population unable to even leave the country. On the other hand, Cuban hard-line policy is driven by a strong Cuban American anti-Castro lobby backed by prominent conservative politicians such as Marco Rubio. Internally, the Cuban government does not allow Cubans the basic human freedoms most Americans enjoy, including the ability to choose one’s own profession. Substandard human rights and the Cuban government’s refusal to comply with the United States’ capitalist and democratic principles has prompted a public statement of disapproval on the American end. The trade embargo, regardless of the Cuban Thaw, stands. Despite 25 years of the UN condemning this

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embargo, the U.S. remains firm on its policy. Under President Trump’s administration, the “Cuban Thaw” has quickly reversed into a freeze on diplomatic relations. From both a human rights perspective and an economic one, the current diplomatic stasis benefits no one. The conflict is clearly counterproductive to diplomatic relations between the two countries,

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Cuban government will retain complete control over its citizens, controlling their lives and forbidding them from traveling outside the country. A decrease in American influence in Latin America will hinder economic development and progress in human rights issues. The current intermediate state of distrust makes it extraordinarily difficult for diplomats to do their jobs. In

escalated into a bigger diplomatic issue. Moreover, Cuba is not the only country with which we take this approach. We can simply consider our history of supposed cooperation with the former Soviet Union and now Russia, or even China. The USSR and China deliberately limited American diplomatic engagement. American diplomats faced challenges ranging from harassment to stalking, harassment of their contacts, jailing, home bugging, and difficulty setting up meetings with outsiders. These obstacles to engagement with the ‘enemy’ made it difficult for the United States to achieve their diplomatic goals. Regardless of these challenges, maintained engagement eventually allowed for the resolution of the Cold War, as the United States was there and available for when the restoration of cooperation came. Experts outside the Trump administration now advocate for the same level of engagement with Cuba. Ultimately, if the United States wishes to avoid conflict, the State Department should strike a previous years of diplomacy in balance between keeping its lines of Cuba, diplomats were always under communication open, cooperating, surveillance. When they left their and standing firm on the issues in homes, they would frequently come which Americans believe. back to find that their rooms had been ransacked. Cuban spies often Maria is a sophomore in the School even emptied spare water tanks in American households or left faeces of Engineering and Applied Sciin water glasses. A return to this ence, majoring in Computer Scilevel of pettiness would recreate the ence with a possible double major foreign policy obstacles the United in International Relations. She is an A-level for UPMUNC and AcaStates faced in the past. While this conflict was demic Affairs and is fascinated by initially somewhat of a trivial case of the international news topics relatdisagreement between the American ed to fluctuating Eastern European and Cuban governments, it quickly relations with the West and Russia.

The key to good foreign policy is open communication between countries, the ability to at least feign cooperation, and at the very least staying engaged.” yet it is a microcosm of US foreign policy – the United States follows this pattern of cutting off diplomatic contact in several countries with which it has tense relations. American diplomacy experts typically agree that the key to good foreign policy is open communication between countries, some level of cooperation, and sustained engagement. Cutting off diplomatic contact with Cuba reinstates outdated policies forbidding Cuban Americans from staying in contact with their relatives and all Americans from visiting Cuba as tourists. The

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CENTRAL ASIA

BY: SOFIYA PAVLOVA

whole region has been lost in translation. Countries have been forgotten and dismissed as irrelevant, grouped together under a nickname that is more reticent of a cult name — the “Stans.” The ignorance of many regarding Central Asian countries is a grave issue, since this region is vital to the understanding of the many ongoing geopolitical struggles. From Chinese “One Belt, One Road” policy to the economic oil price crisis and Russian expansionary policies, the countries of this region are playing a role that cannot and must not be overlooked. Who are the “Stans?” There are seven countries in the Central Asian

region that can fit under this label: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Most people can recognize the country of Afghanistan due to the highly controversial and publicized Afghan War. Others might know Kazakhstan from the movie Borat — whose portrayal the inhabitants of Kazakhstan find extremely offensive. Nonetheless, it is pretty safe to assume that the general population is not entirely educated about the Central Asian region. The landscapes, the demographics, the religions — the seven “Stans” are the birthplace of diversity and wells of cultural wealth.

Going from one country to another it is possible to encounter ecosystems ranging from taigas and desserts to steppes and tropics. There is a bountiful variety of natural resources owned by these nations. Uzbekistan’s whole economy for a long time was based on the agricultural industry of producing cotton for the whole Soviet bloc. Kazakhstan is rich with petroleum products, metals, radioactive chemicals, and similarly to its counterparts in agrarian produce, grains. Natural gas exports (approximately 37.3 billion cubic meters in 2016) serve as serve the main source of income for Turkmenistan. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan might lack precious metal resources

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and oil reserves, they are still abundant in cattle and agrarian products such as grapes and grains. This abundance of raw and agrarian resources is one of the reasons why these nations are so important to international trade. The wealth of these states is not limited to raw materials and agriculture. There is also a rich abundance of history and culture. This is, after all, the region of infamous nomads and Genghis Khan’s legendary empire. Many cities such as Samarkand are older than the nation of the United States, dating back to the seventh and eighth centuries B.C. Most of these countries are secular nations with Muslim-majority populations. The governments of the “Stans” are attempting to crack down on any sort of religious extremism and jihadism, as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have experienced instances of IS recruiting young men, who then leave with their families to join the terrorist organization. However, some of these countries also have big Christian Orthodox and Jewish communes left over from migrations during the Soviet era. Naturally, in any multicultural society there will be conflicts; the “Stans” are no exception, as there are often clashes between their different ethnicities, languages, and religions, such as those that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. These issues are often left unaddressed for fear of their escalation in the case of government intervention that can be seen as favoritism of one side or the other in the conflict. As far as political climates, most of these countries are currently either quite unstable (i.e. Afghanistan and Tajikistan) or lacking transparent democratic processes (i.e.

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Uzbekistan). Similar to developing nations that experienced issues with peaceful transition to democracy and prosperity after decades of imperialism and colonialism, these countries struggle to overcome their legacies as post-Soviet satellites. How does the political climate of such small countries affect the rest of the world? Firstly, these countries are by no means small. Kazakhstan is one of the world’s ten biggest countries, and the area covered by the “Stans” is greater than that of Europe. Secondly, any political crises in this region can directly affect global security. In the case that a leader of one of these nations these regions loses his stronghold, that nation will be at risk of religious extremization due to its proximity to centers of jihadist activity such as Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Rapid changes in government might also lead to internal fighting and even armed conflicts, as the many factions within the countries will become involved in the struggle for power. Such conflicts might destabilize the whole region, which is dangerous for both the securities and the economies of the neighboring countries and the world. These regions have also always been cooperative in aiding more developed Western nations in their dealings in the Middle Eastern regions; thus, they are now left with military bases and artillery. Russia’s biggest military base outside of its own territory is located in Tajikistan. The U.S. still has multiple bases in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan left over from the Iraq and Afghan Wars. It is hard to imagine the resulting level of damage should these bases be taken by guerilla fighters, rebels, or religious extremist

groups. This creates a paradox of major proportions: there is a need to reform many of the governmental structures, but doing so might cause destabilization and security risks. The West has an inherent interest in ensuring the stability of this region, namely, guaranteeing its own safety and prosperity. Since this region lies at the intersection of Europe and Asia, there are great volumes of trade conducted through it. Disruption of that commodity flow can and will affect the rest of world. There is also the issue of the expansionary Chinese foreign policy that is threatening to integrate these Central Asian countries into its own economy. Will it be beneficial for those countries themselves? After all, there is a high chance that this arrangement will provide unrestricted access to the Chinese markets. On the other hand, this might lead to a creation of an economic bubble and Chinese domination of the global economy. The Russian Federation is another big player in this region, with a huge trade interest in the post-Soviet “Stans.” It has been the main trading partner for most of those countries and thus has developed a geopolitical upper hand in that region. Rich in resources and issues, Central Asia is an underestimated region that harbors numerous possibilities. Yes, there are many improvements that can be made in terms of political, economic, and human rights reforms. Nonetheless, the “Stans” should not be dismissed as insignificant, for they are the connecting link between the East and the West. They are the ones who can help reconcile the increasingly polarized world of international affairs if only they are given a chance.

THE BREXIT DEADLOCK Theresa May’s Conservative Party

t has been five months since the momentous general election in the United Kingdom. In the span of that day, Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party transformed from a weak and divided opposition party into an organized and powerful force. Not only that, but the Northern Irish

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) became nationally known (and somewhat loathed), Theresa May’s Conservative Party lost whatever mandate it was trying to get (both domestically and internationally), and the possibility for Brexit negotiations free of turbulence died.

BY: JOE PIRES Labour’s success in the June elections put May in a bind. By losing seventeen seats, the Conservatives failed to reach the 326 needed to govern on their own. They had no choice but to form a coalition. However, finding the party (or parties) with which to

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form a coalition would be difficult. Obviously, neither Labour, nor the Green Party, nor the left-wing Sinn Fein would join. After experiencing significant electoral losses while in coalition with the Conservatives in 2015, the Liberal Democrats chose not to form another coalition with the Conservatives. The SNP did not want to form one either; neither did Plaid Cymru. This forced May to form a coalition with the right-wing DUP. Compared to every other party, the DUP is very reactionary and deeply Eurosceptic. Founded by the virulently anti-Catholic pastor Ian Paisley, the DUP sided with other Unionists during The Troubles and routinely fought against and helped bring down peace agreements between Republicans and Unionists. To make matters worse, the DUP made alliances with Unionist paramilitaries, including the Paisleyfounded Ulster Resistance, which allied with other Unionist terrorist groups. It gets worse. On top of its views regarding Northern Ireland, the DUP takes extremely reactionary positions on social issues. The DUP is a rarity in that it is the only major parliamentary party that has a majority of its members supporting anti-abortion measures, the teaching of creationism in schools, the return of the death penalty, and antiLGBT policy. To top it all off, in Northern Ireland, the DUP – which is the leading party – is involved in a massive corruption scandal. This was all before Grenfell Tower burned down less than a week after the elections. May’s response (or lack thereof ) led to a massive drop in

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support. The situation worsened a few weeks after, when May struck a deal with the DUP to give Northern Ireland a billion pounds in aid in exchange for continued support in Parliament. This occurred while there was massive concern over the lack of funding for social services. May’s popularity has taken hit after hit since then. Now, most polls indicate that support for her has collapsed. Members of her own party want to oust her and become prime minister themselves. Since the election, she has seemed weak, failing to corral her fellow Conservative MPs, and even asking other parties for policy advice. It all reached a breaking

opposition force, weakened the Conservatives, and ensured that Corbyn will remain leader of the Labour Party. This was not expected to happen. Five weeks before the election, most assumed that Labour would suffer a massive loss of MPs, ensuring the expanded mandate that Theresa May wanted. Then came the Labour Party Manifesto. With a series of unabashedly social democratic policies, Labour gained support quickly, especially among groups who usually did not vote. As the June 8 elections loomed, it became clear to most analysts that Labour was bound to win seats.

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May’s career as Prime Minister is in dire straits, putting much of her policy proposals (and Brexit) at risk of falling apart.” point in the recent Conservative Party conference, which was marred with one gaffe after another. To put it bluntly, May’s career as Prime Minister is in dire straits, putting much of her policy proposals – and Brexit – at risk of falling apart. Some parties have fared better than the Conservatives. At the expense of both the Conservatives and the SNP, the Labour Party gained 30 seats in parliament. This has bolstered Labour’s role as an

Few expected Labour to win thirty seats, however. Even though they did not win enough votes to take over the House of Commons, Corbyn and the rest of the Labour Party were the winners of the election. Surprisingly, Labour took a staggering number of seats from the Conservatives. More surprisingly, Labour gained seats in typical Conservative constituencies like Canterbury and Kensington. To make things even better for Labour,

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many Conservative seats are now at risk of being taken. Home Secretary Amber Rudd only won her seat by a few hundred votes. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s majority was halved. Since then, Labour has been in permanent campaign mode, staging rallies in every marginal constituency that it stands to win. This, in conjunction with Labour’s response to recent political events and the Conservative Party’s recent ineptitude, has ensured that if parliamentary elections were held today, Labour would win control of the House of Commons. Of course, there is also Brexit. Before the June 8th elections, Parliament invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, formally beginning the process of leaving the European Union. May, assuming that she would win seats, made one of the worst mistakes in her tenure as Prime Minister. Now, with a frayed coalition with the DUP and dwindling support, and with Labour gaining more support with each passing day, May’s mandate has been significantly reduced. It has not helped that the people appointed to deal with Brexit have proven woefully incompetent. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has had his fair share of Brexit missteps, ranging from lying about the UK’s obligations to pay the money needed to leave the EU (which is about 100 billion pounds) to repeatedly and publicly taking a stance against the party line on Brexit. The chief negotiator for Brexit on the British side, David Davis, has not been much better. Other members of the Conservative Party have had their own gaffes. Chancellor

Philip Hammond called chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier and his team “enemies,” and many others openly speak against May’s Brexit policies. A weakened coalition and major disagreements over monetary policy have led to a massive diplomatic stalemate. It hasn’t been helped by the fact that the EU wants the UK to not talk trade until everything else is agreed upon (putting the UK at a diplomatic disadvantage) and the

with the DUP. To make matters worse, the Labour Party is looking for concessions on Brexit policy. Not only that, the financial industry is in a panic over the deadlock. This has been made worse by the massive drop in the pound’s value. With parliamentary disunity, incompetent officials, and a deeply weakened Brexit mandate, May and the rest of the United Kingdom are in trouble if a deal is not reached before March 2019. Since the June 8th elections,

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With a series of unabashedly social democratic policies, Labour gained support quickly, especially among groups who usually did not vote.”

fact that the UK isn’t aligning its priorities with the EU’s. At this point, members of parliament are trying to force May into signing a deal with the EU before 2019 in order to ensure that the Conservatives will be the ones to have to negotiate with the EU. On top of that, May, Davis, and Johnson have been trying to woo EU politicians most sympathetic to the UK in an attempt to break the deadlock. All this stands in contrast with May’s previous comments, which indicated that most of the negotiations would be done quickly. Implementing Brexit policy through Parliament has been made more difficult by May’s weak coalition

the United Kingdom has been in both political and diplomatic limbo. With a weakening economy and devalued pound, many in the UK are in dire straits. Politically, the governing coalition is between a weakened Conservative Party and the reactionary DUP. Labour has gained thirty seats and a lot of political power, but not enough to control the government. This lack of power, along with the Conservative party’s disunity and major policy disagreements, has led to deadlock in the Brexit negotiations. At this point, the United Kingdom is barreling toward some sort of disaster. At this point, disaster is almost expected.

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RABAD PHOTOGRAPHY / FLICKR

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AMERICA IN NIGER The search for stability

BY: JAKE COHEN

n early October, ISIS-linked militants killed four American soldiers on a mission in Niger. The soldiers were working closely with Nigerien and French forces in an operation that went horribly wrong. While the American media has focused on the frenzy of hazy details surrounding the incident and the President’s interactions with the families of the fallen soldiers, there is a much more important story to tell.

AFRICA

Niger is home to the secondlargest deployment of American troops in Africa. With over 800 U.S. soldiers stationed in the landlocked West African nation, the United States provides support against a slew of threats from Niger’s neighbors, namely, Boko Haram from Nigeria, smugglers and insurgents from Mali, and ISIS- or Al-Qaeda-linked militants throughout the region. Although Chad and Nigeria have provided critical support to the security efforts against Boko Haram, Niger has called upon French and

U.S. troops to provide additional aid. This incident is simply the latest in years of devastating conflict and instability in West Africa, but the U.S.’ presence represents the opportunity to help Niger put an end to the violence that surrounds it. UNDERSTANDING THE REGION Niger is bounded on all sides by instability – both in the form of young governments grappling for internal power and Islamist militias and insurgencies. In order to put the importance of Niger

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in context, one must understand the intricacies of its unstable and violent surroundings. To Niger’s north, Libya remains embroiled in a civil war that began in 2011, and the nation still serves as a major terror hub. Even in 2011, when the war was just underway, the Nigerien military intercepted Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) members attempting to smuggle over a thousand pounds of explosives in from Syria. Libya continues to pose a problem for Niger, as it remains ripe with armed militant groups that also maintain presences in West Africa. To Libya’s east, along Niger’s northeast border, Algeria struggles with Islamist militant groups who have entered from the Libya conflict, including ISIS and AQIM. To the south and southwest, Boko Haram’s operational base in Nigeria and presence in Niger and parts of Chad have provided the basis for devastating sprees of terror attacks throughout West Africa. While Boko Haram has grabbed headlines largely for its propensity to inflict massive casualties, its presence in Niger is also felt through the acquisition of more territory. Boko Haram has seen relatively effective opposition from a coalition among Chad, Niger, Nigeria, France, and the United States; however, its core territorial and military capabilities remain relatively intact. To the south, Mali – and to a lesser extent Burkina Faso – presents threats from insurgents, Islamist militias, and traffickers

who operate a vast black market throughout West Africa. Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s notoriously corrupt political regimes fuel the instability of Niger’s borders, through their lack of political capital and military force to govern their border regions. In the past year and a half, the UN has counted at least 46 attacks by armed groups along the MaliNiger border as Mali has faced a violent insurgency. It was along this border, near Tongo Tongo, where American soldiers lost their lives in October fighting Islamist militants. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND THE ROLE OF NIGER Niger has struggled in the

change, Niger has experienced notable internal peace and political progress since he took over. Flush with natural resources, Issoufou has attempted to invest in infrastructure and attract foreign trade and investment. Unfortunately, Boko Haram, AQIM and ISIS have ravaged the nation’s borders and made it nearly impossible to effectively maintain its security. International aid has been a key part of Issoufou’s security agenda, and Niger is one of the unheralded battlegrounds against Islamic extremism in Africa. Meanwhile, Western nations have been eager to work with Issoufou both

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Niger is bounded on all sides by instability – both in the form of young governments grappling for internal power and Islamist militias and insurgencies.” past several years to allocate its extremely limited funds to both internal economic development and border security. President Mahamadou Issoufou, who took power in 2011 following a 2010 military coup, has brought a significant amount of stability to the nation. Although six years of consistent rule doesn’t seem like sufficient time to implement

because of Niger’s request for aid and its critical geographic location surrounded by these violent militant groups and conflicts. The international presence in West Africa is focused on several of the aforementioned military threats to Niger. In Mali, more than 14,000 United Nations peacekeepers and 5,000 French troops attempt to maintain some

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ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/GETTY IMAGES Soldiers from the Niger National Guard marching in southeastern NIger in summer 2016.

semblance of peace in the midst of a large insurgency. In Nigeria and Chad, a coalition of African nations supported by France and the U.S. has been working in a concerted effort to counter Boko Haram. In Algeria, the French maintain a presence in attempting to combat the ISIS and AQIM militants who have been involved in the Libyan conflict. In Niger, the U.S. military maintains an air base in Agadez and has over 800 stationed service personnel. France also maintains a military presence in Niger’s capital along with its troops in Mali and Chad. Recently, Niger made headlines for the potential $100 million U.S.-funded drone base that would be used to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-

AFRICA

terrorism operations. While it is somewhat unclear in what combative capacity the Americans stationed in Niger have served, it is clear that the U.S.’ presence in the nation is a major part of its broader military strategy and has been for some time. So, is this working? That’s a question that may take decades to truly answer. Niger views America as a potential development and security partner, and the U.S. should largely feel the same. While championing the fight against Boko Haram, ISIS, and AQIM are great rallying points within the U.S., the reality is that these conflicts are largely local, with military support coming from these terrorist groups’ international backers. That being

said, the American willingness to commit military support and funding has been critical for the maintenance of Niger’s security. We may not see the results of this security partnership until Niger can begin to invest the security savings in developing its own economy. While Niger’s six years of political consistency have existed in a volatile international environment, there are certainly positives that can arise from its willingness to work with the United States. While the U.S.’ involvement in Niger has just recently come into public awareness through the tragic loss of American lives, one can hope that it will ultimately serve as a stabilizing force in Niger.

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COLOMBIA’S

POLITICAL SNAPSHOT

BY: VALENTINA LOSADA

fter having spent two months at Penn, I know the look that comes right after I introduce myself and say that I am from Colombia. It almost never fails. It isn’t the same stereotypically, uneducated look that we Colombians are used to getting right before people say, “Colombia? Really? Do you have any weed on you?” It isn’t the annoying, absolutely confused look that people simply can’t hide as they try to figure out what to say while also trying, and failing, to place Colombia in the map. It is rather the look that follows a miniature internal debate in the head of a highly-educated person struggling to quickly come to a consensus on what he knows

about Colombia in light of what the country’s name immediately sparks in his mind: Netflix’s Narcos, James Rodriguez, and some vague idea of a peace process that they can’t really remember what ended up happening to. So instead of making their internal debates public and risking either an offensive comment or a question that makes them seem ignorant (very faithfully following Penn’s culture of “of course I know everything”), they awkwardly say, “Colombia! That is so cool.” It is a very interesting experience, facing an educated, but not knowledgeable, perception of Colombia. It is reassuring to know that the world’s image of Colombia is slowly but steadily separating itself from what Narcos so mistakenly portrays and realizing

Colombia’s achievements in so many other areas. It is reassuring to know, above all, that that world is starting to acknowledge Colombia’s potential. Colombia is holding presidential elections on May 27, 2018. Yet to this day, candidacies haven’t even been declared. This coming election is arguably the most important election Colombia has ever had, because the level of polarization due to the aftermath of the peace negotiations is so high, and because the parties’ stances are so radically different, the direction the country will take is extremely different depending on who wins. To give some very brief historical context, there were two traditional, dominant parties in Colombia until 1991: the Conservative Party and

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the Liberal Party. In the late 1940s, the fight for power between these two parties spiraled out of control, leading to a period of what can only be described as a bloody civil war called La Violencia. To end this war, conservatives and liberals came to a consensus known as the National Front, in which they agreed that the two parties would alternate power in four-year intervals for twelve years (which would end up actually being sixteen). Although the National Front succeeded at ending La Violencia, it created a political scene in which everyone who did not identify with the two traditional parties had absolutely no political representation or voice; this eventually led to the creation of guerrilla organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and ELP, which have been the main actors in the armed conflict in Colombia ever since. As a solution, the Constitution of 1991 completely opened up the political spectrum. Instead of two strong parties, there are now over 30 rather weak ones. The latest peace process with the FARC, the biggest of the guerrilla groups, started in 2012 and was meant to culminate in a strong win for a national referendum to approve the accords reached in the negotiations. Instead, by a voting difference less than 2%, the accords were not approved, and the government was forced to validate the agreements through congress, losing all momentum and legitimacy and setting the stage for an extremely difficult implementation period. As a result, the political climate leading up to the 2018 elections is extremely tense, and the polarization has

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created an atmosphere in which Colombians feel that everything that they know, and everything they care about, is at stake. There is a very real possibility that if the still unknown candidate of the current opposition party (Centro Democrático) wins, the peace process, along with all its progress regarding establishing conversations with other rebel groups such as the ELN and the BACRIMS, will be reversed altogether. And then there is also a real possibility that Colombia will have a leftist government for the first time since its birth. Regardless of the results, these will be the first elections in which the FARC (previously standing for Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionaries de Colombia, and now standing for Fuerza Alternative Revolucionaria del Común) will have an actual candidate running for office. (The last time there was an attempted transition from arms to politics, on behalf of the FRAC, over 2000 civilian members of the Union Patriotic, or UP political party were killed by the DAS, an intelligence state agency that was shut down due to extreme abuse of power, and by paramilitary groups.) And then there is the absence of a candidate from the Partido de la U, the party of the current government and the one that holds the majority of the chairs in congress. So regardless of the outcome, the 2018 elections will determine Colombia’s direction, in a very radical sense, for at least the next decade. The thing is, because the coming elections are so decisive and so important, the possible

candidates – which at this point refers to any active politician with the exception of the current president, Santos (the ex-president) and Uribe (the primary opponent to Santos’ government) – don’t feel that they can afford to say anything that could possibly compromise their voting pool, which in turn means that they can’t afford to talk about the issues that actually matter. There has been no debate over the economy. There have been no pronouncements on infrastructure. Education has become an extra at the end of political speeches, in the part when no one is listening anymore. So in the face of a historical election, political correctness, which is nothing more than a votes-catching, politicallyempty strategy, has taken over the public conversation. And it has gotten to a point in which now, when Colombians ask each other about the country’s current situation and future, the look on our faces doesn’t really differ much from that of the Penn students’. Due to lack of substantial debate, the things that pump into our head when we think about our own country are sadly not far from Netflix’s Narcos, James Rodriguez, and some vague idea of a peace process that we also can’t really remember what ended up happening to. Valentina is a Freshman in the College interested in studying Philosophy, Politics and Economics. An Assistant Director of Academic Affairs, Valentina is interested in Latin American and Middle Eastern affairs.

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STRINGER / REUTERS

ISIS’ MAOIST INSURGENCY BY: SOPHIE PU

SIS, otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, is the jihadist group that abruptly gained international attention when it captured large swathes of territory across the Middle East – namely, in Iraq and Syria. Over the last

few years, however, its grasp on land has weakened, and the sun seems to be setting on the group’s territorial power. Now, the West is consumed by finding a way to combat and extinguish the group’s cyber presence and growing hold over Western-

born extremist fighters. While governments concern themselves with addressing the group’s cyber presence, this article reflects on the fall of ISIS as a quasistate. This article postulates that ISIS, although beginning each stage of Maoist revolution very

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similarly to the original theory, eventually deviates from the goal for a multitude of reasons. As such, through examination of its revolutionary process, it is revealed that ISIS is heavily reliant on the support of the people and built on an infrastructure of hatred and dissatisfaction. In order to proceed with the analysis of ISIS under Maoist terms, these Maoist terms must be identified. “Maoist terms,” in the context of this paper, refers to the three-step process of a successful

local people as kind and helpful in order to generate popular support. In doing so, the group creates a sense of dissent and unrest among the local population against its government or the revolutionaries’ opponents. The second stage is identified as the equilibrium stage. This stage may only occur if the first stage was successful, that is, only when the party has sufficient popular support. Throughout this stage, the party launches small-scale violence, expanding action into guerrilla

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Terrorism in itself is not an existential threat, as an existential threat by definition is a threat to the existence of the state.”

insurgency that Mao outlines in his texts, On Guerrilla Warfare and On Protracted War. In these texts, Mao establishes the three stages in which an insurgency must engage and which an insurgency must complete to successfully overthrow its opponents (contextually, Japan during the Sino-Japanese war). The first stage Mao defines is called the strategic defensive stage. This stage outlines the importance of party expansion into the local towns of its occupation; the group is to establish itself among the

MIDDLE EAST

warfare. This includes increased recruitment and training, hitand-run tactics, petty warfare, and mobile military tactics. Finally, the third and allegedly fastest stage is the strategic offensive stage. This would culminate after an extended period of the first two stages. Here, the insurgent group is finally able to fight its opponents in traditional military terms, although its techniques would still include aspects of guerrilla warfare. Whenever ISIS expands to a new area, “its first priority is

to win the trust and cooperation of civilians, who are an essential source of information, labor, and other material resources that are necessary for territorial expansion and state-building.” This takes the form of handing out free or heavily subsidized food, cleaning up the streets, and fighting crime. After a few months, however, ISIS begins demanding that citizens pay a tax (zakat), and in return, ISIS promises to create social infrastructures such as a justice system, protection, and services that are vital to a budding society, including electricity and health care. In spite of ISIS’ success in accruing support, there seems to be festering resentment in its cities of occupancy. For example, in Dier ez-Zor, Syria, there is growing starvation and unemployment in the face of the lavish lifestyles led by ISIS fighters. Ironically, ISIS fighters themselves seem to be losing faith in the campaign; defection occurs for numerous reasons, with interviewee responses ranging from wanting to escape a weakening ISIS to disgust with ISIS’ corruption. As such, it remains convoluted as to whether or not ISIS has achieved Mao’s first step of insurgency. While it began in the same vein, it seems that the vices of corruption and greed have muddied ISIS’ purpose of gaining public support. Although its policies and social contracts have garnered public support in the past, corruption and internal contradictions have seriously diminished much of ISIS’ support

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from outside and within. Traditional guerrilla tactics, unsurprisingly, take place in the Middle East, where there might be two armies – ISIS and a nation’s army – fighting one another. Indeed, ISIS’ guerrilla tactics have proved successful on numerous occasions, such as when the group managed to maintain its hold over land in Baghdad. The Iraqi soldiers’ efforts to combat them have proved futile, as Brigadier General Nasir al-Fartousi, commander of the Interior Ministry’s Rapid Intervention Division notes: “They are professionals in guerrilla warfare, contrary to our forces which follow an old fighting style.” Unfortunately for ISIS, in spite of many successful campaigns in the Middle East, its ‘hit-and-run’ tactics for attacks on the West have led to intense Western involvement on the warfront. As such, the Islamic State was forced into war too soon for it to have established the footholds that Mao suggested for the second stage. While certainly it seems that ISIS was en route to following the second stage, it incited Western powers too much, leading to Western involvement forcing the group to engage in traditional warfare. In the final stage of insurgency, Mao writes that after years of guerrilla warfare and establishing themselves among the locals, the insurgents are finally ready to conduct war. Thus far, ISIS has indeed engaged in war with the West, however, not necessarily on its own terms. Following the Paris

attacks, France and the U.S. both launched aircraft warfare and airstrikes in Syria, 50 American Special Operations troops were deployed in Iraq and Syria, the British strengthened intelligence cooperation with counterparts across Europe, and Europe began to close down its borders. However, military statistics are not entirely representative of the state of foreign affairs in regard to Islamic terrorism. While ISIS’ militarily can be defeated, it is its ideological and psychological threat to the West that makes it more dangerous. Terrorism in itself is not an existential threat, as an existential threat by definition is a threat to the existence of the state. However, “existence” takes on a broad meaning. Certainly terrorism could not possibly wipe out the existence of the U.S., or any Western nation for that matter, nor could it physically affect a substantial number of people so as to pose a threat to the state. The way the West reacts to terrorism will have far greater consequences than anything ISIS could do to the West. Terrorism could pose an existential threat in the nuances of the nature of the U.S., Britain, France, etc. as just, egalitarian states. So far, the responses of the U.S and the West have been distinctly draconian, for example, the shutting of European borders and the Turkish agreement with the EU to send Syrian refugees in Europe back to Turkey. These measures are threatening to the politics of the West, as they violate international laws and fundamentally jeopardize the

image of the West as moral and democratic. Furthermore, as a result of the power disparity between ISIS and the U.S., terrorism could theoretically go on indefinitely; there is very little the West can do should a suicide bomber in Western residence decide to detonate in the middle of the street. The prolonged, lowlevel nature of terrorism can have a corrosive effect on international politics, the political atmosphere of the affected states, and people’s sense of security. Furthermore, with the maneuverer to cyberrecruitment and appealing to marginalized communities in Western countries, ISIS hold over the West seems to see no end. Given this, although Mao’s definitions of the third stage of revolutionary war have not been reached, ISIS nonetheless poses a threat to the West in a theological and ideological sense. As such, it may be understood that while ISIS certainly employed many of the Maoist methods, what thwarted them was corruption, internal conflict, and differences in circumstances. While in all three stages the Islamic State has begun the way Mao had prescribed, it has had some failure or other at each point, leaving the ultimate result rather different than the victory Mao’s text lays out. Now, the question lies in the appeal of ISIS to foreign fighters. With the Internet, ISIS’ ideological dissemination is rapid and insidious; if Western governments focus solely on the military battle, they may find themselves at a loss in the ideological one.

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THE END OF

PERONISMO? Macri’s Argentina

n December of 2015, Argentines elected President Mauricio Macri, ending more than half a century of Peronist governance. A member of the center-right Cambiemos – or “Let’s change” – party, Macri has based his campaign and presidency on fiscal and economic reform. With the results of Argentina’s recent midterm legislative elections, it would appear that reform is here to stay. So what is the Peronist paradigm, and why is it now coming to an end? One cannot provide a complete answer to those

LATIN AMERICA

BY: CLAIRE REARDON questions without an examination of industrialized industries took its toll the economic history of Argentina. on this economic prosperity. The downturn gathered speed in 1946, ECONOMIC BACKGROUND with the election of Juan Perón to Prior to the first World War, the presidency. He set the model Argentina was one of the world’s for what would become Argentina’s wealthiest countries, exporting economic norms – high government large volumes of meat and grain. spending funded by multiple Beginning in the 1930s, however, a exchange rates, restrictions and high series of factors including political duties on imports, taxes on exports, instability from military coups, the and government intervention worldwide post-war Depression, a in markets. These populist and neutrality in World War II that left isolationist policies spawned high the country at odds with the United levels of unemployment, as well States, and a lack of competitive as hyperinflation and deflation at

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different points in the late twentieth than half that. The government aims but asserting that actually measuring century. This Peronist legacy to reduce it to the 12-17% range poverty would be “stigmatizing” to continued all the way through by the end of the year. It has also the less fortunate. But the Catholic the consecutive presidencies of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and his controversial wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (20072015). MACRI’S REFORMS By 2015, Argentines had had enough. With the popular will on his side, Macri’s first actions as President were to free up the Argentine peso’s long-fixed exchange rate and to open Argentine markets to international trade by slashing import tariffs, export taxes, and subsidies. (Users of electricity, gas, water, and transport now cover 50% of the cost rather than 10%.) He also returned Argentina to international credit markets by settling long-standing disputes with foreign bondholders. As an immediate consequence of these reforms, the country experienced significant currency devaluation and a release of suppressed inflation. This caused prices to jump and inflation to surpass 40%, culminating in a shortterm recession consisting of a 2.2% fall in GDP and the plunging of 1.5 million Argentines into poverty. More recently, however, Argentina’s third quarter 2017 statistics have shown that Macri’s changes are taking the country on a new upward trajectory. Private sector investment has increased, new jobs have been created, and the wage increase is outpacing the inflation rate, leading to an increase in purchasing power and consumer spending. At the end of 2016, the peso’s inflation reached an apex at 47%; now, the inflation rate is less

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He was found shot in his apartment hours before he was scheduled to testify in Congress that then-President Christina Fernández made a deal with the Iranian government to grant immunity to Iranian suspects in exchange for oil.”

pledged to reduce its primary budget shortfall by 1% (to 3.2% of GDP) by 2018. Between the second quarter of 2016 and the second quarter of 2017, GDP expanded by 2.7%, the best performance since Macri took office in 2015. One of Macri’s most promising metrics of success has been a decrease in poverty. In the first half of 2017, the poverty rate fell to 28.6%, a 1.7% decrease from the previous six months’ rate. The government had stopped measuring poverty rates under President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, arbitrarily claiming that less than 5% of Argentines were poor

University of Argentina estimates that poverty rates increased during each of Fernández’s last four years in office, reaching 29% in 2015. Macri had said that his presidency would be a failure if he didn’t manage to reduce poverty, and it would seem he’s off to a hopeful start. MIDTERM ELECTIONS The recent midterm legislative elections were widely viewed as a litmus test for whether Macri had managed to keep the country convinced of the soundness of his reform – especially since former President Cristina Fernández ran

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against Macri’s party members for a congressional seat. Before Argentines took to the polls, however, the campaign trail underwent a number of shocking events. The first was a statement by the investigating team of the 2015 death of Alberto Nisman. Nisman was a prosecutor who had spent years investigating the July 18, 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people. He was found shot in his apartment hours before he was scheduled to testify in Congress that then-President Christina Fernández made a deal with the Iranian government to grant immunity to Iranian suspects in exchange for oil. Immediately afterward, Fernández had pushed the idea that his death was a suicide, but she later adopted the theory that it was a political conspiracy to frame her government. Because the original investigation, conducted during Fernández’s presidency, ended ambiguously, the current team of 28 government forensic experts took over the evidence and studied it in a secret facility for seven months. On September 22, it released a statement labeling Nisman’s death a murder due to evidence such as lack of gunpowder on his hands, signs of sedation, and striking injuries inconsistent with self-inflicted suicide wounds. The statement was considered a milestone in a long history of unresolved allegations against the state’s political elite, and the timing of its release served to both cast a negative light on Fernández’s campaign and check Macri’s vow to support the judicial system in its autonomy from the

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executive branch. The second occurrence was the discovery of a body in Patagonia’s Chabut River. Found just two days before the elections, the body is believed to belong to 28-year-old Santiago Maldonado, a protestor who went missing about two months prior. Some eyewitnesses to his disappearance reported seeing police officers at which Maldonado had thrown stones load him into a truck, and others described Maldonado as running from the police across the river, even though he couldn’t swim. His disappearance was a sensitive issue due to the up to 30,000 disappearances brought about by Argentina’s right-wing military dictatorship during la Guerra Sucia (“the Dirty War”). Because Macri has been less tolerant of roadblocking protests than either of the Kirchners, Fernández used the incident as a roorback against him. Campaigning of both sides halted the day the body was found, but authorities are still searching for Maldonado in Chile. The results? On October 22, Macri’s Cambiemos coalition won 40% of the national vote and thirteen of Argentina’s 23 provinces, including the capital. This translated to 24 out of 72 seats in the senate and 127 of 257 seats in the lower Chamber of Deputies, rendering Cambiemos a minority in both houses but a plurality in congress. In comparison, Fernández’s Unidad Ciudadana (“Citizen’s Unity”) movement won only three seats. Fernández herself won a seat in the senate but finished a distant second in the multi-party Buenos Aires race, decreasing her chances of winning

the presidency in 2019. However, Fernández’s senate seat will grant her immunity from prosecution for the corruption allegations she faces from her presidency. And although her reputation has suffered in recent years, Fernández still enjoys strong support from poorer Buenos Aires neighborhoods due to her dispersion of jobs, welfare, and low-cost housing when she was president. In the aftermath of the elections, Macri asked for public support in his plans to create a more competitive economy and attract investment by overhauling the tax code, Social Security system, and political institutions. Criticizing Congress for wasting taxpayer money on unnecessary employees and failing state companies, he called for a trimming of the public sector and balanced spending. Because the tax rate has already reached the peak of the revenue hill, Macri plans to reduce the income tax as well as taxes at city and state levels. Another goal of his is to reform the pension system, as Fernández bestowed pensions upon three million people who didn’t contribute to the formal economy. To assuage concerns about the national policy’s austere direction, Macri’s Cabinet Chief Marcos Peña assured the public that social spending would reach a record high in 2018. Now it will just be a matter of Macri convincing Congress to pass the 2018 budget. Macri will be up for reelection in 2019, a momentous occasion because no Argentine non-Peronist president has ever been reelected. But if the sun is setting on Peronism in Argentina, he just might be the first.

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SOURCES “EARLY WARNING SIGNS”: GENOCIDE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Aljazeera.com. (2017). UN sees early warning signs of genocide in CAR. 16 Oct. 2017. Vinograd, C. (2017). Inside Ndele, FPRC’s ‘peaceful’ parallel state. Aljazeera.com. 16 Oct. 2017. UN News Service Section. (2017). Central African Republic: UN Special Adviser condemns incitement of violence and hatred. 16 Oct. 2017. BBC News. (2013). Children ‘beheaded’ in CAR conflict. 16 Oct. 2017. NN Library (2017). Central African Republic Fast Facts. CNN. 16 Oct. 2017. Human Rights Watch. (2017). “They Said We Are Their Slaves”. 16 Oct. 2017. United Nations (2016). 2016 HDR Report. Human Development Reports. New York: United Nations Development Programme. 16 Oct. 2017. UN.org. (2017). MINUSCA Facts and Figures. 16 Oct. 2017. Koursany, F. (2017). Bodies Strewn Across Town After Central African Republic Clashes. Bloomberg.com. 16 Oct. 2017. Baddorf, Z. (2017). CAR Becomes Most Dangerous Spot for Aid Workers. VOA. 16 Oct. 2017. Sayer, S. (2013). Central Africa on the Brink, Rebels Halt Their Advance. The New York Times, p.A8. 16 Oct. 2017. Ngoupana, P. (2013). Four killed in Christian-Muslim clashes in Central African Republic’s capital. Reuters. 16 Oct. 2017. Phillips, B. (2014). Deep divisions as CAR violence continues. Aljazeera.com. 16 Oct. 2017. THE TOUGH NEW REALITY IN EUROPEAN POLITICS: HOW GERMANY MAY HAVE HALTED MACRON’S VISION FOR EUROPE Barkin, Noah, and Andreas Rinke. “German Coalition Talks Deal Early Blow to Macron on Europe.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters , 25 Oct. 2017. Berman, Sheri. “Behind the ‘Boring’ German Election Are Four Deeply Disturbing Trends.” The

Washington Post, WP Company LLC, 24 Sept. 2017. Deen, Mark, et al. “Macron Lays Out Vision of a Europe Fit for Globalized World.” Bloomberg News, Bloomberg, 26 Sept. 2017. “German Election: How Right-Wing Is Nationalist AfD?” BBC News, BBC, 13 Oct. 2017. Hill, Jenny. “Germany Migrants: Freiburg Murder Arrest Fuels Tensions.” BBC News, BBC, 9 Dec. 2016. Matthijs, Matthias, and Erik Jones. “This Was the Worst Possible German Election for Europe.” Foreign Policy, The FP Group, 26 Sept. 2017. Melander, Ingrid, and Richard Lough. “After German Election, France’s Macron Paints Sweeping Vision for Europe.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 26 Sept. 2017. Samuel, Henry, and Peter Foster. “Macron to Pledge to Plough on with Europe Reforms despite German Electoral Setback.” The Telegraph, The Telegraph, 25 Sept. 2017. Winfrey, Michael, and Aaron Eglitis. “Macron’s Vision for EU Hits .” Bloomberg News, Bloomberg, 8 Oct. 2017. YEMEN: THE FORGOTTEN CIVIL WAR BBC News. (2017). Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom?. Accessed 27 Oct. 2017. Blanchard;, Ben. “China expresses concern as Yemen’s Houthis form government.” Reuters. December 02, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2017. Ghobari, Mohammad. “At Least 10,000 Killed In Yemen Civil War.” The Huffington Post. August 30, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2017. Najjar, Farah. “Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen ‘a strategic failure’.” Yemen | Al Jazeera. August 23, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2017. Kheel, Rebecca. “Trump signals deeper US involvement in Yemen.” TheHill. April 01, 2017. Accessed October 26, 2017. Press, The Associated. “Yemen airstrikes to go on until Houthi rebels withdraw, Arab leaders say.” Mashable. March 29, 2015. Accessed October 27, 2017. Saba Net - Yemen news agency. Accessed October 26, 2017 Saul, Jonathan, Parisa Hafezi, and Michael Georgy. “Exclusive: Iran steps up support for Houthis in Yemen’s war - sources.” Reuters. March 22, 2017. Accessed October 27, 2017.

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Shaheen, Kareem, and Nadia Khomami. “Iranian sels to Support Ousted President.” Los Angeles military blames Saudis after 12 killed in Tehran Times, 7 Nov. 2017. terrorist attack.” The Guardian. June 07, 2017. Puigdemont, Carles. “I’m Not Just Fighting for CatAccessed October 27, 2017. alonia. This Is about Democracy Itself.” The “Yemen and Saudi Arabia.” Al-bab.com. Accessed Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 6 Nov. October 26, 2017. 2017. Rolfe, Pamela, and James McAuley. “Spain Asks BRIEFING: MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Catalonia: Did You Declare Independence or “Mexican Leftist Obrador Leads Ahead of 2018 Not?” The Washington Post, WP Company, 11 Election: Poll.” Reuters, 18 Sept. 2017. Oct. 2017. Graham, David. “Mexico Ex-First Lady Leaves Op- Tadeo, Maria. “Advantage Spain as Split Hurts Sepposition Party for Presidency Bid.” Reuters, 6 aratists’ Fight for Catalonia.” Bloomberg.com, Oct. 2017. Bloomberg, 7 Nov. 2017. “2015 Election Guide.” The Mexico Institute. Imison, Paul. “Presidential Front-Runner Lopez THE IRAN DEAL: A DANGEROUS GAME Obrador Vows to Drain the Swamp in Mexi- Beauchamp, Zack. “Trump’s Monumental Iran Deal co.” The Washington Times, The Washington Decision, Explained.” Vox. Vox, 12 Oct. 2017. Times, LLC, 4 Oct. 2017. Web. Graham, Dave. “Maverick State Governor Takes Aim Conca, James. “The Iran Nuclear Deal Without The at Mexican Presidency.” The Washington Times, United States.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 17 The Washington Times, LLC, 4 Oct. 2017. Oct. 2017. Web. Graham, Dave. “Maverick State Governor Takes Aim Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. “Iran’s Supreme Leader at Mexican Presidency.” The Washington Times, Dismisses Trump’s ‘rants and Whoppers’.” The The Washington Times, LLC, 4 Oct. 2017. Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 18 Oct. “Potential Contenders in 2018.” Canning House. 2017. Web. “Potential Candidates.” The Mexico Institute, The “Donald Trump Accuses Iran of Violating the NuWilson Center. clear Deal.” The Economist. The Economist “Legislative Framework - Mexico.” ACE Electoral Newspaper, 13 Oct. 2017. Web. Knowledge Network. Fitch, Asa. “Iranian President Hassan Rouhani “The Mexican Electoral System.” Instituto Nacional Threatens to Back Out of Nuclear Deal.” The Electoral. Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, 15 Aug. 2017. Web. CATALONIA: THE RICH SECESSION “France Committed to Iran Nuclear Deal despite Birnbaum, Michael. “Separatist Catalans Retreat as Trump Decision.” Fox News. FOX News NetSpanish Authorities Quash Bid for Indepenwork, n.d. Web. dence.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 30 Friedman, Uri. “Trump Isn’t Certifying the Iran Oct. 2017. Deal-What Happens Next?” The Atlantic. AtCasert, Raf, and Joseph Wilson. “Catalan Five Get lantic Media Company, 12 Oct. 2017. Web. Conditional Freedom in Belgium.” Chicagotri- Images, Anadolu Agency/Getty. “Trump Decertifybune.com, 5 Nov. 2017. ing the Iran Deal Won’t Kill It - But There Will Erickson, Amanda. “Catalonia’s Independence Vote: Be Dire Effects.” Daily Intelligencer. N.p., 06 What You Need to Know.” The Washington Oct. 2017. Web. Post, WP Company, 27 Oct. 2017. “Iran Nuclear Deal: Key Details.” BBC News. BBC, Jones, Sam, et al. “Spain Dissolves Catalan Parlia13 Oct. 2017. Web. ment and Calls Fresh Elections.” The Guardian, Michaels, Jim. “Uncertainty over Iran Nuclear AgreeGuardian News and Media, 28 Oct. 2017. ment Could Heighten Economic Tensions with Jones, Sam. “Spanish Judge Jails Eight Members of Europe.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite InforFormer Catalan Government.” The Guardian, mation Network, 11 Oct. 2017. Web. Guardian News and Media, 2 Nov. 2017. Shear, Michael D. “Trump Will Withdraw U.S. “Nearly 200 Mayors Travel from Catalonia to BrusFrom Paris Climate Agreement.” The New York

FALL 2017 Times. The New York Times, 01 June 2017. Web. Woody, Christopher. “Decertifying the Iran Deal Is Putting the US in ‘rogue-state Territory’.” Business Insider. Business Insider, 13 Oct. 2017. Web. OF CRISES AND CONSTITUTIONS: WHY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST PROTECT THE ROHINGYA (ARNO), Arakan Rohingya National Org. “Who we are?” Rohingya.org. United States, Congress, “Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)” Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008), Printing & Pub. Enterprise, Ministry of Information, 2012. Lipka, Michael. “Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world.” Pew Research Center, 9 Aug. 2017. Rieffel, Lex. “Peace in Myanmar depends on settling centuries-Old ethnic conflicts.” Brookings, Brookings, 20 Mar. 2017. “Timeline: Reforms in Myanmar.” BBC News, BBC, 8 July 2015. Yegar, Moshe. The Muslims of Burma. O. Harrassowitz, 1972. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL (IN)JUSTICE SYSTEM? Birnbaum, Michael. “African Leaders Complain of Bias at ICC as Kenya Trials Get Underway.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 5 Dec. 2013. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. United Nations. “UN, United Nations, UN Treaties, Treaties.” United Nations, United Nations. “State Parties.” International Criminal Court. “Main.” Home, International Criminal Court. “Darfur, Sudan.” Darfur, Sudan, International Criminal Court. “Security Council, SC, UNSC, Security, Peace, Sanctions, Veto, Resolution, President, United Nations, UN, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Prevention.” United Nations, United Nations. (www.dw.com), Deutsche Welle. “Russia Committing ‘Grave Human Rights Violations’ in Crimea – UN | News | DW | 26.09.2017.” DW.COM. “Darfur Genocide.” World Without Genocide.

KILLED IN KASHMIR: THE STORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST CONTESTED REGION Candace L. Bowser, Kashmir (Raleigh, NC: Lulu. com, 2011). SAMEER YASIR and JEFFREY GETTLEMAN et al., “Kashmir,” The New York Times, October 03, 2017, , accessed October 23, 2017. THE CASE FOR A KURDISH STATE Caryl, Christian. “The World’s Next Country.” Foreign Policy. Collin, Katy. “The Kurdish Referendum Won’t Deliver Independence—Here’s Why It Matters Anyway.” Brookings Institute. Grant, Thomas D. “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents.” Columbia Journal of International Law, PDF ed. Natali, Denise. “A New Normal for Iraqi Kurds?” Middle East Research and Information Project. Rubin, Rhys. “Netanyahu Finally Supports a TwoState Solution — in Iraq.” Foreign Policy. Wong, Edward. “Saddam charged with genocide of Kurds.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 5 Apr. 2006. AMERICAN-CUBAN RELATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT “UN Votes Wednesday on Resolution against US Embargo on Cuba.” Havana Times, 31 Oct. 2017. Harris, Gardiner, et al. “U.S. Expels 15 Cuban Diplomats, in Latest Sign Détente May Be Ending.” The New York Times, The New York Times Company, 3 Oct. 2017. Londoño, Ernesto. “U.S. Halt in Visa Services Leaves Cuban Families in Limbo.” The New York Times, The New York Times Company, 5 Oct. 2017. Chuckman, John. “‘Released’ Documents on JFK Assassination?” Sri Lanka Guardian , Sri Lanka Guardian News and Views Media, 31 Oct. 2017. “‘Science Fiction’: Cuban Officials Dismiss Claims of Sonic Attack on US Diplomats.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media Limited, 25 Oct. 2017. Borger, Julian, and Philip Jaekl. “Mass Hysteria May Explain ‘Sonic Attacks’ in Cuba, Say Top Neurologists.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media Limited, 12 Oct. 2017. Borger, Julian. “US Orders 15 Cuban Diplomats to

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Leave Washington Embassy over Sonic ‘Attacks’.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media Limited, 3 Oct. 2017. Ward, Alex. “US Diplomats Returned from Cuba with Odd Injuries. They May Have Been Attacked by a Sonic Weapon.” Vox, Vox Media, Inc., 28 Aug. 2017. Ward, Alex. “The US May Close Its Embassy in Cuba after Possible Sonic Weapon Attacks.” Vox, Vox Media, Inc., 18 Sept. 2017. Aleem, Zeeshan. “Buy Your Flight to Cuba Fast — Trump Might Be Reimposing Travel Restrictions.” Vox, Vox Media, Inc., 1 June 2017. Calamur, Krishnadev. “Trump’s Policy on Terrorism Suspects Looks Like Obama’s.” The Atlantic, The Atlantic Monthly Group, 30 Oct. 2017. Calamur, Krishnadev. “The Enduring Mystery of the Cuba Sonic Attacks.” The Atlantic, The Atlantic Monthly Group, 29 Sept. 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “Trump Plans Rollback of Obama Cuba Policy.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 13 June 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “U.S. to Reduce Staffing at Embassy in Cuba in Response to Mysterious Attacks.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 29 Sept. 2017. “Cuba’s Sonic Attacks.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 25 Sept. 2017. Schwartz, Felicia, and José de Córdoba. “U.S. Orders Cuba to Cut Embassy Staff in Washington.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 3 Oct. 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “At Least 16 Americans Reported Health Problems at U.S. Embassy in Cuba.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 24 Aug. 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “U.S., Cuban Officials Meet Under Cloud of Embassy Illnesses.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 26 Sept. 2017. “Evening the Cuban Score.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 3 Oct. 2017. “Time to Hold Cuba to Account for Its Crimes.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 15 Oct. 2017. Schwartz, Felicia. “Trump Says ‘Cuba Is Responsible’ for Mysterious Health Ailments in Havana.” The Wall Street Journal , Dow Jones and Company, Inc., 16 Oct. 2017. “US Cuba: Washington Expels Diplomats over

‘Acoustic Attacks’.” BBC News, BBC, 4 Oct. 2017. “US Pulls Staff from Cuba over ‘Specific Attacks’.” BBC News, BBC, 29 Sept. 2017. “‘US Pulls Staff from Cuba over ‘Specific Attacks’.’ BBC News, BBC, 29 Sept. 2ADAD.” BBC News, BBC, 29 Oct. 2017. “Deciphering Donald Trump’s Thinking on Latin America.” The Economist, 5 Oct. 2017. “Donald Trump Closes the Door to Cuba—a Bit.” The Economist, 22 June 2017. CENTRAL ASIA 101 Stans Undelivered.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 30 June 2016. “Turkmenistan.” OEC - Turkmenistan (TKM) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. “Kazakhstan.” OEC - Kazakhstan (KAZ) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners. “Silk Road Dialogue, Diversity & Development.” UNESCO. THE BREXIT DEADLOCK Syal, Rajeev, and Henry McDonald. “Tory-DUP deal announcement put on hold due to London blaze.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 14 June 2017. “Results of the 2017 General Election.” BBC News, BBC. “Theresa May is ‘hopeless and weak’, says leading Tory party donor.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 9 Sept. 2017. Mason, Rowena. “George Osborne criticised for gruesome remarks against Theresa May.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 13 Sept. 2017. Bowcott, Owen. “Tory-DUP £1bn deal: crowdfunded legal challenge reaches high court.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 26 Oct. 2017. Stone, Jon. “EU tells Britain it will make no concessions to break ‘disturbing deadlock’ in Brexit negotiations.” The Independent, Independent Digital News and Media, 12 Oct. 2017. “Michel Barnier hits out at ‘disturbing’ UK stance on Brexit as EU prepares for no deal.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 12 Oct. 2017. “Brexit talks in ‘deadlock’ after 5 rounds.” CNNMoney, Cable News Network.

FALL 2017 AMERICA IN NIGER: THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY BALDOR, LOLITA C. “US suspects Niger villager betrayed Army troops.” AP News, Associated Press, 25 Oct. 2017. Burke, Jason. “US special forces deaths in Niger lift veil on shadow war against Islamists in Sahel.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 15 Oct. 2017. Cocks, Tim, and Abdoulaye Massalatchi. “Niger defense minister asks U.S. to deploy armed drones against militants.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 2 Nov. 2017. Frykberg, Mel. “Nine dead, 40 abducted as Niger struggles to contain insurgency | IOL News.” IOL News South Africa, 4 July 2017. Lapegna, Andrea. “Regional terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel connections.” Aspenia Online, Aspen Institute. Lebovich, Andrew. “Overstating Terror in Niger.” Foreign Affairs, 14 Aug. 2013. Lebovich, Andrew. “The Real Reason U.S. Troops Are in Niger.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 27 Oct. 2017. “MINUSMA Peacekeeping.” United Nations, United Nations. “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-Insurgency.” International Crisis Group, 26 June 2017. Oladipo, Tomi. “La David Johnson death: How did US soldiers come under attack in Niger?” BBC News, BBC, 23 Oct. 2017. ISIS’ MAOIST STRATEGY Gregory, Michael. “Iraqi commanders: We’re outmatched by ISIS guerrilla warfare.” Business Insider. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. Mao, Ze Dong. On Protracted War. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. May, Theresa, “Home Secretary on the Brussels Terror Attacks.” Nakamura, David and DeYoung, Karen. “France Launches Fierce Assault on ISIS Targets in Syria,” Washington Post. Nov. 15, 2015. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. Rankin, Jennifer. “EU Strikes Deal with Turkey to Send Back Refugees,” The Guardian, Mar. 18, 2016. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. Revkin, Mara. “Isis’ Social Contract.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. Revkin, Mara and Mhidi, Ahmad. “Quitting Isis.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed Jul 2, 2016.

Traynor, Ian, “Is the Schengen Dream of Europe without Borders becoming a Thing of the Past?” The Guardian, Jan. 5, 2016. Accessed Jul 2, 2016. MACRI’S ARGENTINA: THE END OF PERONISMO? “A century of decline.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 Feb. 2014. “A missing-Person case looms over Argentina’s midterm elections.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 7 Sept. 2017. Aires, AP in Buenos. “Argentinian president Macri vows ‘many reforms’ after strong election result.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 24 Oct. 2017. Aires, Reuters in Buenos. “Argentina halts election campaign after body, thought to be missing activist, found. The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 18 Oct. 2017. “Argentina election: Macri wins crucial mid-Term vote.” BBC News, BBC, 23 Oct. 2017. “At mid-Term elections, Argentina chooses between sobriety and Peronism.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 21 Oct. 2017. Board, The Editorial. “Argentina Votes for Change.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 23 Oct. 2017. “Breaking the spell of Peronism.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 21 Oct. 2017. Devereux, Charlie, et al. “Argentina’s Economy Has Turned the Corner, Macri Says. Bloomberg. com, Bloomberg, 28 Sept. 2017. Invesco US, and SeekingAlpha. “Argentina: Will The Reforms In Place Pay Off ?” NASDAQ.com, 29 Sept. 2017. Martinez, Andres R. “Argentina.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 5 April 2017. Turner, Taos. “Argentina Poverty Rate Declined in First Half.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 28 Sept. 2017. Turner, Taos. “Argentina Probe Finds Prosecutor Alberto Nisman Was Murdered.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 22 Sept. 2017. Turner, Taos. “Argentina’s President Seeks to Build Momentum for Policy Changes.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 30 Oct. 2017. Winkler, Matthew A. “Investors Reward Argentina for Taming Inflation.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 25 September 2017.

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