To the Prime Minister of Aruba
The Hague, Jul y 11, 2014 Dear Mr. Eman: 1. Questions In connection with the events in the past few weeks regarding the adoption of the budget of the Country of Aruba for the year 2014, you put the following q uestions to me: 1. 2.
Does the Governor of Aruba have an independent power to defer a national ordinance approved by Aruban Parliament (here: the Budget National Ordinance)? Does it concern here a national affair in which the Governor should act as a national body, or does it concern a Kingdom affair in which the Governor acts as a Kingdom body? In other words , does the legal system of the Charter provide for something like preventive higher supervision by the Kingdom of the budget of the countries?
In response to your questions, I inform you as follows. 2. General comments on the office of governor Backgrounds The regulations governing and the organization of the office of governor, as we know it, go back to the period in which the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam were granted autonom y and the simultaneous introduction of the parliamentary system. The new relationship between these countries and the former motherland the Netherlands was provided for in the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whic h entered into force in December 1954. Further to a proposal of the De la Try Ellis Committee, it was then decided to combine two t ypes of powers in the office of governor: the Governor became both head of the national government and
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representative of th e Kingdom government. 1 This combination of powers in one office is referred to in popular terms as the dual role issue. The combination has not been undisputed. The Antillean constitutional law scholar mr. Carlos Dip was critical of combining two functions in one person, because he considered this situation to be a relic from the colonial past and an infringement of genuine autonom y. 2 In 1993, the Mixed Task Force for the Modernization of the Charter also felt that, in the future, the Governor should no lon ger be Kingdom body as well. 3 However, the regulation s governing the office have not been modified since their introduction. Constitutional basis The office of governor finds its constitutional basis in Article 2 of the Charter. It stipulates that the Kin g reigns over the Kingdom and over each of the countries, and that he, as Head of Government, is represented by the Governor in the Caribbean countries. The King is inviolable; the ministers are responsible. This also applies to the Governor. Insofar as Aruba is concerned, this is also stipulated and confirmed in Article II.1 of the Constitution of Aruba (“CoA”). Governor as a national body Consequentl y, a s substitute of the King, the Governor is the constitutional head of the national government . In that capacit y, he has no independent powers. In general, it is assumed that, internall y, within the framework of his relationship with the ministers, he does have the right to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn, but the opinion of the ministers will be ultimatel y decisive. For this, I tend to use the expression that, as head of the national government, the Governor should ultimatel y sign near the cross. The ratio behind this is that the ministers are the ones whose appointment is the direct resultant of the will of the democraticall y chosen parliamentary majorit y , and that they are the ones who are accountable to the democraticall y chosen parliament. Therefore, they should also be able to determine the acts of the government. The non -independent power of the Governor extends to all his acts as head of government, including both his administrative acts and legislative acts, such as national ordinances. Furthermore, h e may not go public independentl y and propagate his own opinions. Such an act should also be ap proved by the ministers, because they are also ultimatel y responsible for this. Of course, mutual confidence plays an important role as regards the question to what extent and in what wa y concrete coordination always takes place, but the principle applies.
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Fo r a d i sc u s sio n , see in te r a lia A.B . va n R ij n, “S ta at sre c ht v a n d e Ned er la nd se An t ill e n” [ Co n st itu tio n a l La w o f th e Neth er la n d s An t il le s ] , D e ve n ter 1 9 9 9 , p age s 2 2 5 et seq . 2 C.E . D ip , “Go u ver ne ur en mi n is ter i n he t An ti lli aa n se s t aa tsr ec h t” [ G o vern o r a n d Min i ste r in An t il lea n Co n st itu tio n a l La w ] i n : “Lu s tr u m v a n e e n id eaal ” [ F if th An n ive r sa ry o f a n I d ea l ] , W il le ms t ad 1 9 7 6 , p a ge s 7 6 -1 2 0 . 3 “P r o e v e va n ee n ver n ie u wd S ta t u ut vo o r h et Ko ni n k rij k d er Ned er la nd e n” [ S tu d y o f a ren e wed Ch a rt er fo r t h e K in g d o m o f th e N eth e rla n d s ] , T he Ha g ue 1 9 9 3 , p a ge 4 1 .
The aforementioned situation between the head of government and the ministers has been beyond all doubt since the famous Van der Meer affair in the fifties. At the time, Governor of the Netherlands Antilles Strucyken refused to sign the appointment of Va n der Meer as Minister of Justice, because Van der Meer would also continue to act as a lawyer. The Governor did not like this, but after he had been called to The Hague for this, he signed as yet. In connection with the visit to The Hague, Prime Minister Jonckheer declared in Parliament: “Here, the Government is also formed by the Governor and the Council of Ministers, and the Governor should be informed full y of all matters in which he should be involved according to the Constitution, and he may express his views. However, his views will not be decisive.” 4 Governor as a Kingdom body Article 2 of the Charter stipulates that the Governor also is the representative of the government of the Kingdom. This part of his position has been justified further by Kingdom Act; insofar as the Governor of Aruba is concerned, in the Regulations for the Governor of Aruba (“RGA”). In his capacit y as representative of the Kingdom government, the Governor does have independent powers. With a view to the exercise of those powers, the Kingdom government may also give him instructions (Article 15, paragraph 1, RGA). The Governor monitors the general interest of the Kingdom in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations for the Governor (Article 15, RGA). He supervises the compliance with Kingdom legislation (Article 20, RGA). Also, he will not adopt a national ordinance and a national decree submitted to him, when he deems the ordinance to be contrary to the Charter, international regulations, a Kingdom Act, or an order in co uncil for the Kingdom, or to the interests that should be taken care of or safeguarded by the Kingdom (Article 21, RGA). Scope Kingdom powers The scope of the powers of the Governor as a Kingdom body is determined by a number of aspects. The first aspect is that the Governor can onl y exercise powers insofar as they concern the interest and/or right of the Kingdom. Therefore, these powers can onl y lie in the areas that should be considered Kingdom affairs pursuant to the Charter. These Kingdom affairs are listed exhaustivel y in Article 3, paragraph 1, and Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter. They are: foreign relations, defense, Dutch nationalit y, the regulation of the orders of chivalry, the flag and the coat of arms of the Kingdom, the nationalit y of vessels and related topics, aspects of admission and expulsion, extradition, as well as the safeguarding of human rights, legal certaint y, and good governance. Of course, this safeguarding function is an elastic concept; therefore, there will be a discussion as to the scope of that safeguarding function.
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In so fa r a s t h e V a n Rij n af f air i s co n cer ned , s ee o p . ci t. p a g e 2 1 2 .
The second aspect that is of importance in this connection is that the safeguarding function has the character of an ultimate remedy. There is wide consensus on this in the constitutional doctrine. The official Explanatory Memorandum to the Charter to Article 43 states that taking measures appropriate for that purpose is onl y relevant “if these rights and freedoms, this legal certainty, and this good governance do not exist in a country. When assessing the soundne ss of governance, the resources of which the country disposes should, of course, be taken fully into account. Furthermore, it is self -evident that not the failure of any national body alone can entail such a measure. Only if a redress of an unacceptable situation would turn out not to be possible in the country itself, taking a measure may be considered.” According to Borman, this “apparentl y means that the occasional failure of a national body cannot give rise to remedial action by the Kingdom”, and it should also be clear “that the mechanisms to arrive at a correction existing in the constitution of the country itself do not offer solace.” 5 In m y handbook, I stated on this subject that it is not the intention that the supervisor adjusts by “soft” means, but onl y steps in when the system threatens to collapse. This is not already the case when the legislator fails in one area, but onl y when the legislative system no longer functions. 6 Therefore, remedial action is not already relevant when fundamental righ ts and freedoms, legal certainty , or good governance do not exist in all respects. In his letter , “The future of the Kingdom” , of Jul y 15, 2011 to the House of Representatives, with the policy document “ Safeguarding Function Kingdom” attached to it, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Donner presents his view on the safeguarding function of the Kingdom. He also notes that the safeguarding function of Article 43, paragraph 2, of the Charter has the character of an ultimate remedy. 7 Therefore, the policy document makes a plea for great restraint on behalf of the Kingdom: “The purpose of the safeguarding function is not to make the Kingdom and the Kingdom government the ultimate judge in disputes on fundamental rights, legal certainty, and good gov ernance. To activate the safeguarding function, there should be question of a violation of human rights, fundamental freedoms, the system of democratic legal order, or principles of good governance. But not each such violation is sufficient to activate the safeguarding function. The normal mechanism s of legal protection and political control are meant for these situations. By the same token, t he safeguarding function is not intended to be an instrument to supervise the policy as implemented in the other countries. In the eyes of someone who does not agree, each policy rather quickly 5
C. B o r ma n, “ He t S ta t u ut vo o r h et Ko n i n krij k ” [ Th e Ch a r te r fo r th e K i n g d o m ] , 3 rd ed it io n, De ve n ter 2 0 1 2 , p ag e 7 8 . 6 Va n R ij n, o p . c it. p a ge 1 0 2 . 7 P ar li a me n tar y P ap e r s I I , 2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 1 , 3 2 8 5 0 , No . 2 , p a ge 6 .
satisfies the criterion of unsound governance or an infringement of legal certainty. Applying the safeguarding function every time that one does not agree with each other’s polic y will erode the meaning thereof or will erode the autonomy of the countries. Therefore, the safeguarding function certainly does not form a basis to bring up the policy of the islands for discussion in the States General.” 8 In this connection, the Minist er also refers to the fact that Article paragraph 2, Charter does not create an independent power, materializes in the power to annul of Article 50 , Charter and in power to take remedial action in case of neglect of duties of Article Charter.
43, but the 51,
In his letter, “The future of the Kingdom” , of November 26, 2013, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Plasterk once again confirms the contents of the previous policy memorandum and concludes by stating that said policy memorandum is still t opical and does not have to be adjusted. 9 In m y opinion, this is not different for the supervisory powers of the Governor as a Kingdom body. In m y opinion, they should also be read in light of the conclusion that the safeguarding function of the Kingdom pursuant to Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter concerns an ultimate remedy. After all, the supervisory powers of the Governor could be considered to be a specific elaboration of Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter. This means that the Governor should exercise th e powers he has in this connection as described above and with the utmost restraint and in a manner that may not erode the autonomy of the country. The third aspect is that the exercise by the Governor of his Kingdom powers incontestably affects his posit ion as a national body. As a national body, the Governor does not have any independent power. The Kingdom powers of the Governor are inconsistent with this, to say the least, not to mention the fact that the y even interfere with that independent power. The power of the Governor, as substitute of the head of state above the parties, even threatens to be undermined by this. And precisel y in that position as a substitute state of head above the parties, the position of the Governor as part of the national gove rnment finds its legitimacy. For that reason as well, in order not to lose this legitimacy, the Governor should exercise his Kingdom powers with the utmost restraint. So far, a governor officiall y exercised his power pursuant to Article 21 RGA on two occasions. First, shortl y after the Van der Meer affair , a second conflict arose within the then Antillean government about the role of the Governor as 8 9
Ib id ., p a ge 8 . P ar li a me n tar y P ap e r s I I , 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4 , 3 2 8 5 0 , No . 5 .
representative of the Kingdom government with regard to the interpretation of the safeguarding function. This was prompted by the decision (of aforementioned Minister Van der Meer) to revoke the residence permit of the editor -in-chief of the Stock Exchange and News Report, De Wit, a European Dutchman. De Wit wrote displeasing comments to the government. The Gov ernor considered the expulsion of De Wit to be contrary to the freedom of the press and other fundamental rights and refused to sign the revocation decision. Once again, the Governor (this time Speekenbrink) was called to The Hague, where it was concluded, broadl y speakin g, that he had to exercise his K ingdom powers with great restraint, because his independent position as head of the national government could otherwise be jeopardized. By way of compromise, it was decided to seek the advice of the Council of State concerning the concrete difference of opinion between the Minister and the Governor. This request for advice was superseded by earl y elections. 10 The revocation decision was put under a big pile of papers, De Wit later returned to the Netherlands on his own initiative. The opinion that the Governor should exercise restraint when exercising his Kingdom powers was confirmed by the Kingdom government within the framework of a modification of the Regulations for the Governor in 1985. During the parliam entary debate, the Kingdom government noted that an escalation was not likel y, because, in case of reasonable doubts, consultations would be held between the Governor and the Ministers in an earl y stage of the decision-making process already, and because, broadl y speaking, the Governor would be involved in the formation of national ordinances and national decrees in earlier stages already, by virtue of his position within the national government. The government concluded by stating: “For that reason as well , the case in which he proceeds to not adopting aforementioned Regulations will not present itself quickl y.” 11 The Kingdom government also confirmed that, since the De Wit affair, it had not been called anymore to comment on a decision of the Governor not t o adopt a draft national decree. 12 In 1998, Article 12 RGA was invoked once again, when the Governor of Aruba refused to adopt a draft national decree appointing a minister. The Kingdom government then officially confirmed by Royal Decree that the Governor rightl y held that the grounds brought forward by the Governor could support his decision to refuse the appointment of the minister. 13 At the time, this affair caused a great deal of controversy and led to the “Report of the Committee for the Review of the Eligibilit y for Appointment of Aruban Ministers” (the Biesheuvel Committee). This Committee concluded that the appointment of national ministers is an 10
Fo r a co mp r e he n s i ve d es crip tio n o f t he a ffa ir, s ee A. R ei nd e rs, “ P o li ti e ke ge sc h ied e ni s va n d e Ne d er la nd se An ti lle n e n Ar u b a 1 9 5 0 -1 9 9 3 ” [ Po l it ica l H i sto ry o f th e Ne th e rla n d s An ti ll e s a n d Aru b a 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 9 3 ] , Zu tp he n 1 9 9 3 , p a ge s 2 9 et seq . 11 P ar li a me n tar y P ap e r s I I , 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 6 , 1 9 1 0 9 ( R1 2 9 0 ), No . 1 1 , p a ge 1 . 12 P ar li a me n tar y P ap e r s I I , 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 6 , 1 9 1 0 9 ( R1 2 9 0 ), No . 7 , p a ge 1 . 13 Ro ya l D ecr e e o f J u n e 3 0 , 1 9 9 8 , No . 9 8 .0 0 2 9 3 8 , “S tcr t.” [ Go ve rn me n t Ga ze tte ] 1998, 143.
autonomous matter of the country, and that , in a parliamentar y democracy, onl y the Prime Minister or the “formateur” [person who forms the new government together with the Prime Minister and the parliamentary leaders of the parties ] who is politicall y responsible towards Parliament can make a final decision on the eligibilit y for appointment of a minister. Th e Committee added to this that, if the opinion of the Governor deviates from this, this deviating opinion should give rise to careful cons ultation, and that the Prime Minister and the Governor will have to go to extremes to arrive at a joint solution of the problem. In case of an impasse, relative outsiders, such as the Chairman of the Advisory Council, the Chairman of Parliament, or other persons of authorit y within Aruban societ y, should be involved in the consultation. As a last resort, however, the Comm ittee felt that the opinion of the Prime Minister who is responsible towards Parliament should be decisive. Subsequentl y, the report separatel y discusses the role of the Governor. This role was the true reason for the report. The Committee states first and foremost that the appointment of ministers and the care for the soundness of governance are autonomous matters of the country itself, and that, consequently, the role of the Governor is mainl y related to the relations at a national level. He should do ev erything to ensure that the democratic process develops orderl y. The Committee continues: “Only as a last resort is there room for the Governor to activate his role as a body of the Kingdom. The Governor has an independent power in determining in which ca ses this power can be used. His power is limited to the scope of the task of the Kingdom with regard to the safeguarding of the soundness of governance. The interpretation given to Article 43, second paragraph, of the Charter is decisive for this. Taking a measure pursuant to this Article is an ultimate remedy. The Committee is of the opinion that the Kingdom may only take remedial action as a last resort. For the Kingdom government to take remedial action to safeguard the soundness of governance, it should be certain that all possibilities in the country itself have been tried tested and turned out to be unsuccessful. As the requirements of soundness of governance are handled more carefully in the country itself, there will be less or no room for any action on the part of the Kingdom government. In other words, there is a long way to go before one can apply to the Kingdom government.” 14 The letters of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of 2011 and 2013, already cited above, with regard to the safeguarding function of the Kingdom are entirel y in line with this.
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Rep o r t, p a ge s 1 5 /1 6 .
Summary I summarize: • As a national body, the Governor does not have any independent powers. • As a Kingdom body, the Governor does have independent powers as described (mainl y) in the Regulations for the Governor. • The Governor should exercise his Kingdom powers with the utmost restraint, because - each use of Kingdom powers has consequences for his position as a national body and thus for his authorit y as substitute of the King above the parties; - the safeguarding function in connection with fundamental rights, legal certainty, and soundness of governance has the character of an ultimate remedy; - the Governor, by virtue of his position as a national body, should first focus on the internal solution of differences of opinion by using all means before proceeding to exercise any of his Kingdom powers. 3. Answer to question 1 In response to your question whether the Governor of Aruba ha s an independent power to defer a national ordinance approved by Aruban Parliament (he re: the Budget National Ordinance), I note as follows. In his capacit y as constitutional head of the government of Aruba, the Governor does not have any independent power, within the framework of a ratification of a draft national ordinance as referred to in Article V.2 CoA, to refuse placing his signature under the ratification decree, if the Council of Ministers has decided to ratify the draft. In this connection, there is no difference between a budget national ordinance and other national ordinances, for that matter. A budget national ordinance also is a national ordinance within the meaning of Article V.1 CoA. In his capacit y as constitutional head of the national government, however, the Governor does hav e the right to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn. This implies that, after a draft national ordinance has been submitted to him for ratification, he must be given a reasonable period to secure this right to be consulted. The duration of such a period will depend on the degree of consultations already held before and during the process of formation of the national ordinance, and the degree of urgency existing as regards the entry into force of the national ordinance. For the duration of that period, th e Governor cannot be denied the right to defer placing his signature. However, this will fade into the normal administrative process, as a rule , and will not affect the fact that the Governor will have to sign after that period , if the Council of Ministers persists in its opinion.
As regards the power of the Governor as representative of the Kingdom government, I refer to the answer to question 2. 4. Answer to question 2 In response to your question whether it concerns here a matter of state in which the Governor should act as a public body, or whether it concerns a Kingdom affair in which the Governor acts as a Kingdom body (in other words, does the legal system of the Charter provide for something like preventive higher supervision by the Kingdom of the budget of the countries?), I note as follows. The Charter contains an exhaustive list of the matters of the Kingdom. This exhaustive list can be found in Article 3, paragraph 1, Charter and in Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter. Matters not considered a Kingdom matter in the Charter fall u nder the autonom y of the countries . Public finances and the power to adopt the budget are not mentioned in Article 3, paragraph 1, or in Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter and are also not considered a Kingdom matter elsewhere in the Charter. Therefore, these matters fall under the autonom y of the countries. Proof hereof is also formed by the Kingdom Act on Financial Supervision, which intervenes in the financial and budgetary autonom y of the countries of Curaรงao and Sint Maarten. This Kingdom Act is a consensus Kingdom Act and, also according to the preamble, has the status of a voluntary mutual arrangement pursuant to Article 38, paragraph 2, Charter. Pursuant to Article 29, Charter, a specific exception to the financial and budgetary autonom y is onl y formed by contracting loans outside the Kingdom. This should take place in agreement with the Kingdom government. Except for this limitation, the financial and budgetary autonom y are autonomous matters of the countries. This does not affect the fact that, within the framework of the ratification of national ordinances, the Governor, in addition to his independent power as a national body, also has a responsibility by virtue of his powers as a Kingdom body with the meaning as des cribed above. That power onl y extends to the areas that are K ingdom matters. As finances and budgetary matters as such fall under the autonomous matters of the country, the Governor does not have an independent powers with regard to the acting of the legislator and government in these areas, except insofar as it concerns the safeguarding mentioned in Article 43, paragraph 2, Charter, of the legal interests mentioned in Article 43, paragraph 1, Charter: the fundamental human rights and freedoms, the legal c ertaint y, and the soundness of governance. This power may lead to application of Article 21 RGA, but, in my opinion, may onl y be exercised with the utmost restraint, (1) because each use incontestabl y has consequences for the position of the Governor as substitute of the King above the parties, and (2) because the safeguarding function has the character of an ultimate remedy. This last aspect entails that the standard for refusing to place a signature under
the ratification should be very high. There should be question of a situation that goes well beyond an unbalanced budget with problematic points; the budget should be of such a poor qualit y and also form part of such a structural development that the governabilit y of Aruba would be in serious and immediate danger. Furthermore, (3) an attempt must have been made first, by using all means , to discuss and solve the differences of opinion between - in this case - the democraticall y chosen Parliament and the Ministers, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Go vernor, before the Governor would invoke his Kingdom powers. Therefore, there cannot be room for regular preventive higher supervision of the budgets of the countries through the intermediary of the Governor. Such supervision also should not exist within the usual frameworks. After all, finances and budget are the very basis of the econom y. This is also generall y recognized; for this, see the opinion already cited above in the policy memorandum of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of Jul y 15, 2011 that the purpose of the safeguarding function is not to exercise policy-related supervision of the policy as implemented in the other countries . If there reall y is question of a structural threat to the soundness of governance, and voluntary arrangements do not offer solace, remedial action based on Article 51 would, eventuall y, be the appropriate channel . Control via a Governor who refuses to place his signature is not the appropriate channel, in m y opinion. As regards the deferral that forms the specific reason of this advice, I note as follows. Based on the information available to me, I do not have a good grasp of whether and to what extent an attempt has been made by using all possible means to solve internall y the differences of opinion betw een the Government and the Governor, also with the assistance of external parties. Therefore, I will not continue discussing this aspect . It is important, however, that, once the Governor has decided to defer, the procedure of Article 21 , RGA should also continue to be applied, and , consequentl y, the Kingdom government should be notified immediatel y (also see hereinafter). The obligation of - briefl y stated - a dialogue therefore pertains to the period before exercising the power to defer and cannot give rise to postponing the notification of a decision already deferred. Subsequentl y, I do understand based on your information that the deficit in the budget national ordinance as a result of the implementation of the balanced budget agreement of November 2013 and the austerit y measures introduced and to be introduced based on that is significantl y less high than in previous years, and that the individual budget items can be considered to be realistic. In accordance with the balanced budget agreement, it is also endeavored to accomplish a balanced budget in 2017. On balance, realistic efforts are therefore being made by the Government and Parliament to arrive at the reorganization of public
finances, and there is question of a significant improvement compared to previous years , and a continuing upward trend has also been scheduled for the years to come. Against this background, I can hardl y imagine that the 2014 budget jointl y supported by Parliament and the Government could form a basis to conclude that, becaus e of the financial policy laid down in it, the governabilit y of Aruba, also compared to previous years, would be such an immediate threat to the soundness of governance that this would justify the refusal to sign by invoking Article 21 , RGA. This is all the more persuasive given that finances and budget matters concern one of the core areas of the autonom y. Therefore, the risk of eroding the autonom y is even more realistic when exercising the power pursuant to Article 21, RGA. In other words, additional restraint is all the more applicable in this case. I conclude by making the following more procedural comments on the application of Article 21 , RGA. 1. Insofar as the attitude of the Governor would have its origins in positions and wishes of the Kingdom government, the Governor has an independent discretionary power and responsibilit y within the framework of Article 21 , RGA. 2. This discretionary power pursuant to Article 21 , RGA could onl y be crossed by designations given by or pursuant to Royal Decree, wh ich contain further criteria for whether or not signing decrees (Article 15, paragraph 1, RGA). In m y opinion, such designations should not exceed the aforementioned framework for the application of the safeguarding function. In other words, the designatio ns should be in line with the axiom of utmost restraint. 3. Furthermore, such designations do not affect the fact that, for using the power of Article 21, RGA, the provisions given in that Article appl y. This means that not signing, also if this not signin g is based on a designation, should then lead to a notification that is given “promptl y ”, and that the Council of State of the Kingdom is hea rd, after which the Kingdom government officiall y decides. The procedure prescribed by Article 21, RGA should therefore always be followed. It serves a careful decision-making process, is mandatory by nature , and cannot be set aside by designations. 4. For this reason, it is also important that the Governor, once he decides to defer the adoption of the budget national ordinance, should indeed immediatel y notify the Kingdom government hereof. In this case, the Governor informed the Minister of Finance and Government Organization by letter of June 26, 2014 that he would defer the budget national ordinance. Meanwhile, 16 d ays have expired. Such a long deferral term is debatable, in m y opinion, if , meanwhile, this has not been followed by a formal notification to the Kingdom government. 5. The arrangements between the Netherlands and Aruba, as laid down in the press release of J ul y 3, 2014, do not contain any passage from which it could be concluded that one or more of the measures to be taken form
a condition for the Governor signing the 2014 budget national ordinance or not. Paragraph 6 rather shows that, meanwhile, the already adopted budget can be ratified permanentl y, now that the next reports will apparentl y lead to additional budgets with their own legislative process. Moreover, direct arrangements between the governments of Aruba and the Netherlands cannot affect the G overnor’s own power, in principle, pursuant to Article 21 , RGA. This is m y advice. Of course, I am willing to provide any further explanation you may require. With kind regards, [was signed:] Prof. dr. Arjen van Rijn Endowed Professor Constitutional Law and Political Renewal