RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2019 Military Intelligence Centre

RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2019

Military Intelligence Centre

n international relations, the security policy of Russia continued its revisionist approach, emphasizing the concept of a multipolar world as formulated in 1996 by then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. In fact, this concept is an attempt to revise the available and functioning system accepted by the international community, with foreign policy efforts (and also military efforts, if necessary).

Through opposition to the West and the gradual dismantling of the international security architecture, Russia aims to increase its role as the ‘third Rome’ in world politics. The Kremlin views this approach as a redressing of ‘historical justice’ by eliminating the ‘unfair’ situation that followed the collapse of the USSR, where a weakened Russia perceived itself as having no say in shaping the new security environment. THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA On one hand, confrontation with the West, especially the US, has continued. Compared to previous years, relations with the US can be characterized as the status quo as there have been no fundamental changes. As an accent, the US has however imposed sanctions against Russia, and withdrew from the Intermediate-Range I

Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) concluded in 1987.

On the other hand, Russia has succeeded in regaining membership of the Council of Europe, the negotiations in the so-called Normandy Format to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine have continued after several years of inactivity, and President Vladimir Putin met bilaterally with the leaders of several European countries, which refers both to progress in developing bilateral relations and, more indirectly, to the success of disruption of EU unity.

Russia is back in Africa. First and foremost, Russia is interested in African mineral resources it lacks itself or which it needs due to geopolitical considerations (oil and natural gas). Export of arms (Sukhoi and MiG aircraft, Mi-type helicopters, the missile defence systems Pantsir-C1, Kornet-E, Tor-M2E, main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and firearms) continues to play an important role.

Already at the beginning of 2019, Rosoboronexport announced that Russian companies involved in military and technical cooperation had several major ongoing projects. From an arms export point of view, 2019 was called “the year of Africa”. It is noteworthy that the Kremlin’s focus of attention is slowly shifting

from North Africa to Sub-Saharan countries in order to restore the positions established during the Soviet era in this part of the continent as well.

On the propaganda front, the so-called ‘turn to the east’ was also characterized by the 5th Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok between 2 and 5 September. The EEF was presented to the world as a symbol of national policy aimed at integrating Russia with the fastest growing markets in a situation where the US and Chinese economic axis is no longer extant and a multipolar world is emerging on the international scene.

Despite bold slogans, the Kremlin’s main objective was to attract investments from the economic forum to the least developed region of Russia – the Russian Far East, where the economy has remained stagnant. At the same time, attempts were made to demonstrate to the West that the sanctions imposed by it are not bearing the desired fruit and Russia is continuing the pursuit of an independent policy based solely on its own interests. The same tendency is illustrated by the increasing number of joint exercises with the armed forces of China.

The activities of Russia in the Arctic are clearly the most vigorous in comparison with the other countries in the region (the so-called “Arctic Five”). Russia has expressed its ambition to extend its exclusive economic zone beyond the 200 nautical miles provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To this end, Russia must provide the UN Special Commission with geological evidence that its continental shift extends beyond the scope of the Convention and then submit a relevant request.

The option to force its will lies in the fact that international law, with the exception of UNCLOS, does not have any treaty dealing with the legal framework for the Arctic. Therefore, Russia primarily needs political support in the UN. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS According to Anders Åslund, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Centre, Putin’s system is based on clan capitalism, the essence of which is authoritarianism and unprotected property rights. This system relies on the “four circles of power”: 1. The President’s childhood friends from the Leningrad era (Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Oleg Deripaska); 2. The President’s friends from the KGB era, the so-called siloviki (Igor Sechin, Viktor Ivanov); 3. The President’s colleagues from Saint Petersburg city government (Dmitry Medvedev); 4. A global offshore system that, on the one hand, ensures the security of assets peculated from Russia and, on the other hand, “lubricates” power mechanisms when needed.

Russia can be seen as an example of a declining country where different parameters of power decay at different rates. The demographic situation is the most difficult, the economy is stagnating and the opportunities to reinvigorate it by administrative methods are likely running out. The authorities are continuing their efforts to control the dissemination of information, including the internet. Civil liberties, including freedom to organise politically, freedom of speech, freedom to run for political office and freedom to elect continue to be restricted even further.

Although Putin’s regime is rational, informed and equipped with everything needed, the President’s popularity is in clear decline and his base is also shrinking. Thus, Putin may take more serious risks in foreign policy to stay in power.

As of this writing, Russian society and the power circles around Putin in particular were gripped by the question of what will happen after 2024 when Putin was expected to resign his office as the President under the current constitution. The appointment of an equal successor to Putin was increasingly unlikely, and the current President will likely rather assume a new position (be it formally prime minister, chairman of the federation council or something else) to continue as the state’s actual leader in the form of a grey cardinal. DEFENCE SPENDING, ARMS PROCUREMENT According to Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu, the share of modern armament in Russian armed forces was 68.2 per cent by the end of 2019, thus achieving the 70 per cent milestone set in 2012 with the previous armament programme.

Although the exact meaning of ”modern” is questionable (equivalent to the Western technology or new platforms delivered during the armament programme), it is clear that the previous armament programme (2011–2020) managed to reverse the crumbling and underfunding of the armed forces, which lasted for more than 20 years.

At the same time, systemic deficiencies in the defence industry, such as overstretched structures, shortcomings in manufacturing capabilities and knowhow, corruption, etc., have not been addressed, requiring the defence industry to finance its debt every year instead of producing new technology in the required quantities.

The priority of the armament programmes is the maintenance and modernization of nuclear capacity –

the nuclear triad aims to achieve a 100 per cent share of modern armament by 2024 (currently it is the highest of all branches – 82 per cent).

However, they are also already looking into the distant future, 2030 and beyond, to focus on the development of unmanned weapons systems, the development of laser and hyper-light weapons, and the integration of weapon carrier platforms. Many of these weapon systems are already in the experimental phase. DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT BRANCHES Armament of the Ground Forces with new equipment and technology continued. Modernized main battle tanks, armoured vehicles, communication and electronic warfare systems, as well as indirect fire equipment were introduced in the armament. Deployment of service members to Syria continued (for example, from the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade in Leningrad Oblast) and lessons learned from Syrian experience were integrated into training.

Last year, all 12 rocket brigades of the Ground Forces were completely equipped with new and more powerful Iskander-M systems, which replaced the Tochka-U systems. The last unit to be rearmed was the 448th Rocket Brigade, 20th Guards Combined Arms Army.

During the year, the Western Military District received nearly 90 units of armoured equipment, including more than 40 main battle tanks T-72B3M, about 35 infantry fighting vehicles BMP-2M, 10 IFVs BMP-3, and one BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier. As a result, the proportion of modern armament in the WMD has reached 62.9 per cent.

The automated command and control system (ASU) Akatsiya-M was introduced in the 20th and the 6th Combined Arms Army of the WMD. It was already experimentally used in the 1st Guards Tank Army before that. The system allows simultaneous use of all means of communication, including space, satellite, radio relay and wire communication.

Intelligence tools, including satellites and unmanned aircraft systems, have been integrated into the system to provide real-time access and analysis of data on the current situation. ASU testing revealed that electronics may shorten the battle command cycle to less than half. In addition, the 6th Army has been supplied with 10 command posts APE, located on a Kamaz 63501 truck and equipped with the GLONASS navigation system, audio-video equipment, open and secure communications and video conferencing equipment.

For the first time during the 20th Army exercise, a Palantin operational-tactical EW complex was used to suppress the enemy’s VHF and UHF radio and mobile communications, and for radio-electronic intelligence. The system also has a function for integrating various EW equipment into a single system.

The Airborne Forces received 289 units of equipment: over 9,000 D-10 and Arbalet parachute systems, 203 units of armoured equipment, over 200 cars and other vehicles (ATVs, snowmobiles). The 76th Guards Air Assault Division received the third battalion set of amphibious BMD-4M IFVs and BTR-MDM APCs. The 124th Tank Battalion, which was formed in 2018, participated in training throughout the calendar year. In the course of the exercises, non-floating equipment was moved over water obstacles by using pontoon bridge pieces as barges.

Last year, all 12 rocket brigades of the Ground Forces were completely equipped with new and more powerful Iskander-M systems, which replaced the Tochka-U systems.

In the Aerospace Forces, the long-range aircraft continued to patrol the world’s seas and oceans to demonstrate its presence and deterrence. As in previous years, strategic bombers were a tool in Russia’s military diplomacy, such as the transfer of Tu-160M strategic bombers to Air Force Base Waterkloof in South Africa, as well as the relocation of the S-400 missile system to Serbia during a joint air defence exercise. The most noteworthy exercises of the year with the Aerospace Forces were Okeanski Shchit, Tsentr, Grom and Shchit Sojuza.

An integrated missile defence system (anti-ballistic missiles, early warning radars and satellites, command and control chain) was further developed. The third Tundra satellite of the early warning system of missile defence was launched to the orbit from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome. Also, the construction of early-warning Voronezh radars of the missile defence took place in Olenogorsk and Vorkuta, which are scheduled to begin operations in 2022 and 2021, respectively. In addition, new early warning radars will be built in Sevastopol, Crimea and Ragozinka, Saint Petersburg region.

Progress was made on upgrading the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers into the Tu-95MSM and Tu160M (M1). The aircraft with updated avionics can be equipped with the cruise missile H-101. According to Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, serial production of the strate

gic bomber Tu-160M2 was launched. The aircraft has new avionics, new engines (NK-32 engines were produced again after a 25-year break), and new armament.

By 2035, it is planned to manufacture 50 aircraft and the existing Tu160 and Tu160M (M1) will also be upgraded to version M2. During 2019, five modernized Tu95MS and Tu160M bombers were handed over to the Aerospace Forces.

In September, a modernized version of the IL-78M aerial refuelling tanker IL-78-2 (IL-78M2) made its maiden flight at the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex. The modernization extends the avionics, communications equipment and protective equipment of the aircraft to upgrade the available IL-78M flight resources. Two upgraded Il-76MD-M strategic airlifters were handed over during the year. Modernization of IL-76MD 41 aircraft to version IL-76MD-M is planned.

Over the year, the Military Transport Aviation Command received three series-produced IL-76M90A aircraft manufactured at the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex. The previously presented production plan for 36 IL-76M-90A until 2022 is likely to be revised as aircraft production has proven to be more expensive than initially planned.

As part of the national armament programme, the renewal of the fleet continued with existing versions of older generation fighters in the fighter aviation regiments being replaced with the new and/or modernized versions. During 2019, the assembly of the Su-35S fighter squadron of the Hotilovo Fighter Aviation Regiment in the WMD, and of the Shagoli Mixed Fighter Aviation Regiment in the Central Military District with Su-24M to Su-34 was terminated.

The 1489th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Leningrad Oblast was equipped with the S-400 missile system, which was also added to the 1490th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment’s armament. In Kaliningrad, the 1545th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment deployed the first of two S-400 divisions. For the first time, the Air Defence Forces of the Eastern Military District received a S-300V4 missile system.

The Ministry of Defence received its S-350 first missile system set, which will become a training tool at the Zhukov Air and Space Defence Academy in Tver. The 22nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment of the 11th Army Corps of the Baltic Fleet was re-armed with the Tor-M2 air defence system.

The company Kronstadt launched its serial production of the medium-range attack UAS Orion. In August, the first flight of the long-range attack UAS Ohhotnik was completed, and the Ohhotnik units will be established in the west-south strategic direction in 2024. The medium-range UAS Orlan-30 was tested in Syria and during the exercise Tsentr. In addition, a UAS platoon is intended to be formed in the WMD, Shatalovo, equipped with medium-range UAS Forpost-R and later on also with long-range attack UAS Altius. TRAINING EXERCISES The most important training event was the command and staff exercise Tsentr, which was held in the Central Military District with a large number of foreign service members from China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. A total of 12,950 participants (10,700 from Russia; up to 2,250 from abroad), 250 MBTs, 450 IFVs and APCs, 200 artilleries and artillery rocket systems were involved in the European part of Russia.

The most important training event was the command and staff exercise Tsentr, which was held in the Central Military District with a large number of foreign service members from China, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

A total of 128,000 participants, 20,000 units of armament and equipment, 600 aircraft, and 15 ships were involved in the exercise. The most significant activities were the airborne assault of the 98th Guards Airborne Division regiment and the helicopter airborne assault of the entire contingent of the 31th Single Independent Assault Brigade at the Donguz training ground in the course of demonstration exercises. Tsentr was followed by the Strategic Missile Forces command and staff exercise Grom, which involved about 12,000 troops.

In addition, the cooperation exercise Shchit Sojuza of the joint force regiment of Russia and Belarus took place at the Mulino training area. Other important exercises organized on the territory of the WMD included the regiment-level exercise of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division in Strugi Krasnye, which involved 1,500 service members and 100 units of equipment, and the regiment-level exercise of the combined arms army in Luga, which involved 1,500 service members and 600 units of equipment, commanded by the army-level command brigade and supported by the aircraft from the 6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army.

ESTONIAN DEFENCE FORCES DEPOLOYMENT AREAS

Military Intelligence Centre

Mali Iraq Afghanistan

AFGHANISTAN

While in 2017 and 2018 the Taliban said their main opponents were international forces in Afghanistan, Al-Fath did not formulate a specific target in its strategic operation plan for the 2019 combat season.

Nevertheless, the Taliban’s strategic goal remained the same: to achieve sole power as an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. The Taliban have maintained a high level of combat by aggressively focusing on occupying new territories in rural areas. As of January 2020, the Taliban controls nearly 50 per cent of Afghanistan territory. The strongholds of the government forces (ANDSF) have predominantly maintained in larger urban areas (Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.).

The peace talks between the US and the Taliban that began in 2018 in Doha, Qatar, continued in 2019. The main demand of the Taliban is the final withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan. The US, for its part, wants assurances from the Taliban that international jihadist groups cannot operate in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has so far been left out of the peace talks. Talks on possible peace can only begin at the Taliban’s request once the schedule for coalition forces to leave the country has been agreed on.

The branch of the Islamic State, Daish-K (Arabic: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah – Wilayah Khorasan), which has been active in Afghanistan since 2015, has lost a large part of its territory (Nangarhar) over the course of 2019. This is largely due to active anti-Daish-K operations by coalition forces, the ANDSF, and the Taliban.

IRAQ

The year began with tough political challenges for the new government: Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, who had been a compromise candidate, had difficulty in setting up a cabinet, and the last of the ministerial positions were only approved by Parliament in late June.

The dismissal of the Commander of the Iraqi elite unit Counter Terrorism Service at the end of September triggered widespread demonstrations in central and southern Iraq. Demonstrators are calling for a replacement of the political system in place since 2003, the fight against corruption, the improvement of the economic situation and reforms, and access to vital services. Abdul-Mahdi took responsibility for the bloody suppression of the demonstrations and resigned in late November, but is still leading the Iraqi interim government.

In the first half of 2019, good progress was made in the fight against Daish and the number of deaths from terrorist attacks was the lowest in recent years. At the end of 2019, the security situation drastically worsened, as the supporters of Kata’ib Hezbollah attacked the US Embassy in Baghdad.

The crisis deepened in the first week of 2020 as the US assassinated the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Unit (Quds Force), Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF / Hashd al-Shaabi), Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, with a Reaper drone near Baghdad airport. The killings of Soleimani and al-Muhandis were followed by an Iranian “face-saving” missile strike against US bases on Iraqi territory.

Due to the significant deterioration in the security situation and threat level, both the NMI (NATO Mission Iraq) and the OIR (Operation Inherent Resolve, US anti-Daish mission) temporarily suspended their work in Iraq and most of the coalition troops were deployed to Kuwait.

MALI

The conflict, which broke out as the revolt of the Tuareg people in northern Mali in 2012, has taken on a much larger dimension in 2020. On the one hand, violence has increasingly spread across national borders to Burkina Faso and Niger. On the other hand, it is no longer a purely politically motivated conflict: the Sahel crisis is closely intertwined with political issues, conflicts between various ethnic communities and the ambitions of Islamist terrorist groups.

The 2015 peace agreement concluded between the government and the rebels is stalling, and the situation has worsened despite the activities of international security forces, in particular the activities of the Barkhane operation and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Skilfully exploiting Sahel’s endemic problems, local Al-Qaeda and Daish-related terrorist groups have expanded their area of operation in 2019 and demonstrated their ability to carry out increasingly sophisticated attacks.

As the situation worsens, the dissatisfaction of the population with the central government, the operation Barkhane, and other international security forces has increased. Taking advantage of and promoting the anti-Western sentiment, Russia has intensified its cooperation with Mali and also concluded a military cooperation agreement with Mali in June 2019.

Africa’s foreign policy relevance to Russia has risen; in broader terms, however, Russian involvement in Mali remains at a relatively low level and no credible alternative to Western cooperation can be provided by the country. France, other Western partners and the Sahel countries have pledged to further strengthen cooperation in 2020: both the West and the Sahel countries understand that without international forces, the situation would be even worse.