Introduction to intergovernmental organisations

Box 2.1: Multilevel governance

This concept originally emerged within studies of the EU, where supranational institutions were built that stand ‘above’ EU member states and operate quasi-independently of them. Importantly, scholars noted that sub-national governments within member states were able to form relationships with and influence EU-level institutions, without necessarily being directly represented by their national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2003). However, the concept has since been extended beyond the EU to incorporate the ways that global or international institutions can be multitiered in a number of ways. For example, an additional ‘layer’ of governance now exists between EU member states and global governance structures, wherein the European Commission (EC) often represents EU states within IGOs and in multilateral negotiations on trade, labour and health.

While these different ‘levels’ of governance may appear to be clearly delineated, the ‘competences’ of the different layers can overlap. With so many arenas of authority, it is not always clear who has the ultimate decision-making authority or responsibility for different areas of policy. Consequently, the boundaries between decision-making bodies become blurred. Multilevel governance is also not as hierarchical as the clean delineation of ‘levels’ suggests. Sub-national bodies can interact and further their own interests through taking their claims directly to worldregional and global-level institutions. Different territories may be incorporated into geographically overlapping governance structures. For example, South Africa is at once a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as international networks such as the BRICS group of ‘emerging economies’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). This shows that national governments see no contradiction between national, world-regional and global development strategies. Global governance is therefore in practice a complex structure of governance arrangements, comprising multiple institutions and actors, and multiple and interacting levels of decision-making.

We can see, therefore, that the concept of global governance goes beyond the idea of simple interactions between states within IGOs. IGOs are nevertheless particularly important to the global governance system. The following section looks in more detail at their roles and forms of organisation.

Introduction to intergovernmental organisations

Most IGOs have their origins in the political settlement hammered out by the victorious powers at the end of the Second World War. In 1944, representatives

from 44 allied states met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, at the UN Monetary and Financial Conference (informally known as the Bretton Woods Conference). The aim of this conference was to decide on a series of rules for a new international monetary system; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were the result. Later the same year, delegates from China, the Soviet Union, the USA and the UK met in a private mansion in Washington DC named Dumbarton Oaks, to develop more ideas regarding a wider system of international organisations that would facilitate global peace and prosperity. These were the foundations of the UN, and were ratified in 1945 when representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the UN Conference on International Organization. From this was born the UN system, the ‘umbrella’ system for the majority of IGOs. Most IGOs operate as ‘specialised agencies’ within the UN system. From the outset, the institutions of global economic governance (see Chapter 3, this volume), such as the IMF and the World Bank, were kept separate from those of global social governance. This separation has had far-reaching consequences for GSP and the extent to which global social and economic justice can be attained.

Table 2.1 demonstrates that the majority of these institutions appear to have clear single-issue mandates. The WHO, for example, is concerned with global health; the WTO oversees global trade; the International Labour Organization (ILO) oversees labour and social protection. In reality, however, we find that there are overlapping mandates. As the boundaries between IGOs’ mandates are blurred, there arises from this a rationale for inter-IGO cooperation, but also the potential for a degree of competition among IGOs, as they attempt to further their own agendas.

IGOs differ from each other in a variety of ways: in their forms of organisation, in their missions, and in the amount of resources they receive (which come mainly from member states). The different ways that IGOs are structured internally can affect how they make policy, which, in turn, can affect the content of the resulting policy. The ILO’s tripartite structure, for example, can result in policies that might not be adopted by other IGOs, due to the presence of workers’ representatives. IGOs’ varying organisational structures can also affect how much power they afford to particular states within them, depending on the differing economic size of states and the way power was institutionalised within the particular organisation at the time the IGO was created (see Chapter 5, this volume). While some IGOs offer equal voting power to each country (one country, one vote), for example, others organise voting power based on the size of member states’ economies. The financial contributions that states make to IGOs through different funding mechanisms can contribute to power differentials. For example, the USA wields extensive power over the World Bank through its dominant role as the biggest contributor of funds.

Table 2.1: Key intergovernmental organisations in global social policy making

Intergovernmental organisation Purpose, powers and influence on social policy

World Bank Established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. Originally designed to support the reconstruction of European countries after the Second World War, it now plays a pivotal role in supporting development and alleviating extreme poverty in low-income countries. It influences national social policy through conditions attached to loans that it extends to governments

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Established alongside the World Bank in 1944, and similarly structured. It was set up to ensure currency stability in the aftermath of the Second World War, but is now focused more generally on ensuring the stability of the world economy. Similar to the World Bank, voting power within the IMF is skewed towards rich economies, as votes are allocated to countries based on the size of their economies. Like the World Bank, it influences national social policy via loan conditionality

World Trade Organization (WTO) Formed in 1995, the WTO superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, founded in the post-Second World War period). Its mandate concerns the regulation of trade in goods and services and of intellectual property. It does this by providing a forum through which trade agreements are negotiated. It operates via ‘hard law’, in that it possesses a dispute settlement system, and its agreements can be enforced through trade sanctions. Its agreements can influence national social policy in diverse and controversial ways

International Labour Organization (ILO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) The ILO was created in 1919. It is now a UN agency that seeks to promote social and economic justice through international labour standards. Uniquely for an IGO, it has a ‘tripartite’ structure involving national governments, business representatives and trade union representatives. It operates primarily via ‘soft law’, that is, its power lies in norm-setting

Created in 1948, its mission is ‘The attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’. It operates primarily on the basis of ‘soft law’, but overseas two binding international treaties (which nevertheless lack a means of enforcement): the International Health Regulations and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control UNESCO, founded in 1945, is one of the smallest (and leastfunded) IGOs within the UN group. Its mandate is to contribute to ‘the building of peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable development and cultural dialogue through education, the sciences, culture, communication and information’. It relies principally on discursive and normative influence and state cooperation

(continued)

Table 2.1: Key intergovernmental organisations in global social policy making (continued)

Intergovernmental organisation Purpose, powers and influence on social policy

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) UNICEF was founded in 1946, then called the International Children’s Emergency Fund (ICEF), to help children and their mothers in the aftermath of the Second World War. In 1950 its mandate was extended to address the long-term needs of children and women. Its mandate is to ‘advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential’. It works with governments to develop community-level programmes that support the health and wellbeing of children

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) The OECD, founded in 1961, is a research and norm-influencing organisation that comprises 37 mainly high-income countries. Its mission is to ‘foster prosperity, equality, opportunity and well-being for all’, by acting as a forum for the most ‘developed’ countries to find solutions to economic and social problems. It is not formally part of the UN system

IGOs’ powers of enforcement are a key issue for GSP – there is a wide variety in the ability of different IGOs to enforce their policies (see Box 2.2). On the one hand, there are organisations such as the WTO that operate on the basis of hard law, whereby they are the arbiters of legally binding agreements to which means of enforcement are attached. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism, for example, can authorise a state party to impose trade sanctions on another party that refuses to implement a ruling (see Chapter 3, this volume). At the other end of the spectrum are IGOs that operate primarily through soft law, such as the ILO or the WHO. The ILO, for example, can adopt two kinds of legal instruments: recommendations and conventions. While recommendations are non-binding guidelines, conventions are binding on all ILO members. The ILO, however, has no effective means of enforcement, even for conventions. This means that a state can, in practice, ratify a convention but fail to properly implement it. Soft law organisations are not impotent, however – they have influence in the form of normative power (Manners, 2009). This means that their legal instruments are validated through the fact that they have been negotiated and discussed within a legitimate and accountable forum, among relevant actors. The global norms that are generated through these legal instruments embody shared values and priorities and can be important foci around which supportive governments and civil society actors can organise. The overarching normative framework for global social governance is currently provided by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (see Chapter 8, this volume).

Box 2.2: Forms of ‘policy power’ in intergovernmental organisations

We can differentiate IGOs partly on the basis of how, and to what extent, they exert power over the policies of national governments (and sometimes other actors).

‘Hard law’ power involves: • legally binding international treaties; • an enforcement mechanism, such as a dispute settlement mechanism. Sources of power: law; sanctions.

‘Soft law’ power involves: • recommendations or guidelines; • norm generation; • ideational influence. Sources of power: expertise; moral authority.

Conditionality power involves: • the attachment of conditions to loans or grants. Sources of power: money.

Hard law and conditionality power tend to be located in ‘economic’ IGOs, while soft law power tends to be located in ‘social’ IGOs. However, these distinctions do not always map neatly onto specific organisations. For example, while the ILO and WHO rely much more on soft law than the WTO, they both oversee some legally binding international treaties, although these lack clear enforcement mechanisms. The WTO, on the other hand, oversees legally binding international treaties and a dispute settlement mechanism that can authorise member states to impose sanctions on other member states. Yet even the WTO can have difficulty imposing its will on powerful states, as demonstrated by the undermining of the WTO’s processes by the USA under President Trump. The World Bank can exert strong influence on the policies of states that are recipients of its loans, but it also uses the expertise of its staff to engage in norm generation and ideational influence.

The distinction between hard law and soft law is important because the former tends to be the preserve of economic organisations, such as the WTO, while the latter is more prevalent in organisations with a more direct focus on social policy, such as the WHO and the ILO. The consequence of this is that there are not only imbalances in terms of the power that IGOs possess within countries, but also between the IGOs themselves. Since IGOs’ mandates significantly overlap, this