UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
VENEZUELAN UNREST: Analysis of the Denial & Deception Campaigns (D&D) and Propaganda Operations. UNCLASSIFIED RELEASE 2017/01/08
Joel Vargas, Director of Operations 2014-05-12 This research was performed for the US, Canada, UK, New Zealand, and Australia only and not to be disseminated to any other foreign government. The contents in this research are the work of Contingent Security Services, Ltd. as part of the Political Services Division. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Correspondence: CONTINGENT SECURITY SERVICES, LTD. 10 Martingale Rd #400 Schaumburg, IL 60173 Office: 1-312-650-9363 E: joel@contingentsecurity.com www.contingentsecurity.com
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD......................................................................... 3 CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF DECEPTION AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IN VENEZUELA ................................................................................................ 4
I. DECEPTION AND DENIAL (D&D) PROGRAMS ...................................................................................... 4 II. INFLUENCING HUMAN BEINGS WHEN CULTURE MATTERS .......................................................... 5 A. THE GENESIS OF THE UNREST IN VENEZUELA .......................................................................................... 6 B. FIRST EVENT—TRIGGERS CONDITIONS OF UNREST .............................................................................. 6 C. SECOND EVENT—INDICATORS AND CONDITIONS FOR ......................................................................... 6 MORE UNREST AND INSTABILITY ......................................................................................................................... 6 D. PROTESTS AND UNREST BEGIN ........................................................................................................................ 7 E. OPERATION LAUNCHING OPTIONS .................................................................................................................. 8 F. CONCLUSION—ADJUST FOR CHANGING CONDITIONS............................................................................ 8 III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 9
CHAPTER 2: THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOLS OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND PROPAGANDA .......... 11
A. WHITE PROPAGANDA .............................................................................................................................. 11 C. GRAY PROPAGANDA ................................................................................................................................. 11 B. BLACK PROPAGANDA .............................................................................................................................. 12 D. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 13
CHAPTER 3: THE VENEZUELAN .................................. 15 COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS .............................................................................................. 15
I. DISTINGUISHING PROTESTERS IN VENEZUELA AS CIVILIANS AND NOT AS TERRORISTS 15 II. DECEPTION AND COUNTERDECEPTION IN COUNTERTERRORISM ......................................... 16 A. DECEPTION AND THE CHANGING ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY............................................ 17 B. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY ............................................................................................................... 17
CHAPTER 4: THE USE OF INFORMATION ................ 19 OPERATIONS (IO) IN VENEZUELA ............................. 19
A. THE VENEZUELAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) .................................................................. 19 B. THE COUNTER-INFORMATION AND COUNTERDECEPTION CAMPAIGNS .............................. 20 C. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................ 20
III. CONCLUSION—ENTIRE PAPER ............................. 21 References ........................................................................ 24
2 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOREWORD The four short chapters in this paper have some common grounds that, putting them in one paper, just made more sense than separating them. The Venezuelan Unrest has come at a place in the Venezuelan history when the people in the country are experiencing some real issues with security, food supplies, energy supplies, and several other economic problems. The convergences of the two separate conditions make this unrest a unique situation, unlike the conditions that were present during the failed Coup d’état of 2002. This time around, however, there is serious discontent from the students in universities and the opposition is much more coordinated. The challenges for the US and the intelligence community (IC) are vast. With the emergence of Narco-Terrorism in Mexico, the problems in Africa, the challenges in Iraq, the turmoil in the Syrian Civil War, the Russian intentions to take over more of Ukraine, the tensions in Afghanistan with the Taliban that is getting stronger, and lastly the problems in the Venezuelan unrest, the US Foreign Policy will be tested to the limit. The “Venezuelan Spring” just like the ones in Egypt and other parts of the world has been received in a very similar way with a use of tremendous government offensive. The Venezuelan government makes several arguments. They state that the protesters are terrorists and not just protesters. Using the label of terrorism allows police forces, intelligence apparatus (with all the foreign support from several pro-Maduro nations), and military forces, to use all means necessary to take things under control. The most recent attacks against civilians, including arrests, and now disappearances of some of the key leaders, of both the students and the political opposition, show that the Venezuelan government intends to continue to escalate its level of aggression against civilians. The latest house searches and arrests that follow charges of weapons and terrorism are consistent with the counterinsurgency strategy, a strategy that has had little objection/resistance by the international community, including the US. On the same note, there is need to “reinforce” and “crowdsource” the US government’s abilities to analyze the Venezuelan unrest, as well as defining the high levels of propaganda campaigns by Maduro’s administration. The US must be more engaged in Counterdeception programs as well as expand its dominion in the social media in Venezuela. Twitter and the other social media platforms offer great ways for the US to see and analyze the situation on the ground. Information Operations (IO) campaigns that include white, gray, and black propaganda are also something that must be monitored inside Venezuela and outside Venezuela, when it is about the Venezuelan unrest. In terms of gray and black propaganda, social media has made the dissemination of false information, deceptive information, much faster to distribute. As the result, the Venezuelan government has been creating tornados of misinformation and propaganda campaigns. Therefore, deception and Counterdeception are today one of the fields that must be exploited to a much higher degree and used effectively in the IO and the D&D operations in Venezuela. It is my intention to provide some basic points on this paper regarding the Venezuelan unrest. It is possible to infer that this paper may offer some opportunities for the US and opportunities that may not be available for too long. 3 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF DECEPTION AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IN VENEZUELA It is nearly impossible to talk about deception and the different applications of such deception. The biggest distinction in the D&D Program is to define the goal for it. For example, if the program is to focus on changing the minds of people as to a present government or a future government, the conditions for the proper program must be developed. Political action for example is something that takes time and takes the right conditions on the ground to exist in order to be effective. The Cuban Invasion of Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on 1961 was one of the biggest lessons that an operation must have strong IO on the ground before attempting to overturn a government. The Cuban Invasion failure is a perfect example but it will not be explored in this section. It is noted in this paper that the intelligence operation and support by the Cuban Intelligence in Venezuela is visible by the actions and working hard to ensure Maduro stays in power. The Cuban Direccion de Inteligencia (DI) is a baby of the KGB and it is considered in Latin America as one of the best in the counterinsurgency field. It is possible to make an argument that the Venezuelan Unrest right now could be “round two” against Cuba only because Cuba is totally vested with Venezuela in this internal conflict.
I. DECEPTION AND DENIAL (D&D) PROGRAMS Michael Bennett explains that deception is part of human nature and that deceit is part of human nature.1 In a perfect world where there was one world order, things would be running under one simple policy and the world would not need to deceive others (and go to war). However, the reality is that there are countries fighting for power and resources, as well as religious convictions, a situation that makes it impossible to reach a global agreement. As the result, it is in the world of politics where the most D&D activity can be found. In Venezuela the amount of propaganda is overwhelming not only for the people but also for the OSINT analysts. A weakness of D&D is that it becomes “Open Source” almost immediately after it is communicated to the people. Once the propaganda is gathered, it has to be analyzed and the analyst must be looking for signals and indicators can be discovered from the information, misinformation, and propaganda campaigns. The final OSINT product can be then used to create tactical and strategic operations. OSINT operations must always be use to complement any hidden intelligence already gathered because D&D is practiced by the Venezuela government with a high degree of precision. The Venezuelan Unrest is one example that came from two events tied up to two crimes. The unrest then followed by protests that quickly found support from other students, people, and the political opposition. The challenge on what programs should be running constantly i.e. during peaceful times or war, and for what purposes. In this case, the number of outlets promoting Maduro’s agenda is vast, composed of both state owned sources and friends of the state. The protesters and the opposition are left with international news (mainstream for the most part) and alternative news outlets such as blogs and social media.
Michael Bennett, “Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security,” Artech House, (February 28, 2007), (accessed March 7, 2014). 1
4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY George Tenet, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated, ‘By definition, intelligence deals with the unclear, the unknown, and the deliberately hidden. What enemies of the United States hope to deny, we work to reveal.’2 This quote basically summarizes the most basic fundamental truth in the business of intelligence. In Venezuela today, the open source environment offers tremendous sources for intelligence analysis, while the covert and other sources of intelligence collection (hidden ones) can reveal additional details during this unrest. Keeping in mind that open source in Venezuela has vulnerabilities because of the high levels of propaganda that can challenge the collection and analysis. Just like in any operation such as the Venezuelan Unrest, a tipping point that could cause Maduro’s government to completely collapse is subject to keeping their supporters from crossing the line and move to the opposition. Additionally, the Venezuelan government must be monitoring all the media channels of communication to sanction them the moment they become a threat to Maduro. It is hard to tell what number is needed but protests in Egypt that began with just thousands turn into millions within a few weeks of constant protests. In this paper because it is U//FOUO “a number” is not going to be entertained but there is a definite formula needed composed of leaders, existing opposition government officials, opposition politicians (in Venezuela and outside Venezuela), and people known as the influencers. So far Mauro has been effective in arresting suspected military personnel trying to help the opposition. If the number is crossed and Chavistas move sides for their own benefit, Maduro may be gone within a few months. The IC should begin to pay attention to the killings that are taking place of people who carry a lot of influence in the country and that are Chavistas. This is already beginning to occur. There may be evidence that the same government may be paranoid to the point that they will eliminate anyone trying to switch sides. Cuba and Russia have extensive experience in this form of action. Therefore, in Venezuela the practice of D&D, Information Operations (IO), intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterdeception operations are necessary for the survival of Maduro’s government. Maduro’s fight for survival also means the US should implement information operations and counterdeception operations with a strong concert with the other operations (intelligence and counterintelligence) in order to counter Maduro’s efforts. Deception and counterdeception programs are a form of comprehensive intelligence operation and they are urgently needed in Venezuela. In Venezuela it is necessary to employ the best available resources.
II. INFLUENCING HUMAN BEINGS WHEN CULTURE MATTERS After the planning of a good information operation, Counterdeception operation, D&D program, a sound intelligence and counterintelligence programs should be deployed. Many of the mishaps in US Policy in Latin America, for example, have not been because there was no money put in place for insuring the operation’s success. Many times the US just opted for the quickest way to achieve its goal (mostly a short term goal) and forgot that people’s minds would be resentful and hateful of the US policy. It is important to pause and reflect that the students in the protests are not big fans of US policy. Things are changing but slowly.
2
Ibid, 16.
5 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Coups and US Intervention by using military dictators, as was the case in Guatemala and Nicaragua, are not very democratic according to the “left” in Latin America. Chile also has a lot in their history that tells the application of a US policy that may not be forgotten just yet. The bottom line is that culture in Latin America is of full of distrust of the US policy because their history is full of it and for the most part not very pleasant for the Latin Americans. Therefore, culture matters! Many times influencing people may not be too difficult but it takes time. Influencing the “will” of people takes a sound plan on the ground and requires application of several techniques and programs. In Venezuela, there are a few programs that can be used in influencing people (not all of them will be discussed here). Some real groundwork must be put in place to consolidate the difference among the different student groups and the opposition. A. THE GENESIS OF THE UNREST IN VENEZUELA In order to analyze what happened and how the conditions presented in Venezuela there is a line of events that took place that led the country into the Venezuelan Unrest. The unrest was created when to conditions converged with two separate parties interested in overthrowing Nicolas Maduro: The opposition and the student protesters. Operations then should be launched in order to take advantage of natural conditions in Venezuela and conditions that get fabricated during the different processes (or situations). Triggers and indicators of instability must be monitored constantly. Influencers on the streets and inside the different movements must be followed even in social media to ensure they receive the proper support. Finally, the convergence of the two events In Venezuela created the perfect storm for unrest. Now, the paper visits the two events in more detail. B. FIRST EVENT—TRIGGERS CONDITIONS OF UNREST On Monday, January 6, 2014, an attempted robbery resulted in the death of Miss Venezuela, Monica Spear, and her husband, while their 5-year-old daughter watched. A bullet injured their daughter in her leg.3 This first incident began to gain momentum, while it did not create a coordinated effort by both students and political forces that oppose Maduro just yet. Maduro was not expecting that this one incident was going to ignite unrest and that it could quickly spread in the entire country. This first trigger offers ample opportunities for the Venezuelans to actually move away from the totalitarian Chavista government. This trigger in 2002 would likely have given the necessary support for the coup. The protests that this event ignited were a huge surprise for Maduro’s administration. Maduro tried to capitalize and attempted to bring peace but failed, as additional elements were brought to the protests. The protests became a collective process where groups of people voicing their own particular problems with Maduro began to march alongside everyone else.
C. SECOND EVENT—INDICATORS AND CONDITIONS FOR MORE UNREST AND INSTABILITY
“Monica Spear Dead: Former Miss Venezuela Killed In Attempted Robbery,” Huffington Post, January 7, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/07/monica-spears-dead_n_4554456.html (accessed April 25, 2014). 3
6 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The second event that ignited the massive protests in Venezuela that brought the country into a complete stop was the attempted rape of the student Gabriela Arellano, in San Cristobal. She has been an activist in the opposition to Maduro. After this incident, students of the Universidad of the Andes in San Cristobal began to protest on February 12, 2014, in order to condemn the amount of violence in Venezuela.4 The protests coincided with the Batalla de la Victoria, an event that took place during the Venezuelan War of Independence. The conditions of Venezuela with the high inflation and lack of food and other needs are similar to what happened back then so the students rallied around that event. The support they began to receive from the other schools was unprecedented. D. PROTESTS AND UNREST BEGIN The protests began in San Cristobal on February 12, 2014, by student demanding the current government to do something to the stop the high levels of crime and violence. Later a few more complaints began to be brought into the protests, such as the economy and corruption, even the college tuitions. This unrest also appeared to have an Arab Spring flavor as clashes with security forces resulted in deaths and massive arrests of these students and political opposition. Regardless of the government crackdown, the protests continued and intensified. Maduro then began to use the label of “terrorists” when referring to protesters. This gave Maduro the support necessary from his own base of Chavistas who also came out to protest and clashes began to take place between these pro-Maduro and these against Maduro. Maduro recognized that the use of the police to fight back the protests would not be sufficient and a counterinsurgency operation needed to be launched. Later in this paper, the subject of terrorism is addressed, as it is used by Maduro’s administration. Maduro claimed the “right and the fascists” in Venezuela had launched an economic war back in November 2013, and he continued to voice that same idea during the protests in February, March, and April.5 The political opposition united with the protesters, while the only thing they had in common was the fact that both groups wanted Maduro’s administration out of office. During several press conferences the newly formed leadership of the student protesters began to declare that the political leadership of the opposition were not their candidates for change. The attempts by the opposition political forces had failed to get support from the student protesters, but it was just too early. After the deadly protests, on February 18, 2014, Leopoldo Lopez, opposition leader was arrested on various charges of arson, terrorism and homicide. 6 This is a classic Russian and Cuban tactic to take out of circulation (not necessarily kill) the potential leaders who could escalate the protests and cause the government to be overthrown.
“Student protest over campus rape attempt lit fuse behind Venezuelan unrest,” Fox News, February 21, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/02/21/student-protest-over-campus-rape-attempt-lit-fuse-behind-venezuelan-unrest/ (accessed April 25, 2014). 5 Patricia Rey Mallen, “Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro Fights “Economic War” By Occupying Electronics Stores, Censoring Websites,” International Business Times, November 11, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/venezuelas-nicolas-maduro-fights-economic-war-occupyingelectronics-stores-censoring-websites (accessed April 25, 2014). 6 Virginia Lopez and Jonathan Watts, “Venezuela violence continues after arrest of Leopoldo Lopez,” The Guardian, February 19, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuela-opposition-leader-leopoldo-lopez-arrested-after-deadly-protests/ (accessed April 26, 2014). 4
7 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY E. OPERATION LAUNCHING OPTIONS One of the biggest weapons that can be used to enter into close circles where someone can influence a government or a group of potential targets, for whatever purpose, is to use reciprocity in some way. In Venezuela, the conditions presented in two ways (perfect to exploit reciprocity): 1) The protests became “violent” enough to destabilize the Venezuelan government; and, 2) The political opposition began to rally national and international support. How can the US take advantage of these conditions? The answer is simple: The US could take advantage of the converging situations. On May 7-9, 2014, the protests outside the White House and the US Congress, should cause Maduro’s administration great concern, as the pool of Venezuelans that came out were people who live in 19 different states in the US, and no longer just the “Miami” core groups. Marco Rubio (R-FL) has been promoting sanctions, as well as legislation to support the defense of human rights and civil society.7 The sanctions could put Maduro’s administration to the edge of a free fall. Even if the US implemented sanctions that were similarly implemented against Russia to key political figures, the results could propel such a free fall. Cialdini writes, “By virtue of the reciprocity rule, then we are obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the like.”8 If the US is trying to work with the people who could potentially overturn the Venezuelan government, the best application or technique is to offer both help for both groups and cash without any strings attached while remaining involved with them. Many times the return on the investment (ROI) may be realized by granting the operator more access to their inner activities something that in the field of intelligence is equal to solid gold. In a post in social media, one of the student leaders wrote a message that thanking the media coming to some of their meetings for not going there to try to sabotage their objectives. In Venezuela both covert an overt actions should take place to support the students and the opposition. Precautions must be taken as Maduro has deployed intelligence operators to monitor all US personnel. It is possible to expect reciprocity from these that get direct and indirect assistance. One of the main benefits is that operators (who may be working for US interests) will be collecting significant intelligence that would be worth every dollar spent. Then the US could begin parallel operations with the opposition political forces. Give them something and expect something in reciprocity. As a side note, while outside the scope of this paper, the use of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOS) and Human Rights organizations must be used widely to support the operations of the civilians. In Venezuela, they have been working great even with all the surveillance, threats, and pressures by the security forces. F. CONCLUSION—ADJUST FOR CHANGING CONDITIONS During the initial phase where overt and covert action takes place, it is important to be able to adjust to changing conditions. This is where the psychological war part of the operation begins. Intelligence operators begin to launch information and misinformation campaigns to reinforce the goals and processes as well as short-term objectives. It is important to attempt to camouflage the actions as natural occurrences from the students and the opposition. Cialdini explains that the targets must make Marco Rubio, “Rubio, Colleagues Introduce The Venezuela Defense of Human Rights And Civil Society Act,” United States Senate, Marco Rubio, Press Release, March 13, 2014, http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=69abfc81-b499-40a3-97165ffb66e457a0 (accessed May 7, 2014). 8 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice, (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009), 19. 7
8 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY small commitments and small adjustments in their minds that guide them and influence them into the mission’s purpose.9 One of the adjustments has to do with overt action and the other has to do with covert action. D&D will go only as far as the point at which the target discovers the operation. The Cubans have been very effective for several decades discovering covert operations in their country. Venezuela is following their path as of now. Because of the high levels of surveillance and scrutiny from the Venezuelan government, with their Russian and Cuban intelligence support, preparations to replace and replenish operators on the ground must be made as well. The groups that are actively working in Venezuela from the students to the opposition have both a defined hierarchal structure as well as conformed of cells that spread around the country. The groups operating in tactical and strategic support in Miami and in Mexico should not be neglected. On February 17, 2014, the Venezuelan government expelled three US diplomats because they were conspiring with the opposition. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua stated in a press conference that the diplomats were spies financing and training students.10 The following day, the US expelled three Venezuelan diplomats.11 The overt action had to be better tailored or a better information operation had to be employed. In Venezuela in particular is nearly impossible for US officials with official cover to do anything with the students or the opposition with the amount of surveillance in place. On April 22, 2014, the Venezuelan government arrested 9 people with charges of financing and organizing anti-government protests, according to official statements by the head of the department of interior Miguel Rodriguez.12 Always build on conditions that are present and these that come up during the operation. The operators and planners must always anticipate arrests and discovery of operations but extreme caution must be observed to minimize the risks in Venezuela. Many of the people arrested, such as Henrique Capriles, are confined into military prisons and not civilian prisons. Even when the student protesters and the opposition have disagreements in negotiations with the government of Maduro, an operation must keep activities somewhat compartmentalized but also working in perfect coordination.
III. CONCLUSION Different goals require different programs. The short and the long-term consequences of any program must also be considered, as administrations come and go. Foreign Policy for example may have certain goals, for example Cuba, as a target today may mean one thing, and the next government may have a different idea. The analysts, the operation planners, the ground operators and management can hedge for future changes to avoid having to deal with scandals. The Iraq War was one of the cases where the Bush administration left and Obama came in, so things went into a different direction. Therefore, there are a number of applications of information operations, counter-misinformation operations, D&D that can be deployed effectively, while anticipating future changes to US Foreign Policy. Finally, the
Ibid, 69. Catherine E. Shoichet, “Venezuela: Expelled U.S. diplomats have 48 hours to leave,” CNN, February 18, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/world/americas/venezuela-expels-us-officials/ (accessed April 25, 2014). 11 Andrew Cawthrone and Eyanir Chinea, “U.S. expels Venezuelan diplomats in tit-for-tat move over unrest,” Reuters, February 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/25/us-venezuela-protests-idUSBREA1O12B20140225 (accessed April 25, 2014). 12 “Venezuela accuses 9 of financing violent protests,” Fox News Latino, April 22, 2014, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2014/04/22/venezuela-accuses-financing-violent-protests/ (accessed April 26, 2014). 9
10
9 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY situation in Venezuela is changing daily and the number of alternative media outlets is increasing. Blogs and social media must be monitored daily. On May 7, 2014, Ivan Ballesteros, a very well-known radio figure in Caracas, who runs a program known as “Plomo Parejo,” in Radio Caracas was sanctioned from his program because his program was bringing too much heat to Maduro’s administration.13 This influencer was receiving calls from Chavistas who were voicing their anti-Maduro’s complaints, a threat to Maduro’s administration. In order to illustrate the power of social media, Ballesteros has 349,000 followers and 42,000 Tweets. It is clear he became a target of Maduro’s administration not only for his radio program but also for his footprint in social media.
13
Ivan Ballesteros, Tweeter Account, https://twitter.com/plomoparejo (accessed May 10, 2014). 10 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAPTER 2: THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOLS OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND PROPAGANDA In the world of information and misinformation operations, there is a wide scope of tools that can be employed. Governments will accuse each other of doing propaganda and the battles in the media today become other forms of psychological warfare. Each side attempts to influence the masses in one direction, while the other is doing the same thing. Propaganda is an important part of deception key of deception and it is by far one of the best ways to bring the people in a country to take certain actions— not limited to overthrowing a government. Rankin writes, “Rumors and falsehood were best grounded in genuine intelligence.”14 Propaganda must fulfill it purpose but there must be more than just planting rumors and lies out in the targeted audience. With this in mind, it is now important to turn into the different brands of propaganda and how they can be best utilized. Counter misinformation campaigns are a must besides clarifying the different levels of propaganda. A. WHITE PROPAGANDA Rankin explains, “The strategy ‘white’ propaganda is to tell the truth consistently over time. In the long run, if you are frank about reporting your defeats, your listeners are more likely to believe in your victories.”15 Staying within the context of what is going on in Venezuela, one of the biggest white forms of propaganda that has been playing is the economic conditions that the Maduro’s government is since he took office. Venezuela is in the middle of one of the most serious financial and economic crisis in its history. Investors have left the country, companies are trying to get out, rich citizens are also fleeing into other countries like Panama and Colombia, food is rationed and the inflation could hit 70% this fiscal year. It is a reality Maduro would love to hide from the eyes of his own people, but it is impossible to do so. Chavistas are feeling the pressures just like the rest of the Venezuelan people and some are beginning to shift to the other side. Maduro had begun his own white propaganda back on November 2013, when the people began to complain that there were not enough electronics and toys in the stores for Christmas. Maduro began to blame the businesses in Venezuela for the economic conditions that Venezuela was going through right after his election into office. Maduro called it an economic war led by position leaders and supported by Washington.16 As Rankin explained it, the followers of Maduro and Hugo Chavez aka “Chavistas,” of course are buying the story because Maduro continues to present it in all his information channels. In other words, people believe Maduro. Maduro’s white propaganda campaigns are working. C. GRAY PROPAGANDA Gray propaganda is more related to black propaganda than it is to white propaganda. However, the objective is promoting the interests of the originator. As of now, the US is getting significant benefits in the gray propaganda. A lot of mainstream media outlets, in particular, the international ones, are Nicholas Rankin, A Genius for Deception, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 305. Ibid, 302. 16 “UPDATE 2-Venezuela inflation tops 57 pct amid opposition protests,” Reuters, March 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/14/venezuela-economy-idUSL2N0MB14E20140314 (accessed April 26, 2014). 14 15
11 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY showing a more balanced approach to what is going on in Venezuela. There are two of them that come to mind, BBC and CNN for that matter. As stated earlier, CNN is walking a fine line now after the threats by Maduro. Outlets such The Washington Post, tends to show coverage against Maduro’s administration and provide some interesting forms of gray propaganda. Adam Taylor wrote in an article that all the coverage is focusing in Ukraine and little media is involved in covering the Venezuelan unrest and admitted that they had not been covering enough.17 In this case, Taylor is doing two things here: 1) He is criticizing the amount of coverage and blames it on the lack of involvement by the US as one reason; and, 2) Brings the awareness to the US population that perhaps it is time to start talking about the Venezuelan’s unrest. Both are situations that go in favor of the US and ignite controversy. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) will for sure use that to promote more action and more debate about the lack of action against Maduro’s administration. For Senator Rubio, the Venezuelan unrest is personal, due to his Cuban roots. The new ways to promote gray propaganda today is to use social media. Governments today are able to find influencers in social media and monitor their every step. Not only that, it is possible to spread white, gray, and black propaganda with significant effectiveness to the masses without setting one foot in the target country. Cyril Mychalejko writes that fake photos of the Venezuelan unrest are going viral but many of them are from other places such as “Syria, Chile, and Brazil including a US-Based Porn site.”18 Among some of the issues Mychalejko highlights are that there are real dangers of misinformation in social media. In particular Twitter where people can re-tweet a misleading story i.e. propaganda, with little verification and points out that Washington has been training Anti-Chavista Venezuelans how to use social media for propaganda.19 Therefore, the white, gray, and black propaganda are entering a new era with social media. The Arab Spring showed the potential it had and today governments have institutionalized the practice. B. BLACK PROPAGANDA Black propaganda is more likely meet a lot more of short-term objectives. In many ways contains a high degree of rumors and it is deceptive in every way possible. 20 Depending on the operation, the goals and objectives vary. A black propaganda campaign is not something that can be handled without a good foundation and understanding of the ultimate goal and clear objectives. In Venezuela for example, Maduro began to lose control over the sources of information and he began to crackdown on many fronts to ensure his message was stronger than the adversaries (the opposition and the students). There are many international sources of media covering the unrest in Venezuela. Immediately after the first significant protests, Maduro believed that CNN was covering the conflict to provide black propaganda and influence the more unrest and more violence.21 Maduro blamed the international media Adam Taylor, “Amid the coverage of Ukraine, is a crisis in Venezuela being ignored,” The Washington Post, February 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/24/amid-the-coverage-of-ukraine-is-a-crisis-in-venezuela-beingignored/ (accessed April 26, 2014). 18 Cyril Mychalejko, “Manufacturing Contempt for Venezuela: A Profile of the Venezuelan opposition’s systematic misinformation campaign and social media contribution to it” Upside Down World, March 4, 2014, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/4728manufacturing-contempt-for-venezuela (accessed April 26, 2014). 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, 302. 21 Hadas Gold, “Venezuela president threatens to expel CNN,” Politico, February 20, 2014, http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/02/venezuela-president-threatens-to-expel-cnn-183701.html (accessed April 26, 2014). 17
12 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY for promoting the US intentions and promoting unrest. Maduro went as far as saying that the international media was promoting terrorist acts by the protesters. This was a form of propaganda. Maduro was quoted by saying, ‘Enough! I won’t accept war propaganda against Venezuela. If they don’t rectify this, they’re out of the country.”22 CNN was under threat of being kicked out of the country. In this case, it is possible to argue that CNN may or not have been covering the civil unrest on the side of the protesters and the opposition. In this case, many people outside and inside Venezuela saw this move by Maduro as a form of “censure” so he could continue to use the state media outlets to show his own propaganda. When a pro-government armed group fired on protesters and killed two of them, on February 12, 2014, Maduro was quick to blame the opposition from firing weapons during the protests.23 In this case, the use of Maduro intended to hide the fact that the armed men shooting at protesters were members of his own government or people hired or supporting his pro-Maduro government. In other case, the rest of the world became highly suspicious until later, one or more of the shooters were identified as government officials from the SEBIN (state security). In the Alba Ciudad 96.3 FM, a radio station of the Venezuelan government, the government began to spread the message on April 14, 2014. The heading was that of the 41 people that had died, since the protests began on February 12, 2014, only 5 of them were due to police actions and the rest had died behind the barricades for actions by the protesters.24 This is a typical black propaganda campaign. In this black propaganda example, no official source is cited and no government report is named to back up the claims. The names of the people that died were never disclosed in the article, even when the title indicated or hinted that the article had been written for the reader to know the 41 victims. It is clearly black propaganda (or gray) with one focus that is to deny responsibility in the deaths of these 41 people and blame it in the opposition and the student protesters. A simple message but powerful in the eyes of Maduro’s base (Chavistas) that believed Hugo Chavez presented himself in form of a bird right before the presidential election in 2013.25 In order to counter the effects of the massive amounts of propaganda by the Venezuelan government, a strong Counterdeception campaign must follow to counter these kinds of campaigns, especially coming out from Maduro. The response by opposition and the students immediately came out and countered some of the effects of Maduro’s propaganda. Maduro had ignited confrontation from the Chavistas at the beginning of the marches and protests, but the strategy had since shifted to avoid escalation of violence. D. CONCLUSION In this context, white, gray, and black propaganda are all different degrees of information and misinformation tailored to influence. Nicholas Rankin states, “The simplest distinction between ‘white’ Ibid. “Protestas de la oposicion en Venezuela dejan al menos dos muertos,” Animal Politico, February 12, 2014, http://www.animalpolitico.com/2014/02/protestas-de-la-oposicion-en-venezuela-dejan-al-menos-dos-muertos/ (accessed, April 26, 2014). 24 “Conozca los 41 fallecidos por las protestas violentas opositoras en Venezuela: La mayoria son victimas de barricadas,” Alba Ciudad, April 14, 2014, http://albaciudad.org/wp/index.php/2014/04/conozca-los-26-fallecidos-a-un-mes-del-inicio-de-las-protestas-opositoras-lagran-mayoria-son-victimas-de-las-barricadas/ (accessed April 26, 2014). 25 Gustavo Heredia, “Nicolas Maduro Assures Hugo Chavez Appeared To Him As A ‘Little Bird’ To Bless Him (Video),” The Huffington Post, April 3, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/03/nicolas-maduro-hugo-chavez-little-bird_n_3007965.html (accessed May 9, 2014). 22 23
13 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY and ‘black’ propaganda is one of origin, between the labels on the tins, as it were, rather than between the contents.”26 The statement is absolutely essential in the world of intelligence. Today, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has been built around figuring out the different kinds of propaganda as one of the objectives for effective OSINT. If the source is clearly identified, then the information or propaganda is white. White propaganda is meant to be more acceptable forms of propaganda or more widely accepted, while gray and black propaganda are moving the masses and become much more difficult to define. OSINT is the only way to protect the interests of the US, as even the best analysts in the intelligence field can be fooled by propaganda. The Benghazi hearings revealed that the CIA had experienced and struggled to accurately collect and assess public information according to a Senate Intelligence Committee Report about what was going on in Libya27
Ibid, 302. Massimo Calabresi, “A Benghazi Scandal That’s Already Been Revealed: The CIA Believed A Media Mistake,” Time, May 8, 2014, http://time.com/89144/a-benghazi-scandal-thats-already-been-revealed-the-cia-believed-a-media-mistake/ (accessed May 10, 2014). 26 27
14 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAPTER 3: THE VENEZUELAN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS AGAINST CIVILIANS I. DISTINGUISHING PROTESTERS IN VENEZUELA AS CIVILIANS AND NOT AS TERRORISTS Dr. Elena M. Mastors writes: Roadside and subway bombings, cars driven into airports, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings—welcome to the al Qaeda terrorist network. This network has a global reach and commits terrorist acts against individuals and governments throughout the world. This network operates globally and knows no geographical boundaries.28 The activities and definition by Mastors is of a real terrorist organization. In Venezuela, the Venezuelan government was successful in transitioning the definition of the protesters from fascists, to national security threats, and finally to terrorists with no resistance by anyone. Creating propaganda campaign to tie up the protesters in Venezuela as terrorists is hard to achieve but the Venezuelan government may have actually, achieved that objective. This is an important point to make in this chapter because this broad definition allows Maduro to use his intelligence agency, the military and the police to arrest anyone they like because they may be “terrorists.” Some of the people who were arrested during the raid to clear 4 camps have not been accounted for; it appears they have disappeared. Unlike in Iraq with the Shiites trying to take more power over the Sunnis, the Sunnis that are tied up to Al Qaeda, the Venezuelans are not killing and committing terrorist acts that require a counterterrorism approach. Treating the Venezuelan protesters as terrorists puts democracy and the right for people to protest their nonconformity to governmental pronouncements at risk. Mainly because the counterterrorism approaches make the protesters vulnerable to arrest, torture, and death. Also the Al Qaeda network uses all forms of propaganda and their influence is global and in Venezuela the protesters have been extremely transparent. Additionally, the form of terrorism taking place in the Middle East, Asia, or Africa by Al Qaeda has nothing to do with the Venezuelan unrest. The Venezuelans have not taken arms to fight the government as an example. In the Venezuelan experience, the Venezuelan government successfully brought the protests into the terrorism spectrum without little or no resistance. A totally surprising event that has terrible consequences to US interests and the Venezuelans involved in the protests, as they now become targets of a counterterrorism campaign. Counterterrorism campaigns bring elements against the people of Venezuela that are serious, especially when the Venezuelan protesters do not have arms or equipment to repel the attacks. The Venezuelan government has made several attempts to tie up the acts of the protesters and the opposition as acts of terrorism. This provides the government the opportunity to use any force necessary to combat the threat. While this occurs, the US government has done little to counter the propaganda. The opposition and the students are not prepared for what happens when governments apply counterterrorism operations. It is important to highlight the context in which the Venezuelan government intends to tie the War Against Terrorism the US has been involved following the 9/11 attacks
28
Elena M. Mastors, Breaking Al-Qaeda: Physiological and Operational Techniques, (Lexington: Elena Mastors, 2010), v.
15 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY in US soil. Using propaganda to make the Chavistas believe that the government is engaging into a counterterrorism campaign also provides leverage. The significance of this deception, while totally inaccurate and disproportionate, provides the necessary force to be used against the protesters, namely lethal force and other disproportionate force to stop the protests. On April 2, 2014, two individuals with Venezuelan nationality with foreign ties were arrested and charged with terrorism.29 The commissioner of the Policia Nacional Bolivariana (PNB) of Venezuela, Eduardo Contreras, identified the two subjects as Aki Sfeir Richard and Aki Khoury Chamel. 30 This was again a clever operation of deception that triggers a counterterrorism response by the Venezuelan security forces. This action also puts operators working in Nonofficial Cover (NOC) in Venezuelan territory primary targets for arrest, disappearance, torture, and death. Let’s now look closer at the deception program with a counterterrorism operation against the opposition and the student protesters.
II. DECEPTION AND COUNTERDECEPTION IN COUNTERTERRORISM Michael Bennett writes, “Deception is the central tool of secrecy, protection, and evasion; it is the enabler of surprise. It is a tool of both the defender and the attacker.”31 There are no rules on how much deception one can use. There are rules for military operations in how they can engage the enemy in a conventional war. In terms of counterterrorism, asymmetric powers in terrorist acts come into play and the terrorist has the ability to attack hard and soft targets. The attack on April 24, 2014, Dr. Jerry Umanos, a Chicago pediatrician and two others were gunned down by a police officer that was working security for the hospital.32 In Venezuela there have been no such acts from the protesters or the opposition, even when Maduro has insisted that the protesters are using snipers to kill police officers. This claim is propaganda. There is zero evidence that the protesters in Venezuela have engaged in killings or acts of terrorism, even with all the propaganda by Maduro himself. Thus, the actions by the Venezuelan government to classify the protesters as terrorists and actually succeeding, is disturbing to say the least. This deception carries a lot of power not only against US government interests but also against these on the ground protesting for change. Devin D. Jessee writes, “Historically, states have practice D&D against other countries; however, as non-state actors have turned to asymmetric strategies, these groups have cunningly adopted D&D methods as well. The IRA, Italian Mafia, and other such entities have used tactics… Al Qaeda has quickly become one of the most effective nonstate users of denial and deception.”33 Jessee adds that Al Qaeda can use D&D in every area of their operations including deceiving Islam.34 This again is not happening in Venezuela by the students or the political opposition. The opposition and the student protesters have
“Detienen a dos presuntos terroristas en Venezuela,” Telesur TV, April 2, 2014, http://www.telesurtv.net/articulos/2014/04/02/detienen-a-dos-sujetos-con-armamentos-de-guerra-en-venezuela-3202.html (accessed May 9, 2014). 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid, 15. 32 Rosemary Regina Sobol, et al, “Wife of doctor killed in Afghanistan: No ill will toward gunman,” Chicago Tribune, April 24, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-24/news/chi-chicago-doctor-killed-afghanistan-20140424_1_kabul-hospital-afghanistansecurity-guard (accessed April 26, 2014). 33 Devin D. Jessee, “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18: 367-388 (2006): 367. 34 Ibid, 368. 29
16 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY been open in their actions. They are not hiding anything and that is making them vulnerable to attack my Maduro’s administration. Maduro somehow has also deceived the people (the US and the rest of the world) that the protesters are engaging in D&D, just like a terrorist organization. This has provided the Venezuelan government the ability to negotiate favorable coverage from national media and attack the media outlets that fail to align with the government. A. DECEPTION AND THE CHANGING ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY Bennett writes that deception is increasing in the global security and that the advancements in technology are making deception highly complex and sophisticated.35 Bennett also says that since the role of deception and the sophistication is expanding, the role of Counterdeception has now become more necessary than ever.36 In Venezuela, Maduro has been working his propaganda in terms of threats to National Security. This is crucial as the parallels seen in Crimea and in the Ukrainian crisis all show that putting national security as the means to use force can work. Globalization is also producing national security challenges that bring within risks and threats to the national security of the United States and the world. Venezuela is not exempt from this globalization phenomenon. Furthermore, globalization and the rapid evolution of technology have introduced new opportunities of deception that can impact a country, several countries, and the world. 37 With this in mind, the problems in the 21st Century and beyond will challenge governments to adapt to new technologies. However, one thing will not change is the fact that D&D will continue to be practiced just like it has been practiced for thousands of years. It is clear that only the methods and delivery are changing and transforming, while the recipients remain the same i.e. human beings. In Venezuela the national security card has been played well with the government and again it has succeeded. B. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY Besides the race among governments for having better weapons, the other race is for having the best information gathering tools in the world. Technology allows OSINT analysts to look for key people and targets from over 600,000 different blogs, mainstream media and social media outlets within minutes. It is possible to scope the entire social media networks for person, a target, or even put a lens on top of any place anywhere in the world and monitor all the social media. Bennett writes, “The cornerstone of the U.S. Joint Vision 2020 is information superiority—enabling decision superiority.”38 While the US has information superiority, in Venezuela it is clear that Maduro has the upper hand. Another concept that Bennett explains has to do with the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) in terms of combat power.39 In the last ten years, a significant move from the US has been to use a lot of technology and move away from the low technology D&D, IO, Counterdeception operations, political
Ibid, 16. Ibid, 16. 37 Ibid, 16. 38 Ibid, 17. 39 Ibid, 17. 35 36
17 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY action, as well as counterterrorism. In other words, leaving activities that would require human involvement or HUMINT have been slowly removed from Latin America. Venezuela is no exception. The Russians and Al Qaeda for example have actually increased their effectiveness in the low technology operations. The well-coordinated operations in Crimea, Ukraine, and in Venezuela show a very effective and efficient tradecraft. Cuba conducts mostly low technology operations and appears to be working just fine in the 21st Century. The Cubans are doing a great job assisting the Venezuelan government. The latest arrests provide a good window about how Cuba has been able to maintain their totalitarian government for so many decades. In asymmetric threats, low technology operations are highly. The Venezuelan experience shows that the US may have information superiority, but the Venezuelan government has a lot of more control with their low technology operations. The assistance from Cuba and Russia is clearly showing in all their day-to-day operations and propaganda campaigns.
18 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAPTER 4: THE USE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) IN VENEZUELA In the National Intelligence Strategy of 2009, Dennis C. Blair, the Director of National Intelligence at the time, wrote, “The United States faces a complex and rapidly shifting international security landscape. Events at home and abroad move quickly, often in an interconnected fashion, driven by the pace of technological change and international communications. National security priorities adapt as rapidly as these events unfold.”40 The landscape of these threats includes crime, terrorism, and political unrest. Information flows very rapidly and situations shift by the day. One of the areas that the IC can be effective is to launch effective D&D, information operations, and Counterdeception campaigns. One of the most important is the IO not only in the US but also abroad. In Venezuela, the Venezuelan government is maximizing every opportunity and using every available channel to overwhelm the consumer of information (information overload). Information Operations (IO) are operations that are created when there is plenty of information available for analysis and when one has information superiority. Bennett writes, “IO are these actions taken to ‘affect adversaries and influence others’ decision making process, information, and information systems, while protecting one’s own information and information systems… IO capitalizes on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology.”41 The US has the information superiority and must take advantage of it. The Venezuelan crisis is a perfect opportunity for political change to occur before the protesters and the opposition run out of energy or become so fragmented that their protests will have zero influence and effect. A. THE VENEZUELAN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) The IO by the Venezuelan government are examples of past experiences that can be drawn from Russian Cold War tactics against the west and the Cuban historical ability to keep people from raising against the Castro brothers. The Venezuelan government, since Hugo Chavez took office and overturned the failed Coup of 2002, has been building an intelligence apparatus that combine military and civilian forces. It cannot be underestimated because the godfathers of the SEBIN are Russia and Cuba. Currently, Maduro and his administration have been trying to keep his propaganda channels uninterrupted, which include television, radio and newspapers. Maduro’s constant information operations extend to nontraditional outlets such as blogs, leaflets distribution, and social media. Keeping the Chavistas informed is important. Examining the operations Maduro is engaged in is not difficult. Bennett describes the different IO’s as offensive, defensive, and lastly the computer network operations (CNO).42 Earlier, an example from Venezuela was highlighted when state radio published an article indicating that the deaths of the unrest in Venezuela was caused by the people in the protests who are behind barricades and not the government security forces. On the same subject, the Counterdeception operations by the students, the political opposition, the international media, the US, and the same people Maduro is attacking personally, are evident. “The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,” August 2009, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2009_NIS.pdf (accessed April 26, 2014). 41 Ibid, 17. 42 Ibid, 18. 40
19 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY While alternative channels of communication for the opposition and the students exist, such as social media, alternative media, and international media outlets, the Venezuelan government so far has been successful in their information operations. Let’s now examine the counter-information and Counterdeception campaigns in Venezuela. B. THE COUNTER-INFORMATION AND COUNTERDECEPTION CAMPAIGNS On February 24, 2014, an article by Rafael Romo of CNN, titled “Venezuelan president sees conspiracies,” indicated that Maduro had given a press conference and he had made accusations of conspiracies from foreign media, journalists, the rich in Venezuela, and the US was providing support to destabilize Venezuela.43 The news conference in state-run TV lasted over two hours and among some of the points he made is that the US was building a campaign for intervention in Venezuela. 44 So far, Maduro has been talking a lot about the problems with the students and opposition unrest, and little about the problems with crime and economic conditions such as the inflation and low food supplies. In many ways Maduro’s IO is actually working in Venezuela since people need 4 times what they earn in a month to buy food but the media is not talking about. The reality is that the lack of employment, the high inflation in the 70% for 2014 (estimated), and the rationing of food are beginning to affect Maduro’s base, because they need to stand in line of hours to buy milk and other basic foods. Price controls and financial support and assistance from China and Russia are not reflecting any change yet. Maduro’s daily appearances in all the state media have been used to influence the opinion of his base. Maduro likes to place the face of Hugo Chavez in most of his appearances for propaganda to ensure his followers remember Hugo Chavez. This association is actually working for Maduro. Cialdini writes, “In case of obedience to authority, even a brief consideration of human social organization offer justification aplenty… the opposite is anarchy.”45 Maduro can use the fact that people in his country, especially his supporters, must weather the unrest and oppose the anarchist groups trying to destroy the country. Of course, while trying to put the US behind anything that is happening to Venezuela in order to reinforce the cognitive conditioning in the minds of Venezuelans that the US is the enemy. Behind the propaganda hides the depth of Maduro’s fears; that his administration may be overthrown. C. CONCLUSION Bennett writes, “Synchronized sets of deception actions are created across domains, with effects focused on the cognitive decisions of intelligence analysts, military planners, and decision-makers.”46 All the operations must be working together with strategic deception objectives and tactical actions.47 In Venezuela, the information operations appear to follow a framework from the Russian and Cuban governments. While the Cubans have a history in controlling their people and their military forces from unrest, the Cubans have also been instrumental in ground operations.
Rafael Romo, “Venezuelan president sees conspiracies,” CNN, February 24, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/22/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-accusations/ (accessed April 27, 2014). 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid, 180. 46 Ibid, 24. 47 Ibid, 24. 43
20 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The challenge for the US is to extend to respond or support the multitude of problems such as, unrest, crime, and terrorism. The only way to overcome and secure its interests is to adopt more primitive approaches (low technology), while continuing to have information superiority as well as weaponry over the adversaries. At this point, the opposition and the protesters are not declaring that they are getting help from the US or need the help from the US. The failed coup of 2002 is still fresh in their minds. The opposition needs the US but must play a role where winning the side of the student protesters is more important than bringing the US into a more active role in their support.
III. CONCLUSION—ENTIRE PAPER Animals have survived predators by mimicking other species and hiding in the environment (camouflage).48 It appears that humans are not as good as animals in their ability to change and blend in the environment unless they are at war. The US and Venezuela are not at war. Additionally, Bennett states that men do a very poor job in Counterdeception.49 The opposition and the student protesters in Venezuela have not been doing a good job in Counterdeception mainly because their opponent is the state. It will be impossible to be effective in Counterdeception without understanding deception and all its different forms. Bennett states that many of the intelligence disasters since the 1990’s have brought back the interest in strategic deception.50 One of the examples cited is the D&D used by Hussein during the Operation Desert Storm, which made it very difficult to find the SCUD missiles.51 The Crimean crisis that resulted in the separation from Ukraine has shown that Russia can use propaganda effectively and take over territory. In Crimea the crisis began in February 2014 and proRussian forces began to gradually take over the Crimean peninsula. Unlike the protesters in Venezuela the Venezuelans are not carrying armed attacks against the government. Their protests, while some may get out of hand, are peaceful. On March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin announced that the annexation of Crimea was official.52 This was a classic Russian form of deception. The diversion was the Sochi Winter Olympics, while the disinformation campaign was built around the Russians trying to protect its people in Crimea. The same situation is now translating in Venezuela where the government has been very effective in their propaganda, while the US government has not maximized this opportunity for a government change. Bennett indicates that the response from a government that comes into contact with intelligence and IO or a deception campaign is to watch the feedback and that can be represented in three forms: “maintain, stop, or even escalate the deception.”53 Maduro has been effective in escalating his deception, when he encountered no opposition by anyone including the US.
Ibid, 31. Ibid, 31. 50 Ibid, 34. 51 Ibid, 34. 52 Shaun Walker and Ian Traynor, “Putin confirms Crimea annexation as Ukraine solider becomes first casualty,” The Guardian, March 18, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/putin-confirms-annexation-crimea-ukrainian-soldier-casualty (accessed April 26, 2014). 53 Ibid, 55. 48 49
21 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY On April 25, 2014, Putin stopped all high level communications with the US, as the US and the European Union (EU) prepare to continue with more sanctions.54 Kerry stated that Russian state television was using propaganda to “distort what is happening or not happening in Ukraine.” 55 The military buildup and the constant faint attempts to cross in the Ukrainian border are alarming coupled with the constant incursions by the Russian airplanes. The situation in Ukraine is a ticking bomb and so it is in Venezuela. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded to Kerry’s statement by saying that the “U.S. is trying to pervert everything that is going on in Ukraine.”56 Overt and covert operations in Ukraine and in Venezuela analyzed in this paper provide sufficient evidence that D&D works, when tied up with effective IO, Counterdeception campaigns, and a sound intelligence and counterintelligence operation. While it may not be in the best interest of the US and allies, the Russians, the Cubans, and the Venezuelans are demonstrating significant effectiveness in influencing people, even in the most difficult situations. US sanctions against key government figures in Venezuela could collapse Maduro’s government. The unrest is still in its infancy in Venezuela. So far Maduro’s government has sustained only a few blows to its powerbase. The death of the ex-intelligence Chief Eliecer Otaiza recently reveals that Maduro’s inner circle is vulnerable. Otaiza was elected in December as the head of the PSUV party in Libertadores (it is Maduro’s party). There are conflicting stories from the police and from Maduro’s administration regarding this death.57 The arrest of 58 people charged with terrorism in Venezuela on May 2, 2014 is yet another way to use military and intelligence forces to attack the opposition and the students. The interior minister Miguel Rodriguez Torres stated that the alleged terrorists are part of a plan by the US to overthrow Maduro’s government.58 On May 8, 2014, 4 camps were completely cleared by Venezuelan security forces in early hours and resulted in 234 arrests.59 Guns and several explosive artifacts were displayed by the government indicating that the groups were planning more terrorist attacks. 60 Maduro said that he was protecting the community of Chacao from “right-wing assassins.”61 Protesters are getting stressed out, but the US show of support by their own nationals is providing them hope that change may actually come with the assistance of the US government. On a positive note, the legal process of Leopoldo Lopez case, the opposition leader jailed is running into trouble since the government is not able to show evidence that Lopez committed any crimes as charged. In an article by the Washington Post the Editorial Board writes “More pressure must be
Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: Putin Halts All Talks With White House,” The Daily Beast, April 25, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/25/exclusive-putin-halts-all-talks-with-white-house.html (accessed April 26, 2014). 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 “Venezuelan ex-intelligence chief Eliecer Otaiza killed,” BBC, April 29, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/27202809 (accessed May 9, 2014). 58 “Venezuela detiene a 58 extranjeros por “acciones terroristas,” notimerica.com, May 2, 2014, http://www.notimerica.com/venezuela/noticia-venezuela-gobierno-anuncia-detencion-58-extranjeros-acciones-terroristas20140502201450.html (accessed May 9, 2014). 59 Fabiola Sanchez and Ricardo Nunes, “Cop killed in clashes after raids in Venezuela,” KSWO, May 8, 2014, http://www.kswo.com/story/25463315/cop-killed-in-clashes-after-raids-in-venezuela (accessed May 9, 2014). 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 54
22 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY applied to the Maduro government if it is to agree to reform could break Venezuela’s free fall. Imposing a clear price on those officials who direct repression would be useful leverage.”62
Editorial Board, “U.S. sanctions against Venezuela could break the nation’s free fall,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-sanctions-against-venezuela-could-break-the-nations-free-fall/2014/05/07/2a668d90d55a-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html (accessed May 9, 2014). 62
23 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
References Bennett, Michael “Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security.” Artech House, (February 28, 2007), American Military University Library (accessed March 7, 2014). Cialdini, Robert B. Influence: Science and Practice. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., 2009. Jessee, Devin D. “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18: 367-388 (2006): 367. Mastors, Elena M. Breaking Al-Qaeda: Physiological and Operational Techniques. Lexington: Elena Mastors, 2010. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,” August 2009. Washington D.C. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2009_NIS.pdf (accessed April 26, 2014). Rankin, Nicholas. A Genius for Deception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
24 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY