Intelligence for perception dissertation maiss j ritzer by Johan Ritzer

Intelligence for National Perception: Strategic intelligence and its contribution to political perception during crisis. A multidisciplinary study of Swedish intelligence for perception connected to the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 and the fall of Soviet Union 1989-91.

Masters dissertation submitted for Master in Intelligence and Security Studies /MAISS

Johan Ritzer

Department of Politics and History School of Social Sciences 27 September 2013

TIME cover 07-27-1987 painting of Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev;( inset John Poindexter by Dennis Brack). The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973. Also at p.108, in this paper. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf [Accessed 10-8-2013] 3 The Philadelphia Inquirer front page of October 23, 1962, the morning after President John F. Kennedy's televised address to the nation on the Cuban missile crisis. 4 Swedish ministry of foreign affairs[Unclassified,2011], Example of Diplomatic intelligence, Swedish diplomatic reporting, Crypto from Consulate in Riga, On the situation in Lithuania 1991-01-13. (Soviet attacks) , Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/1991-01-13-om-litauen. [Accessed 7-8-2013]This message in column J, in row 24 in the text analysis, ch 7.2. 5 Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Milit채ra Underr채ttelsetj채nsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, Carlssons (2000). 6 Bildt, Carl, Swedish Statement of Government Policy 2012. Swedish ministry of foreign affairs, (2012). 2

Swedish ministry of foreign affairs, [Unclassified,2011], example of Military intelligence, Orientation on Soviet military in the Baltic area, Crypto, MUST, Stockholm, to Swedish Embassy in Moscow, 1990-03-20.frontpage [middle] and first page [below], Available at:http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name028d04. [Accessed 2-6-2013]Translation of this message in column J, in row 24 in the text analysis, ch 7.2. 8 Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) is a University Inter-Disciplinary Research Centre and the research Centre connected to the Intelligence and Security Studies MA (MA/ISS). 9 Picture of two SAAB J35J Draken aircraft, no 39 and 04 from the 10 Air force wing, [The Draken aircraft were active from 1960 to 2000 and produced in 651 units. Andersson, Hans G. Saab Aircraft since 1937. Washington, D.C, Smithsonian Institution Press. (1989). 7

In gratitude to His Majesty King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden and the Foundation of Herman Friedl채nders Military scholarship. Awarded for Intelligence studies in UK. 2011-2013.

Intelligence for National Perception: Strategic intelligence and its contribution to political perception during crisis. Abstract This dissertation aims to describe Swedish national intelligence in its role as contributor to the national perception of external crisis and events. It identifies the main contributions to Swedish political perception of foreign events/crisis as consisting of both diplomatic and military intelligence that together forms strategic intelligence. This study will establish a link between the findings in the research, to Swedish perception at the decision-making level. It also binds these findings directly from their existence in primary sources all the way to political perception by linking them to political perceptional statements of the crisis as well as policy decisions. This national political perception of the world is publicly stated in the yearly Swedish Statement of Government Policy. Military and diplomatic intelligence are closely connected in their role as provider of intelligence for perception to decision makers. However, they represent different professional and scientific disciplines, which are both being included in the Swedish interpretation of what constitutes the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security policy. From this point, security studies would benefit from a multidisciplinary approach.

Chapters: 1. Introduction : Swedish Intelligence……………………………………………....8 1.1 Research problem : Finding Hugin and Munin10…………………………...10 1.2 The value of this research : The use of Multidisciplinary studies………...11 1.3 Research questions : Hitting the two birds with one stone……………………………………………………………………………12 1.4 Limits of the analysis : Where, When, Who, What………………………...14 1.5 Literature overview : Say from whence you owe this strange intelligence?11 ………………………………….15 1.6 Research disposition : Searching for the “Light of our nation”12…………17 1.7 Scientific theory and methodology : What we know and how we learn…18 1.8 Introduction to the case studies : ……………………………………………22 2. Case studies : 2.1 The Cuban missile crisis: Military intelligence for perception……………..25 2.1.1 Research question / Checkpoints……………………………………..35 2.2 The implosion of the Soviet Union: Diplomatic intelligence for perception………………………………………………………………………46

Grímnismál, Hugin and Munin (pronounced “HOO-gin” and “MOO-nin”; Old Norse Huginn, “Thought” and Muninn, “Desire”) are two ravens in Norse mythology who are intelligence gathering spirits of the god Odin. The Eddic poem Grímnismál describes them thus, from the perspective of Odin: Hugin and Munin Fly every day Over all the world; I worry for Hugin That he might not return, But I worry more for Munin. (Grímnismál, verse 20) 11

Shakespeare: Macbeth: Act 1, Scene 3, Page 4 Francis, Bacon, “Have care about your intelligence, which is the light of your state, do not go out or burn dim or obscure” Sir Francis Bacon (1594), See reference to this in the excellent work on Elizabethan era Intelligence by Dr Deijer, Stevan , The Rainbow Scheme British Secret Service And Pax Britannica. Available at: http://www.volta.alessandria.it/episteme/ep2ded.htm [Accessed 12-9-2013] 12

2.2.1 Research question / Checkpoints……………………………………49 2.3 The Yom Kippur War: Comparative study of both military and diplomatic intelligence……………………………………………………………………58 2.4 Summary on Empirics, including the comparative study……………..….67 3. Induction from theoretical decision making models……………………………………………………………………………..71 3.1 Introduction to the models…………………………………………………...71 3.2 The Rational Actor Model (RAM)………………………………………...…72 3.3 The Organizational Behavior Model………………………………………..75 3.4 The Governmental Politics Model…………………………………………..77 4. Final analysis and syntax……………………………………………………...81 5. Conclusions and Epilogue…………………………………………………….87 6. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………...89 7. Appendixes…………………………………………………………………….…98 7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study……………………………..….98 7.1.1. Perception……………………………………………………………98 7.1.2. Intelligence………………………………………………………….100 7.1.3. Security policy………………………………………………………102 7.1.4. Political perception…………………………………………………102 7.1.5. Strategic intelligence………………………………………….…...103 7.2. Text Analysis……………………………………………………………….106

Chapter 1.Introduction Perception: The ability to become aware of something through the senses, the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted, the intuitive understanding and insight.1 This study will describe the two important aspects of a national ability for perception of foreign events, the military and diplomatic intelligence2 as the nations “senses”. Conducting case studies on two events that has become critically important for Swedish security. Both the military and diplomatic intelligence will be studied to extract empiric evidence on what they contributed to Swedish perception.3 The study of intelligence tends to focus on the military structures and performance.4 This dissertation, however, will show the value of combining both sources of intelligence in an multidisciplinary study to understand what constitutes a nations perception of external crisis and events. Contrary to many other nations Sweden did not have a

The historic context, of Swedish intelligence

designated political/diplomatic intelligence service during the Cold War,5 instead the intelligence was mainly provided by the foreign office organization which reported directly to the political level. It is therefore necessary for this study to provide case studies that draws from both sources of intelligence for perception. During the Cold War the Swedish military intelligence were dimensioned, 1

Oxford dictionaries, definition of perception. Available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/perception, [Accessed 12-9-2013] 2 Examples of the recognition of diplomatic intelligence includes: Governmental Public Investigation (SOU) 1976:19,p.13-15; SOU 2002:108,p. 60-62, and within. Indirect includes diplomatic intelligence but not in use as a context of discussing the value or use, and not either intended for providing recommendations on intelligence). 3 See Annex 6.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study. chapter 6.1.1: Perception. 4 SOU 1999:37,(eng) The intelligence – a review, Swe) Underrättelsetjänsten -en översyn,p. 51. See comparison to this evaluation of the military contribution of intelligence to the diplomatic intelligence available, as shown in the text analysis and conclusions of the case study on the Fall of Soviet Union within this study. Limitations shown in, SOU 1999:37.,p.163-164; SOU 1976:19,p.17,27, 29. 5 SOU 1976:19, (eng) The Military Intelligence, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten,p.17.

in regards of organization and resources, to produce military intelligence and monitor foreign military policy with a strong emphasis on the area in proximity to the nation. At this point only a single section within the military intelligence covered international policy/events, which means that its production was not intended to be equal to that of the foreign office.6 The relationship was described as follows:

The foreign office (UD) has resources to be able to provide political warning. The military intelligence organization is instead dimensioned to give military warning on direct or indirect military threats against Sweden.7

Therefore any research question in regard to Swedish intelligence for political perception8 should draw its conclusions from studying both military and diplomatic intelligence, or risk missing vital material of research. In short, this study aims to for the first time fuse both aspects of strategic intelligence9 for national perception.

SOU 1976:19, p.64. (Swe) “Politisk-ekonomiska detaljen. Bearbetar underrättelser om det militärpolitiska läget (militär och ekonomisk krigspotential, försvarsbudgetar), internationell politik och försvarsdebatt”.(eng) ”Politic –economic section. Processing intelligence of the military-political situation (military and economic potential to wage war, defense expenses), international politics and defense debates”. 7 Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, Carlssons (2000),p.214. 8 Appendix 7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study: chapter 7.1.4, Political Perception. 9 Appendix 7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study: chapter 7.1.5, Strategic intelligence.

1.1 Research problem: Finding Hugin and Munin.

The introduction above gives at hand that there exist a lack of sufficient span on Swedish military intelligence research (an area of war studies within the social sciences).10 This study has the ambition to show that combining studies of diplomatic and military intelligence will offer a better understanding of what intelligence has been provided to the Swedish government. This will use multidisciplinary research to create new knowledge of Swedish intelligence for perception. A research problem can be constructed and summarized as follows;

Can Swedish intelligence, both military and diplomatic, be studied to find empiric evidence on how they contributed to the political perception of ongoing events and crisis, using the case studies selected for this dissertation?

As conceptualized by the Swedish national Defense College (SNDC) Försvarshögskolan (FHS), Available at: http://www.fhs.se/en/about-the-sndc/organisation/department-of-military-studies/organisation/war-studiesdivision-kva/ [Accessed 12-9-2013]and King´s College, Department of War Studies within the School (discipline) of Social Science & Public Policy, Available at:

http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/index.aspx 10

1.2 Value of this research: The use of multidisciplinary studies.

Much has been written and several governmental investigations have been directed to shed light on Swedish intelligence, however, they all stopped short of bringing multidisciplinary research into the scope of their study.11 Therefore the main contributions of this dissertation to the study of intelligence are twofold. First is the initiative to attempt to conduct original research on the released (previously classified) material from

Breaking new ground

Swedish foreign office and then using the findings in this study on intelligence.12 Second is the promotion of intelligence studies for multidisciplinary use in the field of political science and social sciences (represented in the Masters in Intelligence and Security Studies MA/ISS)13 done by fusing diplomatic and military intelligence to the political decision-making process connected to foreign policy during crises (represented by the case studies).

On the value of multidisciplinary studies

Main scientific field of this study is war studies, focused to the areas of warning intelligence studies, strategic intelligence studies and intelligence organizations on a national level. To this, the aim is to promote disciplinary connection between political sciences and war sciences, reaching well into both fields and using empiric result originating from both. This is in line with what government reports has suggested should be a priority for Swedish security policy studies. 14

SOU 1999:37.,p.163-164; SOU 1976:19,p.17,27, 29. Swedish foreign ministry publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 19891991 Davidssons tryckeri vĂ¤xjĂś (2011). 13 The MAISS is directly focused to interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary studies belonging to the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies that is a University Interdisciplinary Research Centre. 14 See Annex 6.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study: chapter 6.1.3, Security policy. 12

Benefits from multidisciplinary and multidepartmental research.15 Closer cooperation is required between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [predominant, political science], the Ministry of Defense [predominant, war studies] and other relevant ministries on the focus needed for security policy.16

This study contains the first attempt to research on previously

unexplored

primary sources,17 concerning what the Swedish foreign minister calls ”For our nation, [this was] the most challenging security and foreign policy situation since the Second World War.”18 This connects to the Swedish government ambition to promote further research in these areas.19

1.3 Research questions: Hitting [the] two birds with one stone.

The introduction includes a thesis that it is possible to identify the main contributions of Swedish intelligence for perception and conduct analysis of both origin and content using important and valid case studies. Analysis should make it possible to create fusion of both military and diplomatic intelligence within a study of intelligence for perception. As the research question is connected to the thesis, and aimed to encompass the research problems, it can be summarized as follows;

Swedish governmental investigation, Thinking about the world - Summary of the report from the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Resources (Ds2004:46),p.81. 16 Ibid,p.81. 17 Swedish foreign ministry publication An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991 Davidssons tryckeri växjö (2011),p.3-4. 18 Ibid,.p3-4. Carl Bildt. The current (2013) Swedish foreign minister since 2006 has been the end recipient of the intelligence for perception not only in his current role as foreign minister, but also as opposition leader during the years for the case study (1986-1999), as well as being prime minister of Sweden from 1991-1994. 19 Ds 2004:46 suggestion to –Focus relevant research to this area, promote individuals and that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs/Government Offices should consider participation in a doctoral program.ch 6.2.4,p.94. And promoting the flow between practitioners and academics ch 6.1,p.90, ch 6.1.1, p.91, ch 6.2, p.92, ch 6.3.2, p.95.

How has Swedish intelligence, both military and diplomatic, contributed to the political perception of ongoing events and predictions of the case studies selected for this dissertation?

To be able to answer this main question, it needs to be broken down into segments, each answering their specific part in relation to one another, as this paper is using several case studies, making them uniform in order to be able to validate findings against each other. These, more refined research questions, will act as checkpoints within the research material and lift the raw-data connected to the case study of the diplomatic material to the same level as the case study on the military intelligence20 â&#x20AC;&#x201C;using the same original set of research questions that were

Defined research questions connected to the case studies and to the extraction of empiric findings

used in the governmental official investigation.21

This dissertation will study intelligence in its role as a tool for political perception by looking at both military and diplomatic intelligence, as perceived within representative case studies. Therefore the case studies are intended to be the main catalysts for extracting relevant empiric findings. The goal is to extract, using the

SOU 1999:37,p.164, on the large amount of background material on military intelligence included in SOU 1976:19. (setting a standard for this), The research questions / Checkpoints to each case study where; The crisis and the intelligence collection and monitoring of military activity connected to it; The crisis and the military intelligence judgment of military activity around Sweden; The crisis in a Swedish security perspective; Assessments of the situation and predictive judgment; The military intelligence assessments of the situation ;predications, viewed with hindsight and The Cuban crisis and Swedish military warning intelligence. 21 SOU 1976:19 and the specific research done by Dr Stig Ekman into Swedish military primary sources.

scientific tool of deduction in a sequence as applied by Merton22 and â&#x20AC;&#x201C;more detailed by Bryman.23 The research question for this first part (the case studies) will be;

What input from military or diplomatic intelligence can be validated to have been provided to the political perception during the case studies?

1.4 Limits of the analysis: Who, Where, What, When.

The definition of the research question includes several obvious limits, intended to help framing the research. It identifies the selected area of findings, to be on political/military intelligence for perception, meaning the actual contribution at the time for the case studies. The frame is national (Swedish) and organizationally defined to be military and diplomatic intelligence within a tight scope by using the selected case studies as reference for empiric findings. Limits on the scope are also connected to the Swedish definition of security policy, explained as â&#x20AC;&#x153;foreign policy and defense policyâ&#x20AC;?.24 This research on Swedish intelligence intends to stop at the study of perception,25 not including the decision making process that follows. Predicted to use the link and empiric findings connected to the decision-making level only to validate the findings on what constitutes as intelligence for perception (Thus,

Merton R K. Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press, (1968), p. 25-38 and, p.39. (also shows up in connection to the RAM in Allison Essence of Decision,p.23). 23 Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008), p.370, see also figure 16.1 referring to Foster, J Informal Social Control and Community Crime Prevention, British Journal of Criminology ,p.35,p.563-583. 24 See Annex 7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study: chapter 7.1.3. Security policy for this definition. 25 See Annex 7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study: chapter 7.1.1. Perception.

excluding some other factors i.e. the decision maker themselves that have significant impact on the use of the intelligence).26 Warning intelligence has been and still is the most important task of the military intelligence;27 however, Sweden has not experienced a direct military threat after the Second World War. This means that studies on military intelligence performance in regard of its primary task are limited to studies of crises that have in some part tested this ability.28 This has limited the study to representative case studies of this type of crisis. Extracting empiric findings from case studies that intends to represent two of the most prominent crisis faced by Sweden during the Cold War29

1.5 Literature overview: Say from whence you owe this strange intelligence.

A literature content analysis can only be as good as its documents30 and the sources have been validated in this literature overview regarding them being, one: Authentic, two: Credible, three: Representative, Four: Meaning.31 The literature is divided into primary sources with a direct link to original documents within their material or consisting of the authentic documents. As well as secondary sources of international and national experts, governmental papers and own research papers and essays produced during the MAISS. The secondary sources are 26

Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p.6-7;Fredén, Peter, Lars, Transformations: The liberation of the Baltic States and Swedish Diplomacy 1989-1991 , practical examples within the material on the difficulties of this direct interaction between (diplomatic)intelligence and decisionmakers,p.53-55. 27 SOU 1999:37,p.229 , as Warning being the primary objective,p.225-229 on the military intelligence primary objectives after an outbreak of war. 28 Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War,p.16. 29 Allison on Cuban crisis in Essence of Decision,p.1. (also Ekman in his book), Carl Bild on the fall of Soviet Union in An empire Implodes,p.3-4. 30 Scott, J, A Matter of Record, Cambridge: Polity (1990). From Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods (Original 2001), Liber, Swedish translation (2009),p.203. 31 Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008),p.370, see also figure 16.1 referring to Foster, J Informal Social Control and Community Crime Prevention, British Journal of Criminology ,p.516.

drawn mainly from the literature to which we were introduced to during the MAISS program, intended to ensure validity as credible contribution to the discussion on the findings. The governmental papers32 are created by persons that are experts on their subjects, or state officials with mandate and access to classified material and key persons to conduct their research and production. In turn their findings are subject to public criticism and the included (primary source) material has survived years of public scrutiny.33 In addition the report conducted by Stig Ekman is the only known research34 that has had complete access to top secret primary sources35 of Swedish military intelligence and therefore is acting as an anchor for the case studies. The relationship between intelligence and governmental bills becomes evident with the intelligence substantiating the context (foreign country/events) that helps visualize the political perception.36Also being officially displayed in the Swedish foreign declaration, the yearly presented parliamentary recapitulation of Swedish external actions of the past year, and presented vision of the future.37

Divided into Governmental Public Investigations (Swedish, SOU), Departmental Series (Swedish, Ds), Swedish Statue Book (Swedish, SFS), Governmental Bill (Swedish, Prop), Parliament protocols (Swedish, Riksdagens protokoll) and the Swedish Statement of Government Policy. Also see, Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008). On documents as source of data (for scientific research),p.521-525. 33 On the structure and regulations in regards of SOU (in Swedish), Available at: http://www.sou.gov.se/sb/d/17260 [Accessed 2013-08-16] 34 Besides governmental investigations SOU 1999:37 and SOU, 1994:11 (swe) Om kriget kommit (eng) If there had been war, with partly other focus and validating Ekmans findings., see, n 31. 35 SOU 1976:19,p. 1-33.SOU 1999:37,p.164. 36 Departmental series Ds, 2013:33 (Swe) Vägval I en globalicerad värld (Eng) Choices in a global world, Swedish Statue Book SfS 2007/08:92 (swe) Stärkt krisberedskap – för säkerhets skull (eng) Enforced crisis readiness – better safe than sorry And SOU 1999:37, SOU 1976:19. 37 Governmental Protocols, 1988/89:71 , 1989/90:85, (directly connected to this study) and the Swedish foreign declaration of 2013, providing a direct opportunity to show on Swedish perception of the world. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5298/a/209053 (English version)[Accessed 8-8-2013]

The second case study on the Swedish perception of the fall off Soviet Union 1989-91 originates mainly direct from primary sources including diplomatic cables and reports released from the foreign ministry archive.38

1.6 Research disposition: How to find the Light of our nation.

The research progress by solving the previously presented research questions. The purpose is to show on the fields of sciences involved in the study and also

explaining

the

chosen

way

(methodology)

solve

the

research

problems/questions. After this, a discussion on intelligence and political theory is made to highlight the questions connections within scientific theories. The following chapter contains the case studies analysis as well as the link to the original research, and ends with the extraction of empiric findings, helped by the checkpoint questions included in the case studies. These parts are then fused to the theoretical models of political decision by use of Graham Allisons work. The final chapter contains the final analysis and connects the conclusions by the study to the empiric findings within it. Furthermore a suggestion of future research is included.

Swedish foreign ministry, dossier “Politic: General. Soviet Union” and “Politic: General. Baltic Sea States combined” (HP 1 Er, respectively HP 1 Eö) from the end of 1989 until the fall of the Soviet Union at Christmas time 1991. Some of the documents included, originates from the foreign ministry’s East Europe department (POL 1) . Interesting these diplomatic documents [Text analysis column J, for reference] has a more personal characteristic –Bryman,p.516-517. Swedish foreign ministry publication An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on [Baltic states / MILO] the years 19891991,p.5.

1.7 Scientific theory and methodology: What we know and how we learn.

The case studies are the defined research strategy for this dissertation, intended to act as an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon (intelligence for perception) within its (historical) real-life context. Implementing the use of the scientific tool of deduction to extract the findings to identified perceptional contributions within the case studies. This part is helped by applying the format for sorting and identifying (coding) the findings that were used by Ekman in his research.39 His research was a targeted study of Swedish military intelligence performance and has a direct focus on ability to provide perception. It does this by dividing its findings, framed by questions that get answered by using the conclusions drawn from the investigation. This model of deduction will be copied to the second case study. This will ensure that the raw data on the second case study will be subject to further analysis the same way the first one was, allowing the research to extract its findings from both in a comparative way. The third step in this research process uses induction; connecting the findings on the case studies of intelligence for perception to Graham T. Allisons models on governmental

Intelligence theory and its use within this research.

decision-making. This will allow the empiric findings to be tested against the three (well established) models used to identify and theorizes on political decision-making processes created by Mr. Graham.40 The following discussion and conclusion will then be able to both validate the original empiric results as solid material for hypotheses testing (as in Grahams models), and to let the 39

N.21 on the coding/research questions/checkpoints. Mr Graham Allisons models are extensively used in the major national (Swedish) literature on intelligence theory. See, Agrell, Wilhelm, Essence of Assessment: Methods and Problems of intelligence Analysis, ch, Testing the Rational Actor Model., p72-74. And Ulfving, Lars, The Mirror- Labyrinth: Operative-Strategic Intelligence: something on theory, empery and method, Ch, Theory., p30-33. 40

essence of the findings be used when advancing to the next part. The study will use induction within the dissertation to connect the findings to the theoretical concepts presented in the first part. Conducting an evaluation, analysis and discussion on the findings intended to create a holistic and multidisciplinary foundation that connects all the way from the primary sources to the foundation in its reasoning. Having secured tested these findings, they can be introduced to the next step. The last step will discuss the final results, including final analysis as well as a re-run on the hypothesis, connecting military and diplomatic intelligence to Swedish perception. The connection to theory intends to be the anchorage of the induction used in this research. It also reemerges in the conclusion part and final discussion to validate and put these in context to theory. This chapter analyses how the analytical methodology and research within this dissertation connects to the theory on the subject. The theoretical frame includes both fields of political and social sciences as defined in the previous chapter. The chapter on intelligence theory is also intended to increase the reliability of the study by showing which theories and sources that has contributed to the foundation of the analysis. This is done by pointing out literature and research on the subject and uses these as direct references in the analysis. As a whole the chapter on intelligence theory is a conceptual foundation that provides a logical link between the original research within the case studies, the empiric findings and the answering [including creation] of the research questions. The logical link has connected in several cases to intelligence theory and from this the predominant has been identified as being warning intelligence.

Warning intelligence represents a vast field within intelligence studies

Warning Intelligence

that in turn has both

generated to and interacts with several other theoretical studies. As example the study of warning intelligence has a logic connection to that of surprise.42 . Warning intelligence and it´s function tends to be represented as the focus area of case studies that represent major events in regard to security policy, often resulting in valuable material for research,43 or in the words of Richard Betts, “The emphasis on history is important because there appears to be little learning from experience”.44Therefore any hypothesis on the theory of warning intelligence could gain validity by being played against previously researched case studies. The significance of the case studies can be supportive if seen in that context.45

In the

attempt to point out the multidisciplinary study within warning intelligence the work of Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis46 is an excellent example of when cooperating multidisciplinary research has succeeded in generating, a new level of knowledge47 as well as having direct practical impact on intelligence studies 41

Agrell, Wilheilm,(eng)Warning and Threat to Society, (swe) Förvarning och Samhällshot., p7 Agrell, Wilheilm,(eng)Warning and Threat to Society, (swe) Förvarning och Samhällshot., p6, Also Roberta Wohlstetter,; Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.(Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962), Betts, Richard K, Surprise despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed.(Political Science Quarterly, 95 Winter 1980) 43 Grabo, Cynthia, Anticipating Surprise. Analysis for Strategic Warning (Joint Military Intelligence Collage, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2002).Case studies; Cuban Missile Crisis 7, 11, 23, 29-30, 35, 47, 86, 92, 93, 102-103, 124, 139-140, 143, 156. --- 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 11, 19, 27-28, 29-30, 47, 52, 59-61, 63, 72-73, 75-76, 81-82, 93-94, 101-102, 115-116, 126, 156, 159 --- 1956 Hungary revolt 19, 28, 59, 124 --Korean War 83, 87-88, 89, 99, 113-114, 122, 124 ---Middle East / Israeli Conflicts 89-90, 95, 101, 114-115 --Pearl Harbor 89, 121-122, 123, 132 --- Vietnam War 21-22, 45-46, 71, 87, 93-94, 117-118, 122, 138. 44 Betts, Surprise Attack, (1982)., p. 8-10 -historical context and p. 10-12 -Dimension of This Analysis.p.8. 45 Agrell, (eng) Warning and Threat to Society, (swe) Förvarning och Samhällshot ., p. 11-12, refers to the crown jewels of study in the case of warning [intelligence] and problems of warning [counter surprise], being Pearl Harbor, 9/11 -2001 and Yom Kippur 1973. On which other examples can be compared against and hypotheses tested, as the Tjernobyl incident of 1985 in this book., p 45-56. 46 Heuer, Richards J. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, also in Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective, Paper presented at the Twenty-first Convention of the International Studies Association,(St.Luis, Missouri, March 1980) and a direct practical multidisciplinary study Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence : The CIA Experience. (Boulder, Colorado 1981). (also see tradecraft below) 47 Kam, Ephraim, Surprise Attack: The Victims Perspective. Reference to Heuer, Richards, p. 54-55, 92, 108, 121122, 145-146, 219. Do You Think We Need More Information? (paper prepared for internal dissemination within the U.S. intelligence community, October 1978) 42

and training.48 Within this dissertation, the theory on warning intelligence connects to the research question in regards on how to discuss the concept of perception.

Marrin, Stephen Evaluating CIAs Analytical performance (2013)., ch Improving Analytic Tradecraft., p4. And reference to Heuer, Richards J. A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-

and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf 21

1.8 Introduction to the case studies. And their role in this research.

The case studies are intended to include both the diplomatic and military intelligence contribution to national perception for political decision making. This will be established through a qualitative analysis of the material consisting the case studies, to extract empiric evidence of actual contribution to perception. Actual contribution is validated through connections from the findings to references in literature. This enables the dissertation to extract findings on a more holistic scope than if only looking at military intelligence, and to build a foundation for further discussion and study.

The first case study is the Cuban crisis of 1962,1

Military Intelligence

which is studied in the light of military intelligence contribution and the Swedish intelligence commission of 1974. The crisis is described as the worst

confrontation

between

the

nuclear

superpowers

US/Soviet, during the cold war.2

Diplomatic Intelligence The second case study is the fall of the Soviet Union. The source is a study of genuine Swedish diplomatic intelligence, written at the time of the events. Originally constituting of raw reports /data, it will be subjected to further research and analysis in order to use the same model of deduction as the first military case study, extrapolating the same set of questions in regard to performance.

Agrell, Wilhelm, Essence of Assessment: methods and Problems of Intelligence Analysis., p. 63, referring to , Cuba 1962 as â&#x20AC;&#x153;a classic intelligence problemâ&#x20AC;?, and also connects to Grahams Allisons RAM model (later in this paper)., 72-74. 2 Graham, Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis second edition (1999)., p1. Hilsman Roger, To move a nation. The politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F.Kennedy (1967).,p 159.

In order to put the findings into context a case study of the Yom Kippur war will be made. The Yom Kippur

Comperative study

case study spans its findings in both military and diplomatic intelligence aspects of perception and assessments (by U.S. and Israel). Meaning that it can be used as a comparison to the Swedish experience on the national based case studies of 1962 and 1988-91. The findings will be summarized in a syntax, intended to point out core findings in regard to what empiric evidence of intelligence to perception that has been found in

Analysis & Syntax

both case studies with the comparison acting as a reference when needed. To add to the main thesis and statement of that both diplomatic and military intelligence are needed to answer the research question, direct empiric evidence on their coexistence will be shown.

Chapter 2. Case studies.

2.1 The Cuban missile crisis: Military intelligence for perception.

This case study on military intelligence relies heavily on Dr Stig Ekman’s book, meaning, that it deserves an introduction as of its value to this study, and its general accreditation. The book was initiated by the 1974 Intelligence Investigation (UU74) to thoroughly investigate Swedish military intelligence performance.3 The task to conduct this investigation was put to DR Stig Ekman, a doctor in History, accredited by the Swedish government with full access to primary sources on all levels (an unprecedented authority and scope). The task was “Investigate how the military intelligence had performed prior and during international crisis. In short: The mission was to investigate the military intelligence crisis management”.4 The resulting report was delivered to the commission in 1976 and was classified as top secret; in 2000 the veil of secrecy was lifted on the majority of the material and resulted in a book by Dr Stig Ekman. The content are concentrated around five crises studies (1961 Note crisis between Finland and Soviet Union, 1962 Cuban Crisis, The Greek military coup of 1967, Six day war 1967 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 1968). The report draws on research of both raw data in form of original agent/SIGINT signals, as well as reports and briefings connected to the crisis, building up a comprehensive picture of the intelligence production in order to evaluate the military intelligence performances. The report build a case study framed by the event and study the 3

SOU 1976:19, The Military Intelligence. Stated in the directive for the 1973 Swedish intelligence investigation committee, p.27-28. 4 Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.8.

intelligence performances prior and during crisis, then recapitulate on all the five case studies in comparison to one and the other using conclusions from the studies to answer a set of questions that together forms the conclusive part of the report on Swedish military intelligence performance during five crises. A question that targets direct empiric findings can be stated as follows,

What input from military or diplomatic intelligence can be validated to have been provided to the political perception during the case studies?

Answering this is helped by the similarities in the original research questions connected to the material “It [military intelligence] shall also give material for the governmental powers to decide upon [Swedish] military readiness.5

Prelude to the crisis The Swedish military intelligence had analyzed the

Cuban situation in its overview of 1961, finished late the same year. A report that recapitulated the most important event as being the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, subsequently recognizing that the situation concerning Cuba had drawn the two superpowers into a tug of war.6 Connecting the Cuban situation to the 1961 intelligence overview meant that the military intelligence had identified the situation to be valid for producing intelligence on it, and started following it (normal threat picture analysis with a, intelligence prepared picture of the battle space - IPB,7 started and continuing). In the 1961 overview , the military intelligence “Deemed it possible with 5

SOU 1976:19, The Military Intelligence. Stated in the directive for the 1973 Swedish intelligence investigation commitee.8 and by Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.15. 6 Ibid, p.66. 7 Ulfing, Lars,(swe) Spegellabyrinten (eng) The mirror Labyrinth, ch 3.6, Assessment on separate actors when national interests is not affected, p.24, and 25 (picture), also helpful, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, U.S (2009)

renewed military actions toward Cuba by U.S”.8 This option would be connected to the Castro-regime success to spread the communist revolution within the western hemisphere. In 1962, the Cuban crisis (still just a situation at this point) gets included in the monthly briefings, when the relations between U.S and Cuba deteriorates as Soviet conducts new military shipping to Cuba in July 1962. The military shipments has been monitored and assessed to increase Cuban military power significantly, and go beyond routine soviet military support to allies.9 The reporting also tries to interpret the meaning of the great number of technicians that have arrived to Cuba from Soviet Union, stating that “the normal usage of the military equipment delivered from Moscow does not require the large number of technicians that just have arrived” [To Cuba].” The large number could be connected to a significant expansion of Cuban sea and air defense or the Cuban security service. 10However this reporting gets overtaken by the open information on soviet shipping to Cuba, provided by the U.S on the 24 of August 1962. The Swedish intelligence monthly overview for

First indications

August 1962, that was concluded the 11 September 1962 included the first indications of a crisis. In this report the Cuban situation was reported using the U.S statements on the numbers of soviet technicians [3 500] and equipment in Cuba to make an assessment helped by the previously initiated

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p 66. referring to the Swedish military intelligence 1961 overview, Fst/Und 21/10 1962 H 91 Und. 9 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p 67-68. Referring to the Military intelligence special branch (T-Office) report (Eng) “Soviet Union – Cuba. Personnel and military shipments to Cuba. July-August 1962” 10 Ibid., p.68. Referring to the Military intelligence special branch (T-Office) report (Eng) Soviet Union – Cuba. Personnel and military shipments to Cuba. July-August 1962 (swe) [Den normal användningen av krigsmateriel som levererats från Moskva nödvändiggör inte det stora antal tekniker som nyligen anlänt. För en kraftig utvidgning av Kubas luft- och kustförsvar eller den framtida utvecklingen av dess säkerhetstjänst skulle dock troligen ett stort antal rådgivare och tekniker erfordras]

intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The political implications in regard to the situation was identified as the existence of some voices for a Cuban invasion within the U.S congress, something that Kennedy had rejected in regard to that Cuba lacked any offensive capability. The presidential initiative to get congressional approval to â&#x20AC;&#x201C;if needed- call in 150 000 reservist, was assessed to foremost be aimed to meet republican criticism of the handling of the Cuban situation. The Swedish military intelligence predicted the Cuban situation to be a political battleground for the 1962 congressional elections, due to be held later the same year. The Cuban situation did was not included in the political summary within the monthly overview [That included a large number of nations/regions], this was due to the fact that the situation was not predicted to have global political consequences at this time.11 A month later, in the monthly report concluded at

Awareness

the 10 of October, the Swedish military intelligence judged the Cuban situation as increasingly serious. The increased rhetoric between the superpowers and the internal political pressure in the U.S was discussed. The assessment of the situation included the comment on the Soviet proclamation on the 11 September to assist Cuba in an event of U.S aggression, was made only after that Kennedy had stated that an invasion was not a course of action. This comment became a supportive argument of that the Soviet Union would not risk a world war on behalf of protecting the Castro regime.12 An estimate that the Cuban situation, if a U.S aggression was made, could generate Soviet reprisal actions in other part in the world [example South East Asia] was included in the report. The Cuban situation was

11 12

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.68. Ibid, p.69.

also now identified to become a central theme for the U.S congressional elections. 13 The Cuban situation did was now included in the political summary within the monthly overview with a focus on the invasion question, the soviet military intervention in Cuba was connected to both the political pressure on president Kennedy and his political position in regard of his actions connected to handling the situation. An U.S invasion of Cuba was also identified to get a negative response from Latin American nations, important for the U.S political influence in the region and at the same time a passive response by the U.S to the situation could be interpreted as a sign of weakness of the same states. Latin American resistance against an invasion could however be reduced if Castro started to support “rebellions in neighboring states”.14 The situation was described as a difficult balance act on behalf of future U.S actions. The Swedish military intelligence then defined that the U.S Cuban politic would be dependent on three factors: One. the question if Moscow dared “Seek to exploit the island for own military purposes”, Two. Castro politic against his neighboring states, Three. Opinion in the U.S.15 The monthly report of the 11 of October was the last written military intelligence assessment covering the situation prior to the development of the crisis. For the period leading up to the crisis, during 1961 and 1962, the Swedish military intelligence did not offer a written prediction of U.S probable politics concerning Cuba. Ekman states for this part that, the intelligence had instead pointed out three possible developments explicitly connected to each other as probable to dictate the course of actions in regard of the U.S. In retrospect, one of the general factors, the one that the Soviet Union would seek to exploit Cuba for own military

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.69. Ibid, p.70. 15 Ibid, p.70. Referring to monthly overview number 9 in 1962, Fst/Und 11/10 1962 H 131 Und. 14

purpose, became close do explain what later happened.16In addition to this, the foreign office reporting did not contain any predictions or intelligence indicating a Soviet Union military escalation with

The crisis begins

offensive weapons to Cuba.

According to information given in interviews (conducted by Dr Stig Ekman during the governmental investigation UU1974 of the head of Swedish military intelligence Fst/Und and Fst/section 2), the Cuban Crisis when it begun came as a complete surprise to the military intelligence personnel. The active phase of the crisis, by Swedish perspective, started with president Kennedys speech to the nation (midnight on the 22 of October Swedish time), where he exposed the installations of Soviet Nuclear Missiles on Cuba and his intention to initiate a blockade of further Soviet Military shipments to Cuba. Prior to the president speech, U.S had proved Sweden with notion on Kennedys speech before to it being aired (at midnight of the 22 of October), using both military and diplomatic channels, (thus showing good insight on how Swedish intelligence for perception was being disseminated). At 22.15 on the 22 of October an urgent crypto [Flash] were received at the Swedish HQ from Washington, at the same time military intelligence received information on the crisis from teleprinter installed at the Swedish military intelligence. Also, a telephone call where received at Swedish foreign office from the U.S ambassador in Stockholm at apx 23.00, in which he stated his instructions to deliver the content of President Kennedys speech, prior to its being held. In this initial phase of the crisis development, he [the US ambassador] also passed on the information that the Swedish government would be presented with unmistakable evidence of the Soviet military installations on Cuba. This would be facilitated by presenting this intelligence 16 17

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.70. Ibid, p.71.

for the Swedish Ambassador in Washington (Jerring).18 (Lacking modern ways to transfer these pictures) In this communication between the Swedish foreign office and the U.S ambassador, the later also states that no other way to solve the conflict peacefully (referring to the blockade as military means) was perceived by the U.S and that the U.S response was a â&#x20AC;&#x153;minimum of actionâ&#x20AC;?. Information that Kennedy had been in direct contact with Soviet leader Khrushchev, hoping to reopen peaceful negotiations, was to be regarded as strictly confidential information [not referring to the classification level, that for this information that was top secret]. This information was passed between the foreign office and the military intelligence to help the fusion of the intelligence available for perception.19The U.S naval attachĂŠ in Stockholm also contacted the Swedish Intelligence in order to give his views on the situation.20On the morning of 23 of October the first of the briefs, initiated by the Cuban Crisis, were conducted, including a check on military intelligence regarding the area close to Sweden and changes to the perception of normality [this also included an increase in Swedish intelligence activity]. The above can be said to be the initial intelligence available for

The perception of the ongoing Crisis, 23 to 27 of October

perception of the crisis during the first 24 hours. The information was passed on directly by the chef of military intelligence directly to defense minister Sven Anderson. The defense minister later commented that the Swedish political leadership continuously received intelligence from the military intelligence on the situation as it developed (including photos of the Soviet installations on Cuba).21 The first written intelligence assessment on the crisis still preserved, were completed on the 25 of October and included as an attachment to the Commander in Chiefs 18

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p72-73. Ibid, p.73. 20 Ibid, p.73 referring to Bo Westin [Lt.Gen, Fst/Sekt 2 1961-66] in an interview 1974.9.20. 21 Ibid, p.73 referring to Sven Andesson [Minister of defense 1957-73] in an interview 1974.10.14. 19

(ÖB) operational order. In this, a short recapitalization was made on the event and the resulting military tension in the southern U.S and the Caribbean Sea. The assessment focused on possible future development of the crisis. In this warning intelligence were included as the U.S blockade could lead to acts of violence that in turn could lead to “acts of war” between the two superpowers.22The Cuban crisis were also described to go beyond the local area of Cuba and could become too seriously affect other, even more neighboring areas, in the world. To this assessment an analysis on observation of military activity of the area close to Sweden was made, stating that no indications of an attack on Sweden were perceived. Even so, the intelligence assessment also the following statement “However, one cannot ignore the danger of a surprise attack (coup). The situation can deteriorate fast.”23 To this threat assessment a recommendation were made to increase the Swedish response to counter a surprise attack.24This recommendation initiated a direct Swedish military response to the ongoing crisis as it brought forward initiation date for the already planned Commander in chief directive on military prepares for response in case of surprise attack25 [due to be initiated 1 January 1963 but instead initiated as ÖB order 25/10 on the 25 of October 1962].26 Two days later, on the 27 of October, the Swedish military intelligence release a special orientation of the Cuban Missile Crisis with a detailed recapitulation of the 22

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.75. Ibid. p.75 a direct quotation of the Intelligence brief (swe) ” Dock kan man icke bortse från risk för kuppföretag. Läget kan snabbt försämras”. 24 Ibid., p.75. 25 Ibid., p.75, n.18, and p.78, n.22, referring to original planning finished I August 1962 by Operational Planning within the Swedish HQ; (eng) Rules and regulations for the defense operational readiness in peace – C in C Strategic Surprise attack, defense order(swe) Bestämmelser för krigsmaktens insatsberedskap I fred – ÖB kuppförsvarsorder, Fst/Opl 8/8 1962 H3050-3, Fst/archive. 26 Ibid, p.78, n.23. The Commander in chief directive on military prepares for response in case of surprise attack (swe) ÖB Kuppförsvars order, from August 1962, was not created as a response to the Cuban crisis, but was a result of Swedish HQ operational commands (Fst/OpL) efforts to streamline the military readiness in peacetime. It was mostly a matter of formalizing and especially ratify some emergency steps, which could be triggered with a higher degree of automation than in the past. The order did not trigger or regulate any form of mobilization. 23

events and with detailed intelligence on the Cuban military and Soviet Union installation on Cuba. The intelligence for perception on the crisis was also updated with information from the U.S military command on what had happened at the naval blockade, with Soviet ships beginning to turn around going back to Soviet union, combined with Swedish intelligence on Soviet shipping that had gone out on the 20 and 22 of October was returning to the Baltic sea on 24 and 25 of October with the cargo apparently still on them.27 The assessments of the 27 of October discuss probable courses of actions by U.S and Soviet Union in regard to the critical issue of the soviet offensive [Nuclear] robots on Cuba. On part of the U.S, the assessment was made based on the interpretation of President Kennedy’s speech, that an invasion or a bombing were possible if Soviet Union did not withdraw the missiles. The Soviet intentions remained difficult to assess and it remained a possibility that the Soviets still had not decided on what to do. As before, in the pre-phase of the crisis, the Swedish military intelligence provided several courses of actions connected to some possible events. The events were discussed in an for and against relationship to the possible event from a perspective that explored possible motives of the Soviet Union. A U.S attack on Cuba was assessed as “not pose serious risks” 28 against Soviet Union [In regards of national survival], therefore a firm stance approach “seemed fully plausible”. Against this stance, was the fact that the Castro regime continued hold of Cuba was to the obvious benefit of Moscow.29 The Swedish military intelligence assessments continue using this perspective when it states; on one side it seemed that Moscow were not willing to take “any greater risks” on behalf of Cuba. Supporting this were 27

Ekman, Stig, (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p75. Ibid., p 76, n 19 (eng) Cuban Crisis. Special Orientation (SO) (swe) Cuba-krisen. Specialorientering (SO) nr 13 1962, Fst/Und 27/10 1962 H 143 Und. 29 Ibid, p.63. 28

Khrushchev own statements and the fact that Soviet had not tried to break the blockade.30 On the other side the Swedish military intelligence (Fst/Und) recognized that the greatest risks did lie in “possible clashes” between military units in the area, by accident or if Soviet Union would try to break the blockade. Another crisis development could be Soviet undertaking of reprisal measures, the Berlin situation [referring to Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961] and a possible activation of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) between Finland and Soviet union [referring to the “note crisis” in 1961] was mentioned as examples of this course of action.31The Assessment of the 27 of October ends with a direct copy, word by word of the previous assessment of 25 of

On providing Warning Intelligence

October but with the additional intelligence that in case of a large scale attack against Sweden, one week of forewarning would be provided, connected to the calculated probability that Swedish intelligence collection should be detecting abnormal troop and equipment dispositions (compare this statement to the head of Israeli Intelligence General Zeira, promising the general staff and Israeli Government, that he would always be able to deliver at least forty-eight hours’ notice of a large scale [Arab] attack, prior to the Yom Kippur War).32 The threat analysis of a strategic surprise attack were also put forward as a possibility, just as on the 25 of October, now including a comment that no warning could be provided if Soviet Union would initiate a surprise attack on Sweden. The military intelligence reports of 25 and 27 of October 1962 represent the written intelligence that were provided to Swedish military and political decision30

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.69. Ibid, p.76. 32 Handel L Michael, Perception, Deception and Surprise : The case of the Yom Kippur War, p.14, in turn referenced to M.H. Heikal, The road to Ramadan., p18, as well as in the Agranat report. 31

makers, on the ongoing crisis, and were the military intelligence contribution to the Swedish political perception. A study of them gives at hand that both comes to the conclusion that an escalating and war threatening turn of events existed as a distinct possibility. The Crisis can also be spread to include the geographical region close to Sweden, and in that situation direct military threat against Sweden was deemed as a possibility.33 At the same time the military intelligence pointed out that it had intelligence for an assessment on the possibilities of a military threat against Sweden, and that such threat seemed absent. Observations on the intelligence picture for perception of the region close to Sweden did not indicate any such threats.34 The perception of the ongoing crisis. 23-to 27 of October. During this phase, the intelligence for perception were disseminated into assessments that included, rather than excluded possible turn of events signaling the wide range of possible outcomes and courses of action.

2.1.1 Research question /Checkpints.

The Case study concludes using checkpoint questions to examine the main question on the military intelligence performance; this also brings forward the final analysis on the intelligence for perception. In this dissertation the answers are complimented with a short reference to provide the reader with background information to ease the interpretation. The checkpoints in the research were, 33

SOU 2002:108, Peace and War, ch.3.4 (eng) Threat picture against Sweden in Defense investigations and Defense bills, (Swe) Hotbilden mot Sverige I fรถrsvarsutredningesr och fรถrsvarsbeslut, p.167-191. Ch, 3.5 (Threat picture in the C in C operational planning directive, (swe) Hotbilden I ร B:s opverk, p.195-203. 34 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p77. Interesting for this study, this also refers / includes of intelligence received by the Swedish military intelligence from the Swedish foreign office in Moscow,[p.77, N.20, intelligence indicating that current Soviet readiness levels did not affect military vacation/holidays, UD tgm 26/10 received .Fst/Und 26/10 R25/ 2382 H], and Berlin [p.77, N.21, Intelligence received from U.S military, that no extra ordinary (soviet) military transport had been observed up to the 24 of October, UD tgm 25/10, received Fst/Und 27/10 R25/2385 H].

The crisis and the intelligence collection and monitoring of military activity connected to it.35 [Assessment of available military options for the involved parties, based on the prepared intelligence picture]. The military intelligence had provided the Swedish decision makers with a perception (provided by the Intelligence prepared picture of the battle space. i.e. IPB) of that no military buildup was on the way in central Europe prior to the start of the crisis, on the 22 of October 1962. During the crisis, SIGINT on Warsaw Pact (WP) increased military readiness, had been provided and disseminated. This together with T- office (Clandestine services) reporting, starting from late 1961 on Soviet shipping to Cuba, had been reported as part of the intelligence for perception. During the crisis, the Swedish military intelligence, continually provided updates on both NATO and WP military actions and dispositions.36 The own military collection assets directly availably in the area were limited to the military attachĂŠs (Cuba being too distant from standard collection assets)37 this somewhat limited the means available for collection, but also directly shows that Sweden were provided with sensitive material by U.S, using already established channels. Interviews conducted during the 1976 report, also makes clear the relative ease to get access to military actions regarding NATO38 [given information] in contrast to the hard work to build a intelligence picture on the WP.

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.217. Ibid, p.217 37 Apart from perhaps the military attachĂŠ in Washington, but no reference to this asset shows up in the material for this research. 38 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.215. 36

The crisis and the military intelligence judgment of military activity around Sweden.39 [Intelligence assessments on military activity at the time of crises in comparison to the normal picture]40 During the rapid course of the Cuban crisis, the Swedish military intelligence presented a calming picture of the Soviet (and other nations) order of battle and activity (IPB), giving the assessment that no sign of military aggression against Sweden were detected.41 [Observe that after this statement, a section is censured in the 76 report].42 This short statement represents an important part of the provided intelligence for perception. The daily and continual monitoring of the IPB on the WP-side in Swedish proximity was without doubt the central focus of the Swedish military intelligence during the Cold War era.43This IBP represented the normal picture, built on an extensive collection and analysis, and were used as a litmus test to detect any anomalies in case of a crisis. The modus operandi of Swedish military intelligence have been that when an international crisis has been identified, the operational intelligence [collection/tasking and analysis] intensifies to allow for increased resolution and coverage in Swedish geographical proximity, corresponding to the increased need for output.44 Swedish warning intelligence has depended on the assessment on WP military actions to its ability to detect a military threat against Sweden. With the 39

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.219. On the normal picture (Intelligence prepared Picture of the battle space (IPB) /Join intelligence picture of the order off battle (OOB) that represents the real-time (daily) and historic reference of the perceived proximity in a security aspect, see. Agrell, Wilhelm,(eng) The black Swan and its opponents (swe) Den Svarta Svanen och dess Motstรฅndare, Stockholm, Fรถrsvarshรถgskolan, (2013),p.15,n.21. 41 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p221. 42 insufficient data exist to speculate on content, but[using deduction] generally censorship tends to include material connected to third party countries [Ekman comment on this fact., p10-14] and can perhaps in the Cuban case study be connected to US/NATO contribution to the perception. 43 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p215. 44 Ibid, p.220. 40

exception of the Greek coup, the five crises studied in the 76 report generated reflexes [anomalies of the normal picture] in the Swedish proximity that were detected by Swedish military intelligence. Swedish military intelligence hence had the critical work to assess if the military activity were normal response to the crisis, or [and] were a potential threat against Sweden.45

The crisis in a Swedish security perspective46 Swedish military intelligence did not provide any false warnings in regard to warning intelligence for Swedish security during the crisis. But the Cuban Crisis became assessed as a potential threat to Swedish security, not indicated by any directly existing military threat as explained by the previous checkpoints above, but indirect as real possibility to became a trigger for a [Global/nuclear] war between the two superpowers.47 This scenario of a third world war involved a nuclear exchange between the superpowers that would affect Sweden 48 (as well as any other country in the world, more or less). The Swedish military intelligence also assessed a Soviet Union surprise attack as something that could not be excluded from possible scenarios. This scenario was a worst case scenario, not evident by even circumstantial evidence, but still brought forward as a scenario that also generated some actions in regard of Swedish readiness. Noteworthy are that no direct reference to the nuclear element of a global war is evident in the 76 report in regard to Swedish military intelligence assessments, this can perhaps be because it was a obvious element of war during 45

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.220. Ibid, p.222. 47 Ibid, p.223. 48 Magnus, Haglund, (swe) Sovjetisk operativ krigsplanläggning under det kalla kriget: En jämförande studie av sovjetisk krigsplanläggning avseende central och Västeuropa (eng) Soviet military operational planning during the cold war: a comparative study of Soviet war planning for central and Western Europe, p.173-188. 46

the sixties. During this period of the Cold War, Swedish military planning and readiness stretching from psychologically mindset of both the civil and military population to the main battle plans, were at its absolute peak in regard to facing a direct or indirect nuclear threat. In a case of a direct nuclear attack against Sweden [by WP], prepared intelligence assessments already existed of likely [Swedish] targets. Presenting the worst case scenario of the crisis escalating to a war between U.S /NATO and Soviet Union /WP had also been the case in the intelligence assessment of the six day war in 67, soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 68 and the note crisis between Finland and Soviet union in 61 (as well as the berlin crisis the same year).49

Assessments of the situation and predictive judgment.50 Assessments on the Swedish security policy situation had been related to the monitoring of military activity in Swedish geographical proximity and military intelligence assessment on likely/possible development in the international arena that had been perceived as uncertain and generally security policy problematic. The assessment on the situation from a predictive view point has been made by assessment of military options and capabilities of the involved parties. Monitoring the military capacity and changes to this, only allowed for an assessment as to what possibilities existed or not existed in regards to these capabilities. The assessment did not predict if anything was about to happened or if a situation will develop into a certain direction.51The assessments on capabilities provide intelligence that can be used for further hypothesis testing and scenario predictions. These predictions only

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.226. Ibid, p.223. 51 Ibid, p.224. 50

gives fragmental indication on how a situation can develop, using words of estimated probabilities,52 highlighting the fact that these type of predictions never can be absolute reliable.53 The predictions, built on substantial or concrete evidences, often involves several possible scenarios both depending on [military intelligence assessment on] the consumers need, in regards of depth and focus as well as the span, from most likely, to the worst case scenario. Swedish military intelligence has provided its customers with a complex set of predictive scenarios on the Cuban crisis from middle of October prior to the crisis as well as in its assessments of the 27 of October.54The military intelligence ambition in regard to its consumers need [C in C] during Crisis has been to encompass the whole security political risk spectrum.55The worst case scenarios during crisis, including the Cuban crisis, have been more hypothetical and fictional in regard to the other scenarios (including the one that actually became close to what then happened). The Swedish military intelligence has in this part been overly pessimistic, and delivered assessment to the C in C, where in regards to the worst case scenario, the threat has been intentionally exaggerated.56

The military intelligence assessments of the situation and predications, viewed with hindsight.57 In its monthly report, dated the 12 of September 1962, the Swedish military intelligence had not yet identified the soviet military shipping to Cuba as a reason for conflict between the two superpowers (mentioned in the yearly report of 1961, but not making it to the monthly intelligence update by September 1962). 52

Kent, Sherman, Words of Estimative Probability. CIA, Centre for intelligence studies, (1964) Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p224. 54 Ibid, p.225. 55 Ibid, p.225. 56 Ibid, p.226. 57 Ibid, p.227. 53

During the September intelligence brief, the focus of international conflict were still a da capo on the 1961 berlin crisis. Starting from the monthly intelligence report dated the 11 of October, the Cuban situation had been identified as a conflict between the two superpowers (emerge as having global politic complications). In this report the Cuban situation were still assessed out from a foremost U.S perspective with different developments stipulated as possible pros and cons for a U.S invasion of Cuba.58 One of these possible developments were the possibility that Soviet Union would use Cuba for its own military purposes (which, unknown to U.S and of course Sweden, already were the case as the first missiles with nuclear capability already had arrived from Soviet to Cuba in September). This development (one of several), were close to what afterwards were proved to be the truth. Swedish military intelligence also made the assessment that Soviet would hardly risk world war in response to a U.S invasion of Cuba.59 Before the crisis was over, in its report of 27 of October, Swedish military intelligence provided a complex assessment with several possible scenarios. Only one was linked to circumstantial evidence. That prediction later proved to be the right one. However, there is no indication if this were the preferred scenario by the Swedish military intelligence.60

The Cuban crisis and Swedish military warning intelligence.61 The Swedish military intelligence was of course not dimensioned to monitor what actually happened on Cuba, nor to have any insight into the SovietCuban relations. That Cuba had installed offensive missiles on Cuba came as a 58

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.228. Ibid, p.228. 60 Ibid, p.228. 61 Ibid, p231. 59

surprise for Swedish military intelligence as much as it did for the rest of the world. The Soviet shipment of military hardware had been detected by the clandestine services and with contacts with other nation’s intelligence services as early as late 1961. The political consequences of this had been open for the international debate and became highlighted by Swedish military intelligence in the middle of October. The Swedish military intelligence primary task is to provide warning intelligence of military threats against Sweden.62 This task can be divided into two parts, one “red” that in time detect potential threats against Sweden, and a “green”: that in [periods of] uncertain security policy, and tense situations, continuously provide assessment with high confidence about the opposite situation that no current threat against Sweden existed. The Swedish system for warning intelligence has not issued any false alarms. During the Cuban crisis a hypothetical threat of a Soviet surprise attack were presented as a worst case scenario but were also presented without any evidence to support this scenario in contrast to other scenarios. The Swedish military intelligence has not been able to provide a warning of the crisis in that meaning that it has not been able to predict where specific events would occur in time, or when a phase would make a transition to a crisis. However this relationship does not constitutes a method for determining if the military intelligence has performed good or bad. To succeed with warning intelligence one must have insight into the involved entities decision-making processes and to assume this is to have unrealistic expectations on what military intelligence are capable of.63 Warning intelligence in form of exact predictions has been beyond the capability of the military intelligence for the 76 report studied crises, instead the

62 63

SOU 1999:37., p24-25. Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War., p232.

military intelligence have been capable, at critical phase, provide a correct prediction of what later actually played out. Studying the intelligence for perception, of what would become the Cuban Missile Crisis, gets created by the

Military intelligence for perception

Swedish military intelligence in late 1961. The link to political perception can be secured as the yearly report mailing list to political and military levels, specifically mentions the Soviet Union military buildup on Cuba. The Swedish military intelligence for perception of the situation leading up to the start of the Crisis on the 22/23 of October was provided by monthly reporting from July 1962. The escalation and worsening of the situation was reported up to the crisis. The event directly responsible for the crisis (Soviet Union using Cuba for its own military purposes) was provided as one of three possible triggers for U.S policy towards Cuba. To extract evidence on diplomatic intelligence to the Cuban Crisis case study, one can use an indirect approach to scientific deduction.64 Reconstructing the

Connections to Diplomatic intelligence.

understanding of the Swedish intelligence flow that the U.S showed when alerting Swedish government of their intentions. This is done by looking how U.S understands Swedish perception, evident in their methods of alerting Sweden, prior to Kennedyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s speech. U.S intention were clearly to inform Sweden, on the decision making level of their intention not only to expose the Soviet nuclear missiles but also their decision to put up the naval blockade of Cuba and the ongoing negotiations. In order to facilitate this U.S choose to inform Sweden using two channels. First the diplomatic 64

Conquest, Robert, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968], pp. 711-12. The classic work on this indirect approach to deduction. Also the Ă&#x2013;EB strategic research of the soviet economy made use of this method, studying the difference between official soviet economic figures against export/imports of for example; grain. The anomalies being indications of actual numbers and indicating the health of the communist system.

intelligence flow with the Swedish ambassador in Washington getting access to IMINT evidence of the missiles. Also the Swedish foreign office receiving a telephone call from the U.S ambassador in Stockholm, and his instructions to deliver the content of President Kennedys speech prior to it being aired. Second the military intelligence flow was feed by both the (standard/official procedure?) crypto received in the communications center in the Swedish HQ and the (redundancy / direct link) teleprinter inside the office of the Swedish military intelligence. Ensuring that that both contributors of intelligence for the Swedish national perception were feed with the same information at the same time. One can therefore argue that perhaps U.S had a better understanding of what the consequences of having two separate channels to perception really meant to our perception of this crisis than that Sweden had during this time. Within the initial phase of the case study, the U.S warning intelligence (using both diplomatic and military channels) can be said to be representative of the intelligence cooperation between the two nations, perhaps best stated by U.S president Eisenhower â&#x20AC;&#x153;Sweden, neutral on our sideâ&#x20AC;?.65

Moore, S , Neutral on our side: Us Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration, Cold war History (2010), p.32. Referring to National Security Meeting (NSC), June 1953.

2.2 The implosion of the soviet empire and the independence of the Baltic states: Diplomatic intelligence for perception.

The end of the Cold War were preluded by several indications of opposition against the communist repression of the East European countries, most known are the worker riots in DDR 1953, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Prague spring of 1968 and Polish opposition finally resulting in free elections in 1989,66 later, the same year the Berlin wall fell

Prelude to the crisis

and the Soviet Union began to crumble. No intelligence or Foreign Service could say that they had predicted this to happen in their analysis; neither could anyone tell if Soviet would implode, or explode in 1989. These developments were naturally intensely monitored by Swedish diplomats in Moscow and other capitals. Already a few years before the formal declaration of independence by the Baltic States, Swedish diplomats were active inside the three Baltic republics. They were formally subordinate to the general consulate in St Petersburg (then Leningrad) but in reality worked as active embassy personal stationed in regional offices in Tallinn and Riga with frequently travels to Vilnius.67 From its achieved position in first row, Sweden could now receive diplomatic intelligence on a previous closed area in the proximity to the nation.68 The complete input will be present in the text analysis attached to this dissertation and direct references in regards of concrete empiric evidence will be made in this segment. But the question on what the diplomatic intelligence provided to political 66

Gregory F. Domber, ed , Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 42 Published â&#x20AC;&#x201C; April 5, 2001 ., p1-2. 67 Lars, Peter, FredĂŠn, Transformations: Balticum independence and Swedish diplomacy 1989-1991. Ch 2.Atlantis publ (2004) 68 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991.(2011), p3-4

perception can be best introduced by Mr. Carl Bildt69, foreign minister of Sweden, in his foreword included to the official release of the reports:

The Soviet implosion can in retrospect look as simple and obvious, but this was not at all the case.70 In a grotesquely militarized empire, strong forces struggled against each other, a development that were not easy to predict on a day to day basis, and were the risks were very real and present.71

This being the perception of the crisis at the time and connects to the discussion of hindsight and warning intelligence:

Today the results speak for themselves. But that clear voice was missing twenty years ago. For many, free Baltic States were an unreachable dream, for others just unrealistic.72

And on the relevance of this case study in regards to Swedish security policy studies, For our nation, this was the most challenging security and foreign policy situation since the Second World War. Our whole security policy as regard to our nation immediate proximity were drastically changing73

Carl Bildt The current (2013) Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs publication since 2006 has been the end recipient of the intelligence for perception not only in his current role as foreign minister, but also as opposition leader during the years for the case study (1986-1999), as well as prime minister of Sweden from 1991-1994. His comments on the material for perception, as the end recipient and decision maker, are highly interesting for this dissertation as it represent the ultimate executive authority views on the intelligence at hand, when it happened. Mr. Carl Bildt is also connected to the Swedish Statement of Government Policy during the years of the crisis, as contributed to this parliamentary debate 88-91. 70 This phenomena of present uncertainty , becoming obvious with hindsight reoccurs in regards to description of the fall of the Soviet Union in Lars, Peter, FredĂŠn, Comeback:, Swedish security policy and the first years of the Baltic states independence 1991-1994 ., p419-420. 71 Carl, Bildt, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication An Empire Implodes â&#x20AC;&#x201C;forewords.(2011). p2-3. 72 Ibid., p2-3. 73 Ibid:, p2-3.

This material intends to “Show Swedish foreign administration when it is as best” and also to be “a contribution to the discussion on the necessity of diplomacy and [its] terms”.74

The released material from the UD, represents the best research material on Swedish intelligence for diplomacy that have been found for this dissertation. Not only has it been accredited to represent the most critical period of Swedish foreign policy since the Second World War in regard to national security, but also

to be the best examples on intelligence for foreign policy, and perception.

Released in 2011, the material has not yet been fully research upon, and no produced scientific papers have yet been found to have analyzed, study or even comment the material. In order to make a comparative study between the two case studies, the material for study must therefore be processed up to the same level to allow mitigation of the findings. This dissertation applies the scientific method of deduction and coding to process the raw data of the reports into material for further analysis. This research is attached in

Defined research questions to the text analysis.

full to this dissertation in order to replicate the method and findings, strengthening the validity of this original research.

Bildt, Carl, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes, forewords, p.2-3.

2.2.1 Research question /Checkpoints.

The crisis and the intelligence collection and monitoring of [military] diplomatic/political activity connected to it. 75 A study on the Diplomatic intelligence reports (as released by the Swedish foreign ministry) represents a general increased collection and monitoring effort that are connected to the fall of the Soviet Union. 76 The increased frequency of reporting coincides with the detection of several critical periods within this major event.77 That also indicates an increased effort on the monitoring side, with meetings/access to political and diplomatic contacts and on –site reporting.78 The first released documents describe the political and diplomatic activity with an emphasis on the geographic area of the Baltic republics within the Soviet Union.79This region represents the proximity of Sweden and a natural focus area for Swedish intelligence, both diplomatic and military. The Baltic States are generating increased focus connecting to their strive towards independence, and the monitoring of Soviet political and military response to this.80Swedish diplomatic intelligence collections were done not only by the Embassy in Moscow, but also from the Swedish consulate in Leningrad, complimented by, frequent travels in the Baltic States by Swedish diplomats. During these trips the Swedish diplomats gained access not only to the Baltic republics parliaments and governments, but also established direct personal

Using the same format/coding on the questions as in the first case study. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes – On Increased Swedish diplomatic presence with established offices in the Baltic region. p4-5. 77 Se text analysis and the division of the released reports into segments representing critical periods. These being, 1. The KGB/OMON Soviet attack /coup attempt in Lithuania on 12 Jan 1991 (marked Red in the analysis 2. The Soviet/communist Coup attempt in Moscow 1991-08-19 (marked Green in the analysis) 3. The declarations of independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (marked Blue in the analysis) 78 Fredén Telex/crypto from Riga, Just in reported by telephone from Lithuania by Fredén 1991-01-14 79 Hyperlink to, text analysis of reports 1 to 11, Start 1989-12-05 End 1990-02-10. 80 Ahlander, Report from Swedish Consulate in Leningrad, Situation in Balticum, 1989-12-05. 76

contacts with both the republics leading politicians,81 and the communist (soviet) opposition.82 Swedish diplomats also had direct contact, early, with Russian republic leaders, including Jeltsin, that provided exclusive insights and assessments,83 also Soviet internal meetings on central level were relayed via Swedish diplomatic contacts, from the Baltic representatives to these sessions.84

The crisis and the [military] diplomatic intelligence judgment of [military] political activity around Sweden.85 Intentionally diplomatic, the released diplomatic intelligence is scares with data on nations not directly involved in the crisis. The reason for this is to avoid commenting on, or force a disclosure on these countries activities, this being a gentlemen’s agreement in international relations, which also exist in the military arena.86 That said, some notions of this exists in the reporting that has been released. The Russian president Jeltsin comments on U.S performance during a meeting “he (Jeltsin) had been somewhat surprised over U.S reaction. This probably was linked to lack of situational awareness by U.S on Soviet situation, the lack of understanding that the republics were going to be independent and a U.S euphoria around Gorbachev”87. And U.S –Swedish meetings on Embassy level in Moscow also helps in understanding each other’s assessments on the situation (If the Swedish diplomat sent one report after the meeting, one can assume that the U.S

Ahlander, PM from Leningrad, Situation in Balticum ,1991-01-19. Ahlander, Report from Leningrad , The Referendums and the Russian speaking (minority) in Balticum 199102-07 83 Bernér, PM from Moscow, Meeting with Jeltsin regarding the Baltic States.1991-01-15. 84 Bernér, PM from Moscow, Baltic States and the Central Soviet Government 1991-02-06. 85 Including Intelligence assessments on [military] political activity at the time of crises in comparison to the normal picture as overlay. 86 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.9-14. 87 Bernér, PM from Moscow, Meeting with Jeltsin regarding the Baltic States.1991-01-15 82

ambassador also sent one, a diving in the national archives (U.S)for the mirror can perhaps be done).88 In conclusion, no external [Outside Soviet] military activity has been found to have been reported, and diplomatic notions are scares. This said, there may exist this kind of reporting but may be excluded, the reasons for this being explained earlier in this chapter. Swedish military intelligence has been provided to this picture of military activity in the proximity of Sweden within the constant collection for perception of the picture of normality. Examples of this are shown in the fusion groups reporting on the geographic area of the Baltic – Eastern EuropeRussia.89The topic of the collapsing Soviet Union were on the other hand highlighted in the global political arena during these years, represented in some of the reports regarding UN activity. But manly exist in other reporting’s, and meetings that Sweden received and participated in, during these years. The words of Carl Bild can be seen to reflecting on Swedish perception on the Soviet Union ”And as it became apparent during these dramatic years, there existed a competence, to when in decisive moments contribute to information collection and to make judgments that made Sweden in these questions and this event probably the best informed of all nations. This was a fact in regards to the Baltic States, but it is questionable if it didn’t include Moscow.”90

Bernér, Crypto from Moscow, Sweden – Soviet. 1991-01-28 Olsson, PM from Stockholm, Baltic Situation group (meeting), 1991-02-04, On military activity and repositions. 90 Carl, Bildt, in, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991, forewords, p.3-4. 89

The crisis in a Swedish security perspective. The implosion of the Soviet Union in regard to Swedish security is perhaps best introduced by Carl Bildt:

For our nation, this was the most challenging security and foreign policy situation since the Second World War. Our whole security policy as regard to our nation immediate proximity was drastically changing.91

Just as in the Cuban missile crisis case study, the diplomatic intelligence did not cause any false warnings. The diplomatic reporting gives the reader a sensein retrospect-, of the turmoil, the hinges of moments and the great uncertainty of the future that existed. In this, the end of the cold war, Swedish security was closely connected to the events, happening on the other side of the Baltic Sea. As a neighbor to the second superpower, its potentially lethal death struggle could easily rip through Swedish national security, and monitoring these events became absolute priority to Swedish security policy. The crisis was perceived as the most important event in regard to national security after the Second World War, even surpassing the possible nuclear holocaust of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Assessments of the situation and predictive judgment Most of the diplomatic reports that have been released are unprocessed (but including a distinct personal touch of the author). However some reports continues assessments on the situation made on the ground and referring to how the

Carl, Bildt, in, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991, forewords, p.3-4.

situation is perceived by the author.92 The external diplomatic intelligence provided both direct information to the Baltic Situation group (inside POL 1 section in the foreign ministry that used this to processed fused intelligence on the situation), these reports consisted predominantly of concrete assessments on the events of interest and included predictive judgments.93 Beside this flow, in some cases complete intelligence assessments from the field operator (Diplomatic Consul) reporting direct to the Swedish Foreign minister.94

The [military] diplomatic intelligence assessments of the situation and predictions, viewed with hindsight. “The reporting that during this period poured in to the Swedish foreign office in Stockholm [from Soviet Union] was of course very important. It did not alone dictate the foreign policy that were conducted, but it says it selves that if gave a material of major importance” “It reflects on Swedish foreign administrations when it gives its best contribution to freedom and peace”.95This statement reflects the decision makers appreciation of the intelligence that were available to the governmental decisions on foreign and security policy during these years. Using the text analysis to compare the assessments and predictions with hindsight some empiric support to this should become evident. This will help prove the hypothesis that diplomatic intelligence provided intelligence for perception to security and foreign policy decision that with hindsight proved right.

Ahlander, Telex/Crypto from Tallinn, Situation in Estonia.1991-01-18. Olsson, PM from Stockholm, Baltic Situation group (meeting) 1991-02-04 : Balticum 1991-03-08 : Lithuania 1990-03-12. 94 Ahlander, report (8 pages summary on situation) from Leningrad to Stockholm – Swedish foreign minister, Sten Andesson directly. The Crisis in Balticum and Soviet Union. 1991-01-21. 95 Carl Bildt, in, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991, p.3-4 93

The Soviet implosion and Swedish [military] diplomatic warning intelligence. The intelligence from the diplomatic activity has contributed to Swedish warning intelligence when providing first indications on events(FLASH). The intensified periods of crisis during the implosion of the Soviet Union; the declarations of independence of the Baltic States, the Soviet attack in Vilnius and the Soviet coup attempt in Moscow. These were regarded as representing possible future scenarios by the assessments done prior to them happening. In the later cases, the Vilnius attack and Soviet Moscow coup, these were identified as representing a prelude to a possible worsened turn of events. The first reporting on these events were relative short FLASH messages, directly identifying these as critical for Swedish perception of ongoing events. Following events, the reporting has represented a focus on both providing a background to the event as well as gathered information to provide predictions. During these phases, Swedish diplomatic reporting has included the diplomats own assessments on the situation, drawing on their own expertise and knowledge on the situation. The individual diplomats own contribution to this reporting, both in the collection phase and the assessments of their analysis are significant. The diplomatic reporting can also perhaps benefit of its language, being addressed to other diplomats â&#x20AC;&#x201C; policy makers, written by diplomats and often representing the opposite positions to the once collected in the reporting. Military intelligence available. (multidisciplinary evidence to the case study based on primarily diplomatic primary sources) The text analysis gives several empiric evidence of the existence of military intelligence. These can be said to be mainly of two categories. One is the diplomats reporting on military activity themselves. These reports are generally

connected to drastic diplomatic/political/military activity and often represent a first detection of is occurrence. The format and descriptions of military hardware in the reports also reflects the diplomat’s rudimentary knowledge of these. However, the reports are short, sharp and speedy.96 The other reporting in the material is Swedish military contribution to the Baltic situation group material (fusion production of intelligence) and a Swedish military intelligence military orientation.97 This information contains direct primary sources to the military contribution to perception of the events. Rather sensational as this type of military intelligence otherwise would been declassified first in 2030. Its existence provides this dissertation with direct confirmation that diplomatic and military intelligence contributed to the perception of this crisis. It even links directly to what that military intelligence consisted of. The Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) report that were released within this material exist not only of actual SIGINT analysis on military dispositions,98 but also assessments and own military response.99 Lars Fredén, one of the diplomats that Sweden had in Soviet and the Baltic states during these years has commented on the MUST contribution during these years in his book.100 Connected to this case study and the question of what the Swedish military intelligence contributed to the perception of events are a testimony of the

Ahlander, Military activity in Moscow 1991-0819.Moscow: Ahlander, Situation Vilnius evening 22:15. 199101-13.Riga:Fredén, Just in-reported by telephone from Lithuania by Fredén 1991-03-14.Riga: Bernér Situation in Lithuania 1990-03-27.Moscow. 97 Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) Crypto, military orientation, 1990-0320.Stockholm. 98 Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) Crypto, Baltic situation group (meeting) 1991-0204.Stockholm. 99 Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) Crypto, military orientation, 1990-0320.Stockholm. 100 Lars, Peter, Fredén, Returning’s - Swedish Security Policy and the Baltic Countries during their First Years of Independence 1991-1994, p.414.

head of FRA (Defense Radio Agency, SIGINT organization/ equivalent to NSA/GCHQ) Ingvar Åkesson: In 1991, sixteen persons were killed by soviet military as they occupied the Tv-tower in Vilnius, Lithuania (see text analysis of diplomatic reporting on this event).101 Moscow stated that the action were due a local miss judgment. But they lied. FRA could tell [the Swedish government] that is was part of a deliberate plan.102

This statement including several other examples on other events is an effort to show what SIGINT meant to Swedish national security policy. – To conclusion-The reports reveals very little about the planning for the collection and monitoring, however the references to the “Baltic situation group” within the Swedish foreign office in Stockholm indicates were the information gets fused. The diplomatic reporting also gets send directly through to the foreign minister office and other decision makers, especially when urgent (FLASH). Some of the reporting is information of the diplomatic political activity, which gets passed on, but some are more analytical and contains assessments on the diplomatic options available for the parties, or even suggestions on own (Swedish) actions. Many of the documents contain material that is probably unique (diplomatic access) and valuable. None of the reports contains any predestinated formula in regards of certainty on the sources, but this can be somewhat mitigated by the reader’s proficiency and understanding, as well as hinted in the reporting? The military options gets included in the diplomatic reporting when called for by the nature of the events, the reporting are not as detailed in regards on the specific military hardware, but in some cases includes access to 101

Text Analysis; 1991-01-13-1991-01-21, total of nine diplomatic reports. Ingvar Åkesson, quoted by Ewa Stenberg reporter on Daily news (DN) published 2013-06-27 00:30 DN.Se Available at:: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/fra-vi-visste-att-saddam-saknade-karnvapen/ 102

military commanders and on-site defensive measures. The assessments on the diplomatic/political options of the parties has been constantly updated and provided to the Swedish government to represent the diplomatic â&#x20AC;&#x153;sensesâ&#x20AC;? collection to the Swedish perception of the crisis.

2.3 Yom Kippur: A comparative study of both military and diplomatic intelligence.

The previous two case studies represent the main focus of the original research in this paper. As they obeys the limits of this dissertation, the national scope and geographical focus, an comparative internationally orientated case study can help act as a way to validate the findings and research questions, hypothesis testing. This comparative study will use the well-researched Yom Kippur war, identified as a good example on when both military and diplomatic intelligence are needed to study intelligence connected to a crisis. The Yom Kippur war represents an good source to this research as it encompass material on both aspects. This being both the Israeli Agranat commission that conducted investigation into the military intelligence failure, but also the resent (2003) release of diplomatic material from the U.S National Security Archives. Connected to the Yom Kippur war are also the work of some of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leading experts in the field of intelligence studies, as Kam, Handel, Betts, Grabo and Agrell to mention a few.103 This enables a possibility of solid fusion between findings and applied theory on the subject of intelligence for perception, both military and diplomatic. The use of the Yom Kippur war within this dissertation has benefitted from earlier research papers on strategic surprise (PP5578 class) and a specific study on Yom Kippur war (in PP5577 class), drawing experience from this learningâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s into this paper.

103

See references to Yom Kippur in, Betts, Surprise Attack, pp. 68- 80, 100-101, 104, 107, 125, 127, 130, 140141, 143, 262-263, 287-288. Enemies of Intelligence (in this, footnoted as Middle East War of 1973), pp. 29, 34, 35-36, 68. Kam, Surprise Attack, pp.14-15, 18-19, 21-22, 30, 32-35, 41, 44, 46-49, 52-53, 59, 61, 105, 119, 160, 172-173, 181. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise., p.89-90, 95, 101, 114-115. Agrell,(eng) The Art of Guessing Right., pp.140, 173, 181, 182. (eng) Warning and Threat to Society, pp. 81, 98, 108-109, 119-120, 201, 261. Handel, Michael, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem papers on Peace Problems, 1976).

It is possible to directly connect the previous focus on military and diplomatic intelligence within the Yom Kippur case study by applying the same method of deduction that Michael Handel (1989) did in his own specific case study on Yom Kippur, with the format of technological, strategic/military and diplomatic surprise.104Connected to these areas of surprise lies the specific areas of intelligence with the ability/inability of warning/perception intelligence that is the focus of this dissertation. Leaving aside the technological surprise for this study, as it is more closely connected to actual military engagement and hardware, none of which plays any major role in the two Swedish case studies. The military intelligence during Yom Kippur war, being well researched and studied has generated knowledge

Military intelligence studies Of the Yom kippur war

not only on the performance and ability to provide warning intelligence,105 but also has given the field of intelligence research a valuable case study for including research on the aspects of psychology and cognitive factors in intelligence studies.106 Pointing on the military intelligence ability to collect on, interpret and provide perception for political level decision, the Yom Kippur war provides several findings, in the Agranat report,107and to several experts as shown above.108 For this dissertation, the similarities between the Agranat commission and the Intelligence expertâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s case study, to Stig Ekmans Swedish investigation exist in the way that they use a study of the military intelligence available prior to and during the conflict to evaluate the military intelligence performance. This point out the significance of the military intelligence, as one component for political perception. 104

Handel I. Michael, War Strategy and Intelligence (Frank Cass, 1989), pp.34, 131-186, 282-309. Handel L. Michael, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of Yom Kippur Warâ&#x20AC;? (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1976)., 106 Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.,ch 6, p.65-84. 107 Link to Agranat 108 N. 254 105

The second component is the diplomatic intelligence. This component has by itself provided the

Diplomatic intelligence studies of the Yom Kippur war.

necessary of being added to gain a holistic understanding, also recognized by Handels early division on the subject. With the declassification and publication of diplomatic cables, reports, meeting notes, the U.S National Security Archive, in 2003 under the Executive order 12958, provided the world with new facts and evidence. Helpful to support the general hypothesis (and showing that not all swans are white), findings in this case study will expose the falsifiability of creating history and research based on secondary sources.109 This shows that including diplomatic intelligence in a multidiscipline research proves the only empery (the black Swan), that can prove the falsifiability of non-multidiscipline studies to security policy studies. Not only does this shed new light and complements to the understanding of Israeli perception prior and during the war, but also expose the diplomatic gamble that preceded the war. In a significant way, this rewrites the understanding of the military intelligence and the background of political and military decisions The Arab possibility to successfully conduct a surprise attack on Israel can be found in the erroneous assumptions on Israeli political and diplomatic levels.110The diplomatic actions of Kissinger together with Israeli agreement not to conduct a preemptive strike, also exposed Israel´s failure to meet the danger adequately.111The Israeli military intelligence assessments got transferred to the U.S, building both nations perceptions of the ongoing crisis. This becomes evident to U.S when analysis their intelligence performance directly after the war, Mr Ray Cline 109

Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books, (1959). Also referenced in, Agrell, Wilhelm,(eng) The black Swan and its opposition (swe) Den Svarta Svanen och dess Motståndare, Stockholm, Försvarshögskolan, (2013),p.70. 110 Laqueur, Walter “World of Secrets: The uses and limits of Intelligence” (London, W&W, 1985), p..257-258. 111 Ibid, p.255-262.

(then a member of the Secretary of State staff) said in a staff meeting on the 26 of October. “I would like to make one observation about the intelligence. Our difficulty was partly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves.”112 This, military/political assessment in combination with the diplomatic / political decisions by the Israelis and U.S, together gives a new depth of insight into the case study.

When studying the released cables between Golda Meir and

Kissinger the hours preceding the outbreak of war, the U.S diplomatic failure to help preventing war can be studied upon. This is a study into the diplomatic intelligence traffic between U.S and Israel.113 A study of the diplomatic traffic starts with the message from the Israeli Prime minister Golda Meir to Kissinger

Diplomatic activity as a prelude to war.

on the 5 of October (U.S. time). Stating that “The intention [of the Arabs] to initiate an offensive military action against Israel”.114 Within it is also the request to the U.S. to act as a mediator and “Inform the Arabs and the Soviets of [the Israeli] attitude [to defend themselves]”.115 The hope was that U.S. could use its diplomatic power to stop the outbreak of war. This lead to intensified U.S. diplomatic actions, which is summarized in the top secret report from Kissinger to the U.S. president Nixon in the hours presiding the war. 116 In this report Kissinger informs the president that, when receiving the assessment by the Israelis of the possible Arab attack, he immediately contacted the soviets and 112

The National Security Archive Document 63: Transcript, "Secretary's Staff Meeting," 23 October 1973, 4:35 P.M. Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977. Box 1. Also, p.108 in this paper. 113 This part draws heavily on previous research done in PP5577, changes in focus has been made to show on diplomatic intelligence for this dissertation. 114 The National Security Archive Document 7: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Brent Scowcroft to Kissinger, 5 October 1973, enclosing message from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (passed through Israeli chargé Shalev) 115 Ibid, p.1. 116 The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973. Also, p109 in this paper.

asked them to contact the Arab, urging them not to attack.117 Kissinger then calls the Israeli representative at the United Nations, Shalev, saying â&#x20AC;&#x153;there must be no preemptive strike.â&#x20AC;?118 The Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir obeys this wish, also knowing that this was a ultimatum to receive U.S military aid in the case of war, and confirms with a message to Kissinger that Israel will not lunch any pre-emptive strike.119 This promise to not conduct any pre-emptive strike is one of the most hotly debated issues of the war. At the time of the October war, just hours before the expected Arab attack, the Israeli military commander got his request to conduct pre-emptive strikes denied. It was denied by Golda Meir with the motivation that Israel could not afford to be seen as the attacker, not mentioning the understanding with U.S. to not conduct pre-emptive strikes.120 Meanwhile, Kissinger then contacts both the Egyptian

To help prove the thesis, -Kissinger lies.

foreign minister Zayyat and the soviet representative at the U.N. Dobrynin. And passes on the information that the Israelis have assured that there would be no pre-emptive strikes.

We are urgently communicating with the Israelis, warning them against any preemptive attack [] Shortly thereafter we received a message from prime minister Mier [Israeli] confirming this.[] After receiving the Israeli

117

The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973, p.1. 118 Ibid, p.1. 119 Ibid, p.1. 120 The National Security Archive Document 18: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 7 October 1973, 8:20 p.m.Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977. Box 25. Cat C 1974 Arab-Israeli War, p.4. Also, Peter and Dan Snow, 20th Century Battlefields 1973 Middle East, BBC. Documentary,19:35-20:50.

assurances that no preemptive strike would be launched I passed this on to both Zayyat [Egypt foreign minister] and Dybrynin [Soviet diplomat]121

This, in effect is the U.S. telling the Arabs about the Israeli military response to their coming attack, just hours before they launch. Kissingers actions are interesting to follow and shows that the Israeli hand was both forced and shown to their enemy by Kissinger, in an attempt to avert war and expecting that the Arabs would play out more diplomatic moves before striking.122 This attempt was a diplomatic failure as the war started without the U.S. being able to stop it.123 The evidence of Kissinger lying about telling the Israelis not to conduct preemptive strikes has been hidden behind the classification of the now declassified diplomatic reports. The reason behind Kissinger, a great diplomat and able statesman, denying his actions can be investigated further as it sheds new light on the diplomatic level of the war and connects to Allisons governmental politics model for reasoning about the essence of decision-making.124 Would Kissinger have said what he said, -or even more important, acted the way he did â&#x20AC;&#x201C;if he had known that his actions would been exposed publicly afterwards? (Or will the risk for exposure have implications to the actions of current diplomats?) â&#x20AC;&#x201C;His own bibliography did not disclose his true actions.125 Kissinger lying about this is exposed by his own words, as the transcript of the secretary of state staff meeting, directly after the war, on the 23rd of October 1973, as it was released in 2003. 121

The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon, p.1. See Annex ch, 6.3.

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf 122

Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack, 1982, pp.105-107. Penney T. Matthew, Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, History Staff, (Richard Nixon presidential library and museum. 2013), p. 8. 124 See this model in the induction part of this dissertation. 125 Kissinger, Henry, Years of upheaval. Little Brown & Co (T); 1st edition (March 1982). 123

There have been many stories that we prevented a pre-emptive attack by the Israelis. [] This is total nonsense. We did not urge them not to engage in a pre-emptive attack.126

This stands in direct contradiction to his reporting to President Nixon on the morning of 6 of October, the day war broke out. It can also be mentioned that Kissinger, when telling the Israelis not to conduct a first strike, assessed the risk for war as high. “I believe the Israeli fears of a possible attack are justified”.127 Dr Kissingers version has been the prevailing truth up to this paper. Therefore with the un-classification of Kissingers actions it is high time to shed new light on the event. Emphasizing on significant diplomatic action/intelligence/ perceptions contribution to the prequel of war. It is well known that Israel, and Golda Meir, considered a preemptive attack as dangerous to Israeli international relations in general and the U.S. in particular, as Kissinger had made clear on several earlier occasions that he did not approve, but he did lie when he never admitted to specifically tell the Israelis to take the option off the table in the hours before the war, and telling their enemies about it. Israel’s needs of U.S. help, diplomatically and military, surpassed its perceived need for a first strike-option that seemed an overkill depending on the assessment from the last war of 1967.128 In reality, the aborted pre-emptive attack on the massing of 900129 Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights proved near disastrous for Israel.130 The

126

The National Security Archive Document 63: Transcript, Secretary's Staff Meeting, 23 October 1973, 4:35 P.M. Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977, p.2. See annex ch, 6.4 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf 127 Ibid, p.3. 128 Handel L. Michael, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of Yom Kippur War, p.40. 129 Ibid, p.37.

fault in Israel’s intelligence estimations, the diplomatic miscalculations and the actual truth about Kissingers role in the run up to the war, provide valuable insights in how Israel’s own intelligence failures, spread over to the U.S.131 and to the diplomatic levels. The result, of diplomatic miscalculations, both of the Israelis to make the err, and the U.S. do copy it into the political agenda of no first strike, almost cost Israel the war on the Golan Heights. In 2013, when releasing their work, President Nixon and the role of intelligence in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the historical collections division of CIA´s management service did not bring this fact up to attention.132 This is a missed chance to correct the previous misconception that Kissinger never urged the Israelis not to conduct a preemptive strike. Vague notion of Kissingers and the U.S. preference against an Israeli pre-emptive attack has been noted by Efraim Inbar in his book on Israel´s national security (2008).133 But this only refers to Kissinger saying that “I do not believe that any Israeli leader would deliberately engage in such a reckless course”.134 Other sources as example Betts surprise attack (1982) includes Kissingers appeal to the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the 5 of October, but lacks the additional information of Kissingers actions as mentioned in his own report to President Nixon. The falsification of history by Kissinger, gets consolidated by prevailing knowledge and continued by partisan writing on the subject, that misses (ignore) primary sources that would easily prove the implications of this lie to our understanding (and perception) of this, perhaps one of the most important case studies on intelligence

130

Kahalani, Avigor, The Heights of Courage : A Tank Leaders war on the Golan, Praeger publ,(1992) for a good recollection of the fierce battle on the Golan hights. 131 Herman, Michael, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge university press (1996),p.213. 132 The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information Management Services, Presidential Series, President Nixon And The Role Of Intelligence In The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and museum, Yorba linda, CA, (2013). 133 Inbar Efraim Israel´s National Security : Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War, p.6. 134 Ibid, n.18.

performance / Surprise attacks in modern war studies.135 This 136

has been done before

On the interpretation of history.

and will happen again.

This piece of the diplomatic puzzle can hopefully better explain the diplomatic gamble and loss by Kissinger hours before the war started. One part of the problem of intelligence failure is that it can trigger and amplify political miscalculations. When intelligence gets tainted by politicization, intentionally or almost subconscious, as in regard to the concept, the assessments tends to diverge towards the invested strategic political interpretation of reality, rather than showing the real picture. The case study of the Yom Kippur war draws on the study of both military and diplomatic intelligence that together shows the intelligence for perception and understanding of the event as it happened. The presences of sources on both are plentiful in this case study. The exclusion of either part would effectively hinder a full understanding of the Intelligence for perception available for the Israelis decisions. With these evidence extracted from the two case studies and also in international comparison, the findings from the research questions can be fused to the decision making process. This will put the deducted empiric findings onto a theoretic model, using induction to study their validity and use in answering the main research question.

135

See references to Yom Kippur in, Betts, Surprise Attack, pp. 68- 80, 100-101, 104, 107, 125, 127, 130, 140141, 143, 262-263, 287-288. Enemies of Intelligence (in this, footnoted as Middle East War of 1973), pp. 29, 34, 35-36, 68. Levite [absent, se Handel criticism], Kam, Surprise Attack, pp.14-15, 18-19, 21-22, 30, 32-35, 41, 44, 46-49, 52-53, 59, 61, 105, 119, 160, 172-173, 181. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise, pp.89-90, 95, 101, 114-115. Agrell,(eng) The Art of Guessing Right (eng), pp.140, 173, 181, 182. Warning and Threat to Society, pp. 81, 98, 108-109, 119-120, 201, 261. Handel, Michael, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War(Jerusalem papers on Peace Problems, 1976). 136 Butterfield, Herbert. The Whig Interpretation of History, London: G. Bell, (1931). As the classic criticisms on falsification of history and partisan writing.

2.4 Summary on Empirics, the findings of the case studies. Including a comparative study.

The case studies show that the government is not solemnly dependent on the military intelligence to provide information and conclusions to its perception of the situation.137 Besides the military intelligence, the information and assessment on the situation that the government receives from the foreign department and its diplomatic reports provides perception. The Swedish foreign department work, can in regard of national perception be labeled as a political information agency (senses), even if not formally an intelligence organization. During the cold War, no formal intelligence fusion centers were in place to fuse both military and diplomatic / intelligence / information. Instead the Baltic situation group of 1989-91 can be viewed as born out of necessity and demand, capable but still more of an ad hoc solution. The lack of, and need of formalization of these kinds of fusion nodes has been identified by Swedish Governmental Public Investigation, referring them as collaboration secretariat.138 Having more than one organizational channel of reporting intelligence to decision level are regarded a strength, one can look at the Yom Kippur case study to see the risks of have just one source that disseminated this intelligence.139 If summarized on their content, the primary military sources (extracted from the Stig Ekman investigation on the Cuban crisis, and MUST reporting in the Soviet Case Study) can be said to contain. Information updates, current assessments, predictive judgments, new intelligence updates including military dispositions, triggers, scenarios for future development, all against the picture of the 137

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.21. SOU 1999:37. Referring to suggested improvements done by the Investigation (Swe)â&#x20AC;&#x153;samordnings secretariatet â&#x20AC;&#x153; (Eng) â&#x20AC;&#x153;Collaboration Secretariat, pp.34-38. 139 Agrell, Wilhelm, Essence of Assessment: Methods and Problems of Intelligence Analysis, CATS, Elanders, (2012), pp.114-115. 138

normal situation in regards to military activity in Swedish proximity that directly links in to Swedish security policy.140 Primary diplomatic sources on the other hand contains flash updates,141 on the scene reporting,142 key persons engagement,143 assessments,144 suggestions on Swedish policy,145 information updates, personal recollections.146 The reporting are made using the same linguistically characteristics as general political diplomatic reporting, which is consistent with it sometimes being sent directly to the decision making levels.147 The diplomatic reporting provides vital intelligence on the crisis that in significant parts cannot be obtained by any other means identified by this research.148 The collection and first hand assessments as well as access to key players are made by single competences left out on the front line (or in the trenches then it gets hot). The creation of the reports can therefore be connected to personal

140

Swedish ministry of foreign affairs [originating from MUST], Military Orientation, 1990-03-20. Available at:

http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name028d04 141

Swedish Embassy in Moscow [Flash] Military activity in Moscow. 1991-08-19. Available at:

http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/namea89d14_20110217_155524 142

Swedish diplomatic office Riga, [Flash] Just in reported by telephone from Lithuania by FridĂŠn 1991-01-14.

Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name9054f4 143

Swedish Embassy in Moscow , Meeting with representatives of the Baltic people, 1989-12-21. Available at:

http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name34fea4 Also meeting with Jeltsin, 1991-01-15. Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/namea6ca04 144 Swedish Embassy in Moscow, Three perspectives on the current political situation, 1990-01-04. Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name3b8984 145

Baltic situation group meeting PM, The Baltic states independence in regard to Swedish security Policy 199109-16 Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/named1c4c4 146 Swedish Embassy in Moscow, An absolute genuine conversation in Moscow, 1991-05-23. Available at:

http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/1991-05-23-ett-absolut-autentiskt-samtal-i-moskva 147

Primary sources see; Diplomatic consulate in Estonia, PM, Situation in Riga Monday evening.1991-01-21 . Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/namee0bb64 Also, represented in FredĂŠn, Sweden, the Baltic States and history, 1990-04-09. Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/1990-04-09-sverige--baltikum-och-historien For the connection to Social research methods, see Bryman, Allan, Social Research Methods, pp.521-535. 148

Qualitative text analysis of diplomatic reports includes this measurement and criteria to support this conclusion.(See column â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Single source intelligence-,this includes on site-reporting, key person engagement and personal reflections)

ability and professionalism of the diplomats.149 A obvious risk as to the numbers of individuals, their coverage and ability to get top level access, but on the other hand, has proved an astonishing ability to be at the right places, meeting the right people and give critical information and assessments, sometimes directly to the decision maker. The text analysis on the primary sources (connected to the Soviet case study) is using quantitative research that secure empiric evidence that the absolute predominant number of reports from Soviet Union is created by one single individual.150 The fusion of this reporting in the Baltic situation group and the MUST reporting represents combined assessments, using several single sources and military intelligence to make a product with greater depth and solidity. 151 This said, some of the diplomatic reports have gone directly to decision making levels, and in the qualitative study of the reports there exist no evidence that they have been regarded as faulty. The findings in the case studies of concrete intelligence and assessment to governmental perception, originating from both military and diplomat intelligence services, shows that they together contributes to Swedish political perception.

149

Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008), pp. 516-517, On qualitative research on personal documents and 521-522 on official documents, one can argue that the documents represents both. 150 See â&#x20AC;&#x153;Column D in the Text analysis ( Author â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Sender). 151 Swedish ministry of Foreign affairs, Stockholm (Baltic situation group meeting), PM, 1991-02-04. Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/namef35084

Chapter 3. Induction of Empery to theoretical models

3.1. Introduction to the models This dissertation will use the well renowned political scientist Graham T Allisonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s book to first compare and then fuse the findings from the two different entities of military and diplomatic intelligence for perception. â&#x20AC;&#x153;First, our central argument can be applied broadly in arenas beyond foreign affairsâ&#x20AC;?.1 To clarify, the models will be used to establish a link between the findings in the case studies, to Swedish perception on the decision-making level. Mr Allisons work is especially suited for this, as it consists of three models to which to apply decision-making theory to.2 Allisons use the different models within the same concept framework, to act as a way to apply different lenses when answering scientific questions and the same will be applied in this dissertation. As this dissertation have a somewhat different research focus than Allison, it may be needed to clarify that it is the methodology and research composition that is the main benefit of using Mr. Grahams theories. By using the same research questions in both case studies and their findings, a tight focus is ensured. Then the lenses of Allison different models acts as a prism from where the results are renewed and conclusions can be made when connecting them to the model. However it is important to acknowledge that the research question imposes a direct limit to the extent of this hypothesis testing, and a limit to the need of stretching the analysis beyond the use of Allisons models. Meaning that the findings from the induction part will be limited to

1 2

Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2,ed (2009), p. 8. Ibid, p. 9.

further soldiering the findings from the case studies.3 These findings will be then used to answer the research question;

How has Swedish intelligence, both military and diplomatic contributed to the political perception of ongoing events and predictions of the case studies?

The Rational Actor model (RAM) The Rational Actor Model (RAM) states that Governments are treated as the primary actor, examining its possibilities by applying rational actions to perceived situation.4 The Government identifies national security as the main goal when exposed to external events and crisis, using the means of policy, military readiness and political decisions as actions to the respond to the situation rationally.5 Using this hypothesis to analyze the empiric result of the research questions connected to the case studies aims to answer the original research question of;

How has Swedish intelligence, both military and diplomatic contributed to the political perception of ongoing events and predictions of the case studies selected for this dissertation?

Still critically important for the buildup of validity and theoretical connection, as well as ensuring that the findings will hold up in the later part analysis. 4 Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2,ed (2009), p. 20. 5 Ibid, p.18.

This is answered by reversing part of the question to test the empiric findings of perception, against this Rational Actor model. The question then becomes rephrased as;

In what way did intelligence support [Swedish] perception for rational decisions during the crisis?

When looking at the Swedish policies and perceptions during the fall of the Soviet Union 1989-91, using the RAM to explain Swedish understanding of the Soviet actions, it shows that Swedish policy makers early in 1989 was planning their policy out from a rational model connected to historic references of past years and not perceiving any changes or actions that would alter the Swedish foreign security policy.6 In 1990 the situation had changed, Sweden perceived the changes as significant to our security policy, with the Warsaw pact practically ceasing to exist. Also Sweden became worried about MoscowÂ´s politics towards Lithuania, something that made Sweden aware of the possibility of the Soviet actions that then happened in 1991.In mid-1991, the government recognized that the Soviet military withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe was irrevocable.7 Sweden (using the rational model to assess possible Soviet military/political capabilities in regard to the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment), became confident enough to recognize the Baltic States in 1991. The diplomatic reporting included significant amount of assessment and information that contributed to the RAM model of decision making for the Swedish government on its security and foreign policy (The lack of Military

Swedish Statement of Government Policy 1989. Regeringen, (1989) Doeser, Fredrik, In search of Security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Changes in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993, pp.232-233. 7

sources to confirm RAM in the 1989-1991 scenario is troublesome but one can assume that the diplomatic reporting must have been consistent with that of the military on Soviet military options and intentions). The use of RAM in decision-making increases exponentially with the perceived confidence of the perception, as this builds and frames the rational options of the parties. Sweden being “perhaps the best informed country in the world” acted itself, rationally in order to get the expected effects of Swedish policy. In the case of the Cuban Missile crisis, it connects to the RAM by the military intelligence successfully encompassing the actual scenario within a series of others on their predictive assessments. The scenarios acted as a way to explain predictions on rational behavior connected to certain triggers. When these got activated, the different actors’ responses were also inside the continued scenarios presented by the military intelligence. No changes or actions in regard to Swedish security policy were made during or after the crisis.8 The RAM, were fed by intelligence that left Swedish security policy unchanged, but Sweden remained aware of the conflict and its momentum. One can argue that the Ram gains value when applied to predicted scenarios, the perceived rationality can however be a subjective thought and if the RAM were to experience events outside its scope, the risk for looking at that as irrational behavior increases. Just as Allison finds himself helped by adding other models than RAM to understand governmental decisions, the Swedish case studies gets much better explained when applied to alternative methods of analysis.

Ulf, Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson, Karl Molin, Swedish Security and the World peace: Swedish foreign policy during the cold war, SuKK, Santérus, (2008), p.340. And the exclusion of the Cuban Crisis to the examples in regard to Swedish security policy 1960-1975.

3.3. The Organizational Behavior model

This model states that organizational behavior dictates and limits national actions, letting organizational best practices and standard operational procedures guide actions of a large organism as a state.9 In this model perception is not primarily used to identify actions for the best possible outcome, but promotes solutions that limit short time uncertainty and the first proposal of actions that utilize the organizational structure to address the issue ensuring national security satisficing.10 Using the same reversed question to test the empiric findings of perception as in the RAM, the question becomes;

In what way did intelligence support perception for Organizational Behavior decisions during the crisis?

The result from the case study of the military intelligence contribution to perception during the Cuban Missile crisis, connects to the Organizational Behavior model by looking the organizational entities in the intelligence and decision-making process. The case study shows that Swedish intelligence with its structure, procedures and methods contributed to the perception of the crisis. 11 The limitations in analytic capability and actual collection in the geographic area of the crisis were compensated by organizational good ties with one other structure (U.S military). The military organization used its standard collection on military activity in Swedish proximity to identify indicators on the indirect and direct threat towards Sweden. 9

Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2,ed (2009), pp.143.155-157. Ibid, pp.147-153. 11 Structure, referring to geographical reach and connections. Procedures, referring to reporting intervals and collection sequences and Methods, normal picture reference and analysis methods. 10

Swedish military organization is also linked to Swedish reactions to the crisis, imposing the standard operational procedures as a guide of the actions of the state.12 The diplomatic intelligence on perception received by the Swedish government during the fall of Soviet Union 1988-1991 contributed to Swedish actions as in regard to the Organizational Behavior model by using its flat organization, and lack of formality to give perception directly to the decision making levels when needed. The intelligence fusion cell (Baltic situation group), composition of both military and diplomatic expertise and sources were able to provide perception and assessments that were given to the decision-making levels. The Swedish diplomatic presence in the Baltic States affected the Swedish ability to gain access to key individuals and collect a first-hand impression. The need of Swedish increased presence were identified and initiated by the ministry of foreign affairs and the organizations actions contributed to maintaining this focus during the full period of time.

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War â&#x20AC;&#x201C; on the activation of (some) coup defense measures, pp.77-79.

3.4. Governmental politics model

The last model used by Graham is the Governmental Politics Model that explains nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s actions as the result of mediating and negotiations between the decisions makers.13 This model also lets personal interests and background of the decision makers to become identified as integrated part of the decision making process.14 The model states that if

a decision making entity, being a

person/group/groups, have an agenda and they will let it influence in this case the perception.15 Reasons for this being, confidence in own perception (sometimes sitting on own intelligence, sometimes not so much), seeking approval rather than input. Also the decision making process is seen as gravitating towards consensus, why a perceptional input that deviates to much from this point risk being downplayed, ignored or even corrupted. The reversed question becomes;

In what way did intelligence support perception for Governmental politics model decisions during the crisis?

The result from the case study of the military intelligence contribution to perception during the Cuban Missile crisis connects to the Governmental Politics Model by providing intelligence that correctly described current events (this being the pictures of missiles, the blockade, and the position of boats and their headings). 16 Initial political intelligence from both U.S embassy and it military gave first hand political confirmation on how the U.S viewed the situation, this were directed to the 13

Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2,ed (2009), pp.255-257. Ibid, p.256. 15 Ibid, pp.280-283. 16 Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, pp.11-14, 30-33. 14

Swedish

political

level

through

both

channels

communication

(Military/Diplomatic).Intelligence provided the Swedish government with information that did not raise any false alarms (resulting in mobilization or diplomatic actions). The scenarios that were presented contributed in Swedish political confidence on the situation. However this Cuban case study does not identify any political decision connected to an individual policy maker.17 The diplomatic intelligence on perception received by the Swedish government during the fall of Soviet Union 1988-1991 contributed to Swedish actions as in regard to the Governmental Politics Model by using this intelligence as a first foundation for major changes in Swedish security policy. 18 It shows that the change of internal Swedish composition (by election in 1991) significantly changed Swedish policy and were supported by intelligence assessment that contributed to this government agenda.19 The empiric findings of the case studies can be applied to all of the models, and offer help to understand the reasoning behind governmental decisions and actions in regard to national security. One model does not exclude the use of another, and they in that regard describes the decision-making process from three vectors of observation. For this study the uses of Allisons models have successfully helped to connect the empiric findings to the Swedish decision making process and political agenda.

Ekman, Stig, The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, p.79. Revering to a possible exceptionHis Majesty the king of Sweden, that approved the C in C request (1/11 1962), to if needed, mobilize reserve personnel and some conscripts (apx 50 persons) â&#x20AC;&#x201C;mainly stationed to costal radar stations. Fst/OpL 9/11 1962 H3050-4, Fst Archive. 18 Doeser, Fredrik, In search of security After the Collapse of the Soviet Union , ch 7.2.1.2, Summary of Developments in Swedish Policies and Perceptions, pp.232,233. 19 Ibid., Chapter Ă¤7.2.2 Reforming the Policy of Neutrality and Committing to Security Cooperation, September 1991- February 1993., p233-246; 7.2.2 Identifying Policy Change, pp.247-250.

This notion of the government agenda is evident in the Swedish Statement of Government Policy of 88-91. In these statements both the perceptions of what has taken place and future predictions, gets publicly discussed together with major Swedish political actions and policy changes. Under this pinnacle of Swedish political perception lies the diplomatic and military intelligence that together supported Swedish security policy with Strategic intelligence. The 1989 perception of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;importance to understand the forces that obviously is reshaping the European futureâ&#x20AC;?20.To the tense anticipation prior to the Baltic states declaration of independence and the potential dangerous situation in regard to Soviet military power and internal instability in the 1990 statement.21 Swedish Statement of Government Policy actually proves the Governmental politics model, as each parliamentary party, connected to the same intelligence flow from both military and diplomatic sources,22 publicly make their own Statements (and the open parliamentary debate, directly after the statements). Statements based on their perception that per say only can differ from one another, when exposed to other factors than only intelligence, proving that a political agenda (and other factors) will affect decisions.

Bild, Carl, Swedish Statement of Government Policy 1989,p.11. Ibid., p6-10: Ibid Andersson, Sten (A more positive tone), pp.1-4. 22 This information flow terminates in (swe) UtrikesnĂ¤mnden (Eng) Foreign board, The board, chaired by the king of Sweden where the current Swedish government, discuss and establish its foreign policy with the other parties represented in the Swedish parliament. 21

4. The last analysis.

First a test of the hypothesis model, showing how the link between intelligence for perception, and political decision-making will support the final conclusions. One, The Swedish recognition of the independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be linked to the intelligence for perception. The Swedish minister of foreign affairs’, Sten Andersson, speech in the Estonian Parliament 199108-29:

“When the old communist staged their coup in Moscow and took power, ten days ago, we asked ourselves: Will the clock be turned back, will the Cold War resurrect?”[]”But everything became different. Already after three days – a total change of scene.”[]”After additional tree days, as we received the one positive report after the other23 – this was on Sunday morning- the prime minister Ingvar Carlsson and I agreed; Now we can recognize Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as independent states!”[]”Dear friends, the Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson said yesterday after the decision to recognize Estonia as sovereign state, that it was the most joyful and positive decision the government had made, perhaps ever.24

This is the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, referring to intelligence that instantly led to important Swedish security policy decisions. In regard to the main research question, it represents concrete evidence of national security policy connected to the national perception of the world, delivered by what constitutes as

Bernér, report, The new Russian revolution 19-25 August 1991 The 36 paged recapitulation report of the coup can be seen as summary of the reporting gone back to Stockholm ( Just as the summary after the Soviet attacks in Jan 1991), prior to the political decision to recognize the Baltic States. 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Foreign [policy] questions (Parliamentary archives of public documents regarding important Swedish foreign policy questions) 1991. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992). Speech of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson in the Estonian parliament (1991-08-29) Ch 16., p.78-80.

national intelligence for this purpose. In a theoretical context these are answering the same question â&#x20AC;&#x153;Do Perception Matter?â&#x20AC;?25 That Robert, Jervis helped answer in his work on the subject of perception in international relations. As shown by linkage to Swedish policy changes, within the case studies, perception do matters. Second the multidisciplinary contribution can be

Value of multidisciplinary research

proved as the research has shown clear evidence of both military and diplomatic intelligence contributing to political perception within the case studies.26 This is supported by their connection to decision level using Allisons models in a Swedish context to frame the answers within the research question. The existence of multiple fields of science contributing with solid evidence proves the direct answer to this part of the main question. The use of multidisciplinary research to help provide the answers has proved essential as previous lack of holistic approach to these types of questions has been identified as imposing severe limitations to conclusions. One direct connection to intelligence theory on this second conclusion is that Swedish decision makers,

When intelligence connects To decisionmaking

during crises, received information and assessments on a security policy situation from different organizations. This tends to be described as strengths against confirmation biases that have been directly involved in several historic case studies (Including the Yom Kippur case studies in this paper).27 This connection to theory includes Heuers explanation of cognitively and intelligence,28and Wholstetter and

Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton Uni press, Ch 1., p11-12. See connection to primary sources of military and diplomatic intelligence within each case study. 27 Betts,K. Richard. Enemies of Intelligence., p 42, on devils Advocacy, pp.146-148, on Centralization vs. Pluralism. 28 Richard J. Heuer psychology of Intelligence Analysis 26

others recognition of this strength.29 This strength, however .has also led to the investigations into Swedish intelligence organization and performances, indirectly to having excluded the foreign office contribution to the intelligence process. Hitting the nail on the hypothesis, Swedish political reaction to Soviets Attack in Lithuania on 1991-01-13, shows direct link between actual intelligence for perception30 and political response. The Swedish prime minister public speech [At Sergels square Central Stockholm] transformed to an urgent and public support to the Baltic states on 1991-01-14, as a direct response to the intelligence on the attack.(This meeting were originally intended to address the Persian Gulf situation and the impending U.S lead coalition attack on Iraq). Also, in 1962 the Swedish perception, as shown being both military and diplomatic, during the Cuban crisis did not create any false warnings. Sometimes no reaction is the right decision, helped by good perception. Finally, the Swedish Statement of Government Policy acts as the ultimate executive declaration of Swedish perception. Helping to test the hypothesis that diplomatic and military intelligence provided intelligence for perception during crisis.

Roberta Wholstetter Pearl Harbor, Warning, and Decision (1962), pp.390,392; Harold L. Wilensky Intelligence, Crises, And Foreign Policy: Reflections On The Limits Of Rationality., P237. Agrell……on this 30 Ahlander, two messages, on 1991-01-13, Situation Vilnius Evening 22.15and About Lithuania: And from Fredén Just in reported by telephone from Lithuania by Fridén.1991-01-14.

5. Conclusion and Epilogue. Swedish intelligence, both military and diplomatic has been found to contribute to Swedish political perception. Within this study, evidence and examples of their existence (as contributors) has hopefully been clearly shown with the help of case studies. Findings that include original research on diplomatic sources, shows that not only has military and diplomatic intelligence been present within the same case study, but also that the combined intelligence has given perception that connects to Swedish decision making during crisis. The methodology and research materials are presented so that hypothesis re-testing can be performed to validate the findings.1 A comparative study, using the same hypothesis has also shown that new findings within one of the fields, continues to change our perception of an historic event. Completing the main task for this dissertation has also presented a lot of inputs for further studies, proving the point of a multidisciplinary approach to intelligence studies.

As reflected in the Swedish declaration of what constitutes the nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security policy,2 the Swedish government receive strategic intelligence from two separate ministries (foreign and defense). These ministries in turn, collects their intelligence from their primary functions within their respective organization. This collection on two fronts represents an indication that professional diplomats and intelligence officers gains their academic background from two different scientific fields, mainly, that of Political science (International relations) and War sciences (Intelligence). Both entities predominant functionality within the state can be said to

Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008), p.149 , on the value of re-testing hypothesis. 2 Ch 7.1.3, Security policy.

provide intelligence, this indicates that applying a multidisciplinary approach within intelligence studies can become very promising indeed. This said, multidisciplinary studies in intelligence should not be seen as limited to War science and Political sciences. To end with the words of the well renowned expert in intelligence history, Sir Christopher Andrews;

Intelligence studies in the 21st century must broaden both their chronological and thematic perspectives.[] What counterterrorism most lacked at the beginning of the 21st century was, arguably, theologians.

Epilouge : Further multidisciplinary studies.

It is the ambition of this dissertation to help further research and studies that connects to national security policy. As this study has shown, an Intelligence process could be described as connected to a decision making process on which all aspects/actors producing intelligence for perception can be studied. The conclusions that intelligence for perception benefits from multidisciplinary and multidepartmental

research

also

confirmed

the

assessments

and

recommendations made in Thinking about the world - Summary of the report from the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Resources (Ds2004:46). Closer cooperation is required between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and other relevant ministries on the focus needed for security policy4

Andrew, Christopher, Treverton. F. Gregory and Agrell, Wilhelm (ed), National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, Cambridge, (2009),p.57. 4 Regeringskansliet, Thinking about the world - Summary of the report from the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Resources (Ds2004:46), (2004),ch.5.3.1 Security policy, p.81.

6. Bibliography

Agrell, Wilhelm (eng) The Art of Guessing Right (swe) Konsten Att Gissa Rätt Studentlitteratur, Lund, (1998). --- (eng) Warning and Threat to Society, (swe) Förvarning och Samhällshot Studentlitteratur, Lund, (2005). --- Essence of Assessment: Methods and Problems of Intelligence Analysis, CATS, Elanders, (2012). --- (eng) The black Swan and its opponents (swe) Den Svarta Svanen och dess Motståndare, Stockholm, Försvarshögskolan, (2013) . Betts, Richard K, Surprise despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed.(Political Science Quarterly, 95 Winter 1980). ---, Surprise Attack, The Brooking Institution, D.C, (1982). ---, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1977). ---, Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable. World Politics, 31 (October 1978), --- Hedging against Surprise Attack. Survival, 23 (July-August 1981) ---, Enemies of Intelligence (Colombia University Press, 2007). Bjereld, Ulf, Alf W. Johansson, Karl Molin, Swedish Security and the World peace: Swedish foreign policy during the cold war, SuKK, Santérus, (2008), Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3rd ed, (2008) Butterfield, Herbert. The Whig Interpretation of History, London: G. Bell, (1931) Conquest, Robert, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties ,New York: The Macmillan Company, (1968) Christopher, Andrew, Treverton. F. Gregory and Agrell, Wilhelm (ed), National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, Cambridge, (2009) Davies, P.H.J, Theory and intelligence reconsidered. In Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates. Studies in intelligence. London: Routledge (2009), Doeser, Fredrik, In search of Security after the Collapse of the Soviet Union: Foreign Policy Changes in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 1988-1993,

Domber Gregory F.(ed), Poland's Revolution as Seen from the U.S. Embassy, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 42 Published – April 5, 2001 Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, Carlssons (2000). Fredén, Peter, Lars, Transformations: The liberation of the Baltic States and Swedish Diplomacy 1989-1991. Atlantis publ (2004) Fredén, Peter, Lars, Returning’s - Swedish Security Policy and the Baltic Countries during their First Years of Independence 1991-1994.(2011) Grabo, Cynthia, Anticipating Surprise. Analysis for Strategic Warning ,Joint Military Intelligence Collage, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, (2002) Graham, Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, second edition (1999) Guntram Fritz, Albin Werther, Recognizing When Black Swans Aren´t: Holistically Training Management to Better Recognize, Assess and Respond to Emerging Extreme Events. Society of Actuaries,(2013). Haglund, magnus (swe) Sovjetisk operativ krigsplanläggning under det kalla kriget: En jämförande studie av sovjetisk krigsplanläggning avseende central och Västeuropa (eng)Soviet military operational planning during the cold war: a comparative study of Soviet war planning for central and Western Europé Handel, Michael, Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, no.19 (1976). --- The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise (International Studies Quarterly, 21 September 1977) Herman, Michael, Intelligence power in peace and war, Cambridge university press (1996) Heuer, Richards J. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence (2007) ---Strategic Deception: A Psychological Perspective, Paper presented at the Twentyfirst Convention of the International Studies Association,(St.Luis, Missouri, March 1980) --- Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence : The CIA Experience. Boulder, Colorado (1981) --- A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence (2009) 89

Inbar Efraim Israel´s National Security : Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War, Routledge, (2008) Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, (1976) ---, Deterrence Theory Revisited, World Politics, vol. 31 (January 1979), --- Logic of Images in International Relations. (Princeton, 1970) Kahalani, Avigor, The Heights of Courage : A Tank Leaders war on the Golan, Praeger publ,(1992) Kam, Ephraim, Surprise Attack: The Victim´s Perspectiv,e Harvard University Press, (2004) -spot on front page, this one. Kent, Sherman, Words of Estimative Probability. CIA, Centre for intelligence studies, (1964) Kissinger, Henry, Years of upheaval. Little Brown & Co (T); 1st edition (March 1982). Laqueur, Walter , World of Secrets: The uses and limits of Intelligence, London, W&W, (1985) Marrin, Stephen Evaluating CIAs Analytical performance, Orbis,(2013) Merton R K. Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press, (1968) Moore, S , Neutral on our side: Us Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration, Cold war History (2010). Penney T. Matthew, Intelligence and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, History Staff, Richard Nixon presidential library and museum. (2013) Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books, (1959) Roberta Wohlstetter,; Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.(Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962) Scott, J, A Matter of Record, Cambridge: Polity (1990). From Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods (Original 2001), Liber, Swedish translation (2009) The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s Information Management Services, Presidential Series, President Nixon And The Role Of Intelligence In The 1973 ArabIsraeli War, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and museum, Yorba linda, CA, (2013) Ulfing, Lars, (eng) The mirror Labyrinth, (swe) Spegellabyrinten, Försvarshögskolan, Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen (2003)

Swedish official publications.

Governmental Public Investigation (SOU) SOU 1999:37,(eng) The intelligence – a review, (Swe) Underrättelsetjänsten -en översyn. SOU 1976:19, (eng) The Military Intelligence, (swe) Den Militära Underrättelsetjänsten. SOU 1994:11 (eng) If there had been war, (swe) Om kriget kommit. SOU 2002:108 (eng) Peace and Security, (swe) Fred och Säkerhet. Swedish Departmental series (Ds) Ds 2004:46, (eng) Thinking about the world - Summary of the report from the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy Resources, Ds 2013:33 (Eng) Choices in a global world, (Swe) Vägval I en globalicerad värld, Swedish Statue Book (SfS) SfS 2007/08:92 (swe) Stärkt krisberedskap – för säkerhets skull (eng) Enforced crisis readiness – better safe than sorry . Governmental protocols Governmental Protocols, 1988/89:71, 1989/90:85, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Foreign [policy] questions (Parliamentary archives of public documents regarding important Swedish foreign policy questions) (1991). Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992). Speech of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson in the Estonian parliament (1991-08-29)(1992) Swedish foreign declaration 2013, Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5298/a/209053 (English version)[Accessed 8-8-2013]

From newspapers, Ewa Stenberg, FRA: Vi visste att Saddam saknade kärnvapen, Ingvar Åkesson(FRA), quoted in ,Daily news (DN) published 2013-06-27 00:30 ,Available at: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/fra-vi-visste-att-saddam-saknade-karnvapen/ [Accessed, 27 July 2013]

From Television. Snow, Peter and Dan ,20th Century Battlefields 1973 Middle East, BBC. Documentary,19:35-20:50. Avalible at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GGpYOyRp2gY [Accessed at 4 July 2013]

Direct reference of primary sources: Cuban case study

From the Swedish armed forces command intelligence.(Fst/Und) Swedish military intelligence 1961 overview, Fst/Und 21/10 1962 H 91 Und. Military intelligence special branch (T-Office) report (Eng) Soviet Union – Cuba. Personnel and military shipments to Cuba. July-August 1962 – not specified. Monthly overview number 9 in 1962, Fst/Und 11/10 1962 H 131 Und. Rules and regulations for the defense operational readiness in peace – C in C Strategic Surprise attack, defense order(swe) Bestämmelser för krigsmaktens insatsberedskap I fred – ÖB kuppförsvarsorder, Fst/Opl 8/8 1962 H3050-3, Fst/archive. Cuban Crisis. Special Orientation (SO) (swe) Cuba-krisen. Specialorientering (SO) nr 13 1962, Fst/Und 27/10 1962 H 143 Und. Fst/OpL 9/11 1962 H3050-4, Fst Archive.

Interviews. Bo Westin [Lt.Gen, Fst/Sekt 2 1961-66] in an interview 1974.9.20. Sven Andesson [Minister of Defense 1957-73] in an interview 1974.10.14.

From the Swedish ministry of foreign affairs (UD) UD tgm 26/10 received .Fst/Und 26/10 R25/ 2382 H. UD tgm 25/10, received Fst/Und 27/10 R25/2385 H.

Direct reference of primary sources: The implosion of the Soviet empire and the independence of the Baltic States.

Swedish foreign ministry publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991 Davidssons tryckeri växjö (2011). Available online, containing,(1) the printed pamphlet produced, "an empire implodes", with a foreword by minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt. (2) A document with all the published reports in sequence, including the reference list. (3) All reports that individual documents. Available at: http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet , and, http://www.government.se/sb/d/1404/a/161229 [Accessed Dec 2 2012] The primary source from; Swedish foreign ministry archives, dossier “Politic: General. Soviet Union” and “Politic: General. Baltic Sea States combined” (HP 1 Er, respectively HP 1 Eö) from the end of 1989 until the fall of the Soviet Union at Christmas time 1991. Some of the documents included, originates from the foreign ministry’s East Europe department (POL 1).

Reports that has been directly referred to: [Number in text analysis]

Ahlander, Report from Swedish Consulate in Leningrad, Situation in Balticum, 198912-05.[3] Ahlander, Riga, Situation Vilnius evening 22:15. 1991-01-13[50] Ahlander, Telex/Crypto from Tallinn, Situation in Estonia.1991-01-18.[55] Ahlander, PM from Leningrad, Situation in Balticum ,1991-01-19.[56] Ahlander, report from Leningrad to Stockholm – Swedish minister of foreign affairs, Sten Andesson directly. The Crisis in Balticum and Soviet Union. 1991-01-21.[58] Ahlander, Report from Leningrad , The Referendums and the Russian speaking (minority) in Balticum 1991-02-07[63] Ahlander, Moscow, Military activity in Moscow 1991-08-19.[76] Bernér, from Moscow , Meeting with representatives of the Baltic people, 1989-1221[5] 94

Bernér, Report from Moscow, Three perspectives on the current political situation, 1990-01-04.[6] Bernér , Moscow, Situation in Lithuania 1990-03-27.[27] Bernér, PM from Moscow, Meeting with Jeltsin regarding the Baltic States.1991-0115.[54] Bernér, Crypto from Moscow, Sweden – Soviet. 1991-01-28[59] Bernér, PM from Moscow, Baltic States and the Central Soviet Government 199102-06.[62] Bernér, report from Moscow, The new Russian revolution 19-25 August 1991, 199108-26[78] Fredén, Report from Leningrad, The Baltic States and history, 1990-04-09[30] Fredén Telex/crypto from Riga, Just in reported by telephone from Lithuania by Fredén 1991-01-14[52] Fredén, Diplomatic consulate in Estonia, PM, Situation in Riga Monday evening.1991-01-21[57] Lyrvall, Report from Moscow, An absolute genuine conversation in Moscow, 199105-23.[73]

Olsson, PM from Stockholm, Baltic Situation group (meeting), 1991-02-04.[60]

Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) Crypto from Stockholm, military orientation, 1990-03-20.[25]

Carl, Bildt, [Carl Bildt The current (2013) Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs publication since 2006 has been the end recipient of the intelligence for perception not only in his current role as foreign minister, but also as opposition leader during the years for the case study (1986-1999), as well as prime minister of Sweden from 1991-1994. Mr. Carl, Bildt is also connected to the Swedish Statement of Government Policy during the years of the crisis, as well as writhing the forewords of the main document linked to primary sources of diplomatic intelligence, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991, p.3-4.

Direct reference of primary sources: Yom Kippur: A comparative study of both military and diplomatic intelligence.

Originating from the National Security Archive New archival records, routinely declassified under Executive Order 12958.

The National Security Archive Document 7: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Brent Scowcroft to Kissinger, 5 October 1973, enclosing message from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir (passed through Israeli chargĂŠ Shalev). Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-07.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2013] The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2013] The National Security Archive Document 18: Memcon between Dinitz and Kissinger, 7 October 1973, 8:20 p.m.Source: RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973-1977. Box 25. Cat C 1974 Arab-Israeli War .Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-18.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2013] The National Security Archive Document 63: Transcript, Secretary's Staff Meeting, 23 October 1973, 4:35 P.M. Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973-1977. Box 1. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2013]

Reference to Pictures: Frontpage.[Number starting top left, to right] [1]TIME cover 07-27-1987 painting of Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev;( inset John Poindexter by Dennis Brack). [2]The National Security Archive Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973., Available at:http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf [Accessed 10-8-2013] [3]The Philadelphia Inquirer front page of October 23, 1962, the morning after President John F. Kennedy's televised address to the nation on the Cuban missile crisis. [4]Ekman, Stig, (swe) Den Milit채ra Underr채ttelsetj채nsten: Fem Kriser Under det Kalla Kriget. (eng) The Military Intelligence: Five Crises during the Cold War, Carlssons (2000) [5]Swedish government. Bild, Carl, (Minister of foreign affairs, Sweden), Swedish Statement of Government Policy 2012, see references to the 1988,89,90,91 equivalent inside the dissertation. [6]Swedish ministry of foreign affairs, Example of Military intelligence, Orientation on Soviet military in the [7]Baltic area, Crypto, MUST, Stockholm, to Swedish Embassy in Moscow, 1990-03-20.frontpage [middle] and first page [below], Available at http://issuu.com/utrikesdepartementet/docs/name028d04. [Accessed 2-6-2013]Translation of this message in column J, in row 24 in the text analysis, ch 6.2. [8]Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies (BCISS) is a University Inter-Disciplinary Research Centre and the research Centre connected to the Intelligence and Security Studies MA (MA/ISS). [9]Picture of two SAAB J35J Draken aircraft, no 39 and 04 from the 10 Air force wing, [The Draken aircraft were active from 1960 to 2000 and produced in 651 units. Andersson, Hans G. Saab Aircraft since 1937. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. (1989).

Backpage. [1]Försvarsmakten.Picture of the S 102B “Korpen" (the Raven) and the two aircraft(022,023) with individual names “Hugin” and “Munin” after the Scandiavian ancient God Oden’s two ravens, who saw everything that happened in the world. Available at: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/information-och-fakta/materiel-ochteknik/luft/s-102-b/ [accessed 20 sep 2013] [2] A plate from a Vendel era helmet. Simek, Rudolf, Dictionary of Northern Mythology, (2007), p.164.and Lindow, John, Norse Mythology: A Guide to the Gods, Heroes, Rituals, and Beliefs,(2005), p.187.

Reference used in Chapter disposition:

Holland, Lee M. Poetic Edda (Grímnismál, ) Verse 20. University of Texas Press,(1986) Shakespeare, William, Macbeth: Act 1, Scene 3, Page 4. Sir, Bacon, Francis, (1594),

7. Appendix

7.1. Key conceptual explanations to the study

7.1.1 Perception.

Perception. The ability to become aware of something through the senses, the way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted, the intuitive understanding and insight.1 This study will describe the two important aspects of a national ability for perception of foreign events, the military and diplomatic intelligence, as the nations “senses”. Also perception adequately describes the understanding of events as buildup of a premonition, if subtle, and the quick reaction to a direct damage, or a first notion of something. This description also can be used when understanding the buildup between signals and response, when subject to an irrational or unprecedented event (surprise, or a black swan event) where the signals does not fit threat analysis and does not trigger the right response, sometimes because the sensory data (Intelligence) cannot be interpreted to give perception of the event or the time to assimilate the new threat gets overtaken by the events as they happened. Perception of the normal situation.

Being the benchmark , normality (Swedish

“normalbild”) This is closely connected to the creation of national awareness of its proximity and foreign policy/security options. Any crisis are being measured and being indicated against this picture.

Oxford dictionaries, definition of perception. Available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/peseption, [Accessed, Aug-9-2013]

Awareness, the intelligence for perception provided by the military intelligence during this pre-faze can be identified as being; the creation of a picture of the event on to every addition will be regarded. A picture of normality (or rather, the first sight impression, of an event being identified for attention and being lifted up to the intelligence picture). From this first report and description of the event, perception is provided again when the situation worsens in July, still no direct warning of the crisis ahead. Last reports provides perception of the situation still going for the worse, this time including a description of â&#x20AC;&#x153;triggersâ&#x20AC;? indicating possible further escalation. Together with the perception of normal picture, awareness of new events can be identified as being indicated by being anomalies against this perception of normality. The Swedish perception of its proximity, and the Swedish national perception of normality (as any other nations), are whenever chronology called upon or researched, a product not only current intelligence at the time of the research, but represents an extensive historic institutional (on a national level) memory and perception of the past leading up to where one look. For this study, this helps limits the extent of which there is a need to explain the historic preferences (but included to help in regards to the case studies in some parts). Swedish

military

intelligence,

unable

indigenously

collect

intelligence

supporting/detecting Soviet Union deployment of offensive weapons/nuclear missiles, did not have the means to provide intelligence warning of this. The intelligence did provide three scenarios of course of events to circumvent that problem (and being right on one)

100

7.1.2 Intelligence.

Some predominant problems exists to intelligence theory, maybe more than other, more established fields of research –as history, psychology. This is perhaps best visualized when approaching the definition of the word intelligence. The significance of this problem to intelligence studies is shared with Richard Betts:

Case studies of intelligence failures abound, yet scholars lament the lack of theory of intelligence. It is more accurate to say that we lack a positive or normative theory of intelligence. Negative or descriptive theory – empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes – is well developed. 2

Intelligence theory currently exists within the area of war studies that in turn belongs to the social sciences.3 But the use of intelligence should be connected to a decision making process

The most important element in the intelligence process is neither the collection of intelligence nor the analysis but the definition of the overlaying purpose, the intelligence need.4

Betts, R.K., Analysis, war, and decision: why intelligence failures are inevitable. In Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates. Studies in Intelligence. London: Routledge, pp. 87-111. 3 The Brunel Centre for Intelligence & Security Studies (BCISS) belongs (in an academic sense) to the School of Social Sciences, Politics and History. Swedish National Defence College, War Studies Division (KVA) states “ In an international context, there is no unified definition of War Studies. It is interpreted both as a subject pertaining to social science and as a professional education for an officer's profession”.These two items are often separated into two different subjects, such as, for example, War Studies and Military Science. In Sweden, both these interpretations are included in the subject of War Studies

101

With this statement Agrell stress the importance that there exists a real need and use of intelligence and also a focus on the value of intelligence. From that argument Agrell, then points towards the other end, to have no fixed definition.

There is an old saying from the debate over the drawbacks of a closed intelligence culture in the 1960s and 1970s: "When everything is secret – nothing is secret." The meaning of every concept is in the limitation. A word for everything is a word for nothing specific. Intelligence analysis runs the risk of ending up here. When everything is intelligence – nothing is intelligence.5 P. H. J. Davies calls this theory ‘Agrell’s limit’,6 and this limit and link between the entities of producer and consumer provides a direct connection between intelligence studies and studies within political sciences. The study of intelligence could therefore be closely linked to or viewed as multidisciplinary to the field of political sciences.7 Having the professional and academic link between military intelligence (war studies) and diplomatic intelligence (political sciences) clearly visible in the research helps promote this multidisciplinary approach. As a result of defining that both scientific fields can be used as a theoretical foundation, appropriate methodology and research methods can be defined.

Agrell, Wilhelm, (swe) Konsten att gissa rätt:underrättelse-vetenskapens grunder: 3 underrättelseprocessen och dess tillämpning. (eng) The art of guessing right: Intelligence science definition: 3 The Intelligence process and its application.(Studentlitteratur 1998),p.27. Included in the pp 5576 essay on (According to Wilhelm Agrell) When everything is intelligence nothing is intelligence; how should ”intelligence” therefore be conceptualized? 5 Agrell, Wilhelm.,When Everything is Intelligence - Nothing is Intelligence. CIA: The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, 1(4). Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasionalpapers/vol1no4.htm [Accessed 6-8-2013]. 6 Davies, P.H.J, Theory and intelligence reconsidered. In Intelligence Theory: Key questions and debates. Studies in intelligence. London: Routledge (2009), p. 189-207. 7 Kings College, London. Shown in the academic entity of war studies (including the Master in intelligence and security studies) belonging to the Social Science & Public Policy department within the college.

102

7.1.3. Security policy.

The conceptual explanation of Swedish security policy (säkerhetspolitik) are stated in the Governmental public investigation (SOU) 1999:37 as being “a summary designation of the actions a nations government takes as a reaction to external threat. The security policy includes that part of foreign policy that together with defense policy are targeted to protect a nation’s political independence and territorial integrity”.8 The military intelligence provides the material for the policy and measures that aims to protect the nations external security. 9 For this dissertation the definition justifies to include both diplomatic and military intelligence production in order to answer the research question connected to governmental perception (linked to the government ability to exert security policy).

7.1.4. Political perception (In regards to Security policy).

The Swedish political perception in the context of its security policy are publicly debated in the Swedish parliament each year. In this, the Statement of Government Policy (utrikesdeklarationen),10 the Swedish perception and assessment on major international events are debated. Allowing public evaluation of Swedish foreign policy of the year that passed. The foreign declaration also expresses the Swedish visions 8

SOU 1999:37, p.11. (conceptual explanations). SOU 1999:37, p.17. (The role of military intelligence). 10 For an example in English see the Statement of Government Policy 2013 (by Carl Bild). Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/20/90/53/c7791e9a.pdf [Accessed 8-8-2013] 9

103

and political intentions as reaction to these events, as well as identifying and describing new events. The Statement of Government Policy can be seen as a compass that the government pledges to use to navigate by in the foreign policy. It affects both the country's relationship with the outside world; expressed geographically as Swedish proximity, EU and globally. And thematically, for example in disarmament issues, assistance, international cooperation and trade.

7.1.5. Strategic Intelligence

It is commonly stated that intelligence is divided into strategic, operational and tactical intelligence.11 Thus, in general the strategic intelligence service is focused on general national or international and global problems. Intelligence work is carried out in order to prepare for decision-making at the national level. The intelligence service's task is then to identify foreign powers ' conditions and possibilities for action more generally and to gather material for an assessment of developments in the longer term. As military intelligence is usually termed an intelligence service, which organizationally tied to a country's armed forces. At the strategic level, the military intelligence service's tasks encompass not only military but also political, economic, social, ethnic, religious etc. conditions. Intelligence referring to giving the country's top policy makers information not only on the purely military operations in the world more generally, but also to give them a basis for assessment of the General Security and defense policy developments.12

11 12

SOU 1999:37., p.66. Conceptualization of [Swedish] intelligence [function] and intelligence [role and task ibid., p.66.

104

7.2. On the Text analysis.

The result of the literature review and critic of the sources indicated that the sources of the case studies were fundamentally different between them. The military case study was able to be constructed primarily based on a governmental investigation made by experts, reassuringly, with access to the vital primary sources. The case study on diplomatic intelligence however, consisted of primary sources, only introduced, but not previously researched upon. In order to use the same research questions on both case studies, a qualitative text analysis was made to elevate the construction of the diplomatic case study to the same level as the comparative case studies.13 Being itself bigger than this dissertation, the text analysis are used for direct references and attached as a separate document.14 The methodological uses of

From pictures of Swedish secret documents â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to text analysis in English

qualitative text analysis can therefore be said to be indirectly connected to this dissertation. The benefit of this analysis on the other hand, is directly used in the dissertation.

The material consists of approximately 400 pages of photocopies downloaded from the foreign ministry official webpage, 15 representing 98 original

Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford university, 3 ed, (2008)., 369, Qualitative text analysis as one of four main qualitative research methods, then applying the research questions as in example; Thinking Deeply, 16.1., p371. 14 Hyperlink to Text Analysis. 15 Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/1404/a/161229, [Accessed 5-6-2013].

105

secret documents, saved in PDF format as pictures of text. The PDF has been processed using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software16 that identifies and analyses texts inside pictures and allows for copying these to Microsoft OneNote. As the documents are in Swedish, the algorithms for the OCR are not as good as in English, but still benefits from the same Latin letters.17 The documents (some being telex) are of varying photocopy quality, some generating a lot of errors and needs a lot of on-hands editing, if not complete manual translations. Some of these more difficult documents have been only partly translated, excluding sections that do not directly add to the research, still crosschecked. After this process the documents (now in Word format) has been processed using translation-software (Google, Word were evaluated with Word-online being the preferred one) to generate an English translation of the Swedish photocopies. However crude, this will allow for an evaluation of references and findings that, in the end, hopefully prove worth the effort.18

Included into Microsoft OneNote 2010. In addition to this difficulty, some (mostly to/from the Moscow embassy) of the messages are not using the regular Swedish-only- letters; Å, Ä, Ö, to form words, and generates even more errors. 18 Ch 7.2. Text Analysis. –See column J for the OCR translation. 17

106

Text analysis; Swedish foreign ministry publication, An Empire Implodes, reports and analysis from Swedish diplomats of the events in Soviet Union and their vassal republics with an emphasis on the [Baltic states] the years 1989-1991. [Total 98 documents]

(Final OCR-Spreadsheet)

TEXT ANALYSIS of diplomatic documents. After the translation process, each document is inserted into an Excel sheet. The sheet contains simple coding mechanisms (columns headings) that help define and identify the individual documents. Column, J, contains the full translation of the documents Color coding are. Military intelligence included Prelude, and Event = Lithuanian declaration of Independence Prelude and Event = Soviet attacks in Lithuania and Latvia. Prelude and Event = Soviet Coup dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;ĂŠtat in Moscow

Document 10: Message from Secretary Kissinger, New York, to White House Situation Room, for delivery to President Nixon at 9:00 a.m., 6 October 1973 Source: NPMP, NSCF, box 664, Middle East War Memos & Misc October 1-October 17, 1973 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdfComperative

108

Document 63: Transcript, "Secretary's Staff Meeting," 23 October 1973, 4:35 P.M. Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger Staff Meetings, 19731977. Box 1 http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-63

109

264

265

264

[Above] Försvarsmakten.Picture of the S 102B “Korpen" (the Raven) one of the two aircraft(022,NNN) with individual names “Hugin” and “Munin”. Available at: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/information-ochfakta/materiel-och-teknik/luft/s-102-b/ [accessed 20 sep 2013] 265 [Below] A plate from a Vendel era helmet. Simek, Rudolf, Dictionary of Northern Mythology, (2007), p.164.and Lindow, John, Norse Mythology: A Guide to the Gods, Heroes, Rituals, and Beliefs,(2005), p.187.

110