The Joint Multinational Training Command Training Journal 5 by 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command

www.hqjmtc.army.mil

spring 2011

THE 7TH U.S. ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

J O UR N A L

Special Feature: Voices of moderate Islam COIN and COMBAT: support, no excuse not to Soldier Being the Enemy: Lessons from the Opposing Force

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Never leave a fallen Comrade: Personnel Recovery Operations in Afghanistan

ITED STATES

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

The 7th United States Army Joint Multinational Training Command

J O UR N A L is an unofﬁcial publication of the 7th United States Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) at Grafenwoehr, Germany Circulation is 5,000 copies. Editorial views and opinions are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army. Correspondence may be sent to: HQ 7th Army JMTC Attention: Public Affairs Ofﬁce, Building 127, Room 105 APO AE 09114 or via Bundespost: HQ 7th Army JMTC Attention: Public Affairs Office Lager Grafenwoehr, Geb. 123 92655 Grafenwoehr Telephone: DSN 475-7776 or commercial 09641-83-7776 email: jmtcpao@eur.army.mil

JMTC COMMAND Commanding General U.S. Army, Europe Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling Commanding General 7th U.S. Army JMTC Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

JMTC PUBLIC AFFAI R S Public Affairs Ofﬁcer Maj. Jennifer R. Johnson Deputy Public Affairs Officer Denver Makle JMTC Public Affairs Specialists Christian Marquardt Michael Beaton Sgt. 1st Class Lyttleton Yates

photo: sgt sean p. casey 982d combat camera abn

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

joint multinational training command

J O UR N A L TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 letters from the command Command Sgt. Maj. Dennis A. Zavodsky and Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar

4&5 jmtc web watch 6 never leave a fallen comrade: personnel recovery operations in afghanistan By Maj. Steven Williams

8 deliberate recovery operations at jmrc… a brigade fight By Col. D. Greg Anderson and Maj. Derek W. Hoffman

10 coin and combat: support, no excuse not to soldier By 1st. Lt. Phillip M. Hoffman

12 being the enemy: lessons from the opposing force By Denver Makle

14 helping afghans build accountable governance, the people’s development fund By Maj. Scott Strickler and Dr. Jay Baker

3-159th arb adds realism to training experience

for u.s. and nato By Denver Makle

18 analysis of intelligence development in the romanian – american battle group By Capt. Krisjand Rothweiler

20 ncoa and small group discussion facilitate lessons-learned By Denver Makle

21 on the same frequency, a complicated game By Denver Makle

22 - 26 special feature: voices of moderate islam By Maj. Matthew J. Yandura

28 itam viewer is now available with historical imagery By Christian Marquardt

Cover photo: Spc. Theodore Schmidt, 173rd ABCT

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

JMTC Command Sergeant Major

Command. Sgt. Maj. Dennis C. Zavodsky On April 14, 2011, I became the Command Sergeant Major of the 7th U.S. Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). I have spent the past 25 years taking care of Soldiers and their families and that is what I I will continue to do at the JMTC. I have never been stationed in Europe before. However, I consider myself extremely fortunate and blessed to have this opportunity to be a part of the JMTC, and a member of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) community. I can think of no other time in our Army’s history that has offered as many opportunities, as well as, challenges for our Soldiers and their Families. As an Army and a nation we’ve been tested by an amorphous and dangerous enemy who has used a myriad of threats and fighters to challenge the U.S. and our allies on a global scale. Since the attacks of September 11th, we have fought through an era of persistent conflict,overcoming all obstacles. Since arriving, I’ve had the opportunity to observe the Counter-IED Train-the-Force Baseline Course at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, which is offered by the Badger Team, the dedicated C-IED training team. My participation in this event confirms that the JMTC is successful at developing the tools to train U.S. and Multinational Soldiers for the mission in Afghanistan. I’m pleased and impressed to see the level of support provided by agencies such as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), which has funded projects that directly effect our Soldiers ability to succeed in theater. The JIEDDO is an important stakeholder and partner in the fight against the IED, and the dividends are seen in training. Every Soldier leaves here with an understanding of what to expect and a clear starting-point for Defeating-the-Device, Attacking-the-Network and Training-the-Force. The new Multi-cultural Mobile Counter Improvised Explosive Device Interactive Trainer (McMCIT), another tool funded by the JIEDDO, and offered exclusively in Europe, because of its language capabilities is also valuable. The successful employment of the Badger team, the McMCIT and the many C-IED courses available here is a 2

direct result of partnership and collaboration ,which is filling voids within the international community, and is a testimony of JMTC’s value and worth as a training leader. The JMTC is performing a critical and important ongoing multifaceted mission that continuously demonstrates our capabilities as an Army and as a nation. This endeavor highlights the resiliency of our Soldiers and their Families. Leadership and training are like winning; they are not a “sometime” thing, they are an “all-the-time” thing. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I take leadership, training, standards and discipline very seriously. I know this sounds cliché, but it is a fact. It is who I am, and who we are as a group of professional leaders. I have a sacred trust and bond with the Soldiers of our nation. I also have an obligation and a responsibility to promulgate our same institutional values, standards and capabilities to our partner nations who are developing and training their own NCO corps’. I believe in the Army Family, and I know from personal experience that it’s the bedrock that keeps our warfighters in the fight for the long haul. I have the utmost respect and admiration for our military Families, and will do all I can to support programs and policies that make families stronger. I know that this assignment is going to be both challenging and rewarding, and I look forward to serving with each and every one of you, as well as our multinational partners. There is no question that JMTC is a truly remarkable place to live and work; for me, this is exactly the right time to be here. I will strive to uphold the legacy of strong NCO leadership and professionalism that the JMTC has earned, not just in our Army but across the armies of the world.

Army Training Network

Dennis C. Zavodsky Command Sergeant Major, USA JMTC CSM

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JMTC Commanding General

Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar This year has been marked by transition, a new Chief of Staff and Sgt. Major of the Army, and Commander of U.S. Army Europe. J However, the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) continues to build partner capacity as U.S. and allied forces prepare for the fight in Afghanistan. As we transition at home, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and the 615th Military Police return, and the 18th Engineers and the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade prepare for deployment. This edition of the JMTC Training Journal highlights significant contributions made by the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173rd ABCT) and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), during their rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no better place to train for Afghanistan! Here, in Europe, units train among International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and coalition partners. No Combat Training Center replicates the current operational environment better than the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), using role-players multinational Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) replicators, and ANSF from Afghanistan, and Multinational Special Operations Forces. And, there is live-and-virtual coalition training, close-air support and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance training available. The JMTC is the only training command equipped with Centrix-ISAF to communicate on the Afghan Mission Network, which enables our capability to “train as we fight.” We also have the Army’s only 360 degree combat outpost live-fire training facility. And, in February 2011, the JMTC fielded the only multicultural mobile counter-IED (C-IED) trainer. We've also published a C-IED training strategy that includes the Combined Arms Training Center’s C-IED Master Trainer course. Another transition, our 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. (1-4), to Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) completed its five-year mission in Afghanistan. Gen. Petraeus, commander of ISAF gave specific mention of their accomplishments, and many popular images document their extraordinary contribution. It’s a legacy continued as they serve as Europe’s professional opposing force. Recently, Admiral James G. Stavridis, the Commander of the U.S. European Command and Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, transition,

the USAREUR commander, called JMTC, a “crown jewel.” The value and utility of its training areas, ranges and facilities is complimented by our greatest tool in the fight. The ability to apply lessons learned, while training to standards set by the ISAF and NATO. The JMTC uses the feedback of returning units to make the difference between unit success and mission failure. Additionally, as we strive to prevail in the current fight, we are continuing to prepare for the next fight. Existing counter-insurgency training is being incorporated into full-spectrum operations (FSO), which meets the Army’s next objectives. Soon, the 173rd ABCT will be the first to train in new FSO and Hybrid Threat scenarios. The operational environment, developed by the JMTC,is leveraging resources provided by JMRC and Joint Multinational Simulations Center, and the Training Support Activity Europe to create a complex, live, virtual and constructive event with our multinational partners serving as host-nation opposing and coalition forces. This full-spectrum training environment trains the brigade in both wide-area security and combined-arms maneuver. We're excited about this opportunity to once again lead our Army into the future, as we develop the tactics, techniques and procedures of our new doctrine. My thanks to the 173rd ABCT and the 12th CAB for their articles, thereby documenting their outstanding contributions to ISAF and the nation. And, best wishes for those units, Soldiers and Families facing an upcoming deployment. We wish you well, and look forward to your safe return. Finally, my sincerest gratitude to the entire JMTC team for their professionalism and commitment to making our forces in Europe and our Allies, among the best trained in the world. Ready Thru Training!

Army Training Network

Steven L. Salazar Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commanding

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

web watch

(Photo: Denver Makle, JMTC Public Aﬀairs)

(Photo: Capt. Robert Burnham, 114th Public Aﬀairs)

(Photo: Spc. Lauren DeVita, 123rd Public Aﬀairs)

Virtual Counter-IED system enhances training in Europe

JMTC trains NATO, ISAF partners in Counter Insurgency

Coalition partners train-to-train Counter-IED tactics

The Army’s only Multi-cultural Mobile Counter Improvised Explosive Device Interactive Trainer, teaches Soldiers to identify visual indicators of an IED and react to a suspected IED. The system is fully-mobile and can be used at homestation or abroad.

To foster unity of eﬀort among ISAF partners, the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC), recently hosted a nine-day Counter Insurgency course, to build partner capacity and overcome terrorist networks.

Soldiers from Poland, Slovenia, Serbia, Romania and Hungary complete the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Train-the-Trainer Course at the JMTC’s Hohenfels Training Area. The students become IED-defeat instructors, who train counter-IED measures at their units prior to deployment.

www.army.mil/article/55172

www.hqjmtc.army.mil/article/59161

www.army.mil/article/55167

lessons learned by a brigade combat team

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN

by col. john m. spiszer, jmrc R ead “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” an article authored by

Col. John M. Spiszer, Commander of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. The article shares personal observations and actions taken during leader reconnaissance, training, and the execution of counter-insurgency operations in the Nangarhar, Nuristan, Konar, and Eaghman provinces from Dec. 2007 to July 2009 by Task Force Duke, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Inf. Div. The article was featured in the Jan./Feb. edition of Military Review, a publication that supports the education, training, development and integration mission of the combined arms center. The article is available online in the JMTC news archive at www.usacac.

army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/repository/ MREditions2011

VISIT JMTC ONLINE AT WWW.HQJMTC.ARMY. MIL

(Photo: Sgt. Whitney Hughes, 114th Public Aﬀairs)

(Photo: Sgt. Richard Frost, 114th Public Aﬀairs)

(Photo: Spc. Lauren DeVita, 123rd Public Aﬀairs)

U.S. and multinational Soldiers learn life-saving skills pre-deployment

U.S. and German aviators test new attack helicopter in Grafenwoehr

An international student provides medical care, during the Combat Life Saver course at the JMTC’s Medical Simulation training Center (MSTC) at Grafenwoehr, as part of his unit’s pre-deployment training for Afghanistan.

For the ﬁrst time, aviators of both countries participate in a coordinated live-ﬁre training exercise with the U.S. and its rotary, aviation assets. They used the U.S. AH-64, Apache Attack Helicopter and Germany’s new Eurocopter Tiger Attack Helicopter.

Working Dogs perform IED “Search and Find” demonstration for Multinational Partners

www.army.mil/article/58284

www.army.mil/article/5840

jmtc spotlight on soldier resilience

so ldi e r 3 6 0 ° t ake s shape, adds more extensive physical readiness training

Military Police Oﬃcer Spc. Mark Gordy leashes Lexa, a MP dog with the 615th MP Co. After an attack demonstration, NATO and Coalition Soldiers received training on Counter-IED tactics and the uses of military canine units for searches.

www.ﬂickr.com/photos/7armyjmtc/sets

SOLDIER 360

by denver makle, jmtc public affairs

A s drill sergeants at Initial Military Training schools introduce new Soldiers to the Army’s Physical Readiness Training (PRT), the staff and faculty of Soldier 360°, a military leader development course offered exclusively in Europe provides seasoned NCOs instruction on the new standards. “Soldier 360° provides direct, hands-on training in all areas of health and wellness for military leaders. We develop the NCOs’ “muscle memory”, and provide them tools to identify, respond, and manage physical, psychological, relationship, marital, and financial challenges,”said Col. Mary S. Lopez,

director of Strategic Initiatives for the Bavarian Medical Command. “Everything we do is based on research and reﬂects cutting-edge approaches.” During the ﬁrst week, the NCOs are removed from day-to-day work and home environments to receive instruction on pain and anger management, stress reduction and the “mindful” use of alcohol. Spouses are integrated during the second week of the training to practice communication skills. For more information on the Soldier 360° program visit

www.army.mil/article/56995

LEADER COMPREHENSIVE FITNESS COURSE 5

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

Never leave a fallen Comrade: Personnel Recovery Operations in Afghanistan By Maj. Steven M. Williams 1-91 Cavalry Squadron, 173rd ABCT

n July 24, 2010, at 7 a.m, during an ongoing, Squadronlevel mission in support of the Brigade’s counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, two U.S. sailors were missing in Afghanistan. The pair were absent since the evening before, after traveling in an up-armored sport utility vehicle south from Kabul, along the main North-South highway through Logar Province, about 80 kilometers south of Kabul. The 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (TF SABER) of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (TF BAYONET) deployed to Logar during Dec. 2009 to support Operation Enduring Freedom X. No one knew the events on July 23, would set off a chain-of-events teaching the unit and leadership valuable lessons in intelligence, planning, logistics, and air support. A Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown (DUSTWUN) was declared. The recovery operation quickly became the priority in theater. Multiple organizations brought personnel and other resources to assist in the effort. A continuous, multi-day operation ensued to find the service members. They were assumed to be alive, but time was short. Evidence revealed the personnel were traveling alone in Kabul, and traveled off-course early in the day. In a few hours, they had made their way out of the city, off the paved highway, and past a remote bazaar in Charkh District of Logar where they were ambushed in an enemy dominated area. They were last seen in TF Bayonet’s area of responsibility and the 173rd was assigned the personnel recovery mission. INTELLIGENCE “We were dealing with four to seven more collection assets than those during steady-state operations; all on-station at the same time for the duration of the DUSTWUN,” said 1st Lt. Thomas Clark, TF SABER’s intelligence (intel) officer “For lethal targeting the DUSTWUN provided an opportunity to apply collection and action arm assets fluidly in pursuit of the service members. By the end of the DUSTWUN, we had captured more than thirty detainees, including a few top priority targets, which were exploited. It drastically changed the enemy situation in the short-and-long term.” The DUSTWUN began amidst an already increased squadron operations tempo, with some constrained resources, personnel and otherwise. The unexpected change of mission forced leaders to execute decision-making in the midst of limited and incomplete information, while continuously orienting and deploying forces from outside TF Saber’s battlespace into the fight. “Every day, during the DUSTWUN event, there were additional units entering our battle space, and another unit unit leaving,” said Capt. Norm Christie, the unit’s plans 6

officer, “Keeping the incoming units informed of the situation and debriefing the outgoing units as well as synchronizing our operations had to occur within a very short window of time.” Officials said there wasn’t a lot of information available initially. “There was so little information we began the search looking for the service members’ vehicle, described as a ‘white S.U.V.’ [Sport Utility Vehicle], and as reports from intel functions flooded in, three distinct and competing storylines emerged,” said 1st Lt. Thomas A. Clark of TF SABER. “We had to decide and advise on a focused course of action, while simultaneously tracking and reconnoitering the alternatives.” Piecing together the intel required deciding which information was reliable, then advising the commanders so they could act decisively. “Both the lack of information in the beginning and the overwhelming amount of competing information in the end could have been paralyzing,” said Clark. “Evaluating information for credibility and putting it into context is the job of the intel section. They [intel ] must be prepared to be decisive.” PLANNING AND LOGISTICS “Under normal conditions, we were planning logistics for 700-800 people at established locations, said Capt. Matthew Booth, the TF SABER Forward Support Troop Commander. “During the DUSTWUN, it rapidly increased to 1500-1800 people from multiple units across multiple remote locations. As time passed, we were planning for even more, as increasing levels of assets were being lined up.” Planners tracked what units were doing hour-to-hour and planned not only the resupply, but anticipated and developed packages for emergency contingencies, he said. “We couldn’t wait for them [units] to call and request supplies, since the timelines were short. The normal restrictions for resupply operations had decreased from two weeks for an air drop to a few hours,” said Booth. “We had to look beyond the standard way of moving supplies.” Normally, supplies were moved by Chinooks helicopters [CH-47s], with slings or a standard Combat Logistics Patrol package, which requires slower, convoy movement of supplies. The Chinooks were busy carrying large groups of personnel. TF SABER had to consider alternatives like non-standard rotary wing usage, including “jingle” air, which usually only resupplied the combat outposts; and “green” air, such as Blackhawks, UH-60s, for moving small teams. “We also used fixed wing, which executed smaller, nonstandard drops,” he said. “Keeping the communication channels open all the way to Division was critical in keeping all levels informed and prepared to handle the bigger and non-standard requests.”

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Item RF-13 Cloth with blood

Blast of the suspected RPG Item RF-16 Blood-stained napkin

Item RF-12 MBITR part

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Interior plastic vent cover AIR SUPPORT It was important to have air planners from the supporting aviation unit available to support the mission, to ensure 24-hour Item RF-3 Tail light fragments coverage, said Christie. “There were three-to-five air assaults conducted every day for five days, with most of the units not organic to our Squadron or Brigade,” said Christie. “Having an air planner with extensive familiarity of all the aviation assets in the Regional CommandItem RF-4A East and knowing who to call to get those Plastic Gatorade bottle assets, was crucial.” The plans section was engaged. Since additional assets and units required Above: The ambush site in Charkh District with the exploited material depicted. air support and resupply operations to U.S. Army Photograph, 173rd Airborne Brigade. ensure timely execution, having an air planner present reduced the turnaround The recovery mission, July 24-28, 2010, challenged time. They helped distribute the workload, Christie said. TF SABER, during its most intensive period of combat “Bidirectional information sharing is crucial and maximizes operations. The operation recovered the service members’ communication with higher headquarters, so information bodies, and effected the enemy’s command structure and affecting search efforts is distributed quickly and accurately,” operational capability. The enduring take-away was a long he said. During the DUSTWUN, the clock was ticking and list of lessons-learned. the unit was already at least 13 hours behind the enemy.

DUTY STATUS WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN

What else did 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (TF SABER) learn? • Develop a plan to rotate units from remote locations (blocking positions, observation points, checkpoints, traffic control points) as well as those units conducting clearances. • Set a minimum number of days of supply early and use it for planning. • Contain the entire area of operation. Estimate where the service members could be located, based on elapsed time, traffic and mode of transportation. • Focus the search based on information available, and apply overwhelming assets to clear those areas. Returning later to search areas more thoroughly wastes time and resources. • Recognize an overwhelming force as a trade off for proper planning. Know it may be the right choice because of the limited time forces are dispersed to unfamiliar locations for unknown and extended periods of time. • At a minimum, host an FM frequency Battle Update Brief with the Troop Commanders (TCs) every 12 hours. The planning cycle of the staff increases considerably, affecting the TCs need for updates to effectively employ their assets.

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

Deliberate recovery operations at JMRC… a brigade ﬁght By Col. D. Greg Anderson and Maj. Derek W. Hoﬀman, JMRC Adler Team

ne of the most complex, yet under trained operations a Brigade Combat Team conducts is the deliberate recovery of a damaged or destroyed vehicle. These operations are usually necessary because of enemy-attack, lack of contracted lift and haul assets, and the rugged terrain. These operations can last several days, some even several weeks, while roads are cut into the mountain to recover a vehicle blown-off the road and down into a steep ravine. For example, for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Inf. Div. (3/1ID IBCT), their first major deliberate recovery operation began with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strike on a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP). The Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) sent to recover the MRAP overturned enroute, sliding several meters down a hill resting upside-down in a ravine. “The BCT and engineers had to cut a road down to the overturned, but largely undamaged wrecker,” said Col. John M. Spiszer, commander of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany. “The wrecker was righted using a local national 30-ton crane, and then driven-up a ramp, and taken back to the Forward Operating Base. The crane went on to recover the MRAP.” Vehicle recovery operations are dangerous in the combat environment, said Spiszer. During the recovery, one medic lost a hand and foot when a secondary, anti-personnel mine exploded unexpectedly, and another Soldier lost a foot when the crane lifted the MRAP exposing another uncleared mine. This deliberate four-day recovery mission was a brigadelevel operation, and required the use of the Shadow Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Apache helicopters, engineers and ultimately the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Recovery Team. Spiszer’s JMRC has successfully resourced a Recovery Center of Excellence to train deploying units to recover combat vehicles on terrain similar to what they will experience when deployed. “The mission ensures that the first time units execute a deliberate recovery mission was not in theatre on an unfamiliar vehicle and under fire. The Adler team acquired three battle damaged MRAP hulls, one Stryker hull, and two locally fabricated hulls that match the specifications of dimension, weight, and hook-up points of the MRAP and Stryker,” said Chief Warrant Officer Jason Stribling, a maintenance technical observer, controller, and trainer (O/C-T) at the JMRC. “Couple these training aids with the restrictive road network, slopes and vertical rises of the Hohenfels terrain, and the JMRC provides a tough, realistic training environment ideally suited to conduct deliberate recovery operations.” 8

The first day of training is devoted to academics on equipment capabilities and the technical aspects of deliberate recovery operations. The O/C-Ts ensure safe operations, and help with technical questions. Once O/C-Ts and unit leadership are sure the students have adequate competency in those skills, the students move to hands-on training at the recovery center, which is led by unit leaders. This phase is a series of multi-echelon situational training exercises, lanes that test tactical and technical skills. “Normally, the lanes consist of two non-kinetic and two kinetic engagements, and the recovery operation,” said Sgt. 1st Class James Boston, the lead recovery trainer. “The challenge is to conduct hasty decision-making processes, and produce a solid order that integrates enablers for the company to execute.” Spizer said, the training scenarios were inspired by realworld experiences. Another problematic recovery began when the 3/1ID IBCT had an MRAP get stuck in a dry river bed, under fire, 6 km above a problem valley. The local unit HEMTT wrecker broke down, also under fire, about 2 km away, and the local crane contracted in that area stalled making a turn through a village. “We had to employ the BSB Recovery Team to the nearest COP [Command Outpost], 100 km away, to assess the situation, and drag all three vehicles out,” said Spiszer. “This operation took three-full days to complete, maximize, and exploit our tactical night vision advantages. We did the majority of the work over the course of two nights.” At JRMC, the deliberate recovery process is taught to the individual Soldier, up to the BCT combined-arms-operation level. The training scenarios highlight a few of the challenges units can expect to face related to battle-damaged, destroyed, stuck or broken vehicles in Afghanistan. The culminating event for BCT training at JMRC happens during the final days of the mission rehearsal exercise (MRE). In the scenario, an MRAP variant vehicle encounters an IED, while on patrol. The IED destroys the vehicle, and creates casualties of various severities, which the patrol must treat and evacuate. By adding a scenario with casualties, the cadre stress the importance of proper Company-Level Evacuation and Recovery (CLEAR) team training and resourcing. The unit must properly evacuate the casualties, using ground and air medical evacuation procedures to the appropriate level of care. The O/C-Ts replace the actual vehicle with a replicate hull. The hull is placed in a position that takes hours and more resources than available to recover. During this operation, the BCT must employ enablers, a Quick Reaction Force, Unmanned Aerial Systems, an Air Weapons Team, a Route Clearance Package, Explosive Ordinance Disposal and

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For more information on this course contact the JMRC Adler Team at DSN (314) 520-5339 or Commercial 09472-83-5339. Stateside: 0049-9641-83-5339

(Clockwise from left) Soldiers from 172nd Forward Support Battalion (FSB) attach winch cables, while preparing a mechanical advantage system to extract a vehicle during a deliberate recovery mission as part of the mission Readiness Exercise at The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels. Soldiers attach the cable to the replicated vehicle hull. Sgt. Ceasar Reyes, a maintenance NCO of Co. B, 172nd FSB, attaches the cable during training. U.S. Army Photographs courtesy of JMRC PAO

theater transportation to secure the site and consolidate recovery assets to complete the destroyed vehicle recovery. During the recent 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade MRE the deliberate recovery operation was a 36-hour, multi-echelon event, lasting from the time of the IED strike to the MRAP hull being returned to the unit motor pool. Several critical decisions were made, all impacting brigade operations during the training event. Once the MRAP was returned the unit motor pool, the maintenance company conducted an estimated cost of damage worksheet. The CLEAR team was employed to clean the hull to the proper environmental standards required for turn-in. The supply and logistics staďŹ&#x20AC; completed a

battle damage/battle loss packet and the Financial Liability Investigation of property loss for items damaged or lost during the IED strike. Once the unit accomplishes these tasks and submits the paperwork to the Brigade Logistics staďŹ&#x20AC;, the O/C-Ts evaluate the completed paperwork and allow the vehicle and personnel to reenter training, which completed the cycle. Since the deliberate recovery of a damaged or destroyed vehicle is one of the most complex, yet undertrained operations a BCT conducts in Theater, the JMRC provides Deliberate Recovery Training to give Soldiers experience managing the tools and resources needed to successfully overcome the challenges. 9

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

COIN and combat: support, no excuse not to Soldier By: 1st. Lt. Phillip M. Hoﬀman, TC, Platoon Leader

ne look at the 173rd Brigade Support Battalion’s (BSB) (Airborne) unit crest, which includes a winged bayonet, and it’s easy to understand that the Paratrooper’s take their secondary mission to fight as infantrymen seriously. In addition to their deployed sustainment mission, the 173rd BSB served as battle-space owner (BSO) and terrain manager of an operationally significant area including the Brigade Headquarters, Command and staff. From November 2009-2010, the 173rd BSB was the only BSB in theater, and was the primary sustainer for the 24-hour safety and security of a major Forward Operating Base (FOB). This required the BSB to conduct daily patrols and key leader engagements with local nationals, while also performing their critical wartime logistics functions.

1st LT Harold Castaneda, Quartermaster and 1st Platoon leader, with Company A, talks to local civilians about recent enemy activity in the area. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion. Conducting logistical operations in support of a combat brigade is a monumental task. Paratroopers of the BSB accomplished this while patrolling and securing a growing operational environment, which ultimately covered 33 villages and more than 365 square kilometers of human and physical terrain. During the deployment training, the Battalion’s focus was sustainment operations. When Soldiers arrived in Afghanistan, BSOs and sustainers began conducting daily key leader engagements, ‘Shuras’, with key Afghan communicators in local dialects to develop the intelligence picture. With that information, the Battalion built an effective security operations plan including tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting mouted and dismounted movements, lethal operations, surveillence and reconnaissance of named areas of interest in outlying areas around the FOB. Veteran officers and NCOs ensured that the BSB paratroopers embraced their dual role as area ambassadors, warfighters, and sustainers. 10

BSB Paratroopers from 3rd Platoon, Co. A set security positions and clear corners before entering a local bazaar in western Pul E Alam Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion “Our 1st Sgt. was the key to how well we adapted, he trained us for everything,” said Sgt. Eduardo L. Torres, squad leader for Co. A, “He really put us in the mindset that we were going to war and to expect anything.” Soldiers who joined the Army to pump fuel or operate cargo trucks hardly thought they would dismount and engage with the locals. The unit rehearsed basic battle drills and used established SOPs to set a base for Soldiers and Leaders. Once on the ground the Soldiers quickly learned how fast things could change. First, as the mission evolved into a complex COIN and security operation, the Soldiers, who would conduct dismounted night patrols or provide security at observation points needed to become proﬁcient on key pieces of equipment, such as, the Common Remotely Operated Weapon System, a weapon station that allows the operator to acquire and engage a target while inside a vehicle, and the Mine Roller, equipment that allows service-members to adapt to changing IED threats.

As the deployment continued, the COIN mission grew more complex as enemy activity increased. The training was conducted in theater. The Soldiers said they would have proﬁted from having this training before deployment. The second initiative launched an aggressive COIN oﬀensive that disseminated Information Operations (IO) themes and messages using words, deeds, and images of our Afghan allies and our Sky Soldiers in support of our unit IO objectives. (continued on page 13)

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COIN “BIG TEN” While preparing units for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) ﬁght, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center evaluates the proﬁciency of a Soldier’s skills, using the COIN “Big Ten”. These skills provide feedback to rotational units, ensuring readiness to operate in the current operational environment. COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT Not Done.

Risks identified but not reduced, no control measures, process not conducted to standard.

Risk Management (safety focused) process conducted to standard & briefed.

Tactical & Safety risk mitigated in planning process. CRM used in all phases of mission. Risk considered and updated during mission.

Risk is considered in the AAR and Lessons Learned are incorporated into future planning.

Leaders at every level involved in PCC/PCIs, all critical deficiencies corrected.

Unit is a learning organization and incorporates lessons learned into PCI/PCC Process

ROE is considered in the planning process.

Lessons learned collected and distributed to the soldier level.

PCC/PCI Not conducted.

Not conducted to standard or not consistently conducted.

PCC/PCI's conducted to Army Standard by lowest level leaders.

ROE No understanding of ROE.

ROE understood & trained to the Leader level.

ROE understood and trained to the Soldier level. Soldiers have Smart Cards on them and reference them.

EOF (ESCALATION OF FORCE) No understanding or EOF training.

Equipment and procedures trained to squad leader level, equipment on hand but not distributed properly or used correctly, Language cards/electronic interpreters on hand.

Equipment and procedures trained to soldier level. Equipment properly distributed and used correctly.

Smart-Card/SOPs enforced. Mitigates an EOF incident into the planning process, and accurately reports when an EOF incident occurs.

Thorough and complete investigation is conducted within 72 hours of an incident being reported and executes an IO battle drill EOF.

NEGOTIATION AND ENGAGEMENT SKILLS Training not conducted or observed. Unit or Soldier does not understand concept of Engagement nor purpose for conducting it.

Engagement hastily conducted, w/o Info/Intel Preparation of Environment (IPE), does not meet minimum performance standards.

Adequate performance. Engagement conducted to minimum performance standards, includes basic IPE, identifies target audience (TA). Mission success possible, but limited pay-off.

Engagement exceeds performance standards; IPE well developed; TA identified; ZOPA/negotiation points identified; BATNA and effects considered; leaders prepared; outcomes wargamed. Mission success likely.

Thorough IPE; negotiation points integrate staff into targeted planning process; end state and assessment criteria clearly identified; incorporates Information Operations and Intel enablers; knowledge management executed.

LANGUAGE CAPABILITY Some formalized individual or collective training conducted. Majority of Soldiers don't have or aren't using language cards/aids or translation tools.

Majority of Soldiers have no basic language knowledge, no training conducted

Majority of Soldiers have received basic phrase training, have phrase card with common phrases, recognize, understand and can articulate basic greeting, courtesies, respects, and parting phrases.

All Soldiers use language tools when interacting with locals. Leaders enforce key phrase memorization. Unit identifies language requirements during mission analysis. Language capability used in pre-combat checks and inspections.

Identifies language requirements during analysis and mitigates limitations when planning; rehearses talking points & phrases with interpreters; communicates effectively verbally and in writing.

CULTURE UNDERSTANDING / SOLDIERS AS AMBASSADORS No basic understanding of the culture or how to interact.

No formalized individual or collective training on the culture conducted. Soldiers briefed on the concept but not adequately trained or prepared. Soldiers don't have or aren't using language cards/aids. Not considered as part of planning process.

Soldiers have a basic understanding of the culture in which they are operating and are trained on culture and appropriate interaction, have resource material to reference.

Soldiers have understanding of the culture they are operating in and includes cultural considerations in their planning and execution. Leaders enforce key phrase memorization.

Cultural Lessons-learned collected and disseminated; Soldiers are pro-active with messages; assesses and incorporates feedback into patrol/targeting cycle and disseminates; integrates linguists and communicates effectively with locals.

EVERY SOLDIER A SENSOR/TACTICAL QUESTIONING/EVIDENCE COLLECTION No understanding of tactical questioning or Information Requirements at the soldier level. No basic understanding of evidence collection.

Smart cards on-hand, not standard or fully distributed; understanding of JUMPs; understanding of TCP Screening info, developed, but not effectively disseminated; limited knowledge of evidence collection; Unit misses some opportunities to collect.

Feedback assessed and incorporated Briefs IR & IO talking points Soldiers study and memorize HVI, into next patrol/targeting cycle. BOLO lists, & IR; understands environment to lowest level; provides smart cards; Information from patrol is recorded (knows normal vs. abnormal); All Soldiers are proficient systematically and routinely conducts and disseminated. with interpreter, communication aids, or patrol preparation; info is continually Understands relationship between target language; performs debrief after patrol; updated concerning 4Bs, ROE/EOF; evidence and intelligence. considers evidence collection during planning. evidence collection process used.

COUNTER-IED No knowledge of active or passive counter measures or current hotspots; No knowledge of CREW implementation and Patrol/Convoy planning related to CIED; No CIED equipment on hand.

Equipment on hand not distributed or used properly; Non-specific knowledge of IED indicators; Knowledge of 5 C's, 5 & 25s but not consistently conducted to standard.

Equipment on hand and distributed properly, Soldiers understand how to use C-IED equipment, soldiers are conducting 5 & 25s to standard.

Leaders know of Tier 1 hotspots and IED indicators; Personnel calls TOC prior to FOB departure for latest IED info. Soldiers know established observations guidelines. Unit attacks the network.

Soldiers know Tier 1 hotspots and IED indicators; Patrols/convoys debriefed upon returning; conducts effective blast analysis & IED exploitation; IED info distributed.

HOST NATION FORCES (HNF)DEVELOPMENT Unit has little or no interaction with HN Forces.

Unit has some interaction with HNF, brings them on MSNs conducted but MSN is strictly U.S. planned & executed.

Unit includes HNF in planning process as well as an active participant in execution

Actively mentors & partners with HNF. Conducts TNG with the unit and teaches them TTPs for mission planning, preparation, and execution.

Partners with HNF in all aspects of their operations, conducts combined planning; forms combined TOCs, shares releasable Intel; puts partners in the lead.

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

Being the enemy: lessons from 1-4 Infantry By Denver Makle, JMTC Public Aﬀairs

uring the summer of 2010, Co. D, of the 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. (1-4), a unit stationed at the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) in Hohenfels, Germany, found itself alongside Afghan and Romanian counterparts locked in a battle for terrain with a hardened enemy high above the mountains of Northern Zabul Province in Afghanistan. “I’ll always remember my first firefight there,” said Capt. Matthew K. Hilderbrand, the company 2nd Platoon Leader. “We had got caught in a close ambush, and 1st Lt. Daniel Meegan, the 1st Platoon Leader, called for mortar fire against the Taliban on a ridge line, while we fought the Taliban in the orchards around us. About thirty seconds later, mortars were landing so close we were showered with dirt and bits of tree branches,” he explained. “I yelled to 1st Lt. Meegan, ‘Hey man, we need to push our mortars further away from us.’ He looked at me and yelled back ‘Those aren’t our mortars!’ “That’s when I realized that it was going to be a long day.” Since 2006, 1-4 —the only conventional unit to maintain a consistent presence in Afghanistan partnered with and augmented the Romanian Land Forces (ROULF) with personnel, enablers, and operational experience. During the partnership, the ROULF developed new capacities, which later increased commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the deployment of an additional Romanian battalion and brigade tactical command post to Afghanistan this year.

At the Jan. 13, 2011, ceremony highlighting the achievements of the unique partnership the ROULF chief of Strategic Planning Directorate, Romanian Maj. Gen. Alexandru Rus said, the special relationship between the U.S. and Romanian Soldiers successfully reinforced a vital economic corridor and met strategic objectives set by the Commander of ISAF. "You can be very proud," said Brig. Gen. Steven L. Salazar, commanding general of the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC). "You served your nation, ably supported the Romanian Task Force, and provided hope for the Afghan people of Zabul province." Each ISAF rotation, the 1-4 deployed a company-sized element. More than 1400 Soldiers served in Afghanistan as part of that mission. In the unit’s classroom are citations of valor awards from the past five years. Eleven soldiers were killed-in-action. “More than any other conventional unit, 1-4 knows the intricacies of the counter-insurgency fight in Afghanistan, and it is uniquely situated to provide this knowledge for other units,” said Meegan. “It [the unit] understands how a simple vehicle breakdown can lead to a six-hour firefight, how a skilled mortar team can mean the difference between victory and death, how technology can only augment skill, not replace it.” Meegan said, the 1-4 Soldiers learned in Afghanistan a single IED, when properly placed, can stop a unit for days. (continued on page 27)

Soldiers at the Hohenfels Training Area train regularly in advanced tactics, techniques and procedures for countering IEDs. Leaders say lessons-learned, while in theater, during the past ﬁve years, is what makes JMRC the premier training center U.S. and multinational forces in Europe. U.S. Army photo: Staﬀ Sgt. Adam Mancini.

TIO N NA

A L T RAI

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continued from page 10

AN D

JO IN

I LT

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ITED STATES

See “Being the Enemy: lessons from 1-4 Infantry” on page 12, for information on the successful Romanian-American partnership in support of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

COIN and combat “Success wasn’t measured in the number of SIGACTS [significant activities], the number of projects completed, or the number of key leader’s engagements executed, said Lt. Col. Curtis A. Johnson, battalion commander. “We measured our effectiveness on whether or not the local populace trusted their local government and took an active role in securing a safe and secure environment allowing governance and development to take hold.” The IO themes pushed by the Battalion, Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) was aimed at self-empowerment of the local populace, ensuring security came from within instead of from the U.S. Military. As the deployment continued, the COIN mission grew more complex as enemy activity increased. During the summer, the fighting season, the overall size of the operational environment increased to include highly contested terrain to the west of their FOB, where a round-the-clock, counter Indirect Fire (IDF) mission was conducted by the Battalion. At this time, Co. A had three Platoons dedicated to IDF. New TTPs were emplaced at the platoon-and-squad level to react to the changing enemy conditions. Conditions drove each platoon to adjust the original SOPs and adopt new tactics to create a high offensive posture in the battle space. “We dismounted a lot, sometimes we drove through fields to avoid setting patterns, when we had to we used mine detectors to clear our own routes, detainee operations also came into play,” said Staff Sgt. Earnest Lockett, a motor transport operator and Platoon Sergeant, from Co. A. “Every Soldier had to know proper detainee handling.” September brought on one of the Battalion’s culminating missions with the provincial elections. “Despite the increased enemy threat, we found great success during this year’s elections,” said Capt. Mary K. Fullenkamp, company commander. “The local populace were not deterred from voting and showed their faith in both the government that they were voting for, as well as, their faith in the local military forces that protected their right to do so.” After looking back, it is clear the 173rd BSB leadership embraced the COIN philosophy that ‘Every Soldier is a Rifleman and an Ambassador.’ Although initially the focus was on its doctrinal sustainment mission, the BSB adapted to unique mission requirements. As a BSO, the 173rd BSB succeeded in sustaining the force, helping legitimize the local Afghan government, while protecting the lives of BSB paratroopers, and disrupting enemy operations in Logar province.

1st Lt. Aaron Gatrell, 2nd Platoon Leader with Co. A., directs movement at a Traﬃc Control Point in Western Pul E Alam. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

A BSB leader from 3rd Platoon, Co. A., assigns a sector of ﬁre while his machine gunner scans for enemy. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion.

BSB Paratroopers from 2nd Platoon, Co. A., cross a shallow stream to reach a local village. Photograph courtesy of 173rd Brigade Support Battalion. 13

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

Helping Afghans build accountable governance, the People’s Development Fund By Maj. Scott Strickler, civil affairs officer with significant contributions by Dr. Jay Baker

hen the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173rd ABCT), arrived in Logar and Wardak provinces in Afghanistan in late November 2009, local radio stations were inundated with callers complaining the U.S. military was not doing enough to improve roads, infrastructure, and government services. When the Brigade re-deployed a year later, local callers were still complaining. However, Afghans living in the provinces were no longer asking the U.S. military to solve their problems. Instead, Afghan citizens were calling on their elected leaders and government officials, demanding improvements in government services. What contributed to the change in the local opinions? Why were provincial and district governments behaving more responsibly and proactively? Part of the answer is a program the 173rd ABCT called the People’s Development Fund (PDF). In the aggregate, PDF proved effective as provincialand-district governments listened and responded to the concerns of local citizens (see illustration page 15). The efforts of the local governments to meet the most pressing needs within their communities, because of PDF, contributed to perceptions of progress and accountability at the district level where the counter-insurgency fight is won or lost. An increase in Afghan-provided services and development projects by local governments to their constituents correlated with actual increased government capacity and local perceptions of their government’s ability to meet local needs. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM Over the past decade, with no tax base in Afghanistan and international donors providing funds to fill the void, a “donor culture” developed across the country. For many Afghans, seeing U.S. forces rebuilding their country created a “culture of expectation.” The U.S. military spent billions of dollars rebuilding Afghanistan, project-by-project. In 2009, within the provinces, the U.S. military and the Department of State did most of the heavy lifting when it came to development, and personally executed spending initiatives. Local Afghan government capacity to manage a budget and execute local development solutions had atrophied as a result of well-intentioned U.S. development zeal. Our plan was to reverse the trend with the PDF program, to use “Money As-a-Weapon-System (MAWS).” “MONEY-AS-A-WEAPON” In the counter-insurgency fight, money is a weapon system. Who has the money, has the power and legitimacy. In short, PDF was a block-grant program that used a Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) seed money to empower governments, by giving leaders accountability and management over a budget for social and civic projects within their 14

communities. The program began as an initiative called CERP-as-a-Budget, originally developed by Task Force Mountain Warrior. The 173rd ABCT adopted and improved the original program to incorporate more robust transparency and accountability features. The fundamental difference between the PDF and other CERP-as-a-budget programs was provincial governors and district sub-Governors were not only provided funds to manage, but given full responsibility for the accounting and transparency of the monies they were issued. In accepting the PDF funds, they accepted the responsibility to account to the local population an expenditure of the funds. Allegations of corruption, all too familiar in Afghanistan, was now the sole responsibility of the Afghan government, not the U.S. military, U.S .donors, or an international contractor. The governors were allowed to succeed or fail in their administration of the fiscal responsibilities. Accountability was provided via the Afghan media and Afghan citizens, who were aware, for the first time, of the money their local governments had to spend, and of how the government was spending it. The PDF program sought to create an organized and effective cadre of Afghan leaders at the sub-national level of government to transfer learned skills , such as, work to support disaster relief, elections and judicial reform. By having a clear command vision for change, recognizing the need for external expertise, and a willingness to accept risk, PDF incorporated non-traditional elements of national power. The PDF proved an effective and versatile tool at developing real human capitol in the Afghan Leaders of Provincial and District Government. BRINGING OUTSIDE EXPERTISE INTO THE BRIGADE Dr. Dennis de Trey, a 30-year World Bank veteran who served on contract as the 173rd’s Global Development Advisor, helped the Brigade design a development and governance program. It was de Trey who proposed the name “People’s Development Fund,” during a meeting with one of the provincial governors. He often traveled across Afghanistan selling the merits of the program to senior U.S. and Afghan audiences, including Gen. Petraeus, Commander of International Security Forces Afghanistan. de Trey insisted the PDF be used explicitly to give purpose and power to leaders of sub-national government. He felt these leaders would be empowered by a budget that they would control in its entirety. “PDF strengthens bonds between people and their local governments by giving those governments financial resources, the freedom to select projects, and making them accountable to their citizens for delivery, said de Trey.

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THE PDF “CYCLE OF TRANSPARENCY” PROCESS Requirement successfully met by Government.

TF SABER AO BAYONET AFGHANISTAN

Requirement partially met, acceptable.

Logar PDC Baraki-Barak

Wardak

Requirement not met, past suspense or unacceptable.

Pul-E’Alam Logar

Requirement not initiated, not past suspense.

Charkh

Kherwahr

Paktiya

Ghazni

To be eligible for the program, provincial-and-district level governments had to participate and be certiﬁed in the PDF Cycle of Transparency process. The sequential PDF process is outlined here:

Step 1.

Announce receipt of PDF funds to local Afghan community through various media.

Step 2.

Host a Shura, announcing a local government meeting, where the PDF budget was developed with participation from elected oﬃcials and the Afghan public. The date and times had to be oﬃcially announced.

Step 3.

Announce chosen budget projects to the public.

Step 4.

Announce contract award to the public.

Step 5.

Announce the ﬁnal audit results of the PDF funds to the public, and explain where the PDF money was spent.

Left: U.S. Soldiers of the Ghazni provincial reconstruction team and their interpreters conduct a Shura, April 14, 2010 with village elders in the town of Jaghatu in Ghazni, Afghanistan. The 173rd ABCT adopted and improved the People’s Development Fund (PDF) program to incorporate transparency and accountability, by giving leaders responsibility and management budgets for social and civic projects within their communities. The program strengthend ties between the citizens and their local governments. U.S. Air Force photo courtesy of Tech. Sgt. J. T. May III. 15

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

Aviators add realism to training experience for U.S. and NATO By Denver Makle, Joint Multinational Training Command PAO

“Being forward deployed in Europe allows unique training s the Veteran’s Day ESPN celebration began at opportunities for aviation Soldiers,” said Capt. James P. Welch Grafenwoehr’s parade field with the “Star-Spangled Banner,” of the Headquarters Company of the 3-159th ARB. helicopters flown by aviators from Company G., of the 1st “The “Quickstrike” Battalion supported numerous training Bn., 214th Aviation Regiment (General Support Aviation events all year at the Joint Multinational Training Command Battalion) delivered American heroes, landing in the center (JMTC) to help U.S., multinational and NATO Forces prepare of the field before more than 400 spectators. The event was for deployment.” broadcast to more than 19 million viewers. These Soldiers had “As the only Attack Helicopter Battalion available in Germany, rescued German paratroopers, members of the Parachute the “Quickstrike” Soldiers add realism,” said Welch. The JMTC’s Battalion 373, during an April 2, 2010, fight in Afghanistan. Hohenfels Training Area is the What television viewers saw was only U.S. facility that can train the expression of gratitude between “When he called me that day, he said ground troops and aviation assets Soldiers, U.S. and German troops the LZ (landing-zone) was pretty hot,” together. Aviators may conduct embracing after sharing a harrowing “I said to him that it was load planning and insertions, and combat experience that many hope they can be incorporated into a to never face. It was an experience cold-enough for me.” training package that simulates that would never be forgotten, three Chief Warrant Officer Jason J. LaCrosse, what happens during a deployment German Soldiers died that day and Company G, 1st Battalion, 214th Aviation Regiment in Afghanistan. eight were injured. “Scout helicopters can conduct What wasn’t visible to the viewers reconnaissance of potential landing zones,” said Ernest was the training required to successfully complete such a mission. L. Roth, JMTC maneuver coordination officer. “While at For example, in the months prior to deployment, the 3rd Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) of the 159th Aviation Regiment , the same time other aviators can insert ground troops or supplies.” “Quickstrike,” provided essential training support for multiple Conducting integrated air mission planning allows staff units, U.S. and multinational, in various stages of training. planners to anticipate the kind of support they may need In 2010, the 159th ARB supported Mission Readiness Exercises to provide when in theater, said Roth. (MREs), Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEXs), Aerial During the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment’s pre-deployment Gunnery, and completed various Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) courses to maintain proficiency that ensured both U.S. and training, aircrews provided medical evacuation escort, convoy multinational forces were ready for combat operations in Afghanistan. security, quick reaction force capability, and air assault security.

THE TRAIN UP:

March 2010 The Quickstrike Battalion supports the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment. Aircrews provide medical evacuation escort, convoy security, quick-reaction force and air-assault security.

May 2010 During aerial gunnery training, aircrews engaged targets with 30mm cannon fire, 2.75 in folding fin aerial rockets, and Hellfire missiles, while the Distribution and Armament platoons refueled and rearmed the aircraft to make each engagement possible. Petroleum Supply Specialists from 1-214th General Support Aviation Battalion and the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade filled manpower shortages. These Petroleum Supply Specialists trained to refuel.

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“Our overall mission was to provide Aerial Weapons Team support to the ground forces during their missions to enhance air-to-ground communication,” said Sgt. Yogesh Pillai of Company D. “We provided combat lifesaver support during an attack, which contributed to making their training more realistic.” This is similar to the events experienced by members of the 5th Bn. of the 158th Avn. Regt. of the 12th CAB, based in Ansbach, Germany, on that fateful day in April. “When he called me that day, he said the LZ [landing-zone] was pretty hot,” said Chief Warrant Officer Jason J. LaCrosse, the pilot. “I said to him it was cold-enough for me.” On Good Friday, that day, the Germans had fought hard for five hours trying to secure the LZ when Master Sgt. Patrick Bonneik, a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) in the German Army made the call for back-up and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). “He [LaCrosse] told me he was going to land right next to the wounded,” said Bonneik. “He felt safe because we defended his helicopter. That’s how we managed to kill seven Taliban that tried to encircle us.” The decision was made between pilot and JTAC, a second Blackhawk would provide suppressing fire from the air instead of the usual security for the first aircraft. The Germans continued the fight to protect their wounded, while the medics provided the medical care. LaCrosse is now an observer, controller, and

June 2010 Company B of the 3rd Battalion-159th Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) in Illesheim, Germany, deployed with support personnel to Grafenwoher Training Area to participate in a Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise in support of Company C of the 1st Bn., 4th Inf. Regt. During their culminating predeployment training event. The 3-159th aircrews provided the Air Weapons Team (AWT) coverage to enhance warﬁghting abilities for infantry Soldiers.

trainer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany. “I believe being able to train before a combat deployment with your counterparts is important,” said LaCrosse. The JMRC trained more than 12,000 U.S. and multinational Soldiers as part of brigade rotations last year. However, during the ﬁrst two quarters of this Fiscal Year, the JMTC has exceeded the number of International Military Students trained during last ﬁscal year at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels Training Areas. This is in large part due to multinational units requesting pre-deployment training prior to their deployments to Afghanistan. “Knowing how each other operates can cut down time on MEDEVACs and ultimately save lives,” said LaCrosse.

August 2010 While at the Hohenfels Training Area, aircrews from Company B conducted air-to-ground integration brieﬁngs for ground forces to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and lethal power of the Apache Longbow aircraft when used in concert with ground forces.

September 2010 The Quickstrike Battalion supported the 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team in it’s pre-deployment Mission Rehearsal Exercise. 3-159th aircrews honed their Air Assault planning skills and provided Close Combat Attack support for Air Assaults and AWT security for German Air Force lift aircraft. 17

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

MILITARY CASE STUDY

Analysis of Intelligence Development in the Romanian – American Battle Group Prepared by: Capt. Krisjand Rothweiler, scenario writing team leader at the Joint Multinational Simulations Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany, Rothweiler was the U.S. Intelligence Oﬃcer- in-Charge of the combined 812 Romanian Battalion and Company D of the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, Task Force in Zabul, Afghanistan. Rothweiler has a Master of Science in Information Assurance from Norwich University and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Maine.

Notice to Reader Information gathered in this case study was obtained primarily by the personal experience of the author, discussions with previous U.S. Intelligence personnel and post-deployment debrief. The Information studied was dated between mid-2007 (approximate) and September 2010. This case study was edited for compilation in the JMTC Training Journal, a publication of the 7th United States Army Joint Multinational Training Command.

ne of the key functions of the U.S. Army, aside from fighting wars, is the mission to partner with foreign forces and provide training, effects and capabilities. This function ranges from training newly-developed indigenous forces to defend themselves, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, to partnering with modern militaries to share lessons-learned from conflicts and peace-keeping operations. Since 2006, the U.S. Army in Europe (USAREUR) has provided support to the Romanian Army through combined deployments in Zabul Province in Afghanistan to complement and enhance the war-fighting capabilities of this allied nation. Of all the enablers provided, U.S. Intelligence (Intel) personnel are among the most valuable, allowing this partnered force access to the broad menu of assets that the U.S. military has available, while enabling Romanian forces to conduct effective operations to defeat the shared enemy.

MISSION BACKGROUND In summer 2006, U.S. European Command agreed to augment the Romanian Land Forces with a U.S. Infantry company, Naval Explosive Ordinance Disposal team, Joint Terminal Air Controllers, a Mortar Platoon, and Operations and Intel personnel to support a Battalion task force during a deployment in support of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. This company-team was attached to the Romanian Battalion, and remained through Dec. 2010, providing operational and logistical augmentation, training and support. Over the years, the responsibilities of the Task Force ranged from the entire Zabul Province to more focused missions including security of Afghan Highway 1, and securing and building the capability of the Afghan Security Forces and key population centers within the province. Similarly, the scope of duties for the attached Intel personnel have evolved from leading the Battalion Intel Section, through operational planning and analysis processes to supporting the Romanian Intel staﬀ from the “right seat”, and augmenting them with assets they would not normally have access to during operations. 18

TRAINING One of the most valuable parts of the mission for the Intel section were the training events hosted at Hohenfels Training Area (HTA), in Hohenfels, Germany, and those at the Romanian Land Forces (ROULF) Combat Training Center in Cincu, Romania. It was during training that the processes needed during the deployment were established and personal bonds between the Romanian and U.S. personnel could be formed. It also allowed Intel personnel to assess their counterparts and ensure individual training, which followed the Mission Readiness Exercises (MREs), would truly develop the skills needed to compliment the Romanians’ skill sets. Since timelines for deployment varied between the Romanians, the U.S. company and those elements attached to the company, not everyone participated in the MRE’s, including some Intel personnel. From the Intel perspective, not attending the training event was a significant detractor to the partnership. Aside from sharpening critical skills and the individual training received on certain computer systems and software, this hindered the ability of those personnel to develop good-working relationships for both U.S. and ROULF personnel. During the MREs attended by U.S. Intel personnel, each side developed an understanding of the other’s capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, which led to a division of labor and internal cross-training of skill sets. For example, where the Americans provided digital systems and technical capabilities, the Romanians offered previous area experience and effective analog systems (which would prove useful during power and network outages). An observation of the previous teams’ after-action reviews revealed that those rotations, where the U.S. and Romanian personnel both attended, showed the greatest cooperation during combat missions. The second phase of the pre-deployment training plan was individual training, including instruction on systems, such as the Distributed Common Ground System – Army and Tactical Ground Reporting Network and processes such as Intel, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) employment, Collection Management and Analysis in support of tactical units.

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While this training was useful in reinforcing the skills of American personnel, it would have been more valuable for the Romanian staff, who because of non-specialization in their Army do not receive such training. Incorporating the individual training could have increased the capabilities and ensured interoperability with U.S. forces. U.S. and Romanian personnel would be empowered to work together, eliminating an unequal reliance on the U.S. element. COMBAT OPERATIONS The integration of the American-Romanian elements during numerous rotations ranged from complete and codependent operation to independent and fragmented duties within the section. In the best cases, a close-working relationship in the section was established because of a conscious decision on both sides to support each other, while those sections that appeared fragmented were less conscious and displayed a lack of understanding of each other’s capabilities, both inside the Intel shop and among the rest of the combined staff. Towards the end of the partnership, when the units should have been most cohesive, certain duties, almost by default, usually fell to either the Americans or the Romanians. The ISR, for example, was almost a solely American duty, mainly due to the greater understanding that U.S. forces had of the assets and capabilities. Some might say that a specialization of duties within the section is a positive attribute, and it can be, but that does not relieve the need for a certain depth of knowledge among the rest of the team. Until late 2009, the U.S. forces of the Romanian - American Battle Group controlled the bases north of Highway 1 in deh Chopan, Mizan and Arghandab, while the Romanian Army provided security along the highway in Qalat, Tarnak-waJaldak and Shajoy Districts. Although the mission of the U.S. attachments to the Romanians was to support them with certain enablers, this was not a direct contact relationship below the Battalion headquarters because of geographic limitations. This, in conjunction with the inability to train together in the Intel section, compounded some of the problems experienced between Romanian and American personnel. As other forces arrived, U.S. units were also allowed to support the highway mission,which brought the priorities of both nations to a common goal. This common interest allowed not only the U.S. and Romanian companies to operate together, but enabled cooperation among the staff so that the elements became mutually supportive, encouraging greater cooperation between the U.S. and Romanian staff sections. As U.S. and Romanian units began to share battle space, missions and facilities to a greater

ITED STATES

See “Being the Enemy: Lessons from Opposing Force that deployed for ﬁve-years,” on page 12, for more information on the Romanian-American partnership in support of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

and greater degree, the Intel personnel also coalesced into more of a single unit than two separate ones. The 2008 and 2009 MREs between the U.S. Company Teams, Co. A, and Co. D, of the 1st Bn; 4th Inf. Regt., and the Romanian Battalions, the 280th Inf. Bn. and the 33rd Posada Mountain Bn., were two of the few training exercises where the attached Intel personnel attended. Here, many skills were developed that led to immediate increased capacity for the Romanians once deployed, and the quick integration of the U.S. Intel attachments into their headquarters as they arrived. While some things had changed between training and deployment, the teams and Intel attachments arrived knowing their colleagues on a social and professional level. As previously stated, some divisions of labor continued, even with the combined mission, but they did so based on an individual’s strengths, rather than nationality, and in a manner that fostered interoperability. Tasks that had once been solely “American duties” or “Romanian duties” became shared efforts. Tasks from major operational planning to routine briefings combined the efforts of American and Romanian personnel, both added and presented information to the commander. During the parliamentary elections of 2010, for the first time in four years, the Romanians led the planning and coordination of the ISR, supporting the main effort in Zabul Province. This could be conducted in a vacuum, and although each person in the section had “their task,” it required the cooperation of many personnel to accomplish these duties. The positive result was a noticeable increase in the quality of the section’s products and increased capabilities overall. Duplicate efforts ceased and the section moved beyond discussing what had happened in the past to allowing the Intel to drive operations to get there. While many enablers provided by the Americans to the Romanian-American Battle Group were indispensable, the Intel section allowed the Battle Group to move from maintaining a presence to expanding their influence. The cooperation between the personnel left a mark on both, as each side learned new techniques and processes, and developed a greater understanding of the coalition environment and the capabilities brought by allied nations. The success demonstrated by the betterment of Zabul Province was achieved through a combination of the technical capabilities of Americans and the tactical knowledge and experience of the Romanians.

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TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

FEATURE

NCOA and small group discussion facilitate lessons-learned Denver Makle, JMTC Public Aﬀairs

owadays, a typical promotable Army Specialist (E-4), might have a few deployments under his belt. He attends the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) with a wealth of knowledge to share. The WLC, Army Noncomissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) in Grafenwoehr, Germany, is a 17-day course, a basic leadership course for Solders, from Private 1st Class to Staff Sergeant. The enlisted Soldiers acquire leader skills, knowledge, and the experience needed to lead teams and squadsize elements. The instructors or Small Group Leaders (SGLs) assess the student’s leadership potential, and evaluate their ability to apply lessons-learned, while effectively leading peers in a garrison environment. During Oct. 2010, a new curriculum introduced three major areas of instruction: leadership, training and warfighting. The new program of instruction facilitates small group discussions between students and instructors, and shifts the teaching methodology from “what to think” to “how to think,” placing the responsibility on the student to learn through group participation. “This method fosters team building, and provides training reinforcements based on the wide range of backgrounds and professional experience. Through these small group discussions students gain insight on how command decisions are enforced,” said Sgt. 1st Class Tony T. Towns, the NCOA operations sergeant. “Recently re-deployed Soldiers share the challenges they faced. It is through this learning process we’re able to bridge the gap between combat experienced Soldiers, and those that haven’t deployed. They share differing viewpoints, and gain practical knowledge from their peers.” The approach creates an atmosphere where students feel comfortable exchanging ideas on any subject, and use collective reasoning when solving problems, said Towns. The NCOA’s WLC is open to U.S. Soldiers stationed within the U.S. Army Europe’s area of operation. However, WLC in Europe is unique because the course can host up to 20 international military students per class from NATO, partnered or allied nations. “This is unique because we are training with countries that deploy in support of regional stability,” said 1st Sgt. Jon Otero, the 7th Army NCOA’s chief of training. “The benefits of that experience are invaluable.” So far, this fiscal year, Oct. thru May, the 7th Army NCOA graduated 38 foreign students, in addition to 2,106 U.S. Soldiers. The International students come from countries such as, Turkey, Serbia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, State of Israel, Poland, Moldova, Namibia, Slovenia, Romania, and the Czech Republic. Michael J. McLean, international military student officer, says some countries are sending larger number of students to WLC than in the past. For example, in the first weeks of April, 11 Polish NCOs graduated from the WLC, completed the 20

U.S. Army photo courtesy of Joshua Rocha, JMTC NCOA.

combat lifesaver course, and the Multinational Counter-IED Baseline Train-the-Trainer Course, two courses taught at Grafenwoehr; Additionally, 12 Polish students did the same thing in May and June following the WLC. “The course was relevant because it expanded our knowledge,” said Sgt. Giovanni Pascascio, a recent WLC graduate. “Through dialogue with class members with numerous deployments to Afghanistan, it provided a different perspective.” The Small Group Leaders’ method of instruction allows instructors to introduce a topic, ask lead questions and facilitate discussions to a predetermined end-state. Instructors facilitate role-modeling, counseling, coaching, learning, and team building in the small group environment. “As a Team Leader in Afghanistan,” asked one student of Staff Sgt. Jimmy Martin, an instructor assigned to Co. C, at the 7th Army NCOA. “How do I get my Soldiers to follow me when the orders that are given are not cut and dry?” Martin re-introduces the question and opens it up for group discussion, as part of the Situational Training Exercise. Out of 16 Soldiers, seven-to-eight raised their hands to provide insight. Although Martin could easily provide the Soldier with an answer, it would have only been from his perspective. By allowing students to discuss the topic, several viewpoints were shared using real lessons-learned. “The students make it easy for me to be enthusiastic,” said Staff Sgt. Jesus Serrano, an instructor from Co. B. “My knowledge base is greatly increased because of the experiences shared by the students.” Serrano said the experience is about give and take. “At this time there is no better wealth of information and immeasurable experience than our junior leaders, who have experienced it first-hand through numerous combat operations,” said Towns. “The WLC is greatly enhanced by the interaction, and the quality of instructors, and the men and women, who are willing to share and grow from each other’s combat experiences.”

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FEATURE

On the same frequency, a complicated game Signal professionals should work together in theater By Denver Makle, JMTC Public Aﬀairs

n the information age, it’s not just bullets and bodies that matter on the battlefield. It’s a complicated game of chess, and a movement of computer applications and frequency that allows information to be fed-to or withheld-from the enemy, but always with the intent of protecting the forces on the ground, while obtaining the information needed to maneuver assets in theater. Blacksheep Company of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Inf. Regt. conducted operation Mountain Protect IX, a mission incorporating counter-insurgency (COIN), intelligence, non-kinetic fires, while proving the value of jamming and collecting functions of Signals Intelligence (Intel) and Communications Intel. The mission exploited Electronic Warfare (EW) methods and techniques valuable to mission success, March 31-April 1, 2010, in Konar Province, Afghanistan. Collectors want to gather and store information, while the Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) wants to shut-down communications, limiting the enemy’s access to information. Previously, the train of thought was to choose one mode, but never both. “Sgt. 1st Class Jason M. Perdue not only understands the various frequencies to target, but just as important, when to target those frequencies,” said Capt. Joseph A. Sanfilippo, Battalion Fire Support Officer for 2nd Battalion of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. “Collection of enemy frequencies is a vital part of the friendly scheme of maneuver, and he has never hesitated to hold-off on jamming a specific frequency to allow a collection asset the opportunity to gather critical enemy information.” Sanfilippo viewed Perdue’s skill as an asset when deployed. He says it’s value added, when a signal professional understands when to deny or not deny the enemy? One must have an extensive understanding of the frequencies to target, but also, when to target those frequencies to support operations. During the operation, EW assets were on station, including two Electronic Support (ES) aircraft. By having the aircraft adjust their jamming, it was demonstrated to one ES aircraft could still collect. Then, three-four minute tests were conducted with the other ES platform, which did not cause interference, or cause them to lose their link. Throughout the operation, insurgents discussed locations of Coalition Forces, while attempting to coordinate attacks. Through the cross-cueing of assets, the EA aircraft prevented insurgents from passing location and disposition of Coalition Forces, and from receiving guidance from their commanders and organizing attacks. Coalition Forces were not attacked in the valley, or during their movement out.

“Was the Prowler [EA aircraft] role decisive? We will never know,” said Lt. Col. Scott A. Cooper, the executive officer of the Marine Aircraft Group 14 at the Marine Corps Air Station in Cherry Point, North Carolina. Cooper was the commander of the Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1, while deployed. In his paper, “Airborne Electronic Warfare in Counterinsurgency Operations”, he said, “Perdue’s actions – his constant, relentless pursuit of the enemy’s communications plan, and his ability to intercept, interfere, and deny it at the right moments on March 11, 2010, are worth noting.” In the article, “The Future of Electronic Warfare, In Support of COIN Operations,” Warrant Officer Clifford Blackmore, said, “Synchronization of all aspects, kinetic or not, is the key to maintaining positive momentum. Second, third, and fourth order effects can destroy everything before a victory is declared.” Perdue believes the planning responsibility is two-fold, intel,security,plans and operations leaders should understand the capabilities and limitations of the ES aircraft. He says, leaders should know how they work to exploit newly detected frequencies , or herd the enemy to specific frequencies to make collection easy. He says, it would bridge the gap, and cultivate a beneficial relationship. “It is important for EWOs at all levels, and especially at the Battalion level to work hand-in-hand with intel, security and planners to ensure there is a integrated plan for EA and ES,” said Perdue battalion EWO. “If EWOs understand the capabilities and limitations of the ES aircraft, they can adjust their jamming so it doesn’t cause interference, and the collection platform is still able to collect. It is not so much a deconfliction plan, as it is an integration plan.”

173rd ABCT paratroopers set up a tactical satellite communication system (TACSAT). Photograph Sgt Russell Gilchrest. 21

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

SPRING 2011

SPECIAL FEATURE

Voices of Moderate Islam By Maj. Matthew J. Yandura, 173rd ABCT information Operations Oﬃcer

This is the abbreviated version of how the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team conducted an initiative dubbed Voices of Moderate Islam.

“T

his is not a war for hearts and minds. This is a battle of words, deeds, and images. We, and our Afghan allies, must win all three.” - Maj. Matthew J. Yandura, Brigade S-7, 173rd ABCT

t was as audacious an idea as it was controversial. If successfully implemented it could have game-changing implications for our area of operations in Afghanistan. The mission: send 35 Afghan key communicators to Amman, Jordan for a 10-day intensive religious study, debate, and tour seminar, then facilitate their pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia for the Umra, or lesser Hajj, during the last ten-days of Ramadan. At the conclusion of the experience the attendees would travel back to Afghanistan bearing the honorific title of Haji. Upon returning, each participant would share, unscripted, the story of their tremendous life-changing journey with family, friends, and fellow Afghans. The operation would erode the credibility of a major thread of the insurgent narrative. The end state of this operation was three-fold: demonstrate respect for Islam and Afghan culture; expose Afghan key communicators to Islam in the context of a modern and religiously tolerant Jordanian society; facilitate an Afghan-to-Afghan narrative. KNOW THY ENEMY In May 2009, during mission analysis the Brigade developed visualization tools to understand the enemy situation. One of the key documents developed was the “Cycle of Frustration.” [See illust. 1, page 23]. The cycle described the prevelant, underlying conditions across Afghanistan. We assessed these as the causes that led many Afghans to join the insurgency [see illust. 2, page 25]. The cycle described the enemy’s “radical suppressive ideology” as the source of their power. To that end, countering-threat ideology was my job as the Information Officer. I had to figure how to make the insurgent ideolgy irrelevant, but how? COMMAND FOCUS The staff was assembled in the Brigade Conference Room for our MRX concept-of-the-operation brief. The Battalion Commanders were also in attendance. During the brief, the Commander unexpectedly said, “Information Operations (IO) was our decisive operation and most significant line of effort during the exercise and deployment.” My jaw hit the floor. In short, my commander had delivered an IO officer’s dream scenario, a fast-track,first-class ticket into the fight. The commander had a vision for this deployment, but now the pressure to perform was on and school-house theory had to be applied. 22

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS During our tour of duty, the 173rd was partnered with three allied nations, two provincial reconstruction teams, one from Turkey, the Czech Republic, and one light infantry battalion from Jordan. However, it was the Jordanian contingent under the dynamic leadership of U.S.-trained Jordanian Special Forces Col. Aref Alzaben, who proved decisive to the Brigade’s IO efforts. Unbeknownst to the 173rd, Alzaben would arrive in theater with an entire IO campaign (IOC) he developed, while serving at the National Defense University. It was based on the five pillars of Islam. One of the pillars calls for all able bodied Muslims to make the Hajj once in their lifetime. Alzaben’s IOC, as he would refer to it, dove-tailed perfectly with two upcoming Brigade operations, operations Noktai Tagheer I and II. OPERATION TIPPING POINT I It was March 2010, and the Brigade was in theater just more than three months. We still didn’t have the detailed picture of local influencers necessary to conduct effective, locallyinformed operations. We were responsible for partnered U.S.-Afghan security, development, governance, and information initiatives in Logar and Wardak provinces, an area roughly the size of Rhode Island. With the Commander’s guidance, we conducted the brigade-level information operation Noktai Tagheer I, Pashto for “Tipping Point,” which was named after Malcolm Gladwell’s book of the same title. Tipping Point I identified the key communicators in each Battalion Task Force’s area of responsibility, down to the village level. The idea to send select Afghans to Jordan was first discussed during mission analysis for Noktai Tagheer I. However—we had a lot of homework and coordination to do first; the time was not right to act on the idea then. At the conclusion of Noktai Tagheer I, the brigade had a much better understanding of who the formal and informal influencers were, and where they were located. Previously, they were unidentified. Now with this data, how were we going to exploit it? What were we going to do? Enter Noktai Tagheer II, the next step. OPERATION TIPPING POINT I I If Noktai Tagheer I solved the question, Noktai Tagheer II provided the answer. In Tipping Point II, we used our deeper understanding of the human terrain within Logar and Wardak to conduct a series of deliberate Afghan key communicator outreach initiatives to empower Afghans to take-on increasing levels of responsibility for community security, governance, and development. During this time, the Brigade formalized its program for reintegrating local Taliban fighters or leaders back into Afghan society using a community-

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THE AFGHANISTAN CYCLE OF FRUSTRATION

- Ideology - Political - Financial

- Increase Recruiting - Influence the Fringe - Ideological Justification

P O P U L AT HAN IO G N U AF S P P O RT CIT A T SUPPO TIVE RT C A G MO COR E R NT SU TIV E S IN ATI ON Radical Suppressive Ideology

INS SFUL S E C SUC RATIONS OPE

2.Destroy Western Connections

- Leadership - Weapons - Finance - Personnel - Movement - Communication - Intelligence

based approach. More importantly, Noktai Tagheer II provided the impetus to conduct the Voices of Moderate Islam (VoMI) initiative. IDEOLOGY VERSUS IDEOLOGY The only way to defeat ideology is with a counter-vailing ideology. But what does an Army Brigade IO officer employ to counter a radical suppressive form of Islam? And moreover, how would we actually go about doing it? In meetings, the Brigade Military Information Support Operations (MISO) planner, who was a Pakistan-born, naturalized-US citizen, the senior Department of State (DoS) officer assigned to the Brigade, and respected senior-Afghan officials discussed how most Muslims practiced a moderate, tolerant version of their faith. However, we agreed fighting radical Islam, within the context of an Afghan counterinsurgency, required Islam to play a critical role, and police itself. Likewise, it was decided that correcting a radical form of Islam with “Afghan patriotism” or “Nationalism,” was the wrong course of action in this case.

- Percieved Injustices - Economic Disparity - Perceived Deprivation

INCA DIST PABLE RICT S

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- Acquisition - Transportation - Utilization

OF R S O ON RR P E EA T W ASS M

1.Establishment of a Shari State

G YIN S L R E ON UNDNDITI CO - Lack of Political Voice

- Lack of Internal Security - Lack of Basic Services - No Rule of Law

- INS Sponsors - Tacit / Active Support - Internal Political Risk - Criminal Activity

Illustration 1 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR VoMI In 2004, King Abdullah II of Jordan sought to answer for once and for all the question: what is Islam? and, what actions represent Islam, and which do not? To that end, the King wrote and issued the Amman message, a document supported by more than 500 leading Muslim scholars from 50 countries. In addition,six other international Islamic scholarly assemblies gave their formal approval in July 2006, culminating with unanimous support by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah. The Amman message created a strategic breach in the enemy’s ideology, and we had to exploit that breach with VOMI. An untruth propagated by the Taliban is that the U.S. and Coalition Forces are in Afghanistan to destroy Islam. That notion led many Afghans to become active or tacit Taliban supporters. In other cases, Afghans assumed a position of ambivalence or isolationism. There is a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the continued U.S. and Coalition presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban and local criminal networks exploit local ignorance with eﬀective and highly decentralized information operations. 23

THE 7TH UNITED STATES ARMY JOINT MULTINATIONAL TRAINING COMMAND

TRAINING JOURNAL

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CONTINUED FROM PAGE 23

Voices of Moderate Islam

Islam is steeped in tradition, and local Afghans view the Hajj attendance as the ultimate journey a Muslim can make in their lives. In fact, hundreds from a village and tribe may gather to see a pilgrim off. Likewise, thousands may greet him when he returns. VoMI exploited this socio-religious phenomenon to tap into a network-of-networks reaching beyond our two provinces. Word-of-mouth, often facilitated by cell-phone and radio, was the most credible source of information. We knew news of our initiative would spread quickly and credibly, if the right participants were chosen. The VoMI candidate selection process was delegated to our Task Forces. They knew their communities best, and we trusted them to find suitable prospects. However, we needed money, lodging, Visas and transportation for 35 Afghans, and two U.S. and Jordanian escorts. Selection guidance was simple: identify formal or informal Afghan leaders within respective AO’s, whom you believe through their participation in the program could bring about a significant, positive change in security, governance, development, or information. There was no restriction on gender, and current and former Taliban members were also legitimate candidates for selection. DEPARTMENT OF STATE and DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT We knew this operation required major assistance and support from the DoS and the embassies in Afghanistan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The DoS representative made us aware of a DoS Public Diplomacy grant program that could assist with the funding. He explained that if our request was under $100,000, a DoS approved non-governmental organization (NGO) could sponsor the initiative, and get a major portion of the funding. Time was against us; and the word “impossible” was uttered by those ideologically opposed to the operation, or those who saw time as a significant challenge. In short, we found a supportive NGO partner in the Hashemite Charity Organization. We drafted, submitted, and got approved a proposal for approximately $65,000. The extensive billeting, transportation, VISA, and oversight issues were worked out. We received a huge boost of support from General Petraeus, his staff, Ambassador Eikenberry, King Abdullah II, and several other key DoS and DoD officials. In the end, final approval for the request lift assets for VoMI were routed from our Brigade, through in-country Command channels to U.S. Central Command, the DoS in Washington, DC, and up to the White House for deliberation, and back to the Pentagon. 24

The oﬃces of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for policy and Deputy Secretary of Defense ultimately gave their approval to proceed with the initiative. This operation was one of the biggest moments of our deployment. We needed help, and in the end, we got it. We couldn’t have initiated this operation without the help of alot of committed individuals.

THE BEGINNING OF THE JOURNEY and THE IMPORTANCE OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS All 35 attendees trekked across our two provinces to meet at Forward Operating Base Shank (FOB Shank). At the FOB, we received them as honored guests. Some flew via helicopter with their Task Force sponsors, others arrived as passenger-guests in U.S. military convoys, while others arrived using local transportation. Every detail of the reception and onward movement was meticulously planned. We communicated with word, deed, and image, our respect for Islam and Afghan culture. This would be a positive life-changing experience for the attendees. We knew this was the first time most of the VoMI attendees were inside a U.S. FOB, the first time they had flown in a plane, and their first time traveling to a foreign country. At FOB Shank, attendees were treated to a special Ramadan meal arranged by our Jordanian battalion. Following the meal the Jordanians hosted a pre-departure Shura, or meeting, with the participants and a small portion of the IO team. After opening remarks, without prompting, the participants got up, one by one, and spoke: “I can speak for us all when I say, we never knew that American bases here had mosques on them, or that you had Muslim soldiers in your Army, or that you would allow them to pray, and observe Ramadan,” said one attendee. “I thought you were only about killing— but now, I see so much more.” Another participant declared: “This journey is our life. When we return, we will tell others what we saw here,” he said. “We will tell others what you did for us. Everyone will know of the respect you’ve shown us.” The last to speak was the eldest of the group. He was a frail-looking tribal elder with a wispy white beard. He stood with the assistance of those seated next to him. His voice was raspy, but still had power, “This is the first time that I do not feel like a prisoner in my own country,” he said. “Thank you. I never thought I would see this day.” The sentiments boded well for the journey ahead, and the program had just begun.

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CAMPAIGN VISUALIZATION

POPULACE GAINING AND MAINTAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL AFGHAN PEOPLE IS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF EVERY ACTION WE TAKE. ADVERSARIAL

ISOLATIONALIST iSOLATIONALIST

- Anti-GIROA - Anti-Coalition

- Geographically Separated - Traditionalist - Autonomist

OVERWATCH - Overwatch and engage only as required. - Provide development to support strategic goals.

SECURE / CO-OPT - Partner with local Leaders. - Meld local iniatives into development programs. - Educate.

- Progressive - Supprts GIRoA - Supportive partners

MO COR TIV E ATI ON

MAINTAIN - Empower moderate voices. - Stress self-governance. - Sustain development.

ACTION

FIGHT THE ENEMY’S STRATEGY FIRST, ATTACK HIS FORCES ONLY WHEN THEY THREATEN THE POPULATION AND GET IN THE WAY OF OUR PARTNERED SOLUTION.

G YIN ERL ONS UNDNDITI CO

1.Establishment of a Shari State

S UL IN ESSF SUCC RATIONS OPE

INCA DIST PABLE RICT S

2.Destroy Western Connections

OF S OR ON RR P E EA T W ASS M

ORK NETW KS LIN

- Separate INS from the people. - Reduce INS Influence. - Disintegrate the INS networks.

- Alienated - Undecided - Subject to INS coercion

REFORMIST

A N P O P U L AT I ON GH C I T S U P P O RT TA SUPPO T IVE RT AC URGENT S S IN Radical Suppresive Ideology

NG LI S IL T W RIC UN IST D

DISRUPT

AMBIVALENT

END STATE

LINES of EFFORT INFORMATION OPERATION

Communicate tangible and recognizable progress.

SECURITY

Embedded partnerships protect Afghan people by, with, and through ANSF.

GOVERNANCE

Increased local community capacity to fullfill basic needs of the Afghan people.

The Afghan people accept GIRoA working for thier interest.

DEVELOPMENT

Sustainable development through economic growth.

Illustration 2 FROM AMMAN TO MECCA AND BACK The attendees departed on August 25, 2010, for Amman, Jordan. Our Deputy Commander made a public appearance annoucing the program to the Jordanian media the returned to the FOB. The Jordanian Commander and his senior Imam, a religious scholar, and two senior Muslim U.S. Noncommissioned Officers accompanied the group for the duration. The group returned to Afghanistan on September 15, 2010, four days later than planned. Nevertheless, the experience in Amman, Jordan and Mecca was filled with experiences the group will never forget. On the second day of the arrival in Amman, King Abdullah II personally invited the attendees to join him and the Royal court, along with the senior officers from the Jordanian Armed Forces to share in a Ramadan prayer and meal. King Abdullah spent an unprecedented 20 minutes with the attendees at the event. In the spirit of charity during the Ramadan season, the King gave each Afghan participant 1500 Jordanian Dinars, a gift, to cover additional personal expenses incurred while in Saudi Arabia.

The Afghans were overwhelmed by the kindness and generosity. During the Amman phase, the attendees spent a day engaging in lectures and debate with respected religious figures from Jordan and Egypt, who are known for their moderate views. They discussed and debated: What is the Amman Message? What is moderate Islam? Why does it matter? What is a Muslim? What are the duties of Muslims? What is Jihad? The Amman portion of the program called for a day of discussion, then travel to sites of religious significance. In Amman, during the visit to the King Hussein I Mosque, the Afghans were surprised, not at the site of this massive and beautiful mosque, but at the site of the Christian Coptic Church directly across the street. From where they were standing, they could see the mosque’s minaret with its crescent moon on top and the crucifix from the dome of the church—side-by-side. “From this example, we learn Islam and Christianity can co-exist in harmony and with respect for one another,” 25

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Voices of Moderate Islam said the Senior Jordanian Imam. After several more days in Amman, attendees boarded a Jordanian Armed Forces C-130 Hercules, one of three in the inventory, and ﬂew to Mecca with special permission from the Saudi Arabian Government. The next ﬁve days was a whirlwind of activity as the attendees, now pilgrims of the Hajj, went to Mecca and Medina to make the journey as the prophet Muhammad had done. Thousands of pictures were taken. Hours of video were shot. These images from all the attendees were collected, and produced into a video presentation of the entire trip, and given as a gift to commemorate their VoMI experience. As the attendees, prepared to return to Afghanistan, the Brigade IO team was ramping up for the opportunity phase, and the real information operation began.

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His Majesty, King Abdullah II of Jordan (left), receives VoMI participants in Amman, giving them a warm welcome, upon their arrival to the Hashemite Kingdom in August 2010. The King hosted a special Ramadan meal honoring the Afghan VoMI attendees. Photo: U.S. Army photo courtesy of the 173rd ABCT.

Illustration 3

VOICES OF MODERATE ISLAM (VoMI) “IO HELLFIRE MISSILES” As the Afghan attendees returned home, the Brigade Commander ensured his Task Force Commanders understood the opportunity before them. “The Brigade S-7 has provided each of you the equivalent of IO hell-ﬁre missiles. Partner with your VoMI returnees “ASAP.” Help get them into your local communities and to public events where they can share their story,” he said. “This is their biggest moment and ours.” [See illust. 3].

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF VoMI The program exceeded our expectations. For example, After returning, a former Taliban VoMI attendee encouraged one of Afghanistan’s most wanted criminals to turn himself in to Coalition Forces without a single bullet being ﬁred. Likewise, calls into our Community Safety Phone Number, a local 911 line we had set up, had spiked; local Afghans were self-organizing, and meeting with the newly returned pilgrims, by the hundreds, to hear their stories. Finally, a month later, we hosted a “Reunion Shura.” The Brigade Commander invited the 35 attendees to each bring ﬁve guests,“friends or family. We expected no more than 185 Afghan guest, but, more than 400 showed up for the event. The reason for the turn-out? They heard about VoMI and believed in the program. It seemed as if they respected what the U.S. and Jordanians were trying to do. They had decided that God willing, they would make the VoMI journey themselves. The Afghan provincial Governors attended, and spoke during the Shura. Senior leaders from the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan National Army, hundreds of local Afghan tribal elders, and religious leaders also attended. All the major media outlets from Kabul covered the event. 26

VoMI FACT SHEET: 35 Afghans from Wardak and Logar provinces attended VoMI; the NGO, Hasemite Charity Organization, funded the program, as an implementing partner. Three-phase operation: FOB Shank to Amman, then engagement phase. International Interagency Team Effort: The White House, Commander of ISAF, 173rd ABCT, US Embassy-Kabul, U.S.-Embassy Amman, His Majesty, King Abdullah II, the Jordanian Ministry of Health, Jordanian Armed Forces, Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foriegn Affairs,U.S. Under Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

VoMI RETURNEE ENGAGEMENT PLAN: Attendees employed in key leader engagements: shuras, reintegration events, official events, ceremonies, tactical radio broadcasts, school madrassa outreach initiatives, and religious observations. Several of the attendees, including an Afghan radio broadcaster passionately addressed the assembled audience. The Audience members showed emotion and spoke openly. VoMI had changed their lives forever. The veil was lifted. They said the Taliban had lied. The U.S. does respect Islam and the Afghan people. VoMI had proved it. “May there always be a program like VoMI. May its blessings reach other Afghans like it has reached us”, one participant said. “God will bless Coalition Forces a thousand times for a thousand lifetimes for what they’ve done here, and what they’ve done for us”.

As the 1-4 continues to serve as Europe’s professional Opposing Force (OPFOR), Soldiers training at the HTA receive advanced tactics, techniques and procedures for counteringIEDs. It’s those lessons learned during the past five years, and in theater that make JMRC the premier center for training U.S. Army units in Europe, and those of allied and partner nations bound for Afghanistan, leaders say. Last year, the unit provided first-hand knowledge and battlefield expertise to more than 4,000 U.S. and foreign troops.

“More than any other conventional unit, 1-4 Infantry knows the intricacies of the counter-insurgency fight in Afghanistan, and it is specially situated to provide this knowledge for other units.” “I think we did well against the Taliban because we always thought ‘how could we kill ourselves?’” says Staff Sgt. James T. Wade, platoon sergeant. “The 1-4 forces BLUFOR [training units] to make hard decisions in training, and to accept the less attractive parts of their jobs.” Downrange units take casualties, receive spectacular attacks, and wage information operations and Humanitarian Aid campaigns against a determined OPFOR, he said. Wade, Hildebrand and Meegan bring their personal experiences to the training. It’s not uncommon for units to experience scenarios including Taliban ambush, tactics, techniques, and procedures for IED emplacement, and Taliban manipulations of the civilian population to ensure realism in every training rotation. When a unit leaves HTA, and on their longest day the enemy’s mortars are in close-range, the lessons taught by the 1-4 become important and life-saving. January 2011, marked the 1-4’s official completion of the five-year mission in Afghanistan. Today, the unit is back to being U.S. Army Europe’s full-time OPFOR. The unit has paid its dues and is well-equipped to train the thousands that come through the training center each year, says Hilderbrand. “Beating the OPFOR at Hohenfels is tough, and clear victory is elusive. The lessons-learned in the box come cheap compared to the price the Taliban will extract if the skills aren’t taught prior to deployment,” said Hilderbrand. “A Mission Rehearsal Exercise at Hohenfels is invaluable for helping units see themselves in the fight they are about to enter.”

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lessons from 1-4 Infantry

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For more information on the OPFOR Academy contact JMRC at DSN (314) 520-5339 or Commercial 09472-83-5339.

O P F O R ACADEMY How does the OPFOR sustain its proficiency? At Hohenfels Training Area the OPFOR Academy trainsthe-trainers to train the forces, maintain warrior competencies, and disseminate combat lessons-learned to make the training experience as realistic as possible for training units. “The OPFOR Soldiers receive training that replicates the contemporary operating environment. OPFOR Academy educates both 1-4 Infantry and augmented Soldiers. The trainers receive guidance on safety, rules of conduct in the training area, and also cultural classes, said Staff Sgt. Muhammadun Abdallah, OPFOR Academy instructor. “When we are replicating the Afghan insurgency, we not only teach their tactics, techniques and procedures. We also teach a little bit of Afghan history and culture, with an emphasis on Pashtunwali, which is the code of the Pashtun people, so Soldiers know how to react to any engagement dealing with Afghan civilians. Abdallah said, it is important to properly interact with women in the Afghan theater. This would be a good example of a potential non-lethal engagement, because what we as Americans take for granted in our culture, could be extremely offensive in the Afghan culture and could lead to conflict and mistrust from the locals.

What’s new for the OPFOR Academy? “We are starting to train for the full-spectrum operations, which means there will be a major attack, followed by COIN operations with stability and peace operations,” said Abdallah. “This kind of training ensures units regain and maintain their battle-craft, keeping up to speed with counter-insurgency operations. Abdallah is a 1-4 veteran from Company B, that led a squad for two deployments, each six months at Forward Operating Base Lane and Mizan in the Zabul Province of Afghanistan. Abdallah is a native of Chicago, IL., who has lived for 18 years in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He currently is the OPFOR Academy instructor. He shares his knowledge of Middle Eastern and Islamic cultures with students. “The better we replicate it here, the better the units deal with the situations when they deploy, he said.” 27

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INTEGRATED TRAINING AREA MANAGEMENT (ITAM)

Historical imagery Available using ITAM viewer By Christian Marquardt, Joint Multinational Training Command PAO

Grafenwoehr Training Area - 1963 Range 201

Grafenwoehr Training Area - 2010 Range 201

This is a dramatic comparison of Grafenwoehr Training Area’s Range 201, provided by the Training Support Activity Europe’s (TSAE) Geographic Information Systems (GIS) office in Grafenwoehr, Germany. “This is imagery that really shows how the training lands in Grafenwoehr have evolved during the years because of focused planning and management,” said Nate Whelan, ITAM Program Manager. The ITAM Viewer is a DVD-based software collection of geospatial data for all U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) training areas and ranges. It also includes maps of host nation-controlled training areas located throughout Europe and Africa that are used by U.S. forces. GIS maintains geographic imagery and data as part of USAREUR’s Sustainable Range Program (SRP). The data is used to update maps of all Army training lands in Europe, and provides baseline spatial information used by various U.S. and local national stakeholders to determine the most sustainable uses for those lands. For the first time, the SRP’s Integrated Training Land Management (ITAM) program includes historical aerial imagery of Grafenwoehr and other USAREUR training areas on its ITAM Viewer DVD library. The maps are a combination of aerial and satellite photos from 1945 to the present. The ITAM Viewer, free Army-network approved software and data DVDs can be requested by authorized users on the USAREUR SRP website: https://srp.usareur.army.mil or by contacting the ITAM office in Grafenwoehr at DSN 475-ITAM.

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the history of the

12th Combat Aviation Brigade 173rd Infantry Brigade The 12th Combat Aviation Brigade (12th CAB) is currently based in Ansbach, Germany, residing at both Illesheim and Katterbach Army Airfields. In 2007, the 12th Aviation Brigade (Combat) became a separate brigade under V corps, and deployed to Iraq in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Feb. 2005, the 12th CAB deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and to Pakistan in support of International Earthquake Humanitarian Relief Operations. In 2006, aviation assets of the 1st Inf. Div. merged with the 12th Aviation Brigade and the former 11th Aviation Group, and reflagged to form the 12th CAB. The unit has a long and distinguished history, dating back to June 18, 1965, when it was first organized as the 12th Aviation Group at Fort Benning, Ga. The unit first deployed to Vietnam as a command element for non-organic Army aviation units. Assigned to the III Military Region, it was the largest unit of its type to serve in combat. Its colors, emblazoned with 18 campaign streamers, gives lasting testimony of its service in the Vietnam War.

The 173rd Infantry Brigade was first activated at Okinawa, on March 26, 1963, as the 173rd Airborne Brigade and served as the quick reaction force for the Pacific Command. The unit earned the nickname “Tien Bien,” or “Sky Soldiers,” by Nationalist Chinese paratroopers. Deployed to Vietnam in May 1965, the Brigade was the U.S. Army’s first major ground combat unit to serve there. The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) was deactivated on January 14, 1972 at Fort Campbell, Ky. Then on June 12, 2000, on Caserma Ederle in Vicenza, Italy, where it currently serves as U.S. European Command’s only conventional Airborne strategic response force, the brigade was renamed the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173rd ABCT) in 2006. The 173rd ABCT has deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the fall of 2009, the unit began its third deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom X.

Visit the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade on the Web at: www.12cab.army.mil/

Visit the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team on the Web at: www.173airborne.army.mil/

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