Rebalance & Resurgence

REBALANCE & RESURGENCE america’s pivot russia’s expansion

Letter from the Editor Dear Reader, I am excited to present America’s Rebalance and Russia’s Resurgence, the fourth edition of ExPatt: Patterson School’s Magazine on Foreign Affairs. As an affiliated Patterson School organization, ExPatt Magazine strives to represent the same standard of academic rigor, respect, and camaraderie that the School upholds through its interdisciplinary scholarship in international diplomacy, commerce, development, intelligence, and security. Accordingly, ExPatt’s Editorial Board has diligently selected, reviewed, revised, and edited essays which meet this high standard of excellence and represent the themes which we study.

The fourth edition of ExPatt concentrates primarily on Asia, illustrating the diplomatic and economic developments of the region. The feature, Travis Cady’s “Secrets of the Trade,” skillfully dissects the complexities of the negotiations surrounding the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Leslie Stubbs uses historical context to frame the current administration’s pivot to Asia, in “From Ike to Obama.” Harry Richart’s essay shifts the focus towards Europe; his essay examines the evolution of German counterterrorism efforts. Further east, Clay Moore’s and Kate Miller’s articles analyze the dynamic situation of Eurasian affairs and the consequences of unrequited promises. ExPatt ends its fourth edition with two pieces focusing on development, Portia Watson’s reflective photo essay on traditional Thai medicine and Danette Smith Cook’s “Misdiagnosed,” which detail the health crises confronting Southeast Asian nations.

This edition of ExPatt is the climax of a tremendously successful semester, with the establishment of a bi-weekly blog, a 2,000% increase in average social media post reach, and the launch of an alumni speaker and podcast series. I am extremely grateful to the good humor, creativity, and talent of the brilliant individuals which comprise the ExPatt Magazine’s Editorial Board. Above all, I am beholden to my co-manager, without whose meticulousness, mirrored passion for enthusiastic debate, and ceaseless puns, this magazine would’ve been a Travis-ty.

Thank you for your readership, and I hope you enjoy America’s Rebalance and Russia’s Resurgence.

Funded by:

Kathryn Wallace Editor-in-Chief

EXECUTIVE BOARD

CONTRIBUTING WRITERS

Kathryn Wallace Editor-in-Chief

Travis Cady Managing Editor

Dr. Stacy Closson Executive Advisor

Travis Cady

Clay Moore

Leslie Stubbs

Kate Miller

Harry Richart Editor

Leslie Stubbs Editor

Dave Jankowski Editor

Harry Richart

Dannette Smith Cook

Sarah Fiske Editor

Kelsay Calvaruso Editor

Taylor Publishing Editor

Ryan Khuns Blog Editor

Clay Moore Social Media Editor

Magazine design by Travis Cady Article sources available upon request All photos are public domain or property of author

Portia Watson ExPatt Magazine of Foreign Affairs 513 Patterson Drive, Rm 455 Lexington, Kentucky 40506 To advertise with ExPatt contact the editorial board at expattmag@gmail.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS FALL | 2015 EDITION

3. SECRETS OF THE TRADE Travis Cady | The Tran-Pacific Partnership is one of the cornerstones of President Obama’s foreign policy. Find out what makes the deal so controversial and why it has the potential to shape America’s future in the Asia-Pacific.

9. FROM IKE TO OBAMA Leslie Stubbs | America’s touted “Pivot to Asia” marks a rebalance of US foreign policy, but it’s hardly the first time America has shifted its international focus - What the Eisenhower administration can tell us about contemporary.

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13. TEUTONIC TERROR Harry Richart | Terrorism wasn’t born in the 21st Century. Learn how Germany has dealt with domestic threats from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

17. WESTERN PROMISES Clay Moore | Renewed Russian expansion is raising concerns about security of its neighbors. The Baltic States seem unnervingly close to Russia, but how vulnerable are they to Russian influence?

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21. THE CRACKS IN NATO’S FAULT NARRATIVE Kate Miller | What explains Russia’s recent behavior? Some blame the expansion of NATO for Russian aggression, but that isn’t the whole story.

25. MISDIAGNOSIS p. 17

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Dannette Smith Cook | Improving the global public health system is no simple task. Find out how Indonesia can help explain a culture of distrust between developing nations and international health organizations.

29. THE UNIVERSALITY OF STRENGTH AND PAIN Portia Watson | A graduate student specializing in international development details her experience at a traditional medicine clinic in Thailand. Includes a photo spread. p. 29

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Secrets of the Trade

The Facts behind the TPP and Why It’s Important for America’s Future President Obama has discovered first-hand how difficult wrangling the interests of a dozen nations can be. For six years, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has been in negotiations and might prove to be Obama’s crowning foreign policy achievement. If the 12-nation Free Trade Agreement (FTA) passes, it will shape the future of economic development in the Asia-Pacific and cement the U.S. as the head honcho in region, but despite recent progress the deal is no sure bet. It certainly sounds important, but what does the TPP actually mean for its members? For an FTA as significant and comprehensive as the TPP, there has been surprisingly little media coverage thanks in part to the secretive nature of negotiations. What is known, however, is that the TPP is a big deal both literally and figuratively.

Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific. The TPP is notable among a myriad of smaller, regional FTAs not only because of its diverse membership, but also because the scope of its proposals reach beyond simple customs and tariff negotiations. The agreement will delve into the realms of intellectual property rights, financial services, labor and structural reforms, and environmental regulations. The comprehensive deal is what President Obama likes to call a “21st century trade agreement.” Assuredly, it would be much less complicated to omit behind-the-border issues that directly affect the internal governance of member states, but it is a decision the U.S. believes is necessary step to normalizing trade and economic integration throughout the region.

The agreement is one of the most ambitious multilateral projects in history encompassing nearly 40% of the world’s Despite its ambitious nature, the TPP did not begin with GDP. It involves 12 countries: The United States, Canada, the aim of becoming a huge, multilateral trade deal inChile, Mexico, and Peru from the Americas and Australia, volving some of the biggest players in the Asia-Pacific

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Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. The framework for today’s deal was born from an agreement among four countries: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. This limited, four-country deal attracted the attention of the United States as a potential gateway to a wider trade network in the region. In September of 2008 the U.S. entered talks with these countries regarding trade liberalization in the financial sector. Australia, Peru, and Vietnam joined the list of potential members by the end of the year. The official first rounds of talks regarding the newly dubbed Trans-Pacific Partnership proposal began in 2009 and it has been one of the Obama administrations top foreign policy objectives ever since. In 2012, Canada and Mexico joined the TPP negotiations and Japan soon followed in 2013. The addition of Japan was a game changer for the importance, and complexity, of the deal. As the world’s 3rd largest economy, Japan became the first Asian country that could bargain on a similar footing with the US. While it was a risk bringing in such an economic heavy hitter, Japanese involvement means that the TPP is all the more significant for regional relations.

What seems to be certain, however, is that the TPP has the potential to become a major force for economic integration throughout the region and it could even become a model for future FTAs.

Obama’s Gambit: The TPP as a Consolidating Force Part of the appeal of the TPP is that it involves a diverse group of countries geographically, economically, developmentally, and culturally. For example, Brunei, Chile, Japan, and The United States all have very different economies and very different concerns when it comes to international trade. While this ambitious scale makes negotiations highly complex, it also has the potential to create an agreement that could become the norm for a wider free trade zone. APEC countries have long considered the idea of a region-wide FTA dubbed the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). However, the voluntary and nonbinding nature of APEC, as well as its inclusion of China and Russia, has prevented any serious headway on such a plan. The TPP, while more limited in geographic scope, still involves only APEC members and is strongly backed by the US. Therefore, the deal has the opportunity to lay the groundwork for expanded membership, But what does the expanded membership mean for the set a model for future multilateral trade agreements, or even TPP’s importance? Many see the deal as the first step in set conditions for future APEC membership for aspirant inuntangling the spaghetti bowl of overlapping trade reg- cluding India. ulations and norms woven throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Others see blatant opportunism and accuse the U.S. and In addition to providing a future template for regional parother developed countries of leveraging market access at ticipation, the TPP has the potential to untangle the web of the expense of smaller nations’ independence. Addition- existing and developing trade agreements throughout the ally, the notable exclusion of China prompts many to sur- Asia-Pacific. The number of regional FTA agreements have mise that the TPP is intended to curb Chinese influence surged over the last decade. Before 2000, only four major in the region, an assertion that President Obama’s recent multilateral agreements among APEC members had been statements seem to support. Most of this is speculation, finalized, but at the time of this publication there are over however, because the TPP has been negotiated behind 40, with numerous others in the works. The current skein of closed doors. The secretive nature of the talks has led to rules and regulations is making international commerce in staunch criticism within the US, as well as the other po- the region increasingly cumbersome, and the trend is gettential members, but it is important to remember that dis- ting worse. There is hope that a successful TPP will begin to cretion is the modus operandi for most FTAs. Reconciling normalize trade deals in the region through its wide-reachthe complex interests and red lines of many different states ing trade policies and the incentivization of internal liberrequires a level of confidentiality that would be utterly im- alization and development. Additionally, expanded TPP possible in an open forum. This fact has done little to pla- membership in future years may make smaller, preexisting cate opponents. Periodic reveals from WikiLeaks have also agreements obsolete by allowing for a simplification of inadded fuel to the fervor of those who perceive the deal as ternational rules. Such a streamlining of trade regulations detrimental to national sovereignty and a boon to big busi- might become the most important facet of the deal by imness. Ultimately, the validity of such criticisms is difficult proving investment and market access throughout the reto judge until a final draft is made available to the public. gion.

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The rules set by the TPP could also serve as a precedent for future WTO dealings throughout the region and even make multilateral dealings beyond the Asia-Pacific more streamlined and accessible. The provisions proposed in the TPP regarding environmental protections, labor reforms, state-owned enterprises, and particularly the enforcement mechanisms included in the framework, could aid in the process of development and the monitoring of internal conditions of member states. This could lessen the reliance on the WTO and future development rounds for liveralization in the region.

Finally, the issue of rising Chinese influence in the region is prompting greater U.S. support of the trade deal. Tacit in the U.S. push for the TPP is the notion of keeping China contained. During the 2015 State of the Union Address, Obama framed issue as follows:

bers. The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has attracted contributions from Japan and other APEC members, as well as European allies (e.g. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) despite American opposition. While the AIIB doesn’t threaten existing institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, its early success signifies China’s desire for a stronger leadership role in Asia. Additionally, China has announced plans to spearhead a competing multilateral trade agreement with its neighbors and has also signed trade agreements with Australia and South Korea this year. These Chinese initiatives could limit the appeal of the TPP for many Asian members as it is decreasingly seen as the primary economic booster. Using the China card to drum up support for the TPP created a new consequence for failure; a public victory for China at U.S. expense. If the TPP isn’t concluded this year, it will roll over into a new president’s purview, which could affect ongoing timelines and push back negotiations for years, if not kill them outright.

“…as we speak, China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules. We should Regardless of the geopolitical gamble, the exclusion of level the playing field.”

China and the fact that the TPP grew out of a smaller, Using a direct indictment of China to foster support for the preformed agreement provides a very real chance for deal is a bold gambit, and one that becomes riskier the longer it to overcome the roadblocks that plague multilateral the TPP awaits a signature. China is already making moves trade agreements. While there is little hope of bringing that undercut the appeal of the TPP for many APEC mem- China onboard into the initial agreement, if the U.S.

2010 TPP Summit

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does manage to get the TPP signed, there is the possibility that it could check Chinese bilateral and multilateral efforts in the region and encourage China to accelerate its own economic, social, and environmental reforms.

There is even talk of knitting China into the TPP framework in the future. As it stands, the deal’s membership could be limited enough to actually pass while at the same time ambitious enough to change the game of Asia-Pacific trade.

The Fine Print: What We Know & Why It’s Controversial Any multilateral agreement as large and comprehensive as the TPP is bound to face serious hurdles as different countries have different priorities based on their current stage of economic development, governing institutions, and internal social and protectionist pressures. This is the primary reason that the current negotiations have been held behind closed doors among trade ministers and representatives. Despite the hushed tactics of the negotiating countries, developing a mutually acceptable agreement has proven to be more difficult than expected. Many hoped that talks would be finalized by 2012, but almost three years later the negotiators are still grappling with various issues. Additionally, documents released

by WikiLeaks have complicated the process by shedding light on several controversial proposals, notably the inclusion of an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism that would allow private parties to sue sovereign states for breach of contract, as well as the development of a strict Intellectual Property right (IPR) enforcement regime.

The TPP is a plan that stretches far beyond eliminating tariffs and promoting greater trade access among members. It has been framed as a 21st century agreement that addresses several global, crosscutting issues that have emerged in recent decades. In order to create a functional and robust free trade zone the agreement is addressing the areas of labor reform and internal liberalization, environmental protections, and intellectual property laws. While these provisions are by no means the only major hurdles that the TPP faces, they are notable in that they deal with internal state reforms and compliance within the new multilateral framework.

Before getting into the specific provisions of the deal, it is important to establish how the TPP is expected to keep all these countries in line. Many multilateral organizations, from the WTO to the UN, have difficulties enforcing their rules on member states. Assurances that states will keep their promises are important for any trade deal because in order to promote new trade and investment, companies must feel like the rules won’t change. The TPP seeks to address this problem by instituting ISDS. This enforcement mechanism operates by creating a forum for private investors to file suit against states outside that country’s domestic legal system. For example, if a company signed a profit-sharing contract in a particular country, invested their money, and the state refused to uphold their end of the deal the investor could sue the state for damages in an international tribunal.

On the surface it seems like a fair solution, as it is possible that a foreign company might not receive fair treatment in local courts. However, there has been strong criticism that ISDS has the potential to undermine state sovereignty by taking decisions away from elected governments and putting them into the hands of foreign powers. The worry is that if a country passes a law affecting the profits of an international corporation, they could be sued, creating a potential conflict of interest. The recent tobacco law passed in Australia requiring cigarette packages to contain graphic, full-page health advisories is often cited as an example of an actionable offense in an ISDS tribunal. However, the outcry while not entirely unwarranted is likely an overreaction. ISDS provisions typically allow state regulation in the areas of public health, the environment, and even financial sectors preempting some of the more vehement arguments against it. According to the Department of Commerce the U.S. is already a member of 50 trade agreements involving ISDS and has never lost a case. That is not to say it is a non-issue, but we are unlikely to see a slew of new investor-state lawsuits challenging traditional sovereignty roles.

Outside of the ISDS, there are several provisions that have garnered criticism. One of the most controversial segments of the agreement deals with worker’s rights. Enforcing labor standards is a vital part of the TPP, but negotiating the scope of these protections and bringing developing members into compliance is no easy task. The U.S. has proposed

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enforceable adherence to International Labor Organization (ILO) standards, a move that has likely been controversial with Vietnam and Brunei. Both countries have protested the proposed labor standards being subject to binding dispute settlement procedures, essentially arguing for some wiggle room. The U.S. and Vietnam are reportedly working on a labor action plan (LAP) that would set benchmarks for gradual reforms in order to bring the country into compliance. Even if Vietnam accedes to such standards, the provision may complicate future expansion of the TPP, especially in countries known for harsh and often unfair working conditions. Additional provisions dealing with fair competition are also making waves. Trade liberalization plans under the TPP seek to limit state-owned enterprises (SOE), a common trend in Vietnam. There are concerns that methods of financing, regulation, and transparency common to SOEs grant them an unfair advantage in an open market, but they are a well-entrenched part of the economy in Vietnam and rolling them back is no mean feat.

Environmental protections are also a part of the TPP. Current language is rumored to be leaning towards an international enforcement mechanism to ensure member states abide by domestic environmental regulations as well as any existing multilateral-environmental agreements (MEA).

While taking action to curb climate change is a part of the negotiations, most provisions seemingly target more specific economic issues such as illegal logging, wildlife trafficking, and fishing subsidies. These issues are likely to be more approachable and enforceable than sweeping climate reforms, and proponents argue that any progress could act as a springboard for more comprehensive environmental changes in the future. Regardless, the TPP continues to face criticism on these provisions. Environmental organizations have spoken out that the TPP doesn’t go far enough when it comes to preventing climate change and conserving natural resources. There is also fear that the plan may make things worse by effectively giving carte blanche to international corporations. In addition, a lack of strong enforcement mechanisms for environmental violations has been brought to light through recent leaks. Short of the more stringent dispute settlement mechanisms reportedly set to deal with trade violations, the environmental chapter proposes that members merely reaffirm their commitment to standing MEAs without significant consequence for violations.

Perhaps the most controversial proposals in the agreement deal with intellectual property rights (IPR). The U.S. in particular is pushing for much more stringent restrictions on the reproduction or derivation of intellectual properties. This will of course mean a large policy and enforcement shift in developing countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia, but the controversy goes deeper than that. Documents released via WikiLeaks reveal plans for strict language regarding digital copyright and pharmaceutical protections in particular. The application of copyright to digital media is a difficult task in terms of enforcement and would likely stretch the boundaries of any enforcement scheme. The U.S. is purported to be pushing criminal penalties for willful copyright infringement on a commercial scale and could even hold Internet service providers liable in certain cases. Many members are rumored to have issues with the severity of the language, which goes beyond past FTAs. There are also concerns that the pharmaceutical IP protections may hinder access to drugs by preventing the entry of generics onto the market. The U.S. is advocating for additional protections for new and existing pharmaceutical products, essentially limiting availability and distribution. This is a serious concern for health care accessibility in certain regions. Proponents of increased protections argue that generics and biosimilars tend to be released before the completion of clinical trials, and undermine the time and investment of pharmaceutical companies. There is also talk of extending existing copyright periods, which would restrict substitutes (e.g. inexpensive generics) from entering the wider drug market and potentially make drugs more expensive for developing nations.

There are, of course, arguments that such protections are necessary to incentivize pharmaceutical companies into investing more in R&D and entering new markets, however the public outcry against the proposed IP language has been stark. Opposition to these anticipated IP provisions is exacerbated by the enforcement framework included within the TPP, which could allow private companies to sue national governments that they believe are infringing upon copyright laws, a move that has been criticized as a violation of sovereignty norms.

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Beyond The Controversy: Why the TPP is Important While controversies surround the TPP negotiations, none of these issues have been sufficient to sink the deal, and there is still real optimism of reaching a final agreement. The recent passage of trade promotion authority, also known as fast track, by the U.S. Congress cleared a major hurdle, but there are many opportunities for failure. Due to the progressive nature of the plan combined with traditional speed bumps, such as the opening of agricultural sectors and other typically protected industries, the evolution of the agreement has been slow and measured. The pace and on-going controversies illustrate that the TPP is, like all trade agreements, a deal built on compromise. Additionally, the public outcry over issues such as international dispute mechanisms and the unprecedented extent of the IP provisions endangers the deal via internal pressures within all member states. Even if the U.S. Congress manages to pass the deal when it finally comes to light, similar local restrictions must be overcome by the other potential signatories as well. Reconciling such domestic pressures and still producing an impactful agreement is a monumental task, but one that is closely approaching the finish line.

For the time being the TPP is still in the works, and because of the discrete nature of the negotiation proceedings it is difficult to appraise how close the member states are from a definitive agreement. What is certain, however, is that it is important for the future of the region, and not just because of its provisions. President Obama has staked his legacy on the deal, and its success or failure may very well determine the future course of American involvement in the Asia-Pacific. A failure could signify that the United States no longer has the strength to shape events in the region, a power vacuum that China will seek to fill. On the other hand, a signed TPP with the teeth to enforce its mandates could be a game changer for the world’s largest trade zone. Beyond simply improving trade relations among members, it has the potential to improve environmental and labor standards while encouraging foreign investment throughout the world’s largest trade zone, cementing the U.S. as the prime economic mover in region.

Travis Cady M.A. Candidate International Commerce

Anti-TPP protest in New Zealand

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From Ike to Obama: The Perpetual Pivot of American Foreign Policy After World War II the West saw the Soviet Union occupy and bring Eastern Europe and half of Germany into the Communist fold. This loss prompted a change in U.S. foreign policy redirecting attention and effort to the Middle East for two key reasons: Access to oil in the region and to combat the spread of Communism. Not unlike President Eisenhower’s pivot to the Middle East and courtship of Saudi Arabia, President Obama’s decision to focus on Asia coincides with the costly and protracted fight against terrorism in the Middle East. Obama’s rebalance to Asia is largely seen as a response to the rising economic development in the region as well as an opportunity to influence the political norms while countering China’s growing dominance. However, Obama’s pivot to Asia, and away from the disastrous endeavors in the Middle East, is also the pursuit of a simpler political victory in a vital region where the U.S. can continue fighting an opposing ideology while promoting U.S. values and economic expansion.

Much like combating Communism, terrorism has forced the U.S. to accept certain losses and readjust its focus to areas where chances of success are greater. Eastern Europe was firmly within the Soviet Union’s sphere and there was little that the U.S. and Western Europe could do to intervene without risking total war. Before Communism could take root in the Middle East, Eisenhower pursued Saudi Arabia as a proxy to counter the spread of Communism.

Similarly, the current struggles in the Middle East are so pervasive that full engagement by the West is needed to defeat Islamic extremism, but U.S. commitment is wearing thin. Asia, like the Middle East, battles its own extremist movements and opposing ideologies, but these forces have not yet taken control of a country or the region. In particular Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and India face terrorist organizations and attacks within their own borders. The pivot to Asia allows the U.S. to continue its fight against terrorism but in a region less embattled and more receptive to American presence and influence.

Communism absorbed U.S. interests and policy decisions for decades, but with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. American attention was redirected towards fighting other ideologies. The fight against terrorism is not simply a matter of preserving national security but also maintaining and promoting economic development. Terrorism and economic stability are intrinsically linked - to combat the former promotes the latter. Obama began his presidency after the Great Recession where economics started to dominate both national and international politics. Fighting terrorism in the Middle East has been costly for the U.S. and done little to promote U.S. interests and perception. Pivoting to Asia presents Obama with the opportunity to provide greater attention and assistance to nations struggling with terrorist organizations while protecting and cultivating U.S. economic interests in the region.

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From Eisenhower’s view, the resources and geographic position of the Middle East were invaluable similar to the current belief that the “lion’s share of the political and economic history of the 21st century will be written in the Asia-Pacific region.” Maintaining positive relations with Saudi Arabia was key as U.S. private investment in oil reserves had existed in the region since the 1920s. The influx of economic and development aid from the U.S. into the Middle East, and specifically Saudi Arabia, assisted in promoting stable and friendly governments that could then resist internal and external Communist pressures. However, an equally strong motivating concern was preventing the Soviets from occupying the oil rich Middle East that could effectively cutoff the West from this indispensable resource. The rebalance to Asia also comes from an economic desire to link U.S. interests and success to a burgeoning market that continues to develop both economically and politically. In order for the U.S. to maintain its role as a global leader it must acknowledge regions where its influence will be effective and beneficial as opposed to regions that would drain U.S. goodwill and resources. The pivot to Asia provides the U.S. will the ideal opportunity to repair its international image and succeed in a region that will be critical to future success.

As the U.S. redirects its attention to Asia its overall approach to diplomacy and relations will need to change to reflect the current reality. Failures and misleading justifications for U.S. actions in the Middle East have eroded the generally positive view of the U.S. The U.S. is forced to garner national and international support as well as establishing causes for intervention since the world no longer blindly accepts unilateral U.S. imposition in its own affairs. The U.S. is evolving into a convening power, rather than an imperial hegemon, that can still bring countries to the negotiating table but cannot force their submission. In pursuing a more integrated and equal international role, the U.S. can repair its reputation and hone its soft power as it pursues interests in Asia.

Eisenhower’s Middle East agenda hinged on courting Saudi Arabia as a regional proxy to prevent the spread of Communism as the Soviets courted Nasser over the Suez

Canal. Courtship of countries has not fallen by the wayside in modern international affairs. U.S. influence is not singularly focused on one country in Asia, but specific countries act as an ideal gateway into the region. India in particular is a logical choice for the U.S. to focus its efforts as it is geographically well positioned to transition U.S. attention from the Middle East to Asia. The U.S. focuses on finding similarly oriented and likeminded nations to court thereby acting as a proxy to promote U.S. national interests in a region. Saudi Arabia was seen as the ideal regional leader to preserve the Islamic religion in the face of Communism as it was both home and guardian of Mecca and Medina.

India is an established democracy that has the political and economic capacity to oppose China’s belligerence in the region. As Japan is already a staunch U.S. ally, gaining India’s support would effectively bookend Asia with U.S. proxies.

The U.S. courtship of India as a potential proxy, like Saudi Arabia, is not a simple one. Several concerns over India’s behavior have recently cooled U.S.-Indian relations, but significant measures and gestures have been made to improve the relationship. The standoff between the two countries over the stockpiling of food in the Trade Facilitation Agreement with the WTO was resolved in November 2014. Additionally, President Obama was India’s honored guest for their Republic Day in January of this year. These are critical and meaningful accomplishments towards building stronger bilateral relations, particularly as Obama was the first U.S. president to attend the Republic Day celebration. India’s importance as a regional ally comes from their growing economy and political strength that can combat terrorism, promote U.S. interests, and most importantly provide additional balance to China’s regional dominance.

The promotion of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) exemplifies the U.S. desire for further regional involvement through economic means. The TPP would link the U.S. economy to eleven other countries in Latin America and Asia and promote U.S. business interests. Agreements like the TPP bring the U.S. closer to Asian countries through mutual agreed upon terms, unlike the Eisenhower Doctrine where the U.S. imposed itself on the Middle East in defense against Communism. As U.S. power and in-

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fluence abroad has decreased since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has changed to reflect its new role. The rising power of other nations like China have sufficient strength to impede U.S. interests and goals.

The TPP would create a stronger connection to the region as a whole and establish a multilateral agreement providing a means to challenge China’s aggressive behavior.

preceded these policy realignments and were then followed by the cultivation of political alliances that could combat these ideologies on behalf of the U.S. Regional failures in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have not deterred the struggle against Communism and Islamic extremism, but caused further involvement in the region to be untenable. These hostile regions effectively forced the U.S. to reevaluate its position and look elsewhere for a successful outcome rather than Obama’s pivot to Asia is certainly rooted in pursuing continuing its current level of involvement and risking economic interests and U.S. norms in the region. How- total war that would be a drain on its political and ecoever, other factors surrounding the redirection need nomic wellbeing. to be considered to fully explain the policy shift. Parallels can be drawn between Eisenhower’s and Obama’s Leslie Stubbs regional pivots. Failures against opposing ideologies M.A. Candidate International Security & Intelligence

President Obama meets with communist party leaders

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Teutonic Terror The History of German Counterterrorism Policy

Although terrorist attacks are often construed as a largely 21st century phenomenon, the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) faced similarly formidable acts of violence dating all the way to the 1960s. Chief among the German domestic terror groups who oversaw such violence was the Red Army Faction (RAF), which formed in 1970 and continued to operate until its official dissolution in 1998. As such, post World War II policy developments pertaining to German counterterrorism efforts have occurred in reaction to two fundamentally different security challenges. The first as stated above, arose out of a need to combat domestic left-wing militant groups such as the RAF; the second was necessitated by the events occurring on 9/11, intended to combat foreign Islamic terrorist organizations. This paradoxical shift of the general aims of German counterterrorism initiatives has forced governmental security agencies to revamp their policies and practices while also driving a fierce public debate.

In the 1960s, left-wing radicalism gained greater momentum, backed in large part, by student movements comprised mainly of the postwar generation of Germans. Among this new generation of German youth were the founders and leaders of the early RAF, Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun Ensslin. In 1970,

after a small group of RAF members shot and killed a civilian while successfully freeing Andreas Baader from incarceration, they coalesced as a organization and for the first time showed a willingness to resort to violence to achieve political goals. Unsurprisingly, the RAF’s tactics became ever more violent following a short stent training Palestinian guerilla units in Gaza and the West bank. This violent behavior achieved headlines throughout the BRD, beginning in 1972 with the bombing of US military barracks in Frankfurt, leaving 13 soldiers stationed at the base badly injured. Similar attacks and kidnappings continued regularly until they reached an apex in both magnitude and infamy in the fall of 1977, during what is known as the Deutscher Herbst (German Fall). During this time, the RAF members kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the president of the Federation of German Employers’ Associations, and executed him near the German-Belgian border some five weeks later.

Over the same time period, four Palestinian terrorists associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked Lufthansa flight 181, killing the pilot and abducting 86 passengers. In exchange for the passengers, the hijackers demanded the release of 13 RAF prisoners held by the German government, but were ultimately unsuccessful.

In all, the RAF was responsible for the death of at least 35 people, including the four American soldiers during attacks on two US military bases in May 1972.

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Although there are some instances where the RAF worked in conjunction with foreign governments (especially the German Democratic Republic in East Germany, or DDR) and other terrorist groups, nearly all of their attacks occurred on German soil.

As a result, the BRD’s counterterrorism measures focused on domestic, secular terror organizations.

Until the attacks of September 11th in the United States, most of the German efforts were geared towards homegrown threats. The German government did not have total freedom, however, as many checks were put on the BRD’s various national security organizations. This imperative to contain governmental power and influence is largely a product of the widely publicized abuses that occurred during the Nazi era.

There were three different acts relating to counterterrorism that occurred in the BRD in direct response to the RAF; these occurred in 1972, 1976 and 1978. These three separate acts criminalized the formation of terrorist organizations or the support and encouragement of serious violent crimes; strengthened the powers of prosecution authorities; and limited the legal rights of the defense, in particular, allowing terrorist activity to be tried under different penal conditions than other criminal acts. Additionally, in 1977 the BRD implemented the contact ban law that limited the rights of the defense and allowed law enforcement bodies to isolate victims that have been charged with terror-related crimes.

Beyond legal instruments, another key change that was precipitated by the RAF was the modernization and computerization of police and intelligence services, where databases were required to be kept on members of the RAF and other left-wing terror groups. Although the creation of a new digital database for criminals may seem innocuous to many observers, it certainly was not for many German citizens, who had grown distrusting of such programs following egregious abuses seen among the Nazis. Even though these developments may seem commonplace when observed through the lens of an American citizen, these legal changes and instruments led to an intense debate over whether they challenged the fundamental rights and freedoms of the German citizenry.

THE PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN COUNTERTERROR POLICY Prior to the escalation in RAF attacks beginning in 1972, German collective understanding of terrorism was framed overwhelmingly by the way it related to the Nazi government from 1933-1945. This history shaped a disjointed counterterrorism policy aimed more at leveraging against federal overreach rather than external national security threats. This security apparatus was based on three overarching principles: first, police and security authorities had to be organized along both federal and state lines, meaning that the 16 German Länder (states) were equipped with their own police, intelligence services, and legal institutions each operating independently from the federal branch. Germany has no federal police force that serves as the overarching national authority for domestic security, similar to the FBI in the United States. Second, there had to be a clear legal and political distinction between police and intelligence services, as stated by the separation clause. Third, German authorities had to distinguish between internal and external security issues, creating a strong separation between the police and military.

These three guiding principles led to the establishment 39 separate departments tasked with protecting national security interests. The most important of these offices in regards to counterterrorism strategy are the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitutions (BfV), tasked with domestic intelligence gathering that includes a federal office and 16 different Länder offices, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) that provides information exchange and central databases for criminal records, finger prints, photographs, and DNA analysis in conjunction with 16 State Criminal Police Offices (Länderkriminalamte or LKAs. Additionally, there are the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND), the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdiesnt or MAD), the Federal Border Guard (BGS), and the Customs Criminal Office (ZKA).

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9/11 and Resulting Policy Decisions Following the terrorist events of September 11 in New York City, the BRD was required to reconsider the legal procedure and practices of its counterterrorism operations. This decision was further motivated by the fact that three of the four hijackers had been educated and radicalized in Hamburg. Prior to fall of the World Trade Center towers, the notion of terrorism was considered a domestic issue in the BRD. As a result, several new measures were required in order to meet the challenge of a dangerous transnational right-wing Islamist threat. This change in policy took place in two separate security packages that sought to achieve five key objectives: destroy terrorist structures through comprehensive searches and investigations, repel terrorists before they can launch attacks in Germany, enhance international cooperation in combating terrorism, protect the German population and reduce the vulnerability of the country, and remove the root causes of terrorism.

The first security package focused primarily on two issues, the first of which led to the abolishment of the “religious privilege.” It became possible to ban certain religious organizations if their purpose or activities ran counter to the provisions of criminal law, were directed against the constitutional order, or disregarded the “idea of international understanding.” This amendment entered into force in December 2001 and is primarily targeted at fundamentalist Islamic organizations that do not reject the use of violence. The BRD has begun to back away from this stance in recent years, making the provision less controversial than it was at the outset. The second measure came in the form of a new paragraph in the penal code that criminalized membership in, or support of, terrorist organizations based in other countries. This law came into force in September 2002 and for the first time it became possible for convictions to be made on the basis of membership in a foreign terrorist group, even if the group had not established any kind of formal base within Germany, in which case it would fall under different legal statutes.

A second security package was passed in January 2002 and dealt with a broader range of issues than the first. The plan contained changes to 17 laws and various administrative decrees. The main goal was to strengthen the rights and capabilities of security authorities. The new measures allowed for improvements in information sharing between

agencies, better identification and background checks in visa application procedures, and allowed for the use of armed sky marshals as well as the use of firearms by security officials on civilian airliners. Another provision granted police institutions, intelligence agencies and other law-enforcement entities the power to obtain information from various public and private services such as telecommunications, mail, air traffic, banking records, employment information and university records. Although this information can only be acquired after obtaining special permission from the government with oversight by a parliamentary body, the law greatly extended the reach and scope of intelligence and law-enforcement agencies involved in counterterrorism operations. During 2012, the policies enacted in the early 2000s were renewed and currently constitute the framework through which the BRD conducts counterterrorism operations.

Looking to the Future The history of counterterrorism operations in the BRD has been shaped in large part by four overarching factors: the Nazi period, left-wing terrorist activity by the RAF and others, police and intelligence abuses by the East German Staatssicherheit (Stasi) and others institutions in the DDR, and the rise of right-wing Islamic terrorism beginning with 9/11. The events that occurred during Nazi rule and in the DDR have left an indelible mark on the German public conscious, creating a situation where most government officials and citizens alike are inherently reluctant to grant any institution too much authority over security operations. At the same time, the past threat of domestic terrorism and the current issue of transnational threats have forced Germany to have a serious policy discussion regarding the limits of governmental power. The paradox between the surrender of individual privacy and privilege in return for a government that is capable of combating terrorism may be as prevalent now as it ever has been, but it is an issue that Germany has struggled with for decades. The unique history of Germany during the 20th century highlights these concerns and the relationship between law-enforcement, intelligence agencies and the judicial system is still a major theme in the public discourse and will be for some time to come.

The current situation in Germany presents a few problems that present both similarities and differences with the last half-century in the BRD. Three of the concerns at the forefront of discussion are: fears that terrorist activity similar to

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that seen in Paris on the satirical news outlet Charlie Hebdo will occur, that issues with the current influx of Syrian refugees may worsen and result in negative societal and political outcomes, or that anti-Islam nationalist groups like PEGIDA will gain greater momentum, exacerbating a deepening rift between Islamic and nationalist groups in Germany and giving rise to new domestic terror threats. While these are certainly not the only issues currently facing the BRD, they lie firmly at forefront of the national consciousness.

It goes without saying that nationalistic beliefs and behavior is approached very skeptically by most Germans, making the atmosphere around the debate even more polarized compared to other European states. Much work is left to be done in order to ensure that religious and cultural plurality is maintained in the BRD, while also making sure that the wellbeing and security of its citizens are protected. Performing this tightrope act will be difficult for the BRD go-

ing forward, but certainly not impossible. A mind for the abuses of the past along with a steady awareness of what perils may occur in the future are paramount in completing this task. Germany’s economic predominance in the EU has recently it turned into a trendsetter in policy initiatives across the continent. As such, a successful security strategy could set an important precedent for all European nations going forward in how they deal with new immigrants, conduct counterterrorism operations, and control the dangerous proliferation of nationalistic fervor. Indeed, widespread international attention will be focused on Germany as it crafts its policy to combat these pressing

Harry Richart M.A. International Commerce M.A. German Studies

Page 13: A car bombing by members of the Red Army Faction in 1981 targeting the U.S Air Forces in Europe headquarters at the Ramstein Air Base Page 14: A training exercise by GSG 9, the German counterterrorism and special operations unit Page 16: Lufthansa flight 181 - hijacked by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1977. The German homegrown terror group, the Red Army Faction, trained militants in Palestine

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Western Promises Sustainability and Consequence for Baltic Security Out of the new geopolitical landscape that emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of three small nations on the western coast of the Baltic beacme important. These states raced to ensure their independence by assimilating into the Western European family of nations as rapidly as possible. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have drawn on their prior experience of independence during the interwar period of 1918-1940 to create national strategies with the aim of protecting their post-Soviet autonomy. The Baltic nations continued integration with western economic, political, and military institutions is sustainable, and will be pursued into the foreseeable future.

Baltic nations fell into Nazi hands. The Germans were viewed as liberators to many inhabitants of the region; however this was not consistent across all three nations.

The Soviet counter-offensive in 1944 led to the final occupation of the Baltic nations, which would last until the fall of the Warsaw Pact.

It is difficult to understate the impact that this succession of repeated occupations had on the Baltic States’ views of state security. The Soviet deportations of hundreds of thousands of political prisoners, resistance fighters, and their families left a very real impression on what independence and self-determination means to the people of the Baltic lands. Thus, the issue of state integrity and The past two hundred years of history of the Baltic na- independence is viewed as a serious privilege, one where tions is important, as it greatly influenced the nations’ the consequences of failure are still fresh in national security strategies through th 21st century. Despite being memory. a part of the Russian Empire in the 19th century, all three Baltic nations strived to retain their cultural, linguistic, Geographic and Ethnic Challenges for Baltic Security and religious independence from increasing efforts to The simple factor of geography presents a challenge to “Russify” the region. Estonia and Latvia were majority Baltic security, as all three Baltic Nations are fairly close Lutheran and Lithuania was largely Catholic, helping to to major population centers of Russia. Estonia is the combat the spread of the Eastern Orthodoxy variant of most egregiously close, as her capital, Tallinn, is less than Christianity into the region. Also, the Estonian, Latvian, 250 miles away from St. Petersburg. Another liability is and Lithuanian languages all use romantic characters in the Polish-Lithuanian border, which runs between Katheir written forms as opposed to Cyrillic. Along with liningrad and Belarus with a width of only 40 miles. In trade ties to Western Europe, these key cultural factors a military conflict, this corridor could very easily be cut helped to ensure societal integrity and contributed to an off, isolating all three Baltic Nations from their NATO allies via land. The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad boasts affinity towards the West rather than the East. over 1 million inhabitants, is home to Russia’s Baltic Sea The twenty-year period of independence following the fleet, and reportedly Iskander tactical ballistic missiles.

Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 allowed all three nations Undoubtedly, Kaliningrad’s location, and active military to pursue a developmental strategy in line with Western forces, the proximity to Russian soil, and past attempts European values. However, this process was cut short at Russification of the region constitute a considerable in 1940, when a Soviet invasion led to the first occupa- threat to Baltic national security. tion. The new puppet governments set up by the invaders largely surrendered Baltic independence by becom- The presence of substantial ethnic Russian minorities in ing member states of the Soviet Union. Dissenters were the Baltic Nations presents an opportunity for Kremsent to the gulags in Siberia or simply executed. The next lin-initiated agitation, although this threat is more proyear, with the German invasion of The Soviet Union, the nounced in Latvia and Estonia than Lithuania. 31.3% of

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Latvia’s population and 27.9% of Estonia’s population is ethnic Russian, Belarusian, or Ukrainian while Lithuania has roughly 7%.

Latvia and Estonia have taken tough stances against Russian minorities. Following the end of the Soviet Union, both nations required language tests in their respective native tongues in order to qualify for national citizenship. Many ethnic Russians were left disillusioned, as both Latvian and Estonian are fairly difficult languages to learn, and those of the older generation often had little desire to adopt another language at all.

Some did not accept the Russian Federation’s offer of citizenship for all former citizens of the Soviet Union due to the higher standard of living and increased opportunities in Latvia and Estonia. A large portion of these individuals received grey passports, which, after 2007, allowed for unrestricted travel throughout the Schengen Zone, in addition to relatively easy travel throughout Russia and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, grey-passport holders are unable to vote in national elections in Latvia and Estonia, making true democratic representation difficult to achieve.

In addition to the aforementioned freedom of movement a “stateless” grey-passport holder enjoys, most ethnic Russians are fairly content living in the Baltic Nations. Lt. Col James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, expressed that during his time teaching at Tartu University, many of his ethnic Russian students have thrived in the Estonian educational system and were eventually employed by Estonian firms.

Corum also claimed that they do not have much interest or attachment to the Russian state. This speaks to the long-term trend of assimilation, even with the starkest example of ethnic tension in Estonia. Lithuania, which features a smaller proportion of ethnic Russians, has largely integrated them into their society. This is partly due to less political representation of the smaller ethnic population, forcing collaboration between marginal

Russian interest groups, such as ethnic Poles.

Additionally, Russian-orientated media outlets are of great concern to Baltic policymakers and elites. Media can influence certain worldviews or beliefs, particularly when targeted at ethnic, cultural, or linguistic groups.

Television stations such as First Baltic, RTR, Planeta and NTV Mir have been known to present information with a decidedly Kremlin bias. Russian civil society groups and media entities have consistently operated with the intent of undermining Baltic independence. Baltic governments aren’t ignoring these perceived efforts to influence domestic Russian-speaking populations. Early this year, a Lithuanian media watchdog agency banned Russian television channel NTV Mir from operating for three months due to a provocative movie, which expressed an alternate view of the 1991 Soviet massacre of 13 Lithuanian civilians 1991 in an attempt to take control of the Vilnius television tower.

It is not unreasonable to predict a scenario where Russian agents enter a heavily Russian region in Latvia or Estonia and attempt to agitate armed resistance against the Baltic authorities. The September 2014 scandal regarding the kidnapped Estonian intelligence agent on Estonian soil has shown Russian authorities’ disregard for national boundaries. The most obvious target of such agitation

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would be Narva, a small city of 60,000 in Northeastern Estonia inhabited by 90% ethnic Russians. How successful any agitation would be is questionable, considering the higher standard of living and superior economic opportunities in Estonia verses Russia proper.

The Risk of Dependency on Russian Energy The question of energy security in the Baltic Nations has been arguably the most pressing issue following their independence. Lithuania and Latvia are, in one way or another, completely dependent on Russian oil and gas for their energy needs. Corum claimed that, “energy supply is a key issue that is mentioned by almost all the Baltic leaders and academics as a major national security concern.” Domestic sources of energy have been stymied by lack of diversification and increasing European Union regulations.

Lithuania once relied on the Ignalina nuclear reactor, however European Union concerns with the safety of nuclear energy and the age of the plant led to its decommissioning. Shale gas exploitation has also been delayed due to EU environmental concerns.

The exception is Estonia, which harvests a portion of its energy supply from shale oil and is a net exporter of energy. How long this will remain is questionable, with the dirty nature of this extraction and growing anti-shale oil sentiments in the European Union at large. However, all natural gas imports to Estonia are provided from Russia. As the Baltic Nations accepted European Union economic integration and regulatory compliance, the further dependent they became on their Eastern neighbor,

Latvian Freedom Monument

and the more leverage that was awarded to Russia. It is noteworthy to mention that this is not only a problem with the Baltic Nations, but many members of Eastern Europe as well.

With recent events in Ukraine showcasing a resurgent Russia, Lithuania and Latvia are making plans to increase their energy independence. In Spring 2015 the Lithuanian government ordered a floating liquefied natural gas terminal dubbed “Independence.” It arrived in the port city of Klaipeda to accept natural gas exports from the United States and diversify Lithuania’s energy source portfolio, as well as make a political statement. Latvia is continuing to diversify its energy mix by bringing in additional renewable sources such as hydroelectric power.

In addition to attempts to align the Baltic energy sector with Europe, currency and finance have also been pathways towards the West. The arrival of the euro as a replacement of the lita in Lithuania this past January marked the moment all three Baltic Nations became fully integrated into the Euro-Zone. With Latvia and Estonia joining in 2014 and 2011 respectively, the Euro was the natural progression in the Baltic Nations’ quest for Western European integration.

All three nations have fairly strong growth rates, even despite the situation in Ukraine and perceived vulnerability to potential Russian military aggression or economic sanctions.

While the introduction of the euro brings eases trade with Western European nations, its presence also acts as a component in national security. Any potential invasion of a member of the Eurozone adds another dimension to the scenario, and increased repercussions for the invader.

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Baltic Involvement in NATO All three Baltic Nations have been active participants in NATO since their admission in 2004. In addition, they have all been consistent partners in the NATO-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, actively pledging troops whenever possible. While Latvia and Lithuania have struggled to meet the 2% defense spending baseline requested by NATO, Estonia is currently meeting the minimum requirement. Recent rhetoric out of Moscow, the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, and the invasion of Crimea seem to be having a persuasive effect on both Lithuania and Latvia in regards to increasing their defense expenditure as they seek to solidify their position as NATO allies. Lithuania even reinstated conscription for a five-year term in order to bolster army manpower by 3,000 to 3,500 soldiers per annum.

As NATO members, the Baltic Nations are entitled to the Article 5 notion of collective defense. This is the most important aspect of the Baltic nations’ national security strategies. Relying on allies is not only the most logical decision for the nations, but, practically speaking, it is their only option when facing a populous and militarily-powerful country such as Russia. In fact, Lithuanian military doctrine purports that, in case of invasion, small squads of soldiers will conduct guerilla activities aimed at harassing the invading force long enough for conventional NATO reinforcements to arrive. This reflects Lithuanian experiences following the second Soviet occupation, where the “forest brothers� waged unconventional warfare for several years, expecting an American and Western European liberation that never materialized.

No military operations were conducted by NATO during the Cold War. Since 1990 it has engaged in multiple peacekeeping operations and military interventions

NATO country, to a multinational force of twelve aircraft.

In fall 2014, the United States deployed armored assets to all three Baltic countries, totaling twenty tanks along with infantry support. Despite the perceived escalation of military forces in the Baltics, the likelihood of an engagement with Russian forces remains slim. The main goal of these actions is to send a message that NATO takes its Article 5 obligations seriously and is willing to deploy forces as deterrence.

Nearly twenty-five years of independence have given the Baltic nations the opportunity to align with western institutions in a bid for security from their eastern neighbor.

This strategy has been economically and politically successful so far, and appears to be sustainable, assuming both The emergence of an unpredictable and militant Russian Western societal stability and a continuing international foreign policy has without question affected the strategic will to protect the Baltic States from eastern aggression. balance in the Baltic States. Russian aircraft have been increasingly willing to violate Estonian airspace, with Clay Moore over five incursions in 2014 alone. These violations have M.A. Candiate led to the Baltic Air Policing mission being bolstered International Security from a rotating contingent of four aircraft from a single Fall 2015 | 20

The Cracks in NATO’s Fault Narrative: Why NATO Enlargement Fails to Explain Russian Aggression Many who study the Russian Federation’s post-Cold War path point to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) actions in the early 1990s as a key factor in understanding Russia’s attitudes and actions in the 21st century.

Specifically, they cite NATO’s decision to enlarge its membership as the cause of Russia’s shift away from integration with the West and towards an independent path emphasizing its great power history and uniquely Eurasian identity.

While there is some truth to this argument, it is, at best, an over-simplified one. This article will explore the greater context of Russia’s initial divergence from the West focusing on the the fundamentally different and ultimately incompatible understandings of the post-Cold War order, and the fact that any security arrangement that incorporated Russia was anathema to many of the newly independent states and to NATO. It will then address the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine in the context of both NATO’s initial enlargement and its 2008 summit in Bucharest. Ultimately NATO bears, at most, partial responsibility for events to its east. The situation now, as in 1994, is not so much the direct result of NATO’s decisions, pronouncements, and actions as it is an inevitable divergence of Russia’s and NATO’s paths after the end of the Cold War. A Perpetual Great Power Narrative It is generally agreed that in the early 1990s, Moscow, under President Boris Yeltsin, was determined to integrate Russia with the West, including the security community and structures. Russia’s support of NATO’s involvement in Bosnia’s civil war through 1993 and its initially positive reaction to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program both support this observation. Vincent Pouliot, director of the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, suggests that NATO managed to “lose Russia…at a time it was begging for inclusion” when it announced in December 1994 that the Alliance would consider whether – and how – to enlarge its membership. This decision, he posits, suppressed pro-Western voices in the Russian leadership, created a sense of exclusion in Russia, and prompted the spread and entrenchment of a great power narrative. In combination, these effects turned Russia away from integration and cooperation with the West and, as made opposing NATO a foreign policy objective in and of itself.

To dispute the allegation that NATO’s expansion frustrated and angered the Russian government would be inaccurate, but to point to this event, or to NATO generally, as the primary cause of Russia’s divergence and modern hostility towards the West is specious. First of all, the “NATO’s fault narrative” ignores the impact of shock therapy, or the immediate liberalization of the market, on Russian popular attitudes towards the West. Economic reform was launched in earnest in January 1992 and produced significant and severe hardship for millions of people. Many Russians became convinced that the West – and especially the U.S. – deliberately proffered economic advice designed to undermine and further weaken Russia. They faulted Yeltsin and his pro-West advisors for the imposition of debilitating reforms. One can reasonably argue that this suppressed the pro-integration minority at least as much as NATO’s later enlargement announcement.

The shocks inflicted by economic reform and structural adjustment, combined with significantly smaller-than-expected aid from the U.S., forged a painful economic reality and sense of isolation in Russia entirely unrelated to NATO. This likely played an important role in the evolution of Russia’s relations with the Alliance. According to Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Russia sees NATO as a “code word” for U.S.-led and –oriented power structures and alliances in Europe. Thus, Russian perception of U.S. stinginess – especially when Yeltsin seemed to concede everything the West asked of him – likely hardened Russia against NATO expansion early on.

Russia understood the U.S. to be undermining it economically, so NATO – and therefore American – enlargement eastward was merely an extension of the U.S.’s effort to establish permanent and indisputable dominance and to fundamentally eradicate Russia’s great power status.

The NATO explanation also fails to acknowledge the fact that the Duma elections of December 1993 saw a clear victory for nationalist forces over pro-West forces. Vladimir Zhirinovskii and his far-right Liberal Democratic Party specifically ran on a platform promising to restore Russia to its great power status. This election predated NATO’s announcement that it was considering expansion by a full

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year, and it seems plausible that the outcome was more related to the economic situation in Russia than to anything The History of else. Moreover, from the time he gained power Yeltsin con- NATO Enlargement stantly battled nationalists in and outside of government over what they perceived to be his humiliating subservience to the West and the U.S. in particular. This suggests that NATO’s enlargement did not create or directly revive the great power narrative in Russia. While it may have inflamed it or given it additional momentum, there is reason to believe that even in the absence of the Alliance’s expansion, this narrative would have come to dominate the Russian political scene. In other words, great power-ness was ascendant in Russia before NATO enlargement truly became an issue.

Incompatible Ideas A pre-existing great power narrative has important implications for Russia’s failure to integrate into Western institutions. Trenin notes that great powers do not integrate themselves into systems for which they did not establish the governing rules. This suggests that Russia’s favorable attitude towards NATO and integration with the West more generally was more precarious than is popularly appreciated, even in the early Yeltsin years. Of particular importance is the fact that Russia’s great power narrative was directly related to its self-understanding as a uniquely Eurasian country that never fully adopted a truly European identity. Indeed, some argue that only small groups of Russia’s liberal intelligentsia ever attempted to incorporate the values associated with the European Enlightenment.

The implication here is that Russia would find it especially difficult to integrate with Western institutions because not only did it not create those rules to which it would become beholden, but those rules are largely based on values not inherent to or even prevalent within the Russian state. Overall, any rapprochement with the West could only be temporary – Russia was bound to diverge at some point, and at most NATO’s enlargement discussion merely caused it to do so sooner than it otherwise might have.

There are other reasons to believe that a Russia-West split was unavoidable. For example, the West saw NATO enlargement as an important (and perhaps the only) tool for ensuring the success of political and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as avoiding the outbreak of the sort of conflict that was ravaging the former Yugoslavia. Enlargement was thus vital to NATO security, while Russia perceived it as profoundly inimical to its own. Despite efforts on both sides to reassure the other, these contradictory understandings remain true today.

Disagreements over the appropriate response to the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s also suggested incompatibilities early on. Although Russia (along with several NATO members) supported dozens of U.N. Security Council resolutions on Yugoslavia, it often did so with reluctance and only after much hesitation and prodding from the U.S. Finally, Trenin highlights an absence of a true and widespread commitment to political reform and democracy in Russia in the early 1990s. This reality sets it apart from Central and Eastern Europe and helps explain Russia’s exclusion from developments to its west. Russia was unable or unwilling to fully and convincingly commit to the European path that NATO represented. Permanent reconciliation and integration required either Russia or NATO to profoundly alter its own nature and its understanding of security. Neither was able or willing to do so, and thus divergence was inevitable.

The Shadow of the Warsaw Pact A vital component of the “NATO’s fault narrative” is the idea that some alternative European security arrangement – be it Russia’s inclusion in NATO, an entirely new framework, or something else – was possible in the early 1990s.

There are certainly arguments to be made for Russia’s proposals that it jointly guarantee East European security with NATO, or that NATO be subordinated to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

It is important to appreciate, however, the extent to which NATO members desired the Alliance’s perpetuation and freedom of action and how eager many Central and Eastern European governments were to win security guarantees from the West against Russia. NATO was cognizant of the desirability and even the need to find a place for Russia in the European security structure, but any framework

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that forced former Warsaw Pact members to rely on Russia for their security was unacceptable to those states. This was especially true of the Visegard states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – who saw the electoral success of the far right in Russia’s 1993 Duma elections as indicative of a long-term threat to their hard-won independence. Even today – nearly twenty-five years after the fall of the U.S.S.R – Poland sees Russia as a menace and acts as a significant stumbling block in the latter’s relations with the EU (which ostensibly focus primarily on economic issues).

Central and Eastern Europe’s memory of abuse and oppression made the integration of Russia into a security system impossible. From its perspective, then, NATO faced a choice between two security frameworks: one in which the Alliance enlarged while trying to reassure Russia of its benign intent, or no security structure for the East at all. They discounted the latter option as it invited perpetual instability and conflict on NATO’s borders. Thus strong Eastern European voices and NATO’s own institutional incentives for survival (as well as U.S. President Bill Clinton’s personal determination to pull Eastern Europe westward), combined with Russia’s own uncertainty about the path it wanted to follow, led the Alliance to pursue enlargement and simply hope it would be able to placate Russian concerns and maintain cooperative relations while it did so. That this resulted in divergent paths for the two is as much Russia’s “fault” (here referring to the consequences of history and domestic politics) as it is NATO’s.

Enlargement and Conflict in the 21st Century More recently, many argue that the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia is a perfect example of NATO’s self-defeating and destabilizing enlargement practices. Pouliot notes that the Alliance perceives Russian aggression as justification for enlargement while failing to acknowledge and/or understand that this aggression is itself a response to NATO expansion. The August 2008 war, for example, followed on the heels of NATO’s Bucharest Summit, where the Alliance announced that Georgia and Ukraine would one day become members (although it declined to present them with Membership Action Plans). Once again, isolating NATO pronouncements and decisions as the sole driver behind Russian policy is to set aside vital historical context that has an important role. Russia and Georgia have a history of tumultuous relations going back to Georgia’s independence. Russian involvement in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the early 1990s has been a particular source of tension largely unrelated to NATO-Russia interactions. The situation in Georgia in 2008 presented an ideal opportunity to punish Georgia for its anti-Russian orientation – itself an affront to Russian great power-ness. In addition, Russian frustration with American ballistic missile defense initiatives in Europe and Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence – both of which undermined Russia’s self-perception as a co-equal player with the U.S. in Europe – likely acted as additional incentives to undertake action in Georgia when the opportunity presented itself. All of this supports the idea that Russia’s war with Georgia was as much a demonstration that it had fully regained its great power status and demanded to be treated accordingly, as it was an attempt to keep Georgia out of NATO. NATO’s promise of membership for Georgia was undoubtedly a factor in Russian decision-making (and may have even been a primary one), but to ignore the role of these other elements is to create an incomplete understanding of Russian actions.

With regards to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, it should be noted that President Putin applied significant pressure to former president Yanukovich to reject closer economic ties with the European Union – a distinct (though not necessarily entirely unrelated) issue from NATO enlargement. Furthermore, Russia pressured a generally pro-Russia president who was unlikely to pursue NATO membership, and did so several years after American President George W. Bush had left office. NATO expansionary rhetoric had receded significantly, and the Alliance’s divisions over enlargement were no secret. All of this suggests that

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Russian involvement in first the political crisis and then the rebel conflict has its basis in factors other than NATO enlargement. Such matters include economic decline in Russia, Putin’s surprisingly difficult election experience in 2012, Russia’s longstanding and complicated relationship with Ukraine, and other political issues. Additionally, the great power rhetoric that Russia never truly abandoned is back in play as Russia attempts – in true great power fashion – to get other states to adopt its “Eurasian” model and integrate themselves into its various structures. In other words, to assert that it all goes back to 1994 is to ignore history before and since that admittedly important – but perhaps not pivotal – time in East-West relations.

It is clear from this discussion that one must go beyond what I have labeled the “NATO’s Fault Narrative” in order to understand and effectively analyze Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. While there is an undeniable relationship between NATO and Russian decision-making, the domestic political and economic context in Russia played a key role, independent of NATO, in how Russia’s attitudes and policies evolved over the course of the 1990s. The causal link between NATO expansion and Russian divergence and hostility is not as evident and direct as some would like to believe. Fur-

thermore, the fact that the great power narrative never completely disappeared from Russian self-perception suggests that even Yeltsin’s early and eager cooperation with the West rested on precarious foundations: this narrative meant Russia could not accept a role as just another European state. The struggles the great power narrative created for integration with the West were further compounded by the West’s (and especially Central and Eastern Europe’s) reluctance to allow Russia in. Finally, while events in Georgia in 2008 can be linked rather clearly to the specter of Alliance enlargement, once again the situation was in fact more complex, with a legacy of stressed and hostile relations that predate NATO-Russian tensions. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine also has roots that reach far deeper than NATO’s decision to expand its membership, and illustrates the extent to which Russia-West divergence exists not just in the security realm but in political and economic ones as well.

All of these factors lead back to the fundamental issue of what precisely the post-Cold War order should look like.

NATO and the West fervently promoted liberal democracies founded on Enlightenment principles and integration with their existing structures. Although Yeltsin and his cadre of pro-Westerners certainly tried to shift the Russian political system into something compatible with the West, ultimately there appears to have been no consensus within Russia on the path forward even before NATO started to contemplate enlargement. In fact, ascendant forces favored the great power path that, in the Russian narrative, inherently sought to challenge the West. The differences in each side’s vision of the future were too great to overcome, especially when neither was particulary motivated to try.

The result is enduring distrust and low-level hostility that occasionally flares, but for which both NATO and Russia share responsibility.

Taken together, all of this suggests that Russia’s turn away from the West – and its continued movement on that path – is not so much a direct retort to any given NATO action or announcement but rather a response significantly shaped by the context (domestic and international) in which both parties act. Russia certainly reacts to NATO, but that is not the only thing to which it reacts.

Katherine Miller M.A. International Security & Intelligence

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Misdiagnosis: Dysfunction between western health organizations and developing nations Infectious diseases play a unique role in perpetuating state weakness, as well as creating security threats for other nations. Indonesia makes a remarkable case study for the examination of the role of infectious diseases in middle states with weak institutions. The country found itself in the middle of a global controversy regarding the novel Southeast Asian highly pathogenic influenza A (HPAI H5N1) virus in 2007. At that time, the virus just described was emerging in Southeast Asia.

An avian influenza virus, it had made the interspecies jump to human infectivity, but not yet to sustained human-to-human transmission. Because it was found to be highly pathogenic, with significant associated morbidity and mortality within Indonesia, concerns were high regarding the potential of a pandemic. However, despite initial cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding pandemic preparedness, Indonesia abruptly altered course and withheld virus samples from WHO labs, igniting a global firestorm as epidemiologists were concerned the Indonesian virus in particular could lead to a pandemic.

This article will explore how Indonesia withheld virus samples because of an underlying distrust of Western institutions. This relationship resulted from serial negative encounters with Western institutions, beginning in the 1600’s with the highly extractive Dutch East India Company and continuing until as recently as 1997 with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998.

Two Indonesias Although Indonesia is considered a relatively strong state by the Index of State Weakness, (ranking 77 out of 141 in 2008) and by the current health of its economy, it’s World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) health care indicators are on par with other lower-middle income developing nations. In fact, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Strategy for Indonesia 2014-2018 describes “Two Indo-

nesias.” It outlines the growing income inequality in Indonesia, with the richest twenty percent of the population owning eighty percent of the wealth, and half of the population living on less than two dollars a day.

Indonesia was particularly hard-hit by the avian Influenza A H5N1 pandemic. According the WHO’s Disease Outbreak News in January 2014, Indonesia experienced a total of 195 documented infections, with 163 deaths.

A British Medical Journal (BMJ) Public Health article in 2013 noted at that time the case fatality rate was 83%, almost twenty percent higher than similarly affected countries. Worldwide documented cases from the start of the outbreak through January 2014 totaled 650 with 386 deaths. The hardest hit countries were Indonesia (numbers stated above), Egypt (173 cases, 63 deaths), Vietnam (125 cases, 62 deaths), and China (45 cases, 30 deaths).

Because of its status as a developing nation with relatively weak public health institutions, public health threats such as avian influenza H5N1, emerging from Indonesia could potentially be associated with an ineffective response. Shortcomings in Indonesia’s institutions play a major role in the dangers of emerging infectious diseases. These include corruption in political institutions, health care system inequities that favor the rich, public health deficiencies both in veterinary and human health, and cultural distrust of Western institutions such as the WHO, the World Bank, and the IMF. This distrust played out during the H5N1 outbreak. In an unprecedented move, Indonesia withheld their viral samples from the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), claiming ecologic sovereignty over the virus type due to a distrust of Western institutions.

Biopiracy and Neo-Colonialism While Indonesia did eventually decide to share viral samples with the GISN, their distrust was validated when an Australian vaccine manufacturer (who

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had obtained samples of the Indonesian virus from the WHO) approached the Indonesian government offering to sell the vaccine. Indonesia felt that this was another example of western powerstrying to keep developing nations hostage. An intense legal battle gave rise to a new term in global governance, “biopiracy.” Indonesia’s fear was that a vaccine was being developed using their H5N1 samples by the Australian company, who would then attempt to sell it targeting their strain of H5N1 at unaffordable prices during a national emergency (such as an epidemic). Unavailability of the vaccine in Indonesia led to a perception that they were living in a “sacrifice zone”, in which the Indonesian population was being ignored at the expense of protecting wealthy nations. Indonesia felt this amounted to blackmail and was representative of western international regimes holding economic power over developing nations.

This added insult to injury as the country was also dealing with the highest caseload of human-avian flu at that time. Furthermore, Indonesia’s Health Minister had difficulty obtaining oseltamir, the only known effective treat- Jakarta, Indonesia ment for influenza A, because worldwide stockpiles were unavailable due to alleged hoarding of the drug by wealthy nations. These events led Indonesia to reconsider what they were gaining from participating in the global health surveillance system. Indonesia’s Health Ministry decided once again to stop sharing virus samples, claiming that the use of their virus to patent a vaccine to which they did not have access violated the principle of ecologic sovereignty. This placed the country in violation of both Indonesia’s Material Transport Agreement (MTA) and local regulations.

Western institutions, including the WHO, the CDC, and the ECDC explained discrepancies in vaccine availability in several ways. The first was on the basis of epidemiologic factors. Targets for vaccine coverage are those peo-

ple who meet eligibility criteria for high risk, including the elderly, and those with chronic medical conditions.

Western countries argued that they receive higher coverage with vaccination stockpiles because they have the largest populations meeting those criteria. They added that many of these same countries have pharmaceutical presence able to produce the vaccines locally. They further asserted that the effects of seasonal influenza outbreaks are not well-studied in developing nations, thus there is not a documented need for seasonal flu vaccine in those countries. Finally, they insisted that withholding virus samples was in violation of international law, specifically an International Health Regulation signed at the World Health Assembly in 2005 (IHR 2005). As far as the vaccine manufacturer was concerned, the WHO insisted that issue was between the Indonesian government and the vaccine manufacturer.

In the end, Indonesia successfully claimed that IHR 2005 was not binding until it officially entered force on June 15, 2007, which was after the controversy started and the samples were held. Furthermore, they argued that while the regulation was designed to facilitate sharing information, it did not include biologic samples. Thus, even though the IHR was not officially in effect, they still had not violated the voluntary obligation expressed in the law.

However, the larger question remains. How can a global response to a pandemic that could potentially require up to six billion vaccine doses be possible? Less-developed countries, especially those with infant scientific or pharmaceutical industries, are ill-equipped to develop and distribute influenza vaccines on an emergency basis. Furthermore, some countries, as is the case with Indonesia, do not trust western institutions to meet their needs in cases of wider global epidemics. In fact,

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Know Your Enemy:

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (HPAI H5N1) each clade, some clades may be more pathogenic in humans versus others, resulting in more profound morbidity and/or higher mortality.

This information is critical to pandemic preparedness and vaccine development because vaccines must be tailored to the clade with the highest pathogenicity. Furthermore, some clades may have a higher antigenicity (the ability to induce antibodies) and therefore make more effective vaccine preparations. Researchers and manufacturers need access to as many clades as possible to design a vaccine that effectively both produces antibodies with the fewest doses possible (ideally only a single thermo-stable dose) and targets the most pathogenic clade(s).

H5N1 is a subtype of avian influenza A that has crossed species to infect not only birds, but also humans. It is a type of virus known collectively as a “zoonoses”- any organism (virus, bacteria, parasites et cetera) whose known hosts are non-human vertebrates. Close and sustained contact between people and the usual host organism, birds, can result in infection in humans. Molecular identification of the viral genome in the case of H5N1 was found to have originated in wild fowl in China where it infected domesticated chickens. Subtypes of this virus were eventually proven to be identical between infected humans and poultry in the case of multiple countries across Eurasia, including Vietnam and Indonesia, proving it had crossed species.

Differences between virus families are known as “clades”.

In the case of H5N1, several clades were identified and mapped, allowing epidemiologists to track the spread of particular viral families (such as those descending into Vietnam and Thailand, versus those found in Indonesia). Because of peculiarities to the genetic code held in

The international health regime has evolved over time to include free and prompt sharing of new viruses to international health agencies in order to study and develop vaccines as needed pre-emptively. The primary agencies are: the WHO, which is associated with the United Nations; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States; and the European Centre for Disease for Prevention and Control (ECDC). These agencies work in conjunction with the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) to survey for and genetically categorize novel influenza viruses. The goal is to identify potentially epidemic strains at their source and activate the so-called “Rapid Containment Strategy” to keep the virus from spreading outside its zone of origin.

These agencies are especially concerned about influenza viruses because they have known pandemic ability, as evidenced by Spanish Influenza that resulted in more than thirty million deaths worldwide. But the entire regime hinges on rapid typing of novel strains, which can only be accomplished though timely participation in the GISN, so the containment strategy can be activated.

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in 2010, a review of seasonal vaccine (H1N1) availability by Khoon showed these worries to be valid. Despite the global vaccine manufacturer’s promise to provide poor nations with a stockpile of 120 million doses, those pledges could not be fulfilled until months after the pandemic had waned. Meanwhile, wealthy nations who had been able to pre-order doses were provided with the first billion produced. Thus, Indonesia (and other developing nations) perceive themselves to be in a precarious and dangerous situation, providing the viruses that may herald a coming pandemic, yet unable to obtain vaccinations until too late. However, as Margaret Chan, Director General of the WHO argues, the global community is at risk when global cooperation in surveillance and planning is not achieved.

should include transparency in policy and processes.

3. View these opportunities as chances for further institutional and economic development. Offer training to local health care personnel in both veterinary and human medical disease surveillance and intervention. Avoid creating parallel systems by not allowing foreign actors (NGO’s etc.) to solely perform these duties. Instead, work with existing infrastructure and governments to build institutions locally and prevent brain drain by creating employment opportunities in the home country.

4. Make an effort to understand local cultural and historical context so solutions will be as seamless as possible.

Be sensitive to these contexts in an effort to avoid paternalistic tendencieswhile seeking consensus regarding global issues.

Policy Solutions There are several policy options that can assist international cooperation between developing countries, like Indonesia, as well as promote increased cooperation between global institutions, such as the WHO, and the nations they claim to help.

Conclusion Infectious diseases are increasingly recognized as threats to national security. Indonesia is a contemporary and compelling study of the multiple and sometimes disparate relationships between public health and geopolitical interests. First, Indonesia displays the cultural norms that allow close proximity and spread of the avian influenza virus to human populations as well as the weak and underfunded health care infrastructure that is unable to care for the ill and infected. Second, it is a nation bearing the collective memory of a long-lasting colonial occupation, and perceives that her national sovereignty continues to be undermined at the hands of global governance agencies. Global institutions such as the World Bank and WHO either intentionally or unwittingly hindered efforts at full integration of Indonesia into global economic and governance regimes. Third, Indonesia’s demographic challenges as the fourth most populous nation, strategically located in the heart of global shipping lanes, placed an enormous strain on her governance structures during an effort to treat an epidemic within her borders and to inhibit the epidemic’s spread to other regions. Finally, all of the above factors support the case that both national security and public health threats are culture specific. A case-specific paradigm must be developed so that all of these issues can be addressed to acheive a desirable outcome.

1. Continue dialogue, including listening to complaints from developing countries regarding global governance and sincerely attempt to remedy those complaints. The WHO did this in their pandemic preparedness plan by having multiple meetings with all the stakeholders, but in the future this should be accomplished successfully in less than four years.

2. Involve countries in all steps of pandemic preparedness so they can have ownership over the process, including assurances that vaccine and/or treatment will be available within an acceptable time frame. This

Dannette Smith Cook, M.D. M.A. International Delopment

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THE UNIVERSALITY OF STRENGTH & PAIN Portia Watson is a M.A. Candidate for International Development at the Patterson School and will be receiving a Global Public Health Certificate from the University of Kentucky.

In the summer of 2015, Portia interned at the Abhaiphubest Thai Traditional Medicine College in Prachinburi Province, Thailand. Thai traditional medicine (TTM) has recently experienced a period of revival and increased support from the government, balancing the adoption of western customs and the preservation of the practice. Although many universities have adopted the standardized curriculum for TTM, many of the practitioners are self-taught village healers who often do not accept payment from their patients.

About two weeks ago, a group of us spent a couple of days volunteering at a Thai traditional medicine hospice for cancer patients. The hospice is located at a beautiful temple in the northeastern province of Sakon Nakhon, and allows patients to live there for free. Most patients are in the end stages of cancer, and seek out the temple as a peaceful place to spend their last days. There they receive herbal medicine treatments each day, participate in group meditation, prayer, and other activities, and live as one big family.

On our ride home from the temple, my friend Ning and I were discussing that ever so difficult question -- Why do bad things happen to good people? “Christianity doesn’t really have an answer to this question,” I told her. I suppose there are answers we create and speak into existence to comfort one another, but these answers still leave a bad taste in one’s mouth. “Oh, but we have an answer,” she replied. “We suffer because of the sins of our past lives.” I thought for a moment. “But we can’t remember those sins, or our past lives. If we can’t remember them, did we really do anything wrong?” This is one of my faults. I always asks questions, and I am never satisfied with the answers. “Mmm,” she nodded.

I could tell she, too, was dissatisfied with this answer, but didn’t feel the need to say anything more. Strength is living with the questions. Strength is being dissatisfied, but not discouraged.

I thought about a young patient named Achi. The light in his eyes. The tumor on his shoulder growing bigger and bigger with each passing day, sucking the blood, the life, right out of his body. We watched helplessly as he cried in pain, as the doctor said he could offer him no more morphine.

In between spurts of pain, Achi still managed to smile.

“He would grow up to be handsome,” one said. He already is handsome. He is beauty and light -- the kind that is too bright for this world. “I will fight my hardest,” he says. “I will endure.” There are moments when I feel a red hot anger rise within me. Why must this wonderful child experience pain and suffering? There are plenty of horrible people in this world who live lives of comfort and pleasure. Why not one of them rather than Achi? But I watch those who take care of the boy and the other patients at the temple, and I see that none of them are angry. None of them are crying. They are warm, smiling faces. They are big, tall trees. They walk into a room like water gliding over stones. They sing songs, hold hands, and speak words of comfort. I know that they, too, are human. That they must also feel, at times, angry, sad, and uncertain. But when they walk into a patient’s room, they do not bring these feelings with them. They bring a soft strength instead, for this is what the patients need to endure. What they need is someone who can calm the troubled seas of their souls, so that they may go in peace. As I stood in Achi’s room I realized how weak I am. I like to pride myself on my sensitivity, my ability to feel intense emotion for others. I’ve never contemplated that these qualities can be, at times, self-indulgent. Achi did not need to look at me and see tears. He needed to see peace, warmth, strength. He needed me, needed all of us, to smile.

The more time I spend here, the more I become acquainted with the sort of person I want to be. I am neither as strong or as wise as I would hope. I don’t know what story I have to tell. I still wish I would handle life more gracefully. I wish I could have held Achi’s hand, and be a source of strength for him. I wish I could look the tough questions of life in the face and smile, not needing to know the answers. Maybe one day, I’ll manage.

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Clockwise from top left - 1: A local village doctor and healer performs a special kind of massage on a patient diagnosed with paralysis four years earlier. 2: Nong Achi, taken at Wat Kampramong hospice for cancer patients. 3: A massage oil out of a root called Prai. 4: Students massage a monk at a one-day clinic set up at a local temple 5: Achi with Luang Dta, the monk who founded the temple healing center.

Photos by Portia Watson

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