Английский макет 1 by Kant-Online

Kant. Aphorisms

Notes

Kant. Aphorisms Compiled and edited by Prof. V.N. Bryushinkin Book design and layout by L.V. Semyonova Artwork by O.R. Pliyeva

Подписано в печать 02.08.2010 г. Бумага для множительных аппаратов. Формат 70×100 1/32. Гарнитура «Таймс». Ризограф. Усл. печ. л. 13,5. Уч.-изд. л. 5,8. Тираж 200 экз. Заказ 177.

Издательство Российского государственного университета им. Иммануила Канта 236041, г. Калининград, ул. А. Невского, 14

Kant. Aphorisms

Notes

Kant. Aphorisms Compiled and edited by Prof. V.N. Bryushinkin Book design and layout by L.V. Semyonova Artwork by O.R. Pliyeva

Kant Aphorisms

Kaliningrad 2010

UDK 1 BBК 87.3 (4г) К15

Kant. Aphorisms / Comp. and ed. by Vladimir N. Bryushinkin. — Kaliningrad: Immanuel Kant State University Press, 2010. — 89 c. ISBN 978-5-9971-0077-3 The English collection of extracts from the works of Immanuel Kant was prepared by Prof. Vladimir Bryushinkin with assistance from Dr. Vadim Chaly, Anna Bryushinkina and in collaboration with Prof. Robert Howell (State University of New York).

UDK 1 BBK 87.3 (4г)

ISBN 978-5-9971-0077-3

Kant. Aphorisms

TO THE READER1 “Yesterday just after dinner I went to visit the renowned Kant, the profound metaphysician... I did not have a letter of introduction for him, but daring seizes a city, and I was admitted into the room” with these words Nikolai M. Karamzin described his visit to the Königsberg philosopher Immanuel Kant more than 200 years ago. We, gentle reader, also do not have any letters of introduction, but the example of the famous Russian writer, historian and traveller encourages and inspires to half-open the door and to get a glimpse of the fancy world of Kant’s thought. It is fancy, for the convoluted exterior form often cloaks a pure miracle, one only has to unveil it. Kant did not invent aphorisms. He is one of the most systematic thinkers in the history of philosophy. Every statement in his works has an inextricable link to the text and his system of his views in whole. Almost every phrase begins with “therefore”, “consequently”, “for”. So it is rather difficult to single out profound and complete thoughts interesting in themselves and giving an integral understanding of Kant’s philosophy. But due to their short form they offer us an insight, become sayings, worldly wisdom, a part of our world view. 1

Translation into English by Anna Bryushinkina. 3

Kant. Aphorisms

And as pieces of amber washed ashore inexorably attract us by the sunshine of bygone ages, the thoughts of the critical philosopher astonish again and again by their depth, unexpectedness and refinement. Vladimir Bryushinkin

PERSONALITY AND PHILOSOPHY

Kant. Aphorisms

Personality and philosophy

On Himself

I I myself am a researcher from inclination. I feel the entire thirst for knowledge and the eager unrest to go further in it as well as the satisfaction with every acquisition. There was a time when I believed that this alone could compose the honour of mankind and I despised the rabble that knew of nothing. Rousseau brought me around. This blinding preference vanished, I learn to honour human beingsâ&#x20AC;Ś

II I will never forget my mother, for she planted and nourished the first seed of the Good in me, she opened my heart to the impressions of the nature; she awakened and widened my concepts, and her lessons have had an enduring healing influence on my life.

III Never, not a single time, was I allowed to hear anything indecent or to see anything unworthy from my parents. 7

Kant. Aphorisms

IV â&#x20AC;Śso I remain henceforth obstinate in my resolve not to be tempted by any authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s itch into seeking fame in easier, more popular fields, until I shall have freed my thorny and hard ground for general cultivation.

V â&#x20AC;Śsince from natural aversion I avoid anything that looks pompous (partly because those who praise often call forth those who reproach).

VI I always hope to look at my judgements impartially from the standpoint of someone else, so as to derive a third view which is better than the one I had.

VII However near or far the goal of my life may be, I will not end my career dissatisfied if I dare flatter myself that what was started by my modest efforts might be brought nearer and nearer to completion by skilful men who zealously work to perfect the world.

Personality and philosophy

On Philosophy and Philosophers

I Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.

II ... philosophy... is... the science of the relation of all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, to which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must all unite to form a unity. The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions: 1.What can I know? 2.What ought I to do? 3.What may I hope? 4.What is man?

Kant. Aphorisms

III ..the other [the value of philosophy] is that of moralpractical reason and is aimed at the final end, which is unconditionally (categorically) demanded, namely the end of creating people with an improved way of thinking.

IV Philosophy is the only science that knows how to provide for us this inner satisfaction, for it closes, as it were, the scientific circle, and only through it do the sciences attain order and connection.

V I know that there are many people that find philosophy a great deal easier than higher mathematics. But what such people understand by philosophy is simply what they find in books which bear that title.

VI ..it is said of philosophy, for example, that she is the handmaiden of theology... But it is not clear whether ÂŤshe bears the torch before her mistress or carries the train behindÂť. 10

Personality and philosophy

VII Nothing can be more desirable to a philosopher than to be able to derive, a priori from one principle, the multiplicity of concepts or basic principles that previously had exhibited themselves to him piecemeal in the use he had made of them in concreto, and in this way to be able to unite them all in one cognition.

VIII To a philosopher two things chiefly pertain: 1) Cultivation of talent and of skill, in order to use them for all sorts of ends. 2) Accomplishment in the use of all means toward any end desired.

IX Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher, and yet the most rarely found.

Kant. Aphorisms

On KĂśnigsberg A large city such as KĂśnigsberg on the river Pregel, which is the centre of a kingdom, in which the provincial councils of the government are located, which has a university (for cultivation of the sciences) and which has also the right location for maritime commerce â&#x20AC;&#x201D; a city which, by way of rivers, has the advantage of commerce both with the interior of the country and with neighbouring and distant lands of different languages and customs, can well be taken as an appropriate place for broadening one's knowledge of human beings as well as of the world, where this knowledge can be acquired without even travelling.

WHAT CAN I KNOW?

Kant. Aphorisms

What can I know?

On Reason and Understanding

I There are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.

II If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary the faculty for bringing both representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding.

III All our cognition starts from the senses, goes from there to the understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is nothing higher to be found in us to work on the matter of intuition and bring it under the highest unity of thinking.

Reason in a creature is a capacity to extend, far beyond natural instinct, the rules and intentions of the use of all that creatureâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s powers; and its projects have no limits. 15

Kant. Aphorisms

V Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

VI The understanding does not draw its (a priori) laws from nature, but prescribes them to it.

VII They [Galileo, Torricelli, Stahl et co.] comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgements according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements...

VIII A correct understanding is that which is lustrous not only owing to its great number of concepts but also owing to the appropriateness of its concepts for cognition of the object; thus it contains the ability and skill to comprehend truth.

What can I know?

On Truth and Delusion I The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: What is truth?

II Truth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgement about it insofar as it is thought. Thus it is correctly said that senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all.

III Error is effected only through the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, through which it happens that the subjective grounds of the judgement join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate from their destination, just as a moved body would of itself always stay in a straight line in the same direction, but starts off on a curved line if at the same time another force influences it in another direction. 17

Kant. Aphorisms

IV It does not seem enough to us merely to have expounded what is true, but also that which one has desired to know.

V The truth is not the highest perfection of social life; the beautiful appearance drives it here just like it does more so in painting.

On Nature I Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in the living world, takes place according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with these rules. â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Water falls according to laws of gravity, and with animals locomotion also takes place according to rules. The fish in water, the bird in the air, move according to rules. The whole nature in general is really nothing but a connection of appearances according to rules; and there is no absence of rules anywhere. 18

What can I know?

II By â&#x20AC;&#x153;natureâ&#x20AC;?... is understood the sum total of appearances insofar as these are in thoroughgoing connection through an inner principle of causality.

III We are not concerned with the nature of the things in themselves, which is independent of the conditions of both our senses and understanding, but with nature as an object of possible experience...

IV â&#x20AC;Śhence nature should be conceived in such a way that the regularity of its form harmonizes with the possibility of the ends that are to be achieved in it according to the laws of freedom.

On Things in Themselves I We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own 19

Kant. Aphorisms

subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us.

II ...Our sensory representation is by no means a representation of things in themselves, but only of the way in which they appear to us.

III In fact, if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as is fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with this thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e., with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Therefore the understanding, just by the fact that it accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible beings, is not merely permitted but also unavoidable.

What can I know?

On Cognition and Experience I ...Although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience.

II ...We will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience.

III Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience.

IV ...We can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.

V All our cognition is in the end related to possible intuitions: for through these alone is an object given. 21

Kant. Aphorisms

VI Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas.

On Knowledge and Faith I ... No curiosity is more disadvantageous to the expansion of our knowledge than that which would always know its utility in advance, before one has entered into the investigations, and before one could have the least concept of this utility even if it were placed before one's eyes.

II ...When taking something to be true is both subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing.

III If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and it is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it is called believing. 22

What can I know?

IV ...I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith...

On Science I Every doctrine that is supposed to be a system, that is, a whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called a science.

II ...The founder and his most recent successors often fumble around with an idea that they have not even made distinct to themselves and that therefore cannot determine the special content, the articulation (systematic unity) and boundaries of the science.

III ...The science must always be dogmatic, i. e. it must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from the secure principles... 23

Kant. Aphorisms

IV Mathematics has, from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, travelled the secure path of a science.

V What a mass of knowledge, what discoveries of new methods would now be on hand if an Archimedes, a Newton, a Lavoisier with their diligence and talent had been favoured by nature with a hundred years of continuous life without decrease of vitality! But the progress of the species is always only fragmentary (according to time) and offers no guarantee against regression, with which it is always threatened by intervening revolutionary barbarism.

VI If there is any science humans really need, it is the one I teach, of how to occupy properly that place in creation that is assigned to humans, and how to learn from it what one must be in order to be human.

WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?

Kant. Aphorisms

What ought I to do?

On Duty I Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening anything that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it...

II ...Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.

III The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own law and also its own court, and even though one might want to shake both of them together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick soul, they soon separate of themselves...

Kant. Aphorisms

On Morals I Morals is of itself practical in the objective sense, as the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accordance with which we ought to act...

II ...morals is not properly the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become worthy of happiness.

III The threat of eternal punishment cannot be an immediate ground of morally good actions although it may be a strong counterweight against temptations to evil.

IV This is the difference between false and healthy morality: the former seeks only for antidotes for evil, while the latter is concerned that the cause of evil is not there at all.

What ought I to do?

On the Moral Law I Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.

II But is man by nature morally good or bad? He is neither, for he is not by nature a moral being. He only becomes a moral being when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law.

III ...act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

IV A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...

Kant. Aphorisms

V So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a mean.

VI The moral law is holy (inviolable). A human being is indeed unholy enough but the humanity in his person must be holy to him.

VII But the moral law of itself still does not promise any happiness, since this is not necessarily connected with observance of the law according to our concepts of a natural order as such.

VIII In this way the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good, as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions â&#x20AC;&#x201D; that is, chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another's will â&#x20AC;&#x201D; but as essential laws of every free will in itself...

What ought I to do?

On Will I It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.

II The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain laws.

III Even if, by a special disfavour of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose â&#x20AC;&#x201D; if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) â&#x20AC;&#x201D; then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take anything away from it.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Freedom I There can be nothing more terrible than that the actions of one person should be subordinated to the will of another. Thus, no aversion can be more natural than that which a person has towards slavery. For the sake of this [aversion] a child cries and embitters itself if it has to do what others want, without someone having bothered to endear it to [the child]. It only wishes to be a man soon and act in accordance with its will.

II The heart is freed and relieved of a burden that always secretly presses upon it, when in pure moral resolutions... there is revealed to the human being an inner capacity not otherwise correctly known by himself, the inner freedom to release himself from the impetuous importunity of inclinations so that none of them, not even the dearest, has any influence on a resolution for which we are now to make use of our reason.

III But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgement that this may be the most important reason why 32

What ought I to do?

learned people cry out so urgently for freedom of press. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our judgements, and we are exposed to error.

On Virtue I One need not be an enemy of virtue but only a cool observer, who does not take the liveliest wish for the good straightaway as its reality, to become doubtful at certain moments... whether any true virtue is to be found in the world.

II To behold virtue in her proper from is nothing other than to present morality stripped of any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious adornments of reward or self-love.

III Virtue signifies a moral strength of will.

Kant. Aphorisms

IV Softness gets rid of more virtue than wantonness.

V A man does not take part in the fortune or misfortune of others until he feels content. Thus bring it about that he is content with less, and you will create good people; otherwise it is in vain.

VI All human virtue in circulation is small change â&#x20AC;&#x201D; it is a child who takes it for real gold. â&#x20AC;&#x201D; But it is still better to have small change in circulation than no funds at all, and eventually they can be converted into genuine gold, though at considerable loss.

On Benevolence I ... one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness received, rid oneself of the obligation for it, since the recipient can never win away from the benefactor his priority of merit, namely having been the first in benevolence. 34

What ought I to do?

II I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my concepts of happiness (except to young children and the insane), thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with his concepts of happiness.

III Do not accept favours you could do without...

On Evil I

However, it must be premised here that a seed of the Good is left in its entire purity and cannot be destroyed or spoiled; it certainly cannot be egoism, which, taken as a principle of all our maxims, is the very source of all evil. II Evil is only the result of nature not being brought under control. In man there are only germs of good. 35

Kant. Aphorisms

III The common opinion that previous times were better comes from the evil that one feels and the presupposition that otherwise everything would be good.

On Happiness I Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will...

II Whoever is able to be happy only according to another person's choice (no matter how benevolent this other person may be) rightly feels that he is unhappy.

III To assure one's own happiness is a duty...

IV One cannot therefore act on determinate principles for the sake of being happy, but only in empirical coun36

What ought I to do?

sels, for example, of a regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve and so forth, which experience teaches are most conductive to well being on the average.

V This ultimate purpose of pure practical reason is the highest good, so far as it is possible in the world, though it is to be sought not merely in what Nature can furnish (the greatest amount of pleasure); it lies, rather, in what is also the supreme requirement, or condition, under which alone reason can accord happiness to the rational worldbeing, namely that the latter's behaviour should simultaneously conform to the utmost with the moral law.

VI A person may tinker as much as he wants, but he cannot force nature to follow other laws. He himself must either work or others [work] for him, and this work will rob others of so much bliss that he will increase his own beyond the average

VII Sympathy for the natural misfortune of others is not necessary, but it certainly is in the injustices suffered by others.

Kant. Aphorisms

On the Truth and Lie I ... truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as a basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of which is made uncertain and useless if even the least exception to it is admitted.

II To be sure, I think much with the firmest conviction and to my great satisfaction that I will never have the courage to say; but I will never say anything that I do not think.

III Thus a lie, defined merely as an intentionally untrue declaration to another, does not require what jurists insist upon adding for their definition, that it must harm another (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius). For it always harms another, even if not another individual, nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as it makes the source of right unusable.

IV By a lie a human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human being. 38

What ought I to do?

V Lying makes a man the object of common contemptâ&#x20AC;Ś

VI Everyone whoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s a coward lies but not vice versa. What makes one weak brings about lying.

On State I For a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (patrimonium). It is a society of human beings that no one other than itself can command or dispose of.

II Now the republican constitution is the only one that is completely compatible with the right of human beings, but it is also the most difficult one to establish and even more to maintain, so much so that many assert it would have to be a state of angels because human beings, with their self-seeking inclinations, would not be capable of such a sublime for of constitution. 39

Kant. Aphorisms

III The problem of establishing a state goes like this: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom need universal laws for their preservation but each of whom is inclined covertly to exempt himself from them, so to order this multitude and establish their constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one another, these yet so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the same as if they had no such evil dispositionsâ&#x20AC;?.

IV The desire for freedom and the exclusive force of a dominator is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as much an orderly system, in fact, there is actually more order, although less bliss than in free states.

V With general luxury one complains about the divine rule and about the rule of the king. One does not consider that, as concerns the latter, just the same desire for honour and immoderacy that the civilians control can have no other form on the throne than as they have that such civilians cannot otherwise be ruled. The subject wants the master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in order to promote the good of his lands and [he wants] to think that demands of him do not occur in consideration of lowly 40

What ought I to do?

things even with the law. Are wise people themselves in the first place righteous and moderate these virtues will soon rise to thrones and also make the prince good.

On Politics and Politicians I I can indeed think of a moral politician, that is, one who takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals, but not of a political moralist, who frames a morals to suit the statesman's advantage.

II That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected, but it is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgement of reason.

III Great people only glimmer in the distance that a ruler loses it in front of his valet comes from the fact that no man is great.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Right I Right is... the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom.

II Thus the universal law of right, so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law...

III Right is the limitation of the freedom of each to the condition of its harmony with the freedom of everyone insofar as this is possible in accordance with a universal law; and public right is the sum of external laws which make such a thoroughgoing harmony possible.

WHAT MAY I HOPE?

Kant. Aphorisms

What may I hope?

On Religion I Religion is the law in us, in so far as it derives emphasis from a Law-giver and a Judge above us. It is morality applied to the knowledge of God. If religion is not united to morality, it becomes merely an endeavour to win favour.

II ... true religion is not to be placed in the knowledge of what God does or has done for our salvation, but in what we must do to become worthy of it.

III Religion is (subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands.

IV ... to have a religion is a duty of the human being to himself.

V There is only one (true) religion; but there can be several kinds of faith. 45

Kant. Aphorisms

VI To begin with I accept the following proposition as a principle requiring no proof: Apart from a good lifeconduct, anything which the human being supposes that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious delusion and counterfeit service of God.

On God

I ... the universal true religious faith is faith in God (1) as the almighty creator of heaven and earth, i. e. morally as holy lawgiver; (2) as the preserver of the human race, as its benevolent ruler and moral guardian; (3) as the administrator of his own holy laws, i. e. as just judge.

II To believe that grace may have its effects, and that perhaps there must be such effects to supplement the imperfection of our striving for virtue, is all that we can say on the subject...

What may I hope?

On History I There is no other way out for a philosopher here than, since he cannot presuppose any rational intention to belong to people and the sum total of their deeds, to try to discover a natural intention in this meaningless course of human proceedings, from which nevertheless a history according to a certain plan of nature might be possible for creatures acting without their own plan.

II The history of human race, viewed as a whole may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about a political constitution, internally, and for its purpose, also externally perfect, is the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed.

III I shall... be allowed to assume that, since the human race is constantly advancing with respect to culture (as its natural end) it is also to be conceived as progressing toward what is better with respect to the moral end of its existence, and that this will indeed be interrupted from time to time but will never be broken off. I do not need to provide this presupposition; it is up to its adversary to 47

Kant. Aphorisms

provide [his] case. For I rest my case on my innate duty, the duty of every member of the series of generations â&#x20AC;&#x201D; to which I (as a human being in general) belong and am yet not so good in the moral character required of me as I ought to be and hence could be â&#x20AC;&#x201D; so to influence posterity that it becomes always better...

On War and Peace I ... a war of extermination, in which the simultaneous annihilation of both parties and with it of all right as well can occur, would let perpetual peace come about only in the vast graveyard of the human race. Hence the war of this kind, and so too the use of all means that lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden.

II ... yet reason, from the throne of the highest morally legislative power, delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a procedure for determining rights and, on the contrary, makes a condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured without a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty... 48

What may I hope?

III ... there must be a league of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league, and what would distinguish it from a peace pact is that the latter seeks to end only one war whereas the former seeks to end all war forever. This league does not look to acquiring any power of a state but only to preserving and securing the freedom of a state itself and of other states in league with it, but without there being any need for them to subject themselves to public laws and coercion under them (as people in the state of nature must do). The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of a federalism that should gradually extend over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be shown.

IV Seek ye first the kingdom of practical reason and its justice, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you of itself.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Revolution I Through revolution, the abandonment of personal despotism may be engendered and the end of profitseeking and domineering oppression may occur, but never a true reform of the state of mind. Instead, new prejudice, just like the old ones, will serve as the guiding reins of the great, unthinking mass.

II A change in a (defective) constitution, which may certainly be necessary at times, can there fire be carried out only through reform by the sovereign itself, but not by the people, and therefore not by revolution; and when such a change takes place this reform can affect only the executive authority, not the legislative.

III Moreover, once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens, and they cannot refuse honest obedience to the authority that now has the power.

What may I hope?

On Enlightenment I Enlightenment is manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intelligence without being guided by another. Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own intelligence! is therefore the motto of enlightenment.

II The question now may be put: Do we live at present in an enlightened age? The answer is: No, but in an age of enlightenment.

III An age cannot conclude a pact and take an oath upon it to commit the succeeding age to a situation in which it would be impossible for the latter to enlarge even its most important knowledge, to eliminate error and altogether to progress enlightenment. Such a thing would be a crime against human nature, the original destiny of which consists in such progress. Succeeding generations are entirely justified in discarding such decisions as unauthorized and criminal.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Upbringing I Education is either physical or ‘practical’. One part of physical education is that which man has in common with animals, namely, feeding and tending. ‘Practical’ or moral training is that which teaches a man how to live as a free being. (We call anything ‘practical’ which has reference to freedom.) This is the education of a personal character, of free being, who is able to maintain himself, and to take his proper place in society, keeping at the same time a proper sense of his own individuality.

II …for with education is involved the great secret of human nature.

III Man's duty is to improve himself; to cultivate his mind; and, when he finds himself going astray, to bring the moral law to bear upon problem himself.

IV One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary, restraint with the child's capability of exercising his freewill. 52

What may I hope?

V â&#x20AC;Śby [discipline] we must understand that influence which is always restraining our animal nature from getting the better of our manhood, either in the individual or in man as a member of society. Discipline, then, is merely restraining unruliness.

VI One principle of education which those men especially who form educational schemes should keep before their eyes is this â&#x20AC;&#x201D; children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future; that is, in a manner which is adapted to the idea of humanity and the whole destiny of man.

VII One must teach virtue to cherish the common understanding as much for moral as for logical reasons.

VIII I cannot make anyone better except by means of the residue of good in him; I may not make anyone more intelligent but by means of the residue of intelligence in him. 53

Kant. Aphorisms

IX Can anything be more perverse than children who have hardly stepped into this world being instantly taught about the other one?

On Education I Since we belong to the animal kingdom and become people only through education, we would see absolutely different people in a short time, if there generally came into practice methods of education, which are wisely drawn out of nature itself and do not slavishly imitate the old habits of earlier and inexperienced ages.

II He should not teach thoughts but to think; one should not carry but guide the student, if one wants him to go agilely on his own in the future.

What may I hope?

On Books Among the harms wreaked by the flood of books that our part of the world is drowned in yearly, is one that has not the slightest bit of real usefulness and that is seen swimming here and back again over the wide ocean of book-scholarliness and must share the fate of decrepitude with the residual chaff.

On Beauty I â&#x20AC;Śonly he â&#x20AC;Ś admits, therefore, of an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, alone admits of the ideal of perfection.

II Flowers are free beauties of nature.

III In forming an estimate of objects merely from concepts, all representation of beauty goes by the board. There can, therefore, be no rule according to which any one is to be compelled to recognize anything as beautiful. 55

Kant. Aphorisms

IV The beautiful is what pleases in the mere estimate formed of it (consequently not by intervention of any feeling of sense in accordance with a concept of the understanding).

V â&#x20AC;Śthe beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light â&#x20AC;Ś does it give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of every one else, whereupon the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure.

VI A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.

On Art I There is no science of the beautiful, but only a critique. Nor, again, is there an elegant science, but only a fine art. 56

What may I hope?

II …aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the reflective judgement and not organic sensation.

III Nature proved beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the appearance of nature.

IV Fine art is the art of genius.

On the Sublime I The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.

Kant. Aphorisms

II Intelligence is sublime, wit is beautiful. Boldness is sublime and great, cunning is trifling but beautiful.

III Eloquence is beautiful, thoughtful silence is sublime.

IV The rising sun is just as splendid as the setting sun but the sight of the former hits upon beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime.

WHAT IS MAN?

Kant. Aphorisms

What is man?

On Respect and Dignity

I Respect is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want it or not...

II Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things.

III ... morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.

IV ... the person who depends on [another] is no longer a human, he has lost this rank, he is nothing except a belonging of another human.

V If a man estimates his worthiness by others, he tries either to raise himself over others or to diminish the worthiness of another. The latter is envy.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Character I Character consists in readiness to act in accordance with ‘maxims.’

II A man who tells lies has no character…

III The first step towards the formation of a good character is to put passions on one side.

IV Few people will endure their mockery and contempt with a peaceful mind if they are in front of a large crowd even though they know that the people in the crowd are all ignoramuses or fools. The greatest crowd always instils awe, indeed, even the onlooker shivers with fright about the false step of whoever compromises himself in its [the crowd’s] presence although each individual would find little disparaging in the speaker’s disapproval if he were alone with him. But if the great crowd is absent then a steady man can inspect their judgment quite well with complete indifference.

What is man?

On Egoism I Egoism can contain three kinds of presumption: the presumption of understanding, of taste and of practical interest; that is, it can be logical, aesthetic, or practical.

II The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his judgement also by understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (criterium veritatis externum).

III The aesthetic egoist is satisfied with his own taste, even if others find his verses, paintings, music, and similar things ever so bad, and criticize or even laugh at them. He deprives himself of progress towards that which is better when he isolates himself with his own judgement, he applauds himself and seeks the touchstone of artistic beauty only in himself.

IV Finally, moral egoist limits all ends to himself, sees no use in anything except what is useful to himself, and as a eudaemonist puts the supreme determining ground of his will simply in utility and his own happiness, not in the thought of duty. 63

Kant. Aphorisms

V The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world.

On Temperament I A man of melancholy disposition bothers little about the judgement of others, what they reckon good or true; thus he depends in this matter only on his own insight ... Friendship is sublime and thus conforms to his feeling. He can perhaps lose an inconstant friend, but the latter will be reluctant to lose him. Even the memory of an extinguished friendship is still venerated by himâ&#x20AC;Ś He will not tolerate a base obedience, and his noble breast breathes freedom. All chains â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from the gold ones at court to the heavy iron of galley-slaves â&#x20AC;&#x201C; fill him with disgust. He is a strict judge of himself and others and is often weary both of both himself and the world.

II He is resolute. Thus he subjects his feelings to principles. 64

What is man?

III So the true virtue based on principles has something that seems to accord most with the melancholic disposition in a tempered understanding.

On Cleverness I It is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know what one should reasonably ask. For if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answers, then, besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has a disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers, and presenting the ridiculous sight (as the ancients said) of one person milking a billy-goat while the other holds a sieve underneath.

II I can never convince another except through his own thoughts. I must therefore assume that the other has a good and correct understanding, otherwise it is futile to hope that he will be capable of being won over by my reasons. I cannot even move someone morally except through his own sentiments; consequently, I must assume that the other has a certain goodness of the heartâ&#x20AC;Ś

Kant. Aphorisms

On Imagination We play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but imagination (as fantasy) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently.

On Genius I Genius is a talent of discovering that which cannot be taught or learned

II Genius, therefore, flashes like a momentary phenomenon, appearing at intervals and then disappearing again; it is not a light that can be kindled at will and kept burning for as long as one pleases, but an explosive flash that a happy impulse of the spirit lures from the productive power of imagination.

What is man?

III Genius also seems to have different original seeds within itself and to develop them differently, according to the difference of national type and the soil where it was born. With the Germans it strikes more in the roots; with the Italians, in the foliage; with the French, in the blossoms; and with the English, in the fruit.

On Craftiness I Craftiness, a head for intrigue, is often regarded as great though misused understanding; but it is only the way of thinking of very limited human beings and is very different from prudence, whose appearance it has.

II Craftiness, cunning, slyness (versutia, astutia) is skill in cheating others. The question now is: whether the cheater must be more clever than the one who is easily cheated, and whether it is the latter who is the stupid one? 67

Kant. Aphorisms

III That people allow themselves to be taken in by treasure seekers, alchemists, and lottery agents is not to be attributed to their stupidity but to their evil will: the desire to get rich at others' expense without a proportionate effort of their own.

On Wit I He who shows judgement in business is shrewd. If at the same time he has wit, then he is called clever. He who merely affects one of the qualities, the joker as well as the prig, is a disgusting subject.

II To be witty (in speech or writing) cannot be learned through the mechanism of the school and its constraint, rather it belongs, as a special talent, to the liberality of the temperament in the mutual communication of thoughts... 68

What is man?

III Wit snatches at sudden inspiration; the power of judgement strives for insight.

IV Wit goes more for the sauce; the power of judgement, for the sustenance.

V Wit in wordplay is insipid; while needless subtlety... of judgement is pedantic. Humorous wit means one that comes from a mind disposed to paradox...

On Fashion I The human being has a natural tendency to compare his behaviour to that of a more important person (the child with adult, the lower-ranking person with those of higher rank) in order to imitate the other person's ways. A law of this imitation, which aims at not appearing lower, especially in cases when no regard to utility is paid, is called fashion. 69

Kant. Aphorisms

II But it is always better, nevertheless, to be a fool in fashion than a fool out of fashion...

On Love I It is quite ridiculous to say you should love other people, instead one must rather say you have good reason to love the ones near you. This even goes for your enemies.

II Othersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; love of honour is so highly valued because it indicates so much renunciation of other benefits.

What is man?

On Women I Feminine ways are called weaknesses. One jokes about them; fools ridicule them, but reasonable people see very well that they are just the levers women use for governing men and using them for their own purposes.

II As concerns scholarly women, they use their books somewhat like their watch, that is, they carry one so that it will be seen that they have one; though it is usually not running or not set by the sun.

On Innocence There is something splendid about innocence; but what is bad about it, in turn, is that it cannot protect itself very well and is easily seduced.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Men and Women I The bravery of a woman consists of the patient bearing of evil for the sake of honour or love. That of a man in the eagerness to defiantly drive it [evil] away.

II It is ridiculous that through understanding and large income a man wants to make a woman fall in love with him.

III A man must depend on no one else so that the wife depends entirely on him.

IV The man has his own taste, the woman makes herself the object of everyone's taste.

V A married woman becomes free; a married man loses his freedom. 72

What is man?

VI Our current constitution makes it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything.

On Health I One can feel healthy (judging by the comfortable feeling of oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life) but can never know that one is.

II Recollecting oneself (collectio animi) in order to be ready for every new occupation promotes mental health by restoring the balance between one's powers of soul.

III The bed is a nest for a whole flock of illnesses.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Death A reason why the idea of death does not have the effect that it could is because as busy creatures by nature we are hardly meant to think about it at all.

On Pleasure and Pain I ... pain must always precede every enjoyment; pain is always first. For what else but a quick death from joy would follow from a continuous promotion of the vital force, which cannot be raised above a certain degree anyway?

II Pain is the incentive of activity, and in this, above all, we feel our life; without pain lifelessness would set in.

III One way of enjoying ourselves is also a way of cultivating ourselves; that is, increasing the capacity for having more enjoyment of this kind, and this applies to 74

What is man?

the sciences and the fine arts. However, another way is overindulgence, which makes us increasingly less capable of further enjoyment.

IV The Arcadian shepherdâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s life and our chivalrous life of the court are both in bad taste and unnatural though alluring. For true pleasure cannot take place when it is done out of occupation.

On Being Civilized ... the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by that. And it is also very good that this happens in the world.

Kant. Aphorisms

On Manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Ends I What are the ends that are also duties? They are one's own perfection and the happiness of others.

II â&#x20AC;Śif there is a final end, which reason must indicate a priori, this end can be nothing other than a human being (every rational being in the world) guided by moral law.

III ... filling our time by means of methodical, progressive occupations that lead to an important and intended end... â&#x20AC;&#x201D; is the only sure means of becoming happy with one's life and, at the same time, weary of life.

Notes

NOTES This collection of Kant’s aphorisms was initially compiled in Russian by Prof. Vladimir Bryushinkin for the edition: I. Kant. Izrecheniya, Kaliningrad, Knizhnoye Izdatel’stvo, 2001. The English translations were collected by Vadim Chaly, those unavailable were translated by Anna Bryushinkina, who also edited the English texts. New English translations were edited by Prof. Robert Howell (State University of New York). The English translations of Kant’s works are cited according to: 1) Cambridge Edition: v1 – Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770. Cambridge: CUP, 1992. v2 – Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: CUP, 1998. v3 – Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge: CUP, 2002. v4 – Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: CUP, 1996. v6 – Religion and Rational Theology. Cambridge: CUP, 1996. v9 – Lectures on Logic. Cambridge: CUP, 1992. v11 – Lectures on Ethics. Cambridge: CUP, 1997. Anth – Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Cambridge: CUP, 2006. They are presented in the notes as follows: СЕ, 1, 34 for the first volume, etc. 2) The English translation of Kant’s treatise “Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen” Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. Translated by Matt Cooley and Patrick Frierson. Whitman College, 2005, located on the web-site: http://people.whitman.edu/~frierspr/kants_bemerkungen1.htm, this translation is referred to as ‘Remarks’. 77

Kant. Aphorisms

3) Some English translations of biographic remarks are cited according to Cassirer E. Kant’s Life and Thought. Trans. by James Haden. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981, they are referred to as: Cas, 13. 4) Kant on Education. Boston, 1900. Reference: Educ, 108. 5) The translation of Kant’s aphorisms produced by Anna Bryushinkina for this edition are referred to as AnnaBryu. 6) CofJ = Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, translated with Introduction and Notes by J.H. Bernard (2nd ed. revised) (London: Macmillan, 1914). 7) The excerpts from Kant’s treatise “What is Enlightenment?” are cited in accordance with the translation located on the website: http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html. Reference: Enl. 8) Kant’s treatise “The Conflict of the Faculties” is cited in accordance with the English translation: Kant I. The Conflict of the Faculties, University of Nebraska Press, 1992. Reference: Conflict, 138.

Page indices by chapters № п/п

Page

I II III IV V VI VII

7 7 7 8 8 8 8

I II

9 9

Source ON HIMSELF

Remarks Cas, 13. AnnaBryu AnnaBryu AnnaBryu AnnaBryu AnnaBryu

ON PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS

CE, 3, 99 9, 538

Notes

III IV V VI VII VIII IX

10 10 10 10 11 11 11

AnnaBryu CE, 9, 539 CE, 1, 255 CE, 4, 338 CE, 3, 114 CE, 9, 538 CE, 4, 158

CE, Anth, 4

ON KÖNIGSBERG

ON REASON AND UNDERSTANDING

I II III IV V VI VII VIII

15 15 15 15 16 16 16 16

CE, 2, 152 CE, 2, 193 CE, 2, 387 AnnaBryu CE, 2, 195—196 CE, 3, 112 CE, 3, 109 CE, Anthr., 90

I II III IV V

17 17 17 18 18

CE, 3, 197 CE, 3, 384 CE, 3, 385 CE, 3, 355 Remarks

I II III IV

18 19 19 19

CE, 9, 527 CE, 3, 466 CE, 4, 114 AnnaBryu

I II III

19—20 20 20

ON TRUTH AND DELUSION

ON NATURE

ON THINGS IN THEMSELVES

CE, 3, 185 CE, 4, 82 CE, 4, 107—108

Kant. Aphorisms ON COGNITION AND EXPERIENCE

I II III IV V VI

21 21 21 21 21 22

CE, 3, 106 CE, 3, 137 CE, 3, 140 CE, 3, 111 CE, 3, 633 CE, 3, 622

I II III IV

22 22 22 23

CE, 3, 355 CE, 3, 686 CE, 3, 686 CE, 3, 117

I II III IV V VI

23 23 23 24 24 24

CE, 3, 183 CE, 3, 692 CE, 3, 119 CE, 3, 107 CE, Anth., 231 Remarks

I II III

27 27 27

CE, 4, 209 CE, 4, 55 CE, 4, 211

I II III IV

28 28 28 28

CE, 4, 338 CE, 4, 244 Remarks Remarks

I II

29 29

CE, 4, 269 Educ., 108

ON KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH

ON SCIENCE

ON DUTY

ON MORALS

ON THE MORAL LAW

Notes

III IV V VI VII VIII

29 29 30 30 30 30

CE, 4, 73 CE, 4, 56 CE, 4, 80 CE, 4, 210 CE, 4, 243 CE, 4, 244

I II III

31 31 31

CE, 4, 49 CE, 4, 78 CE, 4, 50

I II III

32 32 32—33

I II III IV V VI

33 33 33 34 34 34

CE, 4, 62 CE, 4, 77 AA, VI, 405/ 4(2), 390/ Remarks Remarks CE, Anth., 44

I II III

34 35 35

CE, 4, 574 CE, 4, 573 CE, 4, 558

I II III

35 35 36

AnnaBryu Educ, 15 Remarks

ON WILL

ON FREEDOM

Remarks CE, 4, 268 CE, Anth., 17 ON VIRTUE

ON BENEVOLENCE

ON EVIL

Kant. Aphorisms ON HAPPINESS

I II III IV V VI VII

36 36 36 36 37 37 37

CE, 4, 240 CE, Anth., 168 CE, 4, 54 CE, 4, 71 CE, 3, 383 Remarks Remarks

I II III IV V VI

38 38 38 38 39 39

CE, 4, 613 AnnaBryu CE, 4, 612 CE, 4, 552—553 Educ, 102 Remarks

I II III IV V

39 39 40 40 40

CE, 4, 318 CE, 4, 335 CE, 4, 335 Remarks Remarks

I II III

41 41 41

I II III

42 42 42

CE, 4, 387 CE, 4, 388 CE, 4, 290

I II III

45 45 45

Educ, 111 CE, 6, 160 CE, 6, 177

ON THE TRUTH AND LIE

ON STATE

ON POLITICS AND POLITICIANS

CE, 4, 340 CE, 4, 338 Remarks

ON RIGHT

ON RELIGION

Notes

IV V VI

45 45 46

CE, 4, 564 CE, 6, 140 CE, 6, 190

I II

46 46

CE, 6, 166 CE, 6, 193

I II III

47 47 47—48

I II III IV

48 48 49 49

CE, 4, 320 CE, 4, 327 CE, 4, 327 CE, 4, 344—345

I II III

50 50 50

Enl. CE, 4, 465 CE, 4, 465

I II III

51 51 51

Enl. Enl. Enl.

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX

52 52 52 52 53 53 53 53 54

Educ, 30 Educ, 7 Educ, 11 Educ, 27 Educ, 18 Educ, 14 Remarks AnnaBryu AnnaBryu

ON GOD

ON HISTORY

AnnaBryu http://www. litera. co. uk/t/NDA5Mg CE, 4, 306 ON WAR AND PEACE

ON REVOLUTION

ON ENLIGHTENMENT

ON UPBRINGING

Kant. Aphorisms

I II

ON EDUCATION

54 54

AnnaBryu AnnaBryu

Remarks

I II III IV V VI

55 55 55 56 56 56

CofJ ยง1 CofJ, ยง15 CofJ ยง8 CofJ, ยง 29 CofJ ยง59 CofJ ยง48

I II III IV

56 57 57 57

CofJ, ยง44 CofJ ยง44 CofJ ยง45 CofJ ยง46

I II III IV

57 58 58 58

CofJ ยง25 AnnaBryu AnnaBryu Remarks

I II III IV V

61 61 61 61 61

CE, 4, 202 CE, 4, 202 CE, 4, 84 Remarks AnnaBryu

I II III IV

62 62 62 62

Educ, 84 Educ, 98 Educ, 96โ 97 Remarks

ON BOOKS

ON BEAUTY

ON ART

ON THE SUBLIME

ON RESPECT AND DIGNITY

ON CHARACTER

Notes ON EGOISM

I II III IV V

63 63 63 63 64

CE, Anth., 16 CE, Anth., 17 CE, Anth., 17 CE, Anth., 18 CE, Anth., 18

I II III

64 64 65

AnnaBryu AnnaBryu AnnaBryu

I II

65 65

CE, 3, 197 Remarks

CE, Anth., 68

I II III

66 66 67

CE, Anth., 220 CE, Anth., 220 CE, Anth., 122

I II III

67 67 68

CE, Anth., 92 CE, Anth., 99—100 CE, Anth., 99

I II III IV V

68 68 69 69 69

CE, Anth., 99 CE, Anth.,115 CE, Anth.,116 CE, Anth.,116 CE, Anth.,117

I II

69 70

CE, Anth., 142 CE, Anth., 143

ON TEMPERAMENT

ON CLEVERNESS

ON IMAGINATION

ON GENIUS

ON CRAFTINESS

ON WIT

ON FASHION

Kant. Aphorisms ON LOVE

I II

70 70

Remarks Remarks

I II

71 71

CE, Anth., 205 CE, Anth., 209

CE, 4, 59

I II III IV V VI

72 72 72 72 72 73

Remarks Remarks Remarks CE, 4, 209 CE, 4, 209 Remarks

I II III

73 73 73

AnnaBryu CE, Anth., 101 Conflict, 183.

Remarks

I II III IV

I II III [

ON WOMEN

ON INNOCENCE

ON MEN AND WOMEN

ON HEALTH

ON DEATH

ON PLEASURE AND PAIN

74 74 74—75 75

CE, Anth., 126 CE, Anth., 126 CE, Anth., 132 Remarks

CE, Anth., 42

76 76 76

CE, 4, 517 AnnaBryu CE, Anth., 130

ON BEING CIVILIZED

ON MAN’S ENDS

Notes

CONTENTS

To the Reader ........................................................................3 Personality and Philosophy On Himself............................................................................7 On Philosophy and Philosophers...........................................9 On Kรถnigsberg ......................................................................12 What can I know? On Reason and Understanding..............................................15 On Truth and Delusion..........................................................17 On Nature..............................................................................18 On Things in Themselves......................................................19 On Cognition and Experience ...............................................21 On Knowledge and Faith ......................................................22 On Science ............................................................................23 What ought I to do? On Duty.................................................................................27 On Morals .............................................................................28 On the Moral Law .................................................................29 On Will..................................................................................31 On Freedom...........................................................................32 On Virtue ..............................................................................33 On Benevolence ....................................................................34 On Evil ..................................................................................35 On Happiness ........................................................................36 On the Truth and Lie .............................................................38 On State.................................................................................39 On Politics and Politicians ....................................................41 On Right................................................................................42 What may I Hope? On Religion ...........................................................................45 On God..................................................................................46 87

Kant. Aphorisms

On History.............................................................................47 On War and Peace.................................................................48 On Revolution .......................................................................50 On Enlightenment .................................................................51 On Upbringing ......................................................................52 On Education.........................................................................54 On Books ..............................................................................55 On Beauty .............................................................................55 On Art ...................................................................................56 On the Sublime......................................................................57 What is Man? On Respect and Dignity ........................................................61 On Character .........................................................................62 On Egoism ............................................................................63 On Temperament...................................................................64 On Cleverness .......................................................................65 On Imagination .....................................................................66 On Genius .............................................................................66 On Craftiness.........................................................................67 On Wit...................................................................................68 On Fashion ............................................................................69 On Love ................................................................................70 On Women ............................................................................71 On Innocence ........................................................................71 On Men and Women .............................................................72 On Health ..............................................................................73 On Death ...............................................................................74 On Pleasure and Pain ............................................................74 On Being Civilized................................................................75 On Manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Ends......................................................................76 Notes .....................................................................................77

Notes

Kant. Aphorisms Compiled and edited by Prof. V.N. Bryushinkin Book design and layout by L.V. Semyonova Artwork by O.R. Pliyeva

Kant. Aphorisms

Notes

Kant. Aphorisms Compiled and edited by Prof. V.N. Bryushinkin Book design and layout by L.V. Semyonova Artwork by O.R. Pliyeva

Kant. Aphorisms