33 minute read
Alligator: The Forgotten Torchbearer of the U.S. Submarine Force
(above) “The Launching – 1 May 1862” by Jim Christley. This original painting by Mr. Christley depicts the first launching of Alligator in 1862. Courtesy of the Independence Seaport Museum, Philadelphia, Pa.
Advertisement
With his ship wallowing in a Nor’easter off the coast of
Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, J. F. Winchester, the captain of the wooden screw steamer USS Sumpter, was faced with a difficult decision − whether to continue on his mission to join the Union attack on Charleston, South Carolina, towing a revolutionary submersible whose likely foundering threatened to sink Sumpter herself – or to cut the towline and save his own ship. Shortly after noon on April 2, 1863, he made his decision, and his tow was set adrift, allowing Sumpter to fight another day. And with that decision, Winchester sent the U.S. Navy’s first submarine – Alligator – to its final resting place among thousands of other wrecks in the “Graveyard of the Atlantic” off Cape Hatteras and – unwittingly – removed Alligator from the annals of naval history for almost 140 years.
The story of the United States’ first submarine does not begin with John Holland – commonly regarded as the father of the U.S. Submarine Force – but with an immigrant inventor from France named Brutus de Villeroi. Little is known about the oftentimes eccentric de Villeroi – why he was in the United States, what his profession was, or even what he looked like. (No photograph or painting of him remains today.) However, we do know that de Villeroi had been experimenting with submersible designs in France as far back as 1832 and that in the 1860 U.S. Census, he listed his occupation – correctly or not – as a “natural genius.”
De Villeroi and his submarine first appeared in the United States on the Delaware River in May 1861. On May 18, The Philadelphia Inquirer ran a front-page article describing an “infernal machine” that had suddenly appeared in the waters off the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Alarmed, the harbor police, acting upon rumors that the 33-foot, cigar-shaped vessel was intent on sabotage, impounded the mysterious boat. 1 Moreover, unsure of de Villeroi’s intentions and loyalty to the Union, the harbor police arrested him and his crew and turned the unusual vessel over to Navy officials for inspection. Philadelphia Navy Yard commandant Capt. Samuel F. DuPont appointed three officers to examine the vessel, question de Villeroi, and report their findings. The three officers chosen by Capt. DuPont were Cmdr. Henry Hoff, an expert in ship design; Cmdr. Charles Steedman, an expert in naval warfare; and Robert Danby, a naval engineer. The panel reported their findings on July 7, 1861 in what was dubbed the Hoff Report.
The Hoff Report stated that de Villeroi’s vessel was seaworthy and had shown four important features during their testing. These were the ability to surface and submerge, the capability to remain underwater for a substantial length of time without exposing anything on the surface, provision for a man to leave and return to the vessel while both remained submerged, and an exterior breathing tube connected to the vessel that allowed a diver to survive outside the submarine underwater. Apparently, de Villeroi’s submersible was equipped with a diver lockout chamber, originally incorporated for salvage efforts. Confirming these successes, the Hoff
Report slowly began making the rounds inside the Navy.
During this time, de Villeroi wrote letters to both the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, and President Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln’s letter was forwarded to the Navy Department and Secretary Welles instructed Commodore Joseph Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, to provide a response. Commodore Smith reported that it was too small to test as a weapon and recommended that a larger version be constructed on a “no- paymentfor-failure” basis. A contract for the construction of the submarine was signed on November 1, 1861 by Secretary Welles and one Martin Thomas – a contractor who acted on behalf of de Villeroi. The contract stipulated that “The party of the first part will construct and deliver to the party of the second part within forty (40) days from the date of this agreement, an Iron Submarine Propeller of the plan of M. de Villeroi, at least fifty-six inches (56”) in width and sixty-six (66”) inches in height and fortyfive feet in length, for the sum of fourteen thousand dollars to be paid when completed and delivered, ready for use within ten days after delivery and certificate is in all respects ready for service.”
Essentially, the Navy and de Villeroi had entered into a contract with a seemingly impossible schedule. De Villeroi was to deliver a submarine to the Navy a mere 40 days after the contract was signed.
Construction began without incident soon thereafter, and by December 7, de Villeroi reported – via letter – to Commodore Smith that the submarine was nearly completed. De Villeroi went on, however, to explain that the construction timeline would likely need to be extended, because parts of the interior were not yet complete. He attempted to justify the delay by stating that the contractor, Thomas, had not scheduled the construction properly and that the project was unlike any the shipyard had ever pursued before. Unfortunately, excuses were not what Commodore Smith wanted to hear as he grew increasingly frustrated with de Villeroi.
To mediate the growing dispute between de Villeroi and Thomas, William Hirst, a Philadelphia lawyer, was called in. Hirst helped to negotiate a 15-day extension beginning on December 10th. Even so, the situation began to spiral downward. Commodore Smith stood his ground on the delivery date and with good reason: Norfolk had fallen to the Confederates and the iron-clad CSS Virginia was finished and ready to enter service against the Union’s blockading force. In several heated exchanges, Smith and de Villeroi bickered over the root cause of the problems: the lack of funds to work nights and weekends, the need for a larger construction crew, and more importantly, the contractor Thomas himself. De Villeroi ended his letter by requesting direct contact with Smith, and not through the contractor, so that they might more quickly and easily resolve remaining differences.
This request made an already angry Smith even more irate. In a letter dated January 3, 1862, Smith explained to de Villeroi that he could have no direct contact with him and that all correspondence must go through the contractor. Smith went on to explain that the government could only deal directly with the contractor himself, which was – and is still – standard procedure in most procurement matters.
The extension granted to de Villeroi in December 1861 came and went without the boat being delivered. De Villeroi blamed the delay on not having specific materials needed to produce certain “secrets” mentioned in the original contract and now in the possession of lawyer Hirst.
Although it is not entirely clear what these “secrets” were, they most likely included an air purification system, which would increase the amount of time the submarine could stay submerged, and a battery system to detonate mines remotely.
In a letter written to Smith on January 18th, de Villeroi stated that that once he received the lead and platina – a platinum alloy – he needed, the submarine would be completed. He further stated that because the original delivery date and extensions had passed, Thomas’ services would no longer be necessary and that he and Smith could finally work together directly. Four
days later on January 22nd, de Villeroi received Smith’s reply. Smith declared that de Villeroi would receive no more funding for the submarine until it was delivered and tested, and he continued to stress the importance of retaining the contractor. Commodore Smith then wrote Thomas directly to note that if the submarine was not finished in three or four days and ready to be shipped on the soon-to-depart USS Rhode Island, the submarine would no longer be useful to the Navy, because CSS Virginia – the ironclad the submarine was designed to counter – was out of dry dock and entering sea trials in Norfolk.
On January 29th, the submarine was reported ready for launching. However, according to a report from Thomas, the launch had to be delayed due to problems with the oars. A contradictory letter sent by de Villeroi stated that the delay resulted from ice on the river. During the interim, the submarine was painted dark green on the outside – a factor that would later contribute to Alligator’s name – and white inside.
Two days later – faced by the imminence of the Virginia threat – Smith sent yet another letter to de Villeroi stating that although the submarine would no longer be useful to the war effort, the time and effort put into producing the boat made it worthwhile at least to put it through its paces in sea trials. In his letter, Commodore Smith also made a seemingly innocuous statement that markedly improved de Villeroi’s legal position: He told de Villeroi that the contractor was to provide everything needed to finish the project. This essentially gave de Villeroi an “out,” and he immediately responded with a veritable laundry list of items needed to complete construction – including explosives, hydraulic jacks, platina, a telescope, and a chest of tools. He also complained bitterly about Thomas, noting “unethical” discussions the latter had held with scientists, spending insufficient money to maintain the schedule, and the overall expense of the project, which de Villeroi claimed was far less than the award value of the original $14,000 contract.
While de Villeroi’s letter was on its way to Commodore Smith, the commodore informed Thomas formally that the contract was in default, and thus that the submarine would not be received by the Navy until “further opportunities avail themselves” − at which time the agreement would be renegotiated. When de Villeroi learned of this development, he immediately sent another letter to Smith saying that as he was still an employee of the government and therefore entitled to pay
Brutus de Villeroi sent this cover letter to the Emperor of France, Napoleon III, to sell his proposal for a new and improved design for an oar-powered submarine. This cover letter accompanied the enclosure that described a new 125- foot long submarine that was far more ambitious than Alligator.
until such time as the Navy revoked his nomination as engineer of the project.
Continuing this seemingly endless string of letters, Smith then wrote de Villeroi explaining their unique situation and that the contract was forfeited because the delivery date had not been met. Smith closed his letter by stating that the project would be stopped and would remain so until de Villeroi and Thomas came to terms and delivered a boat and crew for testing. This letter caused an uproar, sending Hirst into a furious – but ultimately fruitless – letter-writing campaign to mediate the differences between Thomas and de Villeroi, while de Villeroi himself went into seclusion. In a last ditch attempt to salvage the work and his own pride, he wrote directly to President Lincoln, requesting that he be made “commander of the Propeller.” Not surprisingly, the Frenchman never received a response.
On April 18, 1862, Commodore Smith was informed that the U.S. Navy’s first submarine was finally ready. However, it took almost another two months before the Navy and Mr. Samuel Eakin – the submarine’s first commander – took delivery of the boat on June 13th. She emerged as a truly unique vessel with a length of 47’, a beam of 4’8”, and a height of 5’6”. The original propulsion system – oars – required 22 sailors, but later, when she was retrofitted with a screw propeller, this number dropped to eight. The boat was equipped with an innovative air
In 2002, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) began the search for Alligator in a joint project that has been dubbed “The Hunt for the Alligator”.
The following outlines some of the important milestones in the search for the long-forgotten first U.S. submarine.
• May 2002 – Then-Chief of Naval Research, Rear Adm. Jay Cohen; Daniel Basta, director of NOAA’s National Marine Sanctuary Program; and Dr. Robert Ballard, founder and president of the Institute for Exploration discuss an article on Alligator first noticed by Mrs. Cohen, wife of Rear Adm. Cohen.
•June 2002 – Rear Adm. Cohen initiates a historical research project to glean information on Alligator.
• July 2002– February 2003 – ONR’s Cmdr. Richard Poole leads an intensive research effort at the Library of Congress, National Archives, and Naval Historical Center. He is assisted by Jim Christley, a former submariner, and Mark Ragan.
• August–September 2004 – ONR and NOAA researchers analyze historical documents, in particular those regarding the weather conditions during the loss of Alligator. With this information an oceanographic chart is prepared indicating where the vessel may have sunk.
• February 2003 – Cmdr. Poole and Mr. Christley conduct a two-day historical research trip to Philadelphia. They find information regarding Brutus de Villeroi, Alligator’s designer.
• May 2003 – NOAA’s Catherine Marzin obtains original letters and blueprints drafted by de Villeroi from the Service Historique de la Marine in Vincennes, France. The blueprints are the only plans of Alligator known to exist.
• October 2003 – ONR and NOAA hold the first-ever symposium on Alligator in Groton, Conn.
• August 23–29 2004 – Researchers from ONR, NOAA, and East Carolina University conduct the first ever comprehensive search for Alligator. The search took place off Cape Hatteras, N.C. and was conducted from ONR’s YP679 “Afloat Lab.” Based on sonar and magnetic data collected, several target areas were identified for further exploration.
• September 6–10 2005 – Based on a side-scan survey conducted in the spring of 2005, several target areas were investigated by a team of researches aboard “Afloat Lab.” The information collected is being processed and analyzed for future explorations.
• September 2005-Present – The hunt continues.
purification system and a diver lockout chamber which allowed for a diver to leave the submarine and clear obstructions or plant mines; both features were part of de Villeroi’s innovative original design.
Since Virginia had already been scuttled by her crew during the Confederate retreat from Norfolk, the Union submarine’s original mission had been overtaken by events. However, it was given the task of clearing obstacles in the James River – to allow Union vessels to sail upriver and aid in the bombardment of Richmond – and destroying a railroad bridge at Petersburg. It was during this time that the submarine rather unceremoniously acquired the name, Alligator. From 1861 to 1862, she had been referred to by several other names, including Propeller, Submarine Propeller, and Submarine Boat. However, a newspaper report from the spring of 1862 had called the craft Alligator because of its green color and because it propelled itself through the water via two banks of oars; and the name stuck. After further consideration, both the James River and Petersburg missions were cancelled. Because of the depth of the James and Appomattox rivers – less than seven feet at some points – Alligator would have been forced to operate semi-submerged, exposing it to attack from shore and possible capture by the Confederates, a risk no one was willing to take. On June 29, having spent a total of only eight days in a “combat zone” and with no new missions assigned, Alligator was transferred – under tow – to the Washington Navy Yard for further testing.
From August through December of 1862, Alligator was put through its paces in Washington. These tests resulted in the replacement of the oar propulsion system with a more conventional propeller, which doubled the top speed of Alligator from two to four knots. During this time, the civilian crew was replaced by one furnished by the Navy and command was given to Lt. Thomas Selfridge.
With the beginning of spring in 1863 came a new mission for Alligator and her crew: to clear obstacles around Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor and attack the ironclads CSS Chicora and CSS Palmetto State, which had been positioned by the Confederacy to escort supply ships into Charleston harbor and lift the blockade.
On March 31st, a crewless Alligator began her voyage to Charleston and Fort Sumter under tow from – fittingly – USS Sumpter. 2 During the voyage, the weather quickly worsened into a storm unlike any Sumpter’s commander, J.F. Winchester, had ever seen. On April 2nd, the port towline parted. As a result, the submarine pitched and yawed violently and she began to take on water through broken portholes – recently added during her winter in Washington – and loosened plates in her hull. As Alligator continued to take on water and started to sink, she threatened to drag Sumpter down with her. The tow ship had no other option but to set Alligator adrift with the hope that she might stay afloat long enough to be recovered after the storm. Alligator was cut free shortly after noon on April 2nd, and as Sumpter steamed away – fighting against the storm – Alligator slipped over the horizon, never to be seen again.
The attack on Charleston and the two Confederate ironclads commenced three days later and – without Alligator – was a major failure. Three months later, the Confederates launched their own submarine of a design similar to Alligator, CSS H.L. Hunley, in Mobile, Ala. It would later become the first submersible to sink an enemy warship, when it destroyed USS Housatonic at Charleston on February 17, 1864. While Alligator was never commissioned, she had the distinction of being “the first” in many areas for the U.S. Navy. She was the first submarine ordered and built by the Navy and the first to have a diver lockout chamber, to deploy to a combat zone, to be commanded by a U.S. naval officer, and to undergo an overhaul at a U.S. naval shipyard – just to name a few.
Following the war, the United States concluded that a submarine force was not needed to protect her territorial waters for the foreseeable future. This belief, along with de Villeroi’s retreat to private life and subsequent death in 1874, helped to push the idea of establishing a submarine force to the back burner of the Navy’s consciousness for another quarter century.
Mr. Smith is the Managing Editor of UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine and an analyst with Anteon Corporation in Washington, D.C.
Endnotes: 1 This submarine was built by de Villeroi on his own accord for salvage purposes. However, he recognized the potential for military use and took it upon himself to exhibit it for the Navy.
2 There’s a curious anomaly in the spelling of “Sumter.” The famous fort in Charleston Harbor has always been spelled Sumter. The ship that towed Alligator was really spelled Sumpter and may even have been named after the fort (with a misspelling). There were subsequent Sumters in the U.S. Navy, but never another Sumpter.
Bibliography:
Friedman, Norman, U.S. Submarines Through 1945 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995).
Christley, Jim. “U.S. Naval Submarine Operations during the American Civil War.” Jan. 3, 2006. <http://www.navyandmarine.org/ondeck/ 1862alligator.html>.
Hunt for the Alligator. Jan. 9, 2006. <http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/alligator/hunt2004/welcome.html>.
The Story of the Alligator. Jan. 10, 2006. <http://www.navyandmarine.org/alligator/story.htm>.
USS Alligator. Jan. 9, 2006 <http://www.sanctuaries. noaa.gov/alligator/>.
Courtesy of Service Historique de la Marine and NOAA
Pearl Harbor Sub Participates in Undersea Warfare Exercise with ESG
by Petty Officer 2nd Class Corwin Colbert
The nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Pasadena (SSN-752) participated in an Undersea Warfare Exercise (USWEX) with the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 3 near Hawaii Feb. 21-24.
Pasadena Commanding Officer, Cmdr. John Heatherington, said the exercise provided his crew with valuable experience.
“We had the chance to experience realistic submarine combat conditions,” said Heatherington. “We were also able to provide and assess crucial submarine warfare training to the ESG, submarine squadron and crew.”
USWEX is an exercise that assesses the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of a carrier or expeditionary strike group, including the command and control of air, surface, subsurface and theater assets. The Peleliu ESG’s exercise was planned by the Pearl Harbor-based Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force Pacific, or CTF 12.
“USWEX is designed to evaluate, at a fleet level, how good we are at ASW,” said Lt. Cmdr. Mark Knollmueller, CTF 12’s air operations officer.
CTF 12 coordinates with multiple commands to incorporate surface, air and sub-surface assets to provide situational awareness of submarine activity throughout the Pacific.
“For this exercise, CTF 12 did the majority of the planning, such as coordination with many different commands, federal agencies and facilities,” said Knollmueller. “It evaluates the Navy’s ASW capabilities.”
Aboard Pasadena, Heatherington said that the Pearl Harbor-based submarine acted as the opposition force for the exercise, helping the Peleliu ESG prepare for its upcoming operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. He also said USWEX is the closest you get to actual battle without firing live rounds.
“Our part was to simulate a real world submarine threat,” he said. “We gave the ESG the opportunity to conduct ASW operations as a team.”
Knollmueller emphasized that submarines are a serious threat in today’s world and it is a high area of concern in the fleet.
“Threats from opposing submarines are lethal. With more and more countries purchasing submarines, we must stay alert, and that is why the fleet and specifically the ESG did this exercise,” he said.
In a speech last month to the Asia Society in Washington, Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Gary Roughead noted that because there are about 140 diesel submarines operating in the Pacific, ASW is his top warfighting priority, and a capability for that requires constant training.
“We, as a Navy, are good at anti-submarine warfare. We can always get better, and that’s what we’re doing because we have to be able to dominate that growing submarine capability,” Roughead said.
ESG 3 includes Peleliu, USS Reuben James (FFG-57), USS Port Royal (CG73), USS Gonzales (DDG-66), USS Ogden (LPD-5), USS Germantown (LSD42), and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The six ships and nearly 6,000 Sailors and Marines departed San Diego Feb. 15 for a six-month deployment.
During pre-deployment training in January, the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN-758) joined the ESG 3 ships for 13 days off the coast of Southern California. Though Asheville is not actually part of the strike group, the exercise helped to prepare the ESG commander to effectively employ a submarine if needed.
Changes of Command
USS Columbus (SSN-762) Cmdr. Charles Marquez relieved Cmdr. Michael Ryan
USS Louisiana (SSBN-743)(B) Cmdr. Blake L. Converse relieved Cmdr. John K. McDowell
USS Key West (SSN-722) Cmdr. Thomas E. Ishee will relieve Capt. Kenneth R. Sault
Qualified for Command
Lt. Cmdr. Sean Fujimoto USS Louisville (SSN-724)
Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Harrington USS Nevada (SSBN-733)(G)
Lt. Cmdr. Steven Mathews SUBRON-8
Lt. Cmdr. Sean Muth SUBDEVRON-12
Lt. Cmdr. Patrick Olsen USS Key West (SSN-722)
Lt. Cmdr. Adam Palmer USS Albuquerque (SSN-706)
Lt. Cmdr. Matthew Phelps USS Minneapolis-St. Paul (SSN-708)
Lt. Cmdr. Edward Robledo USS Maryland (SSBN-738)(B)
Lt. Cmdr. Jason Schneider SUBRON-2
Lt. Corey Thompson USS Maryland (SSBN-738)(B)
Lt. William Wertz SUBRON-4
Line Officers Qualified in Submarines
Lt. David Campbell USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Lt. j.g. Brian Bernard USS Albany (SSN-753)
Lt. j.g. Andrew Carter USS Philadelphia (SSN-690)
Lt. j.g. Robert Chedester USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Lt. j.g. Brian Datko USS Providence (SSN-719)
Lt. j.g. Paul Easton USS Montpelier (SSN-765)
Lt. j.g. Michael Eliason USS Los Angeles (SSN-688)
Lt. j.g. Matthew Endress USS Minneapolis-St. Paul (SSN-708)
Lt. j.g. Joseph Fackrell USS Bremerton (SSN-698)
Lt. j.g. Peter Gaal USS Philadelphia (SSN-690)
Lt. j.g. Jonathan Gandy USS Honolulu (SSN-718)
Lt. j.g. Preston Gilmore USS West Virginia (SSBN-736)(G)
Lt. j.g. Ronald Gramlisch USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(B)
Lt. j.g. Christian Heiss USS Annapolis (SSN-760)
Lt. j.g. Christopher Henson USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Joshua Henri USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723)
Lt. j.g. Andrew Hoversten USS West Virginia (SSBN-736)(G)
Lt. j.g. Bryan Hudock USS Hartford (SSN-768)
Lt. j.g. Aaron Kakiel USS Hartford (SSN-768)
Lt. j.g. John Kerchner USS Hampton (SSN-767)
Lt. j.g. Jonathan King USS Annapolis (SSN-760)
Lt. j.g. Michael Lopresti USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)
Lt. j.g. Ryan Martin USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)
Lt. j.g. Matthew McCue USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Lt. j.g. Christopher Mendoza USS Montpelier (SSN-765)
Lt. j.g. David Mensing USS Albany (SSN-753)
Lt. j.g. Peter Nehl USS Dallas (SSN-700)
Lt. j.g. Matthew Opfer USS Tennessee (SSBN-734)(G)
Lt. j.g. Dong Park USS Minneapolis-St. Paul (SSN-708)
Lt. j.g. Matthew Pelar USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)
Lt. j.g. Reginald Preston USS Helena (SSN-725)
Lt. j.g. James Prosek USS Los Angeles (SSN-688) Lt. j.g. Brian Rhoades USS Seawolf (SSN-21)
Lt. j.g. Randy Rogers USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723)
Lt. j.g. Luke Saladyga USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Brian Sofen USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Paul Stence, Jr.. SUBRON-6
Lt. j.g. David Stopp USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Lt. j.g. Sean Thorne USS Annapolis (SSN-760)
Lt. j.g. Errol Watson, Jr. USS Hyman G. Rickover (SSN-709)
Lt. j.g. Paul Will USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Qualified Nuclear Engineer Officer
Lt. Cameron Aljilani USS Helena (SSN-725)
Lt. Taniel Anderson USS Nevada (SSBN-733)(G)
Lt. Eric Astle USS Cheyenne (SSN-773)
Lt. Joshua Collins USS Asheville (SSN-758)
Lt. Robert Garis USS Olympia (SSN-717)
Lt. Nicholas Lenczycki USS Maine (SSBN-741)(B)
Lt. Michael Moore USS Buffalo (SSN-715)
Lt. Paul Rose USS Buffalo (SSN-715)
Lt. Thomas Sheldon USS Bremerton (SSN-698)
Lt. Iradj Stroble USS Cheyenne (SSN-773)
Lt. Danny Stubbs USS Houston (SSN-713)
Lt. Phillip Sylvia USS Chicago (SSN-721)
Lt. j.g. Richard Arledge USS Louisiana (SSBN-743)(G)
Lt. j.g. Christopher Ault USS Louisville (SSN-724) Lt. j.g. Scott Becker USS Asheville (SSN-758)
Lt. j.g. Brian Borillo USS Jefferson City (SSN-759)
Lt. j.g. Darrell Brown USS Buffalo (SSN-715)
Lt. j.g. Casey Caldwell USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(B)
Lt. j.g. Gilbert Canton USS Honolulu (SSN-718)
Lt. j.g Justin Carrell USS Los Angeles (SSN-688)
Lt. j.g. Neil Cayabyab USS Alabama (SSBN-731)(G)
Lt. j.g. Michael Charnota USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735)(B)
Lt. j.g. Joshua Chisholm USS San Francisco (SSN-711)
Lt. j.g. Caleb Cramer USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. David Crescitelli USS Alabama (SSBN-731)(G)
Lt. j.g. Christopher Curatolo USS Topeka (SSN-754)
Lt. j.g. John Eisenbraun USS Nebraska (SSBN-739)(G)
Lt. j.g. Phillip Emery USS Kentucky (SSBN-737)(G)
Lt. j.g. Christopher Fendley USS Tucson (SSN-770)
Lt. j.g. Jeremy Fields USS Kentucky (SSBN-737)(B)
Lt. j.g. William Gardner USS Olympia (SSN-717)
Lt. j.g. John Genta USS Chicago (SSN-721)
Lt. j.g. Ivan Geroy USS Nebraska (SSBN-739)(B)
Lt. j.g. Adam Hattersley USS Columbus (SSN-762)
Lt. j.g. Nicholas Herman USS Alabama (SSBN-731)(G)
Lt. j.g. Erick Johnson USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(B)
Lt. j.g. Benjamin Kim USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735)(B)
Lt j.g. Eric Kleen USS Bremerton (SSN-698) Lt. j.g. Bradley Krack USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705)
Lt. j.g. Ryan Lamonica USS Alabama (SSBN-731)(B)
Lt. j.g. Jeffrey Loebach USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(G)
Lt. j.g. Gregory Marcinko USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN-730)(B)
Lt. j.g. Angel Martinez USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Charles Mello USS Jefferson City (SSN-759)
Lt. j.g. Mathew Merten USS Michigan (SSGN-727)
Lt. j.g. Matthew Mooshegian USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(G)
Lt. j.g. Samuel Nakamine USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735)(B)
Lt. j.g. Justin Nassiri USS Alaska (SSBN-732)(G)
Lt. j.g. Joshua Nevin USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Lester Patterson USS Helena (SSN-725)
Lt. j.g. Charles Phillips USS Pasadena (SSN-752)
Lt. j.g. Jeffrey Poirier USS Greeneville (SSN-772)
Lt. j.g. Sean Ponder USS Salt Lake City (SSN-716)
Lt. j.g. Bryan Reed USS Chicago (SSN-721)
Lt. j.g. Joshua Smith USS City of Corpus Christi (SSN-705)
Lt. j.g. James Southerton USS Los Angeles (SSN-688)
Lt. j.g. Chad Summe USS Topeka (SSN-754)
Lt. j.g. Keith Thompson USS Nevada (SSBN-733)(G)
Lt. j.g. Mark Treen USS Maine (SSBN-741)(B)
Lt. j.g. David Wakayama USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN-730)(B)
Lt. j.g. Scott Washburn USS Louisville (SSN-724)
Lt. j.g. Michael Weber USS Nebraska (SSBN-739)(B)
Qualified Surface Warfare Officer
Ens. George Cantu USS Emory S. Land (AS-39)
Ens. Jeffrey Carideo USS Emory S. Land (AS-39)
Supply Corps Officer Qualified in Submarines
Lt. j.g. Ian Iliff USS Augusta (SSN-710)
Lt. j.g. Raymond Slusar USS Newport News (SSN-750)
Limited Duty Officer Qualified in Submarines
Lt. Corey Hurd USS Dolphin (AGSS-555)
Engineering Duty Officer Qualified in Submarines
Lt. j.g. Jack Tappe PSNY & IMF
DESI: Diesel Electric Submarine Initiative A Partnership for Global Security continued from page 20
A Global Transformation after 9/11
The events of September 11, 2001, have done more to make the United States a international security partner than any other event in recent history. In their Nov. 2005 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, Vice Adm. John G. Morgan Jr., and Rear Adm. Charles W. Martoglio noted, “It will take a fleet in excess of 1,000 ships to address all the new challenges, more complex contingencies, and broader range of maritime missions. The challenge is for individual nations to come together by determining where their national interests intersect and to determine what contribution they can make to this already-emerging network to meet those common interests. Plugging into a regional or global maritime network will not be a one-size-fits-all proposition.”
“Capabilities that cover the spectrum from blue-water operations to maritime law enforcement will play important roles in delivering the kind of maritime security that is helpful to the global community, and that means virtually every nation can contribute in some way to security in the maritime domain,” the Proceedings article noted. “While individual navies have vastly different capabilities, it is their synergy when voluntarily coordinating maritime activities that yields a network in which regional and local results are determined by regional and local interests.”
“Maritime Security” used to begin and end at a country’s territorial waters or national boarders. Transnational threats, environmental attacks, human trafficking, or failed states weren’t expected. But the days of relatively simple maritime security and well defined threats are gone.
“I think the real potential of Sea Power lies in exploring those kinds of possibilities, while developing global awareness,” said Adm. Mullen during his August speech. “It is about international maritime relationships founded on understanding and trust, enduring relationships that bloom into partnerships. Our vision is…and ought to be…to extend the peace through an interconnected community of maritime nations working together. The enemy goes global. So should we.”
Chief Petty Officer Fliesen supports the COMSUBLANT Public Affairs Office in Norfolk, Va.
Virginia-class Submarine Program Team Wins 2005 Defense Standardization Program Office (DSPO) Achievement Award by Team Submarine Public Affairs
The Defense Standardization Program Office (DSPO) (SSN-774), was delivered on October 12, 2005. When Virginia recently selected the Program Executive Office for Submarines’ was delivered to the Navy it was the best logistically prepared Virginia-class Submarine Program Team (VCSPT) as Navy lead ship of any class, as evident from the Board of Inspection recipients of the 2005 DSPO Achievement Award. and Survey results.
DSPO annually recognizes individuals and organizations One metric of success is PMS 450’s $27 million investment from military departments and defense agencies that have in parts standardization. The Navy estimates that this will result achieved significant improvements in interoperability, cost in a cost avoidance of up to $789 million over the life of the reduction, quality, reliability, and readiness through standardVirginia-class Program. The impact of this and other standardization. DSPO also holds an annual ceremony to congratulate ization successes has lead to projected cost avoidance of $80 winners of this award. This year’s ceremony will be held during million for the SSGN submarines, and $72 million for USS the Department of Defense Standardization Conference schedJimmy Carter (SSN-23). uled for May 23, 2006. The project has not only saved taxpayers hundreds of millions
VCSPT won the DSPO Achievement Award for its work in of dollars, but has enhanced the Navy’s reputation for sound Life Cycle Savings Through Standardization (LCSTS) project. stewardship of public shipbuilding and acquisition funds. This program turned to standardization to reduce the overall “Receiving the DSPO Achievement Award validates the acquisition, operation, and maintenance costs of the VirginiaVirginia-class program’s on-going efforts to reduce costs by class program. Consequently, the Virginia-class Program Office streamlining the construction process,” said Rear Adm. William (PMS450) Integrated Product and Process Development stratH. Hilarides, Program Executive Officer (Submarines). “The egy was able to reduce PMS 450’s overall logistics footprint. Program Office is working tirelessly,” the Admiral continued,
The LCSTS project also condensed the Virginia-class subma“so that we can deliver these tremendous platforms to the warrine parts library before the first ship of the class, USS Virginia fighter without overburdening the taxpayers.”
The Art of the Possible – Communications at Speed and Depth continued from page 11
the communications. Additional testing off the Hawaiian Islands in the fall demonstrated a submarine-deployed long-range acoustic pager, which would allow a submarine to be “on call” while performing operations at considerable speed and depth, much greater than those at which the BCA can be used. Follow-on demonstrations in 2006 will showcase expendable, fiber-tethered communications buoys that provide the submarine a two-way, telephone-like capability to respond to the acoustic pager without interrupting its normal operations at speed and depth.
The Submarine Force’s highest priority needs will be addressed using the technology and budget available in the near-term. More complex and innovative technology solutions will be budgeted and developed for mid-term deployment. In the far-term, the fielded capability would fully implement performance objective requirements.
“About 90 percent of everything we’re looking at so far,” Richter offered, “is aimed at all in-service nuclear submarines – attack subs [SSNs], ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs], and the four Ohio [SSBN-726]-class ‘boomers’ that are being converted to SSGNs configuration. Only about 10 percent of the solutions are class-specific, and those typically consist of the larger towed communications buoys for the SSBNs and SSGNs, as well as future Virginia [SSN-774]-class attack submarines with the Advanced Sail.”
As always, real-world physics is the limiting factor in the Navy’s pursuit of a “Holy Grail” communications solution. “Most of the navies around the world which operate submarines – including the United States – have been using communications buoys for years,” Richter said. “The problem today is that those buoy systems were typically one-way and are rapidly becoming obsolete as satellite communication technology advances. The near-term solutions take advantage of modern satellite communications and rapidly improving computer electronics to provide a higher data rate, two-way networked communication capability to the operational commander.”
No “Silver Bullet”
“We’re looking at several technologies to provide the requisite capability,” Richter explained. “Some technologies lend themselves to high data rates but limit the submarine operations in speed and depth. Other technologies provide a lower data rate but can be employed at greater speeds and depths. Still others offer a low probability of intercept to help us maintain stealth.”
The candidates include ELF and VHF, acoustic, and laser comms solutions focused on:
• Legacy antennas • One- and two-way expendable optically-tethered communication buoys • Acoustic communications linking submarines-to-submarines, submarines-to-unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines-to-acoustic gateway buoys. • Acoustic-to-RF gateway buoys of various sizes and capabilities, including one-way tactical pagers, and two-way buoys • Larger optically tethered two-way buoys, and towed buoys • Optical one- and two-way systems (e.g., the “SeaDeep” laser optical communications link between a submarine and an aerial platform)
“There is no CSD ‘silver bullet’,” Richter explained, “and one size does not fit all. Not a single one of these solutions gives us a high data-rate capability at all conceivable depths and speeds in all major ocean areas of the world. They all have their pros and cons. That’s why we’re focused on developing a family of systems to provide the strike group commander and the submarine commanding officer a variety of options to choose from based on the current tactical situation.” One such concept called “SeaWeb” would offer bi-directional communications between patrolling submarines, the in-theater commander, and a multitude of offboard undersea (both buoyant and seabed) “nodes” in the undersea FORCEnet.
There are several promising solutions that could meet nearly all of the Navy’s future needs, but those technologies are still in the developmental stages and require further progress and seasoning. In the meantime, the service is focusing on long-term research and development efforts – developing, testing, and procuring near- and mid-term solutions in order to provide the maximum capability to the fleet in the shortest amount of time. And, they are not being constrained by a “not-invented here” prejudice, as the service looks to the most cost-effective solution.
“Several U.S., U.K., and Canadian companies are involved in CSD R&D efforts and promise to compete favorably for future CSD contracts,” Richter said. For example, a Lockheed MartinSippican team has a complete line of buoyant wire antenna systems capable of operations in the VLF-HF communications bands while the submarine remains submerged at tactical speeds and depths. Also, the team’s expendable SSXCD buoy offers a nearterm solution to CSD needs by providing a limited two-way UHF SATCOM link and can be configured to incorporate Iridium, photonics, other sensor packages, and GPS intercept. The latter is also being addressed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL), which has demonstrated an atsea capability to receive GPS signals while the submarine was at a keel depth of some 400 feet and a speed of about three knots. JHU/APL is also working on thin-line UHF buoyant antenna elements and a High Frequency Structure Simulator-based slot antenna model to aid future antenna design and engineering.
Feedback Spurs Demand
“Feedback from the fleet has been simple and straight to the point,” Richter concluded. “The fleet desires that a modern CSD capability be procured and fielded as soon as possible. Specifically, it wants that enhanced capability…NOW!”
Communications are paramount to a warship. If you can’t communicate in today’s modern security environment from the sea, at best you will be irrelevant – at worst, you die.
Dr. Truver is the group vice president for Anteon Corporation’s Center for Security Strategies & Operations in Washington, D.C. Mr. Holian is an analyst with Anteon Corporation.
Forward Deployed Forward Deployed
U.S. Navy photo by Mr. Paul Farley
U.S. Navy photo by Mr. Paul Farley
Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Carolla Bennett
(above) Crew members man the bridge of USS Annapolis (SSN760) as she departs the harbor following a routine port visit to Crete, Greece.
(above inset) Crew members remove a shore power cable from Annapolis in preparation to depart the pier following a routine port visit.
(left) The Los Angeles -class fast attack submarine USS Norfolk (SSN-714) is moored to the Mina Salman Pier in Bahrain during a brief port visit. Norfolk is currently deployed to the 5th Fleet area of operations in support of Maritime Security Operations (MSO). MSO set the conditions for security and stability in the maritime environment as well as complement the counter-terrorism and security efforts of regional nations.
On The Back
“Alligator in the James, 1862” by Jim Christley. This watercolor painting portrays Alligator – the first U.S. submarine – as it arrives off City Point, Va. in 1862. Alligator was sent to remove obstructions in the James River or destroy the railroad bridge at Petersburg to aid in General George McClellan’s push to Richmond. This marked the first wartime forward area deployment of a submarine in naval history. In the background is the steam tug USS Satellite which was directed to provide berthing and messing for Alligator’s crew.
Jim Christley is a historian in the Alligator Project, a project to study the history of – and perhaps find – Alligator which sunk in 1863. After serving for twenty years in the U.S. Navy, retiring as a submarine qualified senior chief petty officer, and working for another twenty years in the engineering field, Mr. Christley turned to traditional fine arts. The sea and its moods are the areas of primary interest for his work. He has studied with noted artists Lou Bonamarte, Gerald Levey, and Robert Spring. Mr. Christley’s work is on display at the Brick Gallery in Essex, Conn. and the Lyme Art Association in Old Lyme, Conn. His paintings can also be found at the Naval Historical Center, Office of Naval Research, and the Submarine Force Library and Museum in Groton, Conn.
by Jim Christley
