Human Systems Integration in U.S. Submarines
Naval Undersea Warfare Center graphic
An artist’s rendering of the Virginia-class Block III command and control center.
When discussing a new weapon system or platform, it has become commonplace to state something like, “The warrior is a premier element of all operational systems.” This ranks right up there with “our people are our most precious resource.” But as several chiefs of naval operations and other naval leaders have acknowledged, people are also expensive. For example, as much as 70 percent of the total life-cycle ownership cost of ships and submarines is directly or indirectly related to the human element. Until recently, the Navy’s approach to designing, engineering and acquiring complex weapon systems did not routinely or completely include the human “warrior” as an integral part of the system. Rather, the Navy viewed systems as combinations of hardware and software. The results were often less-than-optimal capability and high life-cycle cost—and sometimes even mission failure. Given the high rate of technological change and the need to rein in cost in the face of increasingly constrained budgets, the Navy and the other services have increasingly embraced the need to consider human-performance capabilities and limitations up front and on an equal footing with hardware and software. This is true both for new acquisition and for technology-refresh programs. The U.S. Submarine Force has champi-
oned human systems integration (HSI). HSI is a specialized engineering discipline that takes human-performance limitations and capabilities fully into account to influence system design and engineering early in the research, development and acquisition process, thereby helping to ensure the highest overall performance at the lowest total ownership cost. Implementation of HSI has involved new partnerships with unlikely partners such as the audio equipment company Bose, game-makers, the visual-reality industry, physiologists and psychologists. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the Virginia (SSN-774)-class Nuclear Attack Submarine Program.
The Human-Centered Virginia Class
The 30-ship Virginia-class program has profoundly changed the way the U.S. Submarine Force focuses on the human in the design, engineering, acquisition and operation of advanced submarine technologies, systems and platforms. The ultimate goal was to arrive at an optimal crew size and composition to sustain performance throughout the entire spectrum of anticipated tasks, from leaving homeport to high-tempo wartime ops. From the outset, the design and engineering of the Virginia class fully incorporated HSI fundamentals. Human factors engi
neering was incorporated in combat systems and ship control. Manpower and human performance requirements addressed optimal manning goals. Personnel considerations influenced the layout of spaces, quality-of-life features, and maintenance. The innovative On-Board Team Trainer (OBTT) addressed the need for enhanced training opportunities. In 1991, Navy officials established the Virginia-class Manpower Optimization Steering Committee (MOSC) to analyze concepts for the size and composition of the crew. During 1992, the MOSC’s overall manning analysis determined that 118 crewmembers — 14 officers and 104 enlisted — were required to satisfy at-sea watchstanding and maintenance requirements. In-port needs drove another 16 crewmembers, for a total of 134, compared to 141 (16 officers and 127 enlisted) for the improved Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines already in service. During several concept-of-operations exercises (COOPEXs), combat system designers and engineers went beyond the use of plywood mockups and took advantage of innovative computer-aided design/ computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/ CAM) software tools, such as “Ergo Man,” which enabled them to assess human interactions and performance in a synthetic 3-D product model. The Ergo Man model allowed engineers to test a variety of arrangements, displays, equipment, hardware and software before they finalized designs and physical integrations. HSI design elements were critical to the “fly-by-wire” Ship Control System in the Virginia class, which incorporates enhanced user-friendly touch-screen displays and a single “joy stick” to drive the sub. The Ship Control System allows only two men — the pilot and co-pilot — to control the ship as effectively and safely as the five watchstanders who traditionally perform that function. The experience of the USS Hawaii (SSN-776) on her first deployment in 2008 underscored the success of the HSI process. According to the submarine’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Edward Herrington, the flyby-wire system performed superbly during U N D E R S E A WA R F A R E S P R I N G 2 0 1 0
by Patricia Hamburger, David Miskimens, and Scott C. Truver
Putting the Man Back in the Loop
21
