=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
I am not proud, that I am sending you all these papers against my own country, but because I want the best GOOD of my country and because I LOVE GREECE, as every ci�zen of every country should want the best progress for it ’s own country, I don’t have in mind any other op�on right now and I am sending you all these papers. Honestly, I wish, you to show your empathy for the educa�onal problems that exist in Greece �ll two deca�es and help children and educators. You have the power to help us, PLEASE help GREECE from herself and give her the opportunity to imitate a part of your legal system. It is necessary to estamblish here a Cons�tu�onal Court and then we are going to fix any problems are going to appear (if they appear).
According to the professore Androulakis «When ... a provision of a law is contrary to the Constitution, as changing by simple legislation a fundamental provision of it ... the court is entitled not to apply it in the matter it is judging". This critical consideration of AP 23/1897 constitutes the birth consideration of the review of the constitutionality of laws in our country, at least at the level of the supreme court. Importantly, the authority to review unconstitutionality was recognized by the case law itself, recognized by the judge himself in his own right and not preceded by the drafting or revising legislature. Since that period, the system of control of unconstitutionality takes on its basic characteristics, namely its diffuse (rather than centralized), incidental (rather than direct) and concrete (rather than abstract) character. Above all, the provision deemed unconstitutional is not annulled. It just doesn't apply to this case.»
My opinion is, The cons�tu�on in Greece has a diffuse character, while it should become centralized. It has an incidental character, while it should be straigh�orward and has a concrete and not abstract character, this is posi�ve. The Cons�tu�on in the countries of the European Union is centralized, straigh�orward and abstract. In Greece, the provision which cons�tutes the review of the uncons�tu�onality of laws at least at the level of the supreme court, the AP 23/1897 is not annulled! This in my opinion is WRONG! Normally it should be cancelled! But what about? It is simply not applied in some cases, leading to the crea�on of a vicious cycle of uncons�tu�onality. This provision is the Trojan horse that reinforces uncons�tu�onality instead of condemning it!
According to Mr. Androulakis, «the decision of the Supreme Court 1/1929 was the first legislative provision that was deemed contrary to the Constitution, because it did not meet the conditions set by Article 114 of the then current Constitution. The Constitution of 1975 in Article 93 paragraph 4 of 1927 also contains the provision of Article 87 paragraph 2 according to which judges in the exercise of their work are subject only to the Constitution and the laws and in no case are they obliged to comply with provisions that they are put in place of abrogation of the Constitution (a provision that complements the previous one). Since the entry into force of the 1975 Constitution, it is possible to declare a provision of law as an aid erga omnes which is deemed contrary to the Constitution by a decision of the AED and for this reason the relevant decision is published on ΕτΚ The revision of 2001 contributed to the best organization of the audit in the opinion of Mr. Androulakis. With the new provision of paragraph 5 of article 100, when a division of the supreme court judges that a provision of the law is unconstitutional, it must refer the matter to the relevant Plenary for a final decision crisis. Article 1 of Law
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
2479/1997, A' 67 provides for the possibility of intervention by third parties in trials before the AED and the Plenary Sessions of the Supreme Courts, in which the question of the agreement of a provision of a law to the Constitution is raised.»
Greek Law Professor Manesis when he was alive had told something that for me as a ci�zen of Greece his words have a very important meaning to my heart: «Prove to them that only a free citizen is a good citizen» According to Aristotle, who is the best citizen of the best State?
«He is the active citizen, who participates by choice in the decisions of his city - both in the broader sense of deliberation and judgment, as well as in the narrower sense of exercising power - he is the prudent and moderate man, the man of sufficient means (neither super-rich nor super-poor ), who acts with responsibility, to ensure prosperity, education and peace in his city. It is the free mind that creates in autonomy and lives "at will" but at the same time willingly obeys the law and produces individual and collective works of virtue.» I want to be such a citizen please help me help the children and the teachers of my country. Τhe educational people have been oppressed for so, so many years because of demonstrably flawed teacher recruitment system ASEP and definitely, because of this jurisprudence YA 170405/ΓΓ1 article 5 par. 8, pursuant to which the current director of Primary Education is granted the ABUSIVE RIGHT to move teachers every two months in order to cover emergency needs and substitutes may therefore have no fixed placement! Pursuant to article 93 par. 4S the courts are obliged not to apply a law the content of which is contrary to the Constitution, it is therefore the OBLIGATION of the judiciary to proceed to judicial review of the constitutionality of this law.
«Only the intellectually free ci�zen can be a useful ci�zen and a useless ci�zen is one who believes that there can be no change and accepts an irra�onal situa�on without reac�ng to injus�ce» that is my personal view. For Aristotle eudaimonia is the highest human good. According him a good ci�zen stays loyal to the cons�tu�on of a country. «Civil servants are the executors of the will of the State and they serve the people owing allegiance to the Cons�tu�on and devo�on to the Fatherland.» Ari�cle 103 paragraf 1 of the Cons�tu�on.
Pursuant to Cons�tu�on and the laws, the Cons�tu�on also includes some other general or specific du�es of the individual towards the State. Between others… and the Obliga�on to resist in case the Cons�tu�on is abolished page 32 Cons�tu�onal Law: the duty of obedience has limits and these limits are determined by the fundamental rights which aimto counterbalance. Fundamental rights are «the lawful resistances against authority»
The opposite of the observance of the Cons�tu�on and the law is its viola�on which leads to the prescribed penal�es: Fundamental rights have always formed the «heart» of public law. According to Plato, a ci�zen knows how to rule and be ruled with jus�ce (Laws, 644a), a defini�on comparable to Aristotle’s statement that «the capacity to rule and be ruled is at any rate praised and being able to do both well is held to be the virtue of a ci�zen» (Poli�cs, 1277 a25-26).
Aristotle’s search for the good is a search for the highest good, whatever it turns out to be has three characteris�cs: it is desirable for itself, it is not desirable for the sake of some other good and all other goods are desirable for its sake. A form of social organiza�on according to Aristotle is the state, which is characterized by self-sufficiency, i.e. the ability to ensure not
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
only bio�c, but also spiritual needs in their full form, which is why the city argue Aristotle was not created to ensure only «life», i.e. the biological life, but also «ευ ζην», i.e. the higher spiritual life, every human should focus to help his society achieve quality of life.
According to Aristotle human’s des�ny is to reach comple�on. That is why he invokes «perfec�on», i.e. the comple�on of nature. The nature of every thing is its end comple�on. The city is an end ie comple�on of the first two natural socie�es (family and village). Aristotle consider the city as a society that has as its goal the good. So what is the most important of all goods that leads to happiness, which is the goal of both society and human? In Nikomachean Ethics Aristotle says that the most important thing in life is VIRTUE, because it leads to human’s bliss and happiness. This is or at least should be the goal of any state and by extension, of every ci�zen. Our planet Earth is constantly being destroyed in various ways. The solu�on in my opinion is not to try to relocate to other planets, because we will destroy them too. In my opinion, the solu�on is to focus our aten�on on ways that life on earth has a quality of life on earth for every being. How will society change, when the human who shapes tomorrow ’s ci�zen is punishing unfairly? All our aten�on needs to be given to the educa�on system of each country. In my view, only by correc�ng the wrong and strengthening the right can there actually be an improving healthy change.
Who is protec�ng the rights of educators? The trade unionists? Some of them definitely have a pure heart and the willingness to truly help selflessly, but not effec�vely. Since 20+ years exist this law ΥΑ 170405/ΓΓ1 article 5 par. 8, pursuant to which the current director of Primary Education is granted the ABUSIVE RIGHT to move teachers every two months therefore have no stable placement! and nobody done anything to make it abolished away from Greek educa�onal system. Also, there is a mater of �me before they are abolished and the main point in my opinion is that they are not legal representa�ves. In my opinion it is necessary for ASEP to go away from the educa�on system of Greece he creates educa�onal bureaucracy and to be replaced by the establishment of an Educa�onal Independent Authority and within it there will be established the Educa�on Advocate. Lawyers should exist to protect teachers from an administra�ve irregulari�es. It is inconceivable that nobody in the Greek legal world doesn’t protect teachers!
As a rule, pursuant to theory, is that: The Beneficiary must turn to the State which with its competent bodies will protect the right. It is a mater of Domes�c Law, specifically it belongs to Public Administra�ve Law and pursuant to art. 101Α the Cons�tu�on provides for the establishment and func�on of an independent authority, its members are appointed for a specific term and are governed by personal and func�onal independence, as determined by law. This is the reason why I address the Greek Ombudsman Ar�cle 103 par. 9 of the Cons�tu�on in the belief that as an Independent Authority is a State force that substan�ally has the possibility to help materially in the improvement of the educa�onal system of the country. I asked for immediate interven�on to setle the issues of the protec�on of the rights every teacher in Greece is required to face because of wrong poli�cal educa�onal choices of ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTION the Ministers of Educa�on of Greece with the natural consequence on the one hand the existence of a wrong management of the administra�ve status of the
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA. «The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
Administra�on bodies and on the other the absence of systema�c control leading to legality not being served. There should exist legal representa�on for the human who spends most �me of his life helping to develop the litle humans who are going to be the ci�zens of the future.
The problem in my country Greece is unfortunately the misconcep�on that the most easy thing is to blame poli�cians Every day I am learning something new and as Socrates said I realize «one thing, I know, that I know nothing», but �ll now I realized during these 9 months from reading law books, that the judicial power of Greece unconsciously prevents the change of the state situa�on. How? It reinforces the belief of a division of thought of legal en��es. I will try give you the views of some of legal professors of law school My personal opinion is that we need definitely outside external interven�on in order to exert pressure to establish a Cons�tu�onal Court in Greece. I know, that I am not a lawyer, but as a simple ci�zen I am trying with my wri�ng speech to convince you how important is your help to help us estamblish a Cons�tu�onal Court. Why is so important your help? Because there are so many years and the law professors aren’t going to admit how much important is the necessity it ’s existence and finally to estamblish it. A balanced and ideal model state will emerge in Greece, only if a Cons�tu�onal Court is established, and this is because it already has other categories of courts. In my opinion, only then, there will be an ideal legal balance.
According to law professore Venizelos, «the dual nature of the current system of Greece, in contrast to the centralized model review of the constitutionality of laws by an expert constitutional court ruling in Europe (with initial source of inspiration the Austrian constitutional court and the views of H. Kelsen), remains faithful to the system of the diffuse, incidental and specific judicial review there of constitutionality, by all courts of all levels and of all jurisdictions. This system, which has been in effect since the establishment of the new Hellinikon state2 , is organized based on articles 93 par. 4 and 100 Comp. and a large set of common procedural provisions3. THE pervasive and incidental nature of control is intensified in fact, from the fact that in our country it is traditionally the case system of separation of jurisdictions, resulting in there are three different high courts (Council of the Territory, Areios Pagos, Court of Auditors) and several special high-level courts (court malpractice lawsuits under article 99, special trial court disputes over salaries and pensions of judicial officials of article 88 par. 2, special court for criminal cases responsibility of the ministers according to article 86). His culmination of this form is the Supreme Special Court of article 100 of the Constitution, which includes important responsibilities with the most critical being the removal of the challenge for the unconstitutionality of a formal law provision, if any issued on this issue opposing decisions of two superiors courts. Of course, the original image of diffused control is changing through the common procedural provisions, but also at the level of the Constitution itself : The check in reality it is concentrated at the level of the three supreme courts and in fact of their Plenary and in cases of disagreement between two of them at the level of the Supreme Special Court. The proceedings of legal means, constitutionally enshrined institution of the petition for annulment through which a direct and direct issue can be raised constitutionality of an administrative act and through it issue constitutionality of the formal law on which it is based its issuance at the highest possible level, that is to level of the Council of State and the constitutional ones prescribed powers of the Court of Auditors are mechanisms that concentrate control and make it largely apparently only incidental in essence straight By the same logic the factual and legal implications of the relevant decisions of the supreme courts and in fact, they far exceed the limits of their Plenipotentiaries of the convicted and concern
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
essentially everyone. Therefore the control is apparently specific, while in essence becomes abstract. When he actually reaches his level AED, completely exceeds its occasion and therefore its limits specific case, as it evolves and explicitly now in abstract control, and the diagnosis of unconstitutionality it leads not just to marginalization, but to its abolition critical provision: The declaration of a provision of formal law as unconstitutional by the AED renders it invalid by publication of the relevant decision (ex nunc) or from the time defined by the decision (ie possibility ex tunc)»
In Greece, law professors have been divided into two categories and this is precisely what leads my opinion to the vicious cycle of the dishonesty of democracy. The opinions conclude that if a Cons�tu�onal Court is established, the status of the other Greek courts their value will be canceled and the volume of the work the new court will increase, so they conclude that bureaucracy will arise and its existence will be ineffec�ve, so there is no reason to establish it. They disagree on the same things for so many years.
As far as I study �ll nowadays, I gathered with a few words the reasons the Greek legal world support of no estamblish a Cons�tu�onal Court, these reasons mainly are:
According to Mr. Pikramenos, «If the purpose of the constitutional court is to resolve disputes arising from acts of government, which are currently not controlled by the Council of State, then there will be a restructuring of the entire constitutional edifice with the addition of a player who will have a judicial mantle, but in reality will participates in political becoming with all that this entails» According to Mr. Pikramenos, «an equally serious issue, which is perhaps the heart of the initiative to establish Constitutional Justice in Greece, is the way the Constitutional Court is constituted, the body responsible for their selection and the duration of their term of office. If the members of the Constitutional Court, or most of them, come from a very broad circle of persons outside the classic pools of justice and universities and their selection is made by a political body, government or parliament, then there is a risk that the establishment of the Constitutional Court will be considered as serving the political power in the sense of creating a filter to protect the legislator from the declaration of provisions as unconstitutional, as the persons who will staff the said court will be chosen primarily with political criteria and may even come from the field of politics. Similar arrangements may have worked successfully in foreign countries, but in Greece the political parties have not created a tradition of meritorious selection of persons, regarding the occupation of public positions that inspires confidence for the future. The ques�on arises as to what changes the establishment of the cons�tu�onal court will bring about in the architecture of jus�ce. According to Mr. Pikramenos, «the only thing certain is that it should then be abolished, because the Supreme Special Court will no longer be needed » I disagree with Mr. Pikramenos, I believe that there is no need for the extreme op�on of abolishing it, on the contrary, the Supreme Special Court could be upgraded as indeed the highest that will now undertake the setlement of only special legal cases that lead to a dead end setlement. According to Mr. Pikramenos, «if the solution of mandatory referral of the lower courts to the relevant supreme courts and from the latter to the Constitutional Court is chosen, then in addition to weakening the position of the supreme courts, a serious delay in the administration of justice is caused. According to Pikramenos, the revising constitutional legislator must take very seriously into account that the creation of the Constitutional Court decisively affects the position of the existing supreme courts, which are institutionally unorthodox to exist only in name as supreme, but in fact to they have a limited
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
scope of powers.» I disagree with Mr. Pikramenos. Why would he choose to express such an extreme choice? My opinion is that there is no need to abolish any of the exis�ng courts and could also establish the Cons�tu�onal Court and each court to direct it ’s own cases.
According to Mr. Vlachopoulos, «reactions to the establishment of a Constitutional Court in Greece also come from the Council of State, as can be seen from the minutes 5/2006 and 4/2007 of its Plenary Session, in which the opinion is expressed that: <<the establishment of a Constitutional Court with the competence of the final review of the constitutionality of laws will affect parameters related to the principles of the Rule of Law and the guarantees of effective protection of individual rights and will constitute the most radical possible overturning of the Greek Judicial System» Risk of judicialization of political life: strong aversion to the possibility of creating a «State of Judges» with the concentration of all control of the constitutionality of laws in one body, but also fears, that the intervention of the executive power in such a «Constitutional Court» will increase. The need for a judicial mechanism to resolve organizational constitutional disputes appears unmistakable in cases where the question is not actually of interpretation, but of application of the Constitution.
The mul�tude of interpreta�ve dichotomies in rela�on to the cons�tu�onal provisions concerning the organiza�on and opera�on of the state cannot be dealt with by explicitly resolving all issues in the text of the Cons�tu�on, as it is not possible to predict in advance all the cases that may arise in the cons�tu�onal reality. In this case, the establishment of a Cons�tu�onal Court, which will be entrusted with the responsibility of resolving the main organiza�onal cons�tu�onal disputes following the exercise of relevant legal aid, could cons�tute a decisive guarantee of compliance with the Cons�tu�on. A factor that leads to the establishment of a Cons�tu�onal Court is distrust towards poli�cal power. There is no absolute trust in judges surrounded by a regime of guarantees against poli�cal power. There is a fear about the establishment of the Cons�tu�onal Court due to the possibility of poli�cal interference in the judicial func�on. The big risk that is adopted is if the choice of origin of the members is made by a poli�cal body, government or parliament. Then the establishment of a Cons�tu�onal Court will be considered as serving the poli�cal power in the sense of crea�ng a legislator filter. My personal opinion is that since this fear rightly exists, the solu�on is not to not establish it, but to exclude these op�ons of origin.
According to Mr. Tasopoulos, a cons�tu�onal court would help a) the organiza�onal part of the cons�tu�on and b) social rights. Mr. Tasopoulos raised the rhetorical ques�on, do we really want the government acts (ΣΤΕ 2787/2015) of the Plenary for the referendum of 5.7.2015 for the judge to judge them?
In my opinion yes, because nobody is doing anything to change the condi�ons. Yes, there should be judges specializing in cons�tu�onal law In order to become a judge it means that he was once a small child who saw or experienced injus�ces against himself, his family or others and thus, became an adult a ci�zen who is trying to help change the world for being a beter place. Regardless that some�mes he can make some mistakes it is normal, because he is human. The human who is behind a judge role was led to serve one of the most difficult academic subjects My opinion is, that only if a judge with that special knowledge is not the one to help stop the vicious cycle of uncons�tu�onal laws that systema�cally reinforce the viola�on of the laws established in the Cons�tu�on of my country, then who is? The poli�cian
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
who today supports a posi�on and the next day defies it? The judge will jus�fy and document his posi�on from the outset.
Mr. Tasopoulos raised the ques�on, is it correct for the Constitutional Court of Germany to decide in the final analysis on the political issue concerning whether Germany will save Greece or how far it will advance in European integration? Maybe before we succumb to the power of imitation, we must ask the question, is what is true in Germany correct? If we ask the Americans, many will say of course and no and will attribute it to German history. For Greece, the political decision par excellence, the historic political responsibilities that accompanied, for example, the signing or refusal of the agreement with the European partners in July 2015, would the prime minister share with whom? With the constitutional judge who, judging a case, will obey logic Fiat Justitia ruat caelum who will be institutionally indifferent to the consequences and let the universe be destroyed? Who will bear responsibility for the consequences regarding government actions? The judge in the name of the law or the politically responsible power that has democratic legitimacy and is accountable to the Parliament according to the parliamentary authority article 1 paragraph 1 and 84Σ?
In my opinion, yes, there must exist a cons�tu�onal judge who obeys logic fiat Jus��a ruat caelum. Because precicely now it does not exist and exactly plus this very reason, there is stagna�on prevails and not improvement and a vicious cycle of uncons�tu�onality is reinforced! Precisely to the point of indifference to ins�tu�onal issues, then precisely for this reason, in my humble opinion, the jurists of Greece must stop arguing that there are only two op�ons. In my opinion there is a third op�on and I can't understand why it is not supported by any of them! The one op�on they invoke is not to establish a cons�tu�onal court, or another op�on that if it is established the rest should be abolished or they plead, that they will be demoted. Against these arguments I believe that they are extreme and reinforce a projec�on of persuasive reason whose sole purpose is not the solu�on, but to show each of them that their arguments my horse is bigger than yours! My opinion is that there should be a middle way, i.e. neither abolishing/relega�ng the other types of courts, nor not establishing a cons�tu�onal court. It is necessary to establish and in the process to deal with any problems that are projected, that will arise. In my opinion, the issue of not exis�ng at all and prevailing uncons�tu�onality in its greatness is much bigger. For twenty years there has been the ins�tu�on of the subs�tute teacher with this jurisprudence and precisely because there is no cons�tu�onal court the rights of children and teachers have been violated and are being violated. There were so many fires in Athens (Ma�), in Evia, but also the most recent of all the train crash in Tempi call me when you arrive! What else are they wai�ng for to happen, so that they finally agree that the establishment of a Cons�tu�onal Court in Greece is required more than ever? Are they interested in the good of Greece and its ci�zens, or only in order for each law professor to compete against the other in a legal batle to project an argument, so that there are conferences that ul�mately prove to be meaningless, since they have not agreed on a common legal middle ground, so that legal balance finally reached in Greece?
According According to Mr. Tasopoulos, «regarding the foundation of judicial decisions, if one rates the completeness of the rationale of the decisions from 1-4, the French Constitutional Council gets 1, the Council of State 2, the German Constitutional Court 3 and the Supreme Court of US 4. Suppose we want our constitutional jurisprudence to have a richer rationale. The question is, are we ready as a society, as a legal community, as a judiciary, to respond to this
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
demand. If we fulfill, to the extent necessary, the conditions of a meaningful and critical normative dialogue, based on well-founded arguments that are not hooked on the letter of the law. According to Mr. Tasopoulos, I wish this would happen. But he fears that it is not the case. First among the said conditions is, I think, the distinction between the binding nature of a decision (observance of <<external legitimacy>>) from the criticism of its content as right or wrong (questioning of <<internal legitimacy>>). Well then, let's start with the Constitutional Court. The fear of Mr. Tasopoulos is that what will emerge from the Constitutional Court during the search for legal clarity will confirm Mr. Dimaras' skepticism about the power of the average and about the pathologies of our country's public discourse on the "national our faults>>, as he said: <<the rhetoric, the bluster, the chatter and the vagueness>> and it will be a distorted assimilation of the teaching of Mr. Svoronos with the <<resistance spirit>>, not as a feature of our history, as considered by the great historian, but as a main characteristic of the Greek character, something which Svoronos expressly disapproved of, but unfortunately it is in some cases the alibi for any kind of arbitrariness. The anti-authoritarian discourse is an epistemological constant of constitutional law as a <<technique of political freedom>>. The worst thing for the future of constitutional justice in our country is that these two tendencies of criticism of the Council of State, the perception of the political partisan nature of the review of the constitutionality of laws and the tendency of normative purity to meet in the Constitutional Court, which will he makes purely political decisions in the name of the purity of the law. The burden of proof, that this will not happen, is not on the supporters of the Council of State, but on those who propose the Constitutional Court.»
According to Mr. Androulakis, the main argument put forward in favor of the establishment of a Constitutional Court is the uncertainty of law and the speed required for a long time until the final resolution of the issue. The question of unconstitutionality after a sufficient period of time has passed and after adverse court decisions have been issued increases the insecurity. An immediate clearance of pending issues regarding the constitutionality of the laws is required. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court will take part in the brief petition. The proposals for the establishment of a Constitutional Court aim at converging the central with the existing way of checking the unconstitutionality of laws. Thus, the proposition prevails according to which, when a court is brought to a judgment of unconstitutionality, it must take over the adjudication of the case and refer it to the Plenary of the competent jurisdictional branch, which, if it is also brought to a judgment of unconstitutionality, must in turn to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a final judgment. A system reminiscent of the French after the revision of 2008. It should be noted that the a priori centralized control is not as drastic as the a posteriori and specific. No concrete proposal seems to have been formulated for the staffing of the Constitutional Court. Possibly, the tendency is, in addition to professional judges, to include academic teachers and in general jurists of renowned prestige, all chosen for a relatively long term by the Parliament with an increased majority.
According to Mr. Venizelos, the cons�tu�onally crucial issue is the way the competent court is cons�tuted and its rela�onship with the poli�cal organs of the state, i.e. the ins�tu�onal balance of poli�cal power and judicial power. For this reason, it is par�cularly important to look for another body, the Cons�tu�onal Court, which will take on this special responsibility of controlling the uncons�tu�onality of exile, which has poli�cal dimensions, as long as the law crystallizes the poli�cal balance that has been achieved in Parliament. A�er all, almost all European countries now have such jurisdic�ons. The issue of control over issues of the
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
func�oning of the ins�tu�ons that with the detainees are not subject to judicial control, but also the issue of more complete control over the applica�on of cons�tu�onal rules in areas where it is weak for example interna corporis
I agree with Mr. Vlachopoulos, that the method of selec�ng the members of the Cons�tu�onal Court, in order to ensure the greatest possible reliability and impar�ality in the exercise of their du�es, must be based on 3 categories of qualifica�ons:
1. to the high degree of specialist scien�fic knowledge required for the field of cons�tu�onal jus�ce
2. the great and highest professional service and experience
3. the widest possible democra�c legaliza�on
According to Androulakis, the control of the relevant legislative arrangements by a wiser one due to the establishment of the Constitutional Court will introduce fewer obstacles to the legislator and will facilitate the development of the country. This perception highlights a modern development, the increasing involvement of the judge in the political confrontation, which, however, as pointed out by Professor Alivizatos, is today considered normal and expresses a deeper trend of modern democracy, the increasingly wider acceptance of the Constitution and its implementation in practice as a set of rules and principles that necessarily govern not only the establishment and exercise of political power, but also the organization and functioning of society and the economy of modern states
According to Mr. Androulakis, «the condition for assigning the resolution of constitutional disputes and in particular the final review of constitutionality and the power to annul unconstitutional laws to a Constitutional Court is that the Constitutional Court constitutes a court within the meaning of Article 26 paragraph 3 of the Constitution, it will be constituted, i.e. by judges surrounded by guarantees of personal and operational independence, to meet in public and justify its decisions. The participation of Greece and each member state in the process of European integration is inextricably linked to a continuous reflection that often leads to important revisions of structural elements of the legal order and even issues related to the organization of constitutional justice. On a European level, at the end of the 19th century. and the first ones years of the 20th century Greece remains the only country where a judge practices checking the unconstitutionality of laws. In the 1920s, the first Constitutional Court, the Austrian one, under the influence, as we know, of Kelsen's ideas, Greece was the only country at the end of the century while after the Second World War, when the perception that the control of unconstitutionality is an element of the state of law, Constitutional Courts are slowly being established in many countries. The same wave of establishment of Constitutional Courts, as an element of consolidation of the state of law, is observed, under the impetus of the Council of Europe, after fall of the Berlin Wall, in the former socialist states. Thus, Greece while at the end of the 19th century. was the only European country where widespread, specific and incidental judicial control was exercised unconstitutionality of the laws, constituting, according to the wording of A. Kaidatzi, "deviation from European standards", a century later, at its end 20th century, has lost its uniqueness, now remaining among the few European countries where this control is not exercised by a Constitutional Court, but retains the above characteristics. In proposals for revision of the Constitution, since its decade 1990 to date, but also in texts and interventions of politicians and academics, the idea of creating a
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
Constitutional Court in Greece is supported. A key argument put forward in favor of the establishment of a Constitutional Court is the legal uncertainty created by the current system control of the unconstitutionality of laws, due to the fact that it can should there be contrary decisions of the courts, in that the law may be decided unconstitutional many years after its implementation and in that, from moment when the question of the inconsistency of a statutory provision with the Constitution, a long time is required until the matter is finally resolved. It is argued that the current system has worked satisfactorily in the past when legislative activity was neither so detailed nor so frequent as today. With the speed at which modern life is evolving, we cannot we expect any question of constitutionality to be resolved definitively after the lapse within a reasonable period of time and after adverse judicial decisions have been issued, which will increase confusion and insecurity. Immediate liquidation is required of pending cases regarding the constitutionality of laws. According to this point of view, the Constitutional Court will contribute to the short resolution.»
I completely agree with Mr. Androulakis, that there are no perfect systems. «Each has advantages, but also disadvantages, which are usually the flip side of the advantages. Any proposal for change must be based on an accurate description of the problem and must be preceded by the search for other milder solutions closer to the long-term tradition that has developed in our country. The argument that the need for legal certainty requires the establishment of a Constitutional Court is very serious. Especially regarding Administrative Justice. The need for legal certainty, which is put forward with this argument, would require the Constitutional Court to be responsible for checking the non-contradiction of the law not only with the Constitution, but also with ECHR and EU law, which of course includes and the Charter of Rights and the question of the non-contradiction of the Constitution itself with these two legal acts is always open.»
Why should it remain open? It needs to be setled. In my opinion, why cancel the rest courts? Especially a�er traincrush Tempi, the necessity of establishing a Cons�tu�onal Court is proven once again. The two very different understandings of the legal rela�onship a) the pragma�sts and b) the supporters of "norma�ve purity", i.e. fiat Jus��a et pereat mundus. They aren’ t going to compromise on the issue of the establishment of a Cons�tu�onal Court in Greece. We need definitely outside help, about this issue. If you want Greece to be a country worthy of her glory of ancient historical past, then definitely we need your help by pressuring us to enstablish such a Court. Only if we imitate a part of your legal system and combine it with the courts we already have, then we could be the first country with the most democra�c legal system ever existed and then finaly this country will be rescued from herself. We need your help to succeed. Please help my country.
According to professor Venizelos, «in the context therefore of the general rule of diffuse control (article 93 par. 4) a system with strong elements is housed centralized, direct and abstract control. Issue therefore, the question is whether this bigenius and procedurally complex shape which has been operating for so many decades can withstand them challenges of today. If it offers, in other words, the necessary legal certainty and if it equips the democratic legalized and responsible organs of the state with them institutional mechanisms that exist in other European or Western legal classes in general for the exercise of policy and more specifically to solve social and developmental problems that strongly concern the citizens, always with the eyes focused on the need to respect and defend them fundamental rights. The overall
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
evaluation of the relevant jurisprudence and of practice, that is, the way in which the dialogue develops between the legislator on the one hand (i.e. the Parliament and essence of the Government) and regulatory administration (ie essentially of the Government), on the one hand of the judiciary power leads - in my opinion - to a series of critical conclusions:
First, the removal of any dispute as to unconstitutionality of a law does not occur in a specific and procedurally verifiable period of time and with one relatively simple, transparent and straightforward process. Issue constitutionality can be raised in an incidental manner and on various "unsuspected" occasions, without a complex one legal support and representation of both positions and without the right to justice being guaranteed protection and hearing of all those who legally their interests are affected directly or indirectly.
Second, the current system, although it includes concentration, acceleration and homogenization mechanisms, it still has many random, circumstantial and uneven elements. All this reduces legal certainty and fuels or at least do not defuse social and political tensions related to the unconstitutionality of laws. There are many "famous" cases of judicial review of constitutionality that ensure the safe speech: the case of the so-called royal estate10, the case of the contractors of the public and the wider public sector11, the case of the "main shareholder"12 and so on. A critical one social example are the occasional arrangements for the arbitrary constructions which were ultimately judged contrary to Constitution13 , as well as successive arrangements for transfer building factor that had the same fate.
Constitution and competence of the Constitutional Court Court
1. The dual nature of the Greek judicial system review of constitutionality must therefore be organized in a more explicit, transparent and rational way and that too can be achieved by establishing a Constitutional A court that has the following characteristics:
a. The Constitutional Court must consist of eleven members elected for one non-renewable term seven years old.
b. The members must be chosen by its Plenary itself Parliament following the proposal of a special parliamentary committee which organizes public hearings of the proposed. THE choice must be made between superiors and superiors judicial officers of all branches and professors legal courses of the Higher Educational Institutions of the country, who are public officials. It's about the two groups of officials who now also staff the AED with inquiry to the higher judicial officers of all branches (thus also prosecutors) and in terms of the professors of legal courses in all departments of Universities and not only law. The choice must be made with the increased majority of 2/3 of the entire number of deputies. The President and the VicePresident of the Court among its members.
The selection of members of the Constitutional Court by Parliament with an overwhelmingly increased majority, i.e. with a very broad one consent, follows the rule of the current article 90 for the selection of the leading echelons of justice by political body, i.e. the Council of Ministers. The choice but now it is done consensually and with much more substance guarantees of transparency.
c. The Constitutional Court maintains all of the powers of the AED of article 100 and more acquires the authority to rule on issues unconstitutionality of provisions of formal law which the plenary session of a supreme court necessarily refers to it court. In turn each court, provided is subject to judgment for the unconstitutionality of a formal provision law, which has not already been decided by a decision of the Constitutional Court, must refer the relevant issue to full session of the relevant supreme court.
It is obvious that within this scheme the common courts they will be especially careful when issuing referrals decisions to the Plenary of its supreme court their branch brought to trial for
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. [11]
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
unconstitutionality provision of formal law. The legal investigation of the matter, the theoretical documentation of the views, the complete, special and thorough justification of the decision will be imposed de facto – beyond the existing constitutional obligation- since the referring decision will be subject to the control of the plenary session of the relevant supreme court. And she in turn will formulate with increased attention and documenting its own judgment either by referring the matter of unconstitutionality in the Constitutional Court, either affirming the constitutionality of the provision. In this way, two very serious morals are set before us the Constitutional Court that must be accompanied by analogous acceleration mechanisms: The issues of unconstitutionality referred to the Plenary Sessions of the supreme courts or arise in them must are entered and to be tried in absolute preference and priority. This is how it is treated to a significant extent delay in the administration of constitutional justice which is one of the disadvantages of centralized control.
For the Greek judicial data, however, the ones proposed here mechanisms actually speed up rather than slow down the adjudication of the relevant cases. It is also obvious that when the court of substance does not accept a request, objection or allegation of unconstitutionality or when not raises the same ex officio issue, adjudicates on it substance of the case or dispute. Otherwise it refers to issue in the concerned high court, stalls progress of the trial and awaits the decision of the relevant Supreme Court court or the Constitutional Court, ordering in the meantime any necessary insurance measure. It is, finally, self-evident that each supreme court he can, at his own level, face for the first time on request or ex officio issue of unconstitutionality in the context of the remedies or remedies it is trying. In this case, what applies today with the par. 5 of article 100, i.e. if a section has been taken over of the supreme court and this leads to a judgment for the unconstitutionality of provision of formal law, must refer the matter to the plenary It must also be explicitly specified that the conditions them as regards the exercise of its judicial review unconstitutionality of a formal law provision apply and for the councils formed within it K.P.D. and for the injunction procedure and for the suspension committees of the CoE and for its echelons of the Court of Auditors in the context of considered procedures possibly administrative and not jurisdictional in nature them, such as the control of public contracts before they are awarded their. They also apply to the formations of the CoE which process draft regulatory decrees. It is also evident that the entire machinery of Articles 93 par. 4 and 100, as it is proposed to be formulated, does not affect the advisory competence of the Court of Auditors on the plans of the pension laws (article 73 par. 2 and 98 par. 1 para. d').
d. Within such a procedural framework where it continues to diffuse, incidental and specific control dominates there is no question of an individual constitutional appeal30, directly to the constitutional court, because everyone has the procedural possibility to raise the question of unconstitutionality through existing ones, by category of difference or of cases and therefore by jurisdiction, mechanisms remedies and remedies. In Greek legal order through these existing and constitutionally of registered (Articles 20 and 93-100) procedural mechanisms subject to judicial review of constitutionality, not just all of them the subordinate rules of law, but also all the critical ones real behaviors and situations.
e. It is also unnecessary to organize judicial review of the possible omissions of the legislator to proceed to issuance of executive law of the constitution as well as this is overridden by the obligation of the courts to immediately implement the constitution themselves through the procedural mechanism of judicial control of the constitutionality of laws, but also of legality of administrative acts or omissions with reference rule directly the Constitution itself.
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
f. In any case the Government or 2/5 of the whole of the number of members of the Parliament (120/300) must they can request from the Constitutional Court to address the question of unconstitutionality of formality law or certain provisions thereof (abstract control unconstitutionality). This competence of the Government or 2/5 of the total number of deputies must be able to act repressively on voted and valid ones of laws, but also proactively on plans or proposals for laws, but after their discussion and voting in the competent authority parliamentary committee, so that the relevant arguments in the context of political control of constitutionality and that opinions have already been expressed and the observations of the scientific council of the Parliament, of science and the social actors who are interested The relevant authority should not be delegated to the President of the Republic to prevent the exercise or non-exercise the field of partisan confrontation that makes it difficult position the head of state.
The relevant competence of the Government and the Parliament it should concern only formal laws and not regulatory ones acts, first, because in any case the content of a regulatory act can be made as a whole of the subject of a formal law, if the Parliament so wishes and, secondly, so as not to challenge the annulment jurisdiction of the CoE, but also its competence to process the plans of the regulatory decrees.
4. For reasons of systematicity and for its unity of any kind, primarily for reasons of legal certainty, those formal laws that have become the object of abstraction, repressive or preventive, control of constitutionality they will no longer be able to become the subject of a similar one control by the way. If the abstract control concerned one or only certain provisions of formal law, this applies for the provision(s) that were checked and not for the others. The same must apply to provisions of formal laws, hwhose constitutionality was already judged with previous ones decisions of the Constitutional Court after referral. Finally, as is the case now with the AED, if the outcome of another case in the common courts of all degrees and jurisdictions depends on the judgment of the Constitutional Court on pending unconstitutionality issue before him by referral or application of the government or of 2/5 of the members of the House, the common court must to postpone or suspend the procedure, pending it decision of the constitutional court, ordering of course taking every necessary insurance measure. In this way, all courts, of all grades and of all jurisdictions, retain control authority of constitutionality, but they are subject to mechanisms concentration of control necessary for rationalization and systematization of it.
5. Of course, the fine tuning of this whole system will be made by the common lawgiver in whose favor it is reserved and now article 100 par. 3 on organization and operation of the AED, the appointment, replacement and assistance of of its members, as well as those related to the process therein.
A similar reservation in favor of the law must be provided in the revised article 100 for the founding Constitution Court, but also for the procedure to be followed to the other courts when it is referred to or raised or arises before them ex officio question of unconstitutionality provision of formal law, according to the distinctions already made they happened But this executive law on the Constitution Court must be governed by similar guarantees with those already provided for in its current Constitution country (articles 51 par. 4 and 54 par. 1) for the passing of laws increased majority and indeed by the majority of At least 2/3 of the total number of deputies, due to importance of the issue and the gravity of the issues which such an executive law is required to regulate. Provided that the Constitution now recognizes the institution of the increased law majority, this must also be applied in this case case to enhance and keep enhanced the authority of the Constitutional Court.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. [13]
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
VI. The institutional balance of the new scheme The proposal for the introduction of a Constitutional Court, with this formation and with these responsibilities, I believe that:
First, it preserves all the positive elements of its system of diffuse, incidental and specific control applicable in our country. The control of possible unconstitutionality provision of formal law they can and should anyway to be exercised by all courts, of all degrees and of jurisdictions upon application, objection or claim of a party (or the prosecutor) or ex officio. This can and should be done always, in view of the specific facts case that reveals aspects and problems which possibly does not capture the abstract and in particular the preventive review of constitutionality, which anyway otherwise it will concern minimal cases of laws.
Second, it utilizes and rationally organizes all of the in any case, existing in the Greek legal order mechanisms for concentrating control and converting it into essentially straightforward and abstract control. These mechanisms they now drive with greater speed and straightness than the courts of substance in the supreme courts of each branch and from the plenary sessions of the three supreme courts in Constitutional Court. Added to these is the possibility exercising abstract, repressive or even preventive, control at the initiative of political bodies (of the Government or at least 120 MPs). But this procedural discretion does not prevent the implementation of pervasive control for all the other formal laws and for all regulations actions of the administration.
Third, it draws with the necessary selectivity and attention elements from the most mature and tested systems of judicial review of the constitutionality applicable to other European countries and the USA in terms of composition of the Constitutional Court, the method of selection and the official status of its members, its responsibilities and the procedural approaches to it.3
More specifically:
a. The number of members can only be limited (9 or 11) and close to that provided by the current article 100 of the Constitution number of members of the AED (which is 13 when this is decided on the removal of dispute as to concept or the unconstitutionality of a formal law provision).
b. The selection of constituent members or equivalents of courts is done in almost all countries by political bodies (the head of state, governments, parliaments, presidents of parliamentary bodies, especially electoral ones bodies or supreme judicial councils with participation and extrajudicial persons). I believe that the proposed solution is the quietest and the most functional at the same time, because it strengthens democracy and indeed not just it majority, but the consensual legalization of the body, alongside its juristic legitimation which derives from its own responsibilities. Besides, when it has already more widely accepted with the 2001 revision and addition of article 101A that the constitutionally provided independent authorities are staffed by decision of the conference of the Presidents of the Parliament taken by a majority of 4/5 of the total number of its members, it is not possible not to a similar procedure applies for the selection of its members Constitutional Court, with the maximum already provided for for a decision of the Plenary of the Parliament, a majority of 2/3 of the total number of deputies (article 51 par. 4 and 54 par.
1). It is no coincidence that in a country that has constitutional court with great tradition and prestige, the Federal Germany, all members of the court it is chosen exactly by the two federal parliaments bodies (Federal Parliament and Federal Council) with a 2/3 majority. This selection system worked with satisfactory way for more than half a century.34
Fourth, the Constitutional Court, as proposed, of course, it finally concentrates its control in its competence unconstitutionality of formal laws, but the institutional counterweight lies in the
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. [14]
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
fact that the members of the court are chosen with an increased majority and therefore with a consensual spirit from the Plenary of the Parliament, i.e. by the state body with the most immediate and intense democratic legitimation.
The fact that the members of the Court are chosen for one and single, non-renewable, tenure enhances personal and their functional independence. And the passing of the candidates members from the hearing process before the competent parliamentary committee as well as the consultation that is necessary for the formation of the increased majority of 2/3 of the whole number of MPs reinforce the feeling of the institutional responsibility of constitutional judges.
Fifth, the Constitutional Court does not acquire powers related to the exercise of responsibilities and relationships of the direct organs of the state (President of the Republic, Parliament, Government). And why is this not required in one unitary and not federal state, but also because fundamental constitutional decision of the 1975 Constitution were these issues to remain out of judicial review, according with the long domestic tradition and in the context of its principle separation of powers. Of course, it is worth remembering that OTAs, as n.p.d.d., are bearers of the right to judge protection and therefore have all the procedural possibilities to raise a claim of unconstitutionality.
Sixth, for the reasons mentioned above point the competence of the Constitutional Court as to check the unconstitutionality of a formal law, as well as the relevant incidental jurisdiction of all of common courts are limited to the substantive unconstitutionality and does not extend to domestic formal unconstitutionality, i.e. in the voting process of the law by Parliament. The Parliament has an internal autonomy guaranteed within the framework of the principle of discrimination of powers (interna corporis). On the contrary, the external standard unconstitutionality, i.e. the elements of its existence of law obviously and controlled by all courts and without to be required in this case to follow the procedure of article 100 and finally the reference to the Constitution Court.35
VI. The delimitation of the competences of the Constitutional Court
1. A system is thus formed in the first place phase of diffuse, incidental and specific control and in a second phase of centralization at the level of the Constitutional Court, through the procedural channels that apply to each jurisdiction and each class of dispute or case. Added to this system is the ability to exercise direct and abstract judicial review, whether preventive or repressive, at the initiative of the Government or 2/5 of the entire number of members of the Parliament, i.e. its minutes parliamentary majority and the major or wider united opposition. But they are still needed some additional clarifications:
a. In the context of his other responsibilities the Constitutional A court (eg as an election judge) acts as an interim judge and specific review of the constitutionality of laws.
b. The authority to send a preliminary ruling to the ECJ of question from all courts, of all grades and of all jurisdictions, is neither affected nor can be affected. If of course, at the same time there is a question of constitutionality, it must to apply the prescribed referral procedure to full session of the concerned high court and from there to Constitutional Court, before or after issuing the decision of the ECJ, depending on when and how its question arises unconstitutionality.
c. Each question of unconstitutionality in its fields Constitution which are also fields of the EurSDA (or any other international convention – but the ECHR is of particular importance because the possibility of individual appeal to the European Court of Human Rights), puts in parallel and question of any conflict of the controlling standard law to the EurSDA.38 It could therefore be presented the phenomenon of a common court not setting and therefore not
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
refers the issue of unconstitutionality to the relevant supreme court or not to refer it to the Constitutional Court and set aside the relevant formal law as contrary to the Convention. It must therefore be foreseen that the referral mechanism to the Constitutional Court is valid and when the application of a constitutional provision converges and provision of the ECHR or other relevant international convention increased standard power. The same applies to cumulative application of the Constitution and provisions of the European Community law (primary and derivative), if not there is a question of sending a preliminary question to the ECJ.
d. Any opposition of two supreme courts no longer as to constitutionality, but to the concept of provision formal law must still be lifted as well now, but no longer from the AED, but from the recommended one Constitutional Court.
e. Finally, any question of interpretation of the Constitution in cases of direct application of it (without therefore there is literally a question of unconstitutionality of intervening formal law), must be assimilated with a question of unconstitutionality and therefore to impose the referral to the Constitutional Court, which resolves the issues and proceeds with implementation interpretation, but no in an authentic interpretation of the Constitution, as the competence it belongs only to the revising legislator39.
2. With these conditions the system, while maintaining the advantages of diffuse control, rationalized in relation to the mechanisms of concentration of control and it avoids, I hope, the disadvantages to a satisfactory extent of the centralized system. I am mainly referring to political interventionism of the constitutional courts which they concentrate too much power in the hands of their members.
At the same time, mechanisms are introduced that ensure the smooth flow of unconstitutionality issues through the good cooperation of common courts with the Constitutional Court and national courts with the ECJ and the EurDDA.
VIII. The international horizon With the proposed solution, the Greek system is approaching scheme that is applied with relative success in most European countries: This concerns, as we have seen, primarily him method of choosing the members of the constitutional or equivalent courts, but also the connection of its powers constitutional court with the diffuse competence of common courts to carry out a constitutionality review to a point at least. That is, as far as it arises matter of referral to a higher or special court or as where the avenue of remedies leading matters opens in a higher court or until there is an obligation respecting the jurisprudential precedents, which they have created by the constitutional or supreme courts. The coexistence of a constitutional court with the diffuse competence to review the constitutionality of all commons courts appear e.g. in countries such as Portugal, but also Germany itself. Also, the possibility of exercise, no only specific, but also abstract control and indeed not only repressive, but also preventive is provided for in countries such as Portugal, Ireland42, but also Cyprus. A very interesting osmosis has therefore indeed taken place of the basic systems of judicial control. The phenomenon this is highlighted by the comparative overview of systems. The proposal therefore for the establishment of a Constitutional Court of this form and these powers and in Greece it is placed within the international horizon discussion and practice.
IX. The peculiarity of the Greek system is preserved Although they may be of a comparative nature similarities, the Greek system and as it applies today and as it is proposed to be formed, it has – as it should to happen in each country – its own uniqueness and peculiarity. It makes full use of the domestic tradition, the procedural structure and the practices with which they are familiar to the Greek judge. This concerns the relationship of the Constitutional Court both with the Parliament, as well as with the common courts. With the proposed one solution these
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA.
«The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
two critical relationships I believe are organized with simple and functional way within the framework of the principle of discrimination of the powers and strict nature of the Constitution. The principle of the rule of law is indeed strengthened by the principle of the democratic consensus manifested in the manner composition of the court, but also in the procedures rights of access to it for the exercise of abstract, preventive or repressive control, as they are shared between the respective parliamentary majority and each opposition. By the same logic, the relationship of the Constitutional Court with the common courts and especially with the three supreme courts of the country is organized in such a way that it is kept to the greatest extent as far as possible the competence of the common courts to review the constitutionality of laws. However, since the AED of the article exists anyway 100 with the power to remove the challenge in case issuing conflicting decisions between two superiors courts as to meaning or unconstitutionality provision of formal law, the replacement of the AED by the Constitutional Court offers speed and clarity.
X. The Importance of Detail Of course, the devil is always in the details. Importance has therefore the specific legal and technical structure of articles 93 par. 4 and 100 in a future revision thereof Constitution and the content of the relevant executive laws, but also of the Regulation of the Parliament, which is called to regulate a number of critical issues. Of greater importance than all is the need for formation of a broad political and scientific consensus around from this institutional innovation that puts the finger on him type of hils, rationalizes the institutional relations between them of democratically legitimized organs of the state and of judiciary and strengthens legal certainty both for the citizen as well as for the public administration itself. I believe that the implementation of a system such as the one proposed, can lead to dealing with critical and persistent problems. It can also set and solve with more organized and transparent way a number of issues interpretation and application of the Constitution are linked with modern post-industrial societies and its place citizen within them
Proposed wording of articles 93 par. 4 and 100 Comp. Article 93
4. Courts are bound not to apply a law which its content is contrary to the Constitution, with subject to the provisions of article 100 Article 100
1. A Constitutional Court is recommended in its jurisdiction to which belong:
a) The adjudication of objections according to article 58.
b) The control of the validity and results of the referendum which is acted upon in Article 44 paragraph 2.
c) The judgment on the irreconcilables or the disqualification of a member of parliament, v articles 55 paragraph 2 and 57.
d) The removal of conflicts between the courts and the administrative authorities or between the Council of State and of regular administrative courts on the one hand and of civil and criminal courts on the one hand or, finally, between of the Court of Auditors and other courts.
e) The control of the substantial unconstitutionality of provisions formal law in accordance with the provisions in paragraphs 3 and 4.
f) The removal of the questioning of the concept of formal provisions law, if contrary decisions are issued on this matter of the Council of State, the Supreme Court and Court of Auditors
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA. «The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.
g) The removal of the challenge to the characterization of its rules international law as generally accepted under the paragraph 1 of article 28.
2. The Constitutional Court is composed of eleven members which are chosen by the Plenary of the Parliament with the increased a two-thirds majority of the total number of deputies, upon the proposal of a special parliamentary committee and hearing before the of those proposed for selection, such as defined by the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament. Eligible as members of the Constitutional Court are the highest and most senior judicial officers of all branches and teachers legal courses of the Higher Educational Institutions who are public officials. The members of the Constitutional Court are selected and are appointed for a nonrenewable term of seven years the duration of which they are exempt from all others their duties.
By the same procedure they are chosen from among its members Constitutional Court the President and the vice-president of.
In the event that a membership position becomes vacant for any reason of the Constitutional Court before the end of the term of, the selection of the new member is for a full term.
3. When a court in the context of article 93 par. 4 judges provision of standard law unconstitutional, refers compulsorily the issue in the plenary session of the relevant Supreme Court. The plenary session of the relevant supreme court, if it judges a provision of a formal law to be unconstitutional,obligatorily refers the issue to the Constitutional Court ruling on it. The law defines the relevant matters with the suspension of progress of the main trial, the reception of any necessary injunctive measures and any other related matters issue as well as the organization of the relevant trial before it of plenary sessions of the supreme courts. The plenary session every of the supreme court is constituted in a judicial formation, as prescribed by law.
This paragraph applies accordingly and according to processing of the regulatory decrees by the Council of the State and in the exercise of non-jurisdictional powers audit powers of the Court of Auditors. Special Courts, the establishment of which is foreseen from the Constitution, as long as they judge a formal law provision as unconstitutional, refer the matter to the Constitutional Court.
4. The Council of Ministers or at least two-fifths of it of the entire number of deputies can by their application to ask the Constitutional Court to rule on the substantial unconstitutionality of formal law provisions or draft or proposal of a law passed or made the subject of processing by the competent parliamentary committee and pending before the plenary session or the adjournment section of work of the Parliament. In this case the discussion and passing of the draft or proposed law is postponed until the issuance of the decision of the Constitutional Court.
5. The organization and operation of the Constitutional Court, those related to service status and disciplinary status of its members, their assistance, the related to the proceedings therein as well as with the proceedings before it of other courts when a question arises or arises unconstitutionality of a provision of a formal law, as well as any other relevant issue, are defined by a special law that is passed by a two-thirds majority of the entire number of deputies.
6. The decisions of the Constitutional Court are irreversible. A formal law or provision of a formal law which declared unconstitutional is void upon publication of the relevant decision or the time specified by the decision.»
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA. «The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.
Τhe poli�cal par�es divide the world and as a result there is no collec�ve spirit and a single spirit for a correct course that leads to a balanced state. If the state does not strengthen the man who raises each child as the spiritual parent, then how can anyone expect progress? Our planet is constantly being destroyed in various ways. The solu�on is not to look to relocate to other planets, because we will destroy them too. The solu�on is to focus our aten�on on ways that life on earth has quality of life for every being. How will society change, when the man who shapes tomorrow's ci�zen is wronged? However, all our aten�on needs to be given to the educa�on system of each country. We need your help.
In conclusion, my personal opinion is that: only by correc�ng the wrong and strengthening the right can there really be an improving healthy change, educa�onal and non-educa�onal.
=the "Aristotelian" citizen is one who participates in the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. [19]
«Τhe highest principle of democracy is knowledge» that I learned it from the library of law school of Athens EKPA. «The best way to enchance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation» President Jimmy Carter Center of Civic Education.