Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 45, No. 2, 202– 218, April 2007
What About Us? The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience NATASHA T. DUNCAN & DWAYNE WOODS Department of Political Science, Purdue University, USA
ABSTRACT This article contributes to the sparse literature on democratic regimes in the Caribbean by examining the emergence and persistence of Anglo-Caribbean democracies. British colonialism, not socio-economic modernisation, explains the origins of the democratic institutions of Anglo-Caribbean states. British colonial heritage, however, fails to explain why these democracies have persisted, in contrast to the experience of other former British colonies and many Latin American and non-Anglo Caribbean states. We identify two key variables that we believe account for democratic sustainability. These are size and a political culture of patronage politics that integrates the different socio-economic and ethnic strata of Caribbean society into the political process. Size and patronage politics are conceptualised as interactive variables because the relatively small geographic size and population of Anglo-Caribbean states allow for a high degree of personalisation of politics and reinforces common political cultural dynamics. In this way, we provide a theoretical account of democratic sustainability among Anglo-Caribbean states, despite sharp inequalities, corruption and violence related to the international drug trade.
Introduction Among developing countries, the Caribbean is home to the largest cluster of democracies. Moreover, the Caribbean region has the longest-lasting set of sustained democracies – from independence to the present – among former Correspondence Address: Dwayne Woods, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, 2238 Beering Hall, 100 N. University Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2098, USA. Email: woods@polsci.purdue.edu 1466-2043 Print/1743-9094 Online/07/020202–17 # 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14662040701317527
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
203
British colonies, with two exceptions, Grenada and Guyana (Domı´nguez, 1998). The West Indies poses an anomaly to Lipset’s (1959) famous thesis that modernisation engenders democratisation. Unlike the purported trend in Western democracies, democratisation in the Caribbean was not the result of economic development. Rather, it emerged from the island-states’ colonial heritage. However, while colonial heritage accounts for the origins of the democratic institutions, it fails to explain the sustainability of democracy among Anglo-Caribbean states.1 Unlike most former colonies, British or otherwise, most Caribbean countries have successfully maintained their democratic institutions. Thus, Anglo-Caribbean countries surpass the democratic records of post-colonial African, Asian, and Latin American countries (Domı´nguez, 1998). Despite this noteworthy characteristic of Anglo-Caribbean countries, the region has been largely ignored in the democratisation literature. The majority of regional studies focus on Latin America, sometimes lumping Caribbean countries into their democratisation experience. This article contributes to the sparse scholarship by highlighting the bounded and non-bounded characteristics of the democratic experience in the Caribbean. The main explanatory focus is the one articulated by Rustow (1970: 337): ‘what conditions make democracy possible and what conditions make it thrive’? Looking at democracy in the context of the Caribbean, we can locate answers to the former part of the question in the states’ former British colony status. From the transition toward and upon gaining independence from colonial powers many Caribbean countries inherited democratic regimes and governmental institutions. However, the answer to the latter part of Rustow’s enquiry goes beyond the British tutelary explanation. The overwhelming majority of English-speaking Caribbean countries have sustained democracy since independence – withstanding economic crises, low levels of income in some of the Caribbean states, drug and urban violence and corruption. We identify two dominant factors that we believe account for democratic sustainability even in light of those significant socio-economic problems. These factors are size and a political culture of patronage politics that integrates the different socio-economic and ethnic strata of Caribbean society into the political process. Size and patronage politics are conceptualised as interactive variables because the relatively small geographic size and population of Anglo-Caribbean states allow for a high degree of personalisation of politics. In the very small Caribbean island-states, it is not an exaggeration to say that the governing elites all know one another. The article is organised in three parts. In the first, we briefly situate the Caribbean region within the broader literature on democratisation. In the second section, we compare the Caribbean to former British sub-Saharan African states using the statistical method of independent-sample t-tests.
204
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
With this analysis, we seek to determine whether British tutelage is the only factor contributing to the sustainability of democracy in these two regions. We look at two periods: 1980 and 2000. These two periods were chosen because 1980 was the beginning of an era of economic crises termed ‘the lost decade’ (Green, 2003) in the Caribbean and much of the developing world. The year 2000 provides relatively recent democracy ratings. By comparing these two regions, one can determine whether the Caribbean’s democratic record is indeed outstanding and therefore requires an alternative explanation from the British colonial heritage. In the third section, we engage in a nested case method analysis of the entire universe of independent Anglophone Caribbean countries; however, we concentrate principally on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. These two states provide an interesting contrast regarding the economic threshold that Przeworski and Limongi (1997) deemed necessary for perpetual or limited democratic survival. As will be shown below, Trinidad and Tobago’s economy meets this standard, while Jamaica’s does not. In 2005, Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP per capita was $9,043, Jamaica, on the other hand had a GDP of $3,257. Finding a Place in the Sun: Democratisation and Democratic Theory and the Caribbean Experience Starting in Western Europe and diffusing east and southward, the spread of democracy encompasses three waves.2 Democratisation’s first wave occurred from 1828 to 1926 in Western Europe in those societies embracing the industrial revolution. Eastern Europe and newly decolonised states in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa were the location of the second wave during the period 1943 to 1964. The 1974 coup in Portugal sparked the movement of the third wave of democratisation, which continued through the 1990s (Huntington, 1993). What gives rise to these new or renewed democratic regimes throughout time? The democratisation literature offers two opposing answers. Proponents of the modernisation school claim that economic development causes democracies (Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959). In contrast, opponents of modernisation theory purport that democracies come about through other exogenous factors, rather than following economic development (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). Lipset (1959), in his famous essay ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, set the tone for today’s scholarship on modernisation theory. In his study, he finds that ‘although the various indices have been presented separately, it seems clear that the factors of industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth, and education, are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
205
democracy’ (Lipset, 1959: 80). Simply put, the socio-cultural structure becomes more complex. All these changes ultimately usher in democracy. Democracies arise because authoritarian regimes can no longer oppress civil society because of the impact of socio-economic advancement. Hence, democracy is a function of economic development. Despite the limited predictive power of modernisation theory, its proponents still proceed to generalise across regions. A common criticism is that the generalisations are large and unbounded. As Bunce (2000: 703) puts it, ‘comparative studies of democratisation have produced two types of generalisations: those having nearly universal application and those applying to a range of countries within a region’. Similarly, Mainwaring and Pe´rezLin˜a´n (2003) argue that democratisation in Latin America is an exception to the modernisation rule. In light of these caveats, we examine some of the historical developments and events that capture the regionally bounded aspects of democratisation and democratic sustainability among Anglo-Caribbean states. The Colonial Nexus With independence, Caribbean states adopted the Westminster style of parliamentary system (Whitehead, 1996). Hence, democratisation was not the product of economic development vis-a`-vis modernisation processes. In fact, there was little in the way of economic development outside of a few commodity sectors, particularly sugar. Even in countries such as Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados in which income levels would rise and some degree of economic diversification would occur under the colonial model of commodity exports, these developments followed, rather than preceded, the establishment of democratic regimes. Essentially, the British exited from their colonial territories in the Caribbean and left their political institutions. In this respect, democratisation was not linked to economic processes of modernisation as a precondition of democracy. A simple regression analysis of Freedom House democracy scores for the Caribbean on GDP per capita indicates that it does not have a statistically significant effect on democracy in the Caribbean. As such, Domı´nguez (1998: 17) accounts for developments accurately: ‘the relationship between trends in economic growth as “cause” and democratic stability as “effect” is muddled at best’. The former British colony explanation, however, accounts only for the initial transference of democratic institutions and rules of democracy, not for its sustainability. Other factors must support democracy in the region. Drawing on Freedom House democracy scores for the years 1980 and 2000, we combine the political rights with the civil liberties ratings to form a composite score ranging from 2 (the most democratic) to 14 (the least democratic, that is authoritarianism). We use a continuous scale in accordance
206
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
with Collier and Adcock’s (1999) pragmatic approach. They stress two dimensions in measuring democracy: conceptualisation and degree. We adhere to the second dimension. We want to capture the degree of democracy in the two regions. A continuous scale also provides superior construct validity and reliability (Elkins, 2000). The cases, represented in Table 1, are all independent former British colonies in the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. We did two independent-sample t-tests to determine whether there is any statistically significant difference in the levels of democracy in the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa in 1980 and in 2000. As stated earlier, we hypothesised that there is a difference in the levels of democracy in both 1980 and 2000. That is, democracy flourishes at higher rates in the Caribbean in the periods tested in this study, despite many similarities in the two regions, such as parliamentary systems, Third World economic development status, and, most importantly, a British colonial history. Thus, our contention is that the former British colony nexus does not hold in accounting for democratic sustainability over time in the Caribbean. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics on democracy in both regions. It reveals that the Caribbean scores higher than sub-Saharan Africa in the two periods. For the Caribbean in 1980, the mean score is 5.11 and 3.17 in 2000 with standard deviations of 2.93 and 1.19, respectively. The average democracy scores for sub-Saharan Africa were 8.40 in 1980 and 8.13 in 2000 with standard deviations of 2.75 and 3.5, respectively. The Caribbean, on average, falls within the range of Freedom House’s3 classification of free in 2000 as Table 1. List of countries included in the study Independent Anglo-Caribbean countries
Independent Anglo-sub-Saharan African countries
Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas, The Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago
Bostwana Gambia, The Ghana Lesotho Kenya Malawi Mauritius Nigeria Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Sudan Swaziland Uganda Zimbabwe
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
207
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of levels of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, 1980 and 2000 Variable Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy
score score score score
for for for for
African countries 1980 African countries 2000 Caribbean countries 1980 Caribbean countries 2000
Mean
s
8.40 8.13 5.11 3.17
2.746 3.502 2.934 1.193
well as in 1980, while sub-Saharan African states fall into the partially free category. Simply put, the Caribbean region is more democratic than sub-Saharan Africa. Both regions, however, are, on average, becoming more democratic over time, but the Caribbean outpaces its counterpart because most AngloCaribbean states have continuously maintained democratic institutions. We find comparable results with the independent-sample t-test. It statistically confirms a higher level of democracy in the Caribbean in the two periods in this study. Table 3 shows the mean difference between the two regions is –3.289 in 1980. This finding is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.011, equal variances assumed. Similarly, in 2000, the mean difference in democracy between the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa is –4.967. This result is statistically significant as well, with a p-value of 0.000, equal variances not assumed.4 Even though these findings simply reiterate inferences about the relationship between democracy in the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, this study confirms statistically that democracy flourishes in the Caribbean over subSaharan countries with a similar colonial heritage. Additionally, these findings speak volumes to the limited effect that the former British colony status has had Table 3. Independent sample T-test statistics, 1980 and 2000
Mean: Group 1: Caribbean countries Mean: Group 2: sub-Saharan African countries Mean difference: Levine test significance: t-ratio:
1980
2000
5.11
3.17
8.40
8.13
23.289 0.749 22.770
24.967 0.001 24.684 (Equal variances assumed) 25.132 (Equal variances not assumed)
22.772
p-value ¼ 0.011; significant at the .05 level. p-value ¼ 0.015; significant at the .05 level. p-value ¼ 0.000; significant at the .05 level.
208
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
on democratic sustainability. As such, an alternative explanation is necessary to account for democratic sustainability in the Caribbean. Although the literature is divided regarding the causes of democratisation, scholars agree that democracies are sustained at high levels of development (Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). High income improves the educational system, which translates into better-educated citizens. Education also expands the middle class, which supports democracy. In addition to education, economic development increases the standard of living, income equality, and other socio-economic standards, which bolster support of democratic institutions and democracy as a whole (Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959). In the Caribbean, however, high income does not systematically account for the sustainability of democracy. Przeworksi and Limongi (1997: 165) postulate that the likelihood that a democracy will survive increases with every $1,000 of per capita income. For instance, democracies with under $1,000 are likely to survive for eight years and those with levels of incomes between the ranges of $1,001 and $2,000 will survive for 16 years. When applying these economic thresholds to Anglo-Caribbean countries, we find that in 1980 Belize’s GDP per capita was $1,980, yet democratic regimes survived beyond 16 years; the same is true for Dominica with per capita income of $1,800 and St. Vincent and the Grenadines with $1,500. Currently, Trinidad and Tobago’s level of economic development and per capita income places Trinidad at $9,043, while Jamaica is at $3,257. Overall, in the Caribbean, democracies have survived regardless of their level of income or economic growth. Accounting for Democracy in the Caribbean: Size and a Political Culture of Patronage There is an important body of literature which indicates that there is a strong relationship between size and democracy. In other words, smaller countries5 – especially island-states – are more likely to be democratic than larger states. Ott (2000: 121) noted that ‘the fact of being an island country has a consistent and positive impact on the likelihood of political democracy’. And this is the case ‘at all levels of per capita income, which may explain why some lower income small island countries remain democratic despite being beset with socio-economic problems that often undermine democratic stability in larger states’. Take Trinidad and Tobago, for example. Its small size was integral in moderating political radicalism, which might otherwise have led to worse outcomes than the Black Power Revolution in the early 1970s and the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen coup attempt in 1990. In the Caribbean, the average population size is 500,593 people, although there is some variation in terms of size and population among
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
209
Caribbean democracies. Jamaica is one of the largest island-states with a population of 2.5 million, and St. Kitts and Nevis is among the smallest with a population of only 44,290 people. In addition to being relatively small in size and in population, the democracies under study are islandstates, with the exception of Guyana and Belize. Although Jamaica exceeds the conventional measure of smallness, the fact that it is an island trumps this issue of population size. Island-states whether large or small tend to be more democratic (Ott, 2000). The exact causal relationship between size and democracy is not clear, however. Various studies have shown that size has an indirect effect on democratic sustainability (Anckar, 2002; Diamond, 1999; Ott, 2000; Srebrnik, 2004). It influences the relationship between elites and social interactions. While size does not necessarily contribute to an increase in levels of participation, it does facilitate strong personal ties and limits informational and contact asymmetries between elites and citizens. Thus, politics has a highly personal dimension to it. Governing and opposition elites know each other personally. These personal ties appear to have a two-fold effect on democratic politics in these countries. First, it facilitates the gaining of access to those in power, even when it is the opposition that seeks the contact. Second, more negatively, it contributes to often reducing political discourse and conflict over policy issues to personal conflicts. In other words, personalities matter in island democracies and sometimes the cleavages that emerge in the population are as much a division over different personalities as over policy and ideological issues. The personalisation of politics reinforces a link between elite patronage and class. Beyond the small population sizes that make up the Caribbean countries, the size of their territories also contribute to their democratic stability. Building on Montesquieu’s assertion that a small country is necessary for a republic, Hansson and Olsson (2006) find a negative relationship between territory size and the rule of law. The effectiveness of laws diminishes with the distance from the capital city. This association is even stronger than the effect of population size. In countries with small geographical territory, the government can implement laws and gain compliance from the people. In the Caribbean one can find countries with some of the smallest terrains in the world, although, mirroring the variability in population size of Caribbean countries, there are clear differences among these countries in territorial size. The smallest Anglo-Caribbean country is St. Kitts and Nevis with an area of 261 square kilometres. In addition to size, there is also a neighbourhood effect. The fact that AngloCaribbean nations share a common colonial heritage and are geographically close to one another reinforces their democratic traditions and institutions. There is ample statistical evidence indicating that regime types tend to
210
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
cluster (Doorenspleet, 2005: 150). Indeed, it is noteworthy that AngloCaribbean states remained democratic even when most of their Latin American counterparts had been undermined by military dictatorships. Obviously, it is not just geographic proximity that accounts for this phenomenon because Guyana and Belize were close to non-democratic regimes. The neighbourhood effect is linked to geographical diffusion and political culture. That is, countries in the same neighbourhood with common historical, institutional and cultural ties are more likely to resemble one another. Unlike other newly independent states in sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, the Caribbean peoples removed governments in power via the electoral process (Ryan, 1994). Nonetheless, there are a few rare exceptions in its otherwise unblemished democratic record. The Grenadanian coup in 1979 and the coup attempt in Trinidad in 1990 are cases in point. Such political upheaval is such an anomaly in the region that fellow Caribbean governments denounced these actions. For instance, a statement issued by the former president of Guyana, Desmond Hoyte, defined the coup attempt in Trinidad as ‘an undesirable departure from the traditions of constitutional government which is part and parcel of the political culture of [the] Commonwealth Caribbean’ (quoted in Ryan, 1994: 234). The neighbourhood and political cultural dimension has been reinforced by the regional organisation – CARICOM (Caribbean Community) – which reacted strongly against the ousting of the democratically elected president of Haiti, Aristide. Acting contrary to two of the hemisphere’s powerhouses, the United States and Canada, CARICOM, largely made up of AngloCaribbean countries, continued to support Haiti’s vulnerable democracy, headed by Aristide. In this case, the Caribbean states stood by democracy in the face of opposition by the older democracies, which ignored it. Over 20 years ago, in the wake of the governmental overthrow in Grenada, the reaction from Anglo-Caribbean states was the same. Leaders criticised the undemocratic transition of power in 1979 and remarked that the coup d’e´tat was against the region’s practice of replacing governments with elections. They, in fact, supported President Reagan’s decision to invade Grenada by sending a small military contingent alongside American troops to oust the Maurice Bishop junta that had taken over from a democratically elected government. In direct contrast to Latin America, Anglo-Caribbean states have no tradition of populist military rule. Anglo-Caribbean leaders look negatively upon the few states in their neighbourhood that have flirted with such a tradition. Class, Race and Patronage A key characteristic of Anglo-Caribbean democracies is that even though most have comparatively low per capita incomes, they fare relatively well
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
211
on most human development indexes. Despite high unemployment and concentrated poverty in countries such as Jamaica, Belize, Guyana and Grenada, all of these island-states ranked high on human development measures of well-being. In sum, ‘these countries have also placed great emphasis on education, health and social welfare, for women as well as men; this has helped decrease fertility rates to levels lower than Third World norms and has reduced population pressure on their economies’ (Sbrebrnik, 2004: 334). In 2005, the average fertility rate for the AngloCaribbean countries was 2.1, while the average rate for low- and middleincome countries was 2.7. Patronage has contributed to the development of a redistributive political culture that has helped Caribbean governments mitigate poverty and social exclusion. The post-colonial state developed from an entrenched system of patronage administered through the welfare state that improved the lives of the poor. In addition, the patronage factor has established a nexus between the democratic institutions inherited from British colonialism and a socioeconomic stratum that has an interest in sustaining democratic regimes. Despite widespread inequality in many Caribbean states, a middle class has emerged. In the Caribbean, we find that the middle class makes up the bureaucratic organisation of the state and creates institutions and processes to maintain its domination. The control of the middle class traces back to the pre-decolonisation era, preceding decolonisation in most Anglophone Caribbean countries (Hintzen, 1994a; MacDonald, 1986; Mars, 1995). Historically, in the Caribbean, the planter class in many of these societies was the dominant social group, with their control of labour and capital (Hintzen, 1994a). Post-colonisation, however, the planter class bourgeoisie did not inherit the government. Rather, the governance of the post-colonial state was passed on to the educated elite who typically held white-collar jobs. This group comprises a new middle class distinct from both the planter and the lower class. Its political leaders are heads of trade unions and political parties. In Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, the Afro-Creole population constituted the class that moved on to be the political elite after independence. The middle class maintains its political dominance through several different channels. Elections are an important means of alternating power, usually between two dominant parties vying to gain office at regular intervals. While elections are often marred by irregularities and violence, competing parties respect the overall results. Thus, elections are an important symbol and tool of democracy. Most Caribbean countries have left-leaning political parties that espouse a rhetoric of solidarity with the lower classes, largely inherited from British Fabianism. These parties often identify international capital as a source of dependency and exploitation. Populist ideological
212
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
discourse is buttressed by the use of state resources as a form of socioeconomic redistribution. In particular, the state bureaucracy expanded and so did the leverage of the middle class as they filled bureaucratic offices and controlled its functions. The Anglo-Caribbean middle class maintains links to other social strata via patronage and clientelistic networks. Edie (1994: 3) describes clientelism as the ‘driving force of [Jamaica’s] democracy’. Political parties maintain support through the distribution of resources, jobs and contracts to their loyal supporters. According to Munroe (1996: 107), ‘by the 1980s, patron – client relations premised on partisan distribution of scarce benefits underpinned the loyalty of significant sections of the electorate to one or another established political party in each territory’. As such, patronage serves as a source of redistribution to poor people, which also benefits the elites by conferring them economic opportunities and governmental contracts (Domı´nguez, 1998). In other words, both political parties and supporters gain because ‘in the situation of scarce and often declining resources, public funds and the award of government contracts have been used to reward party “clients” in all social classes’ (Munroe, 1996: 108). Hintzen remarks that the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the lower class is reflective of clientelism. The poor need the assistance of the state and the middle class controls the resources and bureaucracy of the state. As such, the lower class supports the political system as the middle class grants it favours, jobs and other necessities. In Jamaica, patronage is integrated deeply in the political system. The origin of clientelism is rooted in middle-class control of political parties and labour organisations. In other words, clientelism sustains the democratic regime in Jamaica, without which democracy will be hard-pressed to survive. The Manley tenure provides a case in point. Under the Michael Manley government (People’s National Party) in the 1970s, the bureaucracy in Jamaica expanded into a welfare state in an attempt at redistribution to the poor. Newly enacted policies included land reform, the establishment of minimum wage and labour laws, and heavy investment in free public education. According to Edie (1994: 33) ‘the PNP systematically used state resources to mobilize mass support through a strategy of clientelism’. As such, the poor became greatly reliant on the government’s patronage. Upon the PNP’s failure to deliver these goods and services throughout its eightyear tenure, the masses switched alliances to the Jamaica Labour Party in the 1980 elections. Political support from the majority of the population, the poor, is therefore contingent on patronage. The Trinidad and Tobagonian case is somewhat different. Patronage is the mainstay of politics in that country as well; however, patron – client relationships largely exist along racial lines. Consequently, in the Caribbean states
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
213
with significant racial cleavages such as Trinidad and Guyana, people vote according to the political party representative of their race. For instance, in Trinidad and Tobago support for the People’s National Movement (PNM) and the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) was rooted in the racial divisions between the two dominant races, African and East Indian, respectively. Because of this racial separation, the PNM won consecutive elections for 30 years. The African descendant population constituted the majority of the population during that era. With each victory, the DPL accused the PNM of racial clientelism in order to secure support from the African community. The DPL charged the PNM with using ‘state resources’ to distribute jobs, financial and educational opportunities as rewards to their supporters (Ryan, 1994: 239). Today we continue to find this political split across racial lines represented by the PNM and the United National Congress parties. The Jamaican and Trinidadian examples show that patronage is linked to a populist style of rule. Governments enact policies that transform the state into an agent of redistribution. Increased public spending generates electoral support. Michael Manley (quoted in Ryan, 1994: 236 –237) brilliantly captured the logic behind this type of populism: In populist politics the moon is promised by the politicians, and democracy consists of making a choice between competing sets of promises which are dangled temptingly every four or five years ... In the end, therefore, the act of political choice involves, say the casting of a vote which ... expresses the expectation of a benefit, which will somehow come in spite of oneself, through the effort of a faceless authority known as the government. It will not occur to the voters that this may partly be the result of their own lack of involvement. However, it will be enough to guarantee that a rival set of promises will get the nod next time. Political parties ground themselves in populist ideas whereby parties seek to redress the socio-economic disadvantages of the masses – the lower class. In Jamaica, the PNP promoted popular egalitarian policies, including ‘state control of the economy, cooperatives, greater democratisation of the political system, a more explicit nationalist position, and socialist ideas geared to popularize egalitarianism’ (Stone, 1983). Crises and Democratic Sustainability in the Caribbean What is most noteworthy about Anglo-Caribbean democracies is their resilience in face of problems of poverty, violence, drug trafficking and corruption. Interestingly, some of the problems that these democracies confront
214
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
arise from the same patronage system that sustains the regimes. Elections function as a tool to sustain patronage and democracy; however, the inevitable counterpart of patronage is corruption. Corruption is rampant in many of these countries. Additionally, patronage creates an environment conducive to coercion and political violence. In the last two decades, the patronage networks that parties relied upon to mobilise voters and provide resources to supporters have been drawn into the vortex of criminality and drug trafficking, especially in Jamaica. On the one hand, the increase in money connected to drug trafficking has allowed these patronage networks to provide more resources to their supporters. Griffith and Munroe (1997: 87) note, ‘government ministers have been implicated in or convicted for involvement in the illicit drug trade in AntiguaBarbuda, the Bahamas, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands’. On the other hand, drug trafficking has led to a sharp spike in violence – most notably in Jamaica. Currently, Jamaica ranks number one in the world for homicides. The crime rate in Trinidad and Tobago mirrors this dismal situation. At the end of 2005, there were 380 killings reported in the twin island republic – a 66.7 per cent increase from 2003 (George, 2004). Kidnappings, especially drugrelated, are prevalent in the region. The heightened level of crime in the Caribbean is attributed to high unemployment and the drug trade originating from Latin America. Unemployment rates in Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica are 8 and 11.5 per cent, respectively.6 These numbers do not account for the much higher number of those underemployed or those no longer looking for work. Although the trans-shipment of drugs in the Caribbean is not new, the high level of associated violence is a relatively new phenomenon. Some observers view these developments as an indication of democratic decay. Erikson and Minson (2005: 159) assert that ‘Caribbean democracies have remained comparatively stable and well functioning. Yet, in many of these countries, unease lurks below the surface’. Corruption and violence, however, are not new to Caribbean politics and society. Jamaica was beset by a quasi-civil war in Kingston throughout much of the 1980s due to competition for power by the country’s two major political parties. Moreover, the fact that most Caribbean states are heavily dependent on foreign investment, especially in the tourism sector, means that those in power are particularly sensitive to outside perceptions of instability. As such, Caribbean democratic regimes have not hesitated to use coercive means to protect foreign investments and the tourist sector. During the 1970s and 1980s, both Trinidad and Jamaica experienced periods of repression and political violence, respectively, due to economic downturns. In Jamaica, the elections in 1980 led to a significant amount of political violence at a time when the country experienced fiscal difficulties. Likewise, in Trinidad and Tobago, responding to economic
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
215
crisis, the PNM government used coercive measures in 1965 and again in the early 1970s. In 1965, the government introduced an Industrialization Stabilization Act to quell labour mobilisation and strikes (Hintzen, 1994b). In 1970 and 1971, the government passed new ‘antidemocratic pieces of legislation’ such as the Public Order Bill, later reworked to be the Fire Arms Bill and the Sedition Act, in an effort to protect foreign direct investment in an otherwise failing economy. As stated in the bill, the government was allowed to: 1. Regulate public meetings and marches. 2. Penalize persons inciting others to racial hatred or to violence. 3. Prohibit the organization of training of quasi-military organizations and unlawful oath-taking. 4. Allow entry to the police for purposes of search. 5. Enable the minister to make detention orders. (Parriss, 1983: 318) While such coercive measures limited certain civil rights, they did not transform these regimes into authoritarian ones. Basic democratic procedures, such as elections and the relative autonomy of the judiciary, remained in place. Thus, even with the escalation of crime and corruption of public officials, these countries continue to retain high levels of democracy, according to Freedom House statistics. Implications for Understanding Democratic States Comparatively Despite economic crises, corruption and violence, the democracies in the Caribbean did not fall. During the 1980s, the Caribbean, like other states in Latin America, experienced significant economic downturns. This phase, usually referred to as ‘the lost decade’, was initiated by the second oil crisis, which caused world-wide inflation, and the subsequent rise in interest rates on loans. Foreign debt became more expensive to service and exports fell. Trinidad and Tobago experienced acute and sudden economic declines in 1983 and 1984 and yet the democratic regime remained in place. The 1990 coup attempt can be attributed to the government’s incapacity to set the country back on track to economic prosperity after the fall in oil prices in 1986 (Ott, 2000). Nonetheless, the resilience of democracy is echoed in the courts upholding the amnesty granted to the culprits involved in the attempted coup. The 1990s was also a period of high inflation rates in many of the larger countries in the Caribbean. Trinidad, Guyana, and Jamaica suffered inflation rates of 10 per cent and above. Similarly, in Jamaica, economic hardship in the 1980s and in the past decade has not caused the demise of its democratic regime, despite a surge
216
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
in violence between political parties (Domı´nguez, 1998). In Jamaica, the failing economy since 1980 and the decline in foreign aid in the early 1990s raised questions about democratic stability in that country. The government faced hard choices in an electoral system built on clientelism. The well of resources given in exchange for political support was drying up. By the end of 1985, the Jamaican economy saw itself in a continuous state of decline. At this point, the economy was highly dependent on international investment and aid. Foreign finance diminished severely due to pervasive international recession, so too did income from a stagnating bauxite industry. The debt from multinational lending agencies was high as were the costs of their tied austerity programmes, which caused more social harm than economic good (Edie, 1994: 33). The economic turmoil in Trinidad and Jamaica illustrates well the resilience of democracy in the region in the face of severe economic hardship. In this respect, Anglo-Caribbean democracies had already indicated a phenomenon that observers of re-established Latin American democracies are now recognising. Specifically, as Mainwaring and Hagopian (2005: 5) note, democracies can persist ‘despite widespread poverty, terrible inequalities, and (in most countries) bad economic performance’.
Concluding Statement In summarising the main points developed throughout this article, we have attempted to complete four tasks: to highlight the key characteristics of democracy in the Caribbean; to show that British colonial tutelage accounts for the inauguration of democratic institutions but does not explain the persistence of democracy in the Caribbean; to provide a theoretical account of democratic sustainability among Anglo-Caribbean states; and, thereby, overall and most importantly, to contribute to the sparse literature on democratisation and the persistence of democratic regimes in the Caribbean. In this respect, our main objective was to give these countries their moment in the sun.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers whose comments greatly helped to improve this article.
Notes 1. From here on ‘the Caribbean’ refers to the former British colonies that are the focus of this study.
The Anglo-Caribbean Democratic Experience
217
2. Democracy is defined, following the Schumpeterian tradition (see Huntington, 1993), as a system in which the majority of the adult population selects political leaders and elites by means of non-arbitrary (systematic), periodic, and contested elections. In this system, citizens have the freedom to hold their leaders accountable. By this definition, democracy is measured in terms of inclusiveness, contestation – two elements which Dahl (1971) sees as integral aspects of democracy – and representation. 3. Freedom House classifies states as overall free, not free, or partially free based on their combined political rights and civil liberties scores. Composite scores of 2 to 5 fall into the free category, 6 to 10 and 11 to 14 are in the partially free and not free categories, respectively. 4. The bigger variances may be attributable to the inclusion of the outliers, Seychelles, Mauritius, South Africa, and Botswana, in the sample of sub-Saharan Africa. These states have considerably higher scores for democracy compared to other sub-Saharan countries in the sample. 5. In the context of this research, and like similar studies, a small state refers to a population size below 1.5 million inhabitants (see Ott, 2000; Srebrnik, 2004). 6. Data based on 2005 estimates from CIA World Factbook.
References Anckar, D. (2002) Why are small island states democracies?, The Round Table, 365(1), pp. 375 –390. Boix, C. (2003) Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Boix, C. & Stokes, S. C. (2003) Endogenous democratisation, World Politics, 55(4), pp. 517– 549. Bunce, V. (2000) Comparative democratisation: big and bounded generalizations, Comparative Political Studies, 33(6–7), pp. 703 –734. Central Intelligence Agency (2006) The World Factbook 2006. Available at http://www.cia.gov/ cia/publications/factbook/index.html ( 29 March 2006). Collier, D. & Adcock, R. (1999) Democracy and dichotomies: a pragmatic approach to choices about concepts, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 537–565. Dahl, R. (1971) Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Diamond, L. (1999) Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). Domı´nguez, J. I. (1998) Democratic Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press). Doorenspleet, R. (2005) Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Edie, C. J. (1994) Jamaica: clientelism, dependency, and democratic stability, in: C. J. Edie (Ed) Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities, pp. 25 –41 (Westport, CT: Praeger). Elkins, Z. (2000) Gradations of democracy? Empirical test of alternative conceptualizations, American Journal of Political Science, 44(2), pp. 293–300. Erickson, D. P. & Minson, A. (2005) The Caribbean: democracy adrift?, Journal of Democracy, 16(4), pp. 159–171. Freedom House. Freedom in the world: 1972 through 2003. Available at http://www.freedom house.org/ratings/allscore04.xls (accessed 11 April 2005). George, M. (2004) We’re heading for 250, The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian, 23 May. Available at http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2004-05-23/martingeorge.html (accessed 7 April 2006). Green, D. (2003) Silent Revolution: The Crisis of Market Economies in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press).
218
N. T. Duncan & D. Woods
Griffith, I. L. & Munroe, T. (1997) Drugs and democratic governance in the Caribbean, in: I. L. Griffith & B. N. Sedoc-Dahlberg (Eds) Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean, pp. 74–93 (New York: Westview Press). Hansson, G. & Olsson, O. (2006) Country size and the rule of law: resuscitating Montesquieu, Working Papers in Economics 200, Go¨teborg University, Department of Economics. Hintzen, P. C. (1994a) Democracy and middle-class domination in the Anglophone Caribbean, in: C. J. Edie (Ed) Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities, pp. 9– 23 (Westport, CT: Praeger). Hintzen, P. C. (1994b) Trinidad and Tobago: democracy, nationalism, and the construction of racial identity, in C. J. Edie (Ed) Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities, pp. 59 –74 (Westport, CT: Praeger). Huntington, S. P. (1993) The Third Wave (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma). Lipset, S. M. (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy, American Political Science Review, 53(1), pp. 69–105. MacDonald, S. B. (1986) Trinidad and Tobago: Democracy and Development in the Caribbean (New York: Praeger Publishers). Mainwaring, S. P. & Hagopian, F. (2005) Introduction, in: S. P. Mainwaring & F. Hagopian (Eds) The Third Wave of Democratisation in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks, pp. 1 –13 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Mainwaring, S. P. & Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, A. (2003) Level of Development and Democracy: Latin American Exceptionalism, 1945–1996, Comparative Political Studies, 36(9), pp. 1031–1067. Mars, P. (1995) State intervention and ethnic conflict resolution: Guyana and the Caribbean experience, Comparative Politics, 27(2), pp. 167–186. Munroe, T. (1996) Caribbean democracy: decay of renewal in: J. I. Domı´nguez & A. R. Lowenthal (Eds) Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s, pp. 104-117 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press). Ott, D. (2000) Small is Democratic: An Examination of State Size and Democratic Development (New York: Garland). Parriss, C. D. (1983) Resource ownership the prospects for democracy: the case of Trinidad and Tobago, in: P. Henry & C. Stone (Eds) The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy, and Development, pp. 313 –326 (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues). Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1997) Modernization: theories and facts, World Politics, 49(2), pp. 155–183. Rustow, D. A. (1970) Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model, Comparative Politics, 2(3), pp. 337–363. Ryan, S. (1994) Problems and prospects for the survival of liberal democracy in the Anglophone Caribbean, in: C. J. Edie (Ed) Democracy in the Caribbean: Myths and Realities, pp. 234– 250 (Westport, CT: Praeger). Srebrnik, H. (2004) Small island nations and democratic values, World Development, 32(2), pp. 329–341. Stone, C. (1983) Democracy and socialism in Jamaica: 1972–1979, in: P. Henry & C. Stone (Eds) The Newer Caribbean: Decolonization, Democracy, and Development, pp. 238–239 (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues). Whitehead, L. (1996) Three international dimensions of democratisation, in: L. Whitehead (Ed) The International Dimensions of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas, pp. 1– 25 (New York: Oxford University Press).