Kelley Kronenberg - In the Know - First-Party Property Appellate - Feb/Mar 2024

IN THE NOW

FIRST- PARTY PROPERTY

APPELLATE EDITION

FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY APPELLATE TEAM

Tallahassee | Atlanta

T: (850) 577-1301

kfernandes@kklaw.com

Jacksonville

T: (904) 549-7700

dmontgomery@kklaw.com

ADMISSIONS

Florida • Georgia • United States Court of Appeal, Eleventh Circuit

SELECTED OPINIONS

w Expert Inspections, LLC d/b/a ITest d/b/a Moldexpert.com a/a/o Pat Beckford v. United Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 333 So.3d 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (holding that an insurer cannot be required to follow the terms of an AOB contract where the insurer is not a party to that contract).

w The Kidwell Group, LLC d/b/a Air Quality Assessors of Florida a/a/o Maria Amadio v. Olympus Insurance Company, Case No. 5D21-2955 (Fla. 5th DCA July 22, 2022) (interpreting section 627.7152, F.S., as applying to AOB contracts executed after the enactment of the statute, finding the policy inception date irrelevant to the analysis).

w Saunders v. Florida Peninsula Insurance Company, 314 So.3d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (interpreting the “faulty workmanship” policy exclusion to include the workmanship process as well as the finished product in affirming the insurer’s denial of a property damage claim).

w The Kidwell Group, LLC d/b/a Air Quality Assessors of Florida a/a/o Benjamin Kivovitz, Case No. 4D21 2843 (Fla. 4th DCA June 15, 2022) (enforcing the new section 627.7152, F.S., requirement of including a line-item estimate with an AOB contract at the time of execution)

ADMISSIONS

Florida • U.S. District Court, Northern District of Florida • U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida

SELECTED OPINIONS

w Progressive American Insurance Company v. Glassmetics, LLC, No. 2D21-488, 2022 WL 1592154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (“we reverse the trial court’s order and its conclusions (1) that the appraisal provision was against the public policy underlying section 627.428; (2) that the appraisal provision failed to provide sufficient procedures and methodologies; (3) that Progressive waived its appraisal right; (4) that the appraisal provision was unenforceable because Progressive failed to prove that the insured knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights of access to courts, to a jury trial, and to due process; and (5) that the appraisal provision contains an ambiguity.”).

w All Auto Glass v. Progressive American Ins. Co., Case No. 2018-SC-3126, 2019-33-AP (Fla. Seminole Cnty. Appellate Division.) (“reversing trial court, holding ruling of district court of appeal in jurisdiction other than where trial court is located is binding upon trial court absent conflict with another district court of appeal. )

w Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v Broward Ins. Recovery Ctr., LLC, 322 So. 3d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“reversing trial court, holding prohibitive cost doctrine inapplicable to appraisal”).

Daniel

Timely Notice –Conflict Certified

Mario Arce, et. al., v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 3D22-0722 (January 3, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

If notice is untimely, prejudice is presumed even with policy language containing “if prejudicial to us.”

BACKGROUND:

In this appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeals opinion in Perez v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 345 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). In Perez, the Fourth District Court of Appeals held that where the policy includes “if prejudicial to us” within the postloss conditions, the carrier is not entitled to the presumption of prejudice.

In this matter, the Insured reported the loss three years after Hurricane Irma. The claim was denied for late notice. During litigation, the Insured testified that he discovered the problem and made repairs soon after Irma. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens for untimely reporting.

The Third District made clear that requiring proof of prejudice frustrates the purpose of the notice requirement. The goal of notice is to allow a carrier to investigate, prevent fraud, and form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities before it is obliged to pay.

The Third District further emphasized that shifting the burden on the carrier for incorporating the common law legal standard into its policy is counterintuitive.

Lastly, the Third District expressed concerns about adopting the Perez standard as it would assault stability and predictability in the law, a value the Third District seeks to uphold.

Notice of Intent to Litigate

Fernando Cantens and Ana Marie Cantens v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, etc. (Feb. 14, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

Notice of Intent to Litigate is procedural and can be applied retroactively.

BACKGROUND:

Insureds’ policy predated the enactment of section 627.70152, Florida Statutes. Recently, the Sixth District Court of Appeals certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeals, holding the statute was substantive and thus could not be applied retroactively. Hughes v. Universal Prop. &

Cas. Ins. Co., 374 So. 3d 900, 910 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023); Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

The Third District Court of Appeals expressly agrees with the Fourth, holding that the Menendez case is distinguishable from Cole and that section 627.70152, Florida Statutes, was procedural. The Third District did clarify that even if you considered the attorney fee limitation of subsection 627.70152(8), it would not preclude enforcement of the notice requirement. While the attorney fee issue was not on appeal, the Third District agreed that even if one provision is substantive, it does not preclude the other finding of another provision as procedural. It is only when they are intimately intertwined does the substantive prohibition apply.

AOB Sufficiency

Gale Force Roofing and Restoration, LLC v. American Integrity Ins. Co., 2D22-4104 (Feb. 16, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

Section 627.7152, Florida Statutes, requires strict compliance.

KK TAKEAWAY:

Statutory requirements cannot be met via piecemeal compliance.

BACKGROUND:

The Second District Court of Appeals affirms the trial court order granting American Integrity’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to strictly comply with the statutory language set for in section 627.7152(2)(a)(2) by relying on subsection (2) (a)(6):

Contain a provision that allows the assignor to rescind the assignment agreement without a penalty or fee by submitting a written notice of rescission signed by the assignor to the assignee within 14 days after the execution of the agreement, at least 30 days after the date work on the property is scheduled to commence if the assignee has not substantially performed, or at least 30 days after the execution of the agreement if the agreement does not contain a commencement date and the assignee has

not begun substantial work on the property. Fla. Stat. 627.7152(2)(a)(2) (2021)

YOU ARE AGREEING TO GIVE UP CERTAIN RIGHTS YOU HAVE UNDER YOUR INSURANCE POLICY TO A THIRD PARTY, WHICH MAY RESULT IN LITIGATION AGAINST YOUR INSURER. PLEASE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS DOCUMENT BEFORE SIGNING IT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CANCEL THIS AGREEMENT WITHOUT PENALTY WITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE DATE THIS AGREEMENT IS EXECUTED, AT LEAST 30 DAYS AFTER THE DATE WORK ON THE PROPERTY IS SCHEDULED TO COMMENCE IF THE ASSIGNEE HAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED, OR AT LEAST 30 DAYS AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE AGREEMENT IF THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN A COMMENCEMENT DATE AND THE ASSIGNEE HAS NOT BEGUN SUBSTANTIAL WORK ON THE PROPERTY. HOWEVER, YOU ARE OBLIGATED FOR PAYMENT OF ANY CONTRACTED WORK PERFORMED BEFORE THE AGREEMENT IS RESCINDED. THIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT CHANGE YOUR OBLIGATION TO PERFORM THE DUTIES REQUIRED UNDER YOUR PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICY.

Fla. Stat. 627.7152(2)(a)(2), (6) (2021). Gale Force only includes the bold-print language as required by section 627.7152(2)(a)(6). Doing so was insufficient as (2)(a)(6) does not include the required language of (2)(a)(2) in two parts:

1) (2)(a)(2) contains “without penalty or fee”, whereas (2)(a)(6) contains “without penalty.”

2) (2)(a)(2) requires recission by submitting “written notice”, whereas (2)(a)(6) is silent as to the method for submitting recission.

While Gale Force complied with the boldface, they could not rely on that alone to satisfy the requirement of (2)(a)(2). The Second District Court of Appeals clarified that only requiring the boldface language of section (2)(a)(6) would render subsection (2)(a)(2) meaningless.

The Second District went a step further in acknowledging Gale Force’s separate document, which includes submission language, is insufficient as the legislature has prohibited piecemeal compliance amongst several provisions. See, e.g., Samples v. Fla. Birth-Related Neuro. Inj. Comp. Ass’n, 114 So. 3d 912, 916 (Fla. 2013)( rejecting a plural interpretation of statute where plain language is unambiguously stated in the singular).

Statutory Changes – What Law Applies

KK TAKEAWAY:

There must be legislative intent in a statute to apply retroactively.

KK TAKEAWAY:

Silence or a statement of “effective on a particular date” is not evidence of retroactive intent.

BACKGROUND:

The trial court granted Grove Isle’s motion for judgment on the pleadings by retroactively applying statutory amendments to section 627.714(4), Florida Statutes. The policy was issued before the amendment of the statute. The statutory amendment required a policy to provide an association insurer subrogation rights against an individual unit owner if the issuing carrier wanted subrogation rights against the association.

Universal’s action against Grove Isle was based on Grove Isle’s negligent maintenance of an exterior wall. Grove Isle argued, and the trial court agreed that since the required

subrogation rights were not given to Grove Isle’s insurer, Universal could not maintain a subrogation action against Grove Isle.

The dispute is whether the date of the policy controls or the date on which the negligent action accrued. The Fourth District agreed with the policy date controls as the right to subrogation was set forth in the policy, thus, that was when the right became vested. However, the Fourth District found the legislature gave no retroactive intent as it only had “amendments are effective on” a particular date. This gives no evidence of retroactive intent but rather a rebuttal argument against retroactive intent.

Nation Security, LLC v. Everest National Ins. Co., et. al.

Prejudgment Interest

Universal Property and Casualty Ins. Co. a/s/o Dolores Senko v. Grove Isle

At Vero Beach Condo. Asso., Inc. 4D2023-0021 (Feb. 28, 2024).

KK TAKEAWAY:

There must be a denial of coverage to trigger prejudgment interest.

BACKGROUND:

Nation Security appeals a summary judgment granted against it. Regarding policy language, Nation Security argued that Everest relied upon the policy for its claim of breach of contract but never placed the policy into the record. The Third District reversed summary judgment on this basis, clarifying that summary judgment must be granted on evidence in the record.

Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Annette Peipert, 3D22-1335 (Feb. 14, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

There must be a denial of coverage to trigger prejudgment interest.

BACKGROUND:

Insured sought damages for Hurricane Irma, and Citizens opened covered. Insured then sought supplemental payment through a public adjuster. Citizens once again issued payment. Insured filed a breach of contract action, and the parties subsequently proceeded to appraisal. An appraisal award was entered and then paid by Citizens two days later. Citizens sought summary judgment, and the Insured opposed seeking payment for prejudgment interest. The trial court awarded the Insured prejudgment interest.

The Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s holding that there was no denial of coverage; rather, it was a dispute regarding the amount of loss. Because Citizens did not deny coverage and timely paid, the Insured was not entitled to prejudgment interest.

Prejudgment Interest

Aymee Taylor v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co., 5D23-0243 (Feb. 2, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

A policy section with a standalone, independent obligation to pay interest can form the sole basis for a cause of action only for interest.

BACKGROUND:

This claim went through appraisal, and State Farm paid the appraisal award. The Insured filed a breach of contract action and statutory claim for interest-based upon State Farm’s failure to include interest. The trial court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss on the basis that section 627.70131(5) (a) expressly states, “[h]owever, failure to comply with this subsection does not form the sole basis for a private cause of action.”

Ms. Taylor argues on appeal that regardless of the statutory claim, she still has a right to seek damages for breach of the loss

payment provision. State Farm’s policy expressly states:

If we do not pay or deny a loss within 90 days after we receive notice of an initial, reopened, or supplemental property insurance claim from you and no factors beyond our control would reasonably prevent us from making payment, interest will be paid in accordance with Section 627.70131(5) of the Florida Insurance Code.

The Fifth District reversed the trial court distinguishing this scenario from prior Barbato v. State Farm Insurance Co., 2023 WL 2959138 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-11645 (11th Cir. May 15, 2023), in which the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a policy expressly incorporates section 627.70131(5)(a) into the policy, the preclusion on a standalone action remains. However, the Fifth District noted that the policy does not expressly incorporate the statute but creates a separate policy provision requiring interest payment. In doing so, State Farm created a basis for a cause of action for failure to comply with a policy condition. The Fifth District clarifies that the only reference to the statute is how interest is calculated.

The Fifth District held that a policy that contains a standalone, independent obligation to pay interest can form the sole basis for a cause of action.

Trial – Surprise Witness

Heritage Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Killmeyer, 4D2022-1298 (Feb. 28, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

The trial court must analyze whether a late disclosed witness is a surprise.

KK TAKEAWAY:

If a witness is a surprise, the trial court looks to prejudice and the ability to cure.

BACKGROUND:

Insured sought appeal after the verdict in favor of the Insureds on two theories. The trial court improperly permitted:

1) A surprise witness was used to testify about the submission of a sworn proof of loss, although neither the witness nor the sworn proof of loss was disclosed by order

setting trial.

2) Insureds’ expert was permitted to testify to a non-disclosed opinion on damages.

The Fourth District did not reach the second theory as it reversed the trial court of the first issue.

Insureds submitted a water damage claim regarding a water supply line leak. They then filed a separate claim for hurricane damage. Heritage requested a sworn proof of loss. Insureds contend they executed it, and a paralegal submitted the sworn proof of loss.

Three years later, the Insureds sued for breach of contract. Heritage requested admissions where the Insureds denied their failure to submit a sworn proof of loss. A trial court was issued, and the Insureds listed “Any and all correspondence between the insureds or their attorneys and the insurer, its agents, or attorneys. However, the exhibit list did not provide a sworn proof of loss.

During trial preparation, the Insureds’ counsel discovered a verdict form instruction

regarding the sworn proof of loss. Insureds’ counsel issued a subpoena to Heritage’s desk adjuster which was quashed as it was past the trial deadline.

At trial, the corporate representative for Heritage testified that if Heritage had received sworn proof of loss, it would have issued a letter acknowledging the receipt.

The Insureds then tried to call their attorney’s paralegal, who was not listed as a witness.

The trial court initially denied the request but ultimately allowed the paralegal to testify.

The paralegal testified he submitted the sworn proof via email even though the email was not disclosed prior to testimony, nor was it in the record on appeal. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Insureds, specifically finding that Universal failed to show that the Insureds did not comply with the submission requirement.

The Fourth District reversed, holding the testimony was a surprise as the Insureds’ counsel admitted it was unexpected. The Fourth concluded the paralegal was a surprise witness for both parties. The Fourth noted there was also no record of the email submission thus, the substance and identity of the paralegal as a witness were unknown.

The Fourth then transitioned into the second prong of the Binger analysis: prejudice.

The Fourth acknowledged Heritage was prejudiced as it had no knowledge of this issue before trial and only learned of such mid-trial. If Heritage had prior knowledge, it may have been able to discover an opposing witness or examine the validity of the email.

Trial – Evidentiary Rulings

Sandra Perez Carbonell v. Citizens Property Ins. Corp. 2D22-495 (Jan. 5, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

Cross-examination of experts cannot go beyond direct, nor can it acquire an unqualified opinion.

KK TAKEAWAY:

The trial court has broad discretion to limit rebuttal testimony.

BACKGROUND:

Insured sought appeal after verdict, in favor of Citizens, under two evidentiary issues regarding the trial court’s impermissible preclusion of:

1) cross-examination of the defendant’s expert regarding sinkhole activity

2) reliance on the deposition testimony of the defendant’s expert regarding the downward differential

Regarding the first issue, the Insured believed she had the right to examine Citizen’s expert regarding sinkhole activity. Citizen’s expert, Mr. Edwards, is a licensed engineer and testified as to the settlement of the foundation. He testified there was no settlement damage and the property was in good condition. The Insured’s attorney sought to cross-examine Mr. Edwards on

sinkhole activity. Citizens objected, arguing their expert never offered an opinion on whether sinkhole activity occurred or did not occur. The objection was sustained, finding the question was beyond direct examination, which was limited to settlement activity.

Insured’s counsel again on re-cross sought to have Mr. Edwards, given he relied upon a data set that involved sinkhole activity.

Citizens clarified that although he reviewed data, he never testified to whether there was or was not sinkhole activity thus, the cross was beyond the direct. The trial court denied re-cross. Even with a proffer of testimony, Mr. Edwards was clear that he was never retained to opine whether there was sinkhole activity.

The Second District Court of Appeals took a few issues with Insured’s claim. First, Insured’s counsel claimed the preclusion of this testimony prevented Insured from

presenting a key issue in the case. However, the Second District pointed out that Insured presented two expert witnesses who testified to sinkhole damage. Second, Insured never demonstrated that Mr. Edwards was qualified to provide testimony regarding sinkhole activity.

Regarding the second issue, the Second District emphasized the trial court’s broad discretion regarding rebuttal testimony. Insured sought to rely on deposition testimony for the Citizen’s investigating engineer, who agreed there was evidence of a downward differential. The trial court precluded the rebuttal testimony as cumulative, given that the insured’s experts had already provided testimony.

Trial –Contradictive Verdict

Universal Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Paris Tsirnikas, 2D223539 (Feb. 23, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

A jury finding of no liability cannot result in damages to the Insured.

KK TAKEAWAY:

A jury verdict finding no liability and the cost of repairs is consistent.

BACKGROUND:

Universal seeks an appeal of the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of the Insured, whereas the jury verdict found the loss resulted from an exception or exclusion of

the policy. The jury answered the following six questions on the verdict form as follows:

1. Did Plaintiffs, Paris Tsirnikas and John Tsirnikas,1 fail to provide the documentation they were required to provide prior to receiving the denial letter, dated February, 12, 2018?

YES_____ NO ___√___

2. Did Plaintiffs, Paris Tsirnikas and John Tsirnikas, fail to provide the documentation they were required to provide prior to filing the lawsuit?

YES_____ NO ___√___

3. Did Plaintiff, Paris Tsirnikas, establish by the greater weight of the evidence the dock is covered property?

YES___√___ NO ______

If your answer to question 3 is NO, your verdict is for the Defendant and you should not proceed further, except to 1 John Tsirnikas was originally a plaintiff in the lawsuit, but he passed away when the suit

was pending in the trial court. 3 date and sign this verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If you answered YES to question 3, please answer question

4. Did Plaintiff, Paris Tsirnikas, establish by the greater weight of the evidence the dock sustained a direct physical loss on Nov. 24, 2017?

YES___√___ NO ______

If your answer to question 4 is NO, your verdict is for the Defendant and you should not proceed further, except to date and sign this verdict form and return it to the courtroom. If you answered YES to question 4, please answer question.

5. Did the Defendant establish by the greater weight of the evidence that the alleged damage to the dock was the result of an excepted and/or excluded cause of loss?

YES___√___ NO ______

6. What is the cost to repair the dock at actual cash value? TOTAL $9,400

Before the final judgment was entered, Universal filed a motion for remitter seeking to reduce the damages calculation to zero. The motion argued the jury specifically requested if they needed to determine compensation for the Insured. The trial court advised they were required to follow the instructions on the verdict form. Universal argued the jury was following the instructions on the form. However, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the Insured. The Second District held that the verdict was consistent as the verdict can find no liability and award damages. However, as a matter of law, damages cannot be entered where there is no liability. The Second District held the verdict form, which was that it found no liability, and then stated how much it would cost to repair the Insured’s boat dock.

Second, the trial court erred by entering judgment in favor of the Insured after a verdict of no liability.

Default

Universal Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mulaire Andre and Charmaine Andre, 4D2022-2680 (Jan. 17, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

A defendant is entitled to notice and the right to be heard before entry of default.

KK TAKEAWAY:

The default is void if there is no notice or right to be heard when any paper is filed.

BACKGROUND:

Universal appeals two orders from the trial court:

1) default order for failure to appear at a mandatory conference and

2) order denying the amended motion to vacate and set aside

The default order resulted in Universal’s failure to appear at a case management conference. The Fourth District clarified that even if the order listed default as a possible sanction, Universal had the right to notice and a hearing to address whether the noncompliance was willful or in bad faith. The Fourth held that the default order was void because it was not provided either.

The Fourth District, still yet, went to the second issue to elaborate on the requirements to vacate a default if not void:

1) There must be due diligence. In this case, the motion to vacate was filed five days after the initial order; thus, it was diligent.

2) There must be excusable neglect. In this case, there was an affidavit from counsel and secretary that the event was mis-calendared.

3) There must be a meritorious defense. An answer was filed before the default entry; thus, this is uncontroverted.

Bad Faith

Susan Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., No. 4D2022-2376 (Jan. 3, 2024)

KK TAKEAWAY:

After determining liability and damages, you cannot re-litigate coverage in bad faith litigation.

KK TAKEAWAY:

The duty to investigate and evaluate claims includes properly evaluating coverage.

BACKGROUND:

First, Protective paid the full award after an appraisal award in the Insured’s favor. After that, the Insured filed a bad faith action from the post-CRN expiration award and payment. In response to the complaint about bad faith, First Protective did not assert coverage defenses. However, First Protective filed

a motion for summary judgment, arguing that during the bad faith investigation, it discovered the loss was excluded under the policy. The trial court ultimately agreed with First Protective, partly because experts for both sides agreed the losses were caused by settlement, which is excluded under the policy. The trial court held where coverage does not exist, bad faith cannot exist.

The Fourth District clarified that the purpose of underlying litigation is to determine whether coverage exists, liability, and the extent of contractual damages. The Fourth District emphasized that determining liability and damages after the expiration of a CRN sets the condition precedent for a bad faith suit. The Fourth District pointed out the correct process would have been to challenge coverage during the appraisal process. The Fourth clarifies that bad faith addresses the timely evaluation and payment of benefits owed, including the duty to evaluate the claim properly and promptly.

ACCOLADES AWARDS AND FIRM AWARDS

Kelley Kronenberg has been the recipient of numerous awards and honors both firm-wide and for a number of our practices, including individual accolades. Below is a select list of recognition and awards:

MEET THE

CONTRIBUTORS

Jeffrey M. Wank Chair, First-Party Property and Insurance Coverage Division

Email Jeffrey M. Wank

Jeffrey Wank is Chair of First-Party Property and Insurance Coverage focusing his practice on first-party property insurance Defense, including coverage and bad faith litigation. Jeffrey also handles the defense of a wide array of third-party insurance defense claims.

Jeffrey assists insurers in all aspects of coverage disputes, including responses to civil remedy notices of insurer violations, pre-suit investigations and coverage evaluations, declaratory judgment and bad faith litigation. He defends property insurers throughout Florida in first-party coverage matters, where many of the claims involve sinkhole, windstorm, fire, mold, theft and water losses.

In addition, Jeffrey serves as coverage and bad faith counsel in third-party actions, including monitoring the defense of litigation. As part of this role, he is often asked to draft detailed coverage opinions, reservation of rights letters, declinations, and prosecute declaratory relief actions.

Jeffrey also has experience in handling complex civil and commercial matters, including the defense of personal injury, premises liability, employment discrimination, medical malpractice, nursing home liability, homeowner and condominium association claims, and construction defect cases.

Jeffrey has been named a Florida Super Lawyer Rising Star since 2014. In 2011, he was elected to the Broward Bar Association Young Lawyers Section Board of Directors, where he served as Secretary on the organization’s Executive Board and moved up to President in June 2015. Jeffrey was also named the Chair on the Board of Directors of Legal Aid Service of Broward County & Coast to Coast Legal Aid of South Florida for the 2019 term and previously served as the Vice Chair for the 2018 term.

Jeffrey earned his Bachelor of Science in Political Science from Florida State University and went on to earn his Juris Doctor degree from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.

Email Daniel Montgomery

Daniel Montgomery is a Partner at Kelley Kronenberg where he assists in handling matters related to first-party property insurance defense. Daniel handles all aspects of first-party property defense, including coverage disputes, pre-suit investigations, fraud investigations, and CRN responses. Additionally, our clients frequently engage Daniel to assist with the development of claims processes and procedures. Daniel’s practice is also focused on the highly-specialized areas of first-party property appeals and auto glass defense.

Prior to joining Kelley Kronenberg, Daniel worked as an Associate Attorney with an Am Law 200 firm, focusing his practice on first-party auto coverage and litigation, general liability litigation, and appellate law. Daniel also practiced as an Assistant State Attorney for Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit, in Jacksonville, where he litigated a variety of criminal proceedings through trial and served as a liaison for UVISA Certifications.

Daniel received his Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice, summa cum laude, with a Certificate of Crime Scene Investigation, from Colorado Technical University. He then went on to earn his Juris Doctor degree from Florida Coastal School of Law, graduating cum laude.

Since Law School, Daniel continued his education by obtaining a Master of Science, summa cum laude, from Florida State University, with a Certificate in U.S. Intelligence. Daniel acquired an additional LL.M. in Executive Litigation Management from Baylor Law School.

During Daniel’s career he has served on several committees and groups continually working to develop awareness, knowledge, and best practices in a variety of areas including mental health, utilizing technology to drive efficiencies, special investigations, and litigation management best practices.

Daniel Montgomery Partner

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Founded in 1980, Kelley Kronenberg is an award winning, multi-practice national law firm with 495 employees, 220 attorneys, and 16 locations throughout Florida and the United States.

We are privileged to represent large public and private companies, small businesses, and individuals nationwide. With more than 40 practice areas, and growth on the horizon, we offer a comprehensive catalog of legal services to protect your legal interests in business and at home.

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