001 국제개발협력시민사회포럼 정책토론회 자료집 by KoFID

지구촌포럼

국제 개 발협력시민사회포 럼 정 책 토 론회 자료집 일시 : 2011년 3월 7일(월) 오후2시 / 장소 : 한국건강연대 지금여기

주최 주관 후원

국제개발협력시민사회포럼

목 차 축사 국제개발협력 시민사회포럼 (Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation, KoFID) 소개 I. 프로그램

II. 발제문 [발표1] 파리에서 부산까지 : OECD의 원조 효과성 논의 역사, 현황과 쟁점

p.13

(이성훈 KoFID HLF-4 시민사회포럼 조직위원장/한국인권재단 상임이사) [발표2] 개발과 원조에 대한 국제시민사회의 대응과 동향 : Better Aid 와 Open Forum 을 중심으로 (손혁상 경희대 공공대학원 교수/국제개발협력센터장) p.55 [발표3] 부산 HLF-4 와 한국시민사회의 대응과 과제

p.80

(이태주 KoFID 정책위원장/ODA Watch 대표)

III. 참고자료 [OECD] A. 개발원조위원회 (Development Assistance Committee) 1. 원조효과성에 관한 파리선언 (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005) p.95 2. 아크라행동계획 (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008) p.108 3. 보고타선언문 (Bogota Statement: Toward Effective and Inclusive Development Partnerships, 2010)

p.116

B. 원조효과성작업반 (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness)

1. Workshop on Development Effectiveness (Draft Report, 26 October 2010, OECD, Paris) p.121 2. HLF-4 소개 브로셔 (Effective Aid : Accelerating Progress in Development) p.135 C. 분쟁 및 취약국관련 국제네트워크 (INCAF: The International Network on Conflict and Fragility) 1. 딜리선언 (Dilli Declaration: A new vision for peacebuilding and statebuilding (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, April 2010) p.137

[외교통상부] 1. 글로벌 원조체제 워크샵 결과 요약 (The Evolving Global Aid Architecture Chair’s Summary, 2010) p.143

[시민사회] A. Better Aid 1. Development effectiveness in development cooperation: a rights-based perspective (October 2010) p.159 2. CSOs on the Road to Busan : Key Messages and Proposals (2011) p.175 B. Open Forum 1. Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles (2010)

p.191

2. International framework for CSOs Development Effectiveness (2010) p.192 C. 기타 1. Development effectiveness: towards new understandings (The North-South Institute, 2009) p.223

배 경 국제개발협력시민사회포럼(Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation, KoFID)은 한국시민사회 역량 강화를 통하여 한국 ODA 및 개발정책에 대한 지속적인 정책권고를 위한 국제 개발을 위한 한국시민사회단체들의 네트워크임. 본 포럼은 한국 시민사회단체간의 소통강화 및 협력증진에 기여 하며 시민사회단체들의 양적, 질적 성장을 위한 정책교육 및 훈련을 제공하여 정책역량을 강화하는 것을 목표로 함. 이를 위하여 2년 간 워크샵, 포럼 및 정책간담회 등 국내 시민사회 간의 협의과정과 국제연대 구축을 발판으로 2010년 9월 29일 공식적으로 창립 됨.

제4차 원조효과고위급포럼(HLF-4) 준비와 KoFID OECD 개발원조위원회 (Development Assistance Committee: DAC)는 2003년 로마에서 개최된 제1차 원조 효과성 고위급회의(HLF-1)을 시작으로 원조가 실제로 얼마나 수원국 주민들의 삶을 개선하였는지에 대한 논의를 본격화 함. 2005년 파리선언(Paris Declaration)을 채택하여 국제개발협력의 규범과 원칙을 세웠으 며, 2008년 아크라에서 파리선언의 중간 이행성과를 평가하고 원조효과성 제고를 위한 아크라행동계획 (Accra Agenda for Action: AAA)을 채택하였음. 이후 아크라 회의에 주도적으로 참여한 세계 시민사회단체 를 중심으로 ‘Better Aid(BA)’가 구성되었으며 본 포럼은 BA의 운영단체(Coordinating Group, CG)로 부산에 서 개최 될 제4차 원조효과고위급포럼(HLF-4)(2011. 11. 29-12.1)을 준비하기 위하여 사전에 열리는 시민 사회포럼(2011. 11.27-28)의 한국 측 조직위원회의 역할을 하게 될 것임.

목 적 

국제개발협력 관련 한국시민사회단체 간의 소통강화 및 협력 증진



국제개발협력 관련 국제사회와의 네트워크 구축 및 연대강화



국제개발협력 관련 시민사회단체의 정책역량 강화를 통한 정책 권고

주 요 활 동 

국제개발협력 세미나, 워크샵 및 포럼 개최



역량강화를 위한 교육 및 훈련 프로그램 운영



정부의 정책수립과 실행에 관한 모니터링 및 평가



국제개발협력 정책에 시민사회단체와 사회적 약자의 목소리 반영하도록 제안



관련 정부부처 및 개발공여기구에 정책권고



국제사회와 네트워크 구축 및 연대 강화 활동



제4차 원조효과고위급포럼(HLF-4)의 사전 시민사회포럼 조직(2011. 11.27-28)

회 원 본 포럼은 국제개발에 관련된 모든 시민사회단체에 열린 플랫폼으로 자발적 참여를 원칙으로 함. 현재 빈 곤감소, 인권, 성평등, 민주적 거버넌스, 환경, 평화, 노동 및 이주 문제를 다루는 시민사회단체 및 협의체 로 이루어져 있음.

조 직 구 성 총회 : 모든 회원단체로 구성된 최고 정책결정 기관으로 총회는 1년에

한 번 개최함.

- 창립총회 : 2010년 9월 29일, 서울 개최 운영위원회 : 총회에서 결정된 정책을 수행하는 조직으로 목적과 활동에 부합하는 각종의제를 제안함. - 구성 : 운영위원회는 10개의 단체로 구성함

회 원 단 체 (15개) 기후변화연구소, 세이브더칠드런, 아시아재단, 유엔인권정책센터, 월드투게터, 지구촌빈곤퇴치시민네트워크, 참여연대, 한국여성단체연합, 한국월드비전, 한국에이즈퇴치연맹, 한국인권재단, 한국해외원조단체협의회, 한국YMCA전국연맹, 한마음한몸운동본부, ODA Watch

조 직 도

공 동 대 표 이창식 공동대표, 한국해외원조단체협의회 회장, 한국해비타트 회장 정현백 공동대표, 참여연대 공동대표

연 락 처 윤현봉, hbyoon@ngokcoc.or.kr , 운영위원장, 한국해외원조단체협의회 사무총장 이태주, tjlee@hansung.ac.kr , 정책위원장, ODA Watch 대표 이성훈, alee7080@gmail.com, HLF-4 조직위원장, 한국인권재단 상임이사 남수정, sujung.nam@gmail.com, 실무간사 홍지영, endpoverty1017@gmail.com, 실무간사 KoFID 사무국 서울시 마포구 서교동 서경빌딩 3층 374-11 한국해외원조단체협의회 전화: 02-2279-1706 / 팩스: 02-2279-1719 / 이메일: kofid21@gmail.com

I. 프로그램

<지구촌 포럼>

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II. 발제문

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III. 참고자료

OECD자료

 

  - 93 -

Table of Contents

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

I. Statement of Resolve

II. Partnership Commitments

Ownership

Alignment

Harmonisation

Managing for Results

Mutual Accountability

III. Indicators of Progress

Appendix A

Methodological Notes on the Indicators of Progress

Appendix B

List of participating Countries and Organisations

Accra Agenda for Action

Strengthening Country Ownership over Development

Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships for Development

Delivering and Accounting for Development Results

Looking Forward

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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability I. Statement of Resolve 1. We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take far-reaching and Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year. As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid effectiveness further increases in aid. 2. At this High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, we followed up on the Declaration adopted at the High-Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) and the core principles put forward at the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development Results (February 2004) because we believe they will increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs.

Scale up for more effective aid

progress in implementation, especially in the following areas: i. Strengthening partner countries national development strategies and associated operational frameworks (e.g., planning, budget, and performance assessment frameworks). ii. Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries priorities, systems and procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities. iii. Enhancing donors and partner countries respective accountability to their citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and performance. iv. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make them as cost-effective as possible. v. Reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage collaborative behaviour and progressive alignment with partner countries priorities, systems and procedures.

good practices and their quick and widespread application. 4.

We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the remaining challenges, including: i. Weaknesses in partner countries institutional capacities to develop and implement results-driven national development strategies.

development partnerships between donors and partner countries. including in critical areas such as HIV/AIDS. v. Corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, impede effective resource mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away from activities that are vital for poverty reduction and sustainable economic development. Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems.

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5. We acknowledge that enhancing the effectiveness of aid is feasible and necessary across all aid modalities. In determining the most effective modalities of aid delivery, we will be guided by development strategies and priorities established by partner countries. Individually and collectively, we will choose and design appropriate and complementary modalities so as to maximise their combined effectiveness. 6.

In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use development assistance,

donor activities at the country and sector levels.

Adapt and apply to differing country situations 7. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex situations, such as the tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 26 December 2004. In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of partner countries. In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for results are adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity. Overall, we will give increased attention to such complex situations as we work toward greater aid effectiveness.

Specify indicators, timetable and targets 8. We accept that the reforms suggested in this Declaration will require continued high-level political support, peer pressure and coordinated actions at the global, regional and country levels. We commit to accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit of mutual accountability, the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II this Declaration. 9. As a further spur to progress, we will set targets for the year 2010. These targets, which will involve action by both donors and partner countries, are designed to track and encourage progress at the global level among the countries and agencies that have agreed to this Declaration. They are not intended to prejudge or substitute for any targets that shown in Section III. We agree to review these preliminary targets and to adopt targets against the remaining indicators as shown in Section III before the UNGA Summit in September 2005; and we ask the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to prepare for this urgently.1 Meanwhile, we welcome initiatives by partner countries and donors to establish their own targets for improved aid effectiveness within the framework of the agreed Partnership Commitments and Indicators of Progress. For example, a number of partner countries have presented action plans, and a large number of donors have announced important new commitments. We invite all participants who wish to provide information on such initiatives to submit it by 4 April 2005 for subsequent publication.

Monitor and evaluate implementation 10. Because demonstrating real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership of the partner country we will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, our mutual progress at country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. In doing so, we will make use of appropriate country level mechanisms. 11. At the international level, we call on the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to broaden partner country participation and, by the end of 2005, to propose arrangements for the medium term monitoring of the commitments in this Declaration. In the meantime, we ask the partnership to co-ordinate the international monitoring establish baselines; and to enable consistent aggregation of information across a range of countries to be summed up 1. In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

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in a periodic report. We will also use existing peer review mechanisms and regional reviews to support progress in this agenda. We will, in addition, explore independent cross-country monitoring and evaluation processes which should be applied without imposing additional burdens on partners to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how increased aid effectiveness contributes to meeting development objectives. 12. Consistent with the focus on implementation, we plan to meet again in 2008 in a developing country and conduct two rounds of monitoring before then to review progress in implementing this Declaration.

II. Partnership Commitments 13.

Developed in a spirit of mutual accountability, these Partnership Commitments are based on the lessons of

country.

Ownership Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions. 14.

Partner countries commit to: Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies2 through broad consultative processes. Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets (Indicator 1). Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.

15.

Donors commit to: Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.

Alignment Donors base their overall support on partner countries national development strategies, institutions and procedures.

Donors align with partners strategies 16.

Donors commit to: Base their overall support country strategies, policy dialogues and development co-operation programmes on partners national development strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies3 (Indicator 3). Draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner s national development strategy or its annual review of progress be undertaken transparently and in close consultation with other donors and stake holders. Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from the national development strategy. This does not mean that all donors have identical conditions, but that each donor s conditions should be derived from a common streamlined framework aimed at achieving lasting results.

2. The term `national development strategies includes poverty reduction and similar over arching strategies as well as sector and thematic strategies. 3. This includes for example the Annual Progress Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategies (APR).

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Donors use strengthened country systems 17. Using a country s own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the partner country s sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for its policies to its citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures typically include, but are not results frameworks and monitoring. 18. Diagnostic reviews are an important and growing source of information to governments and donors on the state of country systems in partner countries. Partner countries and donors have a shared interest in being able to monitor progress over time in improving country systems. They are assisted by performance assessment frameworks, and an associated set of reform measures, that build on the information set out in diagnostic reviews and related analytical work. 19.

Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country systems (Indicator 2). Integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within country-led strategies for capacity development.

20.

Partner countries commit to: Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of country systems and procedures. On the basis of such diagnostic reviews, undertake reforms that may be necessary to ensure that national systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and transparent. Undertake reforms, such as public management reform, that may be necessary to launch and fuel sustainable capacity development processes.

21.

Donors commit to: Use country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. Where use of country systems is not feasible, establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures (Indicator 5). Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and Indicator 6). Adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks for country systems so as to avoid presenting partner

Partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from donors 22. The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources. 23.

Partner countries commit to: implementation through country-led capacity development strategies where needed.

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24.

Donors commit to: effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly (Indicator 4).

25.

Partner countries commit to: environment for public and private investments. Publish timely, transparent and reliable reporting on budget execution.

26.

Donors commit to: Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules (Indicator 7). Rely to the maximum extent possible on transparent partner government budget and accounting mechanisms (Indicator 5).

27.

Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: management.

Strengthen national procurement systems 28.

Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: Use mutually agreed standards and processes4 to carry out diagnostics, develop sustainable reforms and monitor implementation. development. Share feedback at the country level on recommended approaches so they can be improved over time.

29.

Partner countries commit to take leadership and implement the procurement reform process.

30.

Donors commit to: Progressively rely on partner country systems for procurement when the country has implemented mutually agreed standards and processes (Indicator 5). Adopt harmonised approaches when national systems do not meet mutually agreed levels of performance or donors do not use them.

Untie aid: getting better value for money 31. Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. DAC Donors will continue to make progress on untying as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Indicator 8).

4. Such as the processes developed by the joint OECD-DAC World Bank Round Table on Strengthening Procurement Capacities in Developing Countries.

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Harmonisation Donors actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective.

Donors implement common arrangements and simplify procedures 32.

Donors commit to: Implement the donor action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-up to the Rome High-Level Forum. Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. Increased use of programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort (Indicator 9). (Indicator 10); and promote joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice.

Complementarity: more effective division of labour 33. Excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness. A pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden sharing increases complementarity and can reduce transaction costs. 34.

Partner countries commit to: Provide clear views on donors comparative advantage and on how to achieve donor complementarity at country or sector level.

35.

Donors commit to: Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks. Work together to harmonise separate procedures.

Incentives for collaborative behaviour 36.

Donors and partner countries jointly commit to: Reform procedures and strengthen incentives including for recruitment, appraisal and training for management and staff to work towards harmonisation, alignment and results.

Delivering effective aid in fragile states5 37. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to build legitimate, effective and resilient state and other country institutions. While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery. 38.

Partner countries commit to: Make progress towards building institutions and establishing governance structures that deliver effective governance, public safety, security, and equitable access to basic social services for their citizens. Engage in dialogue with donors on developing simple planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, where national development strategies are not yet in place. Encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting development priorities.

5. The following section draws on the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which emerged from the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States (London, January 2005). 6

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39.

Donors commit to: Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems. Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff. promising but high-risk transitions.

Promoting a harmonised approach to environmental assessments 40. Donors have achieved considerable progress in harmonisation around environmental impact assessment (EIA) including relevant health and social issues at the project level. This progress needs to be deepened, including on 41.

Donors and partner countries jointly commit to: Strengthen the application of EIAs and deepen common procedures for projects, including consultations with stake holders; and develop and apply common approaches for strategic environmental assessment at the sector and national levels. Continue to develop the specialised technical and policy capacity necessary for environmental analysis and for enforcement of legislation.

42.

Similar harmonisation efforts are also needed on other cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and other

Managing for Results Managing resources and improving decision-making for results 43.

Managing for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making.

44.

Partner countries commit to: Strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes. Endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the national and sector development strategies; and that these frameworks should track a manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available (Indicator 11).

45.

Donors commit to: Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with partners national development strategies. Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks. Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely more extensively on partner countries statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems, with partner countries to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting. - 101 -

46.

Partner countries and donors jointly commit to: Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and demand for results-based management.

Mutual Accountability Donors and partners are accountable for development results 47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance. 48.

Partner countries commit to: Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets. Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies.

49.

Donors commit to: present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.

50.

Partner countries and donors commit to: Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. (Indicator 12).

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III. Indicators of Progress To be measured nationally and monitored internationally

OWNERSHIP

TARGET FOR 2010

Partners have operational development strategies Number of countries with national development strategies (including PRSs) that have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure

At least 75% of partner countries have operational development strategies.

ALIGNMENT

TARGET FOR 2010

Reliable country systems Number of partner countries that have

(a) Half of partner countries move up at least one measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on the PFM/ CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) scale of performance.

(a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.

(b) Procurement One-third of partner countries move up at least one measure (i.e., from D to C, C to B or B to A) on the four-point scale used to assess performance for this indicator.

to the government sector that is reported on partners national budgets.

Halve the gap sector not reported on government s budget(s) (with at least 85% reported on budget).

Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support Percent of donor capacity-development support provided through co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners national development strategies.

are implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies. PERCENTAGE OF DONORS

Percent of systems in partner countries, which either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.

TARGET All donors use partner countries PFM systems. 90% of donors use partner countries PFM systems.

SCORE* 5+ 3.5 to 4.5

PERCENTAGE OF AID FLOWS TARGET A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries PFM systems.

A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries PFM systems.

3.5 to 4.5

PERCENTAGE OF DONORS

Use of country procurement systems Percent of donors and of aid (a) adhere to broadly accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these.

SCORE*

TARGET

SCORE*

All donors use partner countries procurement systems.

90% of donors use partner countries procurement systems.

PERCENTAGE OF AID FLOWS TARGET

Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures Number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) per country.

SCORE*

A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner

A one-third reduction in the % of aid to the public sector not using partner countries procurement systems.

Reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel project implementation units (PIUs).

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ALIGNMENT

TARGET FOR 2010

Aid is more predictable Percent of aid disbursements released according to agreed schedules in annual or multi-year frameworks.

Halve the gap halve the proportion of aid not disbursed within the

Aid is untied Percent of bilateral aid that is untied.

Continued progress over time.

HARMONISATION

TARGET FOR 2010

Use of common arrangements or procedures Percent of aid provided as programme-based approaches.

Encourage shared analysis (b) country analytic work, including diagnostic reviews that are joint.

are provided in the context of programme-based approaches. (a) 40% of donor missions (b) 66% of country analytic work is joint.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS

TARGET FOR 2010

Number of countries with transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against (a) the national development strategies and (b) sector programmes.

Reduce the gap by one-third Reduce the proportion of countries without transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks by one-third.

MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

TARGET FOR 2010

Mutual accountability Number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration.

All partner countries have mutual assessment reviews in place.

Important Note: In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on 30-31 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). *Note on Indicator 5: management systems under Indicator 2 above.

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Appendix A: Methodological Notes on the Indicators of Progress The Indicators of Progress provides a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and accountabilities that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This framework draws selectively from the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II of this Declaration. Purpose The Indicators of Progress provide a framework in which to make operational the responsibilities and accountabilities that are framed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They measure principally collective behaviour at the country level. Country level vs. global level The indicators are to be measured at the country level in close collaboration between partner countries and donors. Values of country level indicators can then be statistically aggregated at the regional or global level. This global aggregation would be done both for the country panel mentioned below, for purposes of statistical comparability, and more broadly for all partner countries for which relevant data are available. Donor / Partner country performance The indicators of progress also provide a benchmark against which individual donor agencies or partner countries can measure their performance at the country, regional, or global level. In measuring institutional mandates. Targets The targets are set at the global level. Progress against these targets is to be measured by aggregating data measured at the country level. In addition to global targets, partner countries and donors in a given country might agree on country-level targets. Baseline A baseline will be established for 2005 in a panel of self-selected countries. The partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) is asked to establish this panel. The partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid assure that results can be aggregated across countries and across time. Note on Indicator 9 Effective Aid Delivery (OECD, 2005) in Box 3.1 as a way of engaging in development cooperation based on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a national development strategy, share the following features: (a) leadership by the host country or organisation; (b) a single comprehensive programme and budget framework; (c) a formalised process for donor co-ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for performance will be measured separately across the aid modalities that contribute to programme-based approaches.

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Appendix B: List of Participating Countries and Organisations Participating Countries Albania Belgium [Brazil]* Cameroon Czech Republic Ethiopia France Greece Iceland Jamaica Korea Luxembourg Mali Morocco New Zealand Pakistan Portugal Saudi Arabia Solomon Islands Sweden Thailand Uganda Vietnam

Australia Benin Burkina Faso Canada Denmark European Commission Gambia, The Guatemala Indonesia Japan Kuwait Madagascar Mauritania Mozambique Nicaragua Papua New Guinea Romania Senegal South Africa Switzerland Timor-Leste United Kingdom Yemen

Austria Bolivia Burundi China Dominican Republic Fiji Germany Guinea Ireland Jordan Kyrgyz Republic Malawi Mexico Nepal Niger Philippines Russian Federation Serbia and Montenegro Spain Tajikistan Tunisia United States of America Zambia

Bangladesh Botswana Cambodia Congo D.R. Egypt Finland Ghana Honduras Italy Kenya Lao PDR Malaysia Mongolia Netherlands Norway Poland Rwanda Slovak Republic Sri Lanka Tanzania Turkey Vanuatu

More countries than listed here have endorsed the Paris Declaration. For a full and up to date list please consult www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members.

Participating Organisations

African Development Bank Asian Development Bank Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria Inter-American Development Bank International Monetary Fund (IMF) Islamic Development Bank New Partnership for AfricaÂ&#x2019;s Development (NEPAD) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Commonwealth Secretariat Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) European Investment Bank (EIB) G24 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) International Organisation of the Francophonie Millennium Campaign Nordic Development Fund Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

United Nations Development Group (UNDG)

World Bank

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Civil Society Organisations Africa Humanitarian Action AFRODAD Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD) Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (CIDSE) Comisión Económica (Nicaragua) ENDA Tiers Monde EURODAD International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) Reality of Aid Network Tanzania Social and Economic Trust (TASOET) UK Aid Network

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Accra Agenda for Action Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions endorsed the following statement in Accra, Ghana, on 4 September 2008 to accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2 March 2005). This is a moment of opportunity 1. We are committed to eradicating poverty and promoting peace and prosperity by building stronger, more effective partnerships that enable developing countries to realise their development goals. been reduced to one in four. However, 1.4 billion people most of them women and girls still live in extreme poverty,1 and access to safe drinking water and health care remains a major issue in many parts of the world. In addition, new global challenges rising food and fuel prices and climate change threaten the advances against poverty many countries have made. 3. We need to achieve much more if all countries are to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Aid is only one part of the development picture. Democracy, economic growth, social progress, and care for the environment are the prime engines of development in all countries. Addressing inequalities of income and opportunity within countries and between states is essential to global progress. Gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men, and children. It is vital that all our policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent way. 4. In 2008, three international conferences will help us accelerate the pace of change: the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations High Level Event on the MDGs in New York, and the Financing for Development follow-up meeting in Doha. Today at Accra, we are leading the way, united in a common objective: to unlock the full potential of aid in achieving lasting development results.

We are making progress, but not enough 5. Learning from our past successes and failures in development co-operation and building on the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, in March 2005 we adopted an ambitious set of reforms: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed to develop a genuine partnership, with developing countries clearly in charge of their own development processes. We also agreed to hold each other accountable for achieving concrete development results. Three and one-half years later, we are reconvening in Accra to review progress and address the challenges that now face us. 6. Evidence shows we are making progress, but not enough. A recent evaluation shows that the Paris Declaration has created powerful momentum to change the way developing countries and donors work together on the ground. According to the 2008 Monitoring Survey, a large number of developing countries have improved their management of public funds. Donors, in turn, are increasingly improving their co-ordination at country level. Yet the pace of progress is too slow. Without further reform and faster action we will not meet our 2010 commitments and targets for improving the quality of aid.

We will take action to accelerate progress 7.

Evidence shows that we will need to address three major challenges to accelerate progress on aid effectiveness:

8. Country ownership is key. Developing country governments will take stronger leadership of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and citizens in shaping those policies. Donors will support them by respecting countries priorities, investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their systems

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9. Building more effective and inclusive partnerships. In recent years, more development actors middleincome countries, global funds, the private sector, civil society organisations have been increasing their contributions and bringing valuable experience to the table. This also creates management and co-ordination challenges. Together, all development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty. 10. Achieving development results and openly accounting for them must be at the heart of all we do. More than ever, citizens and taxpayers of all countries expect to see the tangible results of development efforts. We will demonstrate that our actions translate into positive impacts on people s lives. We will be accountable to each other and to our respective parliaments and governing bodies for these outcomes. 11.

Without addressing these obstacles to faster progress, we will fall short of our commitments and miss opportunities

made in the Paris Declaration and, in this Accra Agenda for Action, are agreeing on concrete and monitorable actions to accelerate progress to meet those commitments by 2010. We commit to continuing efforts in monitoring and evaluation that will assess whether we have achieved the commitments we agreed in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and to what extent aid effectiveness is improving and generating greater development impact.

Strengthening Country Ownership over Development 12.

Developing countries determine and implement their development policies to achieve their own economic, social ditional steps to turn this resolution into a reality.

We will broaden country-level policy dialogue on development 13. We will engage in open and inclusive dialogue on development policies. We acknowledge the critical role and responsibility of parliaments in ensuring country ownership of development processes. To further this objective we will take the following actions: a) Developing country governments will work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies and plans. They will also engage with civil society organisations (CSOs). b) Donors will support efforts to increase the capacity of all development actors parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector to take an active role in dialogue on development policy and on the role of aid in contributing to countries development objectives. c) Developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective development policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental sustainability.

Developing countries will strengthen their capacity to lead and manage development 14. Without robust capacity strong institutions, systems, and local expertise developing countries cannot fully own and manage their development processes. We agreed in the Paris Declaration that capacity development is the responsibility of developing countries, with donors playing a supportive role, and that technical co-operation is one means among others to develop capacity. Together, developing countries and donors will take the following actions to strengthen capacity development: a) Developing countries will systematically identify areas where there is a need to strengthen the capacity to perform and deliver services at all levels national, sub-national, sectoral, and thematic and design strategies to address them. Donors will strengthen their own capacity and skills to be more responsive to developing countries needs. b) Donors support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership. To this end, developing countries and donors will i) jointly select and manage technical co-operation, and

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ii) promote the provision of technical co-operation by local and regional resources, including through South-South co-operation. c) Developing countries and donors will work together at all levels to promote operational changes that make capacity development support more effective.

We will strengthen and use developing country systems to the maximum extent possible 15. Successful development depends to a large extent on a government s capacity to implement its policies and manage public resources through its own institutions and systems. In the Paris Declaration, developing countries committed to strengthen their systems2 and donors committed to use those systems to the maximum extent possible. Evidence shows, however, that developing countries and donors are not on track to meet these commitments. Progress in improving the quality of country systems varies considerably among countries; and even when there are good-quality country systems, donors often do not use them. Yet it is recognised that using country systems promotes their development. To strengthen and increase the use of country systems, we will take the following actions: the public sector. b) Should donors choose to use another option and rely on aid delivery mechanisms outside country systems (including parallel project implementation units), they will transparently state the rationale for this and will review their positions at regular intervals. Where use of country systems is not feasible, donors will establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and procedures. c) Developing countries and donors will jointly assess the quality of country systems in a country-led process using mutually agreed diagnostic tools. Where country systems require further strengthening, developing countries will ment assistance. d) Donors will immediately start working on and sharing transparent plans for undertaking their Paris commitments on using country systems in all forms of development assistance; provide staff guidance on how these systems of urgency. approaches. In addition, donors will aim to channel 50% or more of government-to-government assistance through based approaches.

Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships for Development 16. Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To support developing countries efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors.

We will reduce costly fragmentation of aid 17. The effectiveness of aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially at country and sector levels. We will reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries. To this end: a) Developing countries will lead in determining the optimal roles of donors in supporting their development efforts at national, regional and sectoral levels. Donors will respect developing countries priorities, ensuring that new arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individual developing countries receiving less aid.

assessment.

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b) Donors and developing countries will work together with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to complete good practice principles on country-led division of labour. To that end, they will elaborate plans to ensure the maximum co-ordination of development co-operation. We will evaluate progress in implementation starting in 2009. c) We will start dialogue on international division of labour across countries by June 2009.

We will increase aid s value for money 18. Since the Paris Declaration was agreed in 2005, OECD-DAC donors have made progress in untying their aid. A number of donors have already fully untied their aid, and we encourage others to do so. We will pursue, and accelerate, these efforts by taking the following actions: a) OECD-DAC donors will extend coverage of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Aid to non-LDC HIPCs3 and will improve their reporting on the 2001 DAC Recommendation. b) Donors will elaborate individual plans to further untie their aid to the maximum extent. c) Donors will promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that their procurement procedures

d) We will respect our international agreements on corporate social responsibility.

We welcome and will work with all development actors 19. The contributions of all development actors are more effective when developing countries are in a position to manage and co-ordinate them. We welcome the role of new contributors and will improve the way all development actors work together by taking the following actions: a) We encourage all development actors, including those engaged in South-South co-operation, to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in providing development co-operation. b) We acknowledge the contributions made by all development actors, and in particular the role of middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of aid. We recognise the importance and particularities of South-South co-operation and acknowledge that we can learn from the experience of developing countries. We encourage further development of triangular co-operation. c) Global funds and programmes make an important contribution to development. The programmes they fund are most effective in conjunction with complementary efforts to improve the policy environment and to strengthen the institutions in the sectors in which they operate. We call upon all global funds to support country ownership, to align and harmonise their assistance proactively, and to make good use of mutual accountability frameworks, while continuing their emphasis on achieving results. As new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country level. d) We encourage developing countries to mobilise, manage and evaluate their international co-operation initiatives e) South-South co-operation on development aims to observe the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local content. It plays an important role in international development co-operation and is a valuable complement to North-South co-operation.

We will deepen our engagement with civil society organisations 20.

We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts

3. The 2001 DAC recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) covers 31 so-called Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at its 2008 High Level Meeting agreed to extend the 2001 Recommendation to cover the remaining eight countries that are part of the HIPC initiative: Bolivia, Cameroon, Côte d Ivoire, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua and Republic of Congo.

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complement those of governments and the private sector. We share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential. To this end:

b) We welcome the CSOsÂ&#x2019; proposal to engage with them in a CSO-led multistakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness. As part of that process, we will seek to i) improve co-ordination of CSO efforts with government programmes, ii) enhance CSO accountability for results, and iii) improve information on CSO activities. c) We will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development.

We will adapt aid policies for countries in fragile situations 21.

In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that aid effectiveness principles apply equally to development co-operation

environments of weak ownership or capacity. Since then, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations have been agreed. To further improve aid effectiveness in these environments, we will take the following actions: and insecurity, engaging developing country authorities and other relevant stake holders to the maximum extent possible. b) At country level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of realistic peace- and participation of women. This process will be informed by international dialogue between partners and donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development. c) Donors will provide demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery. They will work with developing countries to design interim measures that are appropriately sequenced and that lead to sustainable local institutions. i) bridge humanitarian, recovery and longer-term development phases, and ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace building, and the building of capable, accountable and responsive states. In collaboration with developing countries, e) At country level and on a voluntary basis, donors and developing countries will monitor implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, and will share results as part of progress reports on implementing the Paris Declaration.

Delivering and Accounting for Development Results 22. We will be judged by the impacts that our collective efforts have on the lives of poor people. We recognise that greater transparency and accountability for the use of development resourcesÂ&#x2014;domestic as well as externalÂ&#x2014;are powerful drivers of progress.

We will focus on delivering results 23.

We will improve our management for results by taking the following actions: a) Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, disaggregating data by sex, region and socioeconomic status. b) Developing countries and donors will work to develop cost-effective results management instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust them as necessary. We will better co-ordinate and link the various sources of information, including national statistical systems, budgeting, planning, monitoring and country-led evaluations of policy performance.

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c) Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems. They will support, and invest in strengthening, developing countries national statistical capacity and information systems, including those for managing aid. d) We will strengthen incentives to improve aid effectiveness. We will systematically review and address legal or administrative impediments to implementing international commitments on aid effectiveness. Donors will pay more promote behaviour in line with aid effectiveness principles.

We will be more accountable and transparent to our publics for results 24. Transparency and accountability are essential elements for development results. They lie at the heart of the Paris Declaration, in which we agreed that countries and donors would become more accountable to each other and to their citizens. We will pursue these efforts by taking the following actions: a) We will make aid more transparent. Developing countries will facilitate parliamentary oversight by implementing itures, procurement and audits. Donors will publicly disclose regular, detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by developing countries. b) We will step up our efforts to ensure that as agreed in the Paris Declaration mutual assessment reviews are in place by 2010 in all countries that have endorsed the Declaration. These reviews will be based on country results reporting and information systems complemented with available donor data and credible independent evidence. They will draw on emerging good practice with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement. With them we will hold each other accountable for mutually agreed results in keeping with country development and aid policies. c) To complement mutual assessment reviews at country level and drive better performance, developing countries and donors will jointly review and strengthen existing international accountability mechanisms, including peer review with participation of developing countries. We will review proposals for strengthening the mechanisms by end 2009.

those under the UN Convention against Corruption. Developing countries will address corruption by improving systems of investigation, legal redress, accountability and transparency in the use of public funds. Donors will take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets.

We will continue to change the nature of conditionality to support ownership Declaration that, whenever possible, they would draw their conditions from developing countries own development the following actions: a) Donors will work with developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually agreed conditions based on national development strategies. We will jointly assess donor and developing country performance in meeting commitments. b) Beginning now, donors and developing countries will regularly make public all conditions linked to disbursements. c) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level to review, document and disseminate good practices on conditionality with a view to reinforcing country ownership and other Paris Declaration Principles by increasing emphasis on harmonised, results-based conditionality. They will be receptive to contributions from civil society.

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We will increase the medium-term predictability of aid developing countries to effectively plan and manage their development programmes over the short and medium term. As a matter of priority, we will take the following actions to improve the predictability of aid: a) Developing countries will strengthen budget planning processes for managing domestic and external resources and will improve the linkages between expenditures and results over the medium term. b) Beginning now, donors will provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements accounting systems. c) Beginning now, donors will provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling threedeveloping countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic frameworks. Donors will address any constraints to providing such information. d) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level on ways of further improving the medium-term predictability of aid, including by developing tools to measure it. Looking Forward 27. The reforms we agree on today in Accra will require continued high level political support, peer pressure, and co-ordinated action at global, regional, and country levels. To achieve these reforms, we renew our commitment to the principles and targets established in the Paris Declaration, and will continue to assess progress in implementing them. 28. The commitments we agree today will need to be adapted to different country circumstances including in middleincome countries, small states and countries in situations of fragility. To this end, we encourage developing countries to design with active support from donors country-based action plans that set out time-bound and monitorable proposals to implement the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. 29.

We agree that, by 2010, each of us should meet the commitments we made on aid effectiveness in Paris and today

ideas and initiatives that have been presented at this High Level Forum. We agree that challenges such as climate change and rising food and fuel prices underline the importance of applying aid effectiveness principles. In response to the food 30. We ask the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to continue monitoring progress on implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to report back to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. We recognise that additional work will be required to improve the methodology and indicators of progress of aid effectiveness. In 2011, we will undertake the third round of monitoring that will tell us whether we have achieved the targets for 2010 agreed in Paris in 2005.4 To carry forward this work, we will need to develop institutionalised processes for the joint and equal partnership of developing countries and the engagement of stakeholders. development outcomes and the MDGs we need to meet our commitments on both aid quality and aid volumes. We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to transmit the conclusions of the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to the High Level Event on the MDGs in New York later this month and the Financing for Development Review meeting in Doha in November 2008. We welcome the contribution that the ECOSOC Development Co-operation Forum is making to the international dialogue and to mutual accountability on aid issues. We call upon the UN development system to further support the capacities of developing countries for effective management of development assistance. 32. Today, more than ever, we resolve to work together to help countries across the world build the successful future all of us want to see a future based on a shared commitment to overcome poverty, a future in which no countries will depend on aid. 4. We will have that information available for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, along with comprehensive second phase evaluations of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action as of 2010. Attention will also be paid to improving and developing communications on aid effectiveness for long-term development success and broad-based public support.

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 

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Bogota Statement Towards Effec ve and Inclusive Development Partnerships (FINAL VERSION, MARCH 25th, 2010) This document was prepared by the Steering Committee1 responsible for organizing the Bogota High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development. It contains ideas which might prove useful to enhance the practice of South-South Cooperation. It is presented to the participants for their consideration and reference. We, representa ves of partner countries, donors, mul lateral and bilateral development organiza ons, parliaments and civil society, recognize that South-South coopera on (SSC) is an important instrument of effec ve and inclusive partnerships. We have met in Bogota, Colombia, at the High Level Event on South-South Coopera on and Capacity Development, to acknowledge its role in building capacity and advancing development, take stock of the lessons of experience and iden fy challenges, and outline the way forward. Our purpose was to implement the mandate of the Accra Agenda for Ac on and promote a greater role for, and increased effec veness in, SSC. With this in view, we commit ourselves to promote and implement good prac ces from SSC and capacity development to support countries in achieving the Millennium Development Goals and tackling emerging global development challenges, recognizing that gender equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for achieving enduring impacts on the lives of people, par cularly poor and marginalized popula ons. 1. A Southern-led process

a. SSC is a natural expression of collabora on and mutual interest between partner countries, at global, regional, and country levels. SSC is a historical process, with unique characteris cs, which reﬂects solidarity, adapts to local contexts and capaci es, and promotes mutual beneﬁt and win-win outcomes and horizontal partnerships. SSC is not a subs tute for, but a complement to, North-South development coopera on, with triangular coopera on ac ng as a bridge between South-South and North-South coopera on. 1

The Steering Commi ee members of the Bogota High Level Event on South-South Coopera on and Capacity Development are Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Mozambique, Peru, Spain, Thailand, Vietnam, Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Be er Aid, European Commission (EC), Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB), NEPAD, Organiza on of American States (OAS), OCDE, UNDP and the World Bank.

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b. Although there has been a long tradi on of collabora ve work among partner countries, the current economic and social environment provides opportuni es to foster mutual learning across all partners. South-South learning for all countries in all phases of development is key to capacity development through sharing of experience and learning, knowledge exchange, and technology and skills transfers all of which are important components of SSC. c. As a Southern-led ini a ve, we have established a process to implement the mandate set out in paragraphs 19 and 14b of the Accra Agenda for Ac on. We aspire to mutually enrich and adapt the aid effec veness principles and SSC based on the diverse experiences and good prac ce from SSC, and to further explore complementari es and synergies between SSC and North-South coopera on. While recognizing the need to respect the uniqueness and par culari es of SSC, we also recognize the value and relevance of these principles in the prac ces of SSC. d. SSC is gaining momentum. Partner countries, par cularly middle-income countries, are increasingly contribu ng to coopera on, genera ng important changes in the global development architecture, opening a window of opportunity for all development actors to work together towards a more inclusive, effec ve, and horizontal global development agenda. 2. Building up evidence a. In preparing for the Bogota High Level Event and complemen ng the work of other pla orms dedicated to addressing SSC issues, the Task Team on South-South Coopera on at the DAC-hosted Working Party on Aid Effec veness has promoted a unique evidence-based approach. We can already draw on a rich source of experiences, generated in more than 110 case stories produced mainly by prac oners from all over the developing world, demonstra ng the poten al of SSC to enrich the aid effec veness agenda. In this process, many champions and leaders have also been iden fied and were brought together to share their experiences and views on development coopera on. b. While recognizing that this process is only beginning, and addi onal rigorous evidence needs to be generated, this process so far has shown significant poten al and key findings in the prac ce of SSC and capacity development:

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i. Enabling environments and adequate policy and ins tu onal frameworks and condi ons in partner countries are key to successful strengthening of SSC. ii. Partnerships need to be based on trust, confidence, and respect. iii. Successful SSC experiences have the flexibility to adapt to par cular contexts. iv. Southern-based prac oners and technical experts need to share their experience not only at the country level, but also at the regional and global levels, to facilitate mutual learning and capacity development. c. Our findings have also underlined a few important challenges in SSC prac ces: i. There is a lot to learn from aid effec veness principles and their implementa on. SSC practices can be further enhanced by adap ng to the lessons in the aid effec veness context, especially by improving transparency and accoun ng for results through strengthening capaci es for informa on management and mutual accountability, especially at country and local levels. ii. There is room to improve complementari es and promote synergies between partner countries and tradi onal donors, including through triangular coopera on, by reducing transac on costs and engaging in mixed modali es that combine capaci es, know-how, and resources from the North and the South. iii. To derive maximum benefits from SSC requires deepening ownership by promo ng demand-driven approaches and engaging the par cipa on of civil society, parliaments, private sector, and other nongovernmental actors in development ma ers. iv. There is much scope to bring together, in a coordinated manner, the global and regional pla orms addressing SSC such as the UN ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly High Level Commi ee on South-South Coopera on to generate synergy, benefit from enriching diversi es, and collec vely develop a strong Southern-led agenda on development coopera on effec veness. These pla orms should be linked to regional communi es of prac ce, as a means of dissemina ng and applying good prac ces and sharing experiences. 3. Towards Seoul and beyond: Building effec ve and inclusive development partnerships a. In looking forward to the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effec veness, to be held in Seoul, Korea, in 2011, we are commi ed to build on the lessons of 3

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experience to promote and improve the effec veness of SSC to support countries in achieving their development objec ves and to assist in tackling emerging global development challenges. b. We urge all development actors to address capacity bo lenecks a major impediment to aid and development effec veness by adop ng a broader view of what it takes to develop capaci es and by promo ng horizontal learning and knowledge exchange. The process created for the Bogota High Level Event offers enormous poten al for iden fying and sharing Southernled experiences that showcase the benefits and challenges of horizontal coopera on. c. We shall con nue to engage in the global dialogue on development, to promote the integra on of aid effec veness principles and good prac ces as advocated by the Paris and Accra High Level Forums and by the posi ve experiences emerging from SSC prac ces, enriching the aid effec veness agenda and contribu ng to overall development effec veness. d. We highlight key outcomes of our roundtable discussions, and encourage all development actors to put into ac on the recommenda ons emerging from these discussions: i. Effec ve SSC requires an inclusive approach to ensure sufficient voice for all development stakeholders. It relies on strong country ownership and leadership, underpinned by adequate policy space for effec ve implementa on. ii. It strengthens the capaci es of local ins tu ons based on locally appropriate lessons and best prac ce. It is supported by regional and global mechanisms to match supply and demand, to facilitate peer-learning, and to document and disseminate lessons learned. iii. There is a strong need to improve measurement, monitoring and transparency of SSC to facilitate effec ve planning and implementa on. It is cri cal to promote peer-learning and SSC on data collec on and informa on management with a focus on strengthening country systems. iv. In the current changing development coopera on environment, there is a need to enhance defini ons of technical coopera on, which is o en central to SSC. v. Recognizing the added value of exis ng sub-regional, regional and inter-regional ini a ves and actors on SSC, there is an opportunity to draw on and invest in these to promote policy dialogue and generate knowledge.

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vi. Triangular coopera on should be seen as a broad process that involves three or more development actors - from different countries and organiza ons. In order for triangular coopera on to be effec ve, it is important that each actor contributes according to their respec ve compara ve advantages - and shares responsibility for demand-based development results. vii. Emerging mechanisms to promote SSC should be demand-driven to ensure ownership and sustainability. They should apply sound capacity development and M&E methodologies for learning and scaling-up, and be supported by aligned regional and global facilita on and coordina on mechanisms. viii. It is important to foster mutual learning among southern prac oners and facilitate knowledge management and learning to tackle global development challenges such as climate change. Evidence should be used to design local solu ons and ensure flexibility in their implementa on. ix. It is cri cal to ensure con nued mul -stakeholder engagement in order to sustain the development results achieved through SSC. Parliamentarians, civil society organizations and the private sector should be engaged in implemen ng SSC to tap their compara ve advantages. e. We will iden fy ways of agreeing on mechanisms to be used from now to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effec veness to implement and carry forward some of the ac ons listed above.

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DRAFT REPORT NORE

WORKSHOP ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS 26 October 2010, OECD, Paris

Main Messages: with

expression as it places aid in context as one tool for development, oking at the eﬀec veness of this one instrument. It also broadens the appeal of the

process or an exclusive donor-driven ini a ve. However, par cipants agreed th exis ng commitments on aid effec veness. In fact, par cipants agreed that aid effec veness principles and the Paris / Accra commitments, if implemented fully, will go a lon The Working Party on Aid Effec veness and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effec veness will not to re-open is, but could help iden fy what means for aid effec veness. They could: Reaffirm that aid effec veness is a poli cal agenda. Focus on building systema c and sustainable capaci es for inclusive and accountable ownership and partnerships for development with a mul -stakeholder context at the country and global levels. Demonstrate that aid that follows Paris principles is more effec ve in achieving development results than aid that has not followed these principles; Stronger focus on measuring development results achieved through a money.

Assess the applicability and relevance of the aid effec veness principles for other development coopera on tools, financing instruments and different country / regional contexts, including fragile states; Take a more holis c view of the various factors that contribute to development, not only on microeconomic indicators and figures, but also on improving the quality of life for ci zens.

Contact:

Misaki Kruger (Misaki.kurger@oecd.org) and Eduardo Gonzalez (Eduardo.gonzalez@oecd.org)

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Introduc on 1. recent years. As the Working Party on Aid Eﬀec veness progresses towards the Fourth High

2. Clarity is needed however on what this expression means for the Working Party, as well as for HLF4. The workshop provided a space for WP-EFF members and external thinkers to capture the and for HLF4. This note provides a summary of the main issues discussed at the workshop. Annex 1 consolidates feedback from the breakout groups, and Annex 2 consolidates personal opinions of par cipants.

appears to be an a rac ve expression it has broader appeal to all stakeholders working on development. However, the discussion showed that there is no agreed deﬁni on of what this expression means, as it is applied by various actors for diﬀerent purposes. various forums backed by various commitments (Monterrey / Doha, MDG Review Summit Outcomes, UN Development Coopera on Forum). Others cau oned against re-opening a ment is , in which individual percep ons range from economic development (e.g. growth and produc vity) to human and rights-based approaches to development (e.g. MDGs, gender, human rights, empowerment).

4. It is clear, however, that one of the reasons why topic for debate is the recogni on that the global development landscape has changed since the endorsement of the Paris Declara on on Aid Effec veness in 2005. While many of the actors ve been involved in development for a long me, there is increased global recogni on of their role, and also increased awareness of the need to collec vely and coherently tackle global development challenges and manage global public goods. Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which has been on the agenda for the OECD countries, is o en cited in this context. The impetus comes from the need to iden fy areas within the aid effec veness framework that may be adapted to the changing reality. 5. Based on these parameters, the discussion, which was opened by four speakers offering different interpreta ons of the concept, and informed by four breakout groups (Annex 1) and individual inputs (Annex 2), pointed to the following understanding of t effec veness is

way to achieve development results at country level.

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Countries should be at the centre of this discussion, so that it reflects specific contexts, actors and factors. Quality of rela onships in a mul -stakeholder context in terms of voice, inclusiveness, trust, genuine engagement and partnerships, poli cal relevance and accountability reflec ng power dynamics in local contexts appears to be a key interna onal levels. Capaci es need to be developed to build such high quality rela onships. Assuming inclusive ownership and good governance is an issue of capacity. Capacity is also needed to manage technical level processes on managing financial and human resources. Obtaining the right skills sets and being informed by knowledge and innova on is key.

Naomi Ngwira (Malawi): Aid effec veness is about the quality of the process of delivering and managing aid; development effec veness is about the development results both in the MDG sense as well as growth achieved through using all resources, including local and domes c resources. It is thus about managing aid so that it increases other resources for example, trade, domes c resources, remi ances to move towards aid exit. Local level capaci es are key to manage this. Jeff Dayton-Johnson (OECD Development Centre): Aid is becoming less relevant for reducing poverty and increasing produc vity, par cularly in La n America. Development effec veness is thus about looking at aid in rela ons to other types of resources for development finance, and also the capaci es of states to manage a mix of resources (aid, domes c resources, tax e outcome and results, and the la er about the processes and mechanisms. Shannon Kindornay (North-South Ins tute): Research by the North-South Ins tute on the

coopera on; 2) it is about processes and outcomes, of which policy coherence for development outcomes

poin ng to the need of inclusiveness; 3) is also relates to what we

Niels Keijzer, ECDPM: looking outside aid par cularly relates to policy coherence for development issues as integrated in the MDG Summit Outcome Document; 2) mul -actor focus; 3) and mul dimensional view of development, i.e. looking at development as beyond economic development.

What is the rela onship between development eﬀec veness and aid eﬀec veness? 3

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D expression as it places aid in context as one tool for development, with one concept to a broader range of instrument. It also broadens the appeal of the actors who o en perceive that aid eﬀec veness is a technocra c process or an exclusive donor-driven ini a ve.

should not be a new label or an excuse to dilute exis ng commitments on aid effec veness. In fact, par cipants agreed that aid effec veness principles and the Paris / Accra commitments, if implemented fully, will go a long way in realising development effec veness as conceptualised above.

8. Most of the aid effec veness principles are in fact not only relevant for aid, but also for development. This calls for discussions on accountability, ownership and results to focus on the broad stakeholders in development. Who should be accountable to whom? For whom are we pursuing results? Who owns the development process? A people-centred approach means that discussions must adapt to different country contexts and local reali es (e.g. fragile states; middle income countries). Emerging development challenges (e.g. financial crisis; climate change) must also be taken into considera on, as they affect the answers to the above ques ons. 9. Furthermore, the jury is s ll out on the extent to which aid contributes to development, considering its importance is diminishing, par cularly in middle income countries. As aid is one tool for development, it also appears there is a need for a closer look on how aid can play a cataly c and mul plying role in leveraging and shaping other drivers of development. How might aid help generate domes c and external resources, and develop capaci es to manage these resources in a coherent and effec ve way for development. The overall objec ve is to reduce aid dependency, and also build capaci es to prac ce quality partnerships to achieve development results. What are the implica ons for the Working Party on Aid Effec veness and HLF 4? The Working Party on Aid Effec veness and the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effec veness will not to reis, but could help iden fy what means for aid effec veness. They could: Reaffirm that aid effec veness is a poli cal agenda. Focus on building systema c and sustainable capaci es for inclusive and accountable ownership and partnerships for development with a mul stakeholder context at the country and global levels. Demonstrate that aid that follows Paris principles is more effec ve in achieving development results than aid that has not followed these principles; Str for money.

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10. Many of these issues are being addressed within the WP-EFF. Since Paris and Accra, the WPassess how aid effec veness principles can be adapted and enriched by diverse stakeholders civil society, parliamentarians, partners in south-south coopera on, the private sector as well as how the principles can be applied in broader development contexts and to different financial tools for example, on climate change, fragile states, innova ve finance, tax and the private sector. HLF 4 will be a poli cal opportunity to facilitate ac ons around aid quality in the broader context of development effec veness, to situate the role and impact of aid in the broader development contexts, challenges and partnerships.

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Annex 1: Main Points from Breakout Groups Development eﬀec veness implica ons for the WP-EFF and HLF 4

Group 1: Implica ons at the Country Level The star ng point is partner countries own development strategies, which are home grown, locally adapted. There is no one size fits all towards development effec veness. These plans lity that there are more development actors ac ve at country level. Importance of taking into account the poli cal economy of aid delivery, to know at which level and where discussions and decisions on aid are being taken, for example at the poli cal level, or at the technical / sectoral level. Need to recognise that the aid landscape has changed, and that tradi onal donors need to stay relevant by also learning for example on speed of delivery and flexibility. Need to con nue focus on aid to the marginalized and poor, par cularly on gender and human rights, and keep this as a focus at the poli cal level. Need to adapt approaches to countries in fragile and conflict situa ons Open ques on on where is the place to discuss issues related to policy coherence for development, for example on climate change financing. Group 2: Implica ons for Aligning Policies

opment (PCD). DAC donors PCD is not a new topic for OECD members. The OECD Council adopted Recommenda ons on good ins tu onal prac ces in promo ng policy coherence for development in April 2010. This commits all Ministries to promote PCD, not solely Foreign Ministries and Development Agencies. PCD is poli cal and therefore needs to be owned at the highest poli cal level. The costs of incoherent policies could be used as an argument. Non-DAC donors and other stakeholders, such as private sector actors, should be included in the dialogue on aligning various policies for development. Ideally, donors should apply a whole-of-country approach (as opposed to whole-of-government). At the developing country level, donors can promote dialogue on development and support partners to ensure that their various policies are coherent. This includes coherence between

The WP-EFF

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The Paris Declara on remains a solid basis for future work. Most of principles relate to development not only aid eﬀec veness. At the same me, aid is s ll relevant. It can leverage other investments and help remove barriers to development. The WP-EFF should con nue to work with aid but situate it in the broader context of development. At the HLF-4 in Busan, the WP-EFF could highlight examples from a few speciﬁc agendas/sectors, such as fragility and climate change, in order to stress the importance of aligning diverse policies.

Group 3: Implica ons for Rela ons in Development Coopera on The PD/AAA/Busan process has offered an opportunity to move away from tradi onal donor-led aid rela onship. Through the broader cons tuency of the WP-EFF we have been challenging the tradi onal approach to development coopera on, opening the discussions to others than donors. This is just a first step, there is a long way to go to really change the balance of development rela onships. Rela ons should be at the heart of development effec veness. The ques on is to define these rela onships as these influence concepts such as accountability (to whom and of who?), results (for who?), ownership (of who?). As the cons tuency of development effec veness becomes broader these concepts need to be rethought. Thinking of development effec veness rather than aid effec veness helps to see aid through different tools. Aid becomes one tool among other tools for development. Development effec veness puts local reali es at the centre, in terms of power dynamic and social orders. Although it is good to see aid effec veness within the broader context of aid effec veness, we are not done with the aid effec veness agenda as we are far away from having achieved all commitments. Is the WP-EFF the right forum to con nue this debate or is it s ll too close? If not, which fora can be considered to con nue this effort on development effec veness? Some suggested that the important thing is to con nue a mul -stakeholder dialogue at the country level as the country is where ac on should take place and strategies must be adapted to country context. Development effec veness offers an opportunity to move away from a technocra c vision of rela ons seen as transac on costs, to be judged in monetary terms. Aid effec veness focuses on aid architecture and financing mechanisms, while a shi is needed to grasp the full values of rela onships, trusts, and understanding. Facilita on skills, understanding power dynamics in local contexts and networking are essen al skills that donors should be focusing on. But in reality current budget cuts are jeopardise the possibility for donors to focus, engage and invest resources on this. We can see the failures of tradi onal approach to TC as a failure of understanding and inves ng in rela ons failure in understanding and taking into considera on the local contexts and power dynamics, failure to relate to exis ng resources and knowledge

Group 4: Implica ons for the Interna onal Framework

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The star ng point for the discussion: The landscape of actors, issues, and economic circumstances has changed since PD and led to a new perspec ve on aid and other financing instruments of development. There is a need for development effec veness as the current aid effec veness-framework has an accountability problem: Donors are not accountable to partner countries (which might be impossible to implement) and also domes c accountability processes are weakened as partner countries are primarily accountable to donors. There is also a legi macy problem, as many actors are not included. A rights-based approach would be best suited as it would allow for making aid uncondi onal, as interna onal human rights commitments could serve the same func on, and are legi mate for the whole planet. Development effec veness is about having a rights-based approach to development, a more approach to development, including human rights, environment, gender equality, CSO par cipa on. In Busan, a poli cal and not a technical statement would be desirable, reitera ng PD and AAA principles and adding missing ones, such as a rights-based approach, inclusiveness, par cipa on, legi macy, accountability, and including a mul -stakeholder dimension such as CSO recogni on. The Busan outcome document should be binding on interna onal level, but also on the na onal level, as this would help to implement the principles into prac ce, if the commitments are made on a high poli cal level, and monitored post-Busan. For the follow-up process post-Busan: It would be desirable to have an ins tu on similar to a strengthened UNDCF, as the Working Party of today is not legi mate and the dialogue has to be broader to include other stakeholders (CSOs, but also G20). General problem: Emerging donors are not likely to engage with DAC on these issues and agree to them, as they have another understanding of development do not understand their development coopera on as aid.

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Annex 2: Transcript of Individual Cards Note: The following are literal transcrip ons (as far as possible) of card messages made by par cipants. In order to facilitate their lecture, they were grouped by themes. Aid Effec veness and Development Effec veness Democracy effec veness + Aid effec veness = development effec veness I fully agree with Niels Dabels ein (PD Evalua on). This whole conversa on is a step backwards, not forwards, and may even be counter-produc ve. Our focus (in DAC +WPdevelopment and maximising (+) effects within wider context of country development processes. Policy process. This is where Paris Declara on/ Aid effec veness agenda came from, it looks very odd to be shocking that the secretariat sets up this kind of event!) (Megan Kennedy, OECD/DCD) Development effec veness goes beyond aid but there are strong links between both. Two examples: 1) Condi onality: Economic policy condi onality a ached to aid has made them more vulnerable for external shocks has effected welfare spending etc. 2) Tied aid (Procurement): It means if aid purchases local (dev country) or imported goods( from donor country). In the la er case aid is retained by the dev country and contributes to building their socio economic framework. Generally we have to look at Net flows between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor people. Real distribu on impact. Latest poverty research shows that inequality is a major constraint for making more and faster progress against mutually agreed development goals. (Bodo Almers, Eurodad) 40 years poli cs created the myth, aid brings about development. Now the public is disappointed in the aid actors- they did not bring about development. Aid effec veness must include global structures and Human Rights to become development effec veness. Lest, aid effec veness will again disappoint.

and its deﬁni on and meaning?

and instead use assistance or coopera on from now on. More relevant for development eﬀec veness.

issue

oncept doit servir a bénéficiaires. Cela impose un réorientation des indicateurs: aux indicateurs de suivi existants doivent aussi systématiques ex-

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devraient aussi êtres nourries par des analyses sur les facteurs de réussite des PRI (MIC) Linda Zanfini, MAEF France. Importance of mul stakeholder dialogue and perspec ves in working on development effec veness Development effec veness is different from Aid Effec veness What are the objec ves of the HLF4? (framework, declara on It is difficult to have common understanding and defini on on development effec veness, However we can say that development effec veness is achieved when the objec ves of the development already stated in planning document is achieved. Also it is difficult to dis nguish whether if the objec ves are dis nguish whether the successful programme is because of aid or domes c resources. However all effort that has already agreed in Paris Declara on must be implemented consistently. The principal in PD are steps to achieve development effec veness. Later we can discuss deeply on the defini on of development effec veness. (Benny Kusumo, Indonesia)

fantas c to finally clarify what development effec veness is, or at least hear different defini ons of it. If th we take development effec ve to be defini on-both process and result, how can the WP-EFF delegates here take that message and act on it correctly? How can this rich discussion be translated to ac on? Development Effec veness may go beyond aid but we are all here because we represent aid ins tu ons, partner countries and CSOs working on aid. How can we work towards development effec veness in this context.

Meanings of development eﬀec veness

Focusing on equitable, inclusive development by empowering excluded, holding decision makers accountable to them. Focusing on marginalised popula ons in middle income countries + bo om million Considering interna onal human rights commitments as objec ves of development coopera on. We are not merely talking about sustainability when we talk about development effec veness. We talk about many more qualita ve issues including human rights that need to be part of the out-come set. om the development process will dilute the focus and allow for inser ng language into HLF-4 outcome documents that will enable the supply cycle of aid to con nue with vague prac ces which will make it less difficult for that to con nue with their own agenda. (Arjuna Seneviratue, be er Aid , Green Movement of Sri Lanka) Taxa on saving systems and governance for corrup on should be important part of development effec veness.

Exit policy, gradua ng from Aid and to s mulate Trade/FDZ and industry policy, growth, investment environment should be paid more a en on.

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Less dependency on aid and more rely on own resources to strengthen ownership and self-help efforts. The backbone of development effec veness (DE) should again, focus on capacity development (CD). partner country that establishes its own exit strategy, taking stock of its developed capacity. DE should contribute to catalyzing development, inclusive of new actors, new issues, based on programme-based approach, with an aim to scaling up of CD in accordance with local context. (Nori Masugi, JICA Japan-) Development effec veness is tautology. Can development be ineffec ve? Any examples? No, it ineffec ve: country policy and procedure , incoherence in aid, etc.. People need to (re)study Paris and Accra because all elements that are men oned with regard to a conducive environment are all there (for instance inclusive ownership) We know what development means (UN Human development index, Income). So we should speech of Development process effec veness. ( Alex Gerbrandij EC/AIDCO) Less talk and more ac on We should not forget that there are contribu ons to development that are aiming at development (aid) and contribu ons that deliver development not as aim but from different objec ves.( e.g. interna onal companies). Different types how to get a win-win situa on: that is the ques on. Defini on of development effec veness lies in the posi on of the beholder! Does it help us to get in a win-win situa on to have a general common view on development effec veness/ Do we really want Paris + principles? (Leni Buisman, Netherlands) Focus of the discussion: - we should acknowledge the forum=prac cal focus =not academic - Partners know what development is for them and under PD/AAA our role is to support them in this =>Need we really spend me trying to define development? Is this ever possible? = Not desirable / produc ve Instead of discussion concepts about development effec veness, which may never reach a consensus, why we simply agree that we want other policies beyond aid to be more effec ve in order to contribute in a coherent way to development? And then we try to agree on principles, ways, mechanisms and monitoring

Paris Declara on on delivering aid? If so, we would gain me and we should discuss instruments and development partners? Governance is crucial in this debate. Recommenda ons for further debates We are now engaged in a two step process: 1. discussion on the adjustment of the current paradigm for approaching development due to changing reali es - leading to arrival on me at consensus understanding 2. char ng the way forward for prac cally moving further along the development road post-Busan In this process, we should importantly:

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1. assure that truly all relevant development actors especially those that are now missing from this discussion, namely emerging donors and private sector, but also possibly representa ves from ministries for trade, etc. 2.a. be prac cal, and assure that at the end of the day it is clear who is responsible for what (e.g. donors and partners explore how to use aid as leverage for reform to boost development results). 2.b. we agree on how to coherently work together on this road to development results 2.c. we should, in discussion on adjus ng the paradigm, take a close look again at what the heart of the exis ng current agenda is. - principles of the Paris Declara on (development results, ownership, partnership, mutual accountability) + Accra - principles of the Monterrey consensus on Financing for Development + Doha +NY - principles of MDGs As one of our objec ves in Korea is outreach, we need to be careful about how we approach discussions of human rights and democracy. (Canada) Hardly possible to draw general concluding Discussion on development effec veness has to take place in a country context of aid to development ? <= HLF4 How to make Aid more relevant and effec ve? Paris Declara on and AAA = Excellent framework! Con nued focus on implementa on => results We need to show that aid that follows PD and AAA is more effec ve and provides be er value for money

Recommenda on for message to WP-EFF: o While being responsible for aid effec veness o Recognising the importance as part of that responsibility to be aware how other factors (including other policies) influence development o Transla ng this recogni on in an agreement to monitor and discuss these factors in the Working Party in a systema c manner. General recommenda ons Seems there is consensus that dialogue needs to be about development outcomes. Ques ons remains on who iden fies theme and how. e.g. global outcomes(MDGs) vs country based outcomes

Two signiﬁcant challenges emerge purposes. Development eﬀec veness must recognize two basic reali es:

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There is no country in the world where women and men enjoy equal rights and opportuni es. There is no gender neutrality in any area or sphere (poli cs, macro economics, business, household, religion, community, etc.). Gender equality is a goal of jus ce, not a technical tool. Interna onal assistance and coopera on is the duty and obliga on of states, embedded in a rights framework and not a ma er of good will.

organiza ons in agenda plus policy se ng etc. from the beginning to the end with monitoring and evalua on. The current development coopera on system reproduces inequali es and is illegi mate, thus the UNDCF should play an important role to promote reform of the interna onal coopera on system. As social partner (trade unions), we have decided to move also into development debates, although we are unlikely to be reflec ng of aid because the development strategies, based on aid did divert from policy aspects for development such as what we include in the ILO DECENT WORK agenda; 1) rights based: recogni on of the need of a right based social chart of rights, the fundamental ILO conven ons. 2) importance of economic but social driven development; socially responsible economic growth and job crea on 3) the need for social security and social protec on as an element of sustainable development strategies 4) recognise the importance of social DIALOGUE The social dialogue as an essen al tool/ instrument methodology for enhancing development, bringing in, not only the government, but social partners (civil society) a right-full players and understand the outcomes to be the product of a nego ated joint result of all partners. That is poin ng at the ownership of development strategies and outcomes. Effec ve Development requires and equitable, democra c and inclusive mul lateral architecture. To make aid effec ve in reaching development goals fundamental reforms are needed in organisa ons like IMF, WB and WTO which models has showed to not be development effec ve. If development effec veness is about results of combined resources of partner country and aid and other development financing, how do we get be er at measuring development results in each country? We need to do this together with the partner country and measure sustainable results. Results should focus on economic growth, MDGs and peace-building and state building in fragile states. Gender should be high profile in all these. Popula on issues should be properly addressed because sooner or later most of developing countries face with serious problems of aging society. Importance of aid should not be underes mated and ODA resources should be reallocated to the most needy country a er many developing countries graduate from ODA. To support development effec veness, aid money one component of the development chainshould be be er used, managed and traced. Transparency in aid at donor and country level is key. If development is a dynamic process engaging firs a foremost policy makers and ci zens concerned in countries, the focus of development should, to be effec ve i.e. achieve results and allow a society to move forward towards its expecta ons and dreams for a be er life, focus on: o Building and strengthening ci zen-state rela ons in partners and donor countries for be er, fairer and more open government to build socie es fit to tackle problems of poverty, corrup on, human rights and conflicts o Promo ng effec ve ci zen voice and par cipa on in governance and development o Suppor ng partners governments to find sustainable and owned income/resource to exit aid cycles/dependency

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To achieve be er ci zen-state rela ons and realize development for all, aid agenda should focus on : o

o o

Working together (donors, partners, civil society and private sector) to help build a culture of zero tolerance for corrup on and tackle the global incen ves through responsible donor assistance and through developmental strategies with an -corrup on Accountability and transparency of developmental actors Inclusive, par cipa ng , holis c and adapted / advanced approach to development based on poli cal economy understandings.

about it, but I think an important ques on is about how we are going to develop this framework? Who will be involved? Who will coordinate the dra ing? What will be the process of ra ďŹ ca on? The prog

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외교통상부

Chair s Summary of the Seoul Workshop, 30 November-1 December, 2010

This summary report offers a synthesis of the recommendations and conclusions emerging from the plenaries and roundtables of the workshop on the evolving global aid architecture. The workshop was an opportunity for different stakeholders to engage directly in the preparation process for the HLF-4. It recognized the need to evolve new norms, beyond the Paris Declaration targets set for 2010, to accommodate the diversity of players, challenges and approaches involved in development cooperation. A full record of the agenda, policy briefs, and recommendations is available at www.odakorea.go.kr/eng/news/News/List.php Background to the Seoul Workshop This workshop was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan based on an agenda discussed at Development Assistance Committee. It took place against a backdrop of two important international meetings on development the UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (September 20-22, 2010) and the G-20 Seoul Summit (November 11-12, 2010) which culminated with adoption of the Seoul Development Consensus and Multi-Year Action plan. The workshop was a key milestone in the roadmap to the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to be held on November 29-December 1, 2011. The purpose of the workshop was to provide a multi-stakeholder forum in which participants could share their views to improve understanding of how the global aid architecture might evolve, so as to deepen and broaden global partnerships for development cooperation. A diverse group of around one hundred and sixty participants attended from partner country officials, OECD development partners, new development partners, multilateral agencies and global funds, parliamentarians, NGOs (international and Southern), private business, think-tanks and academia. The workshop had two plenary sessions and nine roundtables, each of which provided a set of action-oriented recommendations for how the HLF4 might address the topic of the evolving aid architecture. Although there have been notable improvements in aid effectiveness in recent years, most visibly in the allocation of aid resources in support of the Millennium Development Goals and in the quality of country systems, budget support and sector-wide programs and donor coordination, there is a recognition that making global aid more effective requires an understanding of an evolving new development ecosystem, one that is organic and dynamic, responding to new players, new challenges and new approaches.

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The Seoul workshop showcased this new ecosystem operating in practice. Participants from CSOs, private sector, academia, and think tanks were given prominent roles in preparing briefing documents and guiding the discussions at the roundtables. These participants were able to bring to bear new ideas, experiences and concerns to challenge the current approach to development. They also brought a sense of urgency and pragmatism to the table. The workshop participants were impatient for action now, based on what is already known. The challenges they put at the forefront of the debate were around fragile states, financial commitments to aid, and building country systems, as well as on the nature of global fora for international development dialogue and global accountability. At the same time, the aid community was commended for being flexible and adapting in many recent innovations, with the experience of global vertical funds, results-based management and in-country accountability mechanisms getting particular attention. The : exciting in the visible tone was established early on as improvements taking place on the ground and the move beyond the traditional ODA paradigm; sobering in the continued difficulties with advancing the aid effectiveness agenda. Yet the spirit of the workshop was optimistic. Participants clearly recognized the formidable challenges of development, especially in complex situations like those prevailing in fragile states, and in complex tasks like capacity development. But they pointed to real progress in development outcomes, and reflected an optimism derived from the resilience displayed by many countries in the face of global economic turmoil. More and more developing countries were felt to be taking ownership of their own development prospects and to be organizing themselves in ways that gave them stronger voices vis-Ă -vis donors. In many areas, leadership of the development process and mutual accountability mechanisms are gaining ground. Five Pillars for Action The workshop recommendations underscored the need for action. Global issues are becoming more pronounced, so more coordination is desirable. But the number of actors is also increasing, making effective coordination harder and more expensive. With so many development stakeholders, the discussions at the Seoul workshop pointed to the need for a fresh global development partnership or compact to be developed at Busan. Such a partnership should be inclusive of the new actors and approaches and broad enough to be relevant in addressing new challenges. From the discussion, managing the process should be based on four additional pillars for action: country ownership, exit from aid, strong leadership and political will, and diversity of approaches with coordination. 1.

Country Ownership

In discussions, the participants returned again and again to the importance of country ownership. While recognizing that progress has been made, the participants 2

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recommended that concerted effort be made at Busan to advance the country ownership agenda in a significant way. Specifically, the workshop participants recommended: Rapid implementation of good practice standards of transparency on aid at the country level A move beyond a focus on country systems to self-reliance and technological proficiency in sectoral areas countries must own the fishing rod capable of implementing their own development agendas; Empowering and trusting countries to make their own choices by increasing the share of country programmable aid in total aid and making most aid on-budget; Simplifying and speeding up aid procedures such as those governing studies, contracting and procurement;1 Professionalizing aid coordination meetings and avoiding bureaucratization of coordination procedures; Delegating the voice of development partners to those with in-country professional expertise in the relevant sector so as to ensure an informed and substantive policy dialogue; Inclusion of domestic accountability mechanisms (CSOs, parliamentarians) in aid coordination processes; between partners and an honest broker function in development cooperation. In the workshop, country ownership was seen as a credible way of operating even in situations where states are fragile and/or have weak capacity. In fact, bilateral and multilateral forums on aid effectiveness have repeatedly endorsed country ownership as a necessary condition for sustainable development. Most recently, the G-20 Seoul Development Consensus called determinant of successful development. The discussions at the workshop reiterated this theme. 2.

The Exit from Aid

The participants agreed that the purpose of aid is to end aid. This implies refocusing the results agenda onto development outcomes rather than aid effectiveness inputs. The participants recommended that this concept be further pursued in Busan and translated into an action agenda. To advance the results agenda, the workshop participants recommended: The development of norms to address good practice exit strategies for aid and the transitioning to different development cooperation partnership structures when countries reach middle income status; The leveraging of aid to support and promote growth, private investment and other instruments for development, such as trade, scientific and technical knowledge exchange and climate adaptation funding to support and promote productive capacity and growth; The metrics of aid success to explicitly include self-sustaining growth; 1

On this point, it is noteworthy that, at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, funds for climate change adaptation and mitigation, so as to avoid the bottlenecks and delays they see as applying to traditional ODA.

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A focus on technology transfer and learning by doing to ensure sustainability and acceleration of development transformations; Support for efforts to develop programmatic and/or systematic approaches that achieve results at scale; Mainstreaming capacity building into all development cooperation activities Looking at aid through the lens of an exit strategy raises the importance of monitoring and evaluation at the country level. Several participants at the workshop believed that impact evaluation can become a common global standard for measuring results. 3.

Strong Leadership and Political Will

The participants recognized that in many cases, the technical issues on improved aid effectiveness have been resolved. What is needed is political will to address collective action problems and to speed up implementation. The workshop participants recommended that at or before Busan, political strategies are adopted to: Raise political awareness of the importance of HLF4 and commit to maintaining strong financial support for development, and additionality of efforts to address global issues; Link the HLF4 narrative of improving aid effectiveness to the UN narrative of making every effort to achieve the MDGs by 2015 and the G-20 narrative of selfsustaining growth; Communicate development results in a single framework, as a product of a development partnership and unilateral results from development cooperation; -create the spirit of multilateralism to reduce transaction costs; Restore cooperative, pooled funding approaches to reduce proliferation, especially in health, climate change and agriculture; Utilize partner country systems more broadly; Clarify mandates, expectations and time frames for development results in fragile states; Promote a whole of government approach, in particular in fragile states Politically, there is a concern that the aid agenda is losing momentum in the face of fiscal pressures and the increased challenges to the proposition that aid is delivering results in a way that helps sustain the global economy and addresses global challenges. It will be important to present evidence at Busan, in simple language, of the impact of aid. In this regard, the resilience displayed by developing countries during the recent financial crisis and the large number of rapidly growing developing countries provide strong evidence that the policy dialogue supported by development partnerships has paid a handsome dividend. Busan could provide a political bridge between the community of those concerned with aid effectiveness and those concerned with broader development, security and humanitarian issues.

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Diversity with Coordination

The participants recognized the value of the unique perspectives and approaches of diverse aid providers and development agents, including CSOs, non-DAC donors and the private corporate sector. In the workshop, the benefit of a structured dialogue between these stakeholders was demonstrated. The workshop participants recommended that this be pursued further at Busan through an open, frank and inclusive dialogue among all development cooperation actors on the relevance and applicability of the aid effectiveness agenda. To promote inclusive approaches, the workshop participants: Underscored the coordinating role of national governments and recommend strengthening of country level institutional coordination structures, especially at the sectoral level; Appreciated the role of South-South Cooperation as an effective tool for national development, while understanding the challenges that remain to maximize the full development potential of SSC; Believe that regional organizations can play a useful role in reducing transaction costs of coordination, especially for South-South cooperation; Encourage further work on an appropriate division of labor among development partners; Called on all development partners, official and private, to develop structures to be transparent in their activities and permit sharing of experiences, and lessons of success, with each other; Recognized the roles that diverse stakeholders within a country can play, including local governments, CSOs and parliamentarians. The speed with which new development partners, including from the private sector, are expanding their activities places a larger burden on developing countries to take the lead responsibilities to articulate and implement a national development strategy, and appear ready to cooperate in providing necessary information on their activities. At the same time, not all development cooperation activities have to involve the government private sector and civil society activities may move ahead in parallel but should be shaped by the overall country development strategy. 5.

A New Global Development Partnership

The participants Development Partnership or Compact that leaves no country behind. The participants recognized that the Paris Declaration principles have been useful for building Global Development Partnerships, but that development partners have found different ways of implementing these principles to mutual benefit. The workshop participants discussed a range of flexible partnerships that offer promise and recommended that at Busan ways be found to support: South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation; Multistakeholder sectoral partnerships, at both global and local levels; Partnerships with the private business community; Scaling up partnerships; 5

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Local government/decentralized partnerships; People-to-people volunteer and exchange programs. In the discussions, it was clear that partnerships are difficult to implement and sustain. Successful global partnerships have some common characteristics, among which the most important are: political leadership and country ownership; appropriate time frames to mature; clear division of responsibilities; focused mandates and expectations of results. These criteria are evident in global vertical funds that have achieved considerable results, despite some shortcomings, as discussed at the workshop. But many more partnerships can be leveraged to promote development. Busan can be an opportunity to formalize or give greater structure to these efforts. It can reposition aid from being governed by the current limited partnerships of DAC donors to a comprehensive network of flexible partnerships covering all development actors. The Way Forward Through two days of stimulating discussion at the workshop, the way forward was repeatedly seen as being the development of stronger development cooperation partnerships. This means moving beyond traditional ODA partnerships that have been strengthened through the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action to encompass other forms of partnerships with new development actors, including other developing countries, philanthropic groups and the private business community, as well as civil society organizations, parliamentarians and other organizations within developing countries that have a stake in, and contribute to, the national development strategy. These partnerships must be led by, or contributing to, national government approaches and must extend beyond aid to a wide range of development cooperation instruments. The success or failure of these partnerships will be governed by their ability to deliver results in a transparent way. Yet this remains a challenge for almost all partnerships and there is significant underinvestment in developing partnerships that simplify, reduce transaction costs and achieve scale. Monitoring and evaluation within developing countries is in its infancy and decisions by development partners cannot readily be made on the basis of considered judgments on value for money. Transparent, evidence-based discussions are needed to make a breakthrough in development partnerships. The Seoul workshop provided many examples of such a dialogue at work, especially in the context of Roundtable discussions and plenaries where issues could be debated in depth. On this basis, a number of detailed recommendations were made. These are attached in the Appendix to this report. They provide a granularity and specificity that could be taken into account in the deliberations of the various clusters and in the preparation of technical Perspective Notes under the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. The participants encourage the WP-EFF working party to consider the recommendations of this workshop during the March meeting of its Executive Committee. They further suggest additional work on building evidence and initiating pilot programs prior to Busan. They believe that in this way the Seoul workshop will be seen as influential in setting the stage for a successful outcome of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan next year. 6

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Appendix 1: Recommendations for HLF4 from Seoul Workshop Plenaries and Roundtables Plenary I: Stocktaking and Issues- How is the Global Aid Architecture Evolving? The first plenary highlighted the need for more aid coordination given the recognition that global issues requiring global cooperation have become more important in development. At the same time, with more development actors, coordination has become harder to achieve. The aid architecture needs to evolve in a way that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the costs of coordination. Country ownership, as evidenced by the experience of Vietnam and Korea, is key. This implies countries need to mobilize their own resources to support development programs and to build their capacity to plan and implement development programs. Country ownership is best supported when all aid providers put their aid on budget. Demonstrating development effectiveness, value for money and results is needed to maintain political support for official development assistance. Showing that aid generates results needs to be a key element of the conversation at Busan. For aid recipients, establishing aid management systems that have transparency and monitoring and evaluation systems for donor programs is essential for managing for development results and mutual accountability. There is also a need for aid providers and recipients to capture results and to spend time and resources on communicating the results achieved by recipients with the support of official development assistance more clearly and in an easily accessible manner. But not all development objectives can be easily captured in monitorable results, and caution must be exercised that the results-agenda not weaken the emphasis on building and strengthening institutions (that ultimately even though this is inherently difficult to measure. The very difficult budget environment needs to be kept in mind as we prepare for the HLF4. Worries were expressed over the trend towards bilateral aid and pointing to specific contributions of each aid provider, or planting one s flag. The PD/AAA agenda is one of working together to support country programs, even though this approach makes it very difficult to generate political support by highlighting key achievements of individual donors. The role that aid plays in making progress on key global priorities such as improving health systems strengthens the case for cooperation and multilateral programs and approaches. Roundtable A: How Much Does Aid Effectiveness Improve Development Outcomes? Lessons from Recent Practice This roundtable presented specific examples of how aid effectiveness was starting to work on the ground. The central message was to stick with the Paris and Accra agendas 7

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and give them time to work. The early indications are that behavior on the ground is starting to change, but it must be understood that behavior change is inevitably a slow process. There will then inevitably be a further time lag until behavior changes are reflected in improved outcomes. The roundtable recommended: Support country capacity to take charge of aid coordination and to bring to the forefront new challenges (fragility, climate change etc) Treat results measurement as a global public to which the Paris principles of countries in the lead and use of local systems also apply. This means improve monitoring and evaluation at the country level; be honest and recognize and learn from errors as well as successes; bring cross-cutting issues like gender to a country level where action is feasible; and fix the disconnect in some aid agencies between headquarters and the field. Re-examine mutual accountability by focusing on regional and sectoral levels where results are more easily identified and discussed. Make every effort to promote frank, informal and equal discussion among development partners. Get the narrative right on aid effectiveness. The current story-line is complex and often negative, and risks undermining support. There is also a tendency to dismiss or ignore survey findings about limited progress toward the Paris targets in some indicators. Development partners need to be honest about their commitments to these targets and perhaps to simplify the message on aid explain in plain language, and in a succinct fashion, what aid effectiveness is achieving in terms of results. Roundtable B: Fragile States- Lessons Learned and Principles of Engagement Fragile states are at the center of a series of global challenges, ranging from peace and stability to poverty reduction and empowerment of women and the youth. Statebuilding, as a disciplined approach to deal with both issues of capacity and legitimacy, needs to be embraced and emphasized in Busan. This roundtable called for fundamental change in aid delivery systems in fragile states to offset the current international and regional division of labor along the functional lines of defense, development and diplomacy. That approach has hardened into silos that impose high costs of coordination and costly trade-offs. The Roundtable participants recommended six actions: Create and monitor incentives for collaboration across defense, development and diplomatic organizations and develop mechanisms for effective coordination to achieve an integrated approach to state-building; Rethink capacity development strategy with a move away from traditional technical assistance towards a system that is more demand-driven, has greater quality; is more appropriate to the circumstances in which it operates and has real commitments and accountability for results. There is consensus that technical assistance as currently practiced is costly and inefficient. Busan should endorse an overhaul of the technical assistance industry, promoting alternative approaches that result in measureable changes in national accountability systems and systematic improvement of country-systems; Adjust aid modalities to fragile state conditions, and scale up based on what actually works. The rules, business practices and assistance instruments of 8

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multilateral and bilateral aid organizations pose a constraint to crafting and tailoring solutions to fragile states. These rules and business practices should be revised to allow organizations to offer solutions tailored to context, using appropriate risk-management instruments devised to offset identified types of risks that are present in fragile states; Be explicit and honest about the risks and timeframes of operating in fragile states and communicate them clearly; Build on the g7+ process in strengthening mutual accountability and positioning of fragile states in the international development dialogue; Create and promote instruments to enhance regional cooperation to promote development and good governance. Roundtable C: Combining Aid Effectiveness and a Results Focus on the MDGs Lessons from Global Programs This roundtable underscored the need for global responses to global risks which have become more and more apparent. It drew on the advice to "think twice" before setting up a new global program to counter each new global challenge. However it widened the debate to request donors to think carefully about the right mix of channels to create appropriate development partnerships to respond effectively to new challenges. This has been an important lesson from the experience of tackling health, and increasingly climate and financial crises. The roundtable found a surprising consistency of what is needed in Funders should follow up and fulfill commitments already made, and ensure existing funding is tracked carefully alongside new funding; They should carefully assess the options for support and build in effectiveness principles up-front; Decisions should emerge from assessment of options, based on comparative advantage, and should involve early consultation of partner countries; Decisions should assess how funds will be distributed taking into account need and country income, among other criteria; Avoid fragmentation by consolidating existing institutions in the sector before creating new institutional overheads; Ensure a complementary and economical mix of channels to fight new challenges. The roundtable also suggested drawing the maximum learning from the results and impact achieved since 2000 in different countries. It recommended that development partners form a better integrated development partnership to manage financing for results and impact. Specifically, it recommended a learning document for Busan that: records cases of impressive development results and impact (as shown, for example, by Rwanda and Ethiopia), as well as country examples where results have been fragmented and uneven; illustrates components of effective country development partnerships for impact and of steps needed to achieve them, including

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o Alignment of financing with the country strategies, salaries, and budget, to allow accountability including with parliamentarians o Results based financing approaches by donors that take account of the capacity to sustain results within countries o Division of labor and clear roles among development partners under clear country leadership such as policy support from bilaterals, capacity building from development banks, and under the leadership and oversight of country partners and their parliaments. Roundtable D: New Development Partners- Perspectives on Aid Architecture, Coordination and Cooperation This roundtable sought to address the challenges of the evolving aid architecture through an open, frank and inclusive dialogue among all development cooperation actors on the relevance and applicability of Paris Declaration principles and other aid effectiveness concepts and standards to all development cooperation partners. Based on this dialogue, it recommended: applicable to all development assistance providers to promote an inclusive global development cooperation partnership maximizing the different roles and comparative advantages of all development assistance providers; Identify how and where best this dialogue and common platform among all development assistance actors can be taken forward at the international level preand post-Busan HLF4. Roundtable E: Private Development Assistance

Ready for Greater Responsibility

This roundtable developed a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the complementarities between ODA and private aid, as well as the synergies that result from strategic combinations of ODA, private aid and civil society action. It recommended that the dialogue at HLF4 should enhance knowledge and understanding of all development stakeholders, including both ODA flows and the substantial diverse private aid flows, that range from foundations to INGOs. Moreover, consistent with the AAA commitments, CSO principl which create the basis for effective and accountable CSO action and define the minimum standards for a rights-based enabling environment that assures CSO existence and their participation as development actors in their own right. The roundtable called for: Recognition of the role of membership-based civil society organizations such as for democratic development and equally important in the aid systems as private foundations and service delivery organizations. Governments and development partners should ensure the promotion of policy space for the democratic participation of citizens and citizen organizations.

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Development effectiveness of development cooperation to realize the internationally agreed development goals and set a process of regular forums to monitoring implementation of these commitments. Establishment of an inclusive, accountable, rights-based framework for effectiveness of development cooperation encompassing all governments, that shall succeed the WP-EFF and that includes CSOs as independent actors in their own right among other stakeholders, and recognizes the necessity of coordination of OECD and UN mechanisms such as DCF. Integration of gender equality, human rights, environmental sustainability and decent work into the preparations for Busan HLF4 as cornerstones for achieving and measuring development outcomes. To this end, indicators have to be identified based on the existing international instruments on gender equality, application of international labor standards, respect for human rights and the elements of respecting environmental sustainability. Roundtable F: The Private Business Community

Leveraging Global Partnerships

This roundtable concluded that aid effectiveness should include support for inclusive economic growth at its core with more coordinated approaches to enabling vibrant domestic private sectors and well-functioning markets by catalyzing more and better foreign private resources (commercial investment, hybrid financing and corporate philanthropy). It recommended five areas for action: Increase cooperation to improve domestic and regional enabling environments for business; Greater analysis and use of incentives for engagement, innovation, replication and scaling; Capacity development of economic institutions and business associations; Common standards for corporate accountability and transparency; Better research and data on market-based solutions and new models of partnership and financing. Roundtable G: Innovations for Greater Impact- Transparency and Scaling Up This roundtable revealed a shared understanding that aid transparency is a pre-requisite to unlocking the potential and impact of both aid and domestic revenues and systems in developing countries. High levels of aid depen can undermine the formation and integrity of the very systems needed to build and sustain public policy. Central to achieving the gains from greater aid transparency is ensuring that recipient governments can receive timely, comparable and comprehensive information about aid in a format that allows for integration into the planning and budget systems. The roundtable recommended that all donors make every effort to meet their transparency commitments made at Accra, by the time of the Busan HLF4, especially by making public information they already have, or have reported to the DAC. It commended the World Bank as an example of the value of adopting an aggressive transparency policy. The roundtable recommended: 11

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Recipient countries should together define data standards most useful to them in terms of identifying aid information formats compatible with recipient country budget systems, as well as predictability and forward flows on aid. This would include establishing a contact group and coordinating with relevant fora. These could include CABRI, Commonwealth Finance Ministers, and the NGOs and recipient country representatives on the IATI Steering Committee. Donors are encouraged to invest in the development and implementation of these standards; All donors should commit to provide information on request by partner countries. Already a are underway to demonstrate the technical feasibility of build a bridge between real-time donor aid information and budget data; Encouragement for the use of new technologies, including geo-coding and beneficiary feedback, as possible path-breaking innovations in transparency; Encouragement for those who wish to move toward common information and transparency standards. The roundtable also discussed scaling up and recommended that: The Busan HLF4 should introduce the objective of helping partner countries to scale up impact based on sound evidence of what works Scaling up impact requires country ownership and is critical to development effectiveness and managing for results; Supporting scaling up impact should be made explicit in aid agency mission statements, operational activities and evaluations; Scaling-up impact should be the default mode of operating and can be used as a framework on which to build partnerships; Scaling up impact can support policy coherence, including the use of market mechanisms for growth and development; Scaling up impact is inclusive of a range of stakeholders and must involve political engagement, including with parliamentarians. Roundtable H: South-South Knowledge Exchange

Towards Horizontal Partnerships

This roundtable discussed practical experiences and forward-looking perspectives of how to take full advantage of South-South knowledge exchange. It proposed that South-South Knowledge Exchange be considered a key issue for Busan HLF4 and beyond with the . The roundtable concluded that in an increasingly multi-polar world, the development architecture is undergoing deep changes with the involvement of a diverse set of actors, including a growing number of middle income countries and low-income countries, eager to share their experiences and learning from their peers. As acknowledged in the 2009 Nairobi Declaration, the 2010 Bogota Statement and the recent G20 Development Consensus, peer-to-peer learning can harness the transformative potential of a world in which solutions can come from virtually everywhere and where every development actor has something to share. The roundtable recommended: 12

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More southern-led evidence is needed to understand what works and what does not work in South-South and Triangular Cooperation Collaboration and coordination between global platforms such as G20, the ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum, the UN High Level Committee on SSC and the Task Team on South-South cooperation of the OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness; Establishing complementarities between South-South Knowledge Exchange and Official Development Assistance, based on comparative advantages of each modality; Mechanisms to scale up knowledge sharing (at multilateral, regional and country levels) by improving their quality, ensuring sound follow-up and working towards results and impact; Additional support for developing and expanding country capacities to promote SSC and triangular cooperation. Roundtable I: Partner Country Perspectives- Ownership and Mutual Accountability This roundtable started from the recognition that country ownership and mutual accountability have been the most difficult Paris principles to define and put into practice. It highlighted the difficulties many partner countries are having in translating national strategies into sector strategies, as well as decentralized programmes and functioning accountability systems. It recommended: Mutual accountability and results should form a center pivot for post-Busan, with a clear framework of mutual accountability at different levels based on adequate information management and disclosure, to be treated as a public good; Proactive design of the building blocks of development effectiveness; Institutionalization of aid/development effectiveness mechanisms to overcome political risks, through ample consultation processes (for example including national, sub-national, and non-state actors) Political level engagement for the aid/development effectiveness agenda, with effective communication packages and exchange of best practices; Clear identification of partner country leadership roles in ownership and mutual accountability. Plenary II: The Evolving Global Aid Architecture: The Development of Global Partnerships This plenary reviewed the challenges faced by existing global partnerships in incorporating new development partners and in expanding the scope of partnerships to achieve more coherent development (as opposed to simply aid) programs. It reviewed the complementarities among alternative forums for discussing development issues. It highlighted: The absence of a mechanism where new development partners can readily play a constructive role; 13

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The usefulness of broad consensus forums like the UN-DCF and the MDG Summits for setting common standards, norms, principles and global objectives, while other forums, like the Seoul Development Consensus forged by the G20 provide more specific operational and implementation guidance on development; The value of regional mechanisms and organizations for consultation and implementation of global partnerships; The value of new partnerships like those on South-South cooperation and knowledge exchange; The Busan HLF4 provides an opportunity for the aid community to develop greater coherence with other parts of the development community as well as with other states and non-state actors. It offers an opportunity to provide greater clarity on the division of labor and on the principles on which a number of global partnerships for development can be based. development effectiveness.

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CSOs on the Road to Busan: Key Messages and Proposals

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CSOs on the Road to Busan: An Executive Summary of CSO Key Messages and Proposals CSOs in the BetterAid Platform, with the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, are calling upon all development actors in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to work together for an ambitious forward-looking outcome at the Busan High Level Forum that addresses critical issues in development cooperation. Progress in three mutually dependent areas of reform is essential for a meaningful and ambitious Busan Declaration on Development Effectiveness: a) Complete and deepen current aid effectiveness commitments; b) Operationalize development effectiveness; c) Promote an equitable and just development cooperation architecture. Each area will require negotiated specific, time-bound and measureable commitments. When taken together, they will build development partnerships, mutual trust and accountability for actions that can realize the goal of aid and development effectiveness: deepening the impact of aid and development cooperation on the capacities of poor and marginalized people to realize their rights and achieve the internationally agreed development goals (IADGs).

Development partners must A) Complete and deepen current aid effectiveness commitments by â&#x20AC;Ś 1. Taking stock of commitments: 1.1 Implement an inclusive assessment of Paris and Accra commitments that takes account of and specifies the underlying reasons for the lack of more significant progress. 2. Carrying forward and strengthen the Paris and Accra aid effectiveness commitments: 2.1 Promote democratic ownership of development policies and actions through full engagement with, and accountability to, all development stakeholders (most importantly the intended beneficiaries and local communities, but also parliaments, CSOs, private sector, local government and media). 2.2 Carry out regular broad and inclusive multi-stakeholder country-level policy dialogues on development strategies, policies and programs. 2.3 Strengthen and realize the Paris commitment towards the use of program-based approaches, while realizing the Accra commitment to increase the use of country systems as the first option by donors in bilateral government-to-government cooperation. 2.4 End donor policy conditions attached to aid negotiations and disbursements, including implicit and indirect policy conditions by International Financial Institutions. 2.5 End all formal and informal practices of aid tying. 2.6 Make technical assistance fully demand-driven, responsive to country needs, ensuring an integrated human rights and gender equality perspective, with precedence given to local knowledge sourced through transparent and inclusive processes. 2.7 Deliver on the Accra commitment to improve aid predictability by providing recipients with, and delivering on, predictable three to five year funding tranches. 2.8 Ensure that support to the private sector does not undermine agreed development goals and human rights standards but supports their realization.

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3. Implementing full transparency as the basis for strengthened accountability: 3.1 Create and strengthen clear accountability frameworks at global and country levels, based on existing country-led processes, with strategies to reduce aid dependence, the inclusion of all stakeholders, and the respect for human rights obligations of each development actor. 3.2 Adhere to and implement the highest standards of openness and transparency by signing up to and implementing the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards, and by recognizing civil society initiatives to improve CSO accountability and transparency.

B) Operationalize development effectiveness by … 4. Giving centrality to human rights, eradicating the root causes of poverty and inequality: 4.1 Commit to and implement rights-based approaches to reforms in development cooperation and its practices, as the basis for concrete measures to eradicate the root causes of poverty and inequality and to promote democratic ownership. 5. Promoting and implementing gender equality and women’s rights: 5.1 Place gender equality and women’s rights at the center for achieving development effectiveness, by strengthening implementation and monitoring of current gender equality and human rights obligations and commitments of donors and governments, and through the allocation of dedicated resources for their realization. 6. Implementing the Decent Work Agenda as the cornerstone for socially inclusive and sustainable development strategies. 6.1 Implement economic development strategies based on the recognition of social rights, with social inclusion, social protection and social dialogue to address the needs of vulnerable and marginalized segments of society. 7. Ensuring the full participation of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right: 7.1 Recognize the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness (see Annex Three) as the basis for assessing CSO contributions to development and for donor and government policies that enable these contributions. 7.2 Engage CSOs through the Open Forum on CSO development effectiveness to agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices that create an enabling environment for CSOs to reach their full potential as development actors.

C) Promote an equitable and just development cooperation architecture by … 8. Proposing and implementing fundamental reforms in the global governance of development cooperation: 8.1 Propose an inclusive multilateral process to consider a binding agreement on development effectiveness, negotiated within the United Nations and the framework of United Nations human rights conventions and covenants. 8.2 Promote inter-institutional collaboration between the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and United Nations mechanisms, such as the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), to strengthen UN institutions for policy dialogue on development effectiveness.

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CSOs on the Road to Busan: Key Messages and Proposals1 I Introduction CSOs organized under the BetterAid Platform, with the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, call for urgent and essential reforms of the global development cooperation system, which is experiencing profound crisis (see Annex One for a brief description of each initiative). The Fourth High Level Forum in Busan, Republic of Korea, in November 2011, will be an important opportunity for collaboration to lay the ground for these reforms. All development actors in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness must work together in the coming months for an ambitious forward-looking outcome at Busan that addresses critical issues in development cooperation.2 A Busan Declaration on Development Effectiveness must set out ambitious commitments for renewed partnerships for a development cooperation system that focuses on human rights, recognizing the centrality of poverty reduction, gender equality, social justice, decent work and environmental sustainability. Busan must also deliver an implementation framework with specific, time-bound, measurable benchmarks, which can be independently and regularly monitored, for these commitments. The context for CSOs’ appeal for ambition is the overarching failure by the international community to give priority to actions that were needed “to spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty” and “to making the right to development a reality for everyone”. These aspirational words from the Millennium Declaration gave hope that the international community would make the hard decisions for reform. These reforms were to give attention to the needs of the people living in poverty, and of developing countries, which is required to achieve internationally agreed development goals (IADGs), including those combined in the Millennium promise. Despite agreements reached in 2002 at the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, and in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) to make aid more effective, donor and developing country governments have made only patchy progress towards their stated goals, and many donors are now abandoning their aid volume promises. This lack of progress demonstrates an alarming absence of political will to deal coherently and effectively with the major development challenges confronting the world.

BetterAid’s key messages and proposals were developed through group discussion at the BetterAid Coordinating Group’s October 2010 meeting in Paris, followed by further consultations within the BACG, the Open Forum Global Facilitating Group, and the BetterAid Platform. They are also derived from four BetterAid background policy papers: 1) An Assessment of the Accra Agenda for Action from a Civil Society Perspective (November 2009); 2) Development Effectiveness in Development Cooperation: A Rights-based Perspective (October 2010); 3) Making Development Cooperation Just: Governance principles and pillars (December 2010); and 4) Policy Paper on South-South Development Cooperation (March 2010). These papers are available at www.betteraid.org. BetterAid key messages will continue to develop based on further CSO consultations and the Working Party agenda for Busan in 2011. 1

Annex Two sets out some useful definitions as employed by BetterAid in this paper for aid, development cooperation, aid effectiveness and development effectiveness. 2

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The last decade witnessed unrelenting and growing inequalities within and between countries, exacerbated by the failure to address the systemic causes behind deepening crises of global finance, climate change and hunger. In the face of these crises, millions of poor and marginalized populations experience weak social protection mechanisms, along with shrinking political space to realize their social, economic, cultural and political rights. There has been severe challenges to realize the IADGs, including the MDGs, particularly for those who need them most. Millions of civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide contribute in unique and essential ways to development as innovative agents of change and social transformation. They play key roles in representing a wide range of voices in the policy debates at country and global levels on the implementation of the Paris/Accra commitments. As full members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, they have been active in building a multi-stakeholder agenda on development effectiveness. Nevertheless, despite recognition as “development actors in their own right” in Accra, CSOs are facing policies and practices that restrict their role as development actors. As CSOs work to improve their own effectiveness, an enabling environment is essential to “maximize their contributions to development” (AAA). Drawing on this rich experience, CSOs have focused their proposals on three mutually-dependent areas of reform essential for realizing a meaningful and ambitious Busan Declaration on Development Effectiveness: a) Completing and deepening current aid effectiveness commitments; b) Operationalizing development effectiveness; and c) Promoting an equitable and more just development cooperation architecture, with systemic changes in the global governance of international development cooperation. Each requires negotiated, specific, time-bound and measureable commitments. When taken together, they will build mutual trust and accountability for actions that can realize the goal of development effectiveness: deepening the impact of aid and development cooperation on the capacities of poor and marginalized people to realize their rights and achieve the IADGs.

II All development partners must … A) Complete and deepen current aid effectiveness commitments by … 1.

Taking stock of commitments:

1.1

CSOs Ask: Implement an inclusive assessment of Paris and Accra commitments that takes account of and specifies the underlying reasons for the lack of more significant progress.

An honest and realistic assessment of the progress achieved on the Paris and Accra commitments by donors and developing country governments will only be possible if the Survey and Evaluation draw evidence at country level from transparent consultations with all development actors, including civil society, parliamentarians and local government bodies.

The determination of key issues for HLF4 should be based not only on the Synthesis of the Survey and Evaluation key findings by the OECD Development Cooperation Directorate, but also take into account evidence-based proposals from all the stakeholders with standing in

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the Working Party, including Cluster A on democratic ownership and accountability. This Synthesis should document not only the evidence for relative success in realizing commitments, but clearly set out both immediate and systemic reasons why more progress was not achieved.

Carrying forward the Paris and Accra commitments on aid effectiveness : The Accra Agenda for Action broadened the Paris Declaration commitments in a number of important areas for aid effectiveness – engagement with all development actors, including recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right, the centrality of gender equality, human rights and environmental sustainability, the use of country systems, on conditionality, technical assistance, transparency and mutual accountability. These commitments must not be rolled back, but rather sustained, clarified and deepened. Their realization is an essential foundation for aid’s contribution to the effectiveness of development initiatives for poor and marginalized populations.

2.1

CSOs Ask: Promote democratic ownership of development policies and actions through full engagement with, and accountability to, all development stakeholders (most importantly the intended beneficiaries and local communities, but also parliaments, CSOs, private sector, local government and media). The AAA elaborates country ownership of development policies and programs not simply as government ownership, but as inclusive democratic ownership. This means that citizens’ voices and their concerns – of women, men, girls and boys – must be the primary basis for national development plans, policies and processes. Donors and governments should therefore give priority to, protect and deepen open and inclusive processes for engagement and accountability with all development actors, especially beneficiary populations, ensuring that grassroots community needs are reflected in national plans. Development actors such as parliaments, local government or civil society organizations, including women’s organizations and membership based organizations, must be fully engaged in all stages of planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and assessment of development plans.

2.2

CSO Ask: Carry out regular broad and inclusive multi-stakeholder country-level policy dialogues on development strategies, policies and programs. Donors and governments should commit to actions that strengthen roles for CSOs, parliamentarians, local government and the media in the formulation and approval of poverty and development cooperation strategies, including multi-stakeholder oversight structures open to all development actors. Development partners must address, proactively and effectively, the current shrinking political space for citizens to act and speak collectively in many countries around the world.

2.3

CSOs Ask: Strengthen and realize the Paris commitment towards the use of program-based approaches, while realizing the Accra commitment to increase the use of country systems as the first option by donors in bilateral government-togovernment cooperation. The utilization of program-based approaches (PBAs) to aid and use of country systems creates important synergies with the use of country systems, building country capacities and avoiding parallel donor systems. While vital for country ownership and reduced transaction costs, donors have yet to move significantly towards PBAs, with myriads of

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projects still the norm in most countries and donors controlling their own programs. Donors should agree on common and transparent criteria for determining when, and when not, to use country systems. They must justify decisions publicly when they choose not to use country systems. The use of country systems should fully respect the autonomy and independence of civil society as actors in their own right, and should not be a justification for interference by government with CSOs. The implementation of commitments on using country procurement and financial management systems lags far behind and needs new impetus in Busan. Donors and developing country partners should commit to reform procurement policies in order to award contracts that take into consideration criteria for pro-poor development outcomes, social inclusion, environmental impacts, and decent work, including compliance with ILO Conventions. Effective country systems for governance of aid and development require more than good practices in procurement and public financial management. While these are important, all development actors should also promote participatory, accountable, transparent and responsive country systems to prevent corruption. 2.4

CSOs Ask: End donor policy conditions attached to aid negotiations and disbursements, including implicit and indirect policy conditions by International Financial Institutions. Policy conditionality and tied aid undermine democratic country ownership, the overarching principle of aid effectiveness, and the right to development. These practices must end. Current policy conditionalities must be made transparent and phased out within one year after Busan, with no such conditions in new aid agreements. This must also include indirect conditions from International Financial Institutions and other multilateral organizations. Only fiduciary conditions, which are negotiated in a transparent and inclusive manner with mechanisms for public monitoring, ought to be attached to development assistance. Donors should work with developing countries to jointly meet human rights obligations as signatories of human rights covenants and conventions, including gender equality, womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rights, childrenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rights, the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples, decent work, environmental sustainability, and anti-corruption. Consultations for budgetary and other forms of sector support should be negotiated with reference to broad-based and open fora that allows for all affected groups and persons to participate, including parliamentarians, local governments, and CSOs.

2.5

CSOs Ask:

End all formal and informal practices of aid tying.

Donors should review all of their aid and development cooperation practices (including technical assistance and food aid) to remove any terms and conditions that result in the effective tying of aid, while giving preferences to local and regional procurement. 2.6

CSOs Ask: Make technical assistance fully demand-driven, responsive to country needs, ensuring an integrated human rights and gender equality perspective, with precedence given to local knowledge sourced through transparent and inclusive processes. A more robust commitment to demand-driven technical assistance should include measurable indicators for demand-driven technical assistance and full transparency on the terms and conditions for technical assistance that is provided in an aid agreement. Donors,

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if requested, should strengthen capacities for developing country counterparts to identify appropriate technical knowledge needed to implement their poverty strategies. 2.7

CSO Ask: Deliver on the Accra commitment to improve aid predictability by providing recipients with, and delivering on, predictable three to five year funding tranches. In the AAA donors committed to provide partner countries with “regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans”. Such an approach to delivering aid is vital to ensuring that recipients can plan for the long-term investments in their social systems and economy that are vital to their development prospects. However, few donors are yet to fulfill this commitment and their aid is still highly unpredictable leaving development strategies underfunded.

2.8

CSOs Ask: Ensure that support to the private sector does not undermine agreed development goals and human rights standards but supports their realization. When awarding private sector contracts, the primary criteria should be development goals, human rights advancement, including decent work, and poverty reduction, not “value-formoney” or economic efficiency. Private sector support should not undercut the legitimate and necessary role of the state in promoting the equitable provision of public goods and services and of ensuring social inclusions and social protection for all. In support of propoor sustainable economic growth through development cooperation, the focus should be on not-for-profit enterprise and local entrepreneurs.

Implementing full transparency as the basis for strengthened accountability: Full public disclosure of aid information – revenues, expenditures, procurement, audits, and all terms and conditions, including indirect conditions, for projects – is an essential precondition for public accountability. In the AAA, donors committed to openness and transparency and making their aid more predictable (paras 24, 25 and 26). Under the leadership of DFID a number of donors separately committed to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IAITI), which to date has drawn up phase-one common standards for the provision of aid information mostly available to donors in their own systems. More ambitious phase-two has get to begin, with the emphasis on implementing phase one standards and making this information available prior to Busan.

3.1.

CSOs Ask: Create and strengthen clear accountability frameworks at global and country levels, based on existing country-led processes, with strategies to reduce aid dependence, the inclusion of all stakeholders, and the respect for human rights obligations of each development actor. Limited accountability has been one of the main weaknesses of the current development cooperation system. There has been little progress in putting into practice the principle of mutual accountability for development results set out in the Paris Declaration. Few development cooperation agreements at national level set out explicit and public targets for individual donors, to which they can be held accountable. Nor do they address “exit strategies” to reduce aid dependency. The AAA committed to strengthen donor/government accountability “to each other and to their citizens” by making aid more transparency, by stepping up efforts for mutual assessment reviews, and by “drawing on emerging good practice with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement”.

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The foundation for mutual accountability between donors and governments at the country level is strengthened national accountability mechanisms and capacities, with full transparency and support for inclusive processes involving all stakeholders. 3.2.

CSOs Ask: Adhere to and implement the highest standards of openness and transparency by signing up to and implementing the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards, and by recognizing civil society initiatives to improve CSO accountability and transparency. The realization of IATI goals will be achieved when aid information is publicly accessibility in local languages for developing country governments and citizens. Systems for accessing information should start from peoples’ needs and donors and governments should enable mechanisms to ensure that information will be comparable, timely, comprehensive and usable by citizens. All governments must work with elected representatives and citizens’ organizations to set out open and transparent policies, including those that look at how aid is related to domestic resources, spending, monitoring and accountability systems. CSOs are working with the Open Forum’s Istanbul Principles on CSO Development Effectiveness (see Annex Three) as well as other initiatives to put in place standards for CSO accountability and transparency.

B) Operationalize Development Effectiveness by … 4.

Giving centrality to human rights, eradicating the root causes of poverty and inequality: Applying a human rights based approach to the development crisis, based on international human rights standards, offers a holistic and universally recognized framework to guide the implementation of social, economic an financial policies, including the contributions of aid to the empowerment of people to claim their rights. A human rights approach is inclusive of political, social, economic and cultural rights as well as the right to development. Development cooperation should only be assessed for the real impacts it has on the well-being of all people, particularly poor and marginalized groups and individuals, many of whom are women and girls. With this approach, the root causes of poverty and inequality (such as gender inequality or the inequalities between and within countries) will be addressed systematically. International development cooperation must aim towards eliminating the dependence of developing countries on external assistance. 4.1 CSOs Ask: Commit to rights-based approaches to reforms in development cooperation and its practices, as the basis for concrete measures to eradicate the root causes of poverty and inequality. Both donors and developing country governments should conduct aid and development cooperation relationships and practices that are consistent with human rights principles and standards. These include non-discrimination (paying attention to the most marginalized and poor), due diligence (systematically considering the conditions affecting capacities of poor people to claim their rights), enabling participation and empowerment (of affected populations and more broadly democratic rights), and democratic ownership (through respect for political rights, accountability and transparency). Donors and governments should respect the principle of free, informed and prior consent of rights-

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holders, by enabling conditions for voluntary local participation in consideration and implementation of proposed development initiatives.

Promoting and implementing gender equality and women’s rights: While the Paris Declaration is gender-blind, the AAA acknowledges the importance of gender equality, together with human rights and environmental sustainability as “cornerstones for achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men and children” (para 3). But it fails to propose concrete goals and timelines, allocation of resources and establishment of indicators to track progress.

5.1.

CSOs Ask: Place gender equality and women’s rights at the center for achieving development effectiveness, by strengthening implementation and monitoring of current gender equality and human rights obligations and commitments of donors and governments, and through the allocation of dedicated resources for their realization. Development cooperation priorities, policies and practices should be derived from human rights obligations to respect, protect and fulfill women’s rights. These policies and practices should not only focus on gender mainstreaming, but also create specific monitoring mechanisms and target capacities and resources for women’s rights organizations in development. Supporting women’s organizations and movements is key to advancing women’s rights, gender equality and justice.

Implementing the Decent Work Agenda as the cornerstone for socially inclusive and sustainable development strategies:

6.1.

CSOs Ask: Implement economic development strategies based on the recognition of social rights, with social inclusion, social protection and social dialogue. Consistent with the inclusion of Decent Work in the objectives of the first MDG, economic development and growth strategies should be based on the ILO Decent Work Agenda. This Agenda recognizes the need for a rights-based approach to economic development, the imperative of social inclusion and protection, preventing growing socio-economic gaps within societies and between countries. It gives priority to social dialogue as the instrument for establishing participation and consultation with social partners concerned.

Ensuring the full participation of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right: The AAA recognized CSOs as “independent development actors in their own right … whose efforts complement those of government and the private sector”. Donors and governments committed themselves to work with CSOs “to provide an enabling environment that maximizes their contribution to development”. In spite of these commitments, CSOs have experienced marginalization and repression by governments, or have been instrumentalized as service delivery channels for international donors.

7.1.

CSOs Ask: Recognize the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness (see Annex Three) as the basis for assessing CSO contributions to development and for donor and government policies that enable these contributions. In Paragraph 20 of the AAA governments and donors recognizes “CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and

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the private sector”. The global CSO-led Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, which is also recognized in the AAA, reached consensus on eight Istanbul Principles that are the foundation for the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors in their own right. These principles were the agreed outcome of more than 60 inclusive national and sectoral consultations by hundreds of CSOs around the world. 7.2.

CSOs Ask: Engage CSOs working through the Open Forum to agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices that create an enabling environment for CSOs to reach their full potential as development actors. Paragraph 20 of the AAA affirmed a shared government-donor-CSO interest to engage “in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential”. The Open Forum has elaborated in a Draft International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness conditions for CSOs as well as minimum standards for donor and government laws, policies and practices, based on the Istanbul Principles.3 Without a multi-stakeholder agreement on some basic minimum enabling standards, it will be difficult for CSOs to be true to CSO development effectiveness principles. CSOs increasingly confront measures in which CSOs are harassed, intimidated and criminalized, undermining the development effectiveness of all development actors. Donors and governments must allow the independence and autonomy of CSO actions for development and refrain from interference in CSO development cooperation activity. They have human rights obligations to create legal and policy frameworks for the exercise of the freedom of association, freedom of assembly freedom of speech, and access to information, in accordance with international human rights law.

C) Promote an equitable and just development cooperation architecture by … 8.

Proposing fundamental reforms in the global governance of development cooperation: Currently decision-making and standard setting on development cooperation is falling short on many fronts. It is not made within a truly multilateral, inclusive and participatory forum. Developing and developed countries, as well as civil society and other development actors, are not equally represented. Following HLF4, the aim should be to move towards a more fully coordinated global architecture, within the framework of the United Nations. The focus of this new architecture should be not only on aid quality and effectiveness, but also on all contributing resources for development – trade, foreign direct investment, other development finance, debt and climate change financing. It should clearly address policy coherence for development.

8.1.

CSOs Ask: Propose an inclusive multilateral process to consider a binding agreement on development effectiveness, negotiated within the United Nations and the framework of United Nations human rights conventions and covenants. A binding agreement would form the basis for an accountable and legitimate international system of governance for development cooperation. It would confirm that all states and development actors have a duty and commitment to mutual cooperation and respect. One such option for such an agreement could be the creation of a Convention under the auspices

See http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/version_2_november__framework_for_cso_dev_eff_final.pdf.

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of the United Nations. This mechanism would focus on strengthening commitment to the IADGs, addressing common standards for adherence and common comparable standards for effectiveness. It would establish an independent accountability mechanism and a dispute settlement mechanism, with improved international coordination among all development actors, including specific guarantees for an enabling and participatory environment for civil society. A binding agreement on development effectiveness would be negotiated by all development actors (including civil society), each of whom will have full membership in the system. 8.2.

CSOs Ask: Promote inter-institutional cooperation and collaboration between the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and United Nations mechanisms, such as the Development Cooperation Forum, to strengthen UN institutions for policy dialogue. An equitable and just development architecture, which promotes sovereignty and policy coherence, should be rooted in a multilateral and multi-stakeholder body that ensures legitimacy through the representation of all development actors. The foundation for this new architecture will be guided by the obligations and accountabilities of all countries to universally accepted human rights conventions and norms, including gender equality, decent work and environmental sustainability. UN-based policy-making and dialogue should be inclusive, with strong representation of developing country perspectives. The OECD DAC should concentrate on its original mandate, which is to collect and make available statistical information on development cooperation and identify best practices through structured dialogue with key development stakeholders.

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Annex One: What are the BetterAid Platform and the Open Forum? Coming out of Accra, the Better Aid Platform and the Open Forum are two distinct, yet complementary global CSO-led processes. The BetterAid Platform: BetterAid is a diverse global platform that brings together hundreds of civil society organizations (CSOs) that engage in development cooperation. It enables their voluntary pro-active participation in dialogue and policy influencing opportunities. BetterAid has its origins in the lead-up to the third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (HLF3). At Accra, CSOs played a critical role. Their participation in the debate was primarily organized by the CSO International Steering Group (ISG) of the BetterAid Platform. After Accra, the ISG was renamed the BetterAid Coordinating Group (BACG). It facilitates the Platform and participates in the official process as full members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. BetterAid’s objective is to monitor and influence the implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) – with specific focus on issues in democratic ownership – while broadening the agenda to development effectiveness. The latter focuses attention on the impact of aid and development cooperation on democracy, human rights, social and gender justice, and includes proposals for reform of international development cooperation architecture. Through regional and national workshops BetterAid has supported local CSOs to develop plans for monitoring and encouraging implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action. The BACG has developed policy position papers on a variety of related subjects that are available on its web site – www.betteraid.org. The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness: The Open Forum is a CSO-led global process, which was initiated prior to the 2008 Accra High Level Forum, to deepen CSO accountability to principles and guidelines that will improve CSO effectiveness as development actors. The Open Forum has held national consultations with hundreds of CSOs in over 60 countries in 2010. These consultations culminated with endorsement of the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness at the Open Forum’s first Global Assembly in Istanbul in September 2010 (see Annex Three). Work is ongoing with CSO constituencies at country level on a Draft Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, which includes guidelines, indicators and accountability mechanisms for the Principles that CSOs will be able to tailor to their country contexts. The Open Forum also continues to engage in dialogue with donor and developing country government stakeholders around the world on the Forum’s proposals, contained in the Draft Framework, for minimum standards for these actors to enable CSOs to realize development practices consistent with the Istanbul Principles. Following a second Global Assembly in 2011, an International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness will be presented to the Busan High Level Forum in November. The Open Forum engages with members of the Working Party in its own right and through the BetterAid Platform. The Principles and Draft Framework are available on the Open Forum web site – www.cso-effectiveness.org.

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Annex Two

BetterAid Definitions

Aid: BetterAid uses the term “aid” synonymously with “Official Development Assistance” (ODA). ODA is made up of concessional resource transfers for development and humanitarian assistance between a donor and a partner in a developing country. The donors meeting in the OECD Development Assistance Committee have established the specific criteria for determining whether a particular resource transfer can be considered ODA. While CSOs can receive ODA, ODA does not include direct resource transfers by civil society organizations or other non-state actors. Similarly, developing country donors, who are not members of the DAC, also provide development assistance, most of which currently is not reported to the DAC, and is not included in ODA. Development Cooperation: Development cooperation is sometimes used inter-changeably with “aid” or “development assistance”, but includes more than ODA resource transfers. BetterAid uses “development cooperation” to include a range of international relationships between governments or people for the purposes of achieving the internationally-agreed development goals (IADGs) in developing countries. It can include civil society cooperation and growing cooperation between developing countries (South-South Cooperation) for the purposes of development. Aid Effectiveness: Aid effectiveness relates to measures that improve the quality of the aid relationship, primarily focusing on the terms and conditions of the resource transfer itself. The Paris Declaration defined five principles that should guide official donors and developing country governments to improve the effectiveness of this resource transfer. Development Effectiveness: There is no accepted definition of “development effectiveness”. For BetterAid, development effectiveness has been understood as policies and practices by development actors that deepening the impact of aid and development cooperation on the capacities of poor and marginalized people to realize their rights and achieve the IADGs. Conditions for realizing development effectiveness goals must include measureable commitments to improve the effectiveness of aid. Internationally-Agreed Development Goals: The IADGs are a set of specific goals, many with concrete time-bound targets, which form the United Nations Development Agenda. They summarize the major commitments of the UN global summits held since 1990 on different aspects of global development challenges. Some of these commitments were combined in the Millennium Declaration adopted by all governments as the Millennium UN Summit in 2000. The IADGs include the eight specific Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but are a much broader set of objectives. The latter include challenges of economic growth at country level, equitable social progress, decent work, sustainable development, human rights (including women’s rights children’s’ rights, indigenous peoples rights), global economic governance, trade, debt and migration. Development Cooperation Architecture: Development cooperation architecture refers to the established systems and institutions of global governance for development cooperation. Among these current structures are the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the informal Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) (facilitated by the Secretariat at the DAC), and the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UN DCF), which is a biennial multi stakeholder Forum within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) aiming at providing an inclusive platform for dialogue on aid effectiveness and international development issues. But other multilateral bodies also play important roles in development cooperation architecture, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, other UN bodies, the G20, the IMF and the European Union, or should play more important roles, such as the UN Human Rights Council.

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Annex Three: Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness4 Civil society organizations are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe. CSOs collaborate with the full diversity of people and promote their rights. The essential characteristics of CSOs as distinct development actors – that they are voluntary, diverse, non-partisan, autonomous, non-violent, working and collaborating for change – are the foundation for the Istanbul principles for CSO development effectiveness. These principles guide the work and practices of civil society organizations in both peaceful and conflict situations, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a continuum from humanitarian emergencies to long-term development. 1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice CSOs are effective as development actors when they … develop and implement strategies, activities and practices that promote individual and collective human rights, including the right to development, with dignity, decent work, social justice and equity for all people. 2. Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girl’s rights CSOs are effective as development actors when they … promote and practice development cooperation embodying gender equity, reflecting women’s concerns and experience, while supporting women’s efforts to realize their individual and collective rights, participating as fully empowered actors in the development process. 3. Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation CSOs are effective as development actors when they … support the empowerment and inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized. 4. Promote Environmental Sustainability CSOs are effective as development actors when they … develop and implement priorities and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future generations, including urgent responses to climate crises, with specific attention to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice. 5. Practice transparency and accountability CSOs are effective as development actors when they … demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations.

The Istanbul Principles, as agreed at the Open Forum’s Global Assembly in Istanbul, September 28 -30, 2010, are the foundation of the Open Forum’s Draft International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles are further elaborated in Version 2 of this Framework, which is being updated and will be found on the Open Forum’s web site, www.cso-effectiveness.org.

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6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity CSOs are effective as development actors when they … commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship. 7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning CSOs are effective as development actors when they … enhance the ways they learn from their experience, from other CSOs and development actors, integrating evidence from development practice and results, including the knowledge and wisdom of local and indigenous communities, strengthening innovation and their vision for the future they would like to see. 8. Commit to realizing positive sustainable change CSOs are effective as development actors when they … collaborate to realize sustainable outcomes and impacts of their development actions, focusing on results and conditions for lasting change for people, with special emphasis on poor and marginalized populations, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future generations. Guided by these Istanbul principles, CSOs are committed to take pro-active actions to improve and be fully accountable for their development practices. Equally important will be enabling policies and practices by all actors. Through actions consistent with these principles, donor and partner country governments demonstrate their Accra Agenda for Action pledge that they “share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential”. All governments have an obligation to uphold basic human rights – among others, the right to association, the right to assembly, and the freedom of expression. Together these are pre-conditions for effective development. Istanbul, Turkey September 29, 2010

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Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles1 Civil society organiza ons are a vibrant and essen al feature in the democra c life of countries across the globe. CSOs collaborate with the full diversity of people and promote their rights. The essen al characteris cs of CSOs as dis nct development actors that they are voluntary, diverse, non-par san, autonomous, non-violent, working and collabora ng for change are the founda on for the Istanbul principles for CSO development effec veness. These principles guide the work and prac ces of civil society organiza ons in both peaceful and conflict situa ons, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a con nuum from humanitarian emergencies to long-term development. 1.

Respect and promote human rights and social justice develop and implement strategies, ac vi es and prac ces that promote individual and collec ve human rights, including the right to development, with dignity, decent work, social jus ce and equity for all people.

2. promote and prac ce development coopera on embodying and collec ve rights, par cipa ng as fully empowered actors in the development process. 3.

wnership and participation support the empowerment and inclusive par cipa on of people to expand their democra c ownership over policies and development ini a ves that aﬀect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized.

Promote Environmental Sustainability develop and implement priori es and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future genera ons, including urgent responses to climate crises, with speciﬁc a en on to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous condi ons for ecological integrity and jus ce.

Practice transparency and accountability CSOs are effective as development actors when the demonstrate a sustained organiza onal commitment to transparency, mul ple accountability, and integrity in their internal opera ons.

Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity commit to transparent rela onships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organiza onal autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global ci zenship.

Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning enhance the ways they learn from their experience, from other CSOs and development actors, integra ng evidence from development prac ce and results, including the knowledge and wisdom of local and indigenous communi es, strengthening innova on and their vision for the future they would like to see.

Commit to realizing positive sustainable change collaborate to realize sustainable outcomes and impacts of their development ac ons, focusing on results and condi ons for las ng change for people, with special emphasis on poor and marginalized popula ons, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future genera ons.

Guided by these Istanbul principles, CSOs are commi ed to take pro-ac ve ac ons to improve and be fully accountable for their development prac ces. Equally important will be enabling policies and prac ces by all actors. Through ac ons consistent with these principles, donor and partner country governments demonstrate their Accra Agenda for Ac on pledge that they obliga on to uphold basic human rights among others, the right to associa on, the right to assembly, and the freedom of expression. Together these are pre-condi ons for eﬀec ve development. Istanbul, Turkey September 29, 2010 -30, 2010, are the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles are further www.csoelaborated in Version 2 of this Framework effectiveness.org. 1

Please note, the Istanbul

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A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

PRESENTED FOR CONSIDERATION by CSOs, DONORS AND GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE SECOND GLOBAL ASSEMBLY, OPEN FORUM FOR CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

Version 2 November 2010

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION A Commitment to Civil Society Development Effectiveness Millions of civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide contribute in unique and essential ways to development as innovative agents of change and social transformation. These contributions are long-standing; CSOs support grassroots experiences of people engaged in their own development efforts; they promote development knowledge and innovation; they seek out inclusive policy dialogue with governments and donors to work together for development progress. Acknowledging not only their contributions but also their weaknesses, CSOs have af irmed in the Open Forum their commitment to take pro-active actions to improve and be fully accountable for their development practices. As full members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, CSO have been active in building a multicreated the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. The Open Forum is leading a global and fully participatory process to determine essential principles that de ine and guide effective CSO development practice. But the policies and practices of governments and donors also affect and shape CSOs as development actors. In this regard, the Open Forum builds on the commitment of donors and governments in the 2008

Given the wide diversity and geographic spread of CSOs, the Open Forum seeks meaningful but distinct application of common principles, in ways that are appropriate to each CSO country situation or sector. To date, more than 2000 CSOs in 65 countries have participated in multi-day national or sectoral consultations, many of which also included preliminary dialogue with donor and government of icials, on CSO development effectiveness. A irst Open Forum Global Assembly, held in Istanbul in September 2010, 170 CSO representatives from 82 countries considered and unanimously agreed on eight Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness (see Annex One). CSO common development effectiveness principles take account CSO visions, approaches, relationships and impact in their development actions. They are the foundation for this draft International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, which builds consensus from the outcomes of the consultations.1 The International Framework will be concluded at a Second Open Forum Global Assembly mid-2011 and presented at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, to be held in Busan, South Korea, November 2011.

Development effectiveness speaks to the impact of actions for development. These actions for development will be ineffective if they fail to bring about sustainable change that affects the causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality and marginalization. For CSOs, therefore

Open Forum Country and Sectoral Consultations: A Synthesis of Outcomes (September 2010), accessible at www.cso-effectiveness.org.

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development effectiveness is linked to an understanding of development, as a multi-faceted human and social process involving poor, vulnerable and marginalized populations. CSOs assume no single development model, but rather focus on empowering people and their organizations, who are free to make choices over how they will develop. For CSOs development effectiveness then requires an openness to many development alternatives, which are increasingly

The poor and marginalized have unequal access to development resources. This inequality is the result of not only limits on capacities and inances for development, but also of concentrations of socio-economic and political power, along with barriers to gender equality. They are persistent obstacles to development and justice. Effective CSO development action must therefore also involve CSOs making choices and taking sides. It involves direct engagement with poor and marginalized populations, not as abject victims, but as development actors and political proponents for development in their own right. A CSO vision of development is informed by the diversity of their roles as development actors, including many CSOs involved in development who are not aid actors.2 Effective development activities must quality and way of life; Build capacity with communities and sectors that is inclusive of all social actors, but particularly the most vulnerable, marginalized and poor; Engage communities, civil society, the private sector and government to collaborate and seek synergies based on mutually agreed development priorities and approaches; Respect and is informed by spiritual virtues embedded in cultural values, including Recognize CSOs as distinct development actors, with a shared accountability on the part of all development actors to affected populations for development plans and outcomes. CSOs increasingly reject a needs-based, welfare or charity approach to their development efforts in favour of an explicit human rights-approach. The latter reframes CSO development activities in support of human rights entitlements of bene iciary populations, rather than in response to often externally determined needs and wants. Internationally-agreed human rights norms and standards with legal backing and existing accountability mechanisms. 2

Annex Two provides a summary of these roles.

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De ining the principles development effectiveness ... The principles characterizing CSO development effectiveness are the values and qualities inherent in CSO actions for development that give them direction, with a clear priority to the rights of people living in poverty, the vulnerable and marginalized populations. Like other development actors, CSOs are striving to become more operationally ef icient as organizations. While some of these operational practices affect their effectiveness as development actors, CSO development effectiveness principles are uniquely focused on those areas of CSO practice that are essential for improving the development impact of their actions. The principles set out in this Framework are not new; they are the expression of decades of experience by hundreds of CSOs involved in the Open Forum process.

SECTION II: PRINCIPLES OF CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS Preamble Civil society organizations are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe. As self-governing and voluntary organizations, they are striving to be accountable and effective organizations. CSOs have also been widely recognized as distinct and independent development actors, working for development outcomes for poor and marginalized peoples. They are catalysts for social change, collaborating with partners around shared values and interests. What are Principles for CSO Development EďŹ&#x20AC;ec veness? CSO development effectiveness principles are statements of values and qualities that should inform CSO socio-economic, political, and organizational relationships. They are universal points of reference for CSO activities in development, emphasizing the impact of these actions on the rights of people living in poverty, vulnerable and marginalized populations. In their diversity, CSO effectiveness is highly dependent on context: their relevance to unique locales, sector, governance and development relationships.

CSOs are expressions of diversity and innovation in development practice. They bring a rich array of organizational values, objectives, means of engagement, sector knowledge, structures, interests and resources.

Development is a social and political process that is equally about peopl participation and engagement to claim their rights, as it is about development results. CSOs are consequently political protagonists for development change, and advocates for public goods on behalf of their constituencies. CSOs collaborate and partner with communities, with each other and with different development actors, such as governments and donors, for changes affecting development at many levels.

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CSOs have close and often unique connections with local processes, but also seek change at national and global levels. But unlike political parties and social movements, which may aspire to in luence development by obtaining formal state political power, CSOs are autonomous non-partisan political actors in the social realm, representing their own point of view. CSOs actions for development are also distinguished by their commitment to non-violent processes. They full range of potential impacts of their development actions. They collaborate to seek development outcomes consistent with international human rights standards that give priority to addressing conditions of discrimination, dis-empowerment, poverty and inequality. In many countries they play important roles engaging citizens, defending the rule of law and guarding against corruption of public funds. As voluntary expressions of citizen action, CSOs are a measure of democratic and inclusive development. These characteristics of CSOs as distinct development actors voluntary, diverse, non-partisan, autonomous, non-violent, collaborating for change, linking development process with results and outcomes have informed all the Open Forum consultations. They are the foundation for the eight de ining statements of the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles guide CSO work and practices in both peaceful and con lict situations, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a continuum from humanitarian emergencies to longterm development.

Istanbul Principles for CSO Development EďŹ&#x20AC;ec veness 1. Respect and promote human rights and social jus ce CSOs are effective as development actors when they activities and practices that promote individual and collective human rights, including the right to development, with dignity, decent work, social justice and equity for all people. Many CSOs have integrated human rights in their stated purposes and activities, but are also seeking ways to implement human rights-based approaches in their work. Strengthening requires holistic approaches for CSO programs and practices, including holding governments to account for their human rights obligations. These approaches address systemic issues of inequality, vulnerability, exclusion, discrimination and global poverty, in ways that are consistent with international human rights standards for political, economic, social, cultural rights. International human rights standards are derived from the United Nations human rights system, including the Declaration on the Right to Development, core ILO Conventions, and human rights agreements at the regional level.

2. Embody gender equality and equity w promote and practice development individual and collective rights, participating as fully empowered actors in the development process.

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CSOs af irm that gender equality is essential for realizing sustainable development outcomes. The empowerment of women through gender equity promotes the goal of gender equality equal access for women and girls to opportunity, resources, and decision-making at all levels. CSOs acknowledge that men are crucial partners in this process. CSOs themselves are not free from gender inequalities and practices. Advancing gender equity goes beyond improving practical conditions for women, to redressing strategic inequalities in power among men and women, tackling discriminatory laws, policies and practices. Explicitly including the rights and opportunities of girls and young women is W movements are essential actors in development, and have been particularly important as a force for democratization.

3. support the empowerment and inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized. Development will be appropriate and effective if it is grounded in the needs, local knowledge and aspirations of affected populations who are the primary stakeholders in development. Empowerment activities allocate resources in ways that as democratic actors in their communities or as individuals claiming their rights. Such capacities extend their in luence, their decision-making power and their resources, free of violence, giving them more control over factors that shape their lives. All people have the right to be a citizen of a state and participate in public policy decisions that affect their lives. CSOs promote democratic development with governments, donors, and the private sector, while protecting the autonomy and diversity of civil society, and seeking avenues for citizens and CSOs to exercise their rights. In relationships between CSOs, empowering approaches imply a sharing of power and resources with local counterparts, including organizations of the poor, who should manage local programs. The role of the external CSO is to enable, rather than dictate, and to amplify, not substitute, for the voices of developing country CSO actors.

4. Promote Environmental Sustainability develop and implement priorities and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future generations, including urgent responses to climate crises, with speci ic attention to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice. The human rights of both present and future generations depend upon development paths and strategies where sustainability is the cornerstone of all development action. All people have the right to live and work in a healthy and sustainable environment. Complex environmental challenges, including the urgency to mitigate and adapt to climate change, require capacities and skills that advance sustainable ecosystems in all aspects of the development process and are inclusive of all affected populations. Meeting these challenges not only demand environmental awareness and innovative solutions, but must also be shaped by principles of environmental justice. Many millions of people, particularly in developing countries, are highly vulnerable, but bear no responsibility for the conditions that have result

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in deepening climate crises. CSOs, wherever they act, must explicitly give priority to local socio-economic conditions as well as cultural and indigenous approaches in strengthening sustainability in their development practice.

5. Prac ce transparency and accountability CSOs are effectiv demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations. As independent public not-for-pro it organizations and as development actors in their own right, transparency, openness and internal democratic practices reinforce CSO values of social justice and equality. Transparency and accountability create the basis for public trust, while enhancing CSO credibility and legitimacy. Accountability cannot be reduced to inancial reporting, but should strengthen public reckoning for organizational efforts to be true and effective in carrying out its mandate. Very often CSOs, individually and collectively, have good practices in meeting standards for transparency, participatory decision-making, and credible mechanisms for accountability. But CSOs are also recognizing and responding with priority to legitimate calls to improve these accountability and transparency practices. There are important lessons to be drawn from current good practices. But progress may sometimes be limited by the challenges CSOs face living under highly repressive regimes and laws. It is also the case that grassroots, less structured, CSOs often require particular support where they lack capacities, skills and scale to implement robust institutional transparency and accountability.

6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship. Effective CSO partnerships, in all their diversity, are effective expressions of social solidarity; they exemplify deliberate transnational, national or sectoral efforts in equitable and reciprocal collaboration and coordination. Effective CSO partnerships for development, whatever their form, require long-term commitments in negotiating shared goals and programmatic objectives, facilitated by the emergence of trust and respect in the relationship . Such partnerships can also ent in donor countries. Organizational autonomy is essential for equitable partnerships. Equitable partnerships result from deliberate actions by both partners, and especially the stronger partner, to counterbalance the inequalities in power that are the consequence of unequal access to resources, of gender inequities, and sometimes-large disparities in capacity. Sustained development outcomes will be achieved through collaboration and coordination between different development actors. But CSOs are actors in their own right, not instrumental agents for donors or governments. The basis for coordination must be mutual respect, agreement on the distinct areas where there are shared development goals and strategies, and equality in setting the terms of coordination and coherence.

7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning enhance the ways they learn from their

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experience, from other CSOs and development actors, integrating evidence from development practice and results, including the knowledge and wisdom of local and indigenous communities, strengthening innovation and their vision for the future they would like to see. Purposeful collaborative processes for learning provide an indispensable foundation for assessing sustainable development impact and results. Development learning requires effective mechanisms for mutual sharing of organizational, partner-generated information and knowledge, particularly for dissemination of development innovation. Mutual learning processes can help increase respect and understanding between counterparts, notably in areas of local knowledge, cultural issues, gender relations, values and different ways of working. Regular qualitative evaluation, working closely with development partners and related stakeholders, is essential to adapting and re ining strategies, priorities and working methodologies in CSO development action. Organizational learning should not be reduced to

8. Commit to realizing posi ve sustainable change collaborate to realize sustainable outcomes and impacts of their development actions, focusing on results and conditions for lasting change for people, with special emphasis on poor and marginalized populations, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future generations. As development actors in the democratic life of all countries, viable and organizationally sustainable CSOs are essential to realizing positive social change. But CSOs do not achieve sustainable development outcomes alone. Positive development change can only be sustained through the complementarily of development actors. CSOs make essential contributions and ill important gaps; but they cannot, and must not, substitute themselves for the responsibilities of the state, whose capacities to deliver public goods, such as education or health, must be strengthened, accessible and accountable to all. At the same time, CSOs acknowledged the importance of CSO capacities to assess and demonstrate, with evidence, the sustainability of results of their work, which are often complex and long-term. Assessing the effectiveness of CSO contributions to positive social change will be shaped by the views of local counterparts and bene iciary populations. It must also take into account the wider socio-economic and political processes that enable or negatively affect the sustainability of CSO development outcomes for change.

SECTION III: IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES: GUIDELINES AND INDICATORS FOR CSOs The Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness are a consensus among CSOs on the essential values and considerations that should inform their practices. But as mere principles, they cannot take account of the diversity in numbers, purposes, geographic locales, and development challenges faced by millions of CSOs involved in development activities. To in luence development

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practice, the principles must be interpreted. They must be applied locally and uniquely to each CSO, through context-relevant and speci ic guidelines, indicators and mechanisms relevant to CSOs capacities and development roles. Internationally, CSOs are working with various initiatives to enhance their development accountability, effectiveness and impact. The Open Forum does not intend to duplicate existing processes or burden CSOs with new tools and reporting mechanisms. Acknowledging the diversity of CSO experience and the importance of existing mechanisms, the Open Forum seeks to deepen the understanding of existing tools and how they can contribute to enhanced CSO development effectiveness. Country consultations for the Open Forum proposed hundreds of guidelines and indicators. A synthesis of these guidelines and indicators for each principle has been Open Forum Country Consultations: A Synthesis of Outcomes which accompanies this Draft Framework.

DeďŹ ni ons A Guideline A context-speci ic recommendation indicating directions on how a principle should be implemented or what sort of action should be taken in a particular circumstance.

An Indicator An observable sign, proxy or identi ied change that provides a credible means of verifying the status or change suggested by a guideline. Indicators should to be recognized by relevant stakeholders as valid, practical, clear, and observable.

A mechanism Mechanisms are the context-speci ic means through which CSOs demonstrate accountability or implement compliance with agreed principles, standards and guidelines.

The Draft International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness elaborates some examples of widely acknowledged directions or guidelines for the implementation of each principle. They are not intended to be exhaustive nor de initive. Many CSOs in country consultations stressed that guidelines, and especially indicators, require more concerted re lection and testing if they are to effectively strengthen CSO accountability to development effective outcomes. The Open Forum is committed to deepen a discussion on guidelines, indicators and CSO accountability mechanisms in the lead-up to the 2011 High Level Forum IV.

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Implementing the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness: Guidelines for CSO Practice 1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice a) Promote human rights based approaches through training and capacity building with staff, in programmatic analysis, design and implementation, mechanisms for participation and dialogue, and holding governments to account for human rights obligations. b) Establish measurable indicators for development effectiveness, in relation to international human rights standards. c) Create mechanisms that allow free, prior and informed consent on the part of affected communities and stakeholders. d) Safeguard and make operational the right of bene iciary populations to participate in the design, implementation and assessment of country-led CSO strategic plans and program.

2. a) I practices of CSOs, in their mandate, their policies, in their active dialogue with counterparts, and in their allocation of human and inancial resources. b) Embed gender equality and equity indicators in program plans by ensuring CSO program planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are based on gender young women. c) Invest CSO time and resources to extend and deepen gender analysis, learning and training based on challenges in applying this principle (on a scale proportional to organizational capacity). d) rights respecting local dynamics and pro iling successes in gender equality part of CSO public engagement and advocacy. e) Seek opportunities for collaboration policy dialogue to promote context-appropriate changes relating to strategic issues affecting wome

3. a) Focus on engagement by people whose lives are directly affected by development policies and initiatives, with an emphasis on the poor and the marginalized, through identi ication, integration and participation of these populations, particularly women, taking account their proposals for development directions and activities. b) Give priority to capacity building and sustainable self-development of counterparts to be independent CSO actors in the areas of governance, inancing, program management and engagement with other development actors.

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c) Promote a diversity of CSO stakeholder in luence and participation in CSO programs, along with local civic participation in monitoring local and national government policies and in advocacy to resolve signi icant social and political issues. d) Amplify the voices of the poor and marginalized in public policy in the countries where CSOs work, including voices for developing country counterparts in the global development arena and in opportunities for advocacy. e) Build awareness among publics in donor countries about the complex reality of development and the importance of accompanying, not directing, change on the part of bene iciary populations.

4. Promote Environmental Sustainability a) Explicitly incorporate issues of sustainability into CSO policies, program planning and design processes, advocacy and public engagement, ensuring long-term environmental and ecological integrity, listening to and supporting local stakeholders. b) Build strategic alignments and collaboration between CSOs involved in environment and development initiatives that strengthen the ability of both sectors to promote and implement environmental sustainability. c) Promote the rights for all people to live and work in health environments in the context of national development strategies and actions. d) In luence policies and approaches to reduce the negative impacts of climate change and environmental degradation with linkages to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice. e) Establish measurable indicators for environmental sustainability drawing on national and international research and guidelines. 5. Practice transparency and accountability a) Provide public access to all constitutive CSO policies and documents and publish regular audited inancial and programmatic reports, including reports required by regulatory bodies. b) Provide an accessible list of major counterpart organizations involving a inancial partnership organization and/or lives of people associated with the organization. c) Provide timely and accessible responses to information requests, including utilization of appropriate languages and provision of accurate information provided to the public. d) Promote and practice a democratic culture within the organization with accountable and effective leadership, assigning clear responsibilities, transparent operational policies and demonstrating integrity, honesty and truthfulness.

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6. Pursue Equitable Partnerships and Solidarity a) Conditions and terms of partnership are explicitly and clearly de ined in a , with roles, contributions, responsibilities, decision-making and accountability clearly set out through respectful dialogue and enhanced through adequate allocation of resources to ensure counterpart capacity and participation. Partnerships agreements should not be considered inter-changeable with inancial contracts. b) Build common actions on a programmatic rather than project basis, by investing in institutionalising long-term relationships with program counterparts, with appropriate consideration of core institutional inancing arrangements and ensuring on-going participation of relevant stakeholders at all levels of the partnership. c) Strengthen strategic alignment and program collaboration among CSOs, domestically and internationally, utilizing existing opportunities and structures, such as platforms, coalitions and networks, and encourage new forms of collaboration. d) Establish mutually agreed conditions and mechanisms for ongoing monitoring, evaluation, accountability and co-learning processes, with all parties and constituencies in the partnership. e) Invest in public engagement activity that links domestic conditions and issues to the reality and experiences of counterparts, promoting a deeper, subjective understanding and commitment to the relationship over time.

7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning a) Foster opportunities and a conducive environment for systematic mutual learning and exchange based on participation, openness and trust within institutional and program activities and between organizations, while internalizing and mainstreaming lessons learned, thinking and practices. b) Encourage collaboration for knowledge sharing among CSOs through networks and coalitions, with a diversity of development stakeholders (government, business etc.) where appropriate, to encourage innovation and improve development performance. c) Facilitate the sharing and use of local / indigenous knowledge in development initiatives and policy dialogue. d) Establish professional and ethical responsible methods and tools to engage critically in gathering and sharing reliable data and information on which to build CSO knowledge.

8. Commit to realizing positive sustainable change a) Utilize results-oriented tools for planning and monitoring development activities, with an orientation to determining and assessing conditions for long-term sustainable development outcomes affecting change for poor and marginalized people. b) Strengthen CSO collaboration with other development stakeholders to maximize sustainable impacts of activities on shared and mutually agreed development goals, particularly with government, to strengthen its role to deliver and be accountable for public goods for all people under its jurisdiction.

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Strengthening CSO Accountability As development actors in their own right, working for the public good, CSOs have an obligation to demonstrate that they are fully accountable for their development actions. In many countries CSOs organizations are highly trusted by the public and local stakeholders, with most practicing high standards of professional management and probity. They demonstrate accountability in various ways depending on their roles and context: through oversight by elected Boards of Directors, accessible external inancial audits and program reports, government regulatory oversight, a variety of CSO-managed Codes of Conduct and transparency initiatives, and ongoing dialogue with counterparts. Accountability Challenges CSOs have many unique challenges in demonstrating their accountability. These include large numbers and wide diversity, transparency in partner relations, the voluntary basis of organizations and action, and multiple demands for accountability. CSOs acknowledge a need to share lessons learned from existing practice in order to develop practical new approaches to strengthen individual and collective CSO accountability. CSO accountability is much more than accessible audited inancial records. In their role as development actors, the measure of CSO accountability requires comprehensive attention to demonstrating sustainable development outcomes for the poorest and most marginalized in claiming their rights. Values-based principles for CSO development effectiveness, however, are subject to interpretation. Appropriate objective standards for accountability to these principles are often dif icult to determine and monitor. CSO accountability mechanisms focus not only on direct measurable development outcomes, but also on advocacy and mobilization for change, in which attribution for outcomes is rarely simple. CSO supporters, counterparts, governments and donors rightly expect transparency as a necessary criterion of accountability. But full transparency is often dif icult in practical terms, and for sometimes-valid reasons timeliness, cost, workload, privacy and protection of the rights of counterparts. The capacity of CSOs to meet accountability standards are also affected by systemic institutional weaknesses scale of the organization, lack of organizational systems, reliance on volunteers, weak reporting and audit systems, or lack of monitoring and evaluation resources. Accountability Mechanisms CSOs are taking up their responsibility to establish strong accountability standards and mechanisms. CSOs stress the importance of voluntary accountability mechanisms, not government CSO autonomy and independence. Many such mechanisms currently exist, but may require renewed institutional commitments to implement standards and more robust tests for compliance.

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In the Open Forum, CSOs will propose ways to strengthen their accountability mechanisms. They will do so through closer examination of good practice experience, clear guidelines on development practice, and CSO dialogue at the country level. The following directions, suggested by country consultations to date, will guide the next stages of this work: 1. CSO principles and guidelines for development effectiveness are the foundation for accountability standards, but accountability must also address broader questions of organizational governance. 2. Accountability mechanisms and context-speci ic requirements are best developed with those whose work will be measured and especially inclusive of primary stakeholders. They should promote mutuality between counterparts, organizational learning and measures to correct weaknesses. 3. It is essential to be clear who is accountable, to whom and for what. Flexibility and adaptability are also essential for mechanisms to be realistically applied in diverse and oftenunpredictable conditions. 4. Never impose principles and measurements on others that the CSO does not accept for itself, with expectations of transparency that are the same for the CSO as for its counterparts, covering budgets, program activities and resource allocation. 5. Utilize and further develop existing mechanisms to strengthen accountability at country level where they exist, with explicit commitments to implement and demonstrate compliance in good faith , avoiding overlap, duplication, and high transaction costs.

SECTION IV: Cri cal Condi ons for Enabling CSO Development EďŹ&#x20AC;ec veness: Policies and Prac ces3 While CSOs are independent and autonomous, they are not development actors working in isolation. Their capacities to live up to principles for development effectiveness are limited and affected by the actions of other development actors.

Enabling standards are a set of interrelated conditions such as legal, bureaucratic, iscal, informational, political, and cultural that impact on the capacity of CSO development actors to engage in development processes in a sustained and effective manner.

The enabling environment for development is complex. Recently all development actors have been affected by multiple global economic, social and climatic crises. Political conditions matter: CSOs in several countries have experienced a narrowing of democratic space for their activities. The private sector is also an important actor affecting development: it is essential for example to strengthen markets and decent work for poor

Please see Annex 3 for more information and recommendations from CSOs on minimum standards on an enabling environment, consolidated from the Open Forum National Consultations

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people, including people working in the informal sector. This International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness establishes the most important principles relevant to CSO roles as development actors. Through the Open Forum, CSOs have also suggested guidelines and possible indicators for assessing and changing their own practices based on these principles. CSOs have encouraged dialogue with governments and donors, based on these principles, to discuss and agree on some minimum standards. These standards, yet to be jointly elaborated, will create the environment in which CSO contributions to development may reach their full potential, which is the commitment of governments in the Accra Agenda for Action. In the absence of some basic minimum enabling standards, it will be dif icult for CSOs to implement and be true to the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness. To date, CSOs have put forward issues and some proposals for standards in a Synthesis of Outcomes4 based on recent country and sectoral consultations. These are not conclusions, but are a basis for further discussion with governments and donors. This dialogue should consider the following key areas for achieving consensus on minimum enabling standards in the lead-up to the Busan High Level Forum in November 2011.

A Commitment by All Governments to Fundamental Human Rights In almost all countries CSOs have experienced political, inancial and institutional vulnerability, arising from changing policies and restrictive practices of their governments. CSOs are concerned about the impact on democratic and legal space for CSOs, as exempli ied in the use of pervasive anti-terrorism legislation, more restrictive government inancial and regulatory regimes, and the leaders, who are critical of government policies and defenders of human rights. CSOs continue to organize and work with government and other stakeholders to strengthen and contribute to democratic governance and inclusive development activities. Democratic government requires laws, regulations and practices that respect several fundamental principles or standards, which are pre-conditions for a robust and effective civil society.5 Freedom of association; Legal recognition of CSOs; The right to freedom of expression; The right to operate free of unwarranted state interference; and The right to seek and secure resources.

See Section V of Open Forum Country and Sectoral Consultations: A Synthesis of Outcomes (September 2010) for an elaboration of CSO issues and proposals for minimum standards. 5 cting Defending Civil Society, A Report of the World Movement of Democracy, February 2008, accessed at www.wmd.org/projects/defending-civil-society. These rights are guaranteed under the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other multilateral and regional treaties.

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Challenges with Developing Country Governments CSOs in consultations in developing countries6 raised the following issues and challenges with respect to policies and practices affecting CSO development effectiveness. The absence of, or a highly restricting, legal framework for recognition of CSOs; Political interference in the work of CSOs; Limitations to freedom of expression, especially in countries where the government and/or state laws are very intolerant of dissent; Limitations on government engagement as partners with CSOs in local or national development activities; and Lack of access to government information on policies, budgets and development initiatives.

Challenges with Donors CSOs in consultations raised the following issues and challenges with respect to donor policies and practices. While they relate to practices of of icial donors, many could also apply to CSOs in their roles as donors, albeit in different ways and with some different implications. Lack of clarity about donor policies; Heavy directive donor conditionality, high transaction costs, and interference in local CSOs; Lack of mechanisms for engagement with donors for mutual learning and policies to improve development effectiveness; Marginalization of CSO programming to engage domestic constituencies in donor countries; In luence of funding mechanisms on CSO development effectiveness (unpredictable inance; lack of funds for management and program oversight; one-off project-oriented competitive funding; prioritizing donor-prescribed areas to support CSOs with shrinking opportunities for responsive funding; -based management ). The Open Forum seeks multi-stakeholder dialogues with governments and donors to agree on a number of minimum standards arising from the above issue areas and concerns. These are not an exclusive or ixed list, but an initial guide of important areas that CSOs have identi ied that would enabling their implementation of CSO development effectiveness principles.

Developing countries include emerging market economies such as India and Brazil and countries of Eastern Europe, who sometimes are both recipients in international cooperation and donors.

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SECTION V: WAYS FORWARD: IMPLEMENTING CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLES CSOs in the irst Open Forum Global Assembly have considered and amended this draft International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. They have agreed that the eight broad Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness, set out in this Framework, are the foundation for advancing their effectiveness as development actors. All actors for development CSOs, government and donors are inter-dependent and must collaborate to effectively realize development outcomes for poor and marginalized populations. They have a shared interest in a robust CSO sector in countries seeking to overcome these conditions. For their part, CSOs commit to strengthening and improving the sector as an actor in development guided by these eight principles. The Open Forum will continue to deepen discussions in the coming months on the application of the eight principles to CSO practices, guidelines and accountability mechanisms. These will take place at many levels in country-level and sectoral meetings, in CSO organizational discussions of their development practice, and in dialogue with other development stakeholders, including organizations directly representing poor and vulnerable people. The Second Open Forum Global Assembly in 2011 will focus on CSO proposals for the implementation of the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. All development actors must make vigorous efforts to strengthen their accountability to international agreed development goals, including the MDGs, in line with international human rights standards. There is no exception for CSOs, who acknowledge their responsibility to better govern themselves. As such, CSOs in the Open Forum will measure and improve their mechanisms for accountability against experience and best practices, while respecting CSO principles for development effectiveness, their independence and autonomy as development actors. The orientation of these efforts will be country speci ic. The Open Forum would welcome the engagement of developing country governments, of icial donors and multilateral institutions in taking forward CSO development effectiveness principles and challenges in their implementation. CSOs are encouraged by the mandate of the multistakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness to work to facilitate dialogues at the senior level to consider minimum standards for government and donor enabling policies and practices. In the lead up to the 2011 High Level Forum in Busan, South Korea, all development actors must collaborate to advance human rights, gender equality and social justice through reforms in development cooperation. This International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, with its principles, norms and guidelines, will be a signi icant CSO step in contributing to these reforms.

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ANNEX ONE Istanbul Principles for CSO Development EďŹ&#x20AC;ec veness1 Civil society organizations are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe. CSOs collaborate with the full diversity of people and promote their rights. The essential characteristics of CSOs as distinct development actors that they are voluntary, diverse, non-partisan, autonomous, non-violent, working and collaborating for change are the foundation for the Istanbul principles for CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles guide the work and practices of civil society organizations in both peaceful and con lict situations, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a continuum from humanitarian emergencies to long-term development. 1. Respect and promote human rights and social justice develop and implement strategies, activities and practices that promote individual and collective human rights, including the right to development, with dignity, decent work, social justice and equity for all people. hts promote and practice development participating as fully empowered actors in the development process.

support the empowerment and inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized. 4. Promote Environmental Sustainability develop and implement priorities and approaches that promote environmental sustainability for present and future generations, including urgent responses to climate crises, with speci ic attention to the socio-economic, cultural and indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice.

Please note 28 International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness. These principles are further elaborated in Version 2 of this Framework, which can be found on -effectiveness.org.

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5. Practice transparency and accountability demonstrate a sustained organizational commitment to transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in their internal operations. 6. Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity commit to transparent relationships with CSOs and other development actors, freely and as equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organizational autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship. 7. Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning enhance the ways they learn from their experience, from other CSOs and development actors, integrating evidence from development practice and results, including the knowledge and wisdom of local and indigenous communities, strengthening innovation and their vision for the future they would like to see. 8. Commit to realizing positive sustainable change collaborate to realize sustainable outcomes and impacts of their development actions, focusing on results and conditions for lasting change for people, with special emphasis on poor and marginalized populations, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future generations. Guided by these Istanbul Principles, CSOs are committed to take pro-active actions to improve and be fully accountable for their development practices. Equally important will be enabling policies and practices by all actors. Through actions consistent with these principles, donor and partner country governments demonstrate their Accra Agenda for Action pled governments have an obligation to uphold basic human rights among others, the right to association, the right to assembly, and the freedom of expression. Together these are pre-conditions for effective development. Istanbul, Turkey September 29, 2010

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ANNEX TWO

CSO ROLES IN DEVELOPMENT

People come together to create CSOs as not-for-pro it voluntary expressions of right to association and speech. They are channels for social solidarity, service and mobilization to enable people to better claim all their rights to improve conditions of life and to build a more democratic society. This is the basis for CSO legitimacy and credibility as development actors. Through CSOs, obligations to respect, protect and ful ill human rights. Uniquely as organizations and in collaboration among CSOs and with other actors, CSOs act in a)

Direct engagement and support for communities, poor and marginalized groups in selfhelp and local development innovation.

Delivery of basic services and essential infrastructures at local level, particularly in social services such as health protection and care, education, water and sanitation, while empowering communities to seek ful illment of their right to these services from government.

Empower marginalized grass roots communities and people living in poverty, particularly women, participation in public policy, through capacity building and development.

Facilitate of cooperation and collaboration with local government authorities and other development actors and organizations.

Enrich the public policy agenda with CSO knowledge, issues, perspectives and proposals.

Monitor government and donor policies and development practices, through policy research and development, policy dialogue and facilitating democratic accountability for excluded and marginalized populations, based on local knowledge.

Educate and help shape social values of democracy, solidarity and social justice through production of knowledge, sharing information and citizenship.

Find and leverage sources of inancing and human resources for development directly as recipients or as donor channels at local, national and international level.

Connect and network CSOs within and between civil societies in ways that encourages accountability to people for positive impacts on the rights of target populations.

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ANNEX 3 Cri cal Condi ons for Enabling CSO Development EďŹ&#x20AC;ec veness: Policies and Prac ces7 Introduction A primary goal of the country consultations has been proposals for the most important principles relevant to civil society roles as development actors, which CSOs will agree during the irst Open Forum Global Assembly in September 2010. During these consultations, CSOs also set out substantial guidelines and possible indicators for assessing and changing their own practices based on these principles. As these will require interpretation within the context in which each CSO works, CSOs at the country level will continue to discuss their application and their relationship to strengthened mechanisms for accountability. While CSOs are independent and autonomous, they are not development actors working isolation. Their capacities to live up to principles for development effectiveness are also limited and affected by the actions of other development actors. The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action committed all ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full . To this end, Open Forum country CSO consultations and multi-stakeholder dialogues (with government and donor representatives) put forward a range of issues and potential standards for government and donor policies and practices. These critical conditions and standards intend to enable and further the implementation of principles for CSO development effectiveness as set out by CSOs in their consultations. Enabling a set of interrelated conditions such as legal, bureaucratic, iscal, informational, political, and cultural that impact on the capacity of development actors to engage For the forthcoming Busan High Level Forum in South Korea (HLF4) to be held in November 2011, CSOs are working for comprehensive HLF4 agreements by all development actors to strengthen development effectiveness. CSOs in the Open Forum are collaborating with a wider CSO BetterAid Platform. The Open Forum is contributing proposals for development effectiveness principles and enabling standards, for themselves and for governments and donors, resulting in the elaboration by CSOs of an International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness for HLF4. Continuing multi-stakeholder dialogue over the next year through the Open Forum, will seek common ground for critical enabling conditions and standards by governments and donors for CSO development effectiveness. The Country consultations included signi icant discussions (in CSO sessions and in multistakeholder dialogues) of issues and possible directions for enabling conditions that would enhance 7

Please note: The work on enabling environment will continue to be re ined in the process leading up to the inal version of the draft framework in 2011. This Annex is a CSO perspective on the enabling conditions for CSOs, and was (September 2010), available online at: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/synthesis_of_open_forum_consultations.pdf

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CSO roles and effectiveness as development actors. This section synthesizes some of these issues and some directions for minimum standards, not as conclusions but as a basis for further discussion by both CSOs with governments and donors. The Synthesis divides these issues and suggested standards into three overarching areas those that are applicable to all governments, those that relate to governments in developing countries, and those that relate to governments in their role as donors.

1) All Governments: Issues & Standards for Enabling CSO Development Effectiveness In all the country consultations, CSOs raised common concerns for the democratic and legal space in which civil society organizations are organizing and carrying out activities for development. CSOs in almost all countries have experienced and continue to be affected by political, inancial and institutional vulnerability, arising from the policies and practices of their governments. These pressures are exempli ied by Sweeping anti-terrorism legal provisions and the focus on a post-9/11 pervasive global security agendas, Changing government inancial and regulatory regimes for civil society, especially those who are aid-dependent, and espouse critical advocacy positions on key policy issues affecting civil, cultural, social and economic rights. The speci ics vary in degree, in time and geographic location, but taken together they describe a the space for citizens to organize for alternative policies and activities for development. CSOs spoke about new international cooperation laws and regulatory frameworks for CSOs that require politically motivated information disclosure, and limit international exchange of resources and skills. Long-standing concerns about inclusive policy making processes, have seen increasingly restricted access for dissent and critical voices. In many countries governments have given ercise considerable discretion to penalize those seen to be opposed to the government of the day. Despite these negative trends, CSOs continue to organize and work with government and other stakeholders to strengthen and contribute to democratic governance and inclusive development activities. Under international human rights law all governments are obliged to respect several fundamental principles or standards.8 Several of these standards are essential pre-conditions for a robust and effective civil society. a) Freedom of association Individuals have the right to freely establish, join and participate in CSOs in order to pursue a broad range of public interest activities and goals, including the

The organization and presentation of these principles Defending Civil Society, A Report of the World Movement of Democracy, February 2008, accessed at www.wmd.org/projects/defendingcivil-society. These rights are guaranteed under the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other multilateral and regional treaties. 8

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promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Freedom of association includes the right to form an organization as a legal entity. b) Legal recognition of CSOs CSOs must be able to create legal status through a process that is accessible, clear, inexpensive, timely and apolitical. The determination of legal status must be guided by objective and fairly administered standards. c) The right to freedom of expression Pluralism, access to information and the right to dissent are an essential characteristics of democratic society and development effectiveness. CSOs must have legal protection and recourse to speak critically against government laws or practices and draw attention to abuses of human rights. States should refrain from laws that restrict freedom of expression through vague or overly broad regulatory language. d) The right to operate free from unwarranted state interference Interference by states can only be justi ied where explicitly necessary in a democratic society and prescribed by law. States have the obligation to ensure that all laws and regulations are implemented in an apolitical, consistent and transparent manner. Dissolution of a CSO must be guided by objective standards a free of arbitrary decision-making. e) The right to seek and secure resources All civil society organizations can seek and secure funding from legal sources including individuals, businesses, other CSOs, international organizations, local, national and foreign governments.

2) Developing Country Governments: Issues & Standards in Enabling CSO Development Effectiveness and proposed standards were identi ied by CSOs in these countries. Developing countries, for the purposes of this Synthesis, include not only ODA-eligible countries, but also emerging market economies such as India and Brazil and countries of Eastern Europe, who sometimes are both recipients of aid and donors. Challenges and Issues Raised a) Challenge of the legal framework Many CSOs in developing countries alluded to the fact that the lack of an enabling legal framework is a key challenge in their operating environment. Noting the fundamental obligations of all governments, the legal framework challenges for CSOs range from overly restrictive, disallowing registration of human rights organizations and social movements, to a state of lacuna where the laws and policies are not well developed. This has led to ambiguous and random restrictions depending on the government of the day or the issue the CSOs are pursuing. Other challenges alluded to relate to the operational requirement in which cases there are high requirement for legal permissions or authorizations that put obstacle on CSOs activities and implementation process. These challenges have led to threats against CSOs. b) Challenges of civic responsibilities and political interference In some context politicians interfere with the work of CSOs affecting their effectiveness. In many cases, CSOs organizations engage in political processes as they empower communities in their civic responsibilities, and while doing so, CSOs ensure neutrality and do not engage in political parties. Draft Framework, Version 2, November, 2010

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However, in many cases, these activities and interventions government and politicians tend to associate such activities with party politics and they lead to threats and political interference. In many countries it was the experience of CSOs that government of icials have negative stereotypical assumptions about CSOs and their tension with government in development. c) Limited freedom of expression In countries where the government and/or state laws are very intolerant, CSOs experience continued threats and arbitrary measures by police or security forces. They are not allowed to engage in peaceful assemblies, mass mobilization and do not have free access to media. This has led to signi icant numbers of civil society leaders being incarcerated without trials in some countries. d) Limits of government engagement with CSOs in development activities In countries where there is no transparency and practice of democratic culture (for instance in ensuring of stakeholders participation in project design and planning), bribery, corruption and lack of openness are common phenomena. Procrastination in contract signing, fund disbursement and decision-making, political bias in implementation of development project are also experienced. Lack of CSOs involvement in decision-making at local and national levels limits the impact of CSOs in development. e) Lack of access to information Many CSOs alluded to the lack of access to information, which make CSOs watchdog role dif icult to achieve. By virtue of their role as watchdogs of public goods, CSOs ought to have access to information on the use of public resources by both governments and donors. CSOs can ensure public resources are used in a way that maximizes impact on poverty and equitable growth if both governments and donors will enhance transparency and facilitate access to information. Some Proposed Minimum Standards for Developing Country Governments The following standards have been derived from Open Forum country and sectoral consultations. They are not intended to be an exclusive or comprehensive list of standards proposed in the Open Forum process. An objective for the irst Global Assembly at the end of September will be to deepen and extend these proposals and initiate a dialogue with donors and governments on minimum standards. Minimum enabling conditions for CSO development effectiveness on the part of developing country governments arising from the consultations revolved around the recognition of CSO; the promotion the development of CSO capacities; the provision for long term funding for CSOs; and inclusive involvement of CSOs in dialogue. a) Independence and Self regulation Civil society organizations are guided by code of ethics/conduct in many countries. These articulate the structures, institutions and policies within and amongst CSOs and enable their independence and self-regulation. Demonstrated CSO compliance with self-managed Codes will facilitate quid pro quo between government and CSOs in that it will enhance their legitimacy and credibility and will reduce bureaucracy. b) Recognition of CSOs Recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right is crucial. CSOs are engaged in complementary roles in provision of services and in in luencing policy and laws. Their close contact with society, their independence (non political) and experience and focus on the poor and

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marginalized makes them key actors in development. Their role should be enhanced and not curtailed. i.

Communication Channels with CSOs Open and formalized communication channel between CSOs and government institutions will enhance CSOs development effectiveness. In CSOs complementary role, the access to information and also feedback mechanism between government and CSOs will widen space for engagement and mutual learning and exchange.

ii.

Participation Channels for CSOs Government should provide an enabling environment for inclusive and meaningful participation by CSOs in critical country processes. For instance in the preparatory work towards the 2011 HLF4 in South Korea, many country level Technical Working Groups have very few CSOs representatives. Governments ought to proactively create opportunities for CSOs engagement in policy dialogue.

iii.

Mutual Learning & home grown solutions Governments should recognize CSOs as promoters and generators of indigenous knowledge. By the very nature of their operations and their de ining characteristic of social solidarity CSOs enable people to express their aspirations and they help improve the conditions for diverse, poor and marginalized groups in society.

c) An Enabling legal framework An enabling legal framework ensures that CSOs operate effectively exploring all their capacities to contribute to development without threats or intimidation. The legal framework allows for clari ication of roles of CSOs, expectations of the government and other actors, and the modalities for interaction. i.

A legal framework based on core human rights treaties As most developing country governments have rati ied most of the core human rights treaties, they provides a good premise upon which to anchor an enabling legal framework for CSO, including freedom of association and expression, as noted above.

ii.

Financial Systems, compliance and support The administrative procedures around registration, taxation and reporting should be made less complex to enhance compliance. CSOs should get tax exemptions due to the philanthropic nature of their activities.

d) Partnership and technical support In new or fragile democracies, the nascent growth of CSOs in tandem with the democratic space has implied that the CSOs are still linked to (and sometimes dependent on) the government for funding and technical support. This close link requires appropriate partnership arrangements that also ensure the independence of CSOs. e) Transparency, openness and accountability Governments should put into practice principles of good governance in their relationships with partner CSOs, including transparency and clarity about policies and practices, timely sharing of information, inclusion and accountability in policy discussions and the need to listen to a wide

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range of stakeholder views. Governments should make public information accessible to all, and where possible by use of technology.

3) Donors: Issues & Standards in Enabling CSO Development Effectiveness A number of issues and possible minimum standards were identi ied with respect to donor policies and practices. These were developed in country consultations in both donor and developing countries. While they relate to of icial donors, many could also apply to CSOs, including INGOs in their roles as donors, albeit in different ways and with different implications for development effectiveness on the part of recipient CSOs (who can be located in any geographic region of the world). Challenges and Issues Raised a)

Lack of clarity about donor policies Recipient CSOs were often frustrated with constant changes and lack of clarity about donor CSO policies (including CSOs as donors), particularly they are being translated into practices that respect the goals of these policies. Very seldom have donors developed their goals and objectives for CSO policies and practices through fully inclusive consultation and accountability to CSO recipient organizations.

Lack of structured engagement with donors for mutual learning and policies to improve development effectiveness CSOs understand that both donors and CSO can learn and in luence the conditions that affect their effectiveness as development actors through regular structured dialogue. But opportunities to exchange information or engage in learning process or structured dialogue are often ad hoc and focused narrowly on the terms of inancial transactions, or reporting on particular projects or institutional programs. Interaction with CSOs, particularly at the political level of donors and developing country governments, remains strongly in luenced by stereotype misperceptions and lack of information about CSOs contributions to development. Some donor are implementing political criteria rather than development criteria in determining support for CSOs whose role is oversight and sometimes

Marginalization of CSO programming with domestic constituencies in donor countries A critical role for CSOs, particularly in donor countries, is educating the public and helping action for global citizenship. While these activities are creating enabling conditions for positive public support for aid, solidarity and development action, of icial donor agencies often provide only modest inancing for such activities, as a marginal sideline to primary support for CSO development activiites in developing countries. Where they do support public engagement, donor tend towards programs of public awareness, and less in support of mobilizing citizens for more direct engagement with development, either in the donor country

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(advocacy) or externally (sharing technical expertise etc.). On the other hand, some consultations in the South spoke about the marginalization of local community-based CSOs by donors, with respect to access, funding and priority of local donor representatives to visit and engage. d)

Heavy donor conditionality and interference in local CSOs Both of icial donors (and sometimes large CSOs as donors) come with speci ic policy mandates as well as strong views about programmatic priorities, operational and development practices of civil society organizations in developing countries. Most of these priorities and directions are derived among constituencies or agencies in the donor countries, with little engagement or reference to conditions facing local CSO constituencies. Where local CSOs are highly dependent or have weak capacities for diversifying inancing, donors control over inance translates into both actions, and their capacities to manage and interact with bene iciary communities. developing country priorities implies support for government priorities. These policies have been increasingly and uncritically orienting CSO partnerships to align with development plans and priorities of national and local governments, sometimes irrespective of local conditions for CSO/government cooperation or the priorities of CSOs in these countries.

The donor In luence of funding mechanisms on CSO development effectiveness relationship is by de inition a relationship rooted in access to development inance for CSOs. CSOs raised many concerns about current trends in donor policies for providing development inance through and to CSOs: i)

Long delays and highly unpredictable inance, affected by changing policies and priorities in donor countries, transmitted by of icial donors and indirectly through CSOs donors who are themselves dependent on these of icial agencies.

ii) Lack of funds to manage the ongoing CSO administration and oversight of programming, including few opportunities for core funding that permits sustainable organizations and effective engagement with local constituencies. iii) One-time project-oriented competitive funding, with few opportunities to present strategic plans for developing country CSO programs for consideration, with project development transactions very labour intensive and increasingly subject to highly competitive, uncertain and un-transparent mechanisms for selection. iv) Very heavy transaction costs, with complex funding criteria accessible only to professional NGOs, and little harmonization of application or reporting requirements among of icial donors and/or CSO as donors. v) Shrinking opportunities for responsive funding to CSO priorities (where they frameworks, and less on long-term partnerships with CSOs whose unique roles, priorities and initiatives have their own development logic and imperatives as for matching counterpart funds. vi)

ts-based

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which can create an illusion of accountability for development with iterative, risky and complex development on the ground or with the needs for substantial learning to improve development impact for bene iciary populations. Some Proposed Minimum Standards for Donors The following standards have been derived from Open Forum consultations. They are not intended to be an exclusive or comprehensive list of standards proposed in the Open Forum process. An objective for the irst Global Assembly at the end of September will be to deepen and extend these proposals and initiate a dialogue with donors and governments on minimum standards. a) The Independence of CSOs i.

Independence and autonomy Donors acknowledge that CSOs are development actors in their own right, with mandates distinct from of icial donors and governments, and shall create policies and practices in support for CSO roles and activities in development that promote their institutional independence, autonomy and development effectiveness.

ii.

Recognition and support for diversity of CSO roles Donors recognize and support the full diversity of CSO roles in development as set out in the Framework agreed by the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness and in the 2008 Synthesis Report from the multistakeholder Advisory Group on CSOs and Aid Effectiveness associated with the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. In some donor countries an elaboration of this recognition has taken the form of Partnership Agreements between the donor and the platform of CSOs.

iii.

CSO integrity and ethical practice Donors shall work with CSOs that demonstrate development integrity and ethical practice, which CSOs may establish through adherence with one or more CSO-directed voluntary code or instrument for accountability, and through CSO association with the development effectiveness, taking account the particular context in which the CSO operates.

b) Consistent Policies in Support of CSOs as Development Actors iv.

Transparent and coherent policies Donors shall put in place transparent, explicit and coherent policies that de ine the place and role of CSOs within the donor strategic framework and plans, including country level program implementation plans. These plans shall be premised on the recognition of CSOs as development actors in their own right and based on inclusive consultation with relevant CSO development actors.

Sharing updates of donor strategic frameworks Donors will be clear, transparent, and timely in sharing revisions of their strategic framework with CSO partners, to allow CSOs to effectively demonstrate, when appropriate, the relevance of their respective programs within such frameworks.

vi.

Recognition of CSOs in developing and emerging countries as primary drivers of development effectiveness on the ground Policies established by donors and CSOs in donor countries acknowledge and respect CSOs in developing and emerging countries as the primary agents and drivers of CSO development effectiveness on the ground.

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vii. Promotion of local knowledge and culturally relevant capacities Donor policies shall recognize and promote the utilization of local expertise and knowledge through CSO efforts to enhance local systems, ideas and capacities within the context of local cultures, traditions and heritage. viii.

ix.

Donors recognize the central importance of

inclusion of women and c inclusion in donor policies and by assuring signi icant funding of CSOs with a primary

Composition of donor advisory boards Donors shall include CSOs from both the donor country and outside the donor country on any autonomous advisory board established to offer advice to donors, and in particular on the implementation of donor policies and operational practices in support of CSO roles in development.

c) Respectful Partnerships x.

Partnerships based on CSO missions and objectives Donors shall establish partner relationships with CSOs on the basis of agreement with CSO organizational missions and program objectives to promote positive change in conditions affecting the rights, material conditions and livelihood of those living in poverty or otherwise marginalized population.

xi.

Primacy to responsive partnerships In their policies, funding, and operational mechanisms for achieving aid effectiveness, donors shall give primacy to support responsive partnerships with CSOs, ensuring the dynamic lexibility and local ownership required to anticipate and nurture developmentally effective CSO programming initiatives and innovation.

xii. Partnerships that respect the right of counterpart CSOs to established appropriate programming strategies Donors shall enter into partnership agreements that respect the independent governance of partner CSOs and their right to establish their own programming relationships. Donors shall negotiate in good faith and enter into mutual contribution agreements with CSO partners, while refraining from imposing externally determined policy and operational conditions for inancing that substantially undermine the rogram as required with their constituencies and bene iciaries. xiii. Direct and indirect funding Direct donor funding for CSOs outside the donor country shall respect the mandate, experience and programming priorities of these CSOs as valued development actors and partners, rather than contracted implementers of donor policies. Such inancing should be undertaken while respecting and strengthening the unique contributions of long-standing CSO-generated international collaborations based on solidarity. d) Conditions for Funding xiv. Terms of funding for CSO development effectiveness Donors will provide funding with a long-term perspective and with lexible terms that respond to changing needs, iterative CSO programming and innovation. Such funding will be characterized by several conditions that will bene it CSO development effectiveness:

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Donors will priorize multi-year funding that will be responsive to CSO initiatives, predictable, with transparent terms; Donors will set out terms for fair and transparent funding mechanisms, which provide access to a diversity of CSO development actors, including innovative ways to support autonomous local CSOs. Donors will encourage CSO collaboration, alignment and harmonization of efforts based on CSO initiatives, not donor or government edicts; Donors will encourage an enabling legal environment for inancing CSO development roles; Donors will work through donor consortia to simplify and harmonize reporting and monitoring procedures; Donors will enable and increase core institutional funding to strengthen CSOs as sustainable organizations for development; Donors will support CSO-led efforts to build strategic, multi-level strategic collaboration among CSOs, including for the purposes of policy development and advocacy, with shared frameworks, evaluation, reporting, and accountability. Donors will support capacity development that enhancing the capacities particularly of smaller, community-oriented CSOs to be effective development; Donor legitimate requirements for accountability to domestic parliaments will have lexibility and encouragement for increased accountability to CSO bene iciary constituencies; Donors will encourage CSO processes that focus on lessons for strengthening impacts for bene iciary populations and less on accountability to donor-prescribed expected results; xv.

Multi-donor supported CSO trust funds Donors will support multi-donor trust funds in developing countries, under the management of CSO platforms or joint initiatives, where local CSOs initiate and demonstrate democratic ownership and management of these funds. Such initiatives, supported by donors, can have the important bene it of nurturing CSO autonomy and innovation by sharing risk, and building local capacity by providing opportunities for CSOs of varying capabilities, experiences and expertise to work together and learn from each other.

xvi. Appropriate forms of accountability and reporting on funding agreements Donors shall consider a range of dynamic forms of reporting and a variety of accountability formats, beyond a reliance on results-based management (RBM) methodologies and logical framework analysis (LFA). These will allow CSOs, and donors themselves, to more effectively report the conditions, challenges and successes of CSO speci ic and collective development efforts, individually and in aggregate. Reporting and accountability to donors will take account the long-term and often unpredictable nature of the development processes. Donors will accommodate and reinforce opportunities for program adjustment and learning. Donors will allocate funds within project and program budgets adequate to support evaluation and monitoring activities undertaken jointly or under CSO direction.

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Aggregate reporting of the outcomes of donor programs in support of CSOs will involve inclusive processes of consultation with affected CSOs. e) Transparency and Good Governance xvii. Practicing principles of good governance Donors shall put into practice principles of good governance in their relationships with partner CSOs, including transparency and clarity about policies and practices, timely sharing of information, inclusion and accountability in policy discussions and the need to listen to a wide range of stakeholder views. xviii. Access to information by local CSO Donors shall adhere to the principles and implementation plans agreed in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and thereby make accessible to CSOs and the public in developing countries information on donor projects and programs, implementation plans and monitoring reports, taking into account the importance of information in local languages. f) Policy Dialogue and Public Engagement xix. Support for inclusive policy dialogue Donors will reinforce and support inclusive political and policy dialogues between CSOs and relevant public policy of icials in government and multilateral institutions, including the capacity to conduct advocacy work to in luence policy, and to participate in policy making and debates. xx.

Support for CSO platforms Provide inancing for organizational and research activities of representative coalitions, networks and platforms of CSOs to better engage governments and donors with coherent CSO policy voices.

xxi. Policy dialogue and participation in developing countries Donors will encourage inclusive country-level policy dialogue among development stakeholders, including local and national government of icials, which respect the unique contribution of CSOs as development actors. Donors will work with CSOs to encourage a legal and regulatory environment in developing countries consistent with their support for democratic ownership and international human rights standards. xxii. Support for public engagement activities Donors acknowledge that public engagement is indispensable to CSO development effectiveness. Donors and CSOs will de ine and promote public to include any and all of: education and awareness-building; research action on critical global issues; activity to generate resources for development activities of CSOs and their international counterparts; mobilising for development action; and advocacy on policy issues and human rights. Donors shall earmark resources for public engagement, with lexible guidelines that encourage rather than discourage CSO public engagement activity as proportion of overall program.

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Development effectiveness: towards new understandings By Shannon Kindornay and Bill Morton Development effectiveness and international aid actors Over the last decade, official aid policy debates have increasingly centred on improving aid effectiveness. The origins for this focus can be traced to the 1995 OECD-Development Assistance Committee statement, Shaping the 21st Century . Momentum grew in the 2000s, with a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, including the 2005 meeting that resulted in the Paris Declaration. Along with the Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration and its 2008 companion (the Accra Agenda for Action) now represent the key international frameworks for donor and developing country efforts on aid effectiveness. Aid actors have also been interested in development effectiveness for many years, but the concept has only recently gained momentum on the international policy agenda. A number of multilateral and bilateral development agencies have engaged with the concept, and this is articulated in various levels of elaboration across their policies and programs, and in different understandings of what is meant by development effectiveness. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have shown particular interest, and are developing a common policy platform on the issue, as well as analyzing their own development effectiveness. Development effectiveness is likely to be an important agenda th item at the 2011 4 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Seoul, South Korea. While there is considerable consensus on the meaning of aid effectiveness, a common understanding of development effectiveness - and its implications for development policy - remains elusive. Instead, the term is used differently by different actors in different contexts. This Issues Brief aims to make a contribution to thinking on

development effectiveness by suggesting four categories under which it can be understood, based on how different aid actors describe and use the term 1 . The four categories consider development effectiveness as: 1) organizational effectiveness; 2) coherence or coordination; 3) development outcomes from aid; and 4) overall development outcomes. This research is not exhaustive, but rather represents a starting point for further discussion, and is part of a broader NSI research agenda on development effectiveness. Future studies will benefit by including more aid actors and sources, and in particular by consulting with Southern stakeholders.

Aid effectiveness and development effectiveness Aid effectiveness generally refers to how effective aid is in achieving expected outputs and stated objectives of aid interventions. The Paris Declaration serves as a technical representation of this understanding, but does not define aid effectiveness. A 2008 independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration, however, suggests that an understanding of aid effectiveness can be extracted from the Declaration. Aid effectiveness can thus be defined as the arrangement for the planning, management and deployment of aid that is efficient, reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including 2 poverty reduction . Under this definition, aid effectiveness focuses on how aid is used, although the evaluation suggests that it is generally assumed aid has a developmentoriented intent. In contrast, there is considerable scope for interpretation of the term development effectiveness , and a lack of clarity regarding what it means in practice. This is most acutely

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illustrated by the tendency of some analysts and aid agencies to make little distinction between aid effectiveness and development effectiveness, and in some cases, to use the terms interchangeably. The author of an Asian Development Bank Working Paper suggests that the meaning of development effectiveness is self-explanatory: it simply refers to the effectiveness of aid in development . The author also advises that in the paper, expressions such as development effectiveness and aid effectiveness are used to convey the same ideas , and that aid effectiveness and development effectiveness are 3 used interchangeably . Other agencies employ aid effectiveness language and concepts when discussing development effectiveness. The World Bank has published Reviews of Development Effectiveness since the early 1990s, but much of their discourse is framed within aid effectiveness principles and language that are now found in the Paris Declaration. AusAID s Office of Development Effectiveness also appears to consider development effectiveness primarily within an aid effectiveness context. It states its role is to monitor the quality and evaluate the impact of Australia s aid program, and describes its 2007 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness as an annual health check of the Australian aid program . While the review systematically assesses the effectiveness of Australian aid, it does not consider how other nonaid policy areas may have affected development outcomes.

Understanding development effectiveness: four categories While the above suggests that some organisations make little distinction between aid effectiveness and development effectiveness, there are many examples in which this is not the case. For a range of actors examined for this study, aid effectiveness is too narrow to describe the results of the overall development process. A reading of their policies and aid strategies suggests four possible categories that serve as a starting point for conceptualizing understandings of development effectiveness. These categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and some organizations have understandings that overlap between categories.

1 Development effectiveness as organizational effectiveness The concept of development effectiveness has frequently been used by aid agencies, especially multilateral organisations, as a means of assessing

the effectiveness of their own policies and programs. Development effectiveness is thus considered from the supply side, in terms of how well an organization is achieving its stated objectives and goals. There are a number of examples of how multilateral organisations have considered development effectiveness in this way. The World Bank s Annual Reviews of Development Effectiveness look at development effectiveness in terms of organizational performance and outputs. In the 2005 Review, for instance, development effectiveness was measured on multiple levels, through the Bank s global programs, country programs and individual projects. The 2008 report assesses outcomes of the Bank s projects and country programs, as well as its work in fostering global public goods. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also published a number of Development Effectiveness Reports. Early reports distinguished between development and organizational effectiveness but still focused on the efficiency and effectiveness of UNDP s own programs and projects. The 2001 report suggests that organizational effectiveness measures timebound organizational objectives and is about results-based management, whereas development effectiveness measures the impact of assistance and progress towards development goals and represents the extent to which an institution or intervention has brought about targeted 4 change . Despite making this distinction between development and organizational effectiveness, the report s discussion of development effectiveness remains confined to the development impact of UNDP itself, and does not consider external factors such as the role of other development agencies or the impact of nonaid sectors. In its 2007 Development Effectiveness Report, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) provides a useful definition of development effectiveness, suggesting it depends on the collective and coordinated actions by a range of national and external actors, and that it is therefore a measure of these actors aggregate impact, with accountability for results shared by many. IFAD claims its 2007 Report has a broader scope than those of other organisations development effectiveness reports, on the basis that it goes beyond reporting on operational effectiveness, and that it is more comprehensive, draws on wider sources and reports on results at the corporate as well as country level.

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Nevertheless, the report remains focused on development effectiveness in terms of IFAD s own organisational performance. Each of these examples demonstrates how key multilateral organisations interpret and apply a particular understanding of development effectiveness. As we will see below, UNDP s 2003 report signalled a deliberate move to go beyond considering development effectiveness in terms of organizational performance, and to instead adopt a broader analysis that looks at the final results of the overall development process and at the contribution of a range of relevant players.

2 Development effectiveness as coherence or coordination Some actors view development effectiveness in terms of coordinating actions and the consistency of development-related policies. One view, for example, argues that development effectiveness recognizes that non-aid policies affect development processes, thus creating the need for policy coherence across various government departments and policy areas, such as trade, security, and immigration. Some bilateral donors follow this understanding of development effectiveness and underline the importance of policy coherence while recognizing that aid is not the only factor affecting development. They emphasize Paris Declaration principles in their approach while policies derived from this conception focus specifically on how donors can improve development effectiveness through internal actions. Whole of government approaches best reflect this rationale, but are often limited by constraints such as the vertical organization of government, wherein departments operate as silos focussed on certain policy areas, making horizontal coordination and consistency across policies difficult to achieve. Institutional rivalry and claims on other objectives also limit policy coherence across departments. Like other studies, the Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa (undertaken by the OECD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa) does not attempt to unpack the meaning of development effectiveness. It focuses on the policies that will promote development effectiveness (rather than on desired outcomes). These include supporting sustainable economic growth, investing in education, health and gender equality; promoting good governance, and enhancing development finance (including an emphasis on domestic public resources). The review also identifies additional

future policy priorities that are implicitly linked to development effectiveness, including advancing African interests in international negotiations on multilateral trade and climate change issues. Overall, the review provides important insights into the range of policies that African governments believe will promote development effectiveness, which supports a policy coherence view of development effectiveness, and which goes well beyond aid. This view of development effectiveness is also reflected in the Center for Global Development s Commitment to Development Index. 5 This index rates rich countries performance in supporting development outcomes according to their performance across a range of related policy areas, including aid, trade, migration, investment, environment, security and technology. The conflation of performance in all these policy areas into a single score represents an ambitious undertaking, but it nevertheless reflects an important underlying rationale: that development effectiveness depends on a range of variables and policy areas, and that good performance in one or two areas means little if it is undermined by development-unfriendly policy in other areas.

3 Development effectiveness as the development outcomes from aid In this view, aid is measured in terms of development outcomes. Development effectiveness looks specifically at outcomes (rather than at policy areas, or at the efficiency of how each aid dollar is spent). This does not, however, mean aid and development effectiveness are mutually exclusive; rather, they are seen as mutually reinforcing concepts and agendas. This view is seen predominantly in current CSO conceptions of development effectiveness. These recognise that development effectiveness is a broad concept that goes beyond aid and development cooperation, and that also considers issues such as trade, migration and finance and investment. The current CSO agenda on development effectiveness, however, chooses to focus on development effectiveness in an aid effectiveness context. This is the result of CSOs close engagement with the international aid effectiveness agenda and with policy discussions surrounding the 2005 Paris and 2008 Accra High Level Forums. In the lead-up to

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the Accra HLF, the Better Aid platform, a global CSO grouping, released a policy brief that set out a civil society position on aid effectiveness. The brief signalled CSO s movement towards a development effectiveness agenda, underlining that aid effectiveness should be understood in terms of whether it is meeting development objectives, rather than in terms of improving aid delivery and 6 management issues. The brief challenged donors to move beyond the current technical aid effectiveness agenda, and to more clearly consider the development outcomes resulting from aid. Following the Accra HLF and in the lead-up to the 2011 Seoul HLF, development effectiveness has become a major focus for CSOs, including for three related groups: the Better Aid Platform, the CSO Open Forum, and the Reality of Aid network. Together, their key policy position is that the international aid effectiveness agenda should be reassessed, and reformulated around a development effectiveness agenda. The Reality of Aid network suggests that the 2011 HLF should result in a new Seoul Declaration , based on a development effectiveness framework. The network has signalled that its 2010 Reality of Aid Report will address the theme development effectiveness as the framework in aid and development cooperation through human 7 rights, social justice and democratic development . In preparation for the 2011 Seoul HLF, the Better Aid platform is planning multi-stakeholder consultations that are designed to further develop understandings of development effectiveness, and to identify key issues for CSOs to take up with donors and developing countries. The consultations are also designed to inform a revised Policy Brief (due for release in 2010) that will set out a CSO policy position, and that will form the basis for engagement with key official aid bodies such as the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. An early draft of the policy brief emphasizes the need to shift the aid effectiveness agenda towards discussions of development effectiveness, and reinforces the Reality of Aid s articulation of the concept. The draft policy brief looks beyond 2011, suggesting that future development cooperation processes should be rights-based, and should take into account key elements of social justice, including human rights, 8 gender equality and decent work.

meeting. Reflecting the Better Aid view, statements made by Open Forum participants indicate they understand development effectiveness in terms of placing human rights, gender equality, environmental sustainability, social justice and democratic ownership at the heart of development. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the OECD-DAC have also used development effectiveness in terms that reflect CSO understandings. While UNIFEM tends to use the terms development and aid effectiveness interchangeably, it sees gender equality as a determinant of development effectiveness, arguing that it must be considered in all stages of development interventions. The OECD-DAC indicates that a consideration for human rights, gender equality and sustainability is important to achieving Paris Declaration goals. The outcome document to its 2007 workshop, Development Effectiveness in Practice , states that attention to these issues enhances development effectiveness and that by addressing these concerns, development goals can be achieved. 9

4 Development effectiveness as overall development outcomes This view overlaps with the other understandings of development effectiveness described here, and is the most comprehensive approach of the four categories. Development effectiveness is seen as a measure of the overall development process, and is not just restricted to outcomes from aid. It incorporates external and internal factors, and has implications for non-aid sectors. Importantly, development outcomes cannot be attributed to any one actor.

CSOs have also formed the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, through which they are examining their own development effectiveness and are developing a set of common principles to guide both their own work and preparations for the Seoul

An independent review of DFID refers to two forms 10 of effectiveness: operational and development. According to the review, operational effectiveness is based on performance measures of the direct and attributable result of projects, but says very little about overall development outcomes. Development effectiveness, on the other hand, refers to the overall development outcome which, while highly relevant in assessing any aid program, cannot be directly attributed to any one actor s activities. Development outcomes result from national and international forces, including aid interventions by various actors, the availability of domestic resources, global commodity prices, regional stability and many other determinants. When there is an improvement in overall

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development, it may arise from any number of factors such as enhanced domestic resource mobilization, improved terms of trade or the culmination of years of aid interventions: discerning exactly which factor has had the greatest effect may be extremely difficult. This is why the DFID review suggests that it is virtually impossible to illustrate a direct link between DFID s activities and progress towards the MDGs, despite its various contributions. For similar reasons, UNDP s 2003 Development Effectiveness Report shows that UNDP interventions could not explain progress in development processes in any given country or sector. Under this view, responsibility for progress lies with all development partners. UNDP has shifted from looking at how to maximize the value of aid towards placing development at the centre of the aid agenda. Its 2003 Report signals a deliberate move from considering development effectiveness in terms of organizational performance towards a broader analysis that looks at the final results of the development process, and at the contribution of relevant players to overall development progress. This means assessing what works and what does not, and then assessing how aid flows can complement these factors. In a more comprehensive understanding of development, the report argues that development effectiveness is (or should be) about the factors and conditions that help produce sustainable development results to make a sustained difference in the lives of people . Development effectiveness is measured in outcomes, such as meeting human development goals and generating growth (which includes the quality of growth, equity, participation, and sustainability), rather than in terms of how money is spent. UNDP also claims that trade and global policies must also become more development friendly in order to meet the MDGs. Measuring outcomes in this way is consistent with CSO perspectives on development effectiveness, while the inclusion of non-aid factors reflects donors concern for policy coherence and whole-ofgovernment approaches. The UNDP approach combines the above categories to create a coherent, integrated approach to development effectiveness.

Conclusion and further research As interest grows, it is likely that development effectiveness will gain more attention internationally: there are already indications that it will feature in discussions at the Seoul HLF. While CSO momentum is clearly strong, a successful international agenda on development effectiveness

will also depend on the active engagement of developing country governments and official aid agencies, and on their willingness to reformulate the current aid effectiveness agenda. Also required is an appropriate forum where stakeholders can debate the issues, and ultimately move to joint commitments. While the 2011 HLF provides the most obvious starting point, the other possibility is the UN Development Cooperation Forum. The DCF aims at multi-stakeholder participation, and at ensuring a voice for all countries. At its first meeting, it addressed many aspects of development effectiveness outlined in this Brief, including donor policy coherency across aid and non-aid sectors, and responses to internationally agreed upon development goals, including gender equality, the environment, and human rights. A development effectiveness approach could be an appropriate lens for the DCF to adopt in addressing its key work areas (mutual accountability, South-South cooperation and aid policy coherence) in the lead-up to its 2010 High Level Meeting. The creation of a development effectiveness agenda also depends on at least some level of agreement on what is meant by the term. This Issues Brief has suggested four categories of understandings of development effectiveness. More research is required to address this in more detail and to explore the views of official aid agencies and Southern stakeholders. Further study is also warranted on whether the four categories are valid and can be improved on, in order to deepen the discussion of development effectiveness and further understand how the concept can be put into practice. This Issues Brief was published by The NorthSouth Institute, as part of NSI s Development Cooperation Series. It was written by Shannon Kindornay, Research Intern, and Bill Morton, Senior Researcher, Development Cooperation. See other Issues Briefs in the Development Cooperation Series at www.nsi-ins.ca Key References AusAID, 2008. Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2007 , Commonwealth of Australia, http://www.ode.ausaid.gov.au/

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Better Aid, 2009, Better Aid Policy Paper: Consultation Draft 1.0 , draft. Economic Commission for Africa/OECD, 2009, The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa: Promise and Performance , www.oecd.org Flint, M., et al. 2002, How Effective is DFID? An Independent Review of DFID's Organisational and Development Effectiveness , DFID Evaluation Report EV 640, www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/ev6 40.pdf IFAD, 2007, Report on IFAD s Development Effectiveness , www.ifad.org/deveffect/ride/index.htm

UNDP 2003, Development Effectiveness Report 2003: Partnership for Results , Evaluation Office, UNDP, www.undp.org/eo/documents/DER/DER2003.pdf UNIFEM, 2008, Gender Equality for Development Effectiveness: National Development Planning in the Commonwealth of Independent States , www.unifem.org. World Bank, 2005, Improving the World Bank's Development Effectiveness: What Does Evaluation Show? , World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Washington: The World Bank World Bank Group, 2008, Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2008: Shared Global Challenges , Washington: The World Bank.

International CSO Steering Group (ISG), 2008, Better Aid: A civil society position paper for the 2008 Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness , www.BetterAid.org.

Notes

Lockhart, C., 2005, From aid effectiveness to development effectiveness: strategy and policy coherence in fragile states , Overseas Development Institute.

OECD, 2007, Workshop on development effectiveness in practice: Applying the Paris Declaration , outcome document, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/20/38933324.pdf. Quibria, M, 2004, Development Effectiveness: What Does the Recent Research Tell Us? , Asian Development Bank OED Working Paper, Number 1, www.adb.org/evaluation Reality of Aid, 2009, The Reality of Aid 2010 Report Theme Statement , draft. Stern, E., with Laura Altinger, Osvaldo Feinstein, Marta Maranon, Nils-Sjard Schulz and Nicolai Steen Nielsen, 2008, Thematic Study on the Paris Declaration, Aid Effectiveness and Development Effectiveness , Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/28/41807824.pdf

We reviewed official documents of OECD-DAC donor countries, multilateral agencies and CSOs. We also considered non-DAC donors, but public information on their aid and development effectiveness policies was limited. Developing country perspectives have not been analyzed in any depth, owing in part to the predominance of literature on development effectiveness emanating from developed countries. This represents a gap in the research and could be addressed through further study. 2 See Stern et al. 2008. 3 See Quibria 2004. 4 See UNDP 2001. 5 http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/ 6 See ISG, 2008. 7 See Reality of Aid, 2009 8 9

See Better Aid 2009. See OECD 2007.

See Flint et al, 2002.

Tomlinson, B., 2008, The Accra Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness: a CCIC Participant Assessment of the Outcomes, http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/aid.shtml Tujan, T., 2009, Development Effectiveness: Claiming Rights and Achieving Development , CCIC: Au Courant, Winter 2009, www.ccic.ca/e/004/aucourant.shtml UNDP, 2001, Development Effectiveness: Review of Evaluative Evidence , Evaluation Office, UNDP, www.undp.org/eo/documents/der2001.pdf

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