Take a Chill Pill: Investigating Psychiatry’s Philosophy of Mood Holly Tengelis, Masters Student (Ryerson University) Introduction Over the last 50 years, significant advancements in psychology and neuroscience have encouraged and allowed many individuals to receive unprecedented treatments for mood disorders. Various treatment options were developed, including cognitive based therapy, neurotherapy, general psychotherapy, electroconvulsive therapy, and most notably, medication (Crumby, Harper and Reavey 2013, 160). While medication was initially developed as a mental health treatment for serious cases of psychosis, it has become an increasingly common form of treatment, in and of itself (O’Donnell 2017). The medicalization of mental-health treatment has recently come under scrutiny as some question whether it prioritizes the needs of those experiencing a mental disorder or the legitimacy of the psychiatric organization (Horwitz 2003, 66; 69; Pick 2015, 14). Critically evaluating contemporary psychiatric treatments, this paper analyzes the philosophy of mood underlying medication-based treatment courses for mood disorders, including major depressive and bi-polar disorder. This paper first interprets the philosophy of mood implicit in psychiatry’s usage of medication as a sole form of treatment for mood disorders. Psychiatry’s philosophy of mood is understood as the theoretical understanding of moods underlying their practices. This paper argues psychiatry implies an inadequate philosophy of mood by prescribing medication alone because it incorrectly reduces the experience of a mood to a neurotransmitter imbalance, unjustifiably treating only one cause of the disorder. This paper proceeds by first positioning the psychiatric diagnostic and treatment process within philosophical discussions of mood and representationalism in §1. In §2, these psychiatric practices are shown to employ an understanding of moods that is incomplete and inconsistent with the experience of a mood. An alternative understanding of moods is suggested in replacement. Lastly, §3 introduces and argues against psychiatry’s treatment of neurotransmitter imbalances alone. §1.1 – Psychiatry’s Directedness of Moods There is disagreement in the philosophy of mood about whether moods are directed at or about something and are thereby representational. It is frequently believed the main difference
Gnosis | 19.1 (2021)
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