Perpetual Peace and Liberal Peace: Three Misunderstandings Luigi Caranti (UniversitĂ di Catania / Columbia University)
Perpetual Peace Kant’s three definitive articles: 1) national governments should become “republican” 2) an international federation of states must be established 3) The ‘Right to visit” must be ensured
Liberal Peace • Three main institutional reforms: 1) National governments should become liberal-democratic 2) An international federation must be established among democracies 3) National economies must be economically interdependent
Three Misunderstandings • The Liberal Peace presents itself as a faithful reinterpretation of the Kantian Peace • But the liberal peace is different from the path Kant suggested • Each definitive article has been interpreted in a dubious way. Hence, • 3 misundestandings
Misunderstanding 1: Liberal Democracy vs Republic 1) Kant warns against the conflation between the republican constitution with the democratic one (Ak.8; 352). 2) The problem with democracy is that “the executive power may make decisions about (and indeed against) the single individual� (Ak.8; 352)
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • This passage lends itself to two different readings: • 1) Kant may be preoccupied with the familiar risk of majority dictatorship. In this case, constitutional guarantees would be sufficient to avoid the risk • But the context of his discussion suggests otherwise
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • He says that the problem with democracy is that an individual may feel that a political decision has been taken without his consent. • Notice! ANY decision, not only decisions that affect the individual’s constitutional rights. It could be an ordinary law, perfectly compatible with the constitution. • This is in fact what happens all the time in a democracy when we don’t agree with our government (even if the government respect our constitutional rights) • This suggests a completely different interpretation of Kant’s distrust for ‘democracy’
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • 2) Alternative interpretation • Kant’s worry is that democracy, even if cured by liberal elements, allows and actually encourages political decisions that further the interests of some, but not of all. • A majority that remains within constitutional limits is fully entitled to serve the interests of a faction and to disregard the general will. This is the capital sin of democracy.
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • This indicates that a republic, over and above individual rights and separation of powers, must display some other key features: • a) a political power that enacts laws for the general good (not the good of the majority) • b) citizens that does not select leaders having in mind only their particular interests (as individuals or as a class) • c) citizens socialized within just institutions long enough to have internalized the republican ethos
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) The notion of representative government includes much more than the democratic transmission of preferences from citizens to rulers. It presupposes an authentic interpretative effort (by electors and elected) to legislate from the point of view of the general will.
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • The normative standards of a republic are considerably more demanding than those of a liberal democracy (again: majority rule + constitutional guarantees are not enough) • This distinction is completely missed by the Liberal Peace, with the disastrous consequence to deprive the theory from the normative space necessary to criticize existing liberal democracies (for example for their exclusionary practices)
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) The republican state is an ideal that is to be continuously striven toward. No existing state can be said to have reached the ideal, nor is a state secured in the progress made toward that ideal.
Liberal Democracy vs Republic (continued) • An obvious retort against this rich and idealized notion of republic (Kant’s exclusion for women and dependants form active and passive electorate) • Reply: Kant fears manipulation in the formation of preferences by the already powerful (no chauvinism, no plutocracy)
Misunderstanding 2. The Federation: Club of Democracies or Mixed IGO? • Doyle (1983a/b) read the Kantian Federation as restricted to democracies • This reading becomes mainstream and was recently supported empirically by Russett/Pevehouse (2006): only IGOs with democratic members promote peace; for mixed IGOs, no clear evidence
Doyle’s textual evidence (1) Kant says that the most suitable constitution for approaching the ideal of perpetual peace is “perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively [samt und sonders].” On Doyle’s reading, Kant is wishing here that republicanism triumph not only inside states (“individually”), but also “among them” (“collectively”). Reply: This is obviously Kant’s wish: a federation with democracies is more secure than a mixed one but that does not prove anything. A mixed federation could still be better than no federation at all. It could actually be a transitory step necessary toward a more perfect union
Doyle’s textual evidence (2) The first definitive article is indeed definitive, by which Doyle means that “in a formal sense, the states he [Kant] refers to later in the treaty have already “signed” the first article.” (Doyle: 210). A state cannot enter the federation if it has not already reformed its internal institutional structure. Reply. The most natural reading of the definitiveness of the articles is that they jointly promise to remove definitively war (in contrast with the preliminary ones that merely ensure that the situation does not worsen). This still does not say anything regarding the order of implementation or the membership criteria of the Federation.
Doyle’s textual evidence (3) • For Kant IR in his time were still in a state of nature. In fact he recognizes to states a right to wage war (for example, if a neighboring state alarmingly increases its power – ex preliminary article 3). A mixed federation would not change in the least this condition because republics can only trust other republics within IGOs. Hence a mixed federation would be useless. • Reply. Kant certainly thought that a mixed federation by itself is insufficient to guarantee peace. This does not prove, however, that he thought that such a federation is completely pointless.
Textual evidence for the mixed IGO • •
Kant never says that the federation is restricted to republics. Actually he seems to suggest the opposite:
“Federation of free states” means Federation of sovereign states, as clear from the context. • In the MM Kant describes the Federation as a “permanent congress of states …” open to “all neighboring states” (“even the smallest”) and indicates as an example the diplomatic gatherings (attached to the Dutch States-General in the Hague) in the first half of the XVIII century. (AK. 6; 350) • Kant also describes the Federation as a “peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international community of all those on earth’s peoples who can enter in active relations with one another.” (AK. 6; 350) Here the only membership criterion that Kant mentions is the ability for peoples of the earth to enter into active relations with one another
Normative challenge • Role for IGOs severely diminished • Incompatible with the status of definitive article • IGOs are most needed when IR are not already in pretty good shape
Empirical Challenge • Methodological intermezzo • Case study vs Statistical and Quantitative analysis • Limited experience and perhaps biased sources (Hassouna, H. A. (1975) The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes. New York/Leiden, Oceana Publications.) • But more case studies can be cited. Consigli (2012) on ASEAN.
Empirical Challenge (continued) • • • •
The Arab League Institutional bodies Decision making mechanisms System of sanctions
Empirical Challenge (continued) • 8 cases of rather successful dispute settlements from 1945 to 1975 The way in which disputes were settled seems to have a lot to do with: • Existence of permanent diplomatic channels • Existence of at least some members with no direct interest in supporting one party t=rather than another in the conflict • Perception of members to be treated as equals Factors that do NOT seem to matter: • Possibility to recourse to heavy sanctions • Credibility of the threats by third countries
Empirical Challenge (continued) 1) The Jordan Case (1950) 2) The Sudan-Egypt dispute (1958) 3) The Lebanon-United Arab Republic Dispute (1958) 4) The Kuwait-Iraq Dispute (1961) 5) The Syria –United Arab Republic Dispute (1961) 6) The Yemen Situation (1962) 7) The Algeria-Morocco Disputes (1963) 8) The North South Yemen Crisis (1972)
Misunderstanding 3: Universal Hospitality Vs international Trade? • “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality” • No indication that the significance of this article is restricted to the idea of economic interdependence. • Kant talks about a right of all individuals “to present themselves in the society of other [sich zur Gesellschaft anzubieten] by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface” (Kant 1795, 106) • This suggests openess to intercultural exchange and dialogue over and above trade.
Conclusion • If one compares the path Kant suggested for reaching perpetual peace with the one the liberal peace indicates we have two very different models.