KCL Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights - Issue 1 by The Journal of Human Rights and International Law

The Journal Team

Vojtech Hons

Atholl Macpherson

Ceren Demirci

Editor-in-chief

Content Editor

Editor

Dalva Barrere

Jihenne E. Khiari

Margritt Clouzeau

Editor

Maurice Kirschbaum

Selen Akgun

Editor

E-mail: kingsstudentjournal@gmail.com Facebook: www.facebook.com/kcl,journal.hr

Twitter: @KSJournal_IAHR

Table of Contents Letter From the Editor ................................................................................................................... 4 A reflection on the international commitment regarding the status of Human Rights in North Korea .... 5 At war with the future: Terrorist ‘scenarios’ and the management of ‘life’ .......................................... 8 Diplomatic immunity re-considered: Do human rights have to pay the price for diplomatic impunity? ..12 Efficiency of Naming and Shaming in Tackling the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers. .............................19 Eradicating polio: The role of Global Health Diplomacy ...................................................................24 Female Genital Mutilation – Stop the Brutalisation of Women and Girls ...........................................37 Free trade agreements: the poison or the cure? .............................................................................40 India’s Watershed Elections .........................................................................................................43 Infant Male Circumcision: Why should the practice be regulated? ...................................................46

L’amour naissant: EU-Morocco relations .......................................................................................59 One Step Forward, Five Steps Back: Recent Human Rights Abuses in Turkey and Turkey’s relationship with the EU .................................................................................................................................65 Oppression and Reaction: A review of human rights abuse and cultural oppression within Xinjiang and Tibet ..........................................................................................................................................69 Prodding Iran’s Nuclear Program: Intelligence in Peace and War .....................................................72 Russia’s use of force in Crimea .....................................................................................................83 The issue of reprisals against individuals seeking to engage with the UN and regional human rights mechanisms ...............................................................................................................................94 The tragedy of the European Union? ..............................................................................................98 “Universality and Regional Enforcement”: A Human Rights Paradox?.............................................102 What would the consequences be if judicial torture warrants were issued to combat terrorism in liberal democracies? ...........................................................................................................................105

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

Letter From the Editor Shortly after we arrived at King’s last September, we all realised that our passion for the world events has met a fertile ground. We were delighted to find that other students share our interests and that projects such as The International Citizen or Dialogue thrive and prosper. One day, however, my friend wrote an amazing essay on the use of drones and their impact on civilians’ lives, but she had to resort to publishing it in LSE journal. This has struck me on first hearing, but it gave me the necessary impulse and the publication you are about to read has departed on its long way to the release. The Journal of IAHR has been edited in the way that would correspond with this impulse: the articles you will read are not journalistic, but rather academic attempts to examine issues stretching as far as the distance gets between the Crimean invasion and global health diplomacy. We all hope that you will accept this inaugural issue with all its imperfections – and we are more than happy to hear about them from you. Should you have words of praise, however, we urge you to address the contributors themselves – without them, the undergraduates, Masters, postgraduates or even alumni, this preliminary note would be the only thing you could read. Our intention is to repeat the whole process of editing again this autumn. But for this, we will need your interest in writing. To give guidance to those who are unsure as to the form, we will be publishing an article guide that will summarise all the requirements. To give guidance as to the content, we encourage you to read the magazines and newspapers, including those at King’s, and when coming across an issue that arouses your interest, try and go as deep into the topic as you can. Mainly, however, our team of editors is here to help, and you can always reach them for consultation.

We wish you an interesting read and we hope to gain your support for this project for the future years!

Vojtech Hons Editor-in-chief

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

A reflection on the international commitment regarding the status of Human Rights in North Korea D E N Í F R AG O S O M A RT ÍN E Z 4TH YR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO

The relatively recent events that have been taking place in the Middle East since the end of 2010, or erroneously referred as Arab Spring, quickly attracted the world’s attention and led to international, political and/or armed, intervention. However, while a debate over the best ways to direct the post conflict reconstruction inside these countries is underway, the deplorable situation of Human Rights in North Korea has been struggling to call the attention of the international community, despite the efforts of many international organizations and formal committees. Thus, the aim of this short note is to modestly contribute to those efforts in an attempt to open a formal debate that in the upcoming future pushes for real action. In the year of 2006, the report Failure to Protect: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea was released, constituting one of the firsts documents that broadly informed the world over the status of Human Rights in North Korea, making a direct condemnation of the political leaders of this nation. In this publication, Václav Havel and other prestigious political figures documented the massive Human Rights violations that have been taking place in North Korea for the last decades, especially since the economic decay of this country in the late 70s. The system of segregation (songbun), the almost generalized famine, the life in the gulags (kwan-li-so), the forced abortions and many other situations were described detailed. Eight years later, more testimonies have been compiled into a multiple number of documents, though all of them have not succeeded in motivating the necessary empathy to take action through international forums such as the United Nations. The big famine that occurred in North Korea in the early 90s led to the annihilation of about 1 million people (almost 5% of the population) (U. S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2006, p. 12), and because the country never recovered, the

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prolonged effect of the famine has been causing the starvation and malnourishment of many more millions. As Amartya Sen wrote in the Idea of Justice (2009), free press avoids the spread of famine, but if there is no free press inside a country, as it happens in North Korea, then the task of international media is to reproduce and distribute the, much or less, information that is already known. Probably the main reason of the failure in communicating this information is the fact that Human Rights concerns are overshadowed by the most media covered situation of North Korean nuclear program, which has been repeatedly said to be an enormous threat to peace. Nevertheless, if we look at a broader conception of security we can identify more sources of risk rather than military. In this sense, a state that is not just incapable to place the environment for its citizens to improve their material and human conditions, but also threatens directly their lives, clearly fits into the category of a failed state and represents a potential conflict scenery which can cause, for example, a massive flow of refugees to neighboring countries. Likewise, the important role that North Korea plays as a kind of ‘strategic pivot’ (Brzezinski, 1997) stopping the influence of United States from spreading in the area, has led China’s and Russia’s governments to consider the stability of North Korean leadership as politically profitable; the reason why both countries have been rejecting any kind of initiatives in the Security Council to take compulsory action. Nonetheless, even if we know in advance that both nations will execute their right to veto in any circumstance regarding the case of North Korea, that should not be stopping international community to press not just for politically isolating North Korea, which might not change the situation at all; but also to expand this political condemnation and economic restrictions to those leaders in China and Russia who are also making possible the endurance of this situation. For no reason should the principle of non-interventionism and self-determination be enforced to protect a recursive state of failed conscious decisions taken by a short group of individuals that have collapsed economically and morally a country. In this regard, it is difficult to understand the positions coming from those who argue that the West should not force the adoption and applicability of human rights in other places, as they might not have a conception of human rights and that it should be respected. However, most of the time, these arguments come from people in the West attempting to understand and respect strange cultures, though they reinforce their point of view comfortably seated in their houses without feeling the uncertainty of a situation where your government is not protecting, but even denying your rights. In March of the present year, the recently created Commission on Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, after presenting the last update report of Human Rights, succeeded in passing a resolution in the General Assembly to

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strongly condemn the crimes against humanity taking place in this part of the world (Doherty, 2014). The fact that the accusations have pointed directly to the leadership of North Korea, and to Kim Jong-un, shows that United Nations has started to lose the fear of pointing out to the people responsible for those crimes, yet we will still have to wait and see if the level of commitment is enough for making valuable changes that materialize in people life’s conditions. Recent aerial night images have shown North Korea as a dark country, where the electrical energy is a luxury, though not just the lack of light, but the lack of information, of opportunities and of adequate life conditions, are also shadowing this country. Misery is not the natural condition of men, reason why ‘we can no longer afford to remain oblivious to it, nor impotent to act against it’, as Michael Kirby said in his statement in front of UN Human Rights Council on March. Thus, the decision remains to international political and opinion leaders in order to support the decisions taken in UN’s forums, and to show that international law regarding crimes against humanity must not remained ignored once again.

Consulted sources Amnesty International, (2014) North Korea: UN vote a positive step to end crimes against humanity. [Online] Available from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/north-korea-human-rights-council-2014-03-28 [Accessed: 10th April 2014]. Doherty, D. (2014) UN Human Rights Council: It's Time to Prosecute Kim Jong Un, et al. Townhall [online] 28th March. Available from http://townhall.com/tipsheet/danieldoherty/2014/03/28/un-its-time-to-prosecute-kim-jong-un-et-al-n1816084 [Accessed: 8th April 2014]. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, (2014) Statement by Mr. Michael Kirby Chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the 25th session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 17 March 2014. [Online] Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14385&LangID=E [Accessed: 10th April 2014]. Sen, Amartya. (2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane. U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Failure to protect: A call for the UN Security Council to act in North Korea [Online], united States of America, 30th October 2006, Available on: http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/North%20Korea%20Report.pdf, [Accessed: 18th August de 2013.]. Zbigniew, Brzezinski, (1997), The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books.

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At war with the future: Terrorist ‘scenarios’ and the management of ‘life’ S E BA ST I A N LA R SS O N MA IN CONFLICT STUDI ES The logic of ‘risk’ In recent decades, ‘risk’ has been established in Western security vocabularies, understood as an all-embracing concept paying no respect to the demarcated terrain of the international structure of states. Risk is associated further with the global yet concealed uncertainties of ‘terrorism’, and serves as the discursive foundation for the exceptional nature of the so called ‘war on terror’. With the introduction of risk, a borderless set of security practices is set to constantly battle a borderless idea of terrorism, and ‘humanity’ now has to be protected from an enemy which is rendered ‘inhuman’.1 In essence, the terrorist threat as such must disregard boundaries, it must stay covert and strike towards the structures of society when least expected; it can violently manifest itself within society and must not necessarily come from outside. Per definition, by being ‘terrorist’, it is not a part of a society or the state, not a part of humanity, not a part of ‘us’, hence, it is defined through that which ‘we’ are not. This constructed ‘other’ is then transferred onto an alien individual or group which is in some way different in relation to the identity of the ‘self’. Consequently, the construction of the terrorist enemy becomes a social and cultural process. 2 The threatening ‘other’ can, due to its literal contingency, strike anywhere, any day, and this potentiality illustrates the peculiar but dreadful ambiguity that terror holds. In effect, states must consistently expect and fight threats lurking in the dark, beyond their direct grasp, and they must gaze into societies and impose a blurring of boundaries between traditional war-waging and exceptional policy-making, enabling innovative measures of regulation and punishment.3 With this, the problematique is reformulated; wars against terrorism are fought constantly in and across societies,

M. Hardt & A. Negri, Multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire, Penguin Books, 2005; V. Jabri, War and the transformation of global politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 2 D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity, University of Minnesota Press, 1998; E. Balibar, ‘Difference, otherness, exclusion’, in Parallax, vol. 11, 2005; R. Jackson, ‘Language, power, and politics: critical discourse analysis and the war on terrorism’ in 49th Parallel [online], vol. 15, 2005. 3 M. Foucault, Society must be defended, Penguin Books, 2004. 1

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and rather than being an extension of politics by other means, wars do in this sense constitute the basis for politics itself.4 The function of ‘scenarios’ Significantly, ‘risk’ does not merely transform spatial sites of the friend and enemy; there is more to risk than what can be perceived in space since threats are also emerging in time, in the ever-potentiality of an attack, in the unknown future. When societies are to be secured, and similarly, when companies and organisations are to be ‘insured’, it becomes a matter of imagining potential ‘scenarios’ and preventing them from happening, hence, a matter of assuming that which has not yet happened and enabling the future to inform and constitute the basis for policies of risk management in the present. Indeed, ‘[i]n a [globalised] world defined by change, the most important standard for measuring what risks are important and need to be dealt with are what kind of catastrophes they may cause in the future’.5 ‘Scenario thinking’, then, entails a presupposed idea of ‘plausibility’ which is based not in statistical probability, but in cultural contextuality. 6 Vivid terrorist futures can be made believable by having a strong emotional impact, yet when explicated, they simultaneously discipline and regulate the thinkable; in other words, scenarios are at the same time reproducing and delimiting the actual characteristics that deem themselves ‘plausible’. Importantly, when a securitizing actor is able to construct scenarios bridging the future with the present, they are also attempting to project a face onto the faceless terrorist, to locate the spatially indeterminate, to unveil the concealed threat. This is, again, anchored in a cultural context that informs societies about what risk supposedly means and looks like. Scenarios of future terrorism become effective when they are proliferated and spread further to the public through so called ‘premediation’. When an image or narrative of an unknown future is premediated, it is done in order to ‘soften the impact’ of catastrophe and shock, to remove panic stemming from the ‘genuinely unexpected’.7 Here too, premediating terrorist scenarios is not about predicting the future correctly, but about reproducing as many plausible ‘what if’s’ as possible, spreading performative conceptions about the threat, for example, via media outlets. Here, the future is not exactly passive, something ‘waiting to be settled’, but rather it is actively engaged as it informs action here and now.8

M. Dillon & J. Reid, The liberal way of war: killing to make life live, Routledge, 2009, pp. 127-128. M. V. Rasmussen, The risk society at war: terror, technology and strategy in the twenty-first century, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p 114. 6 A. McClanahan, ‘Future’s shock: plausibility, pre-emption, and the fiction of 9/11, in symploke, vol. 17, 2009. 7 R. Grusin, Premediation: Affect and mediality after 9/11, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 8 M. De Goede, ‘‘Beyond risk: premediation and the post-9/11 security imagination’, in Security Dialogue, vol. 39, 2008. 4 5

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For the field of security, preventing scenarios from occurring becomes a challenge of controlling time; of fighting a war against the future. If pre-emptive practices are to be guaranteed as successful they must have the ability to see and know the future, however, since this is utterly impossible, the ‘uncertain temporality’ of a future scenario must indeed be withdrawn and ‘displaced’. In fact, the anticipation of the ‘next terrorist attack’ is being countered by ‘practices of preparedness’; again, security practices that take place here and now.9 Managing ‘life’ Time as an element cannot be controlled, yet risk must be contained, and therefore the state has to retreat, rethink, and refine methods of managing the current spaces of society. In the West, this is done to a large extent by mapping and tracing whereabouts and movements of populations, turning them into ‘masses’ subjected to surveillance, corresponding with them as ‘information’ in databases. As legitimate ‘procedures’ wherever bodies are in transit, their biological features become recorded, categorised, and stored as biometric data, giving birth to virtual ‘identical’ twins that are linked and attached to physical bodies of citizens. 10 By mapping masses of bodies, patterns start to emerge in which normal and deviant forms of movement and behaviour can be clearly separated. The alien ‘other’ is thus spotted in a mass of information and can be projected by authorities onto a specific individual body, unveiling the potential ‘terrorist’ and making it subject to pre-emption. By viewing safe and dangerous in terms of measurable ‘data’, the uncertain future can be displaced, and the imagined terrorist scenario can be avoided by detaining and eliminating an information-carrying body. Zooming out slightly, this illustrates not only how security actors deem certain forms of life as productive and some as destructive, but also how ‘life’ as such is reduced to information. 11 And as information, ‘life’ is viewed as passive molecules in a system of governance and punishment, as manageable and negligible, as if the citizens carrying information were somewhat incapable of resistance. In conclusion, then, the introduction of ‘risk’ into politics has enabled exceptional ways of managing the existence of ‘selves’ and ‘others’. Just as we allow ourselves to culturally determine, delimit, and depict the terrorist scenario, paving way for preemptive violence, in similar ways do we allow ourselves to consider ‘life’ as such as passive information, turning bodies into mere information-carriers. Critically, we C. Aradau & R. van Munster, ‘The time/space of preparedness: anticipating the “Next Terrorist Attack”’, in Space and Culture, vol. 15, 2012. 10 L. Amoore, ‘Biometric borders: governing mobilities in the war on terror’, in Political Geography, vol. 25, 2006; C. Epstein, ‘Guilty bodies, productive bodies, destructive bodies: crossing the biometric borders’, in International Political Sociology, vol. 1, 2007. 11 Dillon & Reid, pp. 106-111. 9

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allow biological ‘differences’ (such as skin- and eye-colour) to matter politically and symbolise ‘risk’, the ‘other’, indeed, the ‘terrorist’.

Bibliography Amoore, L. (2006) ‘Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror’, Political Geography 25(1): 336-351. Aradau, C. & R. van Munster (2012) ‘The time/space of preparedness: Anticipating the ‘Next Terrorist Attack’, Space and Culture 15(2): 98-109. De Goede, M. (2008) ‘Beyond risk: premediation and the post-9/11 security imagination’, Security Dialogue 39(2-3): 155-176. Balibar, E. (2005) ‘Difference, otherness, exclusion’, Parallax 11(1): 19-34. Campbell, D. (1998) Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity, 2nd edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Dillon, M. & J. Reid (2009) The liberal way of war: Killing to make life live. London: Routledge. Epstein, C. (2007) ‘Guilty bodies, productive bodies, destructive bodies: Crossing the biometric borders, International Political Sociology 1(2): 113-201. Foucault, M. (2004) Society must be defended. New York: Penguin Books. Grusin, R. (2010) Premediation: Affect and mediality after 9/11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hardt, M. & A. Negri (2005) Multitude: War and democracy in the age of empire. New York: Penguin Books. Jabri, V. (2010) War and the transformation of global politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Jackson, R. (2005) ‘Language, power, and politics: Critical discourse analysis and the war on terrorism’, 49th Parallel [online] 15(1). Available: http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/jackson1.htm [Accessed 5 December 2013]. McClanahan, A. (2009) ‘Future’s shock: Plausibility, preemption, and the fiction of 9/11’, symploke 17(1-2): 41-62. Rasmussen, M. V. (2006) The risk society at war: Terror, technology and strategy in the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Diplomatic immunity re-considered: Do human rights have to pay the price for diplomatic impunity? H A N A H O L LA “Whether they are diplomats or national emissaries of whatever kind, we all must be accountable for the treatment of the people that we employ.” Hillary R. Clinton1 The Vienna Convention of 1961 does no distinguish gravity of cases. Whilst many today believe that immunity should be confined to official diplomatic duties and thus protect diplomats from minor offences, the reality is more complex. 2 The Vienna Convention protects diplomats from criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction. Since no agreement has been reached on what constitutes private and unofficial activities, it is generally accepted that diplomatic agents enjoy constant immunity. 3 This is based on the premise that diplomat remains a diplomat even outside his duties and thus serves as a potential target wherever he goes.4 The general public has long seen diplomats as individuals enjoying excessive impunity, behaving in a way inconsistent with their duties and norms of international law. The abuse of immunity is most striking in the field of human rights. Thanks to privileges that stem from diplomats’ status, ordinary citizens are often the target of criminal offences. There are raising calls to bring diplomatic actions under international criminal jurisdiction, since acts such as rape, murder, slavery, theft and kidnapping breach fundamental rights of all human beings.5

Vandenberg and Levy, “Human Trafficking,” 79. Värk, “Personal Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity.” Ross, “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity,” 174. 3 The Vienna Convention, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Keating, “Can you get away with any crime?” 4 Brown, “Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice,” 146. 5 Bennett, “Sexual assault allegations.” 1 2

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The clash of human rights and immunity in practice “The interests of those who continue to traffic humans like chattel around the world are secure in part because a misplaced allegations to the doctrine of diplomatic immunity guards their heinous acts.” Derrick Howard6 “A recent essay by the American Anti-slavery Group noted that diplomatic immunity has become an increasingly appealing cover for slavery.” 7 In the UK diplomats often use migrants as domestic workers, and sadly, cases of abuse and the violation of human rights exist.8 Bennett noted that over a six-year period, diplomats in Britain have “escaped prosecution for almost 90 crimes...including human trafficking and sexual assault”.9 A 2010 research further showed that 6.9% of domestic workers in private diplomatic households are victims of physical torture or human trafficking. 10 A 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office found that in the last eight years at least 42 foreigners brought as domestic workers were physically or mentally abused. This includes physical and mental abuse; food and sleep deprivation; and inadequate payment.11 Because many diplomats possess absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction, the legal remedies available to domestic workers are severely limited.12 There are also influential political reasons, which force states to reevaluate any judicial proceedings in order not to jeopardize tense inter-state relations.13 Slavery is by no means an issue of the past. Whilst official forms of slavery were universally abolished in the late 19th century, today modern-day slavery still threatens lives of citizens who leave their countries to seek a better future. Unfortunately, as Howard writes, “[h]uman trafficking is the most profitable criminal enterprise behind drug and gun trafficking”.14 What is more upsetting though is the fact that the US’ annual funding for the elimination of modern-day slavery equals only one day worth of funding for the elimination of the drug trade.15

Howard, “Twenty-First Century Slavery,” 126. Higgins, “Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges,” 3-4. 8 Salter, “Diplomatic immunity.” 9 Bennett, “Sexual assault allegations.” 10 Pierrot, Escaping Diplomatic Impunity. 11 Semple, “Peruvian Diplomat.” ACLU, “Kuwaiti Government.” 12 Howard, “Twenty-First Century Slavery,” 136. 13 Ibid., 137. 14 Ibid., 129. 15 Ibid. 6 7

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Foreign workers are often brought to countries with language different to that of their own and thus lack ways of seeking help. They are frequently uneducated and come from poor neighborhoods, which means that the life in diplomats’ service sounds extremely appealing. Howard, for instance, writes: “Domestic servants work for government officials who may appear to them to hold exceptional power and/or influence”.16 Customary international law considers slavery a part of jus cogens. This implies that any treaty or norm that is not part of jus cogens cannot annul its effectiveness, since jus cogens can only be altered or revoked by another jus cogens norm. From this perspective slavery should not be protected by “lower” norm of diplomatic immunity.17

Human rights and immunity: Case studies “Many UN workers who have made or faced accusations of sexual harassment say the current system for handling complains is arbitrary, unfair and mired in bureaucracy.” Edward P. Flaherty18 There are numerous case studies linked to the breach of human rights under the pretext of diplomatic immunity. Whilst many criminal offences are closely linked to drink driving, murder and child abuse, even more worrying are the exploitation of workers and the return of slavery. Ben-Asher notes several cases of the abuse of human rights and of diplomats’ escape from responsibility, such as that in which an Egyptian diplomat in the US kept a Bolivian servant a virtual prisoner.19 Furthermore, in 1981 a man convicted of 15 rapes in New York City escaped punishment because of diplomatic immunity. He reportedly left the police station laughing.20 Another son of a foreign diplomat in the US robbed and sexually assaulted a woman, after which he left the country unpunished. Before getting on his plane, he stopped by his favorite bar.21 A worker for a Bangladeshi diplomat to the UN claimed that for over two years she was kept a virtual slave inside the house. She was forced to work as many as 16 hours a day without any salary and was forbidden from leaving home. She was hidden from guests and forced to sleep under the table so she would not be seen. 22 It seem that all Howard, “Twenty-First Century Slavery,” 136. Ibid., 147. 18 Flaherty, “United Nations Above the Law?” 19 Ben-Asher, Human Rights meet Diplomatic Immunities, 18. 20 Ross, “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity.” 21 Ben-Asher, Human Rights meet Diplomatic Immunities, 6. 22 Howard, “Twenty-First Century Slavery,” 134-5. 16 17

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it takes for diplomats is to know “what one can get away with”. 23 Such treatment not only violates conventions on human rights and the UN Charter but also destroys human dignity. Diplomats should not have a right to treat human beings as worthless possessions. Some mechanisms thus need to emerge so privileged individuals who want to abuse human rights know that consequences will follow.

Conclusion: Remedial measures “There is no need for so many diplomats and so many staff of embassies to walk around with immunity and with diplomatic passports: it is an indulgence, it is outdated and it is a license to abuse.” Eamon Delaney24 Calls for the limitation of diplomatic immunities has been widespread in the last two decades. Whilst there can be no talks on its total elimination, a good deal of debate has been focused on other remedial measures that can be set in motion for situations, in which diplomatic immunity breaches human rights. The first idea was a creation of the International Compensation Fund for Victims of Diplomatic Crimes that would be operated by a receiving state and reimbursed by the sending government once the diplomat was found guilty.25 A second idea aimed to set up a Permanent Diplomatic Criminal Court, which would have its own penal system. Even though nothing serious has come out of these talks since 1980s, it could eventually serve as a convenient way of setting disputes between diplomats and their victims.26 Linked to this idea was the creation of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg that has long ago rejected the notion that one’s official status frees diplomats from responsibilities and legal punishment.27 Whilst Moutzouris claims that diplomats should not claim immunities that are non-essential to their official duties, practice notes that such duties are hard to define. 28 Diplomats need to respect local laws and new enforcement mechanisms need to be in place in order to prevent an abuse of diplomatic privileges.29

Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?” Bennett, “Sexual assault allegations.” 25 Ross, “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity,” 193. Morris, “Problem of Diplomatic Crime,” 194. 26 Ross, “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity,” 195. Morris, “Problem of Diplomatic Crime,” 619. 27 Värk, “Personal Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity.” 28 Moutzouris, Immunity sought by diplomats. 29 Howard, “Twenty-First Century Slavery,” 142. 23 24

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It is undeniable that diplomats need immunity to perform their functions in safe and consistent manner. However this should not clash with human rights and freedoms, especially if these evidently violate other internationally binding treaties. McClanahan was right in saying that “diplomatic immunity was never intended to prevent the investigation of serious crimes”. 30 Unfortunately, immunity is so loosely defined, so wide in scope and so frequently used by thousands of state representatives that any real check on its mis-use by diplomatic personnel seems unattainable. In order to punish perpetrators of most serious crimes despite their official status, international society needs to agree not only on definitions of immunity, but mostly on methods that would help victims seek justice and find inner peace.

Bibliography ACLU. “Domestic Workers Who Accused Diplomats of Human Trafficking Settle With Kuwaiti Government.” ACLU.org, February 15, 2012. Accessed April 10, 2014. https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/domestic-workers-whoaccused-diplomats-human-trafficking-settle-kuwaiti-government. Akande, Dapo and Sangeeta Shah. “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts.” The European Journal of International Law Vol. 21 (2011): 815-852. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=2115&issue=104. BBC News. “Diplomatic Staff in London ‘commit serious crime’.” BBC News London, June 28, 2010. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10436729. Ben-Asher, Dror. Human Rights meet Diplomatic Immunities: Problems and Possible Solutions. Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2000. Accessed April 4, 2014. http://ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Benasher__Human_Rights_meet_Diplomatic_Immunities.pdf. Bennett, Owen. “Embassy workers use ‘diplomatic immunity’ in UK to avoid sexual assault allegations.” Express, March 26, 2014. Accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/467007/Embassy-workers-use-diplomaticimmunity-in-UK-to-avoid-sexual-assualt-allegations. Bensen, Jackie and Richard Jordan. “Possible Human Trafficking Investigated at Saudi Diplomatic Compound in Virginia.” ABC Washington, May 4, 2013. Accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/FederalLocal-Authorities-Investigate-Possible-Human-Trafficking-at-Diplomatic-Compound-in-Virginia-205653811.html. Brown, Jonathan. “Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 37 (1988): 53-88. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=8E45B14ED564E8963C3949307F34688A.journal s?fromPage=online&aid=1510164.

McClanahan, “Diplomatic Immunity,” 156.

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Donaldson, Kitty. “Murder, rape, assault: the secret crimes of London’s diplomats.” The Independent, July 16, 2006. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/murder-rape-assault-the-secret-crimes-oflondons-diplomats-408170.html. Flaherty, Edward P. “Diplomatic Immunity – Is the United Nations Above the Law?” The Huffington Post, June 10, 2010. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-p-flaherty/diplomatic-immunity---is_b_607850.html. Higgins, Rosalyn. “The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom Experience.” American Journal of International Law, Vol.79 (1985): 641-51. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2201891?uid=3738032&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=2110360309 4841 Howard, Derrick. “Twenty-First Century Slavery: Reconciling Diplomatic Immunity and the Rule of Law in the Obama Era.” Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 121 (2012-2013): 122-73. Accessed April 10, 2014. http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/alabcrcl3&div=7&id=&page. Keating, Joshua E. “Can you get away with any crime if you have diplomatic immunity? Pretty much unless your own government gives you up.” In FP Magazine Online, February 15, 2011. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/15/can_you_get_away_with_any_crime_if_you_have_diplomatic_i mmunity. McClanahan, Grant V. Diplomatic Immunity: Principles, Practices, Problems. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1989. Morris, William G. (2012). “Constitutional Solutions to the Problem of Diplomatic Crime and Immunity.” Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36 (2012): 601-37. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.hofstralawreview.org/2012/05/11/constitutional-solutions-to-the-problem-of-diplomatic-crime-andimmunity/. Moutzouris, Maria. Sending and receiving: Immunity sought by diplomats committing criminal offences. Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 2009. Accessed April 1, 2014 http://eprints.ru.ac.za/1571/. Nelson, Christine M. (1988). “Opening” Pandora’s Box: The Status of the Diplomatic Bag in International Relations.” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 12 (1988): 494-520. Accessed April 3, 2014. http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol12/iss3/5/. O’Keefe, Roger. “State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds.“ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44 (2011): 1000-1044. Accessed April 8, 2014. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/manage/wp-content/uploads/OKeefe-cr.pdf. Pierrot, Eirwen-Jane. Escaping Diplomatic Impunity: The Case for Diplomatic Law Reform. The Bar Council, 2010. Accessed April 4, 2014. www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/61895/eirwen-jane_pierrot__42_.pdf. Ross, Mitchell S. (2011). “Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.” American University International Law Review Vol. 4 (2011): 173-205. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol4/iss1/6/. Salter, Glendor. ‘Does diplomatic immunity breach a victim's human rights.’ The Guardian, August 30, 2010. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/aug/30/diplomatic-immunity-european-human-rights.

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Semple, Kirk. “Housekeeper in New Jersey Accuses Peruvian Diplomat of Human Trafficking.” New York Times, June 25 (2013). Accessed April 10, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/nyregion/housekeeper-accuses-aperuvian-diplomat-of-human-trafficking.html?_r=1&. Sharp, Paul. “Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation.” Diplomacy.edu, 1998. Accessed April 5, 2014. http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/who-needs-diplomats-problem-diplomatic-representation. Tai, Amy. (2007). “Unlocking the Doors to Justice: Protecting the Rights and Remedies of Domestic Workers in Face of Diplomatic Immunity.” Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16 (2007): 175-222. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=jgspl. Vandenberg, Martina E. and Alexandra F. Levy. “Human Trafficking and Diplomatic Immunity: Impunity no more?” Intercultural Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 7 (2012): 77-101. Accessed April 10, 2014. http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ichuman7&div=9&id=&page. Värk, René. (2003). “Personal Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity in Respect of Serious Crimes.” Juridica International Vol. VIII (2003):110-19. Accessed April 2, 2014. http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=12585. Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Vienna: The United Nations, 1961. Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7F83006DA90AAE7FC1256F260034B806/$file/Vienna%2 0Convention%20(1961)%20-%20E.pdf. Wilson, Clifton E. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1967.

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Efficiency of Naming and Shaming in Tackling the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers. M IC H A E LA SZÁ R A ZOVÁ MA INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

One of the international community’s approaches to stop active involvement of 300,000 children in conflicts around the globe1 was elaboration of several fundamental international treaties, protocols and resolutions. These documents aimed at defining child soldiers and illegalising their employment. Accordingly, UNICEF and most international NGOs define a child soldier as any person younger than 18 years of age, recruited forcibly or voluntarily into regular or irregular armies2, where they fulfil a variety of roles associated with combat, supporting functions and sex.3 Although multiple governments ratified or accessed binding international documents, they continuously recruited underage combatants. Consequently, the United Nations responded to the lack of governments’ commitment by developing the name and shame strategy. Through a case study of Uganda, this article brings attention to the success of the name and shame approach in decreasing governmental recruitment of children and the simultaneous insufficiency of enforcement capacities when addressing the enrolment of child soldiers by non-state actors.

International endeavours to terminate and prevent employment of children as soldiers led to the adoption of the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in 2000 and its subsequent entry in force two years later. 4 Binding for both governments and non-state actors, the Protocol has forbidden armed groups from forcibly and voluntarily recruiting persons under 18 years of age, whilst allowing states’ armies to enlist adolescents older than 15, if all necessary conditions have

Graça Machel, Impact of armed conflict on children (1996). Aaron Young, ‘Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in African Conflicts’ (2007) 7, The Journal of International Policy Solutions <http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/012/6360.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014. 3 UNICEF, ‘Factsheet: Child Soldiers’ <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 4 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report (2008) 375. 1 2

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been complied with.5 Hereby, the Protocol codified a legal norm and enabled to hold states that breach it accountable for doing so.6

One of the consequences of the wide support for the Protocol was a more active role of the UN Security Council after its adoption. In order to address the phenomenon of child soldiers, the UNSC has endorsed several important resolutions. Of particular significance is the Resolution 1379, requiring the UN Secretary-General to include in his annual report a ‘list of shame’ of governmental and non-state actors employing child soldiers.7 Several other essential resolutions followed, creating monitoring mechanisms and calling parties to cooperate with the UN through agreement and implementation of binding action plans terminating recruitment of children. 8 Consequently, the name and shame approach came into practice.

The list of shame is composed of two annexes to the Secretary-General’s annual report submitted to the UNSC. Annex 1 includes countries already on the agenda of the UNSC while Annex 2 mentions states which are not. The initial criteria to be placed on the list, employing child soldiers, has been expanded to responsibility for killing and maiming children, perpetrating serious sexual violence against children, or attacking schools and hospitals. Although scepticism persists about this strategy, the name and shame approach appears essential for eradicating recruitment of children, since inclusion on the list incites the country level Task Forces to negotiate a binding and time-limited Action Plan with listed actors. After systematic verification that an actor implemented all necessary requirements specified in the plan, it can be eliminated from the list.9 Positive changes brought about by naming and shaming are apparent. For instance, at least 17 action plans were signed between 2006 and 2012 and 11,000 children were released from armed groups during 2011. 10 The mechanism’s success was also appreciated in the UNSC Resolution 2068, concluding that the implementation of the strategy enabled signing action plans, demobilising thousands of child soldiers, and even removing several actors from the list of shame. 9 United Nations General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000). 6 Shara Abraham, ‘Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to Protect Children in Conflict’ (2003) 10 (3), Human Rights Brief <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/10/3abraham.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014. 7 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1379 (2001). 8 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1460 (2003); UNSC Resolution S/RES/1612 (2005); UNSC Resolution S/RES/1998 (2011). 9 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, ‘The “List of Shame’’ ’ <http://watchlist.org/the-list-of-shame/> accessed 4 April 2014. 10 UN News Centre, ‘FEATURE: UN envoy confident use of child soldiers can be eradicated’ (3 April 2012),<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewsID=41699&Cr=child&Cr1=soldier#> accessed 10 April 2014. 5

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Both, strengths and weaknesses of the approach can be demonstrated by the Ugandan case. Two central parties to the conflict were governmental forces - Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and the main armed group - Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).11 UPDF as well as Local Defence Units, armed and trained by government, both had a record of recruiting children, killing, torturing and perpetrating sexual violence during the conflict.12 The employment of children by UPDF continued even after Uganda signed the Optional Protocol in 2002 and established, in the UPDF Act, 18 years of age as an obligatory criteria for joining military.13 The persevering recruitment of children resulted in the UPDF’s periodic placement on the list of shame, although in 2007 it was believed that children’s presence in army was a result of insufficient monitoring capacities.14 An essential milestone was the signature of the Action Plan in January 2009.15 Several months later, after a successful implementation of all established conditions, the UPDF was removed from the list of shame.16 Although political factors may have played an important part in the willingness of Ugandan government to cooperate, the termination of children’s recruitment by UPDF is still a remarkable achievement of the name and shame approach.

Nonetheless, the case of Uganda also points out the shortage of enforcement measures when dealing with non-state actors recruiting children, such as LRA, that are not willing to cooperate with the UN. In spite of all international and regional efforts, LRA has again been placed on the latest list of shame in 2013, as an actor operating in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic. 17 Since 1986, at

Human Rights Watch, ‘Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda’ (2003), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 12 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report (2008) 345-347. 13 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict, Declarations and Reservations: Uganda, <http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=iv-11b&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 4 April 2014. The Republic of Uganda, ‘Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces Act’ (2005), <http://iclass.iuea.ac.ug/intranet/Ebooks/LAW/all%20laws%20of%20uganda/ACTS%200F%20PARLIAMENT%202001-2006/U.P.D.F%20Act%202005.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 14 United Nations Security Council, ‘S/2007/260’ (2007), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/7-May-2007Report-of-the-SRSG-on-Children-and-armed-conflict-in-Uganda.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 15 United Nations Security Council, ‘S/AC.51/2007/12’ (2007) <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20SAC%2051%202007%2012.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 16 United Nations Security Council, ‘S/2009/462’ (2009), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/15September-2009-Report-of-the-SRSG-on-Children-and-armed-conflict-in-Uganda.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 17 United Nations Secretary General, ‘Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General’ (2013), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CAAC-Annual-Report-2013.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 11

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least 20,000 children have been abducted by LRA.18 Despite promising to release children younger than 18 years of age, as a part of 2008 peace agreement, LRA refused to do so and continues to employ children.19 Public humiliation strategy has since 2010 motivated at least five armed groups to sign Action Plans with the UN. 20 However, LRA is still not one of them. Unconcerned with being placed on the list of shame, the LRA remains reluctant to sign any action plan, therefore highlighting the dependence of naming and shaming on the will of a particular actor.

To conclude, as the case of Uganda illustrates, the UN naming and shaming mechanism is efficient when actors are open to collaboration. However, LRA clearly proves that the strategy lacks any sort of enforcement that could coerce non-state actors to sign action plans and implement measures. Thereby, as the Office for the Special Representative for the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict expressed: ‘More must be done to systematise and activate the full range of options available to the international community to ensure more robust action against recalcitrant violators.’21

Bibliography Aaron Young, ‘Preventing, Demobilizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in African Conflicts’ (2007) 7, The Journal of International Policy Solutions <http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/012/6360.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report (2008) 345-375. Graça Machel, Impact of armed conflict on children (1996). Human Rights Watch, ‘Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda’ (2003), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. IRIN, ‘In-depth: Child Soldiers: Fighting for the rights of child soldiers’ (17 January 2012), <http://www.irinnews.org/indepth/94657/94/global-fighting-for-the-rights-of-child-soldiers> accessed 10 April 2014. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict, Declarations and Reservations: Uganda, <http://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=iv11- b&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 4 April 2014.

Human Rights Watch, ‘Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern Uganda’ (2003), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 19 United Nations Security Council, ‘S/AC.51/2010/1’ (2010), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20AC%2051%202010%201.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. 20 IRIN, ‘In-depth: Child Soldiers: Fighting for the rights of child soldiers’ (17 January 2012), <http://www.irinnews.org/indepth/94657/94/global-fighting-for-the-rights-of-child-soldiers> accessed 10 April 2014. 21 IRIN, ‘In-depth: Child Soldiers: Fighting for the rights of child soldiers’ (17 January 2012), <http://www.irinnews.org/indepth/94657/94/global-fighting-for-the-rights-of-child-soldiers> accessed 10 April 2014. 18

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Shara Abraham, ‘Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to Protect Children in Conflict’ (2003) 10 (3), Human Rights Brief <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/10/3abraham.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014. The Republic of Uganda, ‘Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces Act’ (2005), <http://iclass.iuea.ac.ug/intranet/Ebooks/LAW/all%20laws%20of%20uganda/ACTS%200F%20PARLIAMENT%2020012006/U.P.D.F%20Act%202005.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. UNICEF, ‘Factsheet: Child Soldiers’ <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. United Nations General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000). United Nations Secretary General, ‘Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General’ (2013), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CAAC-Annual-Report-2013.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. United Nations Security Council, ‘S/2007/260’ (2007), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/7-May-2007Report-of-the-SRSG-on-Children-and-armed-conflict-in-Uganda.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. United Nations Security Council, ‘S/2009/462’ (2009), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/15-September2009-Report-of-the-SRSG-on-Children-and-armed-conflict-in-Uganda.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. United Nations Security Council, ‘S/AC.51/2007/12’ (2007), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20SAC%2051%202007%2012.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. United Nations Security Council, ‘S/AC.51/2010/1’ (2010), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20AC%2051%202010%201.pdf> accessed 4 April 2014. UN News Centre, ‘FEATURE: UN envoy confident use of child soldiers can be eradicated’ (3 April 2012,<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewsID=41699&Cr=child&Cr1=soldier#> accessed 10 April 2014. UNSC Resolution S/RES/1379 (2001). UNSC Resolution S/RES/1460 (2003). UNSC Resolution S/RES/1612 (2005). UNSC Resolution S/RES/1998 (2011). Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, ‘The “List of Shame’’ ’ <http://watchlist.org/the-list-of-shame/> accessed 4 April 2014.

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Eradicating polio: The role of Global Health Diplomacy A N D R EA B EC K MSC INTEGRATEDWATER RESO URCES MANAGEMENT – MCGILL UNIVERSITY Abstract Since the 1980s, the incidence of polio has decreased significantly around the world. In order to better understand the factors that account for this success, this paper focuses on Global Health Diplomacy (GHD), and examines the extent to which it has played a role in polio eradication efforts. Based on four case studies concerning the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), the 2003 polio vaccination boycott in northern Nigeria, the Polio Partnership between the United States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and Rotary International field volunteers, it is argued that multistakeholder and informal GHD have contributed significantly to polio elimination. In the future, GHD might help address current challenges related to polio-endemic Pakistan and recent polio outbreaks in the Middle East.

Introduction Poliomyelitis (polio) is a viral disease caused by the poliovirus. Despite its long history dating back at least to the Egyptian 18th dynasty (1580-1350 BC), the disease was only recognized as a distinct condition in 1840. Its causative agent – poliovirus – was first identified in 1908 (Drutz et al., 2000). Given that the virus can cause infantile paralysis, polio became one of the most feared childhood diseases of the 20 th century. However, since the 1980s, significant progress has been made towards worldwide eradication of polio. Notably, polio cases have decreased by over 99 percent, from an estimated 350,000 cases in more than 125 endemic countries in 1988 to 406 reported cases in 2013. Last year, polio was endemic in only four countries, namely Afghanistan, India, Nigeria and Pakistan (WHO, 2014). On 27 March 2014, India was officially certified as polio-free by the World Health Organization (WHO), making Southeast Asia the fourth world region to be declared free of polio, after the Americas (1994), Western Pacific (2000) and Europe (2002) (Fry, 2014).

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In order to better understand what accounts for these advances towards the goal of eradicating polio, this paper focuses on the emerging concept of Global Health Diplomacy (GHD). GHD has recently received more attention by academics and practitioners, and has been identified as an important factor in combating infectious diseases such as avian influenza and yellow fever (see, for example, Andrus et al., 2012; Michaud & Kates, 2013, p. 25). Against this backdrop, this paper addresses the question ‘To what extent has GHD played a role in polio eradication efforts?’ To answer this question, the paper is organized as follows. It begins by providing an overview of the GHD concept, including its origins, definitions and three major forms. The next section briefly introduces the polio disease and progress towards its elimination. Thereafter, four case studies will be discussed to examine the role of GHD in eradicating polio. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of this paper and suggests avenues for future action. Taken together, the principal argument of this paper is that GHD in its multistakeholder and informal forms has played a significant role in polio eradication activities around the world. Although the successes in polio elimination cannot be attributed to GHD alone, its use has nevertheless made important contributions towards the goal of a polio-free world. Given the persisting challenges to polio vaccination in Pakistan and recent outbreaks in Syria and Iraq, GHD is likely to remain a powerful tool in future eradication efforts.

Global Health Diplomacy Over the past years, GHD has moved to the forefront within both academic and policy-making circles. This section offers a brief overview of the GHD concept, with a particular focus on its origins, definitions and three main forms – core diplomacy, multi-stakeholder diplomacy, and informal diplomacy. Origins The origins of health diplomacy can be traced back to the 19th century, when the first examples of international health cooperation appeared. For instance, the first International Sanitary Conference (ISC) was held in 1851, and the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) was established in Paris in 1907 (Kickbusch, 2013, pp. 2-6). Although the practice of health diplomacy is thus not a new phenomenon, the concept of GHD has only emerged relatively recently. As Ilona Kickbusch (2013, pp. 1-2) points out, “…it is only in the past decade that the technical areas of global health have been explicitly linked to the sphere of diplomacy.” According to Rebecca Katz et al.

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(2011, p. 503), today, “[h]ealth issues have become increasingly preeminent in the evolving global diplomacy agenda. More leaders in academia and policy are thinking about how to structure and utilize diplomacy in pursuit of global health goals.” In 2009, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly explicitly recognized the close relationship between global health and foreign policy, encouraging member states to consider health issues in foreign policy formulation (UNGA, 2009, para. 1-2). Several factors have contributed to this increasing interest in the theory and practice of GHD. These include shifts in the global political environment, the emergence of new epidemics (such as those related to HIV/AIDS and SARS), and the greater need for international health cooperation in a globalized world. In consideration of recent trends, it can be expected that the importance of GHD will continue to grow in the future (Kickbusch, 2013, p. 2; Michaud & Kates, 2013, pp. 25-26). Definitions In general terms, GHD refers to diplomatic activities that directly or indirectly address issues relevant to global health. As such, it is concerned with questions of how and why global health matters play out in the context of diplomacy and foreign policy (Michaud & Kates, 2013, p. 24). From an academic perspective, GHD has been described as an interdisciplinary field which focuses on critical exploration, research and training, combining medicine and public health with disciplines such as international relations, politics, law, economics and culture (Adams et al., 2008, p. 316; Kickbusch & Berger, 2011, p. 276). In a more applied context, GHD can be defined as “the policy-shaping processes through which States, intergovernmental organizations, and non-State actors negotiate responses to health challenges or utilize health concepts or mechanisms in policy-shaping and negotiation strategies to achieve other political, economic, or social objectives.” (cf. Fidler, 2013, p. 693)

As becomes clear from this definition, the relationship between global health, diplomacy and foreign policy can take two main directions. On the one hand, diplomacy and foreign policy can be used to advance global health interests and to address shared transboundary threats related to communicable and noncommunicable diseases, health-system capacity and social determinants of health (for example, poverty, access to education, gender inequalities and environmental degradation) (Fidler, 2013, pp. 693-699; Kickbusch, 2013, p. 16). On the other hand, global health issues can be utilized as instruments to achieve non-health-related objectives in diplomacy and foreign policy. In this connection, GHD is often described as an instrument of “soft power” in the pursuit of influence, allies and competitive

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advantages in the international system (Fidler, 2013, p. 693; for a more detailed discussion of the soft power concept, see Nye, 2011). The use of global health for the achievement of political objectives has been controversially discussed, not least from an ethical point of view (Fidler, 2013, p. 703); yet numerous examples illustrate the practice of using GHD as a soft power tool in international relations (see, for example Feinsilver, 2010; Hotez, 2001a; Hotez, 2001b; Lee et al., 2010; McInnes & Rushton, 2012). In sum, GHD has thus been defined and employed both as an instrument to genuinely address global health challenges and as an instrument to achieve other non-healthrelated diplomatic and foreign policy goals. Mindful of these nuances in defining GHD, the remainder of this paper uses the first interpretation as its conceptual basis. Three forms Three forms of GHD can be distinguished in practice, namely core diplomacy, multistakeholder diplomacy, and informal diplomacy (Katz et al., 2011, pp. 506-514; see also Michaud & Kates, 2013, p. 26).

Core diplomacy The first form of GHD can be referred to as “core diplomacy,” describing formal bi- or multi-lateral negotiations between or among states. The principal goal of these negotiations consists in the resolution of disputes and the conclusion of formal treaties. Examples of core GHD are the negotiations that take place at the World Health Assembly (WHA), which can result in international health treaties such as the 2003 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Multi-stakeholder diplomacy The second form of GHD is “multi-stakeholder diplomacy.” It encompasses negotiations on global health-related issues among states, international organizations and/or non-state actors (such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector companies and philanthropies). These negotiations are not necessarily intended to lead to binding agreements; rather, they often result in the creation of global initiatives and long-term partnerships, for example the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, or the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). Informal diplomacy

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The third form of GHD has been termed â&#x20AC;&#x153;informal diplomacy.â&#x20AC;? It refers to interactions between health actors from one country doing fieldwork with actors in another country. As in the case of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, the types of actors involved in informal diplomacy can vary, ranging from official or semi-official government representatives to individuals of the general public. Examples of informal GHD include on-the-ground action undertaken by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or by charity volunteers sent abroad on medical missions.

Polio and its eradication After having provided an overview of GHD, this paper now proceeds with a brief discussion of polio and the progress achieved towards its eradication. Polio As noted above, polio is a highly infectious disease caused by polioviruses. If sanitation conditions are poor and human faecal material contaminates water supplies or the dirt children play in, the virus easily gets ingested. It mainly affects children under the age of five (WHO, 2014; Wilson, 2009, p. 2). Having entered the body through the mouth, polioviruses multiply in the intestine. Initial symptoms of poliovirus infection typically include fever, fatigue, headache, vomiting, stiffness in the neck, and pain in the limbs. In approximately 90 percent of cases, the poliovirus stays within the intestinal tract and causes no further illness. This form of polio is therefore called inapparent poliomyelitis. In less than five percent of infections, however, the poliovirus enters the central nervous system in the spinal cord, where it causes damage that can lead to paralysis. The degree of damage determines the extent of paralysis. If the nerve cells are only damaged, the paralysis may be temporary, and most or all muscle functions could be regained over time (abortive poliomyelitis). If the nerve cells are destroyed by the poliovirus, the paralysis is likely to be permanent and irreversible since the cells are unable to regenerate (paralytic poliomyelitis) (Wilson, 2009, pp. 2-3). Among the patients that are being paralyzed by polio, five to ten percent die when their breathing muscles become immobilized (WHO, 2014). Progress towards polio eradication The scientific study of poliomyelitis and the poliovirus began in the early 20 th century. At first, action against polio was most prevalent in North America, with support being provided by prominent actors such as the Rockefeller Foundation and U.S. president

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Franklin D. Roosevelt, who himself had been diagnosed with polio in 1921 (Scott et al., 2009, p. 212). When polio research began, the field of virology was still in its infancy. However, scientists soon started to seek ways of preventing the disease, despite many unknowns and obstacles. By 1952, an inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) had been developed, and in 1961, an attenuated live-virus oral polio vaccine (OPV) was introduced. Due to its advantages in terms of effectiveness, administration and costs, the OPV subsequently became the vaccine of choice for mass eradication programs (Scott et al., 2009, p. 213; Wilson, 2009, p. 141, 143). Thanks to the development and use of polio vaccines, the incidence of polio was significantly reduced during the 1960s, particularly in developed countries. The first major region outside North America to focus on polio eradication was Latin America and the Caribbean, where the OPV was introduced in 1977 and achieved considerable successes (Scott et al., 2009, p. 213). With polio eradication campaigns expanding throughout many other world regions in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of worldwide polio cases decreased considerably. Of the three strains of wild poliovirus (type 1, type 2 and type 3), type 2 was eradicated in 1999 and case numbers of type 3 were reduced to relatively low levels. Today, 80 percent of the world’s population lives in certified polio-free regions. As previously mentioned, in 2014, only parts of three countries – Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan – remain polio-endemic, which according to the WHO represents the smallest geographic area in the history of polio (WHO, 2014).

The role of Global Health Diplomacy in eradicating polio In an attempt to explain these successes, this section examines the extent to which GHD has played a role in polio eradication. According to the conceptual framework introduced above, three cases of multi-stakeholder diplomacy and one case of informal diplomacy have been identified from the literature. In the following paragraphs, each of these cases will be discussed in more detail to analyze the contributions of GHD towards eradicating polio. Multi-stakeholder diplomacy I: Global Polio Eradication Initiative The rapid progress made with respect to interrupting polio transmission in the Americas, as well as the global certification of smallpox eradication in 1980, created considerable interest in continuing elimination of infectious diseases. In 1988, the

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Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched by a resolution of the WHA (WHA, 1988). The GPEI is a public-private partnership whose goal consists in worldwide polio eradication. The initiative is led by national governments and supported by four spearheading partners, namely the WHO, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and Rotary International (GPEI, 2010). Beyond its core structure, the GPEI works with a variety of partners, including NGOs and private foundations (Aylward & Tangermann, 2011, p. D81). As a global health initiative comprising several state and non-state actors, the GPEI can thus be regarded as a case of multi-stakeholder GHD. Since its founding, the GPEI has become one of the largest coordinated health initiatives in history. At the peak of its field operations, it directly employed over 4,000 people, managed a budget of about U.S.$ 1 billion, and maintained active field operations in more than 75 countries (Aylward, 2011, p. 13). Taken together, since 1988, the GPEI has become involved in 200 countries, where it mobilized 20 million volunteers to vaccinate 2.5 billion children. According to the GPEI, its international investment towards the goal of a polio-free world now totals approximately U.S.$ 8.2 billion (GPEI, 2010). These impressive figures notwithstanding, note should be taken of the fact that the GPEI has faced many challenges in its work. Some of the most difficult obstacles have included weak management and oversight of mass OPV campaigns, weak implementation of supplementary immunization activities, loss of community confidence, underserved mobile and migratory populations, inaccessible areas due to insecurity or active conflict, and polio outbreaks caused by circulating vaccinederived polioviruses (cVDPVs). Acute funding gaps have also hampered GPEI activities on various occasions (Aylward & Tangermann, 2011, pp. D81-82). Despite these challenges, however, the GPEI has played a pivotal role within the global campaign to eradicate polio. Importantly, many countries in which the strategies suggested by the GPEI were introduced succeeded in interrupting poliovirus transmission within only two to three years (Aylward, 2011, p. 14). The support provided by the GPEI to polio-affected countries – mostly in the areas of strategic planning, policy development, priority setting and resource mobilization – was essential in this respect (Aylward et al., 2003, p. 910). The GPEI is also often commended for its successful actions in conflict-affected areas, being presented as evidence that polio can be eradicated even in the most difficult political and security environments (Aylward, 2011, p. 19). Even if global poliovirus transmission can one day be interrupted, the GPEI is likely to keep an important role. Notably, the GPEI has started to prepare for the polio “endgame,” with long-term strategies including global

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certification of polio eradication and the phasing out of OPV due to the risks of vaccine-related paralysis (Aylward, 2011, p. 22; Aylward & Tangermann, 2011, p. D84). Multi-stakeholder diplomacy II: Polio vaccination boycott in northern Nigeria Another example of multi-stakeholder GHD is the diplomatic effort aimed at ending the 2003 polio vaccination boycott in northern Nigeria. In August 2003, political leaders in several northern Nigerian states banned federally-sponsored polio immunization campaigns. The interruption was justified by purported evidence that polio vaccines were contaminated with HIV/AIDS virus and anti-fertility drugs to sterilize young Muslim girls. Other factors lending further community support to the boycott included negative experiences with international drug trials in the past, lack of education, traditional cultural beliefs and the perception that disproportionate resources were being devoted to the polio campaign at the expense of primary health care services. In Kano state, the boycott lasted for more than a year. Overall, the vaccination suspensions in northern Nigeria caused a global outbreak of polio, as the disease was spreading into 20 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia (Frishman, 2009, p. 1860; Kaufmann & Feldbaum, 2009, p. 1091; Yahya, 2007, pp. 194-202). The prolonged boycott in Kano state provoked an international diplomatic response. In order to find a solution to the ban on polio vaccination, a variety of state and nonstate actors became involved in negotiations, including the UN (sending a special envoy to Nigeria), the WHO, U.S. government departments and agencies, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the International Fiqh Council, the African Union, as well as vaccine manufacturers (Kaufmann & Feldbaum, 2009, pp. 10931097; Michaud & Kates, 2013, p. 25). Notably, factors such as the shipment of polio vaccine produced in Indonesia (another Muslim country) were decisive in eventually ending the polio vaccination boycott in Kano state. However, the multi-stakeholder GHD response played an indispensable role in the resumption of polio immunization activities, not least due to the intense political pressure it put on the Kano state government (Kaufmann & Feldbaum, 2009, pp. 1097-1098). Multi-stakeholder diplomacy III: U.S.-OIC Polio Partnership Following U.S. president Barack Obamaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Cairo speech in June 2009, the United States and the OIC (comprising 57 member states) decided to cooperate to further support the GPEI and eradicate polio from the last remaining endemic countries (UNICEF, 2009). Within the framework of the U.S.-OIC Polio Partnership, efforts at coordination have since been made in specified areas, including advocacy, fund-raising and technical support (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2009; White House, 2014). Specifically, the United States and the OIC have worked closely together in order to

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“…support affected countries to vaccinate children and establish robust disease surveillance systems, to increase community awareness about the safety and importance of immunization and to identify new sources of funding to close the resource gap, especially among OIC member countries.” (Voice of America, 2010) By partnering with the OIC, the United States has shown a desire for cooperation with the Muslim world. Due to the legitimacy that the OIC possesses among Muslim constituencies, the organization can help provide access for American and other health actors to isolated, hostile or otherwise inaccessible communities (cf. Chhabra, 2010, p. 146). As an example of multi-stakeholder GHD, the U.S.-OIC Polio Partnership therefore has the potential to facilitate eradication activities in the remaining countries experiencing endemic polio. Informal diplomacy: Rotary International field volunteers The activities of Rotary International members in the field illustrate the contributions of informal GHD to polio eradication efforts. Rotary International – one of the four main spearheading GPEI partners – is an NGO with a network of local service clubs and a membership of more than 1.2 million around the world. Among other things, it encourages experienced business and professional leaders to undertake projects that address pressing challenges within communities (Scott et al., 2009, p. 211, 216). Through its advocacy efforts, Rotary International has mobilized key individuals ranging from UN personnel, business leaders and celebrities to local political, community and religious leaders in support of polio eradication (Aylward & Tangermann, 2011, p. D83). Beyond Rotary International’s crucial support for the GPEI, the organization’s club members have served as “food soldiers” in the task of delivering polio vaccines to children in developing countries (Bristol, 2012, p. 8). Recalling her on-the-ground experiences in India, Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar Esha Chhabra (2010, pp. 141-142) notes that polio eradication “…relies on unconventional diplomats – those who venture into the nooks and crannies of areas unvisited by dignitaries and who talk with locals, not just officials, to acquire a richer, more complex picture of the situation on the ground. These diplomats include students, local residents, Muslim clerics, and health workers, all of whom cross religious and national divisions in pursuit of their objectives. Their interactions make polio eradication a dynamic program, extending beyond the field of development and foreign policy.”

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Conclusion The purpose of this paper has been to examine the question ‘To what extent has GHD played a role in polio eradication efforts?’ Based on the four case studies discussed above, it can be argued that GHD – in its multi-stakeholder and informal forms – has made important contributions with respect to worldwide polio eradication. The fact that no example of core GHD could be identified reflects general trends in 21st century diplomacy, which increasingly moves away from formal state-to-state negotiations towards more flexible forms of cooperation, involving diverse arrays of state and non-state actors (Pigman, 2010, p. 18). While many factors may have cooperated to produce the significant successes in eradicating polio since the mid-20th century – notably advances in scientific research and development of polio vaccines – this paper has illustrated GHD’s indispensable role in the efforts towards a polio-free world. Yet, many challenges remain for the future. In Pakistan, for example, polio vaccination teams have repeatedly become the target of attacks due to opposition by local Taliban, who perceive immunization campaigns as a cover for international espionage and – as in the case of northern Nigeria – as a plot to sterilize Muslim children (Ahmad, 2014; Landau, 2012). Recently, new cases of polio have been reported in the Middle East as a consequence of the escalating civil war in Syria (Aylward & Alwan, 2014). Damaged health infrastructure, poor access to health care, massive population movements and lack of access for international vaccinators are among the most important reasons for the re-emergence of polio in the region (Jones, 2014). In order to address these challenges, future GHD action is required. The international efforts to end the polio vaccination boycott in northern Nigeria could serve as a model for future multi-stakeholder GHD in Pakistan. Strengthening cooperation between international actors and the OIC – such as the U.S.-OIC Polio Partnership – could be another promising avenue towards building trust and engaging local actors in polio vaccination campaigns. Regarding the recent polio outbreaks in the Middle East, diplomatic efforts should be continued to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Syria. In the meantime, multi-stakeholder GHD could serve to negotiate temporary interruptions of the fighting to allow for health care provision, including the vaccination of children against polio and other diseases. The 1995 cease-fire achieved for combating drancunculiasis (“guinea worm cease-fire”) and national immunization days (“days of tranquillity”) during the armed conflicts in Sudan and Sierra Leone provide past examples of GHD achievements in contexts of war and insecurity (Hopkins & Withers, 2002; Hotez, 2001a, p. 69).

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Taken together, the continuation of GHD efforts is thus essential if the vision of a polio-free world is to become a reality. Not only could the eradication of polio lead to at least U.S.$ 40-50 billion of savings over the next 20 years, but most importantly, “…success will mean that no child will ever again suffer the terrible effects of lifelong polio-paralysis” (WHO, 2014).

References Adams, V., Novotny, T. E., & Leslie, H. (2008). Global health diplomacy. Medical Anthropology, 27(4), 315-323. Ahmad, J. (2014). Militant ambush kills 12 of polio workers escort in Pakistan. Reuters, 1 March 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/01/us-pakistan-polio-attack-id USBREA200AA20140301 Andrus, J. K., Ropero, A. M., Ghisays, G., Romero, S., Jauregui, B., & Matus, C. R. (2012). Yellow fever and health diplomacy: International efforts to stop the urban yellow fever outbreak in Paraguay. In E. Rosskam, & I. Kickbusch (Eds.), Negotiating and navigating global health: Case studies in global health diplomacy. Singapore & Hackensack: World Scientific, 391-403. Aylward, R. B., Acharya, A., England, S., Agocs, M., & Linkins, J. (2003). Global health goals: Lessons from the worldwide effort to eradicate poliomyelitis. Lancet, 362(9387), 909-914. Aylward, R. B. (2011). Lessons from the late stages of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. In S. L. Cochi, & W. R. Dowdle (Eds.), Disease eradication in the 21st century: Implications for global health. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1323. Aylward, R. B., & Tangermann, R. (2011). The global polio eradication initiative: Lessons learned and prospects for success. Vaccine, 29(S4), D80-85. Aylward, R. B., & Alwan, A. (2014). Polio in Syria. Lancet, 383(9916), 489-491. Bristol, N. (2012). The U.S. role in global polio eradication. Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://csis.org/files/publication/121217_Bristol_USRolePolio_ Web.pdf Chhabra, E. (2010). The power of polio. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 11(1), 141-147. Drutz, J. E., & Ligon, B. L. (2000). Polio: Its history and its eradication. Seminars in Pediatric Infectious Diseases, 11(4), 280-286. Feinsilver, J. M. (2010). Fifty years of Cuba’s medical diplomacy: From idealism to pragmatism. Cuban Studies, 41(1), 85104. Fidler, D. P. (2013). Health diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds), The Oxford handbook of modern diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 691-707. Frishman, A. (2009). Major reason for Nigerian boycott of polio vaccine. Health Affairs, 28(6), 1860-1861. Fry, M. (2014). Southeast Asia declared free of polio. Time, 27 March 2014. http://time.com/ 39919/india-declared-free-ofpolio/

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Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) (2010). About us. http://www.polioeradication. org/AboutUs.aspx Hopkins, D. R., & Withers, P. C., Jr. (2002). Sudan’s war and eradication of dracunculiasis. Lancet, 360(S1), S21-22. Hotez, P. J. (2001a). Vaccine diplomacy. Foreign Policy, 124, 68-69. Hotez, P. J. (2001b). Vaccines as instruments of foreign policy. EMBO Reports, 2(10), 862-868. Jones, S. (2014). UN brands polio outbreak in Syria and Iraq ‘most challenging in history.’ The Guardian, 28 March 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/20 14/mar/28/un-polio-syria-iraq-most-challenging-history Katz, R., Kornblet, S., Arnold, G., Lief, E., & Fischer, J. E. (2011). Defining health diplomacy: Changing demands in the era of globalization. Milbank Quarterly, 89(3), 503-523. Kaufmann, J. R., & Feldbaum, H. (2009). Diplomacy and the polio immunization boycott in northern Nigeria. Health Affairs, 28(4), 1091-1101. Kickbusch, I., & Berger, C. (2011). Global health diplomacy. In R. Parker, & M. Sommer (Eds.), Routledge handbook of global public health. New York: Routledge, 275-281. Kickbusch, I. (2013). 21st century health diplomacy: A new relationship between foreign policy and health. In T. E. Novotny, I. Kickbusch, & M. Told (Eds.), 21st century global health diplomacy. New Jersey: World Scientific, 140. Landau, E. (2012). Why polio hasn’t gone away yet. CNN, 30 July 2012. http://www.cnn. com/2012/07/27/health/polioeradication-efforts/ Lee, K., Chagas, L. C., & Novotny, T. E. (2010). Brazil and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Global health diplomacy as soft power. PLoS Medicine, 7(4), 1-5. McInnes, C., & Rushton, S. (2012). Smart power? Health interventions for strategic effect in Iraq and Afghanistan. International Political Sociology, 6(3), 328-331. Michaud, J., & Kates, J. (2013). Global health diplomacy: Advancing foreign policy and global health interests. Global Health: Science & Practice, 1(1), 24-28. Nye, J. S. (2011). Power and foreign policy. Journal of Political Power, 4(1), 9-24. Pigman, G. A. (2010). Contemporary diplomacy: Representation and communication in a globalized world. Cambridge & Malden: Polity Press. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (2009). U.S., OIC forge partnership to eradicate polio. http://www.saudiembassy.net/print/latest_news/news07290901.aspx Scott, R., Wilkinson, W., & Eberhard, J. (2009). Rotary International and eradicating polio. In A. F. Cooper, & J. J. Kirton (Eds.). Innovation in global health governance: Critical cases. Surrey & Burlington: Ashgate, 211-218. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2009). United States and Organization of the Islamic Conference join forces against polio. http://www.unicef.org/immunization/ index_51990.html United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2009). Global health and foreign policy. UN Document A/RES/63/33, 27 January 2009.

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Voice of America (2010). Eradicating polio everywhere. http://m.editorials.voa.gov/a/ eradicating-polio-everywhere105103604/1482099.html White House (2014). Expanding opportunity. http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-anew-beginning/expanding-opportunity Wilson, D. J. (2009). Polio. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press. World Health Assembly (WHA) (1988). Global eradication of poliomyelitis by the year 2000. WHA Document WHA41.28, 13 May 1988. World Health Organization (WHO) (2014). Poliomyelitis. Fact sheet, 114. http://www. who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs114/en/ Yahya, M. (2007). Polio vaccines – “No thank you!” Barriers to polio eradication in northern Nigeria. African Affairs, 106(423), 185-204.

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Female Genital Mutilation – Stop the Brutalisation of Women and Girls D EA N FO R R EST E R 1ST YR BA INTERNATIONAL POLITICS EDITOR-IN-CHEIF OF THE INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN Warning: graphic content Personal stories from women who have undergone female genital mutilation are, understandably, hard to find. The painful procedure can leave mental as well as intensely pronounced physical scars. Yet, according to UNICEF, more than 125 million women and girls alive today have undergone some form of genital mutilation. Right through infancy to adulthood, women are still at risk from this practice. Though, concentrated in Africa and certain other Middle-Eastern countries, the problem also plights typical western countries. What’s more worrying is the fact FGM is currently illegal in most of these places, the problem is in enforcing the law. But what exactly is FGM? Referring to the name in full helps to engender an accurate image of its true nature, but the World Health Organisation has described the four main types. There is the Clitoridectomy - a partial or total removal of the clitoris; the Excision - partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora; Infibulation narrowing of the vaginal opening through the creation of a covering seal; And finally, Other - all other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes. The descriptions of the types of FGM are reason enough to stop the act. It is cruel, inhumane but most importantly, it is largely inflicted on those who have no choice. Even a screaming infant cannot protest sufficiently while older girls may not dare to speak out against their respective culture’s practice and will suffer all the same. But why exactly do some feel a need to do this to their women? For once, it isn’t a problem that can be pinned down to poverty or the instability of a country – it is based on ignorance, misperception and the subjection of women. Many societies believe it makes a girl “clean” or “suitable for marriage.” Some hope the act will reduce a female’s libido until marriage. The underlying reason is simply cultural tradition and these justifications are far from sufficient. It isn’t demanded by the Qu’ran – even if it was, it should still be remain illegal and several Islamic scholars have actually spoken out against the practice – and there are

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no medical benefits. In fact the list of medical complications from these mutilations is both long and alarming. It varies from infection, infertility and even child death during labour. All of which are beside the pain during the procedure and the lasting psychological impact. “The first thing I heard was my sister screaming. Then it was my turn. Four held me down while they cut my clitoris. I felt every single cut. The pain intense – I blacked out.” This disturbing testimony should be reason enough FGM. It is such a needless and pointless suffering and these women should deprived of their basic rights because of sadistic cultural norms.

women was so to stop not be

Fortunately, over the past few years there have been great strides toward combating FGM. A new documentary, ‘The Honour Diaries’ represents the resurgence of a global campaign against FGM. It helps mitigate the culture of acceptance around the act and at least highlights the extensive nature FGM. Furthermore, the World Health Assembly, in 2008, passed resolution WHA61.16 to try and halt it. The problem is at least being widely recognised. However, a global effort isn’t as fruitful as it could be. The means set by the WHA are often undermined by an inability to enforce any law. This is unfortunately the case in most countries, including Britain. In London alone, nearly 4,000 women have been treated for FGM since 2009, despite the Female Genital Mutilation Act having been passed since 2003. In fact, there have so far been only two prosecutions of people found guilty performing Female Genital Mutilation, whereas France has secured roughly 100 prosecutions. Though this British prosecution was in March 2014 and the appeal from MP’s to do more to combat FGM in the UK, suggests there is becoming a much greater focus on the issue domestically as well as globally. Still, much more needs to be done. For a start, there are nation-wide petitions in many countries that implore governmental officials to take a stronger stance against the issue. This, combined with removal of highly entrenched misconceptions in societies, should help dramatically reduce the number of females who are condemned to suffer such a horrific abuse of their bodies for no other reason than being born a girl. But despite the ghastly nature of the practice, there are still some understandable critiques of the anti-FGM movement. The standard argument of cultural apologists would be that the attempt to stop FGM constitutes as Western imperialism. Of course this is nonsense as implies that the promotion human right is an entirely oppressive endeavour and can be easily countered by The Honor Diaries’s slogan, ‘Culture is no excuse for abuse.’

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The serious argument against the prevention of FGM is that it is hard to determine what is simple cosmetic surgery and what is involuntary circumcision. This is because it is difficult to establish a legally enshrined difference between community or social pressure and genuine consent. But, before such precedents even need to be set, a stronger stance on clear violations of these girlsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; rights, and maleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s for that matter, needs to be taken. For instance, the age of consent must at least be reached before any operation is made and this should still be a painless procedure, not condoned or paid for by the state. Nonetheless, even an improved conception of FGM is hard to try and fit in a modern and tolerant society. It is simply incompatible. How dare someone deprive a girl of a choice in a matter that is so undeniably theirs to make? How dare someone deny women of a perfectly natural pleasure and replace it with indescribable pain? It only subjugates women and denotes them as inferior and unequal. There is simply no place for this attitude in any society.

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Free trade agreements: the poison or the cure? I OA N N A SC U (4TH YR LLB ENGLISH LAW AND AUSTRALIAN LAW)

The sheer support for free trade agreements seems undeniable as of late1. The upcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership is just one of the many battles to reshape the economic landscape of the world. The support is based on the logic that since trade is always better than no trade – according to economic theory – hence more trade is even better. Like any economic theory, the model is built on a number of assumptions and lacks interpretation of non-economic aspects that free trade involves. This article will specifically look at whether FTA’s are always a win for developing nations, using the TPP as a specific example for certain parts of the analysis.

1. Specializing conundrum David Ricardo’s theories vastly support the free trade model based on comparative advantage. According to him, countries should specialize in industries in which they are more efficient (or, in economic jargon, producing a good or service that has a lower marginal and opportunity cost than another). If all players within the market would specialize and trade (for without trade it would not be feasible to specialize as any one country needs a diverse range of products) then the overall market would be much more efficient. Cooperation is thus a benefit for all involved. The Dutch disease model however is a good example of how free trade is not always a boon2. According to comparative advantage, a country rich in natural resources should specialize in their extraction. This is dangerous for a number of reasons: firstly, it shifts workforces from manufacturing, becoming a form of indirect deindustrialization3. Secondly, resource-reliant industries are very vulnerable due to price volatility and the risk of the natural resource coming to an end. Thirdly, which is a criticism from ecologist groups, developing nations already have weak (if any)

Kent Jones. “ Who’s Afraid of the WTO?” (Oxford, 2004). "The Dutch Disease" (November 26, 1977). The Economist, pp. 82-83. 3 Corden WM. "Boom Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and Consolidation" (Oxford Economic Papers, 1984). 1 2

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legislation to protect from abuses of the land. Deforestation 4, gold cyanidation (extracting gold using cyanide, which is very toxic in nature and has disastrous effects on the environment) and other forms of pollution are thus deeply encouraged through this model. Focus should be given to this ecological aspect considering the governmental apparatus already lacks a built-in incentive for long-term sustainability5. Another great problem with the comparative advantage model is that there is an assumption that the job losses occurring from the loss of some industries will be compensated by the job creation in the booming industry. The case of Ghana would show that this is untrue: since the start of liberalization in 1986, it has lost more US$510 per person6. A similar scenario exists for many sub-Saharan countries.

2. Race to the bottom The free trade model works well if the number of countries involved is small, however, it becomes more complicated when the number involved grows. The reason for that is that whereas in a binary system it is easy to divide the industries somewhat fairly, in a multi-party scenario there will inevitably be more countries that wish to specialize in the same industry. This competition can prove to be harmful for those who engage in it; there are two ways in which products can compete (in a simplistic interpretation): providing highest quality or providing lowest price. The first one is not only hardly accessible to developing nations when competing with more technologically and financially developed states, but the second also seems as a safer bet. Competing for price, however, generally leads to sacrifices such as worse working conditions and lower wages. Chile is one of the most open trade countries in the world – having signed 47 different FTA’s. Its booming agricultural sector, however, has mostly lined the pockets of multi-national corporations. The poorest citizens are provided with jobs that pay below the minimum wage, with no labour right or a welfare system to support them 7.

. Meyfroidt P and Lambin EF. “Forest transition in Vietnam and displacement of deforestation abroad” (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 2009). 5 William Ascher and Robert G. Healy. “Natural Resource Policymaking in Developing Countries: Environment, Economic Growth, and Income Distribution” (Duke University Press, 1990). 6 Christian Aid, “The economics of failure” (2005). Retrieved from: http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/economics_of_failure.pdf 7 Oxfam International. Retrieved from: http://www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/trade/real_lives/chile 4

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3. Playing with the big boys On the political level, developing nations (especially if smaller from an economic point of view) are more likely to have less bargaining power or ability to refuse certain considerations. Whilst little is known of the actual content of the TPP, it is clear that there are provisions that support a strong intellectual property system 8. Strong copyrights and patents are one of the greatest enemies of developing nations, which find it difficult to access expensive medicine and would prefer the creation of cheaper, generic ones. Packaged as a bigger deal, nations which had previously refused the likes of SOPA could very well see themselves bound by them. It is difficult to refuse, what seems by all means economic improvement and unrestricted access to markets. Yet despite being a “free trade agreement”, the TPP will most likely have several reservations in terms of many markets that developing nations would want to access. It is well known that Japan refuses to open its incredibly closed rice, wheat, beef and poultry, dairy products and sugar9. The US has a vested interest in protecting its car making industry10. This is not an article that believes that we must all pack our toys and go home. This article believes that Free Trade Agreements, in the form that they are done now, hold too much scope for abuse and long-term suffering for developing nations. There needs to be a restructuring of how these deals are made and what conditions they impose on nations. Used as a political tool in the correct way, these agreements could impose fair trade rules, better labour regulations and environmental protection conditions. Sometimes, though, less is more.

“The Pacific free trade deal that's anything but free”. The Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/27/pacific-free-trade-deal 9 “Sacred cows, rice and the rest of them” (9th October 2013). The Economist. 10 “US-Japan deadlock points to no April TPP deal for Obama” (10th April 2014). The Financial Times. 8

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

India’s Watershed Elections P EA R L PA N DYA 1ST YR LLB LAW

To some, India is the world’s next superpower; to others, it is the place that accounts for a third of the world’s poor but to most, it is an enigma. To me, India is the embodiment of the mythical phoenix- a land emerging from an ancient civilization, shaped by an arduous struggle for independence and sustained by pluralism. This month, the largest democracy on Earth goes to polls and with an estimated 150 million young voters, the country’s destiny is in the hands of its youth. And the youth is dissatisfied with the incumbent Congress led UPA government, widely discredited for corruption, a declining growth rate and a failure to tame inflation. However, the man promising to be the harbinger of change and touted by most to be the next Prime Minister, Mr Narendra Modi is not a man shy from controversies. This article scrutinizes the various allegations made against Mr Modi regarding human rights violations committed in the state of Gujarat under his rule and concludes that his election may be catastrophic for the very ideology that the nation’s founding fathers strived to preserve, that of unity in diversity and inclusive growth. Mr Modi entered the world of politics through the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu nationalist group, which is responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. The calamity resulted in nationwide communal outrage and 2000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in the ensuing riots. The RSS is the patron of India’s second largest political party, the BJP, which appointed Mr Modi the Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002. Soon after he assumed power, the state witnessed one of the worst communal riots post independence, which, according to official reports, resulted in the death of over 1000 people while other sources place the figure much higher. 1 The orgy of rape and murder, referred by some to be akin to ethnic cleansing, 2 was a response to the killing of 59 Hindus pilgrims by Muslims. Independent inquiries by the British High Commission and the Human Rights Watch concluded that the attack on Muslims was pre-planned and Mr Modi has been accused of allowing or even abetting

1 2

C Jaffrelot, ‘Communal Riots in Gujarat: The State at Risk?’ [2003] HPSACP 17. Martha Nussbaum, The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future (HUP 2008) 51.

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the pogrom.3 Repeated investigations have failed to find any evidence against the Chief Minister despite confessions by the then police officers. It is widely speculated that evidence was lost or wilfully destroyed. In a country, where politics is a spectacle, governed by symbolism as much as by substantive issues, Mr Modi’s refusal to wear a skullcap or apologise for the riots is resented. Twelve years after the massacre, the Gujarat government is yet to set up any state minority commission for the redress of issues concerning the minority communities. One of the most recent controversies to haunt Mr Modi involves sheer disrespect for the rights of an autonomous woman and brazen abuse of power. Sting operations have revealed that Mr Modi’s closest aide, Mr Amit Shah allegedly ordered the intrusive surveillance of a young woman at the behest of someone mentioned on the supposed recordings of the event only as "saheb"(sir), whom many commentators believe was non other than Chief Minister Modi. The BJP has acknowledged that government resources were used to monitor the lady but justify it citing that her father had requested it. It is submitted that neither morally nor legally does a parent have the right to organize such surveillance of their adult child. This is especially precarious in the absence of any paperwork for such extensive tracking; a claim confirmed by Mr Saikia, the then city police commissioner. Regardless of any knowledge possessed by the woman’s father, a failure to follow regulations amounts to an illegal invasion of privacy. At a time when the country is already facing the brunt of bad governance and policy paralysis, such gross misuse of official machinery for purposes of disreputable implications under the leadership of the Prime Ministerial aspirant is a cause for concern. Being the second most populated country in the world, India’s real asset is its people. However, India ranks 136 among 186 countries on its Human Development Index. Within India, Gujarat, one of the country’s most prosperous states, fails to be a good example of socio-economic development. The Indian Human Development Report 2011 states that Gujarat fares the worst in terms of overall hunger and nutrition among the industrial high per capita income state. A rank of 15 among all states in poverty and 13 in terms of literacy is an illustration of the poor position of the state vis a vis social indicators. Amidst disturbing reports of two-thirds of the state’s rural people defecating in the open and half of its children under five suffering from malnutrition, Mr Modi infamously attributed the dismal figures to vegetarianism and the ‘beauty conscious’ middle class. Also lurking behind the facade of industrial development is the murky truth of a corrupt land acquisition policy, leaving hundreds of poor farmers in the lurch. If elected as the Prime Minister, Mr Modi will have to

Human Rights Watch, ‘”We Have No Orders To Save You” State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat’ (2002) 14(3) Human Rights Watch Report. 3

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combat claims of crony capitalism and a failure to invest in the ‘software’ of the society. Recently, there has been a movement in the international media and among India’s non-resident intelligentsia deriding Mr Modi for his politics of sectarian hatred, expressing concern that a Modi win will signify India having crossed a blood soaked moral Rubicon.4 For the reasons aforementioned, this essay agrees with the stated view. History is a witness that moments of restlessness and impatience lead the masses towards a wrong ideology. The fate of the nation and the ideology envisaged by its founding fathers lies with its disgruntled voters and yet there is hope, as in the words of one of India’s most astute writers, ‘India has been born and reborn scores of times, and it will be reborn again. India is forever, and India is forever being made’. 5

‘Can Anyone Stop Narendra Modi?’ The Economist (5 April 2014); Priyamvada Gopal, ‘If Modi Wins the Election, India will have crossed a moral Rubicon’ The Independent (10 April 2014); ‘A Narendra Modi Victory Would Bode Ill for India’s Future’ The Guardian (11 April 2014). 5 Shashi Tharoor, The Great Indian Novel (Viking Press 1989). 4

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Infant Male Circumcision: Why should the practice be regulated? BA R B O R A PA L ESOVA (MA IN INTERNATIONAL CHILD STUDIES) Introduction The decision of the Cologne district court in June 2012 to outlaw non-therapeutic male circumcision (MC) was followed by a great outcry of the religious minorities in Germany. Based on the extensive, several years-long international debate over viewing the non-medical circumcision of infants as a violation of multiple children's rights, the German regional court made its ruling on the grounds of the argument that newborn circumcision is an infringement of the right to bodily integrity and selfdetermination, which should take precedence to the parental right to freedom of religion (Landgericht Köln, Ns169/11). Despite the application of the ban to the Cologne district only, the doctors in hospitals all over the country preventively stopped performing surgery, waiting for clarification of the issue by the federal government. Followed by an outrage of Muslim and Jewish communities, on December the 12th 2012, the Merkel government recognized it inappropriate to limit the freedoms of Jewish and Muslim parents, and passed a bill 'enshrining' the nontherapeutic circumcision as sovereign right of the child's parents (Ahren and Ahren, 2012). According to the new German law, MC is thus currently legal outside of the medical setting1 and without the use of anaesthesia (§1631d StGB). Acknowledging both the fact that no country in the world specifically outlaws MC and the history of German anti-Semitism, it would be rather unlikely for modern Germany to be the first country to enact infant MC as a violation of children's rights. Nonetheless, there are several initiatives across the European as well as other Anglophonic countries that openly oppose the intervention. Among the most recent ones is the resolution passed by the Council of Europe (Resolution 1952, 2013) that calls on member states to reconsider the national policies on the male ritual circumcision and to recognize the practice as a "violation of the physical integrity of the children" that needs to be treated accordingly, under clearly defined legal standards.

However, once the boy reaches 6 months of age, the procedure needs to be performed by a doctor

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Furthermore, while a number of national medical associations do not explicitly recommend MC (e.g. American Medical Association2, Canadian Paediatric Society3, British Medical Association4), several of them dismiss the practice due to the unnecessary risks, infliction of pain and injury, or violation of children's right to bodily integrity (e.g. The Royal Dutch Medical Association, The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, The Australian Medical Association). Moreover, in January this year, the Danish and Swedish Medical Associations56 recommended to ban ritual circumcision, comparing it with the female genital mutilation (FGM) which, according to them, similarly amounts to abuse. Nevertheless, despite multiple other efforts of various activist associations, the governments of the countries seem to be resistant to outlaw this practice. This paper will aim to elucidate what factors and which arguments are decisive in shaping of the policy on banning MC. As the Cologne's court decision failed and no other country has yet been successful in outlawing non-medical circumcision, my analysis will not focus on a specific country's policy but comment on the necessity of and problems with implementation of the initiative in general. The paper will therefore conclude with a discussion on which circumstances are responsible for the difficulties in recognising this practice as violating children's rights and suggestions will be made on how to best approach this problem.

A preventive procedure? There are several conditions that indicate that the infant MC needs an extra consideration when it comes to its justification. The surgery involves a relatively high risk of harm, the infant is not capable to give his consent, the nature of the practice is not urgent, and its preventive nature has also been questioned on numerous occasions. As Frisch et al. (2013) note, "For preventive medical procedures, this means that the procedure must effectively lead to the prevention of a serious medical problem, that there is no less intrusive means of reaching the same goal, and that the American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs (1999). Report 10: Neonatal circumcision. Chicago: American Medical Association. 3 Canadian Paediatric Society. (1996) Neonatal circumcision revisited. Canadian Medical Association Journal. 154, 769780. 4 British Medical Association (2004). The law and ethics of male circumcision: guidance for doctors. Journal of Medical Ethics. 30, 259-263. 5Danish College of General Practitioners, Vejledning om omskæring af drenge, Accessed 7 March, 2014, http://www.dsam.dk/files/203/hoeringsudgave_09122013_vejledning_om_omskaering_af_drenge.pdf 6 SvD Nyheter, "Läkarförbundet: ”Kräv samtycke för religiös omskärelse”", Accessed 7 March, 2014, http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/lakarforbundet-krav-samtycke-for-religios-omskarelse_8929562.svd 2

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risks of the procedure are proportional to the intended benefit. In addition, when performed in childhood, it needs to be clearly demonstrated that it is essential [author's cursive] to perform the procedure before an age at which the individual can make a decision about the procedure for him- or herself" (p.797). In an ideal world, it would be thus the responsibility of the pro-circumcision advocates to present valid evidence for the benefits of the infant MC, rather that of the 'anti-circumcision' community. This includes a considerable number of doctors, whose arguments seem to be unable to reach a level of agreement on the part of the legislature makers. Nonetheless, although the American Association of Pediatrics (AAP) did not recommend the infant circumcision, it did identify a number of benefits of the intervention that can "justify access to this procedure for families who choose it" (2012, p.e757). The next sub-section will review the academic discourse that followed the release of the AAP's Technical Report and discuss the health-related arguments in the MC debate.

The health benefits of male circumcision The research on the effects of MC shows opposing results and provides thus only partial and often biased answers to the benefits and detriments of the procedure. Among the most often quoted arguments in favour of the MC is its preventive nature for penile cancer, urinary tract infections (UTIs), some common STDs, and HIV and AIDS (AAP Task Force on Circumcision, 2012; Morris, 2007; Kigozi et al., 2008). On the other hand, there exists an abundandance of research showing that most of these findings are biased, omit facts and purposefully select the literature to support their claims (e.g. Svoboda and Howe, 2013). In particular, Frisch et al. (2013) argue that, being one of the rarest types of cancer in the developed world, to prevent one incident of penile cancer, between 909 and 322,000 boys need to be circumcised. The authors also claim that the disease generally occurs many years after the procedure and if diagnosed in an early stage, it is rather easily treated. Interestingly, several studies show that the prevalence of the cancer in the United States, which has the biggest MC rates in the developed world (Parkin et al., 2002), is comparable with the incidence rates in Scandinavian countries, in which a relatively low number of men are circumcised (Frisch et al., 1995; Maiche, 1992). Furthermore, although the AAP's report cites two studies that suggest the beneficial nature of MC with regards to HIV and AIDS, Svoboda and Van Howe (2013) show that the studies suffer from various flaws and bias, while they also acknowledge that despite the high rates of MC, the US has one of the highest number of people infected

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with HIV or ST infections in the developed world. However, most importantly, penile cancer, AIDS, or STDs are diseases mostly affecting individuals who are sexually active7. Therefore, none of these diseases are relevant to children and the decision whether to preventively circumcise could therefore be postponed until the age when the child could potentially be at risk of the infection. Finally, out of all the diseases listed by the AAP's 2012 Report, only in the case of UTIs, the procedure could be reasonable at a very young age. Nonetheless, supported by many others, Frisch et al. summarize the oppositional arguments in their calculation: "for every 100 circumcisions, 1 case of UTI may be prevented at the cost of 2 cases of haemorrhage, infection, or in rare instances, more severe outcomes or even death" (p. 797, 2013). The following section elaborates on the risks and complications associated with MC in more detail.

Risks and complications There are multiple costs associated with the legally and medically lax approach to MC in most of the industrialized countries. Sweden is currently the only country that has a law specifically addressing the practice of MC. Although the legislation allows for ritual circumcision, it can be only done by a certified practitioner and a registered physician or a nurse must be present during the procedure. After the age of two months, only certified physicians can perform the procedure and in all cases the boy must be given an anaesthetic (Circumcision Act, 2001:499). Unfortunately, in most other countries the procedure is approached as a cosmetic surgery and similarly as with ear piercings or tattoos, no anaesthesia is provided, there is no need for the training of the practitioner, he or she is not obliged to report a botch in case he sees one, there are no follow-ups to assess the healing, there is no available tracking of the children injured by the procedure, and the consent of both of the parents is in most countries not necessary. Not surprisingly then, there is a high risk that a child will be harmed, without the harm being noticed. What are the complications that can occur as a result of the procedure? As previously said, there is no monitoring of the problems with circumcision and thus reliable data is not available. However, it is known that circumcision decreases sensation in the penis (Smith et al., 2010), and can lead to various psychological and physical problems (Boyle & Bensley, 2001; Goldman, 1999). Multiple studies also show that MC can lead to sexually-related problems not only in men but also in their partners (e.g. Frisch et al., 2011; Fink et al., 2002). With the exception of rape and in the case of HIV, by being infected through iatrogenic exposure or an infected injection as it often is by drug use. 7

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Finally, one of the first criticisms of the AAP's policy report by Svoboda and Van Howe (2013) is the document's failure to acknowledge the important role that the foreskin represents and the harm that its removal can cause8. It is not in the scopes of this paper to show evidence of the adverse effects of the MC, however, it is clear that foreskin is a healthy tissue and removing it raises a number of medical, ethical, human and legal rights based issues. To conclude, referring back to the above quote by Frisch et al. about the criteria for preventive medical procedures, it seems that at this point, it cannot be safely concluded that any of the principles necessary for preventive medical procedures are fully present. Therefore, MC cannot be viewed as more beneficial than harmful. From this point of view, the neonatal MC is no different than, for instance, the FGM, which, until the last century, was characterized to prevent a remarkably similar set of diseases and conditions that the MC is nowadays believed to preclude (Geisheker, 2013). By this, the present paper does not claim in any way that MC is comparable to FGM in its severity or in the potential benefits of the practices 9. The aim is to show that despite the fact that so far, no convincing and profound medical benefits were proven for the MC, not only there is no legal regulation of the practice in most of the developed countries, the procedure is often done under questionable conditions and without consideration of the infant's best interests. For these reasons and due to a number of risks that the procedure implies, the fact that MC is regarded as a cosmetic and "elective procedure" (AAP) is rather alarming. Nonetheless, since the failed decision of the Cologne court and numerous talks about banning infant MC in some of the Scandinavian countries, the major opposition came from the Jewish and Muslim religious communities. In both of the religions, MC represents a deep-rooted tradition and thus the majority of the opponents argue against the initiative by using arguments related to their own and their children's religious freedoms. The next section will focus on MC as a religious practice.

Circumcision as a religious custom It is often argued that MC is an ancient tradition signifying the child's covenant with God and therefore it is in the child's best interest as a member of Judaism and Islam to take part in this procedure (e.g. Mazor, 2013). Historically, however, the reason behind the religious as well as customary circumcision is thought to be strikingly similar to that of the FGM (Hellsten, 2004). One of the main goals was to diminish the The literature describes it as a complex, erogenous, richly innervated structure with different protective, immunological, and sexual functions (Taylor et al., 1996). 9 The absence of any health-related advantages of FGM are confirmed and generally known 8

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person's genital sensation, leading to less sexual desire and thus both protecting one from multiple diseases and preserving one's "moral hygiene" (Darby, 2005). There are several other ritual practices that were respected and observed for hundreds of years, however, with the development of the modern legal and moral system, it became not only rational but in fact inevitable to abolish these practices. It is understandable that such ancient practice will be hard to confront, however, the irregularities in the public and judicial approaches to different 'abusive' behaviours seem to be difficult to overlook. For instance, in three of the US's states, MC is explicitly listed as an exemption from the law forbidding ritual abuse. Moreover, in some other states, the law exempts ritual circumcisers from needing a licence to practice medicine (Geisheker, 2013). A number of speculative, philosophic arguments have been raised on this account10. For instance, Fox and Thomson (2005a, 178 n12) describe a British legal case from 1974, in which a Nigerian woman has been convicted for scarring her two sons (aged 9 and 14) with a razor, making incisions on their cheeks according to the Yoruba tribal traditions. The ruling was made based on the presumption that the incision could seriously harm the boys' eyes if they moved, which differentiated this case from the male circumcision (also practiced by the community) procedure in which the risk of harming a child is lower. Another inconsistency in the moral and legal understanding of a potential or actual harm rendering to a child can be seen in the law relating to FGM and MC. While acknowledging the difference in the severity and outcome of the procedure in the majority of FGM and MC victims, it would be discriminating to not recognize that even a small ritual 'nick' on the female genitals is outlawed by most of the developed countries, while there are no or very limited regulations on the so called Metzitzah b'peh type of MC. Among ultra-Orthodox Jews, a mohel (Jewish ritual circumciser) sucks the blood to "cleanse" the circumcised penis, a practice called Metzitzah b'peh. This puts the newborns at more than triple the normal risk of contracting herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1), which caused deaths of 11 children only in New York between 2000-2011 (Davis, 2013). The practice is still legal in the US and despite multiple complaints of the parents who were not aware of the procedure, there is no policy that would ask for the informed consent of the parents or the legal guardian before the act. Therefore, this paper agrees that the nature of both practices (FGM and MC) requires two different discussion arenas and therefore the overall public treatment of the issues differs; similar toFox and Thomson (2005b), Earp (2013), Davis (2013) and many others, it is held that the contrast between the strident laws for FGM and the absence of any statutory regulation of the MC practice is unreasonably disproportionate.

For examples see Geisheker (2013) or Johnson (2013)

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Taking into consideration the religious aspect of the practice, it becomes increasingly more complicated to recognize the separate liberties that are involved in finding the 'right' stance on the issue. The next section outlines the major rights that are involved and used by the proponents and opponents of the non-therapeutic MC.

Who's right comes first? Should the parents have sovereign rights over their children? If no, where is the border between the parental and state authority to decide what is in the best interest of the child? Or can the argument over best interests of the child be used in this context at all? Is the right to an open future, bodily integrity, or a self-determination more applicable? Merkel and Putzke (2013), in their resolute paper argue that "No conceivable (positive) liberty right, roughly understood as a right to perform certain acts at one's will, can possibly justify direct physical intrusion into someone else's body" (p.446), setting the line between the parent's rights and the rights that a child already has or has yet to exercise (rights in trust). The above statement, however, loses its value once it is assumed that the circumcision, has indeed been made for the child's own benefit. Who's right comes first then?

Parental rights It would be difficult to argue that the protection of a child's welfare is positively related to a heightened parental authority. Different authors disputed the doctrine of parental rights and the consent to medical procedures of their children that they are entitled to. Howe (2012), for example, claims that it is not the rights that parents should be seen as having but instead an 'obligation' to protect the rights of their children. Similarly, Davis (2013) argues that a more elaborate analysis should conclude that parents are able to give 'permission' to a medical procedure on their children, but not consent. Both arguments point to the hierarchy between the involved agents and thus the reasons and motivations behind such legal instruments as parental rights or informed proxy consent. Considering that the ultimate goal of infant MC is to protect a child, it would be wrong to regard the parent as having a sovereign right to make decisions for his or her child solely on the basis of the parent's interests or motivations. In a like manner, any adult can give consent to different risky or senseless procedures, however a parent is given permission because it is assumed that the child's welfare is of the utmost importance, which the parent should be able to best judge . If any procedure has the potential to be unreasonably dangerous, this

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permission should be repealed and be legally regulated by the government instead. What connects then Howe's or Davis' arguments is the presumption that from the human rights perspective, only rights directly relating to the best interest of the child are valid in the discussion of the acceptability of the infant MC. The next sections therefore elaborate on the child-centred rights, namely the child's right to bodily integrity, the child's right to an open future, and other rights entrenched in the core human rights documents.

Child's right to bodily integrity The 2012 ruling of the Cologne district court outlawed infant MC on the grounds that it is a violation of the child's right to bodily integrity and self-determination. One of the biggest MC advocates, Joseph Mazor (2013), argued in his paper against both of these arguments, claiming that the concept of bodily integrity is based on the fact that the use of any human being merely as a means for others' ends should be prohibited. The author also claims that MC is done for the infant's own benefit only. After considering the above mentioned arguments concerning the disputable medical benefits of and the risks associated with the procedure, one could only hardly contend that the infant clearly profits from the procedure, especially in the nonsecular case and in such young age. With regard to the religious circumcision of a male infant, Svoboda and Howe (2013) voice their concern very aptly by saying that "In fact, few things are less reasonable and more unprecedented than physicians making medical decisions based on nonmedical factors and vagaries of their infant patients' parents' culture and religion as central to whether to do a procedure" (p.438). In other words, the arguments of MC as a procedure for one's own benefit and the violation of the child's bodily integrity as justified by the procedure's medical necessity, seem to be undermined by the hesitant involvement of the medical professionals and the rather overpowered role of parental interests and their cultural habits.

Child's right to an open future A number of authors tried to attend to the child's incapability to exercise some of the human rights by viewing children as potential adults and thus recognizing the socalled 'rights in trust' or rights that "are to be saved for the child until he is an adult, but which can be violated "in advance" before the child is even in a position to exercise them" (Darby, 2013, p.463). The proponent of this argument, Joel Feinberg (1992) argued that if a child is at risk of growing up with certain important choices

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being already closed to him, his right to a later autonomy and capacity for choice was violated. This does not mean that a child should be given complete freedom and not to be subject to parental discipline and protection. In fact, parents should and do prevent their children getting tattoos, piercings, eating too many sweets, or possibly, due to peer or community pressure, having genital alteration, if they wish to. All of these limitations to the children's autonomy are to prevent them from making irreversible choices that they might regret later in their lives. The child's right to an open future strives to preserve the child's future options in a similar way, however, this perspective is unfortunately not respected. As Darby (2013) rightly notes, just because parents have the right to prevent their children from making potentially harmful decisions, it does not mean that they have the right to impose such decisions on their children themselves. Finally, much theoretical and practical evidence shows that the likelihood of a boy resenting being left uncircumcised in comparison to having the procedure been done to him is much lower in the former case, as there always exists a chance to get circumcised later if he wishes so (e.g. Howe, 2013).

Other rights The purpose of development of human rights principles is to set a universally accepted ethical norms that could protect individuals regardless of their cultural or personal relativisms. According to numerous international as well as national documents, infant MC meets the formal criteria for being a human rights violation. In particular, under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention against Torture (CAT), the non-medical MC would be viewed as conflicting with human rights and therefore should be prohibited under these rights11. States' purposeful ignoring or making of exceptions to the treaties that they decided to be bound by ultimately undermines the reasons why these principles exist in the first place and their role in the protection of the rights of individuals. Nonetheless, even though important, legal definition and states' formal recognition of the problem is only one aspect of the solution. The practical implementation of the initiative to regulate or ban the infant MC goes much beyond the theoretical basis. The next section outlines problems related to the successful implementation of the initiative and suggests steps that could address some of the issues raised in this paper.

For more discussion on the specific Articles that the non-therapeutic practice of MC breaches, see Svoboda, J.S. (2013). Circumcision of male infants as a human rights violation. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 469-474. 11

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Way forward Not only in Germany but also in other states where the idea of the ban of the infant MC has recently attracted both public and institutional sympathies, the major opposition came from the religious groups. Similarly as in the case of FGM, a procedure with such long historical tradition, widespread practice, and people's strong beliefs in its beneficial nature is difficult to be dealt with merely on a statutory level. Moreover, MC is also traditionally believed to bring hygienic as well as medical benefits to an individual than FGM and as a result, the doctors in many countries are willing to perform the procedure, giving parents the impression of approval of the practice. Lastly, MC is exclusively a male issue, which makes it yet harder to receive the desired attention. One of the reasons described by Fox and Thomson (2005b) is the interplay of pain and masculinity, which they believe is deeply embedded in the public and legal perception of the male body's invulnerable nature. In other words, through the association of pain and endurance during circumcision (an overwhelming number of cases is performed without anaesthesia12) the boy's masculine status is established and consequently the harm done to the newborn is more likely (compared to FGM) to be accepted or overlooked. How can the observations in this paper be helpful in devising an efficient plan that would both address the human rights of children as well as respect the beliefs of religious groups and their newborn members? It is necessary to realize that the best interest of the child is of the utmost importance and therefore an outright ban would be likely to cause a similar conflict of interests as in the German case, which could in the long run possibly result in many illegal circumcisions under unsafe and risky conditions. On the other hand, following the Swedish case and thereby allowing infant MC only with the use of anaesthetic might not be enough, especially in the countries with bigger Jewish and Muslim populations and where MC is a standard procedure regardless of the religious belonging of the child (such as the US). One of the possible and, with regards to human rights, morally necessary ways forward is to postpone the practice until the age when the child will be able to fully consent to it. Moreover, this change will need to be supported not only by the medical stuff and national associations but, similarly as in the case of FGM, also through raising awareness and educating people about the possible risks and benefits of the procedure. Finally, as Waldeck (2003b) claims, with MC rates falling below the critical value, the social norms that distort views on the practice will abate and the Waldeck, S. (2003a). Social norm theory and male circumcision: why parents circumcise. American Journal of Bioethics, 3(2), 56-57. 12

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practice of MC will slowly disappear. Until then, however, the legal and educational forces need to make sure that male newborns will be sufficiently protected and public will be made aware of the current academic debate on the topic.

Conclusion The present review of the medical- and rights- based implications of the infant male circumcision provided a partial justification for the decision of the Cologne district court and the recent initiatives of several Scandinavian countries and the Council of Europe to ban or regulate the practice. It is argued that the procedure is only justifiable in the presence of the medical indication, which remains presently questionable. The results of the existing research show diverse outcomes and no medical association in the world currently explicitly recommends the practice. Based on these observations, it is further argued that the parental preferences and their rights alone should not be legally sufficient to provide a consent to remove a healthy tissue from a newborn's body. Instead, the potential harm and medically unnecessary nature of the procedure make the right to bodily integrity, open future, and other rights enshrined in the core human rights documents central arguments in favour of regulating MC, making it safer, painless, and a matter of the concerned child's (or becoming adult's) fully informed consent. Therefore, in accord with recent resolutions passed by government advisers on child welfare from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, this article suggests that infant MC should be postponed until a consent of the child is available and additionally recommends that public awareness and education is needed in order to change the social norms that keep the practice a common neonatal procedure.

References Ahren, A. & Ahren, R. (2012). German government looking for quick fix on circumcision ban. The Times of Israel. http://www.timesofisrael.com/german-government-looking-for-quick-fix-on-circumcision-ban/#ixzz2x0S1F7wy (accessed 25 March 2014). American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Circumcision (2012). Male circumcision. Pediatrics. 130(3), e756-e785. American Academy of Pediatrics Task Force on Circumcision (2012). The AAP Task Force on Neonatal Circumcision: a call for respectful dialogue. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 442â&#x20AC;&#x201C;443. Boyle, G.J. & Bensley, G.A. (2001) Adverse sexual and psychological effects of male infant circumcision. Psychological Reports. 88(3 Pt 2), 1105-1106. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, October 1 (2013), Resolution 1952.

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Darby RJL. (2013). The child’s right to an open future: is the principle applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision? Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 463–8. Darby R, Svoboda JS. (2007). A rose by any other name? Rethinking the similarities and differences between male and female genital cutting. Medical Anthropology Quarterly. 21, 301-323. Davis, D. (2013). Ancient rites and new laws: how should we regulate religious circumcision of minors? Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 456-458. Earp, B.D. (2013). The ethics of infant male circumcision. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39(7), 418-420. Feinberg, J. (1992). The child's right to an open future, In: Freedom and fulfilment: philosophical essays. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fink, K.S., Carson, C.C., DeVellis, R.F. (2002). Adult circumcision outcomes study: effect on erectile function, penile sensitivity, sexual activity and satisfaction. Journal of Urology. 167(5), 2113-2116. Fox, M. & Thomson, M. (2005a). Short changed? The law and ethics of male circumcision. International Journal of Children's Rights. 13, 161-181. Fox, M. & Thomson, M. (2005b). A covenant with the status quo? Male circumcision and the new BMA guidance to doctors. Journal of Medical Ethics. 31, 463-469. Frisch, M., Friis, S., Kjaer, S.K., et al. (1995). Falling incidence of penis cancer in an uncircumcised population (Denmark 1943-1990). British Medical Journal. 311(7018), 1471. Frisch, M., Lindholm, M., Gronbaek, M. (2011). Male circumcision and sexual function in men and women: a survey-based, cross-sectional study in Denmark. International Journal of Epidemiology. 40, 1367-1381. Frisch, M., Aigrain, Y., Barauskas, Y. et al. (2013). Cultural bias in the AAP’s 2012 technical report and policy statement on male circumcision. Pediatrics. 131, 796-800. Geisheker, J.V. (2013). The completely unregulated practice of male circumcision: human rights’ abuse enshrined in law? New Male Studies,2, 18-45. Goldman, R. (1999). The psychological impact of circumcision. BJU International. 83(suppl 1), 93-102. Hellsten, S. (2004). Rationalising circumcision: From tradition to fashion, from public health to individual freedom - critical notes on the cultural persistence of the practice of genital mutilation. Journal of Medical Ethics, 30, 248-253. Johnson, M. (2013). Religious circumcision, invasive rites, neutrality and equality: bearing the burdens and consequences of belief. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 450-455. Kigozi, G., Watya, S., Polis, C.B. et al. (2008) The effect of male circumcision on sexual satisfaction and function, results from a randomized trial of male circumcision for human immunodeficiency virus prevention, Rakai, Uganda. BJU International. 101, 65-70. Landgericht Köln (Cologne District Court), Jedgment of May 7 (2012), Urteil Ns 169/11. Maiche, A.G. (1992). Epidemiological aspects of cancer o the penis in Finland. European Journal of Cancer Prevention. 1(2), 153-158.

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Mazor, J. (2013). The childâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interests and the case for the permissibility of male circumcision. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 421-428. Merkel, R. & Putzke, H. (2013). After Cologne: male circumcision and the law. Parental right, religious liberty or criminal assault? Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 444-449. Morris, B.J. (2007). Why circumcision is a biomedical imperative for the 21st century. BioEssays. 29, 1147-1158. Parkin, D.M., Whelan, S.L., Ferlay, J.L.T., Thomas, D.B. (2002). Cancer Incidence in Five Continents. Vol VIII. Lyon: IARC Scientific Publications, No 155. Lyon, France: International Agency for Research on Cancer. Smith, D.K., Taylor, A., Kilmarx, P.H., Sullivan, P., Warner, L., Kamb, M., Bock, N., Kohmescher, B., Mastro, T.D. (2010). Male circumcision in the United States for the prevention of HIV infection and other adverse health outcomes: report from a CDC consultation. Public Health Reports. 125(suppl 1), 72-82. Svoboda J.S., & Van Howe, R.S. (2013). Out of step: fatal flaws in the latest AAP policy report on neonatal circumcision. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 434-441. Svoboda, J.S. (2013). Circumcision of male infants as a human rights violation. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 469-474. Taylor, J.R., Lockwood, A.P., Taylor, A.J. (1996). The prepuce: specialized mucosa of the penis and its loss to circumcision. British Journal of Urology. 77, 291-295. Van Howe, R.S. (2013). Infant circumcision: the last stand for the dead dogma of parental (sovereignal) rights. Journal of Medical Ethics. 39, 475-481. Waldeck, S. (2003a). Social norm theory and male circumcision: why parents circumcise. American Journal of Bioethics, 3(2), 56-57. Waldeck, S.E. (2003b). Using male circumcision to understand social norms as multipliers. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 72, 455-526.

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

L’amour naissant: EU-Morocco relations LU IG I LO N A R D O LLM IN EUROPEAN LAW

1. Background The north-African kingdom has very close ties with the European Union (EU). It is the largest recipient of European funds under the European Neighbouring Policy (ENP)1, yet has very poor records on what are supposed to be the core values of the EU, namely democracy and human rights. The EU however seems to accept that Morocco still plays by her rules-by accepting the Kingdom’s poor records on human rights and the low standards of democracy. Is the EU going to get anything out of this partnership?

2. The international agreements The European Union is legally bound to Morocco by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995)2 and the European Neighbouring Policy (2004) 3. The EuroMediterranean Partnership has been implemented by the 2000 EU-Morocco Association Agreement4 (AA), while the 2008 Advanced Status Agreement has been adopted in the framework provided for by the ENP. The AA establishes cooperation in three fields: politics and security; economics (through a free trade area added to the GATS/GATT); society and culture5. Morocco’s request for an advanced status within the ENP has brought to the 2008 agreement, and it implies new impetus to the pre-existing ties6, namely in the matter of governance and security, a common space for knowledge and a new Deep and Eu Commission data http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/morocco/morocco_en.htm Karolien Pieters ‘The Mediterranean Countries’ in Steven Blockmans & Adam Lazowski (eds), The European Union and Its Neighbours (TMC Asser Press 2006) 413 3 On which see, in general, Bart Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy. A Paradigm for Coherence (Routledge 2012) 4 OJ L 70 (18/03/2000) 5 K. Pieters, n 2 6 Larbi Jaidi, ‘The Morocco/EU Advanced Status: What Value Does it Add to the European Neighbourhood Policy?’ IEmed 2009 available at http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2009/aarticles/a149.pdf 1 2

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Comprehensive Free Trade agreement7. The key idea is to integrate as far as possible Morocco into the EU acquis8, therefore facilitating market access in the four crucial areas of goods, services, establishment and capitals9.

3. EU’s and Morocco’s objectives Europe looks not only eastward but also to the Mediterranean 10. After Maastricht and the WTO, the EU felt like paying closer attention to the Mediterranean countries, thus lunching the EMP. After the 2004 enlargement, the EU is ready to increase even more its commitment to the neighbours, and not just to the eastern ones: the ENP is extended from Morocco to Moldova to Israel, encompassing a total of 16 countries. In contracting with Morocco, the EU has three main objectives: A) Immigration: i.

Avoiding immigration from Morocco to Europe, and especially situation of mass migration11. The concern is raised also because of social tensions in some countries12. However it is worth keeping in mind that 5.6% of all non-EU citizens living in Europe is from Morocco13 making it the second largest group after Turkish people.

ii.

Even more worrying than Moroccans are the people trying to get into the European Union from the sub-Saharian region. This what Morocco is there to prevent, and why the EU seeks an ally in it.

B) Security: i.

Apart from immigration, the region of Sahel14 (for example, Mali), and the whole north Africa has recently risen concerns15. Morocco, instead, is a highly

Saad dine El Otmani ‘Guest Editorial, Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU: A Locomotive and a Model for Reforms in the Region’, European Affairs Review 18,3 (2013) 298 8 L. Jaidi, n 8 9 S. El Otmani, n 7 299 10 S. El Otmani, n 3 297 11 Daniel Zisenwine ‘Mohammed VI and Moroccan Foreign Policy’ in Bruce Maddy-Weizman and D. Zisenwine (eds), Contemporary Morocco. State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Routledge 2011) 76; Aomar Boum ‘Youth, Political Activism and the Festivalization of Hip-hop Music in Morocco’ in B. Maddy-Weizman and D. Zisenwine (eds), Contemporary Morocco. State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Routledge 2011) 161 12 For example, Dutch people remember well the murder of film director Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch Moroccan in 2004, Zig Layton-Henry ‘Migration, the Challenge to Europe’ in Montserrat Guibernau (ed), Governing Europe: the Developing Agenda (The Open University 2006) 161; D. Zisenwine, n 12 76 13 Eurostat data http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics 14 S. El Otmani, n 7 297 7

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stable and secure country, for regional standards. In the words of Morocco’s minister for foreign affairs, “a trusted partner in an unstable southernMediterranean zone”16 ii.

Fundamental extremist. Radical Islam, however, should not be a major concern in Morocco because there are two Islamic oppositions (“Parti de la justice et du developpement” and “Justice and Charity”17). The two parties, however, are tolerated and don’t pose a threat to the stability of the country anymore.

iii.

Organised crime, smuggling and drugs18.

C) Economic interests: The internal market being the aim of the Union implies that if other millions of consumer are brought in, the comparative advantage is going to be felt in both Morocco and Europe. The principle of free trade to which the Union is inspired had indeed brought about good results to Morocco ever since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, indeed Morocco is one of the few countries that has significantly benefitted from an economical standpoint19. Indicatively, the data from the EU Commission indicate that Morocco has received in the last two years 580.5M€ 20 As far as Morocco’s objectives, they are slightly different from the EU’s ones in the matter of migration. As it is predictable, Morocco pushes for an integrated market of people, for free movement of workers21, though so far no agreement has been reached so far, not even under the Advanced Status.

4. Why EU’s behaviour is paradoxical Simply put, because Morocco is not complying with the Union basic principles. This is a legal perspective. Art 2 TEU reads: “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, Ibid 300; in general D. Zisenwine, n 12 and Sven Biscop, Rosa Balfour and Michael Emerson (eds), An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy? Egmont Papers 2012 16 S. El Otmani, n 7 299 17 Rachel Linn ‘Morocco’s Radicalised Political Movements’ in George Joffe’ (ed), Islamist Radicalisation in Nord Africa. Politics and Process (Routledge 2012) 138. The life of the founder of Charity and Justice, Abdelsalam Yassine, is worth checking. 18 D. Zisenwine, n 12 76 19 K. Pieters, n 2 413 20 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/morocco/morocco_en.htm 21 L. Jaidi, n 6 3; S. El Otmani, n 7 301 15

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tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. Art 21(1) TEU, called upon by art 205 TFEU, states: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”. The Union adopted the so called Copenhagen criteria in 1992: these are criteria to be met in order to become a Member State and they repeat the basic values of the Union (democracy, rule of law, human rights, respect and protection of minorities)22. Even though the case in question doesn’t regard accession, the Copenhagen criteria reinforce the strength of EU basic principles. How does Morocco score on Human Rights? Very low. Despite being part to all the major international instrument of HR protection, and having dramatically improved since the 1990s, this is just as an overview of the current situation: 

Freedom of press: in the 2013 freedom of press index Morocco is ranked 136 out of 17923.



Human rights in Western Sahara: the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has criticised the sever lack of human rights in the occupied territories of western Sahara24



Immigration: The paradox is striking here. It is the EU policy of keeping the migrants at bay that fosters Moroccan’s abuses. The report Medicins sans frontiers are alarming25, especially considering that Frontex, the agency for border control, is partly a EU one26



Morocco was registered each year as “partly free” since 1972 in the “freedom in the world report”.



Art 489 of the Moroccan criminal code punishes “quiconque commet un acte impudique ou contre nature avec un individu de son sexe” 27. The infamous law

Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (Kluwer 2008) 87 http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html 24 http://www.arso.org/OHCHRrep2006en.htm 25 http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2013/Trapped_at_the_Gates_of_Europe.pdf 26 Karl Kopp, Europe’s borders (D+C, 4 December 2012) <http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/human-rights-problems-euborder-agency-frontex> 27 Dahir n° 1-59-413 du 28 joumada II 1382 22 23

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that allowed a rapist to escape prosecution if he married his underage victim has been recently repealed28. How about democracy? Morocco is ranked 115 out of 167 by the Economist Intelligence Unit, among the “hybrid regimes”29; 97 out of 115 by the Democracy Index Ranking30. Fouad Laroui wrote in his novel: “Qu'est-ce qui vous amène ici au commissariat? grogna t-il. On ne vous a pourtant pas convoqué. J'ai votre fiche. D'accord, vous lisez le Monde, mais ce n'est plus un délit depuis que Sa Majesté a décidé de démocratiser ce foutu pays”31. If the EU has brought about improvements in the HR and democracy conditions of Morocco is a moot point32

5. Conclusion The European Union has entered a partnership which brings security and economical advantages with a country that has a lot to gain. Morocco, however, appear to violate the basic principles to which the EU should inspire its action.

Bibliography

Raj Chari Sylvia Kritzinger, Understanding EU Policy Making (Pluto Press 2006) Zig Layton-Henry ‘Migration, the Challenge to Europe’ in Montserrat Guibernau (ed), Governing Europe: the Developing Agenda (The Open University 2006) Daniel Zisenwine ‘Mohammed VI and Moroccan Foreign Policy’ in Bruce Maddy-Weizman and D. Zisenwine (eds), Contemporary Morocco. State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Routledge 2011) Aomar Boum ‘Youth, Political Activism and the Festivalization of Hip-hop Music in Morocco’ in B. Maddy-Weizman and D. Zisenwine (eds), Contemporary Morocco. State, Politics and Society under Mohammed VI (Routledge 2011) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/morocco-repeals-rape-marriage-law-2014123254643455.html https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por_global.open_file?p_doc_id=1034 30 http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/ranking/2013/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2013_letter.pdf 31 Fouad Laroui, Mefiez-vous des parachutistes (Folio 1999) 32 S. El Otman, n 7. Wojciech Sadurski ‘EU Enlargment and Democracy in New Member States’ in W. Sadurski, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygies (eds), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in post’communist Legal Orders (Hart 2008); Päivi Leino ‘The JourneyTowards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals (Springer 2006) 28 29

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Rachel Linn ‘Morocco’s Radicalised Political Movements’ in George Joffe’ (ed), Islamist Radicalisation in Nord Africa. Politics and Process (Routledge 2012) Päivi Leino ‘The JourneyTowards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals (Springer 2006) Larbi Jaidi, ‘The Morocco/EU Advanced Status: What Value Does it Add to the European Neighbourhood Policy?’ IEmed 2009 Saad dine El Otmani ‘Guest Editorial, Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU: A Locomotive and a Model for Reforms in the Region’ European Affairs Review 18,3 (2013) 297 Bart Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy. A Paradigm for Coherence (Routledge 2012) Wojciech Sadurski ‘EU Enlargment and Democracy in New Member States’ in W. Sadurski, Adam Czarnota and Martin Krygies (eds), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in post’communist Legal Orders (Hart 2008) Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality (Kluwer 2008) Karolien Pieters ‘The Mediterranean Countries’ in Steven Blockmans & Adam Lazowski (eds), The European Union and Its Neighbours (TMC Asser Press 2006) Paul Mason, ‘The EU is ignoring the human rights abuses behind Morocco's razor wire’ The Guardian (London, 2 September 2013) Sven Biscop, Rosa Balfour and Michael Emerson (eds), An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy? Egmont Papers 2012 Karl Kopp, Europe’s borders (D+C, 4 December 2012) <http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/human-rights-problems-eu-borderagency-frontex>

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One Step Forward, Five Steps Back: Recent Human Rights Abuses in Turkey and Turkey’s relationship with the EU M A H I R O N AT TO PA L 1ST YR LLB LAW

The EU and Turkish relations were presumed to be changing after the AK Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. The liberal and pro-Western AKP promised to improve the Turkish-EU relations, and take realistic steps for accelerating Turkey’s accession into the EU. ‘The EU,’ the new Prime Minister asserted, ‘will become a World power with the accession of Turkey.’ Indeed, Stratfor argued that the enthusiasm of countries such as the UK, Sweden and Italy for the Turkish accession to the EU derived mainly the thriving economy of the country and the recognition of its growing regional power. 1 Consequently, Turkey was accepted as a full candidate in 2005. Nevertheless, it will be argued that the deteriorating Turkish-EU relations and the recent human rights abuses in Turkey render the future of the relations precarious. Turkey’s promotion to the ‘Candidate’ status was celebrated in Turkey with much fanfare.2 Even so, the ‘Eurobarometer’ survey in 2006 showed that about 59% of EU-27 was against Turkey joining the EU. It was notable that over 90 percent of the people who opposed Turkey’s accession noted human rights abuses as the leading cause. Indeed, academics such as Rumford suggested that the biggest barriers to accession existed in the fields of democracy and human rights. 3 Even the Commission report which paved the way for Turkey’s promotion to candidate status noted that there were still ‘serious shortcomings’ on human rights issues. The government acknowledged this problem in AK Party’s (AKP) party manifesto, and pledged to

1 Stratfor:

"Turkey and Russia on the Rise", by Reva Bhalla, Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan. 17 March 2009. ever lengthening road.” Economist. 7 December 2006. Retrieved 12 February 2014. 3 Rumford, C (2001)-Human Rights and Democratisation in Turkey in Context of EU Candidature 2 “The

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resolve it.4 Subsequent reforms led Amnesty International to hail the attempts of improvement in its report in 2008.5 It is widely accepted that the Turkish-EU relations started to sour around the Eurozone crisis period.6 While Turkey’s economy endured the economic crisis much better than most of the EU countries, many expressed concerns on whether Turkey’s economy will be affected detrimentally if acceded to the Union. This was followed by Cyprus blocking 6 chapters of Turkey’s accession negotiations and questions on whether accession (“or even more integration with the EU”) had ever been a realistic prospect. Some analysts interpreted that the increasingly acrimonious remarks of some of the top officials reflected the Turkish people’s frustration over the EU.7 Vardan argued that even the existence of negotiations was beneficial to the TurkishEU relationship8, who was back by Kentmen in his article in the European Union Politics.9 Nevertheless, this does not allay the fact that the relationship deteriorated substantially and took an ‘inopportune’ negative turn.10 2013 and early 2014 was marked by turmoil and many human rights abuses in Turkey, which also exacerbated Turkey’s retrogressive relationship with the EU. The police’s unreasonable intervention to a small and innocuous protest against a park being torn down to make place for a shopping mall sparked a colossal nationwide protest. Over 7.5 million people in Istanbul alone actively participated in the protests which lasted about a month.11 These were widespread and unprecedented protests against the increasingly authoritarian rule of the Prime Minister, who declared that the protests were ‘unlawful’ and organized by ‘looters.’ The police cracked down on protesters everywhere. One investigation revealed that the amount of pepper spray used by the police in 2 weeks surpassed the amount the whole world disposed in all of 2012. 12 The protests left more than 134 detained, 4900 arrested, 8163 injured (63 serious

For the analysis of this issue, see Servet Cetin (2013), (Turkish) “10 Yillik Reform Donemi”, Institute for Strategic Thinking, pp. 7-12. 5 Although it reported in 2009 that there were no significant improvements made on human rights issues. See: Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey/report-2010 6 See in particular “The future of the European Union,” The Economist Magazine, May 26 2012 and "Growing worries in the West over the risk of losing Turkey". Economist: Turkey, America and Europe. 28 September 2006. Retrieved 18 May 2013. 7 Yiğit Bulut (Turkish), Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği projesinin 'alternatifidir' ve bunu idrak etmelidir! 11 November 2012 8 ÖC Vardan - Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2009Turkey-EU Relations and Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects 9 C Kentmen - European Union Politics, 2008 “Determinants of Support for EU Membership in Turkey...” 10 E Alessandri - Institute of International Affairs Documents and Working, 2010, “The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations” 11 Unofficial estimate- (Turkish) "Gezi'ye rekor katılım: 7.5 milyon yurttaş". Aydinlik. 13 September 2013. Retrieved 1 April 2014. 12 (Turkish) Cnn Türk- Türkiye'ye "biber gazı" uyarısı! Retrieved 1 April 2014. 4

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condition) and 15 dead, the oldest being 27 years old.13 These “Gezi Park” protests were followed by numerous protests and human rights abuse issues. Protests against the destruction of METU’s forests, corruption scandals, and the death of Berkin Elvan – a 14 year old boy killed during the protests – were followed by the accustomed excessive use of force by the police, and more deaths. Peculiarly, however, Erdogan insinuated that EU Member States (and specifically Germany) 14 took part in engineering the protests in a ploy against the government when he alleged that “international conspirators” had contrived the protests beforehand. While some argued that Erdogan based his claims on pertinent analysis and intelligence reports, 15 others suggested that this was merely an attempt to legitimize the use of force 16 and a “psychological tactic” of incriminating an estranged “former partner.”17 The EU joined the worldwide reactions against the human rights abuses in the events. In June 2013, EU foreign ministers backed Germany's proposal to postpone further EU membership talks with Turkey for about four months due to the government's handling of the protests. This bolstered the arguments of the impossibility of Turkey being acceded to the EU.18 EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said that the recent widespread human rights abuses were ‘a major cause of concern.’ The 2013 EUTurkey progress report stated that ‘far-reaching reforms’ were necessary in order to ensure the respect for freedom of assembly in line with European standards. Furthermore, the EU officially condemned the ‘cowardly and pointless’ bans on Twitter and YouTube. EU’s enlargement commissioner, Stefan Füle expressed concern over the Turkish government’s recent coercive and oppressive actions and the future of Turkey’s relationship with the EU. The comments of top government officials on the EU and the Turkish-EU relationship, which could be interpreted as a response to the EU’s severe criticisms, were bold and antagonizing.19 The Turkish EU Minister, whose responsibility is to head the accession negotiations for Turkey, asserted that ‘Turkey does not need the EU, but the EU needs Turkey.’ He later commented, ‘We will say, “Go away, kid” to some of the EU states if necessary.’ Similarly, the Prime Minister said that he ‘did not care about the response of the international community’ as he responded to the EU’s criticism on the (Turkish) "Gezi Parkı Direnişi ve Sonrasında Yaşananlara İlişkin Değerlendirme Raporu 17.07.2013". Human Rights Association Turkey. 17 July 2013. Retrieved 19th March 2014. 14 Selcuk Gultasli, The Daily Zaman, 5th January 2014 (Turkish), 2014, ‘AK Parti’nin en zor Avrupa Birliği yılı olacak.’ 15 For examples see Yeni Akit (Turkish) “28 Şubat’ta da aynı filmi görmüştük” 3rd June 2013, and “Alçak Alman basını, Gezi provokatörlerini aratmadı!” 23rd June 2013. 16 E.g., See Can Dundar (Turkish) “Sensin Terorist!” Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 23rd May 2014 17 (Turkish) Ozgen Acarli, “Sultan Ciplak” Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 2nd March 2014 18 EU delays latest round of Turkish entry talks - European News | Latest News from Across Europe | The Irish Times Tue, 25 Jun 2013. The Irish Times (2013-06-25). Retrieved on 2013-08-12. 19 Dombey, Daniel, James Fontanella-Khan, and Quentin Peel (21 June 2013). "Germany blocks Turkey's bid to join EU". Financial Times. Retrieved 3 April 2014. 13

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Twitter ban and the force by the police. These comments conveyed that the government was relatively indifferent to the EU’s reaction. In fact, the Prime Minister later added that although the government will not back-track on the negotiations, he now has ‘doubts about the accession’ which conveys that the government is skeptical about trying to improve the relations with the EU. Notwithstanding the reciprocal bitter comments between the officials of EU and Turkey, Turkey's accession talks resumed in November, after the suspension of nearly three-and-a-half years. Nevertheless, several EU countries’ opposition towards Turkish accession (notably Austria, Germany and France) has upsurged, especially after the recent events and human rights abuses. 20 Even the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who welcomed the recommencement of the accession talks, reiterated "the European concerns" about the latest events in Turkey. 21 With an undefined time limit on the accession process and tenuous relations, Turkey’s future relationship and position within the EU has indeed become problematic and precarious.

See in particular, “Europeans against Turkey in EU: Poll” (Retrievable from URL: http://www.presstv.ir) and BBC World News, “EU presses Turkish PM Erdogan over democratic reforms” 21 January 2014, Retrieved 3 April 2014. 21 “Statement by President Barroso following the meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey,” European Commission SPEECH/14/43 21/01/2014 20

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

Oppression and Reaction: A review of human rights abuse and cultural oppression within Xinjiang and Tibet C A ME R O N RO G E R S 1ST YR BA INTERNATIO NAL POLITICS ASIAN AFFAIRS CONTRI BUTOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL CITIZEN

China unfortunately had to suffer one of its most horrific acts of terrorism on the 1st of March this year, in the form of the Kunming knife attacks. The attacks brought such a shock to the nation that it was left in national mourning, the attack has even been described as “China’s 9/11”. The eight terrorists left twenty-nine civilians dead, with over one hundred and forty injured. The attackers were described by Wu Yuheng, a student and surviving witness, as “crazy swordsmen” who “mostly went for the head and shoulders”. There is no doubt that this incident was disgusting, any sane human being would be appalled by what happened. However, the attackers, who were revealed to be part of the oppressed Uighur minority, have suffered greatly as a people within the Peoples Republic of China. China, as one would be able to tell from their actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, are not very rational or diplomatic when handling minorities or recognising their respective cultures. The Uighurs, much like the Tibetans, have harsh restrictions on the practicing of their culture. Within Xinjiang these restrictions are particularly bad for Uighur students, who are not allowed to practice their religion and are prohibited from religious teaching within schools. There are even bans on using the Uighur language within schools, and many students caught speaking the language are punished as a result. This is also not to mention that the Han minority within Xinjiang (making up around two fifths of the population) is openly racist towards the Uighurs and also control the majority of the wealth within the province, creating extreme poverty within the Uighur community. It is conditions such as these that have led to a rise in what is branded by China as ‘Islam extremism’, yet one has to question whether this extremism is in the name of a people rather than a religion.

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Unfortunately, attacks such as the one in Kunming and protests within Xinjiang and Tibet are only going to worsen the situation for the minorities within China. The logical thing for the government to do is to lift cultural bans and target economic growth within the provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet to help the minorities, violence could worsen if China fails to act in this fashion. Yet the Chinese government is not one for a compromise, and although the violence is creating significant internal damage within China, it is doubtful that president Xi Jinping will be one to negotiate terms with the Uighurs and Tibetans. Recent actions have certainly shown that this is the case. The recent dispute with Thailand, who detained more than 400 Uighur refugees whom China demanded be brought back to face punishment, has shown that the nation is now taking a zero tolerance policy on attempts of the people to leave their brutal state. Further anger was expressed by China when Uighur academic Ilham Tohti won the Freedom to Write Award by the PEN American Center, whose outspoken nature on the oppression of the Uighurs has led him to be detained by the government and charged with separatism. This is also the case within the infamous province of Tibet. Tibet only has a 17% Han population, much less compared to Xinjiang, however this does not mean that oppression is less prevalent. Tibetans are currently pushing for laws to save what they see as their ‘dying culture’, and although not often reported, protests are very regular. According to non-profit organisation ‘Free Tibet’, there were six protests in March 2014, including three self-immolation protests by Buddhist monks and nuns. Self-immolation has tragically become a popular form of protest against the government, 125 Buddhists have been known to set themselves on fire since March 2011, the youngest being 15 years old. Many Tibetans flee China to neighbouring Nepal and India to escape the oppression. For those who stay, the Chinese security forces in the area still intimidate the people and regularly beat local monks. Forces often occupy monasteries after protests and severely beat those inside, whilst arresting the families of the protestors as well as the protestors themselves. If it were not for the Dalai Lama’s restraining influence from his exiled government in Dharamshala, violence, and as a result oppression in the area, could be much worse. Some cultural accommodation for Tibet has been installed since the unrest in 2008 by the Chinese government, which may seem to mark a change in the government’s attitude towards Tibet. Tibet can now boast three Tibetan language TV channels, one being 24 hours. Also China commenced a historical preservation scheme (worth $81.43 million) in 2008, to protect 22 historical and cultural heritage sites in Tibet. Yet one should not be fooled by these seemingly reformed acts. The money spent by tourists within Tibet goes towards the Chinese ‘enterprises’, therefore it keeps the current system by which Tibet operates in check. China has ‘Disneyfied’ the Tibetan culture to make it seem more attractive, therefore it makes a lot of money off the industry.

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This was the main incentive behind the preservation project and the Tibetan TV channels, as they attract tourists who may be interested in the culture of the area. And although oppression is still widespread, Xi Jinping is not questioned or scrutinised any longer by the international community or powers such as the US and EU on Tibet, they are too busy building economic ties and therefore dooming Tibet to it’s unfortunate fate. This fate is not likely to occur in Xinjiang, as there is not as much of a cultural fascination for tourists in this region, yet due to the people’s less restrained nature (not being influenced by the calm teachings of Buddhism and the Dalai Lama) and more violent protests, the Uighurs could suffer a worse degree of oppression and cultural destruction. Judging through the evidence of the government’s actions in Xinjiang, this could already be the case. The one question that we as individuals should be asking is whether there is anything we can do to stop this oppression. The answer to that is yes. No matter how small a contribution, participation through student bodies, petitions and groups such as ‘Free Tibet’ will slowly put the issue of minority oppression in China back on the international agenda. This could be used to pressure China into having a more accepting stance on minority cultures, granting more autonomy and rights to the Uighurs and Tibetans, the Chinese state would also be more internally stable as a result. Independence for these two provinces is an idealistic possibility, but the possibility for China to have a more ‘liberal’ attitude to separate cultures is certainly within the realms of possibility. Yet for now, China will deal with the increasing violence amongst the Uighurs and unrest within Tibet the only way it knows how, tactics of oppression, intimidation and restriction, and if the ‘terrorist’ violence intensifies, so will China’s response.

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

Prodding Iran’s Nuclear Program: Intelligence in Peace and War N A D I M K H AT E R MA INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTRODUCTION This paper will assess the role of the western intelligence community with regards to Iran’s nuclear program, focusing on its suspected military dimension. Although a deal was recently struck,1 this issue saw a decade of headline-grabbing incidents and the timeline of these events warrant study of their contribution and outcome. A short summary of the Iranian nuclear program sets the background for this study, followed by an assessment of the role of western intelligence in Iran’s program. The paper also provides insights into the motives of various intelligence actions and its escalation. The study objective, and conclusion, is an evaluation of the efficiency of western intelligence actions in curbing Iranian nuclear ambitions.

IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM The Iranian nuclear program originally started in the 1960s with the Shah wanting to assert the regional profile of the country with the avid support of, its then ally, the United States (U.S.). Less than two decades later, the revolution of 1979 dented the development of the program with the outflow of scientists and international firms involved, not to mention the opposition of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to nuclear development.2 From 1989 to the early 2000s, Iran reactivated its nuclear program withstanding European and American embargoes on nuclear and dual-use technologies. During this period Iran secured equipment and knowledge from Russia, China and even the A.Q. Khan network while concealing their activities in a bid to develop a self- sufficient nuclear cycle.3

December 2013 saw the finalization of a 6-months deal with regards to the Iran Nuclear Program, summary details http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/23/world/meast/iran-nuclear-deal-details/ 2Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 9 – 32 3 Ibid p. 34 1

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In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an exiled opposition group exposed the construction of the underground nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, towing with it a revelation of the secret Iranian nuclear program.4 By that year, Iran had already established a pilot program with the theoretic ability to develop a nuclear device, yet still at the early stages of a very steep learning curve.5 What followed was a period of international sanctions and negotiations from western nations, paralleled by taunting yet chequered advance of nuclear capabilities by Iran.66 Although the Iranians claimed their nuclear program was solely for peaceful purposes, the shocking nature of the exposure alongside the nation’s sponsoring of terrorism and its radical stance towards the west and especially Israel, spurred the international community to action.77

PAINTING THE PICTURE Western intelligence agencies started compiling reports with regards to the intentions and capabilities of Iran’s nuclear program. Preliminary analysis deduced, with moderate to high degrees of confidence, that Iran had not yet taken the political decision to build the bomb but sought to create the capability if needed.8 U.S. intelligence secured “eyes on the ground” and re-activated its muddy affiliation with the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK). 9 This relationship supposedly included training, weapons, and financial support for MEK while they provided Human Intelligence (HUMINT), including defectors, and proxy tools to the U.S. 10 Another prong was the collation of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) through data sourcing from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Estimates with regards to volume of fissile materials, analysis of environmental samples, location of facilities and sophistication of Iranian nuclear equipment were some of the inputs considered by western intelligence. Although the Iranians eventually banned IAEA visits under the pretext of this collusion with western intelligence, the accusation of nefarious IAEA intents was futile since it is the charter of the IAEA to monitor, report and publish nuclear activity.

Ibid p. 16 Ibid pp. 33 – 34 6 Ibid pp. 17 – 31 7 Daniel Byman, “Iran, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008) pp. 169 – 181 8 National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, (2007) pp. 1 – 9 9 MEK is listed as a terrorist organization although it is part of the NCRI. 10 Seymour Hersh, “Our Men in Iran?”, The New Yorker, April 6 2012 4 5

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With international pressure mounting against Iran, western intelligence agencies probably guided the spider web11 of sanctions through the use of Financial Intelligence (FININT).12 Although limited declassified sources discuss this topic, FININT could have been collected from international audit firms operating in Iran, bank statement, posted profits and OPEC allies with regards to Iranian oil revenues. Numerous financial institutions were penalised by western government for continued dealings with Iran, some as recently as 2013, and this could have been detected through FININT as well.13 The sanction support effort by western intelligence was coupled with OSINT reviews from news outlets and Iranian Government officials’ releases. During the period 2005 – 2008, CNN ran numerous, almost monthly, news segments about the Iranian economy highlighting decreases in oil revenues, currency devaluations, inflation and rescinding of government subsidies. Even Ayatollah Ali Khameni acknowledged in a 2013 speech that the banking and oil sanctions have damaged Iran. 14 Thus, western economic actions can be labelled as effective, indicating that there was a proficient intelligence cycle guiding these measures. Iranian nuclear sites were subsequently identified and imaged by western satellites, and eventually drones. This collection of Geospatial and Imagery Intelligence (GEOINT and IMINT) was instrumental in assessing the construction and activity at Iran’s nuclear sites, which presented indications towards the utility and size of related operations. Satellite imagery related to these facilities was plastered across news outlets, sometimes accompanied by indexes and analysis of structures. This IMINT could have also been compiled to guide future military policy against Iran if need be, and its wide distribution in open sources, could serve as an indicator to its detailed availability within the western intelligence community. 15 Somewhat of a side-project was intelligence activity related to Iran’s missile program. Western intelligence identified that medium to long range missiles would pose a threat to a region occupied with U.S. allies and military bases. International sanctions blanketed Iran’s missile capabilities and disrupted the supply chain for components that could not be home-grown.16 FININT could have been used to guide this process as well, yet there must have also been a concerted effort by western

International Crisis Group, Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, (2013) pp. 5 – 15 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions”, Congressional Research Service, RS 20871 (2013), pp. 49 – 61 13 Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Those Aiding Iran”, The New York Times, May 9 2013 14 Gawdat Bahgat, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: An Assessment”, NESA Center for Strategic Study, (2013) pp. 67 – 76 15 There were also unconfirmed reports (mostly from Israeli news outlets) that Iran managed to “blind” a CIA satellite using laser burst technology. 16 International Crisis Group, Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, (2013) pp. 19 – 21 11 12

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intelligence agencies in terms of Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) and Measurements Intelligence (MASINT). TECHINT and MASINT would have guided western intelligence estimates about the range, payload and accuracy of Iranian missiles. 17 This effort could have drawn common inferences and analysis from intelligence about Russia’s missile program, since most of the Iranian missile program emulates its Russian supplier.18 This use of TECHINT culminated in an underreported incident, where seized computers belonging to the A.Q. Khan network contained blueprints of a “compact warhead design that could fit Iran’s medium range ballistic missiles”.19 More intrusive techniques of Signals (SIGINT) and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) would have likely complemented the overall western intelligence strategy, yet evidence for such operations has remained classified so far. This suppression also applies for TECHINT and HUMINT with direct exposure to Iranian nuclear equipment. Western intelligence agencies’ remote interference with Iran nuclear program characterised the period 2004 – 2008, with objectives being mostly the support of political and economic actions of the U.S. and its allies.

PRODDING THE PROGRAM The years 2009 – 2010 saw a drastic shift in the attitude of western intelligence agencies, and the results of more intrusive operations started to surface. An analysis of this escalation will be presented later on, whereas this section will show the additional activities of the western intelligence agencies against Iran’s nuclear program for the period 2009 – 2012. A watershed event was the Stuxnet virus, discovered in 2010 but estimated to have started spreading at least a year earlier.20 The virus was assessed as “unique” and “one of the most sophisticated ever developed” by Symantec and Kapersky Labs. Its modus operandi was established as a “virus specifically coded to spread through industrial software, in terms of size and manner, for monitoring and interference”. Although this fits generally within the definition of viruses, Stuxnet specifically infected Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) of industrial facility equipment and attempted to cause their malfunction.21 This was a virus that was coded to cause Iran periodically released footage of tests relating to its missile program. Philip Sherwell, “New Long-Range Missiles for Iran Thanks to Russia”, The Telegraph, November 2 2011 19 Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) Time point: February 2011 20 Nicholas Fallerie, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Security Dossier”, Symantec Security 21 Ibid 17 18

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physical damage, programmed to spread via USB drives since industrial computers are not networked too often in order to contain infections.22 Although there is no definitive evidence that western intelligence agencies were behind Stuxnet, most of the analysis and cyber-security firms point in that direction. The virus has 15,000 lines of code worth an estimated 10,000 man-hours.23 This means that a 4- man team, working 50 hours per week, would need a year to compile the required code. Such an investment, coupled with consideration of motivation, hints at state involvement.24 Throughout the preceding years of monitoring and assessment, western intelligence agencies would have developed a detailed understanding of the Iranian nuclear program. Reports comment on the low-tech nature of the program which would not have evolved significantly with sanctions in place. 25 This identification of low resilience could have steered western intelligence in judging a sophisticated virus would affect Iranian nuclear efforts. And it did, Stuxnet had close to 60% of its infections in Iran and managed to spread to several Iranian networks related to the nuclear program.26 This caused material, financial and operational damage to the infected facilities, not to mention the amount of data collected from these networks, allowing for more TECHINT and Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT) analysis. Another important aspect of this covert war is the targeting of personnel involved in the programs of interest. During the period 2010 – 2012, at least 5 Iranian scientists related to the nuclear program were killed.27 In 2010, Masoud Ali Mohammadi, a teacher of neutron physics, was killed by a remote-controlled explosive device. Later that same year, 2 separate yet simultaneous car-bombs killed nuclear scientists Majid Shahriar and Fereidoun Abbasi. In 2011, Darioush Rezaei, an expert in nuclear chain reactions and member of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, was gunned down. Most famously in 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, who was involved in the Natanz enrichment facility, was killed when a magnetic bomb was attached to his car and detonated. Iran consistently pointed the finger at the Mossad and U.S. intelligence agencies for the murder of its scientists. Although most of Iran’s rhetoric has been hollow and bellicose, the sophistication and coordination of these attacks, not to mention

Ibid 23 Sharon Weinberger, “Is This the Start of Cyberwarfare?” Nature: 474, June 9 2011 pp. 141 – 145 24 Numerous articles and reports indicate that the virus was developed by the U.S. and Isreal. These include Hebrew words left in the coding and an allegation by Snowden about U.S. and Israeli involvement 25 Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 33 – 67 26 Nicholas Fallerie, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Security Dossier”, Symantec Security Response, (2011) 27 Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) 22

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their effectiveness,28 suggest the involvement of intelligence agencies. An often overlooked clue in these cases is how were these scientists identified and tracked? Few papers discuss how the network compromise by Stuxnet could have provided traces and details about personnel involved in the Iranian nuclear program, which then led to their eventual targeting by covert operations. Most of these murders involved motorcycle-riding perpetrators knowledgeable with the layout and traffic of Tehran yet with sophisticated planning and equipment, 29 characteristics of proxies. Israel has a policy of “no-comment” with regards to such operations to stave off confirmation, but the U.S. has already been implicit in supporting the NCRI including its more violent members such as the MEK. Western intelligence could have identified the scarcity of nuclear knowledge in the country and the long investment period required to enriching it. 30 Judging a move against the existing pool of nuclear scientists would serve to retard Iran’s position on a steep learning curve and demoralise personnel involved. This campaign of assassinations potentially brushed the Iranian Republic Guards (IRGC) as well. Major General Hassan Moqaddam, dubbed as the father of Iran’s ballistic missile program, was killed alongside 16 IRGC members in an “accidental” explosion in 2011. Such directed covert attacks against Iran’s nuclear program fit the overall strategy of western nations against Iran and had characteristic signatures that implicated western intelligence. Interestingly, a 2004 publication titled “Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions”, encompasses a chapter discussing the challenges of U.S. military intervention and recommends “covert actions such as assassinations of key personnel and sabotaging the infrastructure of the nuclear program” as an alternate option for U.S. policy makers, with specific references to targeted computer viruses.31 The author of that chapter, Michael Eisenstadt, was a reserve officer in the U.S. Army with recent service in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.32 Another prominent event during this campaign was the downing of the U.S. RQ-170 drone by Iran. Developed by Lockheed martin as a high-altitude surveillance drone,33 the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) had been undertaking reconnaissance and All the attacks succeeded and no perpetrators were identified or arrested. The placement of explosive devices, especially the magnetic bomb, show technological suave. Moreover, the shooting of Darioush Rezaie involved two gunmen, indicating high standards of safety redundancies and Operational Security (OpSec). 30 mentioned earlier, most of the educated bright minds fled Iran after the 1979 revolution. It took 10 years at least to grow a new generation of nuclear scientists and experts (1990 – 2000). 31 Michael Eisenstadt, “The Challenges of U.S. Preventative Military Action”, in Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, ed. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, (2004) pp. 113 – 126 32 Ibid, pp. 129 – 130 33 Lockheed Martin Skunk Works: http://www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/what-we-do/aerospace- defense/ 28 29

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surveillance of Iran nuclear sites. Although IMINT and GEOINT had already been collected using satellites, the physical use of drones represents a material and intelligence escalation. Drones could be equipped with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies that aid the collection of MASINT and offer a more detailed and intrusive view into targets.34 The period 2009 – 2013 was characterised by these activities, reasonably undertaken, by western intelligence agencies; although limited academic and professional reports have been published in this regard. Western intelligence agencies came out of the background of political initiatives and became a pinprick needle that prodded Iran’s nuclear program at previously identified weak spots.

SHIFTING GEARS This section will delve into the plausible reasons that could have influenced the decision to escalate western intelligence involvement in Iran. Following years of economic sanctions and political wrangling, Iran had remained defiant by shirking agreements and buying time. But midway through 2008 their strategy seemed to become even bolder, moving from buying time through hollow promises towards outright rejection of agreements from the international community.35 This indicated to western powers that stringier measures should be considered, even waving a military option.36 2008 – 2009 saw a plethora of news reports and specials discussing a potential war with Iran, as if to poke public and international opinion. Yet direct war with Iran was not popular with U.S. politicians and citizens. With armed forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops equipped and trained to fight guerrilla warfare could find themselves under attack by conventional armed forces from Iran with missiles, warplanes and armoured equipment. This would undoubtedly have cost the U.S. additional investment in capital and troops in a time when the president announced disengagement as one of his main elections platforms. Moreover, such a war would pivot around the Strait of Hormuz where at least 20% of the worldwide oil trade passes.3737 The risk impact of an Iran war on oil prices can 34 www.darpa.mil the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency already has several spectral reconnaissance projects in the works. 35 Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) Time point: October 2009 36 Ibid, Time points: June 2008 – 2009 37

U.S. Energy Information Administration

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be safely assumed to be palpable,3838 and in 2008 – 2009, the world was still reeling from the global financial crisis. Thus consideration of war brought with it contemplation of further crippling a struggling global economy. Iran also witnessed social and political turmoil following the presidential elections of 2009.3939 Regardless of involvement in these events, western nations would have preferred to see a regime change in Iran. 4040 Such a development would have considerably side-tracked the Iranian nuclear program or even placed the political leadership of Iran in a more favourable position towards western overtures. The suppression of these protests ended hopes of political gains in Iran and could have further convinced western leaders that a shift from passive to active intelligence activity was due. Iran’s escalatory stance took an additional turn in 2009 when an underground nuclear facility at Qom was exposed. 4141 This alarmed western officials, which considered the secret enrichment facility as further evidence of Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions. The background of 2008-2009 was spotted with occasional tests of Iranian ballistic missiles placing the Gulf and Israel within their effective reach. 4242 The increase in pace and severity of events placed western nations in a thorny position, diplomacy and sanctions alone were not working and history showed Pakistan and North Korea had endured similar measures and developed nuclear weapons. Yet direct military confrontation was deemed disproportionate, especially after the Iraq debacle, and the consideration of its economic implications shunned such overt intervention. With a clear intelligence picture about Iran, western nations could have estimated that covert intelligence operations would be effective and yield positive results against a program in its early stages that lacks appropriate resilience.

EFFICACY OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE If we consider the timeline of intelligence actions presented in this paper, we can deduce intertwining results about its performance.

Geoffrey Kemp, Patrick Clawson, Amy Jaffe, Suzanne Maloney, The Economic Consequences of a War with Iran, Panel on September 6 2011 39 Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) Time point: July 2009 40 S. Rob Sobhani, “The Prospects of Regime Change in Iran”, in Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, ed. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, (2004) pp. 61 – 80 41 Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) Time point: September 2009 42 Al Jazeera, Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Programme, (2013), Time point: 2009 38

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Economic sanctions were mostly effective in curbing the development of Iran’s nuclear program, arguably scarring its economy.43 Thus intelligence efforts in support of these economic actions can be deemed as productive, but we note that FININT contributions to this issue have been underestimated in the realm of academic and professional reviews. The volume and reaction time of western economic moves suggests that FININT had a vital, even if unglamorous, role in the decision cycle and yielded accurate results. GEOINT, IMINT, HUMINT and TECHINT monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program provided good intelligence about the resilience and complexity of the program. This was most obvious in the penetration and impact of Stuxnet, where its success indicates supportive intelligence accurately guiding its development. The employment of Stuxnet proved successful in at least delaying the Iranian nuclear program with reports indicating centrifuge operability decreases in 2009,44 and probably kicking off a costly revision of Iran’s cyber-resilience. A darker side-effect of Stuxnet was its potential mining of personnel data, which could have contributed to the, at least, half-dozen death of nuclear personnel. The coding of Stuxnet includes an automated reporting mechanism, 45 yet its link to the homicide of Iranian nuclear scientists has not been studied sufficiently. Moreover, the limited nuclear knowledge in the country created an effect multiplier with the loss of the scientists, likely pushing back Iranian nuclear efforts on the learning curve. Legitimately, the killing of these scientists, often with family collateral damage, tainted western intelligence in a bad light. This tarnished the productivity of targeting personnel because it was done in personal settings instead of their professional environments, which could have been considered unfeasible. Empirically, the targeting of Iranian nuclear assets through covert, complex and risky operations showed good accuracy and success rates. Indicating that intelligence agencies painted an accurate picture that contributed to planning and execution. Although western intelligence had established there was no Iranian political decision to build a nuclear bomb yet, there were opinions that the escalation into covert operations could push Iran into more hard-line politics and making that decision.4647 This can be assessed to not have happened, where we recently saw the election of International Crisis Group, Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, (2013) pp. 24 – 71 Sharon Weinberger, “Is This the Start of Cyberwarfare?” Nature: 474, June 9 2011 pp. 141 – 145 45 Nicholas Fallerie, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Security Dossier”, Symantec Security Response, (2011) 46 David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker, Christina Walrond, Houston Wood, Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining its Future Nuclear Options, The Institute of Science and International Security, (2012), pp. 8 – 10 47 Austin Long, William Luers, Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action against Iran, The Iran Project (2012) p. 37 43 44

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president Rohani, a moderate cleric who helped catapult 2013’s negotiations, culminating in a 6-month deal between Iran and western nations. This temporary deal can be seen as an additional indicator of the impact and accuracy of international pressure on Iran, making Iran’s leadership more cordial to western demands when offered temporary and minor easement of sanctions. Measured against years of escalation and rejection of western initiatives, the fact that even a temporary deal was signed with the U.S. on board is considered a significant achievement. The covert actions by western intelligence were well gauged since political actions were being skirted by Iran time and time again, and military intervention was not deemed a favourable option in 2008-2009. Faced with historical examples of nations acquiring nuclear weapons through sanctions or a war with severe destabilisation potential in the region and at home, turning towards covert operations presented an actionable middle ground. Western intelligence managed to impact the Iranian nuclear program with plausible deniability and limited retaliation, at home and in the region. Iran has nonetheless made progress in its nuclear program, 48 coupled with its historic deception and breaking of agreements, this would define Iran as a rogue state indicating it could eventually seek a nuclear weapon. The fact that western intelligence agencies have made each minute advancement in Iran’s nuclear program costly in terms of time, capital and lives, places their effort in a category of productive. Western intelligence actions uphold the integrity of international diplomacy, and Iran was effectively punished for its deception, breaking of agreements and pompous rhetoric. In conclusion, western intelligence efforts, both passive and active, were productive. Yet their productivity went only as far as hindering and delaying the Iranian nuclear program, since covert actions present moderate involvement they would yield moderate results. This means that if more drastic results are desired, overt policy or military actions would be needed. Still, the moderate results that were achieved by western intelligence could be capitalised on by western leaders for future operations. Political options could present solutions with friendly Iranian leadership and military options could apply for a hostile one. The novelty at this juncture is that western intelligence is now better educated and more experienced about Iran, and this paper concludes that this productive track record of intelligence agencies could be built-on effectively as well.

Gawdat Bahgat, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: An Assessment”, NESA Center for Strategic Study, (2013) pp. 67 – 76 48

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BIBLIOGRAPHY David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker, Christina Walrond, Houston Wood, Preventing Iran from Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining its Future Nuclear Options, The Institute of Science and International Security, (2012) Gawdat Bahgat, “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: An Assessment”, NESA Center for Strategic Study, (2013) pp. 67 – 76 Daniel Byman, “Iran, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008) pp. 169 – 181 Michael Eisenstadt, “The Challenges of U.S. Preventative Military Action”, in Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, ed. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, (2004) pp. 113 – 126 Nicholas Fallerie, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Security Dossier”, Symantec Security Response, (2011) Rick Gladstone, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Those Aiding Iran”, The New York Times, May 9 2013 Seymour Hersh, “Our Men in Iran?”, The New Yorker, April 6 2012 International Crisis Group, Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, (2013) Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions”, Congressional Research Service, RS 20871 (2013) Geoffrey Kemp, Patrick Clawson, Amy Jaffe, Suzanne Maloney, The Economic Consequences of a War with Iran, Panel on September 6 2011 Austin Long, William Luers, Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action against Iran, The Iran Project (2012) National Intelligence Council, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, (2007) Nuclear Threat Institute, Iran Nuclear Chronology, (May 2011) Gary Samore, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 9 – 67 Philip Sherwell, “New Long-Range Missiles for Iran Thanks to Russia”, The Telegraph, November 2 2011 S. Rob Sobhani, “The Prospects of Regime Change in Iran”, in Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, ed. Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, (2004) pp. 61 – 80 Sharon Weinberger, “Is This the Start of Cyberwarfare?” Nature: 474, June 9 2011 pp. 141 – 145

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

Russia’s use of force in Crimea H E L IN MA R IA LAU F E R 2ND YR LLB LAW

The use of force is potentially one of the most controversial areas of international law. This is mainly because Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) has been interpreted differently and conveniently by several States since it came into force.1 The recent 2014 Crimean crisis illustrates the difficulties that the law on use of force poses. In the first part of this paper, it will be analysed whether Russia breached Article 2(4). The second part of the essay will look critically at Russia’s President’s justification for the use of force. In the third part of the paper, other potential exceptions from Article 2(4) will be analysed in the context of the Crimean crisis. The final part of this paper will deliver an overall appraisal of the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the Crimean crisis and the legality of Russia’s use of force. The Crimean Crisis 2014 – a brief overview: In November 2013, the former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, abandoned trade deals with the EU in favour of a closer collaboration with Russia. Consequently, protests started all over Ukraine. As they escalated, President Yanukovych fled Ukraine after the Ukrainian Parliament unanimously disowned him. On 1 March, the Russian Parliament approved Vladimir Putin’s request to use military force in Ukraine. On 16 March, after a referendum in Crimea in which 97% of the Crimean population voted to join Russia, the Russian Federation annexed Crimea. Russia’s use of force constitutes a breach of Article 2(4): Russia breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that prohibits the threat of and the actual use of force.2 Force has effectively been used - trenches were dug along the boundary line, guns were fired in the air and Ukraine’s border has been crossed. 3 Moreover, Vladimir Putin threatened to use military force if Ukraine would not comply C Gray,“The Use of Force and The International Legal Order” in M Evans (ed), International Law (OUP 2010) The United Nations Charter, Chapter I, Art 2(4) 3 J Gahagan, “As it happened – Ukraine army on full alert”, BBC News (2 March 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-26405082> 1 2

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

with Russia’s requests. This was factually a threat prohibited under Article 2(4). Furthermore, the procedure behind the use of force also breaches international law. The UN Charter stipulates that the UNSC must authorise any use of force – the authorisation of the Russian Parliament is not enough to legitimise the use of force in Crimea.4 Vladimir Putin has also admitted that Article 2(4) has been breached, as he is constantly trying to justify the military intervention. 5 Article 2(4) has, consequently, been breached. The Russian Federation’s Justifications for breaching Art 2(4) of the UN Charter: Putin has tried to justify the use of force against Ukraine by claiming that Russia was protecting its nationals abroad.6 He argued that the Russians living in Crimea would suffer because of the new unconstitutional government in Ukraine unless Russia intervened.7 The protection of nationals falls under Article 51 of the UN Charter that allows use of force in the form of self-defence.8 As Gray explains, self-defence has two interpretations.9 The narrow interpretation entails the strict interpretation of the Article – States may only use force to defend themselves where there is an armed conflict or threat directed at the State itself. Putin, however, appealed to the wide interpretation. It suggests that the nationals in Crimea are part of the Russian State, giving it the right to exercise force in order to protect them. This is, nonetheless, an extension of Article 51 that has not been recognised as customary international law. 10 The legality of this first defence invoked by Russia is, therefore, highly questionable. Moreover, Russia’s justification raises another practical issue – how did its nationals residing in Ukraine need protection? They were not in any apparent danger and they were also not oppressed.11 In Nicaragua v USA, the Court held that self-defence must be necessary and proportionate.12 Since there is no concrete proof that self-defence was needed in Crimea, this justification does not apply.

The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Art 39 K Lally and W Englund, “The Russian Federation’s Justifications for the Use of Force”, The Washington Post (4 March 2014) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves-the-right-to-use-force-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a38911e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html> 6 Ibid 7 A Foxall and O Kessler,“Yes. There are bad Guys in the Ukrainian Government”, Foreign Policy (18 March 2014) <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/18/yes_there_are_bad_guys_in_the_ukrainian_government> 8 The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Art 51 9 Supra note 1 at 625 10 Ibid 11 Supra note 8 12 The Case Concerning The Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (ICJ), Judgment of 27 June 1986 [192] 4 5

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

Russia has in fact tried to argue pre-emptive self-defence. Vladimir Putin has explained that he intended to prevent the Russians living in Crimea from suffering distress caused by the new government.13 In Nicaragua v USA, the legality of preemptive self-defence was deliberately left open because of the difficulties surrounding it.14 On the one hand, Bush’s doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence has its merits – why should a State wait for an armed attack when this can be prevented? 15 On the other hand, this doctrine usually leads to escalations. Putin’s justification of the use of force through this doctrine has caused more social and political tension in Ukraine, as well as international unrest. Gray is thus correct in pointing out that the UN Charter should not be interpreted expansively so as to allow pre-emptive selfdefence.16 Russia can, therefore, not rely on this justification. Vladimir Putin has subsequently attempted to use another justification – consent as to the use of force. In essence, this is collective self-defence as recognised by customary international law and the Nicaragua v USA case, which suggests that there must be an inter-State conflict.17 The conflict in this case was not between States as Crimea is not a State. Putin has also claimed that the people from Crimea welcomed Russian troops. However, Crimea does not have the necessary status in international law and relations to determine the legality of an invasion by welcoming the foreign troops. Moreover, for this justification to work, there must have been an armed attack on Russia, which there was not.18 President Putin has tried to argue that there was an invitation from President Yanukovych to assist him in regaining control of the government. Putin presented the UNSC with a letter in which Yanukovych consented to the use of force in Crimea.19 There is a debate about the facts at this point – is Yanukovych still the Ukrainian President? Russia argues that he is because the new Ukrainian Government is an unconstitutional one.20 Yanukovych was disowned and fled the country, but he was not impeached. Therefore, he technically still is the President of Ukraine. However, it is submitted that his flight from Ukraine symbolises his de facto resignation. He, therefore, no longer holds the Presidency of the Country. This view is supported by the Western countries.21 Moreover, Oleksandr Turchynov was elected legitimately as the new interim President.22 These facts and the unknown Ibid Supra note 12 15 Supra note 1 at 631 16 Ibid 17 Supra note 12 18 Supra note 1 at 626 19 “Ukraine’s Yanukovych asked for troops, Russia tells UN”, BBC News (4 March 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26427848> 20 “Putin: Use of force is last resort in Ukraine”, Aljazeera News (4 March 2014) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/putin-ukraine-events-unconstitutional-coup-201434105511394582.html> 21 “As it happened: Ukraine Crisis”, BBC News (2 April 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26380336> 22 D Stern,“Ukraine Parliament Names Speaker Turchynov Interim President”, BBC News (23 February 2014) 13 14

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date of Yanukovych’s letter lead to the conclusion that this document is not enough to constitute a legitimate invitation to interfere in Crimea. Other possible justifications for the use of force in Crimea: As the protection of nationals and Yanukovych’s invitation have failed to justify Russia’s use of force in Crimea, this paper shall analyse two other possible defences for Russia. The Russian Federation could have potentially argued that it was protecting the interests of the Crimean population who was seeking selfdetermination. According to the General Assembly’s Resolution 3314, use of force can be justified by an action of self-determination when the people are struggling.23 However, although the meaning of struggle is very broad, it is not as broad as to cover the peaceful relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian residents in Crimea prior to Russia’s use of force. Moreover, according to re Secession of Quebec, the people seeking self-determination have to be oppressed.24 This was not the case in Crimea. Although Russia has not tried to justify its use of force through selfdetermination, it has used this as a justification for the referendum from 16 March 2014. Crawford and Boyle explain that a referendum is never enough to be regarded as statehood criteria. It would be an unstable custom to have – 51% of the people cannot determine the statehood of a territory. 25 The referendum also breaches the Ukrainian Constitution that stipulates that the entire State of Ukraine must vote in a referendum, not merely the region in question.26 It is, therefore, submitted that the result of this referendum shall not be accepted as a justification for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Similarly, this same analysis also applies to the referendum held in Eastern Ukraine. Such referenda should thus not be allowed to exceed their intended purpose by materially affecting statehood in International Law. Another justification for the use of force could be the Responsibility to Protect. 27 This doctrine, however, only applies to the protection of a State’s own nationals. Russia was not entitled to intervene if the rights of Crimean people were not respected by the Ukrainian government. When the State fails to provide protection, in this case, Ukraine, it is only the UN Peacekeeping Troops that may intervene. 28 Responsibility to protect, therefore, also fails to justify Russia’s actions.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20140223115150/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26312008> 23 UNGA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (Definition of Aggression), Art 7 24 Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 25 J Crawford and A Boyle, “Referendum on the Independence of Scotland – International Law Aspects” in Report: Scotland analysis: devolution and the implications of Scottish independence (10 December 2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79408/Annex_A.pdf> 26 Ukrainian Constitution 27 S Zifcak, “The Responsibility to Protect” in M Evans (ed), International Law (OUP 2010) 28 Ibid

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The Crimean Crisis – An Overall Appraisal: The UNSC has the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and international security.29 The UNSC must authorise any use of force. However, the Russian Federation did not wait for its authorisation in the present situation. Moreover, the UNSC was unable to pass a resolution condemning the referendum from 16 March 2014 because Russia, as a P5 Member, vetoed it.30 Because of Russia’s P5 status, it is unlikely that the UNSC will be able to exercise its power under the Charter to sanction Russia for its breach of international law. 31 This shows that the role of the UNSC is rather limited and that the Council itself is weak in practical situations. There is, therefore, little hope that it will be the Council that will solve these tensions. The resolution of the Crimean Crisis is thus dependent on negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the International Community. Besides the UN Charter, Russia has also breached a Friendship Treaty between itself and Ukraine.32 This Treaty stipulates that the territorial integrity of both States shall not be violated. Through the invasion of Crimea, Russia is in breach of this treaty’s provisions. Moreover, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has also been breached. 33 The Kiev protests, the legitimacy of its government and the protection of its residents are exclusively Ukraine’s responsibility. Wright explains that “since international law recognises the right of revolution, it cannot permit other states to intervene to prevent it.”34 This reaffirms that Putin had no authority to interfere in Ukraine’s revolution and domestic matters.35 Russia has also breached the Friendly Relations Declaration that condemns the instigation and assistance of civil conflicts. 36 Through crossing the Ukrainian border, Russian troops have encouraged riots and further protests in Crimea. The Russian Federation has thus breached Ukraine’s Constitution, the Friendship Treaty between Russia and Ukraine, several UNGA Resolutions and multiple key provisions of the UN Charter. Conclusion: In Nicaragua v USA, it was held that, where a State tries to justify its actions repeatedly without success, this is a clear indicator of the illegality of its use of

The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 24 “Security Council Fails to Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognise Planned 16 March Referendum in Ukraine’s Crimea Region”, UN News (15 March 2014) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2014/sc11319.doc.htm> 31 The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42 32 Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine 1997 33 The United Nations Charter, Chapter I, Article 2(7) 34 Q Wright, “Subversive Intervention” [1960] 54 AJIL 529 35 M Shaw, “International Law” (6th edn, CUP 2008) 1149 36 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), Art 1 29 30

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force.37 From Russia’s multiple failed justifications, it is safe to draw the conclusion that the law on use of force has been violated. Unfortunately, the UNSC’s powers are limited, which affects its practical efficiency. The tensions in Crimea can currently only be solved peacefully through negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The powers of the UNSC may also have to be reviewed in order to render the Council more efficient.38 The illegal use of force in Crimea increases the fears against a potential Russian forceful intervention in Eastern Ukraine, despite President’s Putin assurances to the contrary.39 Furthermore, smaller States in Russia’s vicinity fear tensions and annexation.40 The whole International Community is awaiting for Russia to be held accountable for its illegal actions. The grave breaches of International Law that Russia has committed make it clear that present state of affairs must be remedied and that the Russian Federation must continue to be sanctioned. Otherwise, this creates a dangerous precedent in international law, allowing other States and Russia itself to breach International Law in similar ways in future.

Supra note 12 Supra note 1 at 644 39 “Pro-Russian separatist go ahead with Eastern Ukraine Referendum”, Fox News (8 May 2014) < http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/08/pro-russian-separatists-to-go-ahead-with-eastern-ukraine-referendum/> 40 D McGuinness, “Crimea crisis sharpens Latvia ethnic tensions”, BBC News (6 March 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26720549> 37 38

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

The Difficulties of Humanitarian Intervention: A Case Study of Syria TO B IA S U D SH O LT & DA N IE L A H ME D 1ST YR BSC POLITICAL ECONOMY

The current humanitarian crisis in Syria epitomizes the difficulties of establishing consensus on the necessary circumstances for humanitarian intervention. This article will explore the challenges faced to the international community in abetting humanitarian crises on a global scale through the case study of the current crisis in Syria. This article employs the Responsibility to Protect report (henceforth RtoP) as a framework for the discussion on the necessary circumstances justifying the violation of sovereign territory on humanitarian grounds. While comparisons can be made to interventions in Kosovo or Libya, the specific social, political and military circumstances of each crisis illustrate the difficulty in implementing RtoP consistently and successfully. Operating within the Westphalian model of international relations, the notion of humanitarian intervention is inherently contentious in the challenge that it presents to the territorial sovereignty of a state. Nevertheless, international consensus exists on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a policy tool under certain conditions of grave violations of human rights. The responsibility of the international community to protect civilians from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ when national authorities manifestly fail to do so, was established at the United Nations 2005 World Summit. It falls within the authority of the Security Council to take measures to “maintain or restore international peace and security”. The civil war in Syria has been raging since mid-2011 with reported civilian casualties of between 100,000-150,000. The humanitarian crisis has resulted in the displacement of millions and a mass refuge spill over to neighbouring countries. Military intervention on humanitarian grounds has been on the agenda on a number of occasions since the beginning of the conflict. This was seemingly brought to the fore after a widely reported chemical weapons attack in mid-2013. The use of chemical

King’s College London Student Journal of International Affairs and Human Rights

weapons constitutes a war crime under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and hence grants the Security Council authority to sanction an intervention on humanitarian grounds. It was therefore highly significant when UN weapon inspectors concluded that “overwhelming and indisputable” evidence exists of the use of the nerve gas in Syria on the 21st of August, 2013. However, an intervention has not been forthcoming for a number of reasons. While it has been firmly established that grave violations of human rights have taken place, including the use of chemical weapons, there is both serious doubt over the reasonable prospect of success of any UN mission, as well as Russian national interest at stake in sustaining the rule of Bashar al-Assad (Stahn, 2013). This illustrates a central disparity between nations affirming their obligation to protect civilians from grave violations of human rights in principle, and acting upon this in practice. Davis adopts an institutionalist approach in the critique that the “international regime […] often appears inadequate to the task of coping with these events” (2004, p.4). A system endowing the five permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers facilitates the prioritisation of geostrategic considerations over concern for human rights. This has obstructed the development of consistent practice on humanitarian intervention, as only a UN mandated humanitarian intervention is legal under international law. In this respect, it is significant to consider the impact of the UN sanctioned NATO intervention in Libya. While seemingly setting a precedent for humanitarian intervention to prevent and end the “gross and systematic violation of human rights”, commentators have argued that NATO’s active participation in the deposition of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime eroded the confidence in NATO’s willingness to operate within the parameters of a UN mandate. In Libya the Security Council adopted UN Resolution 1973, authorising the imposition of a no-fly zone to protect civilians, including in Benghazi where the advance of the Libyan army was adjudged to constitute a grave threat to the human rights of civilians. After halting the advance of the Libyan army, NATO continued conducting strategic bombings on military and civilian targets until withdrawing on 31st of October 2011, immediately after the death of Colonel Gaddafi. This led Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister to comment that “certain actions by NATO in Libya do not correspond to its mandate”. Thus, the lack of agreement on the appropriate means of intervening in a humanitarian crisis presents a challenge to the overall aim of protecting human rights through multi-lateral military intervention. Indeed, Samuel Charap has commented that Russia will block Security Council motions “if it suspects the stated or unstated motive is removal of a sitting government”. In light of the difficulties in establishing Security Council approval for a multilateral intervention, it is important to consider whether it is morally justifiable to act only where geo-political interests permit or

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facilitate action, rather than exclusively from a position of human rights violations reaching a certain quantitative and qualitative level. In todays globalised world there are globalized moral obligations which overlap with the basic notion of common humanity and human rights; the notion of just war theory – that nations have a universal duty to offer charity against murderous states (Baylis et al., 2011). It has further been argued that sovereignty rights are lost by states if they do not successfully protect their citizens, which in turn calls for a responsibility to protect by the international community (Teson, 2003). However, moral arguments for intervention risk legitimising the military occupation of sovereign territory on non-humanitarian interests and set a dangerous precedent for the circumstances under which inter-state military action can be employed unilaterally. The crisis in eastern Ukraine is a case in point of this. Furthermore, the precedent of intervention without appropriate authorisation could lead to increasing popular animosity towards troops deployed on humanitarian grounds thus delegitimising humanitarian intervention as a feasible policy tool for the UN Security Council. The cumulative effects then, may serve to destabilise “international peace and security”, thereby undermining the central argument justifying UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention. Striking a balance between acting when circumstances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity arise and acting under the correct mandate represents perhaps the greatest challenge faced by policy makers. The difficulty of identifying certain circumstances under which humanitarian intervention is justified in practice is complicated by the “methodologically arduous and operationally problematic” process, of making “political, temporal, military, strategic, and geographic translations from one situation to another” (Weiss, 2001, p.420). This is particularly relevant in considering the cursory similarities between the types of conflict in Libya and Syria and the potential military intervention required to achieve regime change. On this point Mehdi Hasan is worth quoting in full: “Syria isn't Libya. The latter is a nation of six and a half million people, while the former consists of more than 20 million. Unlike Libya, Syria's densely populated cities and towns are a mix of ethnic and religious communities; the country cannot be spliced into pro-rebel east and pro-dictator west. Dropping bombs from 5,000 feet would guarantee civilian casualties and rally some anti-Assad Syrians behind the regime.” In this regard the RtoP framework seeks to harmonise humanitarian interventions and limit any risks of military occupations with its ‘precautionary principles’ – acting under the ‘right intention’, as a ‘last resort’, with ‘proportional means’ and with ‘reasonable prospects of success’. Crucially this requires a judgement that the short and long-term damage caused by intervention does not outweigh the harm it is designed to remedy. While amicable in theory, this presents considerable practical

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difficulties in achieving international consensus on the fulfilment of each of the principles. In particular there is serious doubt over the ‘reasonable prospect of success’ of any intervention given the complex and fractured composition of the opposition forces should the Assad regime be deposed. This article has sought to highlight the challenges faced by policy makers in establishing consistent practice on humanitarian intervention. It is has been argued that there exists no contradiction between arguing for the responsibility to protect civilians from grave violations of human rights in principle, to recognising the necessity of possessing the practical means to improve, and not worsen a humanitarian crisis. Therefore, in spite of the problematic implications of letting international realpolitik dictate the circumstances under which humanitarian intervention can be conducted, the significant long-term consequences of advocating Western unilateral intervention in any sovereign territory must be considered. There exists no easy solution to the Syrian crisis, yet the temptation to let morality be the only factor in dictating the course of action must be resisted, for the sake of the Syrian population and for the future of humanitarian intervention as a long-term policy tool available to the UN. The diplomatic process of exerting pressure on the Syrian Regime through international isolation and sanctions may appear unattractive or insufficient yet it constitutes the most viable policy tool currently available to the international community. Bibliography Anon., 2012. Intervention in Syria won’t work, so how do we stop Assad?. New Statesman, 9 February. Baylis, J., Smith, S. & Owens, P., 2011. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. 5th ed. Oxford University Press. Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (5th Edition ed.). Oxford University Press. Bellamy, A. J. (2009). Responsiblity to Protect. Cambridge: Polity Press. Benjamin, B. M. (1992). Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities. Fordham International Law Journal , 16 (1). Byers, M., & Chesterman, S. (2003). Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law. In J. L. Holzgrefe, & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (pp. 177-204). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Charap, S. (2013). Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy , 55 (1), 35-41. Economist, T. (1999a). Law and Right: When they don’t fit together. Retrieved 03 24, 2014, from http://www.economist.com/node/195247

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Economist, T. (2001). War and its victims: The first casualty. Retrieved 03 22, 2014, from http://www.economist.com/node/748512 Forsythe, D. P. (2000). US foreign policy and human rights: The price of principles after the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press. G-77. (2000). Group of 77 South Summit. Retrieved 03 24, 2014, from http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm Holzgrefe, J. L., & Keohane, R. O. (2003). Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas . Cambridge University Press. McLean, I., & McMillan, A. (2009). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (3rd Edition ed.). OUP Oxford. Power, S. (2001, September 2001). Bystanders to Genocide. Retrieved 03 21, 2014, from The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/?single_page=true Solana, J. (1998). "Securing Peace in Europe". Retrieved 03 22, 2014, from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm Stahn, C. (2013). Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment. Journal of International Criminal Justice , 11 (5), 955-977. Teson, F. R. (2003). The liberal case for humanitarian intervention. In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (pp. 93-129). Cambridge University Press. UN. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved 03 19, 2014, from https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml Davis, M. C., 2004. International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics. Armonk: M.E. Sharp. Stahn, C., 2013. Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment. Journal of International Criminal Justice, November, 11(5), pp. 955-977. Teson, F.R., 2003. The liberal case for humanitarian intervention. In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press. pp.93-129. Weiss, T. G., 2001. Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons. Journal of Peace Research, 38(4), pp. 419428.

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The issue of reprisals against individuals seeking to engage with the UN and regional human rights mechanisms C A M IL L E MA R QUI S MA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

What are reprisals? Reprisals against individuals engaging or attempting to engage with the UN and regional human rights mechanisms are a crucial issue in the human rights field. Human rights activists and defenders are decisive actors when the UN addresses human rights situations in various States. Some of these States, or even some non-State actors, do not appreciate that their violations of human rights are brought to light by these individuals and groups at the regional and international levels, and as a result perpetrate acts of intimidation and reprisals against them, be it verbal threats, arbitrary judicial prosecutions, or even physical attacks and murders. This article focuses on 'reprisals suffered as a consequence of an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cooperation or attempted cooperation with the UN or a regional human rights body', as defined by the International Service for Human Rights in its Reprisals Handbook.1 The United Nations and the Human Rights Council also understand reprisals as 'intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups who cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.'2 Human rights defenders have the right to collaborate with the UN and regional human rights mechanisms, as set out in articles 5(c) and 9.4 of the 1998 UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.3 Since the Declaration was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, thereby representing a very strong commitment by States to its implementation, a number of high-level discussions were held, and three resolutions ISHR, Reprisals Handbook (2013) Human Rights Council, A/HRC/22/34 (17 December 2012) 3 General Assembly, A/RES/53/144 (8 March 1999) 1 2

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were passed at the Human Rights Council specifically on this issue – resolutions 12/2, 22/6 and 24/24.4 However, many acts of reprisals are still regularly reported. Recently, a case of reprisals against Chinese human rights defender Cao Shunli, which led to her death, has been reported to the Human Rights Council. Cao Shunli, Chinese Human Rights Defender who died for her engagement with the UN human rights mechanisms On 14 September 2013, Ms Cao Shunli, a Chinese human rights activist, was prevented from boarding a flight to Geneva, where she was planning to attend a human rights training course. She was subsequently detained by the Chinese authorities. 5 Before being formally charged in October with 'illegal assembly' and with 'picking quarrels and provoking trouble', her whereabouts remained unknown, and she was reported as having 'disappeared'.6 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a press release on 16 October 2013, in which UN experts expressed their concern about reprisals against activists linked to China's international human rights review. Cao Shunli was indeed very engaged in demanding greater civil society participation in China's Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which took place in October 2013, and had already been arrested for her human rights activities. The experts stated that this case 'seems part of a pattern of increased harassment by China of those calling for greater accountability of public officials, transparency and political and legal reforms'. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders Margaret Sekaggya explicitly emphasised that 'these reports suggest there have been acts of reprisals against people who seek to cooperate with the UN'.7 While in detention, her health deteriorated dramatically, and it was reported that she has been denied access to proper medical care in prison. She was transferred to the hospital in a critical condition on 19 February 2014, and died on 14 March 2014. 'The death of Cao Shunli is a tragic example of the results of criminalisation of the activities of human rights defenders in China and reprisals against them. It is unacceptable that civil society activists pay the ultimate price for peaceful and legitimate interaction with the UN and its human rights mechanisms', a group of UN experts said.8 Human Rights Watch suggested that 'everything about the circumstances of her case – the harassment she faced, her arbitrary detention, the ludicrous and legally baseless charges against her, the reluctance or refusal to swiftly grant access to adequate http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/declaration.htm BBC News (25 September 2013) 6 Human Rights Watch (14 March 2014) 7 OHCHR Press Release (16 October 2013) 8 OHCHR Press Release (18 March 2013) 4 5

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medical care â&#x20AC;&#x201C; suggests it is unlikely the Chinese government will voluntarily agree to an independent, credible investigation into her death.'9 The Chinese delegation at the UN in Geneva even interrupted the moment of silence called for by NGOs at the Human Rights Council on 20 March 2014, 'to remember Cao Shunli and other human rights defenders who have died or been killed as a consequence of their advocacy at the UN.'10 The case of Cao Shunli is unfortunately only one of the many cases of reprisals, threats and intimidations faced by many human rights defenders across the globe. The lack of willingness of some States to comply with their international human rights engagements hinders the effective work of the UN and regional human rights systems. These acts of reprisals perpetrated by the Chinese authorities set dangerous precedents for all the other civil society actors seeking to engage with the UN human rights system. Sophie Richardson, China Director at Human Rights Watch, asserted that 'China's actions are eroding the integrity of the UN's top human rights review process'.11 Why is it an overarching issue for the international and regional human rights systems? 'When people who cooperate with the United Nations are targeted for reprisals, we are all less secure. When their voices are stifled, our work for human rights is also a victim'. (UN Secretary-General, 2011 remarks to high-level panel discussion on 'stopping reprisals for cooperating with the UN in the field of human rights â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a priority for all'. ) Human rights defenders play a crucial role in bringing human rights violations to light at the international level. They provide the international community with independent information, for the UN human rights mechanisms to work on, be it the Human Rights Council, the UPR, Special Procedures or Treaty Bodies. Human Rights bodies could not fulfil their mandate of protecting and promoting human rights if NGOs and defenders did not engage with the system and did not submit testimonies and documentation on human rights situations in various countries. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders Margaret Sekaggya stated that 'defenders play a key role in holding States to account for the implementation of their human rights obligations, including at the international level. Their legitimate work should be fully respected'.12 Human Rights Watch (14 March 2014) ISHR (20 March 2014) 11 BBC News (25 September 2013) 12 OHCHR Press Release (16 October 2013) 9

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Sources BBC News (25 September 2013), 'China activist Cao Shunli 'disappears', says rights group': http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24238678 General Assembly, A/RES/53/144 (8 March 1999), Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or “The Declaration on human rights defenders”: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/Declaration/declaration.pdf Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/22/34 (17 December 2012), Summary of the Human Rights Council panel discussion on the issue of intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups who cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/AHRC2234_English.pdf Human Rights Watch, Sophie Richardson (14 March 2014), 'Dispatches: The Death of a Defender in China': http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/14/dispatches-death-defender-china International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), Reprisals Handbook (2013): http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/ishr_reprisals_handbook_web.pdf International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), 'China interrupts moment of silence for Cao Shunli at the UN Human Rights Council' (20 March 2014): http://www.ishr.ch/news/china-interrupts-moment-silence-cao-shunli-un-humanrights-council OHCHR Press Release (18 March 2013), 'Deadly reprisals: UN experts deplore the events leading to the death of Chinese human rights defender Cao Shunli, and ask for full investigation': http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14394&LangID=E OHCHR Press Release (16 October 2013), 'UN experts alarmed by reprisals against activists linked to China’s international human rights review': http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13860&LangID=E

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The tragedy of the European Union? KSENIA KIRKHAM MA INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY Exciting discussions are often not those which answer your questions but those which leave you with more questions than you initially had. I had this feeling after attending an event at the Houses of Parliament, organised by Open Europe, devoted to George Soros’s new book, ‘The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival’. Soros presented his book and a panel discussion followed. The panel comprised of Conservative MP Andrea Leadsom, Open Europe Chairman Lord Leach, vice-chairman of investment bank Nomura Andrew Cahn, former leader of the Liberal Democrats (1988-1999) Lord Ashdown, former chairman of the Financial Services Authority (2008-2013) Lord Turner, and Financial Times economics leader writer Martin Sandbu. The tragedy of Europe, according to Soros, stems from “too much respect for the rule of law” (Soros 2014:74). He argues that although we should continue to obey the law, we must not be held hostage to it, as laws are fallible, “like all human constructs” (Ibid). As David Cameron pointed out, European law should adjust to the changing environment, become more flexible, and not be “weighed down by an insistence on a one-size-fits-all approach which implies that all countries want the same level of integration” (Cameron 2013). The Maastricht treaty of 1992, which is based on a “false economic theory, championed mainly by the Bundesbank”, serves as an example of such fallibility (Soros 2014:35). The neoliberal world in which Europe lived in the 1990s is different from the period after the crisis of 2008: for the time being the world has become more “real”, or in Soros’s terms, less reflexive (Soros 2008). He suggests, that before the financial crisis of 2008 the real world had been “reflexively” changed by “intellectual misconceptions”: reflexivity first worked to strengthen the economy of the Eurozone by investors anticipation of uninterrupted prosperity; then after 2009 this process went into reverse, “as it usually does” (Soros 2014:71) . The problems which exist in the EU today are the hangover from two decades of booming markets driven by false expectations of perpetual sustainability. Soros is certain about the causes of the Eurozone crisis, but the future of the Euro and Britain’s membership of the EU are unknown. Three main issues were covered during the discussion: European security, further political integration within the Eurozone,

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and common European identity. The question of Britain’s future in the EU is relevant both to geopolitics and its own political economy. Geopolitically Britain has strong incentives to remain within the EU for security reasons, especially in the aftermath of the crisis in Ukraine. Soros always remembers his father’s survival instincts; a Hungarian Jew who lived through both fascist and communist regimes, he always kept a packed suitcase in the attic, ready to flee at a moment’s notice. Europe lives in peace today, but we must not take for granted how this has happened. From the political economic perspective, Britain’s departure from the EU would be a “big blow”, because at present, “Britain has the best of all possible worlds. It is part of the common market, but not part of the Euro” (Soros 2014:103). I agree, that the result of the “in-out” referendum of 2017 is unpredictable, because “very active” anti-European forces are reinforcing eurosceptic attitudes (Ibid.) However Soros thinks exit from the EU is in reality unlikely, rather the proposed referendum is a means of blackmail, with the goal of changing the existing treaties in Britain’s favour. Andrea Leadsom recalled the Government’s argument that to make the EU more competitive, European legislation should undergo a “fresh start”, creating a flexible legal mechanism, which can “undo and reverse” outdated laws. Member states should be able to determine their applicability, as in the case of Britain’s proposed opt-out from EU migration policies. As Lord Ashdown noted, Europe, as the birthplace of many important political ideas, including democracy itself, has the intellectual capacity to succeed with reforms. The problem of democratic deficit, a “contradiction at the heart of Europe”, could possibly be resolved by further political integration, as “you cannot create an economic giant on the back of a political pygmy” (Ashdown 2014). Soros believes that one cause of disintegration is deeper than the economic interests of member states. It is the lack of a strong common European identity. Andrea Leadsom believes that the formation of the common European identity is not possible, as Britain will always stay within its own identity. Her point of view was strongly disagreed with by others: Sir Andrew Cahn believes that British do feel they are European, Lord Ashdown suggests that we live in a world where identities have been globalised, and the modern form of identity is to be comfortable with multiple identities. Here, I believe lies the main contradiction in Soros’ analysis. On the one hand, he suggests that the divorce of Britain from the EU is very unlikely to happen, yet on the other, he predicts that without a common European identity and further political integration the future of the EU is doomed. At the same time, what is clear from David Cameron’s referendum speech is that national identity remains much stronger than any vague notion of European identity, and Britain will not concede further sovereignty and might never be ready to join the Euro. So where do we end

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up? Britain stays in the European Union which is in imminent danger of disintegration in times of severe economic and political internal and external challenges. The major EU economic problems Soros associated with the introduction of the Euro. He believes that the future of the Eurozone is highly dependent on Germany: it should either accept its dominant position and inherent responsibilities, or leave the monetary union and “allow the rest of Europe to take possession of the Euro”, with debtor countries regaining their competitiveness through devaluation (Soros 2014:21). For Soros, the Eurozone can only be preserved by further political integration, with a common budget and fiscal policy. Germany, however, is not ready for any concessions. Chancellor Angela Merkel strongly opposes the idea of “taking EU integration a step further by converting the debt of individual countries into Eurobonds”, the step which, according to Soros, could help to solve the Eurozone’s problems. The future success of the EU requires a greater level of integration. Soros believes that EU federalisation could eventually work, and Britain’s participation is essential. The reality, however, proves to be far from ideal. According to Soros, the EU is approaching another crisis. It will be a political crisis, with political elites failing to realise the vitality of Karl Popper’s “Open Society” capacity of reform. If we want to “make Europe work”, we should start with the formation of the European identity, as for Soros, human uncertainty derives from uncertainty of identity. If the process of disintegration is not stopped, Europe could return to its state before the EU was formed: doubt and fear. From the realist geopolitical perspective, it is undoubtedly so. However, I think it is very unlikely that Britain would ever agree to be part of European federalisation. I suggest that a better understanding of possible EU disintegration could be reached by placing the forthcoming referendum in the UK in the historical context of social relations in which human identities are constructed. The renegotiation of Britain’s membership of the EU signifies the degeneration of the neoliberal hegemonic block centred in the US, a process which devolved along with the global financial crisis of 2008. The latent conflict which has long existed between different types of capitalist social models, built on strong national identities, came to the fore and continues to impede further integration. That makes me conclude that the formation of a common European identity is not a feasible mission, and the risk of a fundamental political crisis in the European Union, whether Britain stays or leaves, remains very high.

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References: Cameron, D., (2013), The speech on the EU referendum, Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum Soros, G. (2008), The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means, New York:Public Affairs Soros, G. (2014), The Tragedy of the European Union: Disintegration or Revival? George Soros with Gregor Peter Schmitz, New York:Public Affairs Leadsom A., Ashdown P.,(2014) A discussion with George Soros, held by Open Europe,12th March, House of Commons, London

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“Universality and Regional Enforcement”: A Human Rights Paradox? N I LS G R AVE N H O R ST MA IN WAR STUDIES

The conviction in the universal respect for human rights was above all carried forward with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 later affirmed by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993. Yet they are accompanied by regional mechanisms, such as the European Declaration of Human Rights (1950), the American Declaration of Human Rights (1978) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986). After looking at the theoretical challenges to the universality of Human Rights, this essay will argue that regional treaties bridge the gap between the Universal Declaration and local enforcement. This system incentivizes governments to promote human rights, as violations can lead to conflicts and destabilize neighbouring countries. Similar regional cultural traditions and political histories make it easier to reach a consensus on rights and endow a regional court with meaningful powers (Shelton 2008). The essay will conclude that while taking into account cultural sensibilities, the universality of Human Rights is not jeopardised by regional enforcement. Underlying the conflict between moral universalism and cultural relativism is the same issue of moral ontology raised by the question of minority rights. The standard liberal argument for human rights is based upon both individualism and universalism, while the argument for cultural relativism typically assigns moral status to some collective entity such as "culture" or "community." The question then raised is whether the doctrine of human rights is "Western," not only as a matter of contingent historical fact, but also in the doctrine's individualistic, ontological implications. Theories like Donnelly1 (1989) or Dworkin2 (1977) that see Human Rights contingent on a moral view of human beings or as constructed by human habits are difficult to 1 Donnelly,

J. (1989). Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

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square with universality (Freeman3 1994), because human rights are reduced from universal values to either arbitrary products of power or particular cultural developments. A possible answer is that achieving universal acceptance of international human rights norms is a process, and different norms occupy different places on the continuum 4. Change and acceptance of these norms must ultimately come from within the region and cannot be imposed by outside forces, though as Donelly5 notes, there is in fact wide agreement as to these norms. Moral distinctions between insiders and outsiders have been eroded with increased mobility and aspirational commitment to the idea of a universal human moral community. Regional treaties provide compliance mechanisms and bridge the gap between the treaties and enforcement (Shelton6 2008). This is apparent from the Opuz v Turkey case7 (2009), in which the European Court relied in part on Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of discrimination against Women to support its conclusion that Turkey's inaction was conducive to domestic violance. This case demonstrates how a regional court can serve as a bridge between international law and national governments. Regional enforcement mechanisms leave particular sensitive issues to regional resolution. For instance, in addition to individual rights, the African Charter gives special protection to the family and recognizes certain collective (peoples‘) rights, including the right to equality, the right to development, and the right to peace and security. In addition to rights, it expressly recognizes duties, including duties to one‘s family, the duty to protect state security, and the duty to promote African unity. There are concerns about conformity as the latters have to be balanced with the individual's interests (Article 27). In some cases, regional laws do not fully comply with international human rights law. The Council of the League of Arab States' Declaration, for example, does not primarily in respect to the death penalty, women's rights, and the freedoms of expression and religion. Franck’s argument8 (2001) could be seen as an explanation here. He argues that human rights are not grounded in a regional culture but in modern transcultural developments. Although these recent developments occurred first in the West, they 2 Dworkin,

R. (1978). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press. Freeman, M. (1994). Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, The. Hum. Rts. Q., 16, 491. 4 Cerna, C. M. (1994). Universality of human rights and cultural diversity: implementation of human rights in different sociocultural contexts. Hum. Rts. Q., 16, 740. 5 Ibid at 1 6 Shelton, D. (2008). Regional Protection of Human Rights. GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-55 7 Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 8 Franck, T. M. (2001). Are human rights universal. Foreign Aff., 80, 191. 3

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were caused not by some inherent cultural factor but by changes occurring, at different rates, everywhere: universal education, industrialization, urbanization, the rise of a middle class, advances in transportation and communications, and the spread of new information technology. Sensibilities are also accounted for within regional treaties. This is evident from the concept of the margin of appreciation as the court notes in Handyside v UK 9 (1976). It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various contracting States, a uniform European conception of morals. The doctrine has been purported 'as a means of introducing flexibility in universal human rights standards in response to non-Western particularist human rights discourse' (Brems10 2001). In Johnston v Ireland11, petitioners challenged the prohibtion on divorce set forth in the Irish Constitution. Pressured by Irish public opinion on the issue, the constitutional status of the prohibition on divorce, and the importance of Catholicism in Ireland, the court issued a judgment denying the right claimed. This shows that disagreement on the scope of rights may exist at a regional, but also at a sub-regional level. It is important to note that the consensus determines the scope of the right, but not its existence. In conclusion, regional systems particularly those established in Europe and the Americas, have provided the necessary intermediary between state domestic institutions which violate or fail to enforce human rights and the global human rights system, which alone cannot provide redress to all individual victims of human rights violations (Mugwanya12 1999). Universality of Human rights is a difficult concept. The doubts as to the theoretical foundations are important, but alleviated by actually wide shared concensus in regard of the core of the rights.

Handyside v The United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 Brems, E. (2001). Human rights: Universality and diversity (Vol. 66). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 11 Johnston and others v. Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203 12 Mugwanya, G. W. (1999). Realizing universal human rights norms through regional human rights mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African system. Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 10, 35. 9

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What would the consequences be if judicial torture warrants were issued to combat terrorism in liberal democracies? R E B EC C A MAC D O N A LD MA IN TERRORISM, SECURITY AND SOCIETY

Torture is currently contrary to every human rights law; 1 however, Dersowitz has argued that judicial torture warrants should be issued so that accountable, non-lethal torture could be used in order to prevent a terrorist attack. 2 Using the social identity theory, namely social identity complexity, the uncertainty reduction theory and the group dynamics theory, it is argued that if torture warrants were made legal, there would be an increased likelihood that liberal democracies would experience greater inter-group hostility. Furthermore, it will be developed that this would prompt an increase in terrorist activity and a decrease in the amount of intelligence voluntarily given by the minority community which would be needed to prevent further terrorist attacks from occurring. Building on Sednak’s concept of the deep practice of human dignity the essay will conclude that a deep consequentialist approach is needed when considering the impact of torture on a liberal democracy. Throughout this paper, the terms ‘torture’ and ‘terrorism’, which lack a stable definition3 and are widely contested,4 will be used. To clarify, throughout this essay, these terms will be defined in the following way. The meaning of torture is taken from the Torture Convention and can be summarised as ‘any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person. 5’ Terrorism is defined as 'acts (or intended acts) of political communicative violence, mainly targeting civilians, with the aim of spreading fear and paralysing those governments and populations who are perceived as the enemy.6’

Shue in Levinson (2004) p.47 Dershowitz (2002) 3 Posner in Levinson (2004) p.291 4 Neumann and Rogers (2007) p.10 5 UN General Assembly (1984) 6 Nesser (2010) p.110 1 2

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Using the ticking time bomb scenario, Waltzer argues that, according to utilitarianism, it is morally right for a politician to authorise the torture of a terrorist in order to save the lives of all those who would die in a bomb blast. 7 However, it is argued that this argument fails to take into account the communitarian perspective which claims that people consider themselves, not simply as individuals, but as part of a community.8 According to social identity complexity, individuals understand their identity as being part of two or more in-groups, such as a citizen of a State and as a member of a particular ethnicity or religion.9 However, uncertainty reduction theory argues that when people feel uncertain they tend to identify more strongly with ethnic and religious in-groups.10 An example of this appears in a feature published on the website of Cage, an independent advocacy organisation that describes its purpose as ‘working to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror.’11 In the article the author argued that, due to the treatment of detainees in Guantanamo Bay, the ‘horizon of the Muslim people is already beginning to show all the tell-tale signs of a SalemMcCarthyesque witch hunt.’ (emphasis added) Therefore, rather than the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay being seen as isolated cases against a few individuals who represented a threat to US security, the treatment of prisoners was instead framed as a threat to an entire religious community. The feelings of uncertainty this creates may increase the perception within a minority community that they are being treated in a manner that is discriminatory and lacks fairness. Ultimately this can then lead to that community becoming alienated from the State. This alienation could be a concern for liberal democracies because, as group dynamics theory argues, an out-group threat, such as torture, reliably leads to in-group cohesion.12 While in-group cohesion is itself not a concern, the anticipated out-group hostility, resulting from a perceived threat, has been ‘repeatedly linked to preemptive anger and increased intergroup bias.’13 For example, once it became known that the British were using the Five Techniques in Northern Ireland there was a flood of new recruits to the Provisional IRA and an immediate upsurge in violence. 14 Therefore, not only could the intergroup bias result in a security threat, it could also lead to a break down in social harmony, increasing the potential for inter-community tensions to exacerbate. Waltzer (2000) loc 3454 Bell (2013) 9 Roccas and Brewer (2002) 10 Hogg and Terry (2000) 11 ‘About Us’ http://www.cageuk.org/about [accessed 14/04/2014] 12 McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) 13 Louis and Taylor (2002) 14 Cobain (2012) loc.2810 7 8

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In addition, whilst the vast majority of Muslims are opposed to suicide terrorism 15 social identity theory states that individuals strive for a positive self-concept.16 Therefore in order to overcome the cognitive dissonance that terrorism creates, the increased in-group cohesion causes an idealisation of in-group values which can lead to an extremity shift among like-minded individuals.17 This suggests that if torture is understood to have taken place against those who are part of the individual’s ingroup, then minorities may feel discouraged from interacting with others society and this ‘disengagement from the State would include not passing on information to the police, and not assisting with their enquires.’ 18 As Slater argues, the key to winning the war against terrorism is accurate intelligence and for information to be passed on it is essential for the State to maintain good relationships with any community from which the terrorists are a part.19 The necessity of this is evident in the tip off from the Muslim community that foiled plots to bomb transatlantic flights. 20 Therefore, based on Sednak’s concept of the deep practice of human dignity, which includes the importance of ethical decisions being put into practice under adverse circumstances,21 policy makers should apply a deep consequentialist approach when making decisions related to the use of torture. Rather than focus on the short term impact of averting individual terrorist attacks, consideration should be given to reverberations that would impact the communities of which the terrorists are a part. In conclusion, while judicial torture warrants could have appeared, in the short term, to be in the best interest of the State in order to prevent a terrorist attack, policy makers should also consider the longer term ramifications. By applying a deep consequentialist approach it is evident that the use of torture would drive a wedge between a liberal democracy and the community that the terrorist claims to represent. As history has indicated, there is an increased likelihood of individuals being recruited to terrorism as well as an increase in inter-group bias which can lead to a refusal by minority groups to co-operate with the State and report information necessary in order to prevent more terrorist attacks from occurring.

Schultz and Woodson (2011) Mialon et al. (2012) 17 McCauley and Moskalenko (2010) 18 Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind and Solhein (2009) 19 Slater (2006) 20 Hill (2007) 21 Sednak (2013) 15 16

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Bibliography Bell, Daniel, "Communitarianism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/communitarianism/ [accessed 14/04/2014] Cobain, Ian, Cruel Britannia ‘A Secret History of Torture’ (London: Portobello Books, 2012). Dershowitz, Alan, ‘Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge’ (Yale University Press, 2002) Hill, Daniel. (2007) ‘Ticking Bombs, Torture, and the Analogy with Self-Defense’ American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 395-404 Hogg, M., Terry, D (2000) ’Social Identity and Self-Categorization Processes in Organizational' The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 121-140 Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., Liebkind, K., and Solheim, E (2008) ‘To Identify or Not To Identify? National Disidentification as an Alternative Reaction to Perceived Ethnic Discrimination’ Applied Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp 105-128 Louis, W., and Taylor, D., (2002) ‘Understanding the September 11 terrorist Attack on America: The Role of Intergroup Theories of Normative Influence’ Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp.87-100 McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2010). Individual and group mechanisms of radicalization. In L. Fenstermacher, L. Kuznar, T. Rieger, & A. Speckhard (Eds.), Protecting the homeland from international and domestic security threats: Current multidisciplinary perspectives on root causes, the role of ideology, and programs for counterradicalization and disengagement. Washington, D.C.: Topical multi-layer assessment (SMA) multi-agency and Air Force research laboratory multi-disciplinary white papers in support of counter-terrorism and counter-WMD. Melucci, Alberto, ‘The Process of Collective Identity’ in Johnston, Hank and Klandermans, Bert (eds.) Social Movements and Culture, (University of Minnesota Press, 1995) Mialon, Hugo., Mialon, Sue., Stinchcombe, Maxwell (2012) ‘Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 96 pp. 33-41 Nesser, Petter ‘Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe: Exploring Motivational Aspects of Recruitment and Radicalization’ in Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation (London: Routledge, 2010) Neumann Peter and Rogers Brooke, ‘Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe’, A study carried out by King’s College London for the European Commission (Directorate General for Justice, Freedom and Security), December 2007, pp.44-6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf [accessed 01/12/2013] Posner, Richard, ‘Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation’ in Levinson, Sanford, (ed.), Torture - A collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Qureshi, A. (28 December 2013) ‘Witch Muslim will be next?’ http://www.cageuk.org/article/witch-muslim-next [accessed 14/04/2014]

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Roccas. S and Brewer, M (2002) ’Social Identity Complexity’ Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 88–106 Sednak, L. (2013) ‘The Deep Practice of Human Dignity’, [Lecture to Associate of King’s College Semester 1, Strand Campus, King’s College]. 28 October 2013 Schultz, M and Woodson, J., (30 August 2011 ‘New Pew Research Centre Survey Finds Moderate Attitudes Among Muslim Americans’ Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C.). http://www.pewforum.org/2011/08/30/new-pewresearch-center-survey-finds-moderate-attitudes-among-muslim-americans/, [accessed on 14/04/2014] Shue, Henry, ‘Torture’ in Levinson, Sanford, (ed.), Torture - A collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Walzer, Michael, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ in Levinson, Sanford, (ed.), Torture - A collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) UN General Assembly, (10 December 1984) ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [accessed 01/12/2013)