www.kclpolitics.org.uk
Autumn 2012
Message from the editorial team: Welcome to our first issue of Dialogue, King’s College’s first student journal which aims to be truly international and non-partisan in its pursuit for political analysis and reflection. Please note that all views expressed in this journal belong to our authors alone, and do not reflect the views of the King’s College London’s Politics Society. g
In light of forthcoming events, our primary focus in this issue was on the upcoming American elections and their wider impact on international foreign policy. As pollsters put Obama and Romney unpredictably close, it is impossible to know for certain who the next “leader of the free world” will be, but undoubtedly important to reflect on the impact that America’s choice will have on the international community and particularly the fragile China-US relationship. g
Thank you very much to those who have contributed, your support and hard-work is much appreciated. I would also like to extend an open invitation to you for international contributions towards the next issue of “Dialogue” which already promises to be more extensive and diverse than this one.
Editors Note: Please contact us if you would like a fully referenced copy of any of the articles.
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
In this issue... Contact us
kclpolitics@gmail.com kclpoliticsjournal@gmail.com
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Webpage
www.facebook.com/pages/KCLPoliticsSociety/267247936669070
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The U.S. and China: Playing the Game g
Russia: Third Time Lucky? g
British Politics Rise and Fall: Labour’s Reawakening
www.twitter.com/KCLPolSoc
Content editor
The US-China Relationship: Primed With Identity Dynamics?
www.kclpolitics.org.uk
Whither Clinton, and Whither State Without Her?
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Conservative Leadership: Losing One’s Voice
Georgie Singer
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Creative editor Linnéa Strand
Society President Ramtin Hajimonshi
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
Europe: Steps Towards Municipalisation g
Inside Venezuela: The Plight of the Refugees g
Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Why the Revolution Continues
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- Welcome notes: ”What is Politics?” - Notes by KCLSU President, Thomas Clayton, on the ”Politics of KCLSU” jff
- Presenting the KCL Politics Society agenda j
- Complimentary wine reception
27th September 18.30 King’s College London Strand Campus Anatomy Lecture Hall (K6.29)
WITHER CLINTON, AND WITHER STATE WITHOUT HER?
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short five years ago, presidential candidate Barack Obama condescendingly equated his primary opponent’s experience as First Lady of the United States to sipping tea with foreign leaders.
A short five years ago, presidential candidate Barack Obama
those credentials, it’s not surprising that the same Democrats
condescendingly equated his primary opponent’s experience as
that shunned her in 2008, likely due to personal insecurities and
First Lady of the United States to only sipping tea with foreign
wishful thinking about the alternatives, are now singing her
leaders. One year later, after a bruising primary campaign and
praise. This, along with a seemingly thin 2012 field for Demo-
an equally bruising general election battle, Obama asked that
crats, may very well put the top job within her grasp in four
former First Lady for her help in drinking the most important cups
years.
of tea of all: those served to the Secretary of State.
However, Secretary Clinton's gaze does not yet
Today, Secretary Hillary Clinton has made her mark in
stretch four years ahead, but is focused on this coming year.
four brief years as State Secretary: she has visited over a hund-
Clinton has repeatedly stated that, having no political ambitions
red countries, and, as PolicyMic’s Lindsay Novic has noted, has
for the future, she looks forward to stepping down from the helm
carefully navigated through the WikiLeaks storm, pushed for
of State after President Obama’s first term. So, whether Obama
democracy in the Middle East, and kept a close eye on human
wins or loses this November, one thing is for certain – Clinton
rights. At the same time, she is the nation’s most-liked woman,
will no longer be the face of America abroad. This development,
with sky-high approval ratings, and an inspiration for young girls
which we have known for months was coming, brings up two
across America.
questions: why is Clinton leaving State, and what might State Hillary Clinton has done so well at State be-
look like for the next four years?
cause she is Hillary Clinton, an identity that no other can hope to
Firstly, Hillary Clinton has a lot of good reasons
emulate – she entered State already having fostered relation-
for packing her bags and leaving Foggy Bottom. Few people,
ships with the world’s leaders (that’s what all that “tea” was
other than her supporters, believe her official stance of her need-
about), having established a global identity, and having proved
ing to escape from what she calls the “high wire of American
her prowess on the world stage. Not to mention that she also
politics”. Without over-analysis, it does makes sense: she has
has a habit of making history: from her speech at her Wellesley
spent decades directly involved in roles of serious national im-
College commencement, to her election to the Senate as a First
portance, and the next presidential term offers her the chance
Lady and her historic primary victories eight years later. With
for a well-deserved break. However, others believe that Clinton
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
isn’t calling it quits permanently, and that 2016 is still very much
eager for the spot in 2008, and who now may once again come
on her agenda. This is linked to the fact that, according to author
into contention. John Kerry, the Massachusetts senator who ran
Ed Klein, she turned down the vice presidential spot on Obama’s
for the top job himself eight years ago, seems to be the over-
2012 ticket. For those who take this scenario seriously, she not
whelming favorite. With global recognition, as well as years of
only needs time to rest and recuperate, but to distance herself
experience as a statesman, it seems that Kerry's name is com-
from Obama’s polarized presidency. That way, if Obama loses,
ing up in pundits’ speculations numerous times. A Kerry State
she would not be tied through the 2012 ticket to his failures, and
may give us a glimpse of what a Kerry presidency may have
if he wins, she will be able to claim enough of a difference be-
looked like. It would be classically Obama, but State would likely
tween her and his policies to establish herself as a unique voice
lose its "chic", unique branding that has come with Clinton’s ten-
on the Democrats’ side in 2012.
ure. It would also perhaps be less exciting, because without Clin-
Regardless of Clinton’s plans and aspirations,
ton’s celebrity pushing her to the forefront of foreign presses it
the fact that she is leaving remains the same. But depending on
would operate at a calmer pace, signifying a slowing down of
who then wins this November, we may have two very different
Obama’s presidency as he winds down his own tenure.
State Departments come next year.
Clinton’s departure from State, though it opens
A Republican State Department will likely be
exciting possibilities for her own career and future role in her
more assertive, more confrontational, and more unrelenting –
country, puts America at a highly unpredictable position as to
the Grand Old Party has grown tired of what they see as
the tone diplomacy will take for the next four years. Whether
Obama’s four-year “apology tour”. Nevertheless, it is unclear
Romney or Obama wins will not only determine whose portrait
who would lead a Republican State Department. The Romney
hangs in embassies and consulates worldwide, but also whether
administration will probably want to restore the aura of
America's newest top diplomat will be able to successfully re-
“American exceptionalism” on the world stage. However, with
store the country's reputation in the eyes of a growingly cautious
the possible president’s recent underwhelming overseas trip, he
and skeptical world. Tea or no tea, Secretary Clinton will be hard
may be advised to follow Obama's lead and tap a familiar face to
to replace.
global diplomacy who can stand well on his or her own feet. If Obama is fortunate enough to keep his job, there are a number of senior American politicians who seemed
Photo curtesy of thedailynewsegypt.com
HUMZA BOKARI is a student at Harvard College and a writer for the Harvard Political Review’s Electoral Politics column.
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It should come as no great surprise that foreign policy has
should provide fertile ground for another ideological campaign,
been relegated to the outskirts of the US presidential elec-
especially now that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are
tions. After all, domestic economic hardships and disenchant-
no longer tying up all the resources.
ment with the military entrapment in Afghanistan provide little opportunity to rally the American public around foreign involvements. Even the much-touted rise of China has so far – with the partial exception of Mitt Romney’s Wall Street Journal editorial back in February – not really agitated the presidential candidates, let alone generated the kind of China-bashing statements that might be expected during an election year.
On the other hand, this `American urge´ has been accompanied by an equally strong desire to identify, confront and ultimately eradicate what identity scholars usually label “The Other”. That is, the un-American elements – like Nazis, Communists or radical Islamists – that pose an existential threat in a material and ideological sense. To be sure, the United States is not alone in confronting its “Others”. Yet, in
However, there are a number of reasons why especially
light of its heterogeneous ethnic fabric and its lack of deep
the US-China relationship is likely to dominate the White
historical roots America may be regarded as the `imagined
House agenda in the coming years, irrespective of the hue of
community par excellence´, deriving its internal cohesion from
the coming house steward. While most pundits usually point
an outward-looking, exceptionalist mind-set fed by ongoing
either to the multifaceted interdependence of the US and Chi-
missionary and confrontational practices.
nese economies or to the growing threat posed by China’s military modernization, there is a tendency to overlook what is likely to become a key driver of US-China relations: identity dynamics. Indeed, crucial aspects of each country’s selfunderstanding may easily spur these dynamics.
Interestingly, with the War on Terror on the wane and despite the projected downsizing of the US military (500 billion USD in 10 years), the United States is actually already redirecting its strategic attention elsewhere. The socalled “pivot to Asia” may not appear as a dramatic strategic
Firstly, the American polity has from its very inception
shift in terms of military resources, adding 2500 marines to
displayed a strong urge to engage in identity dynamics with its
northern Australia, a sixth aircraft carrier group and 10% extra
outside world. On the one hand, this urge has taken the
warships in the Asia-Pacific region, new missile defense inter-
“positive” form of a missionary impulse to shape the world in
ceptors and a projected long-range bomber. But if one in-
the image of America, `a chosen nation´ with a `Manifest Des-
cludes Washington’s proposal of a new Air-Sea-Battle concept
tiny´ to expand and propagate `the American Creed´. Ameri-
and its recent efforts to step up military cooperation with sev-
can evangelists of liberal democracy did run their heads
eral southeast Asian countries to orchestrate what looks like
against the Chinese wall in the nineties, but the secular, capi-
an alliance of China-skeptics, then the “pivot” evokes a more
talist, and increasingly individualist spirit of Chinese society
clear-cut picture of American mobilization towards […]
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
Photo Curtesy of AP/Charles Dharapak
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[…] `the Middle Kingdom´. Importantly, the rise of China provides a much stronger point of reference for American identity politics than the one-off, non-state Al Qaeda jihadists provoking the War on Terror. Not only is the potential China-challenge of an entirely different material magnitude, it also represents a far more viable non-Western
moral philosophy, ancient civilizational uniqueness, dynastic tributary centralism and Han-ethnocentrism. As Sino-centrism seems to be gaining prominence in Chinese society – partly supported by the legitimacycraving communist leadership – one may argue that it is only a matter of time before Beijing reverses its cautious identity profile internationally.
identity model: the so-called “Beijing Consensus”, which
In this post-9/11 decade, most Chinese as well as
epitomizes top-down politics, a state-propelled economy
American observers view the rise of China as a new
and absolute state sovereignty. Yet, it takes two to tan-
defining moment in international affairs. However, as
go, and so far Beijing has been determined to downplay
long as Beijing and Washington consciously refrain from
any notion of ideological rivalry, stressing instead the
accentuating their mutual differences, they need not
peaceful and harmonious nature of China’s ascend-
revert into the game of oppositional identity dynamics
ance.
that seemed to be in the making prior to 9/11. In that Still, China – just like the United States –
is infused by its own heavy dose of an exceptionalist
sense, the rhetorical restraint characterizing the US presidential race so far is indeed laudable.
mentality, which is likely to have a greater impact on US -Chinese identity dynamics than the notion of a “Beijing Consensus”. This exceptionalism (or `Sino-centrism´) is
ANDREAS BØJE FORSBY is a PhD Candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies.
based on China’s ethno-cultural heritage and includes four more or less distinct discursive elements: Confucian
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
In 2012, Washington has yet to figure out what to do with a rising China. Perhaps a few optimists in Capitol Hill have joined the rank of critics who are counting down the days until Beijing’s inevitable dissolution from within. Then - voila! Washington can get away without a solution and continue to remain on top of the world. Unfortunately, with each day’s new dawn, China seems to be going nowhere. Despite a gamut of domestic problems, China continues to be touted as a rising power with a market with infinite potential while the U.S., well, is on the decline. After the financial crisis in 2008, the U.S. is slowly recovering, but the unemployment rate remains at an unpleasant figure of 8% (August 2012). While the dollar continues to be regarded as the dominant global currency, Washington’s extremely high deficit and its series of quantative easing have many experts beginning to think otherwise. Under such difficult economic time, perhaps also feeling insecure with economic chaos at home that is threatening America’s global status, Washington has elevated its suspicion against Beijing, the rising star, and adopted a series of measures in an attempt to seduce China into showing its true intentions behind its rise. Since 2008, the Obama administration has made several moves that have intensified Sino-U.S. relations and challenge the benevolent image Beijing tries to establish. Not long after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s groundbreaking visit to Asia in 2009, President Obama made a speech in Japan confirming U.S. position in Asia and announced the initiation of the Transpacific Strategic and Economic Partnership (TPP). President Obama followed up with a personal Asia tour as well, visiting Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and India, and consolidating relations with these traditional allies. In Southeast Asia, Washington joined the East Asia Summit and offered to serve as the protector of peace in the South China Sea. In 2010, Washington made its presence felt in Asia by conducting joint military exercises with both Korea and Japan. China’s reaction? Alarmed and frustrated. From Beijing’s perspective, the Bush administration’s policy focus on the Middle East provided a gap for China to con-
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
solidate its influence in Asia. With Washington making headways into the Pacific again, the Beijing leadership is forced to watch out for the strategic game the U.S. is playing, a game that would certainly disrupt China’s plans to become a great power. The TPP is merely an example of the delicate interaction between Beijing and Washington. From a strategic point of view, the U.S. is essentially challenging the benign international image China has been trying to establish in recent years. Through close interactions with ASEAN and the pronouncement of concepts such as “harmonious worldview” and “good neighbor policy”, China has shaped Asia around itself. So far, the TPP has managed to attract the interest of more than half of ASEAN members and traditional U.S. allies such as Japan; it is clear that the U.S. is trying to regroup influence around itself in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, Washington has not made any objections to Beijing participating in the TPP. Yet the Chinese leadership is left with a dilemma: joining the TPP would mean acknowledging U.S. presence in the region, while not joining would inevitably arouse more suspicion against China’s intention behind its rise. China has reasons to be frustrated. Whether President Obama wins the election in November or not, one thing for certain is that the U.S. will continue to deal with China, and Sino-U.S. relations will continue to dominate international affairs for years to come. If President Obama succeeds in office, not much would change in current U.S. policies except more pressure for China to show its hand as a threat or a peacemaker, a move that Beijing may simply choose to ignore. If President Obama succeeds in office, not much would change in current U.S. policies except more long term pressure for China to show its hand as a threat or a peacemaker, a move that Beijing may simply choose to ignore. If a Republican candidate steps into office, the U.S. may quickly increase the presssure on China, as the Republican Party has traditionally adopted a strong stance against China. Regardless of who runs away with the election in November, the future of Washington’s China policy will be grounded in the answer to two questions: how much pressure and how fast. Meanwhile, politicians and pundits continue to fiercely debate.
TONY TAI-TING is a PhD candidate at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan.
Photo Curtesy of www.chinaglobaltrade.com
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In May 2012, Russia welcomed the new (old) President Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin. At the age of 59, his presidential term in office is his third six-year term, and follows his second stint as Prime Minister. Previously Putin’s popularity among Russians was unyielding, but his questionable success at once again taking office has raised eyebrows at home and abroad, hindering the country’s progress towards modernisation and stability. The Russian economy may not be on the brink of the economic abyss like her European neighbours, but the economy lurks not far from precipice. Putin’s move to gain Russian membership into the World Trade Organisation (August 2012) is an important step towards a stronger economy and embracing BRIC status. Membership of the World Trade Organisation should increase competitiveness and draw more foreign investment where it is currently the lowest amongst the BRIC nations. Membership also has the potential to provide a kick-start to the Russian manufacturing industry; where new factory-friendly policies are expected to create 25 million skilled jobs. However, inherent economic problems remain unresolved. Putin has ordered a new wave of spending which many analysts believe Russia is unable to afford. Public spending is already an incredible 40% of GDP, which is possibly set to rise by a further $160 billion if Putin keeps his pre-election promises for further domestic spending. Similarly, military spending has already increased by 33% in 2012 alone, and is set to increase by a further 60% by 2013. Oil remains Russia’s biggest export and most important source of revenue, but as prices continue to fluctuate and public spending continues to increase, the budget deficit could dramatically increase if Putin does not balance his books, ultimately tipping the Russian economy over the brink. Putin must also strive for a balance in his belligerent foreign policy, not since the days of the Cold War have the ties between America and Russia been so fraught with political tension. As a true former KGB member, Putin has always freely spoken of his mistrust and dislike for America which, amongst petty spats and snubs, have been recently demonstrated by his refusal to cooperate with the US on finding a solution in Syria. It would seem that regardless of the US election outcome, it is unlikely that relations will improve and may in fact be aggravated if Romney is given the power to exercise his hard-line foreign policy. Instead Putin
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
Photo Curtesy of www.rugrad.eu
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looks again to China to find companionship against
The controversial imprisonment of the Pussy Riot band
American hegemony. According to recent Chinese and
members for two years in August 2012 has been met
Russian press reports, relations have significantly
with international outcry and condemnation at the
strengthened between President Hu and President
Kremlin’s underhand intervention in the verdict. This
Putin, reaching an “unprecedented high” as transport,
intervention signals a harsher response to the growing
trade and cultural exchanges are reinforced.
domestic protests that had been gaining momentum since Putin announced his candidacy in March 2012.
Nevertheless, Putin’s blatant disdain for the West’s governance may cause Russia far greater long term damage than the satisfaction of giving America the cold shoulder. China is indeed on the rise, but America still successfully dominates the international governance systems, and therefore has the potential to increase the pressure on Putin’s unpopular regime to breaking point. However, if recent events in Russia are any indication, the regime’s breaking point may be trig-
According to a report by Chatham House from early 2012, Russian society is at the level of “deep-reaching atomization” where increases in alcoholism, suicide, murder and abortions reflect a society in a state of deep depression. If domestic unrest is to decrease, Putin must start taking steps down the path of humanrights liberalisation which will not only make him more appealing to the Russian people, but significantly increase Russia’s reputation on the world stage.
gered from within. Putin’s six-year term has just begun, but as oil prices fluctuate, ties with the West strain against a leader who is rapidly losing his support at home as well as abroad. Russia is certainly a country that deserves careful diplomacy, but it should not be allowed to continue to abuse its own people and block the humanitarian efforts of the international community. This time round, Putin might find himself the exception to the rule of “third-time lucky”.
GEORGINA SINGER is a second year BA International Politics student at King’s College London.
15 | Photo Curtesy of www.tripadvisor.com
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY g
at King’s College London is a unique multi-disciplinary enterprise – it is the only academic department of its kind in the UK. “Teaching and research in the department is informed by an
understanding of the interdependence of economic and political institutions.”
BRITISH POLITICS RISE AND FALL: LABOUR’S REAWAKENING British politics is at a crucial juncture. The Conservative Party
policy review, and Ed Miliband. Both have met Mr Soutphom-
has found itself aimless and drifting further to the Right, and the
masane to discuss how his ideas can translate to re-establishing
Liberal Democrats have been led into the political abyss by Dep-
the idea of a State that appeals not to the standard nationalistic
uty-Prime Minister Nick Clegg, with their support inexorably
catalogue of clichés – monarchy, military and aristocracy – but
crumbling. The economy is entering a double dip recession
to a renewed sense of community and an acknowledgement
thanks to Chancellor George Osborne’s failure to understand
that as a people, the British have fought the greatest battles not
simple economics, and incompetent Minister after incompetent
on foreign blood-soaked soils, but at home, where working peo-
Minister has pointed out just how unsuited they are to running
ple have fought to establish a nation that has a powerful social
the country.
conscience and a collective duty to one other. The concept of
There is a million dollar question facing Ed Miliband: what is the point of the Labour Party when there is no money left? If we can answer it, we will win the next election. The Party is replenishing itself, and is drawing on a variety of ideological strands, some of which are seen by the Conservative Party as
‘Blue Labour’ has somewhat fallen by the wayside in recent months, but Soutphommasane’s ideas are influential in the leader’s office. Some prefer to focus on more conventional economic concepts in the battle for Labour’s soul. Ed Miliband’s latest I
strong challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy. A promising addition to the bank of ideas Labour can draw from over the next three years comes from a young Australian thinker, Tim Soutphommasane. He re-imagines patriotism as a sentiment of democratic renewal and national belonging, a chance to make the emotional case for citizens to support those they will never meet through the welfare state. The Right, he argues, has kept tight hold of patriotism and used it to appeal to its own agenda. The idea that the Left can regain control of patriotism in public discourse has excited Jon Cruddas, the head of Labour’s
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Dialogue | Autumn 2012
dea; which he fleshed out in a September speech to Policy Ex-
Toryism is not the acceptable face of capitalism – it is a vacuous
change, is ‘predistribution’. His message is that rather than com-
creed promulgated by a small cabal in the hands of the City.
pensating for poverty pay through redistributive handouts, the poorest people in society must surely prefer having their own money in their hands. Whether Miliband is planning to adopt a full prices and incomes policy remains to be seen; the last time we saw such a policy in a mainstream political party was under Jim Callaghan in 1979. So is Labour for equality of opportunity or for overall
Public opinion is on the side of Ed Miliband’s Labour Party on every major issue. The deficit is growing every day because of the Chancellor’s inability to recognise that he needs to change his austerity mantra. Internal Conservative discipline is in disarray. A government has not been this incompetent in decades, and the Labour Party is well placed to capitalise on it. It will not be easy – but Opposition never is.
equality of outcome? Is Labour for a safety net so that those at the bottom do not become trapped there? Or is it for a full prices and incomes policy, tinkering with the whole of the economy? We will see in the coming years.
TOM WILLIAMS is a second year BA War Studies and History student at King’s College London and the chair of KCL Labour Society.
The current Government’s complete economic failure, means that whoever next occupies Downing Street will still face a large deficit. Labour’s approach must consider the issue that has rarely faced it in government; how can social progress be achieved when there is very little money to use? The often-overlooked redistribution of the last Labour government relied on revenue that the next Labour government will not have. Increasing tax credits in the way we did during our last period in power will not be possible. Labour’s priority for the coming years will be to articulate a vision of a better Britain that is not reliant on a plentiful supply of tax revenue. It will not be easy. But to do so we will draw together the various strands of thought in the Party. We need to show that austerity without a credible plan for growth is not the answer. We need to show that a new patriotism is compatible with modern liberalism. We need to show that modern
Photo Curtesy of wikipedia.orb
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CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP: LOSING ONE’S VOICE ‘The central party appears unable to truly shake the traditional stereotypes of upper class “English buffoons”’
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llegedly “reinvented” by party leader David Cameron, the Conservative Party won back power for the first time since 1997 in the 2010 election. While this should have been a triumphant victory, the formation of a bittersweet coalition has arguably generated more problems than it has addressed, and one can now begin to truly question the longevity of both the coalition as an entity and Cameron’s ability as a leader. Nevertheless the Conservative Party, despite an unpopular legacy from the 1980s, has indeed made some notable achievements; particularly if compared with the actions of the recent Labour Party, the reverberations of which are still felt from Ireland to Iraq. From 2007 and 2008, Dylan Jones (editor of GQ magazine) repeatedly interviewed David Cameron for his book Cameron on Cameron, which portrayed what could be seen as the unbridled determination and drive of a man who knew he would become Prime Minister. Holding a string of professional jobs since his time at Oxford, there should have been fewer men more qualified, and fewer more confident, indicating that Cameron is clearly more than capable of running the country. So where has he gone wrong? Facing an increasing number of criticisms – both from the public, the opposition, as well as his own coalition, Cameron is becoming increasingly unpopular and arguably ineffectual. Leaving us with the beguiling question – why does David Cameron appear unable to drive the conservatives forward in the way that past leaders have been able to?
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Firstly, one must examine Cameron’s own political stance. Surely to rise to becoming the youngest Prime Minister since the 1812, one would think that Cameron must have a distinct and clear set of ideals and an agenda that he would be unwilling to stray from. Once hailed by the media and political commentators - not to mention Cameron himself - as a “compassionate conservative” and the “heir to Blair”, the man who stands beside the dispatch box today is almost unrecognisable. However a biography of Cameron titled ‘Practically a Conservative’ which was published in 2009, shows how even before the coalition, his political agenda and ideology was already under question. New Statesman writer Jason Cowley argues that Cameron is incapable of truly leading his party, as he is more concerned with his portrayal in the public image: “He is non-ideological and pragmatic” , reinforcing the criticism that rather than being concerned primarily with his political stance, Cameron’s main priority is his image. Moreover, while not a hugely popular figure in the present climate, Rupert Murdoch once described how Cameron “doesn’t believe in anything other than trying to construct what he believes will be the right public image”. This preoccupation with public image acts as yet another constituent that Cameron has to placate in his dealings in parliament. Not only is he held accountable to those in his constituency, party and coalition, but he appears to hold himself accountable to the general public. While some argue that this is quite right – after all, the Prime Minister is supposed to lead the country - it does mean that Cameron has limited the scope of his actions.
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
The second major factor which has clearly limited Cameron as a leader is the stereotypes that the party is still forced to confront. A classic example of this could be seen in the BBC’s recent critically acclaimed Wonderland program; ‘Young, Bright and on the Right’. Following the airing of the program, both the press and social media exploded, neither of which endorsed favourable impressions of the people involved in the program, nor the party itself. Tales of debauchery, faction and class conflict; not to mention crises of cheese and biscuits, proved little help to the reputation of the Cameron and the Conservatives. Furthermore, shamelessly encompassing Conservative stereotypes, the loveable yet comedic Boris Johnson is viewed by some as the Conservative’s biggest asset and by others as its greatest hindrance. In line with Boris’s unequivocal success at the 2012 Olympics, the media continues to speculate the chance of Johnson taking over as leader once Cameron leaves, the thought of which is arguably undermining Cameron’s own leadership. Currently preferring to adopt a more placid and reserved nature, the central party appears unable to truly shake the traditional stereotypes of upper class “English buffoons”, which in turn limits them from being able to drive forward their own agenda.
It is therefore clear that Cameron faces two major injunctions with in his leadership: the first is his delicate issue with accountability, his role in the coalition and ties to constituents and public leaves him politically torn and unable to follow his own agenda. The second issue lies in confronting the stereotypes that continue to haunt the party, while also tackling the unpopular legacies of Thatcher’s miners and Blair’s North Ireland. In this context, and as the New Statesmen also argued, it would certainly appear that Cameron’s leadership style is making his own voice “…less and less distinctive as he seeks to accommodate and compromise”.
RUTH REEKIE is a third year BA History student at King’s College London.
Photo courtesy of www.number10.gov.uk
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During the very recent years the major developments of European integration have been driven by crisis – financial, economic or Euro crisis. However, we should not overlook that European integration can be more than the outcome of decisions and negotiations between national governments. As integration continues, it becomes increasingly important that the EU reaches its demos. At least some member states, where local government takes a strong political role, cities, counties and municipalities can provide a key link between citizens and European governance – given that there is a link between the local and the European level.
wered local governments across all member states. Conflicts of interest, power constellations and resource dependencies between different levels set structural limits to the formation of multilevel governance. Hence, interaction between local and European level develops largely through patterns of ‘loose coupling’ and cognitive (instead of political) processes without relying on binding mandates or formal decision-making. In other words, the EU’s ‘multilevel compound’ represents a ‘complex set of overlapping and nested systems of governance involving European, national, regional and local actors, and networks’.
The following offers some sketches how to understand European integration from a local government perspective. Is the relationship between the EU and local authorities just a matter of Europeanisation of local government? Or has the European engagement of local actors modified the patterns of integration and thus led to a ‘municipalisation’ of European governance? What are adequate perspectives to look at European integration of local government and how does the notion of multilevel governance relate to the local level? Notwithstanding the role of formal polity provisions and constitutional developments, this analysis suggests that local-supranational relations are primarily subject to interactive policy styles amongst institutions and actors from multiple levels.
There are formal provisions which indicate a growing acknowledgement of local government within European governance. Whilst the Maastricht Treaty already introduced subsidiarity and the Committee of the Regions (CoR), which provided local representatives with direct access to EU policy-making, the Lisbon Treaty has been a further major achievement of municipal lobbying. Under Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), for the first time the EU time acknowledges the right to local selfgovernment, and Article 5.3 explicitly extends subsidiarity to the regional and the local level. The right to defend subsidiarity before court potentially creates greater mutual awareness and cooperation between the local and the European level.
Since the early 1990s with the completion of the single market, the European integration process has significantly affected local governments across Europe. The implementation of EU legislation and the EU’s Regional and Cohesion Policy have led to Europeanisation processes at the local level. As local authorities became increasingly aware of the EU’s influence on their practice, some adapted their politico-administrative structures. At the same time, EU membership has also provided local authorities with windows of opportunity that changed local decisions and encouraged municipal entrepreneurship to promote local concerns at the European stage. Although this might be described by the notion of multilevel governance, the European engagement of local actors has not empo-
Despite the formal acknowledgement of local government in the European treaties and the growing influence of the CoR, the latter’s powers remain comparatively week and it is not clear how the Lisbon Treaty has brought effective changes of practice. Therefore, multilevel cooperation between different levels offers a complementary insight into local-supranational relations, as certain policy areas have become subject to the influence of engaged local government actors: the Regional and Cohesion policy, the Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020 are direct points of reference for local governments to engage in EU policies. With the reforms of the Structural Funds in 1988, the allocation of funding was decentralised by introducing the
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
partnership principle for the implementation of funding programmes. National governments remained in charge of the final decisions on the allocation and monitoring of funds, but they were supposed to work in partnerships with local and regional authorities. Despite continuous efforts and initiatives to involve subnational governments in the delivery of the EU’s policies, such as the White Paper on European Governance from 2001, the Systematic Dialogue from 2004, the CoR’s White paper on Multilevel Governance from 2009 and the Territorial Pact of Regional and Local Authorities on the Europe 2020 Strategy, the partnership principle often suffers from effective. Hence, the challenge of partnership-building amongst multiple level is still present in the very recent discussion about the Partnership Contracts for the Cohesion Policy post 2013. The measures that are debated to include local and other stakeholders in the design and implementation of the 2014-2020 programming period emphasis the need to build capacities, such as local action groups, to integrate urban development and community-led development (which is only compulsory for the European Agriculture Fund For Rural Development). The major hurdle for local government to have a say in the design of EU policies is their constraint position within in their countries, since not all member states have decided to relax the ‘hierarchical command-andcontrol form’.And yet, European policy initiatives indicate a growing relevance for local actors within at least the delivery of EU policies. Whereas so far subnational actors have struggled to become involved in the design of the programmes of the Cohesion Po-
licy, the pressure to meet the Lisbon and Europe 2020 objectives has pushed European governance and polity further towards a system of negotiation and cooperation processes involving European, national, regional and local actors. The implementation of the Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 within different member states will show whether a cooperative dynamic between local and European actors is going to develop further in the future. Overall, the relationship between the EU and some local actors is not just issues of Europeanisation, but has enhanced the logic of European integration beyond intergovernmental patterns, at least at an early stage. Within limited policy areas, a functional ‘fusion’ of different levels into compound policy arrangements has emerged. With regard to the outlined constitutional provisions and policy initiatives around partnership, ‘municipalisation’ of European governance is mostly a matter of policy, modestly of polity and marginally of politics.
MARIUS GUDERJAN is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Humanities and Social Science Research at the Manchester Metropolitan University.
Photo Curtesy of http://www.intermediachannel.it
22
With a harsh squeak the small government bus sets itself in mo-
Before we enter the village, which is made up of count-
tion.Two policemen, detailed to provide our fast and secure
less wooden and corrugated iron shacks, we are told that neither
transfer to a refugee village in the foothills of Venezuela’s Andes,
photographs must be taken, nor real names used in any inter-
get on their motorbikes and take on their task. Our driver skillfully
views intended for publication. Many of the refugees have had
steers us through the colonial city centre of San Cristóbal, out of
traumatic experiences and do not wish to be portrayed in the
the urban area, into one of the most notorious barrios of the
media. Some fear they might be recognised by their violent per-
state and beyond it, up the heights, where usually no policeman
petrators back home. Others worry they might attract unneces-
sets foot. At each intersection our escorts stop the traffic and we
sary attention from the national Venezuelan government and
are winked through, much to the outrage of the busy and impa-
face deportation. The great majority of the dwellers here do not
tient road users. Our expedition to La Tinta is led by the local
have a legal permit and only few of them have got the lengthy
Director of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), W.
and bureaucratic asylum application process under way. Their
Sánchez, who kindly arranged for an international group of jour-
statelessness exposes the refugees to a number of perils:
nalists to interview a few of the chiefly Colombian refugees at
Throughout the community there is no official political authority,
this site. We are hosted by the government of the Táchira state,
no law enforcement, which gives rise to informal power struc-
which during most of Hugo Chávez’ presidency has been, and
tures and often violence. Most of the children growing up in La
continues to be, held by the opposition.
Tinta have no access to even the most basic form of institu-
23
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
tionalised education, nor to health care. They are not protect-
cial programmes, the so-called Bolivarian Missions, do not
ed against abuse, exploitation, neglect and discrimination. Run-
reach the refugees. When applying for social housing they are
ning water and electricity are generally tapped illegally. Many of
generally told to obtain the Venezuelan nationality first, which
the shacks are not at all weatherproof and have been swept
has complicated implications of its own. Waiting lists for such
down the hill or suffered severe damages due to heavy rainfalls
housing are endless, even for Venezuelans anyway.
recently.
Not too long ago the asylum application process in Ven-
We walk and skid down a swampy hillside, past a num-
ezuela could last up to four years. Thanks to continuous efforts
ber of wobbly huts and cabins, into the village. Judging from
of the UNHCR to reduce bureaucracy and accelerate that pro-
the stares that we get, we must be a rare sight to the locals and
cess, successful applicants now wait roughly twelve months for
our presence is only condoned because of our UNHCR es-
their asylum to be granted. Throughout the years refugees in
corts. We entered without the two policemen, who would likely
Venezuela have been the victims of political cleavages and
have scared away or frightened the refugees. Despite our for-
clashes of national and bi-national sorts. The hostile stance of
mer briefing, some of the journalists are too eager to learn
Chávez’ government toward the oppositional Táchira state and
about personal fates and become rather persistent in their in-
bellicose relations with the Uribe administration in Colombia
quiry. As we interview an elderly lady who had fled from the
have worked to exacerbate the refugees’ woes. The rather dip-
more than 300 miles distant Cali, we witness her reliving a trau-
lomatic Juan Manuel Santos seems to introduce a more peace-
matic memory. Under tears the woman tells us that unidentified
ful era both in terms of the Colombian internal armed conflict
militiamen had killed her son and that the rest of the family had
and in terms of bi-lateral relations with Venezuela. This could
been threatened with the same destiny. Together with her
help past and future refugees alike, as peace with the FARC,
daughter and grandchildren, she had hurriedly left her home,
ELN and other violent armed groups in Colombia would likely
embarking on a journey of fear, uncertainty and insecurity. “I
stop the flow of refugees and even allow some to return to their
will never go back”, she tells us “because although Colombia is
homes. However, much of the asylum seekers’ future might
my motherland, I must leave the past behind. I am hoping to
depend also on the outcome of Venezuela’s presidential elec-
build a better future here.”
tions due to be held on October 7th, where Mr. Chávez is facing
But how much brighter a future can she and her family
his biggest electoral challenge so far.
seek in Venezuela’s border region? For now – it seems – they are safe from their perpetrators in Colombia, which to them is most crucial. Yet, Venezuela is all but ideal a refugee destination. With one of the continent’s highest murder rates, impunity figures beyond 90 per cent, and illicit Colombian armed groups
DAVID VALENTIN SCHWEIGER is a second year BA International Politics student at King’s College London.
operating also on this side of the border, their security is far from guaranteed. Furthermore corrupt policemen and soldiers may take advantage of the refugees’ vulnerability. Finding formal employment is a frustrating and nearly impossible endeavour for many of the refugees, who are denied work despite proper qualifications and due not only to legal restrictions but often also because of national discrimination. Therefore, many of them are forced to accept informal, unattractive, and underpaid employment. Most of President Hugo Chávez’ flawed so-
Photo Curtesy of www.elmundo.es
24
Egyptian politics are currently as unpredictable as they are complicated. As outside observers seek to understand the rapidly changing political landscape, it is important to remember that for many the revolution continues. Change is ongoing and despite the recent success of Mohamed Morsi in the presidential elections, the long-term political direction of Egypt is far from decided. It would be a mistake for scholars and the international community to use the election results to assume either that the future of Egypt is assured, or that the country is destined for Islamist leadership. This article argues that although the Muslim Brotherhood has been successful in the early stages of Egypt’s new democracy, this success was more the result of circumstance, political maturity and election tactics than a reflection of the will of the people.As Morsi settles into the role of president, questions about the future of Egypt continue to loom large. Who is in control? To what degree does the Muslim Brotherhood dominate and what does this mean for Egypt’s foreign and domestic policy? What happened to the non-Islamists behind the uprising in 2011, and will they reemerge?
25
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
To begin to address some of these issues, insights gained through interviews with key political actors are used to identify and briefly explore five key points that outside observers should bear in mind as they consider the broader implications of the Muslim Brotherhood ascension to the presidency: 1) the need to contextualize Morsi’s victory in the elections; 2) the questionable motives of the Muslim Brotherhood’s charitable donations and the subsequent distrust this has generated toward the party; 3) the advantage political maturity and financing provide the Muslim Brotherhood; 4) the Muslim Brotherhood as both Islamist and capitalist; and 5) the uncertainty of Morsi’s long-term power and aims.
the presidential elections, they would have won. 2. The questionable motives of the Muslim Brotherhood’s charitable donations and the subsequent distrust this has generated toward the party. During the parliamentary and presidential elections the Brotherhood has been accused of using both its religious foundation and strong finances to unfairly bias voters. In both elections, the Muslim Brotherhood provided voters in poor and rural districts with meat, rice, and oil in exchange for votes and often drove buses of voters directly to the polling stations. Critics argue that this is bribery masked as charity. They contend that this form of giving creates long-term dependency and argue that while the distribution of these goods may
1. The need to contextualize Morsi’s victory in the
provide immediate relief, it provides no long-term
presidential elections
mechanism for the poor to develop skills or provide
Morsi’s ultimate victory in the second round of the
services to make this segment of the population self-
presidential race must be taken into context and be
sufficient and less dependent on charitable donations.
understood not as a sign of widespread support, but as
Tactics such as these have caused many Egyp-
a rejection of former Mubarak Prime Minister Ahmed
tians to question the integrity and motives of the party
Shafiq and also an indication of the failure of the liberal
and further supports the argument that the actions of
candidates to consolidate forces and run under a sin-
the Muslim Brotherhood have been carefully focused
gle ticket.
on a single aim—assuming power.
By the June 2012 presidential elections, the Muslim Brotherhood was increasingly viewed with skepticism by voters. Election promises made during the parliamentary elections of November 2011-January 2012, were tossed aside and critics claimed that the party had hijacked the revolution to consolidate their own power base and Islamist agenda. As suspicions grew and the Brotherhood reneged on an earlier promise not to run for the presidency, many voters drew away from the Muslim Brotherhood and toward centrist pro-revolutionary candidates such as moderate Islamist Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatooh and center-leftist Hamdeen Sabahi. Had these men joined forces prior to
Photo Curtesy of AP PHOTO/MANU BRABO
3. The advantage political maturity and financing provide Muslim Brotherhood In the parliamentary and presidential elections, the parties created by the revolutionaries of Tahrir Square were new, highly disorganized, decentralized and had little financing. In the 11 months between Mubarak’s resignation and the first parliamentary elections, these groups sought to organize themselves as political parties and simultaneously run for office. In sharp contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood was an experienced and mature political force. With over 82 years of political experience in Egypt, the organization benefited from a vast […]
26
network of established supporters in each of Egypt’s
achieve their goals. Free and open trade relations will
governorates, a well organized and tightly managed
be a priority. Aggressive foreign policy aimed at Israel
network of leaders, and the ability to generate funds.
or any other state is unlikely as it would generate in-
These factors gave the Brotherhood a substantial ad-
stability and run counter to these aims.
vantage as they profited from the political immaturity and upheaval facing their opponents. 4. The Muslim Brotherhood as both Islamist and capitalist The Muslim Brotherhood are not simply Islamists, they are also capitalists. Led by successful and dynamic businessmen such as Khairat al-Shater (the Brotherhood’s original presidential candidate and a longtime leader and financer of the organization) the Brotherhood understands the importance of simultaneously growing Egypt’s economy to secure its own position of power through the accumulation of wealth while also being seen to satisfy the demands of the revolution. These demands include higher wages, greater employment opportunities and more equal distribution of wealth. The Muslim Brotherhood aims to achieve these objectives largely through free trade, economic development and attracting foreign direct investment. To make this possible, a greater degree of economic and political stability must be achieved to lure investors back to Egypt. Morsi’s actions thus far indicate that he remains closely aligned with the Brotherhood in the pursuit of these goals. While Morsi and the Brotherhood may differ from Mubarak by first looking east to the Gulf rather than west to Europe and the United States in the first instance as a source of investment, few potential investors are likely to be dismissed and these astute political actors will continue to be incentivized to cooperate with the international community and maintain strong relationships with the US and Europe to
27
5. The uncertainty of Morsi’s long-term power and aims Upon assuming office, Morsi’s power and authority was limited by two primary sources. First, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) prevented Morsi from serving as commander-in-chief and maintained legislative, military, and budgetary control of Egypt. Second, the power of the president was further limited by perceptions that Morsi was little more than a puppet of the Brotherhood and selected as their candidate based on his demonstrated willingness to follow instructions from key party leaders (including alShater). While it appeared that the SCAF would significantly limit Morsi’s power and authority as president, his recent actions indicate a focused attempt to centralize control and authority in Egypt. On August 12, the president issued a constitutional declaration to transfer legislative authority from the SCAF to the president, forced the resignation (retirement) of the two most senior members of the SCAF among others, and appointed a new vice-president. While weakened, the SCAF maintains control of the military and Morsi and the Brotherhood have said they will continue to accept the authority of the SCAF on matters of foreign policy and domestic security. The economic implications of this are significant given that Egypt is the recipient of $1.3 billion a year from the United States in military aid and additionally owns as much as onethird of the nation’s economy through a vast network of government-owned service and manufacturing companies. It is important to recognize that, while weak-
Dialogue | Autumn 2012
ened, the military continues to hold a great deal of
ship in Egypt is not a forgone conclusion. The Egyp-
power. Morsi’s actions, however, bring in to question
tian people remain uncertain about the political party
both the degree of power the military has over the
best poised to represent their interests. The people
president and the degree to which the SCAF can—or
will demand that their wishes be upheld and having
would—challenge his authority to block the assump-
recently deposed President Hosni Mubarak, they will
tion of additional powers.
not tolerate the pursuit of individual- or party-interests
The relationship between Morsi and the Mus-
over national interests. The centralization of power by
lim Brotherhood also creates uncertainty about
the president in recent weeks has created worries
Morsi’s real power. Although the president officially
among secularists that the reforms, in combination
resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood when he took
with recent restrictions on the media, may indicate a
office, Morsi is widely seen as little more than a fig-
transition toward a more authoritarian form of govern-
urehead president who continues to closely consult
ment reminiscent of the Mubarak era.[ix] The degree
Brotherhood leaders and follow their policies, aims
to which Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood will be
and objectives. One recent indicator of their contin-
able to satisfy the populace remains uncertain, and
ued closeness was seen when Morsi announced the
for many in Egypt, regardless of who is in power, the
retirement of the generals. The Muslim Brotherhood
revolution will continue.
financed the transportation of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters to Tahrir Square from various
Dr. AMI J. ABOU-BAKR is an Egyptian-
governorates to publically celebrate his announce-
American lecturer in Politics at King’s Col-
ment.[viii] This level of support indicates the Brotherhood’s ongoing support for Morsi and their continued alignment.
lege London. She is the author of the forthcoming book, Managing Disasters Through
Although the SCAF’s influence and grip on
Public-Private Partnerships, scheduled for
power has apparently lessened in recent weeks, the
publication by Georgetown University Press
personal motives and ambitions of the president remain unclear. Close links with the Muslim Brother-
in the spring of 2013.
hood are both predictable and evident, but the degree
This article was originally published at: e- Internation-
to which Morsi will continue to operate “under orders”
al Relations (http://www.e-ir.info/2012/08/23/
from the Brotherhood is not yet certain. Conclusion
mohamed-morsi-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-whythe-revolution-continues)
While the five factors above are not exhaustive, they illustrate that Muslim Brotherhood (or Islamist) leader-
Photo Curtesy of voiceseducation.org
28
The King’s College London Politics Society is entering its second year. It leaves behind a year filled with progress and achievements and has an ambitious vision for the future. What started in 2011 as merely a promising project has successfully developed into a distinctive political society that engages its members in political discussions. In the past year, the society organized a series of high-profile conferences and interactive workshops, with speakers ranging from academics and journalists to diplomats. It continued to be the only studentlead political society across London, to host complimentary wine receptions to facilitate networking and discussions between students and experts. While focusing on its members across KCL, the society has successfully gone beyond the College’s campuses to cooperate with major political organizations. This was exemplified by the series of debates on the French presidential and parliamentary elections, covered by mainstream French media and praised by the French Ambassador to the U.K. But, our mission does not stop there. Focusing on further engaging you in political discussions, the Society has ambitiously established its first political journal: Dialogue. Dialogue is aimed to be a platform for publications on pressing political issues. What distinguishes it from many of its kind is its diverse and global approach. Accordingly, while presenting a balance publication, this issue included several commentaries from KCL and international students We are just at the beginning of an exciting path. The Society has developed rapidly, but it is yet to present many of its upcoming events and projects. Our audiences have always been the critical center of our development. Therefore, I, on the behalf of the committee, want to thank you for being supportive of us.