Experience Music by Kristian Schou

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

RESUMÉ (DANISH ABSTRACT)

INTRODUCTION

WHY MUSIC?

REFLECTIONS ON METHOD

ENACTMENT AND MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

The phenomenological listening experience

Active perception

Aesthetic perception

Enaction & Mindfulness

Embodiment

ON THE SCENT OF MUSIC

Music and emotions

Moodagent - A study case

MUSIC AS AN ACTIVE DOING

Musical Affordances

A Sonic World

INTERLUDE; DANCING –ILLUSTRATING THE FORCE OF EMBODIMENT 56 MUSIC AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

MUSIC AND TIME

SITUATEDNESS OF MUSICAL EXPERIENCE

Intentional Arc

Scheme of Reference

Habitus of Listening

Situated Musical Actions

SOCIAL AFFORDANCES

Mutual tuning-in Relationship

Joint Attention

SETTING THE SCENE

MUSICAL IDENTITIES

LISTENING TO MUSIC – A PARTAKING OF THE MUSICAL WORLD.

CONCLUSION

100

REFERENCES

103

Abstract How do we experience music? I argue that music is an active doing, essentially situated within the current of our everyday lives. Through a phenomenological approach, I investigate the character of our musical experience, in particular the experience of listening to music. The specific mode of listening of interest here is framed by the notion of deep listening, which is combined with the character of aesthetic perception and in addition the state of attention achieved by mindfulness. An expansion of the active component of perception is called for, in order to justify my claim of music as an active doing. The enactive approach to perception, combined with the crucial aspects of embodiment, in particular those demonstrated by Merleau-Ponty, will establish a theoretical frame in which the experience of music is illuminated as an active doing. But music is a multi facetted entity, facilitating a whole range of potential usage – we do things to and with music. An illustration of the multi facetted nature of our musical experience is initiated by examining the emotive aspects – a complex field, suggesting music as ranging beyond the subject. Investigating this mutual availability, I draw on Gibson’s theory of affordances, applying this specifically to the musical domain by conceptualizing musical affordances. Music offers different affordances dependent on the perceiver, the use and the context. Applying the theoretical elucidations of enactment, embodiment and musical affordances to the area of dance, is not merely an exemplification of the theoretical foundation, but equally a reminder of the missing inquiry into the social aspects of our musical experience. The investigation of the social dimension is initiated by the temporal facets of music, assisting along with the theory of social affordances, the claim of music as a shareable entity. The mutual sharable character of the musical experience is examined through mutual-tuning-in relationships and joint attention, demonstrating how the musical experience is dramatically altered, when shared with others. The social investigation will find its closure in an illustration of the physical surrounding’s impact on the musical experience and an examination of the identity material within music. Finally, I will discuss my conception of the experience of listening to music as a partaking in the musical world, theoretically speaking. 3

Resumé (Danish Abstract) Hvordan oplever vi music? Jeg vil positionere musikoplevelsen som en aktiv handling funderet i vores sociale omverden. Gennem en fænomenologisk tilgang ønsker jeg at afdække i særdelelshed, hvorledes vi lytter til musik. Den særlige oplevelse, jeg sigter imod, er karakteriseret ved, at det lyttende subjekt er dybt involveret i den respektive musik. En analyse af æsthetisk perception og det buddistiske begreb om mindfulness understøtter det dybe engagement. For at illustrere det aktive perspektiv af musikoplevelsen giver jeg en teoretisk udredning af den aktive tilgang til perception generelt betragtet, der sammen med Merleau-Ponty’s begreb om kropslighed, supplerer det teoretiske fundament for min argumentation. Jeg vender mig efterfølgenede til at applicerere disse teoretiske betragtninger på en analyse af musikoplevelsen, hvor musikkens følelsesmæssige aspekter åbner mod en forståelse af oplevelsen af musik som en intersubjektiv entitet. Dette forfølges nærmere ved at specificere de strukturer, musikken tilbyder forskellige perceptioner, en strategi der bygger videre på Gibson’s teori om affordances. Musik er en mangfoldig entitet, der tilbyder sig og udnyttes i mangfoldige scenarier i vores sociale liv. De teoretiske pointer vedrørende aktiv perception, kropslighed og de intersubjektive potentialer eksemplificeres ved at se nærmere på dansen. Dans er desuden en uundgåelig påmindelse om den sociale dimension af vores musikoplevelse. De sociale konnotationer danner grundlag for den anden del af undersøgelsen, effektueret af en analyse af de temporale aspekter ved oplevelsen af musik. Musik er en stor del af vores hverdag og dybt integreret i vores omverden. Den intersubjektive tilgængelighed af musikoplevelsen undersøges gennem deres kontekstualisering, og hvorledes musik tilbyder sig socialt. Karakteren af musikoplevelsens sociale tilgængelighed illustres via mutual-tuning-in relationship og joint attention. Endelig påvises de fysiske opgivelsers indflydelse og musikkens sociale identitetspotentiale. Jeg konkluderer med teoretisk at konceptualisere musikoplevelsen som deltagelse i den musiske verden – en verden der er uadskillelig fra vores hverdagsverden. At opleve musik er en aktiv handling, dybt forankret i vores sociale omverden. 4

Introduction Music is a ubiquitous form of art – we are surrounded by music in our everyday lives. Music is of great importance to people across the world and it is used in a variety of different scenarios. Music is not just something that happens to us, something that we are exposed to. On the contrary, music is something we do, or rather; we do things to and with music. Music is an active doing essentially embedded within our social lives. I wish to examine the character of our musical experience – I wish to gain an understanding of how we experience music in our everyday lives. Choosing music as the object of my investigation is an obvious choice, considering my personal appreciation of music in general. Music is a significant part of my life. I myself use music in various ways – i.e. relaxation, mood regulation, concentration, as a social gathering point –just to mention a few. But I feel committed to expose that I am not a practicing musician. I am simply an enthusiastic listener. In other words, I have no technical background knowledge of the phenomenon music, besides my own autobiographical history of innumerous listening episodes. But as we will later determine, such technical knowledge of music is by no means a necessary ingredient in my approach to the musical phenomenon1. On the contrary, I will argue that music is a multi-available entity, one that is accessible to anyone who is willing to openly engage with the phenomenon. This calls for an extensive examination of the particular mode of listening to music, I embrace. The particular mode of listening will be illuminated by investigating the nature of aesthetic perception, combined with notions such as deep listening and mindfulness. My focus on music must be conceived in general concerns. Put differently, I do not intend to describe specific technical aspects of music; neither will I engage in a definition of the kind of music at stake. I will simply focus on music in general and in particular our experience of it. But I must refer to a wide-ranging consensus within recent philosophical treatment of 1

Though it certainly might be in other kinds of approaches, especially within musical science. 5

music, which is the tendency to focus on instrumental music, also called pure or absolute music2. Focus on instrumental music leaves out the complicating representational aspects of lyrics and vocals potentially conveying their own philosophical problems. For the sake of simplicity, I therefore embrace this strategy. Historically conceived, music has indulged in a varied acceptance, scattered amongst the recognition of the highest member of the fine art to the degradation, and nearly exclusion, from the artistic forum3. Regardless of the status however, music has always played an important role in different societies and to different people. Music is a philosophically difficult form of art, which is why the focus tends to be that of the visual arts. Recently music has received renewed interest, and within the area of philosophy (among others) this interest has resulted in various examinations of music .Traditionally, the area of musical experience has been approached within an examination of the solitary experience. The focus has been on the individual experience of music4. My approach to the phenomenon is of a different character, as I wish to emphasize the social dimension of our musical experience. I do not intend to neglect the gains of the solitary experience-devotee, but I do believe that focusing on the social dimension of the experience of music will serve as illumination of important aspects, aspects that the common conception of the musical experience hopefully can profit from. Music is essentially founded within the current of our everyday lives, and I find it impossible to disregard the social aspects of music in general. This places me in a difficult situation. I simultaneously seek a clarification of the active component of our musical experience and equally of the social foundation. In overcoming the obstacles of such a twofold strategy, I have chosen to separate the treatment of the two statements. This means that my investigation of the nature of the musical experience falls in two parts; the first part will be focusing on illustrating the active character of the musical experience. This will form the theoretical fundament of my thesis and in order to establish this, I have postponed the analysis of music to the second half of the first part. I will in other 2

Kivy (2002), pp. 24ff and Krueger (2009), p. 99 Kivy (2002), p. 9 4 Ex. Kivy (2002), Fiske (1990, 1993, 2008) 3

words seek a theoretical frame, in which I can develop my view on the musical experience. I will in particular be focusing on the experience of listening to music. I will claim that listening to music is an active doing essentially embodied and embedded within our world. But listening to music is not a solitary affair – a pure subjective experience restricted within the limits of the perceiving individual. Music inescapably is a part of our social worlds – music inevitably summons the presence of the other5. Not merely is music produced within this social world, it is equally maintained and to some extend created within social contexts as well. Listening to music with others dramatically alters the listening experience, as well as the social surroundings will have an impact on the character of the musical experience. The social foundation of our musical experience will form the second part of my investigation. In the social dimension of the musical experience I will focus more broadly on the experience of music in general, in order to illustrate the multifaceted character of music. This will be initiated by the intermediary section of the two parts, which will be focusing on dancing. I will nevertheless continuously throughout the second part be exemplifying the listening experience in relation to my theoretical elucidations and I thereby hope to preserve a permanence in my findings. But I must emphasize that the separation of music as an active doing and the social dimension of the musical experience is an artificial, conceptual distinction. In real life they are inseparably linked. The challenge has been to develop a frame in which each of the claims could be described, and it is in this respect that I have sought a separate treatment of the two. However, these difficulties have haunted me throughout my investigation. It has been extremely difficult to isolate theoretical concepts in order to examine them separately. I have nevertheless maintained this strategy as I believe that a separate treatment of each of the notions at stake is necessary, not merely for the understanding of the particular notions, but equally to grasp the unity of the notions. Besides, such a strategy enables me to thoroughly describe my conception of a specific notion.

Cumming (2000), p. 71. This claim will be thoroughly elaborated in the section “Social Affordances”. 7

The difficulties regarding the separation of particular notions are partly due to the nature of the musical experience. Musical experience is an elusive phenomenon in many ways, and music is a complex entity, communicating a whole range of relationships6. But in order to grasp these, I will be confined in a different mode of articulation than the experience itself. The experience of music is the only way to understand the phenomenon, whereas my description of the musical experience merely will be an attempt to articulate ways in which we can begin to understand elements of this elusive phenomenon. I have sought to illustrate some of the aspects of our musical experience, both through my theoretical groundwork, the analysis of music, and in particular by exemplifying my claims. But I am aware that I raise far more questions, than I answer. In delimiting my field of research, I have intentionally excluded certain areas. This exclusion has solely been executed on behalf of philosophical economy. I simply have not found the necessary space for developing these thoughts further7, but have occasionally drawn attention to the eliminated areas. Thus, summarizing my intentions in the present work; I wish to explore the character of our musical experience. I will do this by first of all investigating the active aspects of our perception in general and our essential embodiment. This will supply the theoretical groundwork for establishing the analysis of our musical experience, which will be characterized by a specific mode of listening to music, namely deep listening. The second part will focus on the essential social foundation of music in general by investigating the shareable potential within the musical domain. The second part will be concluding music as offering a shareable sonic world â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a world of music, so to speak â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a world in which we actively engage and participate when experiencing music. The two parts will be connected by an intermediary exploration of dancing. But initially, I will now move towards a clarification of my motivation for choosing music as the object of my investigation and illustrate why an elaboration of the nature of our musical experience is philosophically interesting.

Small (1998), p. 137 I specifically have the field of communicative musicality in mind here. This field concentrates, among other things, on our innate musical abilities and such research is of great importance to my claims. 7

Why music? It seems highly relevant to give an account of my reasons for choosing music as an object for my investigation. Music does not possess any self evident character, which would explain its relevancy in the respective context. Rather, it seems plausible that any given form of art would perfectly well do the job. I must admit, though, that music has a special interest to me, an interest I not only share with lots of people around the world, but also one that forms the very basic circumstances for my choice. But there seems to be more to it. Music is not just some enjoyable hobby I share with a large number of other people. If that was the case, music would thereby be justified as the investigation object because of its self sufficiency. I will in the following work to show my reasons for choosing music as the object of my investigation by differentiating music from the visual arts. This maneuver will equally result in an illustration of a number of the problematic issues attached to any approach to the philosophical puzzling phenomenon of music. Some of these problematic issues will be the center of focus of my investigation of the phenomenon, but again, I raise more questions than I can possibly answer. Music appears to me to be a very complex entity, one that besides my private appreciation consists in difficulties regarding the very definition of its being. Language itself seems insufficient to describe the essence of music. It may prove very useful in respect of notation of a given musical work, which can ensure the accessibility for the posterity8. But even concerning the musical score, we find a tension within language. Not only is the musical work, through the notation, given an autonomous existence, but at the same time, the use of language opens up for interpretation9. Nevertheless, music in general will be my main focus and I will therefore not engage in a discussion of the constituting elements of a given musical piece. Neither am I interested in clarifying the ontological foundation of music in general. I wish to characterize and explore our musical experience. But even in this overall 8

Some philosophers, ex. Nelson Goodman, argue that the musical score is identical with the score and thus any deviation of the former from the latter compromises the â&#x20AC;&#x153;essenceâ&#x20AC;? of the work, Kivy (2000), pp. 206ff. I find this view pretty implausible and I will therefore not engage in a further discussion of this position. 9 Benson (2003), pp. 77-79 9

approach to the phenomenon music, we discover the very same tension within language. Music is somehow both an autonomous entity and at the same time it opens to interpretation. Music is a part of our everyday life, an object we can approach, speak of and share. But simultaneously, music creates a world of its own, a world we can explore, engage with and manipulate. The following will be an attempt to encapsulate this musical world, or perhaps more accurately; my understanding of the musical world. It is as if we just do not have the adequate vocabulary suitable for our experience of music. But that is exactly what music is –An experience. A common visual sense-perception such as perceiving the redness of an apple might be illustrative of the issues at stake here. The redness of the apple is a part of the visual content, but in everyday perceiving we merely conceive the redness as a property of the given experience. We presume that we have a mutual understanding of what the redness refers to, namely the color of the apple in front of us, but faced with the challenge of explaining this experience, for example to a colorblind person, we run into trouble. In other words, the irreducibility of the concept red makes it impossible to reduce it to something simpler10. I believe that the same difficulties apply to the area of music. We have a common understanding or agreement of what music is – a sort of a mutual frame of reference, which allows us to speak of music. But essentially, music is an experience, an active doing that reveals itself to the subject perceiving it. And faced with the challenge of explaining this musical experience to a deaf person for example, we stand before the very same difficulties, as in regard to the example with the color-blind person. I must emphasize though that my aim is to expose the general “structures” of music perception, which is common to all instances of musical experience. I will by no means claim that music is a private, subjective experience precluded from everything else than the subject. On the contrary, I wish to position the experience of music as a multi-available entity by exposing the common structures of our musical experience. I am, in other words,

Bastian (1987/1995), p. 19 10

interested in engaging in a phenomenological analysis of the musical experience in general11. Music can in this respect be conceived as an analogue to the problems concerning the senses. We seem to be dealing with the same obstacles in explaining colors to a color-blind versus music to a deaf (many other examples can substantiate the two given). This analogue can in fact be dispersed to entail the variety of different forms of art in general. But music differs from the visual arts, not merely because of the medium by which it is perceived, but seemingly also because of the above mentioned difficulties regarding the very fundamental aspects of the being of music12. It is apparently exceedingly difficult to approach the phenomenon music, without appealing to some degree of mysticism. â&#x20AC;?We fall out of the realm of real lifeâ&#x20AC;?13 is not an uncommon conception of the experience of music and presumably one that all of us to some degree embraces. Peter Kivy gives a more profound description of the musical experience;

[â&#x20AC;Ś] listening to absolute music is, among other things, the experience of going from our world, with all of its trials, tribulations, and ambiguities, to another world, a world of pure sonic structure, that, because it need not be interpreted as a representation or description of our world, but can be appreciated on its own terms alone, gives us the sense of liberation that I have found appropriate to analogize with the pleasurable experience we get in the process of going from a state of intense pain to its cessation.14

Music is valuable in its own right; it has its own legitimization. Music seems to be intrinsically valuable because the pleasures it offers are unique to the medium of music, e.g. we cannot get them anywhere else. Besides, these pleasures are essential to an aesthetically sophisticated flourishing human life. Concerning the liberating effect, it is a matter of great importance to clarify the implications of such an effect. The emotional and 11

Another plausible interpretation of the analogy between music and redness of the apple is to argue that music essentially is a collection of sounds, which is ontologically distinct from the experience of this collection of sounds as music by a particular hearer. But this will, as mentioned, not be my approach to the field of investigation. 12 I certainly do not aim at a patronizing of the visual arts, rather, my goal is to emphasize that music appears to be of a different character and therefore deserves separate attention. 13 Bastian (1987/1995), p. 15, my translation. 14 Kivy (2002), p. 260 11

liberating aspects of music will be thoroughly examined later15. First of all it is important to establish an understanding of the scope of the musical world. Kivy seems to approach the phenomenon from a platonic perspective, claiming that the musical experience belongs to another world. I find it quite illustrative to use the metaphor “another world” in trying to make the musical experience comprehensible. Literally speaking though, it appears to be a misleading conception. I find music deeply rooted in our everyday life. Basically, music is, like any other kind of art, the results of man’s efforts on earth and in this sense; art in general is prefigured in the very process of living 16. Instead of approaching music from an object-based description17, I suggest approaching music from a merely phenomenological perspective18. I find it insufficient merely to describe the structural elements of music. Music differs from the visual art in respect of its tangibility. Both music and the visual arts seem to exist by virtue of a perceiving subject. To determine whether or not this existence is verified independent of the perceiving subject, is a complex matter beyond the scope of this examination. It is relevant though, to consider the fact that any given form of art seems to demand an active engagement from the perceiving subject. Merely recognizing the existence of the artworks is insufficient in order to appreciate its artistic qualities. Thus, appreciating art apparently require an active involvement in the perception of the given piece of art on behold of the perceiver. Experiencing art will always involve some sort of temporal frame, in which the perception of the art is unfolded. The temporal frame in which the visual art involves the perceiver seems to be an inferior aspect of the perception of the given piece of art. On the contrary, music appears to be of a different nature. The temporal dimension is crucial for the existence of music – it is the very medium through which it reveals itself. In this sense, a musical piece is unfolded through time. We experience a piece of music as it reveals itself and only through an act of reflection will we be able to bring the musical flux to a standstill. Music is a temporal form of art – it manifests itself in the topicality.

This will be done in the section “Music and Emotions”. Dewy (1934/2005), pp. 22-25 17 We will examine Kivy’s formalism later in the section “Music and Emotions”.40 18 Fiske (2008), p. 28 16

Perhaps this topicality is the key to an understanding of the difference between the visual art and music. They each seem to have their own time span. Visual art is perceivable in outer time. It is an object that reveals itself in the time we all share, the time we all participate in. Once accomplished, any work of art exists autonomously19. In the case of the visual art this autonomous existence opens for the possibility of returning to the perception of the given visual work of art. It is possible to recreate the given perception. Music, on the contrary, is beyond the control of the perceiver20. Whereas a perception of the visual art object entails the perceiver’s ability to captivate the given object, music reveals itself through time. Perceiving music is thereby a matter of participation in the time given, the time that the respective musical piece unfolds21. Many seem to endorse a conception of the musical time span as a kind of inner time (durée), which is independent of outer clock-time;

There is no doubt that the dimension of time in which the work of music exists in the inner time of our stream of consciousness – in Bergson’s terminology, the durée.22

In fact, this inner time forms the very conditions of existence of music23. The time span dominated by music is a matter of complexity and it will be given separate attention later 24. For the time being it will do to recognize the fact that there seems to be a difference in the time spans involved in perceiving respectively visual art and music. Engaging in the musical inner time seemingly involves an active doing from the perceiving subject 25, a participation in the unfolding of the musical elements, a part-taking in the musical world.

Schutz (1964), p. 169 Except of course the perceiver’s possibility to ignore the music, to turn it off, go somewhere else, etc. 21 Nevertheless, we can control how we perceive the music, e.g. selectively attending to and focusing on certain aspects of a piece while ignoring others, pausing, rewinding and re-listening to certain parts of a piece, etc. When examining the musical time, we will also have a closer look at how we anticipate future events within the music. Cf. “Music and Time”. 22 Schutz (1996), p. 249 23 Schutz (1964) p. 170 24 Cf. “Music and Time”. 25 The active role that the listener plays in constructing her musical experience will be examined thoroughly in “Music as an Active Doing”. 20

Reflections on Method Before turning towards the investigation of the nature of our musical experience, I find it appropriate to mention my methodological approach to the phenomenon. As indicated, I wish to advance the musical experience from a phenomenological perspective. This gives me the advantage of investigating the musical experience from a first person-perspective. I will, in other words, be able to thematize my musical experience, instead of being obliged to give an ontological account of the musical experience. Obviously, I do not intend to establish a solitary conceptual frame of exclusively my own experience of music. Rather, I wish to investigate the common “structures” of our musical experience. Though, I must emphasize that my intention is not to digress into the history of phenomenology but to do phenomenology. I will not commit myself to a thorough elaboration of the phenomenological method but rather turn my focus towards the object of my investigation, namely music. Obviously such a strategy calls for a profound theoretical groundwork. This will primarily be developed in the first part of the thesis, where the elaboration of my claim of perception as an active, embodied doing is to be found. But I do not confine my theoretical premises strictly within the area of phenomenology. On the contrary, I believe that the object of investigation – music – motivates a larger frame of survey, mainly due to its complexity. Music is not just one thing, but can be many different things in different scenarios (sometimes it can even within the same scenario be a multifaceted entity). I have therefore chosen to approach the phenomenon music from an interdisciplinary point of view in order to illustrate this complexity. In doing so, I hope to achieve a broader picture of the phenomenon and hopefully a more nuanced one as well. This brings me far around the scientific landscape stretching from psychology, neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, Buddhism and, obviously, philosophy. Whenever I have encountered a workable theory, I have implemented it in my overall elaboration. The profitable perspective of such an interdisciplinary approach is its potential of illustrating different aspects of the phenomenon music. By moving transversely between different fields of research it 14

becomes possible not merely to illuminate the phenomenon from different points of views (on different levels of abstraction) but equally to shift between diverse analyzing-tools. The disadvantage of choosing an interdisciplinary approach is first of all due to the scope of the present work. Restrictions concerning the length of the work naturally set a limit with regard to the space available for elaborating the different views, which is why I sometimes find it necessary to abolish introductory comments on the respective fields of research. This obviously will infect the reading process, but I have tried to develop an understandable portrait of each theory/notion at stake with respect to the overall scope of the work. This is one of the reasons why I occasionally have a considerable amount of footnotes. Another disadvantage worth calling attention to is the difficulties regarding the different areas conceptual frameworks. Each tradition maneuvers within its own agenda and when isolating a part of a theory or a notion from its context, this inevitably causes disturbance regarding the clarity of the specific part of theory or notion at stake. The different traditions often operate with different conceptual clarifications and I have therefore carefully sought to thoroughly describe every applied notion - yet another reason for my extensive use of footnotes. One last reservation must be made concerning my methodological approach. By choosing a phenomenological perspective I hope to gain insight into a widespread phenomenon that is so commonly manifested that we seldom call it into question. We often do music without giving it any thoughts. Music is a deeply integrated part of our lives â&#x20AC;&#x201C; it is something we often take for granted. When illuminating music as an object of my investigation I thematize mundaneity - I wish to challenge commonsense by calling it into question. Obviously I aim at an extensive illustration of the musical experience, but I must emphasize that my investigation inevitably is influenced by my own experience of music. I have, both in my method and choice of theory, been guided by my own conception of the phenomenon, and though I have sought to illustrate the general structures of our musical experience and include conflicting views, I must nevertheless admit that my elaboration of the thesis is the result of a normative account of the phenomenon.

Enactment and musical experience My intention in the following sections is to develop a conceptual frame in which I can position my claim of the musical experience as an active doing. I therefore feel obliged to turn away from the musical domain for a while and focus on some general perspectives on perception and embodiment. This strategy will supply me with the necessary theoretical foundation for developing my views on the musical experience, and will equally serve as a justification of these views. Initially, my center of attention will be on the phenomenological listening experience, clarifying my view on a phenomenological approach to the experience of listening to music and some of the philosophical issues in this context. Afterwards I will move on to illuminate some aspects of the active component of perception, in particular the aspects of aesthetic perception. Focusing on aesthetic perception enables me to validate my conception of the specific mode of deep listening, characterizing the kind of listening experience that I am interested in pursuing. Finally, I will examine the character of enaction and embodiment, which will complete the theoretical groundwork. I will thereby be theoretical prepared to congregate the analysis of the musical experience and this will form the basis of the second half of the first part.

The phenomenological listening experience In examining our musical experience I have chosen to emphasize the experience of listening to music. I therefore feel obliged to initially clarify why it is philosophical interesting to focus on the listening experience and to elucidate what sort of listening experience I have in mind. I will in this section elaborate my conception of the term â&#x20AC;&#x153;listening experienceâ&#x20AC;? by first of all approaching the phenomenon from a very large scale perspective, illustrating the problematic issues regarding the aural dimension and the listening experience. I will be sketching out some of the traditional philosophical assumptions about music, in order to position my own advance to the phenomenon. Finally, I will mention some problems related to a phenomenological approach to the 16

experience of listening to music and narrow down to my conceptual understanding of the listening experience. During my motivational account for choosing music as an object for my thesis, I described the difficulties concerning the differentiation between visual art and music. We perceive respectively visual art and music through different mediums; they reveal themselves through different senses. Traditionally there has been a presupposed and dominant visualism to our understanding of experience26. A visualistic position regards vision as the superior sense, in other words, vision is considered as the most reliable source of collecting sense data. Due to this visualism, we may expound the reasons for the lack of philosophical interest within the field of music as caused by the assumed superiority of vision, or at least an inclination to focus on vision. But why should we ascribe more value to a tangible visual object? The question is if not the dominance of visualism is on retreat, especially in view of the increasingly importance of music in our society. Perhaps the coast is now clear for a more equal distribution of the senses… Nevertheless, I find it important not to neglect the gains of the visualism, and to recognize the fact that we presumably still, on a more or less unconscious level, carry a great part of the legacy from visualism with us27. The task is therefore to acknowledge some sort of sense-equality and at the same time recognize the unity of the senses. My focus is on the musical experience as such, the experience of listening to music and though the auditory dimension is an apparent concern in this context, I nevertheless do not aim to highlight this dimension solitarily. Such a strategy would fail to acknowledge the unity of the senses.28 Apparently we face great difficulties when focusing on the listening experience. Listening to a piece of music, for example, involves an invisible process, which easily can degrade the

Ihde (2007), pp. 6-7 I especially have the verbal legacy in mind here. Think of the connotations of vision entailed in words like “enlightenment”, “insight”, even “perception” is implicitly combined with the visual area, but more of this later. See besides Ihde (2007), p. 8 for more examples. I have on several occasions encountered a propensity to focus on visual perception, despite a declared focus on musical perception, see ex. Cochrane (2009), p. 64, where he speaks of the task of seeing, but summarizes that it is perception in general, without justifying this shift of focus. 28 This unity will be crucial in developing my position. In particular Gibson has advocated the unity of the senses. Gibson (1979/1986), p. 205 27

listening experience compared to a visual experience. But again, why should a visual object be more tangible than an auditory? I think one of the difficulties consists in the fact, that music (or some other complicated sound structure for that matter) presents itself over time. It is as if we can only establish an understanding29 of a given musical piece after it presented its entirety30. Music appears to consist within its own time span, but much more about this later31. Another complicating matter is due to the ubiquitous character of music. Music is so easily taken for granted that we often “do music” without giving it any thoughts whatsoever. In fact, many consumers use music as a distraction from thinking32, as a kind of refuge. Listening to music from a phenomenological perspective demands more than an intense and concentrated attention to the sound structure and the listening experience in itself. It also involves a careful awareness in the process of pervading beliefs that might intrude the attempt to listen to the things themselves33. Elizabeth A. Behnke gives an interesting perspective on the matter, when describing her own experiences of supplying a phenomenological angle on her violin playing;

A phenomenological approach to playing the violin might begin sketching out the network of inherited assumptions that we usually bring to our studies. What is “taking for granted” before I even start to play?34

I find this approach applicable to the listening experience as well. We need to uncover the hidden assumptions that accompany us, when we listen to music. I will return to a thorough elaboration of these assumptions, conceptually enveloping them under the notion of situated musical actions35. Revisiting the visualistic tendency to divide the senses

”Understanding” is in these settings meant to disclose the recovering of an organization of certain sound patterns as music. 30 Fiske (2008), p. 24 31 Cf. “Music and Time”. 32 Fiske (2008), pp. 1-2 33 Ihde (2007), p. 49 34 Behnke (1989/1990), p. 23 35 Cf. “Situated Musical Actions”. 18

hierarchic, in favor of sight, I find within this general approach challenging obstacles in my attempt to describe the phenomenology of the listening experience. How is it even possible to speak of perception of the invisible? Vision has its sense object represented in the world (unless of course we speak of illusions or imagination, but for the sake of simplicity let us disregard the complicating matters). But as Don Ihde determines, “Material objects is the realm of mute objects” 36. The muteness of the material objects can work as a splendid analogue of the solidarity of the senses (in this context it is in particular sight and hearing that obtains our attention). Silence –the muteness- is at the horizon of sound, as is the invisible at the horizon of sight, and despite the mute objects presence in the visual world, this perspective supply us with the possibility to gain an understanding of the interwoven structures of the senses37; Listening makes the invisible present in a way similar to the presence of the mute in vision.38

The invisible is made present through music. However, this presence of the invisible is not to be defined in terms of palpable elements, but perhaps another fertile analogue can clarify the issues at stake here. We construct a thought experiment, in where we place ourselves walking in a dark forest at nightfall. The howling sounds from an owl might give us the shivers, but nonetheless we are confident in our beliefs about hearing an owl. In other words, the presence of the owl is justified from a conclusion due to its sounds. The very same conclusion can apply to the experience of music. We listen to music in respect of the effects that it leaves behind. But at the same time we anticipate actively within the given piece of music39. We not only perceive the parts of the melody that are immediately present in a given moment of perception, but we also in some sense perceive, or at least predict, future parts of the melody40. The different sound elements form a unity, which presents itself to us. If we try to divide the parts into single elements, the time span is 36

Ihde (2007), p. 50 Gibson argues throughout his work for this unity of the senses, see ex. Gibson (1979/1986), p. 205 38 Ihde (2007), pp. 50-51 39 Only through motion is the sounding accomplished, see Friedson (1996), p. 165 40 This anticipation is by Husserl called protention (ex. Husserl (1964), p. 76) and will later be examined in the section “Music and Time”. This point is contrasted by Fiske, who describes musical perception as limited to the information available to us in the “now”, Fiske (2008), p. 59 37

broken and the musical experience is lost. The musical experience is more than just the sum of the elements. In various scenarios, though, the dissection may be the means. Musical theory for example is occupied with the different elements in music;

Indeed, the way in which the relationship between music perception and music theory has generally been conceived is that whereas music perception and cognition studies what listeners hear, music theory persuades the listener of what they might or could hear.41

But acoustic descriptors as well as notational elements are insufficient to describe our listening experience42;

It is erroneous to think that a symphony exists only in the score or in its performance by an orchestra. Both the score and the performance have the same relation to the work of music as the printed book or lecture has to the existence of a philosophical thought or a mathematical theory.43

They fail to capture, for example, the listenerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s profound emotional response to a particular piece of music. They might be useful tools in regard of establishing an understanding of the musical elements in order to grasp the artistic effects. But we need to acknowledge that the understanding of musical structure not is a matter of simply receiving it. The perceiver plays an active and crucial role in establishing the listening experience. I will work to show that music invites to a dynamic engagement, one that encourages perceptual composing. Traditionally many have framed music as a non-representational art form44. Unlike literature, sculpture, painting, etc., music cannot represent moods, states of affairs or events the way other art forms can. And yet music nevertheless elicits profound emotional

Dibben (2003), p. 194 Fiske (2008), p. 26. Fiske determines the acoustic descriptors as necessary but insufficient to explain musical understanding. 43 Schutz (1996), p. 247 44 See ex. Schutz (1996), p. 244 42

responses within listeners. Somehow something appears to be going on in music, even if it’s not formally represented. This has caused great puzzles about the nature of music45. Over and all music is something that happens in the world. And so does music perception. And even though music perception to some degree involves hidden processes, e.g. things happening in our brain and auditory system, it does not follow that all parts of the process of music perception are equally as “invisible”. Music perception is more than sub personal physiological processes. It also involves using music, doing things with it in the world; organizing our environments, establishing social relationships, constructing our emotional response to music by listening in different contexts, etc. I will return to the elaboration of these claims later. I will first of all sum up the phenomenological listening experience. I have worked to show some (but certainly not all) of the difficulties related to focusing on the listening experience. Listening to music within the frames of phenomenology ascribes the listener the task of sensitively engagement in a given piece of music. Music can be perceived in various instances, and it is likewise used in various settings. We are in many ways surrounded by music; we hear music when we buy groceries, when we watch a movie, at social gatherings, etc. We often move in and out of our everyday listening experiences, giving music more or less attention. But the listening experience that is in focus here is the kind of deeply engagement with the music. I will here on use the term “deep listening”46 to frame this concentrated engagement in a given piece of music. We will shortly investigate the character of such deep listening episodes by scrutinizing aesthetic perception. I must first of all emphasize that the mode of deep listening not is to be confused with the traditional conception of music as belonging to a privileged crowd, an elite activity reserved for the few. On the contrary, deep listening is a sort of listening mode attainable to people cross culturally and independent of status. It will now be necessary to verify the

In the section “Music and Emotions”, I will elaborate the complexity of emotional responding to music by outlining two different positions within the field, besides my own. 46 Becker (2004), p. 2 21

claim of engagement in the musical experience. This will be done by taking a closer look at the concept of perception that I embrace.

Active perception Listening to music is a dynamic process involving the active subject. This claim appears to be trivial, but a closer look reveals a different perspective. Many authorities within the area of philosophy of music represent another view on the listening experience, namely that of conceiving the listener as a passive recipient of the musical elements. Besides, there seems to be tendencies towards placing this passive listening experience in the frames of a privileged situation, for example a concert hall or a solitary musical reception in the armchair at home47. Music, in this view, is a matter of careful intake of the musical structures, reserved for the privileged. I find this view on the listening experience phenomenological inaccurate and suggest a diverging point of view that both disclaims the passivity and the privileged status as characteristics of the listening experience. The first step in such a renouncement is the acceptance of the fact that music is everywhere. Music is not reserved to a certain group of people but surrounds us in our everyday life. In fact, music’s ubiquity demands great efforts to establish a space out of reach of musical intrusion. Thus, a thorough examination of the social structures of music will be vital. The social dimension will be put aside, though, and instead I will concentrate on the next step, which is a closer look at the notion of perception. Please note that the term “perception” often implicitly is restricted to reveal visual meaning 48. It is important to be aware of the concepts connotations regarding the primacy of vision, and to emphasize that my use of “perception” is founded on the broad sense of the term, meaning “perception” as becoming aware of something via the senses49. Perception embraces our openness to the world and in this sense perception is a capacity to be aware of and track things happening in the world. My goal is illuminate the active aspect of perception and thereby implement this on 47

Christopher Small disagree with this passive listening-position, but nevertheless gives a good description of the issues at stake in his discussion of concert hall culture, see Small (1998), pp. 39ff. 48 Ihde (2007), p. 8 49 See Webster’s definition of “Perception”. On further elaboration on the notion of perception; http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/ 22

the active role the listener plays in constructing her musical experience. After the justification of a dynamic perception concept, I will turn my focus towards the body and take a closer look at its influences on active perception.

Aesthetic perception First of all I will give attention to the notion of perception. I do not aim at a thorough examination of the perception concept. Such a project reaches far beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I seek an understanding of perception in relation to my overall project, namely to clarify those implications perception holds in context of the experience of listening to music. I will therefore primarily be concerned with aesthetic perception, which is uniquely reserved to aesthetic objects. In contrast, “normal” or brute perception covers our ordinary everyday encounter with sensory objects 50. The distinction between aesthetic and brute perception finds its origin in an attempt to narrow my focus and must therefore not be conceived of as any kind of value attribution in favor of either of the two areas of perception. Neither must the focus on aesthetic perception be put together with the above mentioned idea of a separation between the crowd and the privileged. In my point of view, aesthetic perception encapsulates the aesthetic object, but these are deeply rooted and inseparable of our surrounding world and our lives. Music, the present area of interest, is such an integrated part of our lives that one could argue that it is meaningless to separate the perception of music from our other everyday encountering objects. My response to such an objection would partly be of theoretical concerns. Using the term “aesthetic perception” enables me to distinguish between the two kinds of perception. It allows me to center on the specific mode of the deep listening – to illustrate the particular listening episodes that I wish to investigate. But this leads me to the other part of my response, namely that of the necessity of such a division. Generally speaking, every object including natural objects and works of art can be conceived as an object existing for a

Edward S. Casey: Translator’s foreword in Dufrenne (1953/1973), p. xxv. 23

consciousness51. The difference between the natural object and a work of art is that a work of art both can be considered as ordinary things existing among other things, and at the same time it can be the object of an aesthetic perception;

[…] the work of art can be considered as an ordinary thing, that is, as the object of a perception and a thought which distinguish it from other things without according it special treatment. But the work of art can, in addition, be the object of an aesthetic perception, the only kind of perception which does it justice.52

The aesthetic perception differs from ordinary perception in terms of the object that is being perceived. The aesthetic object has a twofold character. At one hand it exists autonomously among other objects, as an object in-it-self. But at the other hand, the aesthetic object necessarily depends upon fulfillment within the sphere of a perceiving subject;

[…] it is essential to an aesthetic object that it embody its own norm – not a norm which our thinking or taste imposes on it, but one which it imposes on itself or which its creator has imposed on it […] The norm of the aesthetic object is its will to the absolute. And to the extent that the aesthetic object proclaims and attains this norm, the object itself becomes in turn a norm for aesthetic perception. Thus the aesthetic object assigns to aesthetic perception the task of approaching the work of art without any prejudice, of giving it as much credit as possible, of placing it in a position to furnish the proof of its being.53

It is thereby only the perceiving subject that can complete the aesthetic objects being. But it is not sufficient merely to perceive the given aesthetic object. The emphasis on aesthetic perception is crucial for such a fulfillment. One can imagine a non-aesthetic perception of an aesthetic object that surely recognizes the existence of the aesthetic object without truly

Dufrenne (1953/1973); “Nothing enjoys an existence which would free it from the obligation to be present to a consciousness (even if only a virtual one) in order to be recognized as a thing”, p. lxv. 52 Dufrenne (1953/1973), p. lxv. 53 Dufrenne (1953/1973), p. lxii. 24

apprehending or appreciating it54. But in order to furnish the proof of the aesthetic objects being, as Dufrenne puts it, the perceiver need to assume a dedicated attitude towards the given aesthetic object, in order to attain the beneficial outcome of the aesthetic experience55. The perceiver must, in other words, not merely recognize the existence of the aesthetic object, but rather, the perceiver must engage actively in the perception of the aesthetic object. It is due to these conditions that the differentiation between perception and aesthetic perception is called for. Another objection must be noted. By speaking of respectively work of art and aesthetic object, I do not thereby mean to implement a platonic approach the phenomenon of art. Put differently, I do not conceive either the work of art or the aesthetic object as an ideal entity that is manifested through a real appearance of any kind. In so far I agree with Dufrenne, who seems to be aware of the problems concerning such a division, when he says;

Aesthetic object and work of art are distinct in that aesthetic perception must be joined to the work of art in order for the aesthetic object to appear. However, this does not mean that the work of art is real and the aesthetic object ideal, as if the former existed as a thing in the world and the latter as a representation or signification in consciousness.56

All objects can, as mentioned, be considered as objects existing for a consciousness. This also applies to both the work of art and the aesthetic object, they both exists as objects for a consciousness. The difference consists in the fact that whereas the work of art possesses the possibility of existence at the level of other things in the world, the aesthetic object is on the other hand truly dependent on the dedicated perceiving subject. But this dependency must not be misunderstood. To some extent, all objects are dependent on perceiving subjects. If we engage in a discussion about dependent and independent objects, we fall back into the arms of idealism. I will therefore approach the differentiation between work of art and aesthetic object from another angle, and determine that the difference 54

Dufrenne (1953/1973), p. lxvi It is precisely this dedicated attitude that is characteristic of the above mentioned notion of deep listening. I will return to this in the section â&#x20AC;&#x153;Music as an Active Doingâ&#x20AC;?. 56 Dufrenne (1953/1973), p. lxv 55

consists in the perception of the two. Whereas the perception of a work of art can result merely in the perceivers paying attention to the given product, it can also implement what we characterized as an aesthetic perception, if the perceiving subject is willing to approach the phenomenon openly and dedicated. Thus, work of art and aesthetic object do not differ from an outer perspective, but it is on the contrary the perceiverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s engagement that determines the difference. It is precisely because of the engaging role of the perceiving subject that I found the distinction between work of art and aesthetic object useful. I will now elaborate the claim that the aesthetic perception calls for a dynamic and engaging attitude from the perceiving subject. But I must point out that both aesthetic and brute perception deserves equal attention, but for the sake of clarity, mine will be centered on aesthetic perception.

Enaction & Mindfulness In order to establish an understanding of perception as a dynamic and active process, I will need a more general approach to the notion of perception, before narrowing down to the implications this has in the case of aesthetic perception, in particular with respect to music. As indicated, perception in a broad sense is an overwhelming field of investigation and far too ambitious for my project. I will therefore in the following only focus on fragments within this enormous area, fragments that require special attention due to my overall project. Initially I do feel, though, that it is necessary to give a somewhat superficial outline of the traditional concept of perception. This outline will serve as a context in which I will differentiate another concept of perception, namely that of enaction. The classical way of approaching perception is characterized by the opinion that the external, objective world somehow imprints representations of the things existing within

this world onto the subject through perception57. These traditional approaches do, in other words, conceive perception as a passive reception of outer existing objects. These objects are received by the subject either through a representational scheme or through some kind of interpretation or (re-)construction somewhere in the brain58. The idea that perception in this way reveals the external world is strongly dependent on the assumption that the existence of the objective world is independent of the perceiving subject. This will be the typical objectivist claim, mainly belonging to the scientific viewpoint. Another position is that of the subjectivistic (or idealistic, if you will) approach, which very roughly speaking can be determined as an opposite of the objectivistic position, claiming that the true foundation of perceiving the world depends on the subject. Traditionally, we thereby acknowledges two different approaches to the fundamental aspect of perception, though both somewhat endorse a similar view on perception understood as representation (this representation can either be of representing outer existing objects or an internal creation build upon the subjects own interpretation). Recently, new research within especially cognitive science has challenged this traditional view on perception, pointing out that we have an alternative to the classical dichotomy between the objective and subjective approach. The alternative consists in a middle way between the two positions, one that unites the peripheral positions by emphasizing their mutual relationship;

In contrast, the challenge posed to cognitive science is to question one of the more entrenched assumptions of our scientific heritage – that the world is independent of the knower. If we are forced to admit that cognition cannot be properly understood without common sense, and that common sense is none other than our bodily and social history, then the inevitable conclusion is that the knower and

A good example of such a classical approach can be found in what Noë determines the snapshot-view. According to this view, experience (visual) represents the world as pictures do, through an internal representation of outer input. See Noë (2004b), p. 9 58 Varela et al. deals with different aspects and positions throughout The Embodied Mind but the essential issue in this context is the insufficiency of these theories; “*…+ having discovered the groundlessness of the self, we turn toward the world, we are no longer sure we can find it *…+”, p. 130 27

known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent coorigination.59

One of the pioneers of the new notion of perception appears in The Embodied Mind by Varela, Thompson and Rosch60. This book gave birth to an alternative concept of perception, one founded on the roots of the phenomenological tradition61;

We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs.62

The idea is that instead of conceiving perception as a passive registration of the external world, Varela et al. proposes an active approach to perception and thereby opens the possibility of a dynamic understanding of the process of perception and of experience in general. According to the enactment position the classical schism between the external world and the subjective perceiver can be circumvented by choosing a middle way. This middle way is inspired by the Buddhist concept of mindfulness63;

Mindfulness means that the mind is present in embodied everyday experience; mindfulness techniques are designed to lead the mind back from its theories and preoccupations, back from the abstract attitude, to the situation of one’s own experience itself.64

In everyday life we are commonly endowed with habitually actions and combined with a stressful way of living, it seems fair to argue that we usually are quite distanced from our 59

Varela et al. (1991), p. 150 Varela et al. (1991) 61 I will not go further into the details of the phenomenological legacy. In the following section on embodiment, we will get a clear understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s influence on the enactive view. Throughout their book, Varela et al. acknowledges the phenomenological heritage, see ex. the introduction, where Merleau-Ponty is mentioned as having ”both inspired and guided our orientation here”. Varela et al. (1991), p. xv. 62 Varela et al. (1991), p. 9 63 Other very interesting concepts such as groundlessness, emptiness and compassion find its origin in the Buddhist tradition, but I will have to refer to The Embodied Mind for a further elaboration of these in relation to the enactive approach. 64 Varela et al. (1991), p. 22 60

selves. Mindfulness allows the mind to be present in embodied65 everyday experience. This mindfulness, also termed awareness, enables the subject to achieve awareness not only about its own actions and punctual self but because these relations only reveal themselves in relation to the other, the subject is potentially able to grasp a surrounding world66. Mindfulness is, in other words, a practical ability to achieve an unbiased attention of present perceptions. Mindfulness is not a matter of intellectual capacity. Rather, mindfulness is an alert participation in the ongoing process of living. The person performing mindfulness is thereby both an observer and the very source of the perceptions that originate from this awareness67;

We are both the mind and the observer of the mind. Therefore, chasing away or dwelling on any thought isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t the important thing. The important thing is to be aware of the thought. This observation is not an objectification of the mind. It does not establish distinction between subject and object. Mind does not grab on to mind; mind does not push mind away. Mind can only observe itself. This observation isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t an observation of some object outside and independent of the observer.68

In this sense mindfulness can be combined with the above mentioned aesthetic perception. As determined, aesthetic perception calls for a dynamic and engaging attitude from the perceiving subject. This attitude seems quite similar to the awareness called for within mindfulness. The only conspicuous difference is apparently that whereas mindfulness has a great field of potential perceptions, aesthetic perception is narrowed down a more specific field of interest. Aesthetic perception thereby looses the multiplicity and openness of mindfulness. Nevertheless, I find it fertile to combine the two notions not only because of their similarities but also because mindfulness contributes with a more profound understanding of the perceiving subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s active and engaging role within aesthetic 65

Not to complicate matters more than necessary, I have chosen to postpone the treatment of embodiment. This is, however, not doing justice to the conception of the enactive approach, which is why I find it urgent to indicate the strong connection between embodiment and an active approach to perception. Just how interwoven these are will become evident in the next section on embodiment. 66 Varela et al. (1991), p. 246 67 For a more profound examination of mindfulness see ex. http://www.buddhanet.net/budsas/ebud/mfneng/mind0.htm (especially chapter 13 and 14), Wallace (2006) and Hahn (1975/2008) 68 Hahn (1975/2008), p. 40 29

perception. This active and engaging attitude is equally applicable to the specific listening episodes I wish to focus on, namely what I have termed deep listening. I will shortly develop this claim thoroughly69. The enactive approach to perception does not necessarily involve the Buddhist notion of mindfulness70. But in my opinion it not only illuminates my approach to the musical experience, it also clarify the active component of perception in general. Making use of mindfulness in relation to the enactive claim is a way of emphasizing the subject’s role of actively engagement with the surrounding world. I must call attention to the fact that this by no means imply that we commonly perceive in a unaware, passive, manner and it is only through establishing mindfulness that we achieve the active component in perception. On the contrary, this active component is an integrated part of our way of perceiving. Practicing mindfulness is merely a practical illustration of this, but not a necessary condition. Since practicing mindfulness reveals the present in a non-judgmental, impartial and nonconceptual manner we are disclosed with a pure experience of topicality, an experience that reaches beyond the self. We have now returned to the above mentioned middle way between the classical schism subject-object. Mindfulness is, in all its simplicity, a way of paying close attention to the ebb and flow of our experiences and in particular being attuned to the deep integration between our embodied actions and the world in which we act. Practicing mindfulness will make us realize that our actions are dependently conditioned by the many contexts in which they occur and that these contexts at the same time are organized and structured by our patterns of embodied action. In this sense (embodied) mind and world are interwoven in such a profound manner that it seems impossible to try to separate the two. Embodied actions creates (i.e. enacts) a world which

Cf. “Music as an Active Doing”. In fact, it would perhaps be more appropriate to focus on Nöe’s approach to enactive perception as he places the body as a whole at the center of perceptual experience, whereas Varela et al. seems to approach the phenomenon from a somewhat more general and cognitive position. But I have, in order to draw out the notion of mindfulness, found my focus in the general approach and continuously supplemented it with Nöe’s enactivism. 70

in turn redounds back upon and shapes (i.e. creates, enacts) an embodied mind. The relation mind â&#x20AC;&#x201C; world is thus one of reciprocal engagement, and not ontological separable. The dichotomy subject - object is thereby overcome. Neither the self nor the world is a stable pregiven condition, in which we can find our point of departure. In contrast, the subject are left free of any kind of foundational aspects and must therefore actively engage in the correlation to the surrounding world and its inhabitants. The priority of either the external world or the perceiving subject recedes into the background, and we find ourselves occupied with the fact that we are actively engaged in the surrounding world;

On one way, we reflect on that world as a domain of facts and states of affairs. On the other, we reflect on the world as a domain for active exploration. The dual-aspect of experience is mirrored, then, in two ways of thinking about the world. Phenomenology, then, aims at the second way.71

The enactive view implies that experience is considered as an active process of exploring, manipulating and engaging with our environment. The individual is closely connected in its autonomous ability to act and to perceive the surrounding world72. The external world and the subject are inseparable connected. We have direct access to the world and the things in it, and these (the things in the world) are the content of our experience. We discover, in other words, the strong connection between mind and world, a discovery that finds its origin through active involvement from the perceiving subject. But this implies that perception is not only embedded in the external world, it is also embodied;

[â&#x20AC;Ś] knowledge is the result of an ongoing interpretation that emerges from our capacities of understanding. These capacities are rooted in the structures of our biological embodiment but are lived and experienced within a domain of consensual action and cultural history. 73

NoĂŤ (no date available), p. 6 This link between agency and perception consist according to Varela et al. in what they term the self modifying process, Varela et al. (1991), p. 139. 73 Varela et al. (1991), p. 149 72

As stated previously, the enactive account of perception finds its origin in disapproval with the classical concept of perception. Phenomenological speaking, the enactive view seems much more attractive, as it not only appears more eloquent with our common understanding but also because it offers a plausible way out of the traditional subjectobject schism. By situating the perceiving subject as both embodied and embedded within an (existing) world, perception is not just a matter of “taking notice of something”, but it also contributes to the enactment of the surrounding world. The classical division between the subject and object fades out and is replaced by a reciprocal specification between the organism and the environment74. We will now take a closer look at the role of the body within this enactive approach to experience.

Embodiment In the above paragraph I have sought verification for the claim that perception is a matter of actively engaging with the surrounding environment. I therefore subsequently promised to imply the findings of the enactive approach to the general area of aesthetic perception and more specifically to the area of music. But before fulfilling this promise I will need to take yet another detour in order to clarify the implications of embodiment in relation to enaction. The necessity of such a clarification will appear obvious at a later time, and I therefore appeal to you’re patiently awaitments for the return of music. I may be walking down the path of generalization, but as in the discussion of perception I similarly do not aim at a thorough examination of the concept “embodiment”. My intentions are far more humble, and I merely wish to highlight some important aspects of embodiment in the context of the enactive approach to perception. In some sense it is a bit peculiar to separate embodiment and enaction, given their mutual interwoven character. In fact, it can be argued that they stand in an interdependent relation to each other. I do endorse this somewhat inseparable structure, but nevertheless, I feel obliged to give an

Varela et al. (1991), p. 174 32

account for each of these concepts in order to fully understand their interdependency. Another gain by such a strategy appears to be a greater understanding of each of the concepts at stake here, a feel of their own significance, so to speak. Besides, as we will later discover, these aspects will not only be of relevancy in the case of enaction, when we return to music we will discover the valuable insights of embodiment. When speaking of embodiment it seems inevitable to refer to Merleau-Ponty. He was one of the first to put emphasis on the importance of the body. In approaching perception, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes this importance by situating the body as the very subject of perception;

But by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also rediscover ourself, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and, as it were, the subject of perception.75

My body is the primary cause of my possibility to perceive the world, to engage with and achieve understanding of the surrounding world. This is not merely to say that all subjects have a body, nor is it to stress the dependency on certain bodily features. The point is, rather, that when considering human individuals as perceiving acting subjects, as agents, an essential aspect of the subjectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s manner of being is that of an embodied agent. The subject is, in other words, essentially an embodied agent76. We are all placed in and a part of the world and our body is the center of this relationship. The body is not merely a shelter of my consciousness. On the contrary, my body is the very foundation of all my experiences. This claim requires further elaboration. We earlier recognized the fact that we are situated within the world77. The existence of the world is not a matter of interest here, since the position/stand of the existence of the real already is made up before entering this analysis78. So, we are situated within a world, a world that we take in and engage with

Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 239 Taylor (1989/1990), p. 3 77 Merleau-Ponty(1945/2009), p. xv 78 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. xviii. 76

through perception79. Perception thereby becomes a basic condition for experiencing the world, even a basic condition for having a world in the first place;

This [perception] is basic, first, because it is always there; I am always open to the world in this way […] And secondly, perception is basic because it is the foundation of all the other ways of having a world.80

Though perception as such provides an elementary condition for the possibility of interaction with the surrounding world, perception alone does not do the job. I always necessarily perceive the world from my point of view, from where I am, via my senses. Perception is thereby generated by the individual’s background, by her previous experience and by her capacity to move around in it81. In order to fully understand the claim of this essentially embodied agency, we must take a closer look at Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body schema. First we must acknowledge, though, the occurrence of a conceptual ambiguity encumbered within the notion of body schema. As Gallagher remarks, the English translation of Phenomenology of Perception confuses the translation of “schema corporel” with body image82. Gallagher thereby concludes that Merleau-Ponty himself adapts this ambiguity as he does not explicit explain the difference between body schema and body image. But as Taylor Carman points out, Merleau-Ponty inherits his terminology from Henry Head, who explicitly distinguishes between these two concepts83. I therefore feel confident in assuming that Merleau-Ponty’s schema corporel coves the English notion of body schema and this assumption will be maintained throughout the following discussion.

“The world is what we perceive” as Merleau-Ponty puts it, Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. xviii Taylor (1989/1990), p. 3. Taylor puts aside mystical experiences, which “claim to open us to a reality beyond the world”. However interesting these mystical experiences might be in relation to our musical experience, I have unfortunately not found it possible to elaborate this. 81 Taylor (1989/1990), p. 6. This background knowledge is by Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), pp. 157-158 described as an individual’s intentional arc. This notion will be examined further in the section entitled “Intentional Arc”. 82 Gallagher (2005), p. 20. I do not intend to develop a further analysis of the concept of body image, just point out that it according to Gallagher covers the system of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. Body schema, in contrast, consists of a system of sensori-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual maintaining, ibid. p. 24 83 Carman (1999), p. 218. Carman also provides an interesting connection to the Kantian legacy, where the notion of schematism provides Kant with a link between the category and the intuition, ibid. pp. 217-218 80

Merleau-Ponty uses the concept of body schema to capture the issues at stake in relation to our interaction with the world84. The body schema as such encloses the set of integrated skills that entails a readiness to anticipate and incorporate the surrounding world prior to any form of intellectual involvement, e.g. application of concepts or formation of thoughts and judgments85. Merleau-Ponty also denotes this integrated readiness as habit and determines that habit manifests itself in the perceptual body; “it is the body that “understands” in the acquisition of habit”86. Habit is thereby not to be interpreted as either intellectual knowledge or involuntary action, but rather as an underling open system of potentialities in regard to the access to the world;

This is because the normal subject has his body not only as a system of present positions, but besides, and thereby, as an open system of an infinite number of equivalent positions directed to other ends. What we have called the body schema is precisely this system of equivalents, this immediately given invariant whereby the different motor tasks are instantaneously transferable. It follows that it is not only an experience of my body, but an experience of my body-in-the-world […]87

We do not only have a feel of our own body but also of our body as situated within a world. Embodiment is always given, experientially, as embedded embodiment (i.e. as a body situated in the world). The body is thereby to be understood as a field of potential action, as a potential capacity to move around, examine and take in the world88. The above mentioned basic structure of perception is initiated by this very capacity to engage with the world. We can determine that the primacy of perception is dependent on the embodied agency and vice versa. We cannot navigate in the world without perception, and we cannot perceive without being essentially embodied agents. But an important aspect is still missing. This reciprocal structure of perception and embodiment can only be maintained if 84

According to Gallagher, the body schema is traditionally believed to be a product of development but recently this view has been contrasted by research claiming that a primitive and primary sense of embodied self is operative from the very start of life. These are not issues that will be pursued further, but I do endorse this innate character of embodiment and the following will assume this position. For further discussion on the matter, see Gallagher (2005), pp. 66-78 85 Carman (1999), p. 219 86 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 167 and Carman (1999), p. 219 87 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), pp. 163-164 88 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 121 & Taylor (1989/1990), pp. 3-6 35

the agent possesses a sense of herself as an embodied agent. We have to hold some sort of self knowledge that reveals the bodily field of potential action, we have to be not only aware of our own embodiment but also embrace some kind of capacity to navigate, without being engulfed by the initiation of bodily movement. Body schema is this very capacity. On a practical level, the body schema enables us to interact and navigate throughout our surroundings. On a theoretical level, the notion of body schema provides us with the possibility to interpret the body as the intermediary between consciousness and the things in the world89. The implications of the body schema inevitably supply us with not only a sense of our body (subject body) but also a sense of our body-in-the world (object body). To move one’s body is to aim at things through it, to “respond to their call”90 and given the bodily sense of being situated within a world, we can thereby determine that the body is our fundamental access to the world;

Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge; it provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a “praktognosia” [practical knowledge], which has to be recognized as original and perhaps primary. My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my “symbolic” or “objectifying function”.91

Another important notion must be introduced in order to fully understand this bodily experience of movement. The body schema as such is responsible for maintaining posture, balance and governing movement. The body schema feeds on information obtained by proprioception92, which is a subtle, but ubiquitous form of self-experience. Proprioception is the sense of always knowing where my limbs are positioned in space, I do not have to reflect upon it and it is thereby an automatic property. Because I have this intimate bodily self-acquaintance at every moment, a felt understanding of where my body is at and what it is doing, the body is an ever present frame through which the world is given to me. This felt experience of embodiment will always be given as the center through which I experience my world. The body image, on the contrary, is a more articulated form of bodily self89

More of this at the end of this section Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 161 91 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 162 92 Gallagher (2005), p. 43 90

knowledge. The body image is, in other words, a reflected image of my own body, for example thinking that I am fat or that someone is staring at me. But this reflective, conceptually-developed sense of my body rests on the primitive findings of the body schema93. Our essential embodied agency can thereby be considered as a twofold character containing not only a personal sense of myself as an embodied agent but also a sense of my body as an object among other objects in the world (subject body versus object body). This twofold structure is also applicable to perception, in that the activity of perception in one way is a matter of taking my view on reality. On the other hand perception is also prepersonal, a matter of inescapable being within a world94. We do in some regards master our perspectives on the world, but in the end we can never escape the continuing situatedness in the world. To sum up, we are essential embodied agents who actively engage and perceive the surrounding world. We know the world through our capacity to move around in it. But in order to obtain this openness to the world, I necessarily need some kind of self-awareness, I need to have a feel of my stance among things, otherwise I will lose orientation95. The notions of body schema and proprioception cover this intimate self-awareness, this prereflective feel of our own body and its capacity to move around in the world. It is precisely this pre-reflective self-awareness that offers a way out of the traditional schism between the subjective and the objective96. The body is, according to MerleauPonty, both a lived subject, i.e. the body is a felt phenomenal perspective on the world. But at the same time, the body is also an object situated alongside other objects in the world. Our bodily existence is thus a constant negotiation of these two kinds of embodiment. Gibson seems to contribute to the dissolution of the schism by summiting the pointlessness of such a division. It is merely a matter of point of view; 93

Gallagher (2005), p. 24 Taylor (1989/1990), p. 10 95 Taylor (1989/1990), p. 6 96 Carman (1999), p. 206 94

The supposedly separate realms of the subjective and the objective are actually only poles of attention. The dualism of observer and environment is unnecessary. The information for the perception of “here” is of the same kind as the information of “there”, and a continuous layout of surfaces extends from one to the other.97

We have now reached an understanding of the interwoven character of embodiment and perception. Merleau-Ponty proposes a way of thinking about the body and the (embodied) mind – world relation that suggests a way around the classical schism. We will now, equipped with this theoretical fundament, return to the analysis of music.

Gibson (1979/1986), p. 116 38

On the scent of music We are now finally ready to return to music. I will in the following seek an understanding of the preceding theoretical elucidations in relation to music. This will not be a strict chronological account, though. The only chronology I am aiming at is my own. In other words, I will work to show my examination of music in relation to the above mentioned theoretical foundation. I must therefore emphasis that the following analysis of music originates from my point of view, from what I find important in my understanding of music. First of all, I will return to an initial inquiry, raised in the beginning of the thesis, namely that of the emotional qualities of music. This is an often neglected area of interest within the field of music, probably due to the fact that emotions in relation to music is a exceedingly complicated matter and besides, it has been considered as a second degree derivative compared to the primary target within the investigation of musical influence;

[…]listening has been tackled in a predominantly structuralist fashion: It has been widely assumed that the primary aim must be to investigate the kinds of abstract tonal, metric, grouping, melodic, and timbral structures that people accumulate as they listen *…+ as well as the more dynamic processes to which these structures give rise.98

The fact is that we do get emotionally moved by music. Many musical consumers will in all probability ascribe this emotionally affect as an enhancement of the musical experience. But at the same time, we cannot determine exactly why we do get emotionally moved by music. As mentioned introductory, music is considered as a non-representational art99. Music cannot represent moods, states of affair or events in a way that other art forms can. But still, music elicits profound emotional impact on listeners, so something must be going on, even though it is not formally represented. This “something” will serve as my point of departure into the puzzling field of music.

98 99

Clarke (2003), p. 116 Cf. “The Phenomenological Listening Experience”. 39

Music and emotions How do we get emotionally moved by a piece of music? This is a quite complicated question. The matter of even determining what an emotion is is itself an extremely complicated problem. The fact is that there is no unambiguous answer; we cannot precisely say what an emotion is. There is, scientifically speaking, no agreement upon what an emotion is100. I will nevertheless try to give an explanation of what it indicates when we say that we are emotionally affected by a given piece of music. There seems to be agreement to the fact that we do get emotionally moved by particular music. This is a rather perplexing aspect of music. As mentioned, music is a nonrepresentational form of art that nonetheless arouses different emotional responses in the listener. But whether these emotions are an intrinsic element of the music, a purely subjective response, a cultural product/condition, or perhaps somewhere in between, is a conflicting issue. To begin with, I will put the discussion of musical emotion’s ownership aside and turn to the field of neuroscience to clarify their position on the subject. In the end, nobody can possibly disagree with the fact that emotions somehow are related to the perceiving subject. Research indicates that our musical perception involves a considerably large amount of neural networks shredded throughout the brain. In fact, a discovery within neurobiology back in the 1970s shows connections between sound perception and the cerebellum part of the brain. This means that the inner ear not only distributes all received information to the auditory cortex as previously believed, but besides directly involves the cerebellum101. Normally the cerebellum is considered as the part of the brain dealing with timing and movements. But in 2003, Schmahmann discovered a close connection between the

100

Levitin (2006/2008), p. 182. Damasio claims that the term “emotion” should be applied to the autonomic arousal of specific cortical and sub-cortical structures, and that “feeling” which generally follows emotion should be applied to the complex cognitive, culturally inflected, and secondary interpretation of emotion, Damasio (1999), p. 42, also quoted in Becker (2004), p. 47. I endorse this conceptional distinction. 101 Levitin (2006/2008), p. 184 40

cerebellum and emotions specifying the cerebellumâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s involvement in emotions 102. This is interesting in the case of music as this discovery gives us a plausible explanation of the emotional arousing. We can scientifically detect the musical influence (though somewhat blurred) and gain evidence for the intuitive claim that music convey emotional responses from the perceiving subject. The issues at stake are according to Daniel Levitin similar to the ones at stake in concern of language;

Music appears to mimic some of the features of language and to convey some of the same emotions that vocal communication does, but in a nonreferential, and nonspecific way. It also invokes some of the same neural regions that language does, but far more than language, music taps into the primitive brain structures involved with motivation, reward, and emotion103

The parallel to language is, as mentioned, a risky business. Non-musical elements (such as lyrics) potentially possess novel representational content and it is therefore important to carefully distinguish between music and language. Nevertheless, the above quote from Levitin serves its purpose by emphasizing the difference between the two. The question remains of the source of the emotional reaction to a particular musical piece. As alluded, I find it implausible that the respective emotional response should originate from anything else than the perceiving subject. But the relation between music and the arising emotion remains unsolved. Is the cause to be found within the structure of music or perhaps as a mental construction based on the stimulus received by the music? In other words, is the musical affect attributed to the perceiving subject or is it rather an immanent quality? These are two prominent positions within the area of emotional responding to music. I think the truth lies somewhere in between, and I will briefly sketch out the two positions in order to clarify my own. The first position â&#x20AC;&#x201C;that music evokes emotions on the basis of its structure- is commonly known as the formalistic approach. Peter Kivy, a great authority within philosophy of 102 103

Levitin (2006/2008), p. 175 Levitin (2006/2008), p. 191 41

music, is advocating what he labels enhanced formalism. Enhanced formalism is a refinement of traditional formalism defended by ex. Kant and Gurney104. According to Kivy, we do in fact get emotionally moved by music, e.g. music possesses emotive properties. These emotive properties exist within the musical syntax itself, they are embedded within the general structure of a particular piece of music;

In other words, the emotive properties of music, like such other properties as turbulence, or tranquility, or its being major at one point, minor at another, or simply that it has one kind of melody here, and another kind next, can be explained, initially, in terms of the simplest facts of musical structure: that is sonic patterns, and that patterns consist in repetition and contrast.105

The emotive properties are in the music, not in the listener 106. The listener is emotionally moved by a piece of music when recognizing these aspects within the sonic pattern of the particular piece. The emotional qualities are neither semantic content nor dispositional properties, but rather things happening in the music and that the listener hears happening there107. One of the immense troubles related to Kivyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s enhanced formalism is the incapacity to match this approach to the important role context plays in shaping the character and content of individual listening episodes. In fact, Kivyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s account fails to recognize the unique autonomous position the listener holds in shaping her own individual listening experience108. I will return to these deficiencies later when illustrating my own view on the matter, but let us first turn to the alternative position to see if it offers a more comprehensive perspective. The second position considers the emotive response evoked by music as a mental phenomenon. This is a field of diversity but I have chosen one representative for the overall 104

Very roughly put, traditional formalism argues that music is pure sound structure without representational or semantic content, Kivy (2002), p. 68 105 Kivy (2002), p. 91 106 Kivy (2002), pp. 95-96 107 Kivy (2002), p. 95. Besides see Krueger (2009), p. 106 108 Krueger (2009), pp. 107-116 42

approach to the connection between music and emotions. But please note that my selected delegate not necessarily frames the general arguments within this area. In fact, the emotional responding to music appears to be only a small part of his examination of music. But for the sake of simplicity and philosophical economy my focus finds its origin in Harold Fiske and his stand. In contrast to Kivy, Fiske points out that musical understanding solely is the outcome of the listeners own mental processing. Understanding music is thereby a product of an individual mental construction process, requiring both cognitive time and effort109. Music is not out there, it is not an independently existing entity, but rather an internal pattern construction on the basis of an on-going anticipation in the temporal experience of the flow of information;

Owing partly to how sound is produced and transmitted and partly to the limitations of the narrow perceptual field, the perceived shape of music can only be an outcome of a construction (not reconstruction or ”copy”) calculated on the part of neural network mechanisms from the flow of information extracted from the “now”[…] What it seems we do is: identify relevant cues, piece the cues together into patterns that can be retained (in echoic memory) long enough for brain mechanisms to examine and create the sense that we can “look” at music by invoking principles borrowed from vision, and then creating the impression of an auditory “object”. The “object” seems complete and multidimensioned but is, however, only remotely related to what we hear during the slit-like limitations of the perceptual “now”. 110

Music is perceived as an on-going temporal experience. Music does not stand still long enough to be a shape. Nevertheless we do experience musical shapes but these does not exist independent of time111. Rather, musical shapes has its origin within the brains 109

Fiske (2008), pp. 25-26. I failed to find any explanations of the term “musical understanding” in Fiske’s work. I therefore choose to interpret musical understanding in my own terms, namely as the experience of recognizing organized pattern of sound as music. I find it plausible that Fiske will endorse this explanation. Support for this claim is ex. found on p. 41: “*…+ pattern realization is prerequisite for musical understanding. Music perception begins with pattern recognition *…+” 110 Fiske (2008), p. 56 111 Fiske (2008), p. 43 43

attempt to construct patterns from incoming acoustic stimulus information. The brain has an underlying need for realized structure and in any kind of perception it is therefore driven by a need to find discernable shape 112. One at the great achievements of Fiske’s account, we will from here on entitle it the mental construction approach, is its capability to expound the active component of the individual listening experience. Listening to music is a matter of actively engaging in the acoustic flow of information. Music perception is an active process based on pattern construction activity113. The listener, in other words, constructs her own listening experience. This is a claim we will return to shortly. But first off all we will take a closer look at how Fiske conceives the emotional aspect in relation to music. Not surprisingly, Fiske ascribes the emotional response as something happening within the listener;

Having ruled out the idea that the connection originates with either the composer or sound object (this rules out performer origin as well obviously), only a single possibility is left: specific expressive reference originates with the listener in response to some life experience affect finding association with some particular realized tonal-rhythmic structure or some multi-structural relationship. Let’s call this reference “appearance value”.114

The so called appearance value is ascribed as belonging to the individual listener; it is solely dependent on the listener’s response to realized tonal-rhythmic content. The appearance value is thereby of no content in itself, but rather a specific extension of the musical process known only by the listener115. Appearance value finds its source in the individuals own life experience, and in this regard, emotional responding to a particular piece of music can be determined as an affect caused by the specific internal frame of reference, reserved for the particular listening individual;

112

Fiske (2008), pp. 40-41 Fiske (2008), p. 86 114 Fiske (1990), p. 125 115 Fiske (1990), p. 126 113

An emotional response to music is genuine and real-life, but its source is synthetic. The source is an association; the result is an appearance of an emotion-laden event. Appearance value is (an important) extra to understood pattern relationships and may, for many, enhance the musical experience. What is clear, however, is that appearance-value is not part of the music itself, it is not embodied in the patterns of their anticipation, or in the sound object. Nor is it entirely appropriate to claim that appearance value is caused by music. Appearance-value is created by the listener in which an affect, based upon the listener’s own life experiences, finds ground with particular musical patterns. 116

The listener is in this mental approach responsible for creating her own listening experience. I find this idea of perceptual composing quite intriguing. We do not just discover music, as seemingly Kivy would argue, but we also create the character of our own musical experience. Nevertheless, I fear that endorsing the full force of Fiske’s argument inevitably would direct us back into the arms of subjectivism. If emotional responding to music is solely a matter of an individual processes on the basis of an internal frame of reference, how can music then ever reach out of the subject and be a shareable entity? Besides, though I am fascinated of the composing aspect of the musical experience, I find this claim as only part of the story, a facet of the bigger picture, so to speak. Music reaches out of the subject; music is not just a question of mental processes. We use music in various settings and in various scenarios in our lives, and the musical experience is strongly dependent on the context in which it appears. In order to demonstrate this claim, I will first of all exemplify a practical case, illustrating this multiplicity of how we use music as an emotional regulator. I will hereafter return to the elaboration of my point of view.

Moodagent - A study case There is a commercial tendency to try to combine people’s commercial interests. Think of Amazon’s success of administrating the consumers’ preferences. They always seem to find irresistible suggestions of new purchases. The Moodagent is one of the most ambitious attempts to connect the emotional aspects in music. The Moodagent is a mobile technical 116

Fiske (1990), p. 129 45

devise, developed to specify music in accordance with the emotional aspects. The Moodagent applies digital signal processing on the sound signal extracted from digital music. The information based on this signal processing is through advanced recognition technology and neural networks employed to extract the emotional aspects of music117. The purpose is to facilitate a similarity of different kinds of music on behalf of the analyzed emotional aspects. The consumers will thereby be capable of constructing individual musical playlists, based on emotional aspects of music. Against a background of indication of emotional value, the consumer is able to choose a particular desired emotional effect of a piece of music. In practice, this is done by regulating five different slider bars on a mobile phone118. If I for example feel angry and wish to hear music with angry connotations, I can turn up the anger indicator and thereby receive a number of different music with aggressive overtones. On the other hand, if I am going out and looking for some music to support or initiate my mood for such an action, I would rather aspire for something energetic and joyful music. Another potential of the Moodagent is the possibility to organize your music collection. Applying the Moodagent to your collection of music enables you to structure your listening episodes according to emotional indicators. It will be possible to construct personalized playlists taking you from one emotional spectrum to another. My intention in this section has been to give a practical example of how we use music in our everyday lives. In the particular case of the Moodagent, it is related to emotional regulation, which is why I found it an illustrative example in this context. I have merely worked to show the general aspects of the Moodagent, a further analysis of how the emotional aspects are established and an encountering of the theoretical foundation, as well as the technical details, would be a welcomed gesture in understanding the potential of this mobile device. But I have achieved my purpose by positioning the Moodagent as a practical example of how we use music as an emotional regulator in our everyday lives.

117 118

For further information of the Moodagent, see www.syntonetic.com/moodagent or www.moodagent.com These slider bars includes sensual, tender, joy, aggressive and tempo. 46

Music as an active doing Despite the intriguing elements in the above mentioned mental construction approach to music, it nevertheless fails to give a comprehensive perspective on the diversity of the musical phenomenon. However prosperous the mental construction approach may appear, it can only supply us with a possible explanation of how an individual conceives music. But it seems fairly unsatisfactory to explain music as an individual experience dependent on invisible brain processes that we fall short in understanding. I wish to illustrate a more nuanced picture of the musical experience by drawing attention to the various settings in which we use music in our everyday lives. Understanding music is not just a matter of detecting the internal influence or the mental construction. This is just a small part of it;

Work in anthropology of the emotions and elsewhere suggests that we can productively focus not on trying to penetrate and pin down hidden internal states but rather on the manner, variably practiced and conceptualized in different contexts, in which people are personally involved in the musical engagements.119

If we restrict ourselves to the area of emotional responding to music, the above mentioned Moodagent provides evidence for our way of using music as an emotional regulator. This manner of regulating emotions goes far beyond the technical boundaries of the Moodagent. The Moodagent is merely a practical example of the conscious adjustment of emotions by the use of music. Such an emotional adjustment can also take place on a more or less unconscious level and can also be more or less involuntary. But I want to take the discussion of musical experience past emotional responses illustrating the multifaceted and ubiquitous character of music. First of all I will return to Fiske and his mental construction paradigm acknowledging his active approach to the musical experience. Though disagreement with the full force of his argument I nevertheless find this active component quite illustrative of the experience of 119

Finnegan (2003), p. 188 47

listening to music. In line with the elucidation of the active component in perception I find this exceedingly applicable to the listening experience; we actively construct, or rather compose the scope of our musical experience. This composition is among other things dependent on the level of our anticipation in the particular musical scenery. In order to get deeply involved in a given piece of music it will require a mode of what previously was termed deep listening120. In deep listening episodes, the listener is intensely involved in listening profoundly and being absorbed by a particular piece of music. This intense involvement or awareness is quite similar to the previously mentioned awareness achieved by mindfulness121. The listener directs his or her undivided attention towards the musical piece in a way that is comparable to the practical achievement of mindfulness. Both of these modes of experience are very active. In deep listening the perceiver is intensely listening, attentive and utterly absorbed. The practicing perceiver of mindfulness is equally attentive and intensely involved in the ebb and flow of his own experiences. Yet, paradoxically, one loses the sense of being a distinct acting subject over and against an independent object (i.e. the music as an object of perception in the case of deep listening or whatever specified object of perception in the case of mindfulness). In both deep listening episodes and mindfulness it seems fair to say that, experientially, the subject-object distinction weakens or is dissolved, the mode of experientially immersion seems to reveal the close coherence between the surrounding world and its inhabitants. To fully grasp the multifaceted character of music, we will have to go past the individual listening experience and enlarge the discussion of musical experience to contain elements reaching beyond the subject. The social dimensions of music are an important aspect that we will return to in the second part of the thesis122. Initially, I have chosen to turn towards perceptual psychology, specifically James J. Gibson’s notion of affordances, to illustrate the far-reaching perspectives of musical experience 123. 120

The notion of deep listening is introduced in “The Phenomenological Listening experience”. Cf. “Enaction & Mindfulness”. 122 As in the case of my separate treatment of active perception versus embodiment, it is not quite fair to make such a clear distinction between the solitary listening experiences versus the social dimension. It will later be evident that music is deeply rooted in our social world. 123 An ecological approach to the listening experience is establishing, based on the theory of affordances. See ex. Clarke (2003), Clarke (2005) or DeNora (2000). 121

Gibson uses the notion of affordances to describe the elements the environment offers the animal;

The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment.124

The affordances of an object in the environment are the uses, functions, or values of that object - In other words the opportunities the given object offers a perceiver. But affordances are not merely dependent on a particular object’s properties; they are at the same time defined relative to the particular perceiver, in that the perceiver interprets the affordances in relation to his respective situation. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “intentional arc” may prove supportive here125. In describing the essentially embodied human nature, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that perception always inevitably is generated by the individual’s previous experiences and capacity to move around in the world. This sort of background knowledge is framed by Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intentional arc, which projects about us our past, future, human setting, physical, ideological and moral situation126. This basic practical orientation capacity is not only connected to the body schema, but equally to the affordances in the environment. We pick up different affordances dependent on our given situation and who we are. This means that the same object offers different affordances, dependent on the perceiver. A wooden chair, for example, affords a termite to eat, while to a human being it affords sitting on (if rest is the desired effect), or perhaps standing on (in order to reach something). The relationship between affordances in the environment and the interceptive animal (we will from here on concentrate on human perceivers) is dialectical. It is neither a relationship 124

Gibson (1979/1986), p. 127 This notion was briefly mentioned in the section of Embodiment and will later be taken up again in “Intentional Arc”. 126 Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), pp. 157-158 125

founded on perceivers imposing needs on an indifferent environment, nor a fixed environment offering strictly delimiting affordances127. On the contrary, the relationship between the environment and the perceiver is of a reciprocal character, where an affordance “implies the complimentarity of the animal and the environment”128. Gibson’s perceptual psychology is also known as the ecological approach to perception129. Central to an ecological view is the idea that perceptual information specifies objects and events in the world, and that perception and action are indissolubly linked 130. All senses obtain information about both the environment and the self, and in this sense exteroception (awareness of the world) and proprioception (awareness of the self in the world) must be complementary131. An understanding of this reciprocity of action and perception provides us with a way around the mental construction paradigm. We are as essentially embodied and embedded agents situated in the world, and we navigate within this very world on the basis of the affordances the environment offers us, and equally on the basis of our specific situation;

Instead of supposing that the brain constructs or computes the objective information from a kaleidoscopic inflow of sensations, we may suppose that the orienting of the organs of perception is governed by the brain so that the whole system of input and output resonates to the external information.132

This resonance or tuning of the perceptual system to the environmental information is, again, an illustration of the reciprocal character between the perceiver and the environment. Perception is a self-tuning process which increases the perceiver’s resonance

127

Clarke (2003), pp. 117-118 Cf. above quote from Gibson (1979/1986), p. 127. Despite my appreciation of DeNora’s Music in Everyday Life, I nevertheless find her interpretation of Gibson’s notion of affordances inaccurate. DeNora claims that; “For Gibson, objects afford things independently of how users appropriate them.”, and she turns elsewhere to find justification for the reciprocity of the environment and the perceiver (DeNora (2000), p. 40). This is, as argued above, an unnecessary and misinterpreted exercise. 129 One of his works are entitled The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Gibson (1979/1986)) 130 Clarke (2003), p. 117 131 Gibson (1979/1986), p. 183 & p. 187 132 Gibson (1966/1968), p. 5 128

with the environment; “In music (and more obviously still in dance) the body resonates with the world”133. Resonance is by no means passive, but on the contrary a highly active, exploratory engagement with the environment134. We do, in other words, act within a world that also acts upon us.

Musical Affordances Applying the ecological approach to the experience of listening to music can be very obliging for the attempt to illustrate the far reaching perspectives of the musical experience. Interpreting music as affordances facilitates the possibility of explaining the range of various listeners’ response to a variety of musical attributes;

The ecological approach to perception offers an alternative view that gives a coherent account of the directness of listeners’ perceptual responses to a variety of environmental attributes, ranging from the spatial location and physical source of musical sounds, to their structural function and cultural and ideological value.135

Music offer an innumerous series of affordances, and different listeners pick up different affordances in accordance with the diversity of their perceptual capacities136. This can be illustrated by music’s interpretive flexibility. A particular piece of music offers a range of musical affordances. These musical affordances are picked up by the perceiver on the basis of not alone his or her perceptual competences but they are besides constituted from the circumstances in which they are used137. Music thus affords a multiplicity that enables different perceiver’s to interpret the very same piece of music in various ways, dependent on perceptual capacities, use and thereby context. I may for example have an experience of a particular piece of music that is attached to the previous setting in which I first heard the

133

Ingold (2000), p. 410. Original italics. Clarke (2005), pp. 18-19 135 Clarke (2005), p. 46 136 Clarke (2005), p. 47 137 DeNora (2000), p. 44 134

given piece of music. This experience might accompany my future re-hearings of that piece, coloring my impression of the particular music. Or it might be replaced and experienced in a new way. Such an example of individual changeability within a particular piece of music can function as an illustration of the multifaceted dimensions of the musical experience. We experience music as offering a variety of affordances, which we actively engage with and make use of in various ways;

The musical context offers a situation in which the listener is surrounded by acoustic information. Designed intentionally for sensory exploration, the musical environment is characterized by the presence of not only harmony and rhythm but also such factors as silence, timbre (instrumentation), dynamic (amplitude), desity, texture, gestural and motivic figures, patterns, and audible processes of accretion and degradation (such as rescendi or ritardandi, the processes of getting louder or slower). These factors are affordances, objective characteristics of the music subjectively discriminated in context. To different listeners, they may suggest attending to the music in particular ways *â&#x20AC;Ś+.138

Music is not just a stimulus that we passively register and incorporates as a pleasant artifact139. On the contrary, understanding music as an affordance-laden structure suggests that music is a dynamic art form, offering us a whole range of potential uses. Musical environments are designed for exploration140. But musical affordances are not merely to be understood as a one way relation between the object (the music) and the perceived opportunities (the subject). Musical affordances emerge through the dynamic interaction between the musical piece (the sounds) and the active listener with the appropriate skills. It is important to stress the individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s influence on the musical experience. Perception (both everyday and aesthetic) is based in reality. Perception is not just a mental affair but a skill learned, exploratory and voluntary141. Through intimate self-acquaintance is the reciprocal relationship between perception and action established. Experiencing music is thereby a matter of actively engaging in the musical environment, a perceptual learning 138

Nonken (2008), p. 294 Pinker describes music as auditory cheesecake. In his point of view music could vanish from our world, leaving our lifestyle virtually unchanged, Pinker (1997), p. 528 & p. 534. It should be quite obvious that I do not endorse this claim. 140 Nonken (2008), p. 294 141 Nonken (2008), p. 291 139

process not established out of the blue, but based on an innate ability to control or direct the experience of music142. Thus, we pick up different musical affordances depending on our perceptual skills, use and the context in which they arise143. Music is not merely a stimulus, rather, music’s powers are constituted by one self; we interact with the music144. We compose the content of our musical experience by picking up musical affordances. Again we observe reciprocity, this time between the object (the music) and the perceiver. Experiencing music is neither a matter of receiving the musical sounds in an appropriate way, nor is it an unequivocal relation, solely dependent on the perceiving subject. On the contrary it seems fair to say that we to some extend create the content of our musical experience, while the music at the same time creates us145. Music is a deeply integrated part of our lives, a resource of transformative powers that provides potentialities for doing things, changing things and making things happen146;

[…] recognizing music as […] an affordance structure, allows for music to be understood […] as a place or space for “work” or meaning and lifeworld making. Music can, in other words, be invoked as an alley for a variety of world-making activities, it is a workspace for semiotic activity, a resource for doing, being and naming the aspects of social reality, including the realities of subjectivity and self […].147

We do things to and with music. This dynamic relationship finds verification in different domains such as emotional regulation, memory recapturing, identity construction and 142

Nonken (2008), p. 285. Studies of neonate music therapy indicate that already within the womb the unborn child is exposed to a “uterine symphony” (DeNora, p. 77) I find this research quite interesting and I will continuously refer to it, but must unfortunately restrict myself in going further into those issues. 143 This will be thoroughly explored in the section “Situated musical actions”. 144 DeNora (2000), p. 41 145 An obvious consequence of such a claim would be to examine the identity aspects in relation to musical experience. DeNora speaks of music as providing material for identifying identity (DeNora (2000), p. 69). We will later catch a glimpse of music’s influences on the establishing social identities (“Musical Identities”), but a comprehensive study of the identity aspects of music will unfortunately fall beyond the scope of the present examination. 146 DeNora (2000), pp. 44-48 147 DeNora (2000), p. 40 53

interpersonal coordination, etc. Music is an “aesthetic technology”148, a cultural resource offering not only pleasant sonic structures but besides a variety of potential uses.

A Sonic World A suggestive way of summarizing the musical affordances is to portray music as offering a sonic world. Music provides a sonic space. This sonic space is the internal spatial configuration of the piece itself, i.e. the different ways that sound features hang together to form a coherent musical work. By engaging in a particular piece of music the listener is surrounded by acoustic information149. This acoustic information is incorporated by the listener dependent on perceptual skills, use and the context in which they arise. The sonic space is available to everyone, who is willing to openly engage with the acoustic information of the particular piece of music. This proposes that music offers a shareable sonic world – an intersubjective sonic space accessible to any individual with the appropriate perceptual skills150. Interpreting music as offering a shareable sonic world is by no means an attempt to separate music from our everyday world. On the contrary, music is such an integrated part of our everyday world that such a maneuver seems absurd. My intention of introducing the notion of a sonic world is a purely theoretical concern – an attempt to encapsulate the specific character of the phenomenon music, by conceptualizing the spatial aspects of music. Schopenhauer believed that music was experienced exclusively through time with absolute exclusion of space151. I believe he was wrong. I agree with his claim of the importance of the temporal aspects of our musical experience and of music in general. This will be evident in my examination of music and time below. But I do not think that an 148

DeNora (2000), p. 7 Nonken (2008), p. 294 150 By emphasizing the importance of the appropriate perceptual skills, I wish to disregard specific cases such as inabilities to perceive certain sound elements, due to either illness or innate defects (see ex. Sacks (1983/1986) or Sacks (2007) for illustrative examples of such perceptual defects related to musical perception). The appropriate perceptual skills are not a matter of having the right kind of musical training or any other kind of privileged status. Such an over-intellectualizing of musical experience can ex. be found in Kivy (2002), pp. 81-83. Rather, the appropriate perceptual skill is simply a matter of being willing to openly engage with the particular piece of music. 151 Schopenhauer (1969), p. 266 149

exclusion of the spatial aspects supply an accurate approach, either to the experience of music or music itself. The spatial aspects are an important part of our musical experience. In the end of the next part, the notion of a sonic space will be incorporated into my conception of the musical world. Worth noticing first of all is the urgency of a clarification of the social aspects of music. If music offers an intersubjective sonic world, we will need to elucidate the aspects of the shareable character of music. This will, as promised, be the center of focus in the next part of my examination. But first I will focus on what can be termed as an intermediary of the social dimension, namely the case of dancing.

Interlude; Dancing –Illustrating the force of embodiment This section will be focusing on dancing. My motivation for conveying an analysis of dance originates in its twofold potential to illustrate partly the theoretical elucidations in concern of embodiment, partly the multiplicity of the musical experience. Besides, I find the case of dancing quite efficient to emerge a bridging between a characterization of the individual listening experience and the social dimension of the musical experience. Dance is a well integrated and deeply founded activity of our everyday lives. Its history reaches far back and its practice finds a great variety in widespread manifestations. Recent research within dance therapy designates an assumption that we are, in fact, born to dance152. This research finds its source in an intensive dance programme with dual sensory impaired children. Facing the devastating effects of deaf-blindness, these children countenance great challenges, especially in the area of communication. A study into the bodily effects of the dual sensory impaired children will therefore potentially reveal quite a good understanding of the force of embodiment. As Bond puts it in her concluding remarks “Such children remind me that I build my everyday social world through embodiment” 153. However fascinating such studies may be, I nevertheless want to move the discussion in another direction. I find the assumption that we are born to dance intriguing, and I will in the following work to show a possible explanation of the innate character of dance154. Returning to the previous section on embodiment, let us recall Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the body as the very foundation of all our experience. We are situated within a world that we actively perceive and engage with as essentially embodied agents. But the reciprocity of perception and embodiment can only be maintained through a sense of oneself as an embodied agent. I have to know where my body is and what it is doing. This 152

Bond (2009), p. 402 Bond (2009), p. 218 154 Again, I have unfortunately not found the necessary space for developing an extensive analysis of the achievements of communicative musicality. Research within this field supplies evidence for this innate character of dance, see ex. Trevarthen and Malloch (2000). 153

intimate self-acquaintance is based on information attained by proprioception (knowing where my limbs are positioned) and the body schema (which is responsible for maintaining posture, balance and governing movement). We know the world through our capacity to move around in it, but the openness to the world can only be obtained through self-awareness. Applying this theoretical foundation to the area of dance is an obvious strategy. Dance is generally considered as enhancing self-awareness155;

[…] dance is conceptualized as intentional non-verbal behavior that expresses, through the dynamic patterns of special movements in space, a heightened felt sense of self and/or environment.156

Given such a definition of dance it seems fair to argue that dance initiates this heightened felt sense of self (we will return to the environmental aspects shortly). Dance is thereby the practical illumination of the theoretical notions of proprioception and body schema. These two notions are experientially exemplified in the case of dancing. Evidently, as mentioned, dance is broadly manifested, and it is not insignificant to consider the context in which dance is practiced. Professional ballet dancers face completely other challenges than Saturday night clubbers157. In accordance with my overall project, I do not intend to engage in a particular dimension (that is of either musical character or dance). My interest is to accentuate dance as an observable outcome of the experientially aspects of music. I will therefore neither be discussing dance as abstracted from music, but rather as a common everyday situated aspect of our listening experience 158.

155

Friedson (1996), p. 30, describes his own experiences with dance within Tumbuka healing as an expansion of self. 156 Bond (2009), p. 404. See also Wulff (2006), p. 137. 157 For an elaboration of the ballet world see ex. Wulff (2006). A thorough study of electronic dance music is found in Butler (2006), though the dance dimension is a bit neglected. 158 Gregory (1997), pp. 125-127 point out that it can, indeed, be difficult to tell whether the music is an accompaniment to the dance, or the dance a movement to the music. Besides, one can also imagine a situation where dance is completely precluded from music. 57

Listening to music in an engaging and intensely manner, i.e. listening deeply, not necessarily results in dancing. But music will nevertheless commonly still have a profound impact on the listening subject’s body;

Movement is, I believe, the most fundamental conceptualization of music – the basic category in terms of which it is experienced.159

This impact can, besides dancing, be observed through finger tapping, head nodding, swaying and several other more or less obscure bodily responses. The above mentioned definition of dance as “intentional non-verbal behavior that expresses a heightened felt sense of self” will therefore be extended to entail all of the bodily responses of musical influence160. I will in the following assume that such bodily response, regarding their individual form, is a result of not merely the perceived musical elements, but besides an integrated individual interpretative response to both the music, the terms of which it is being used, as well as the context or the setting, in which it arise. Here are my reasons; Dancing to music often arise within a social setting where a variety of other participants are present. The environmental aspects inevitably have an impact on not merely the experience of dancing, but equally on the experience of the music in general. These environmental factors will be examined below in the section “Setting the Scene”. I will therefore initially focus on the individual dancing experience. But the idea of participation is an important consideration. Dancing to music is not merely a participation in a larger scale, implying social scenery, but equally a participation in the music. The dancing individual actively engages with the music, creating a creative interpretive response to the perceived musical sounds161. Music is frequently described in terms of movement162. I

159

Hamilton (2007), p. 142 Thereby avoiding, among other things, cultural and sociological discussions of dance, such as for example exemplifying dance as a primarily female phenomenon due to its sexual potential. For an elaboration of such a strategy, see. McRobbie (1991) 161 The temporal aspects of music is an important factor in understanding this claim, but I am afraid that I once again will have to postpone a discussion, this time that of the temporal aspects of music. See “Music and Time”. 162 Davidson and Malloch (2009) claim that music is experienced as movement, because musical meaning itself originates in the body, p. 565. I think they present only one side of the story, neglecting the role of context. 160

think an illustrative way of thinking about musical movement, is to think of dancing as a creative musical performance163, where the individual dancer fashion a personal response based on anticipation not only in the music as perceived here and now, but also on the expectations of what to come164. Christopher Small uses the term “musicking” to express the act of taking part in any kind of musical performance165. In dance, musicking in sound and musicking in movement occurs simultaneously and in relation to each other166. Participating in the music in this way is thereby both a creative and musical process, where the dancer’s motion is a rhythmic additional counterpart to the sounding patterns of the music, and besides an interpretation of the music that is being danced to 167;

Taking a semiotic view (and one consistent with the naturalistic account of the sense given by psychologist James J. Gibson, 1966), I assume that it is a basic psychological proclivity not to hear sound as an uninterpreted quality, but to hear it as bearing information that is adaptively useful. In a natural environment, such information could be about the location and movement of objects, the position and attitude of another living thing, the affective state of another as bidding affection or retreat. 168

Interpreting music through dance is first of all an individual determined phenomenon. The dancer shapes his or her response as the music unfolds, and given that this response is expressed through bodily movement, the dancer must possess a certain kind of selfawareness in order to elicit such a response. This awareness of the self is, though primitive, already effective from birth169. But the amount of self-awareness often increases concurrently with the experience of dancing to music. A possible explanation of this heightened felt sense of self is to turn to the previously explored intertwining of perception and embodiment. When dancing to music one actively engages in the music in a particular 163

This notion of creative musical performance is inspired by studies within electronic dance music. Though used in a similar fashion it is important to point out that dancing within this particular kind of music has a significant impact upon the music, in that the DJ presumably responds to the audience’s feed-back. For more on electronic dance music see Fikentscher (2000) or Butler (2006). 164 Husserl uses the notion protention to describe anticipation in the future events, Husserl (1964), p. 76 and Husserl (1913/1998), pp. 174ff. In the section “Music and Time” I will elaborate this notion further. 165 Small (1998), p. 9. See also Fikentscher (2000), p. 57 166 Fikentscher (2000), p. 58 167 Butler (2006), p. 72 168 Cumming (2000), p. 118 169 Gallagher (2005), pp. 72-78 59

dynamic manner, where one must play an active role in shaping the direction of the musical experience170;

Dancing, or “working (it) out” translates into a ritual in which the physical aspects of self, the body, is the instrument for renewing the spiritual or mental aspect of self, that is, the nonphysical aspects of identity.171

The dancing body is in this sense a musical instrument that elicits an immediate and profound response to a particular piece of music as it unfolds, enabling us to explore the nonphysical aspects of identity172. Identity aspects within the musical domain are a general consensus. DeNora, for example, describes music as a building material of subjectivity, as a resource for identifying identity173. Cumming specifically speaks of musical personality coined in her notion of the sonic self, a creation that comes into being with sound174. The sonic self is not a previously existing element of personality, but a dynamic making based on the choices made among musical sounds. Establishing a sonic self is a matter of actively engagement within the musical repertoire of possibilities. The sonic self can thereby be understood as a twofold character. There is an outward face of identity exemplified in the formation of subjects by their participation in the social sphere of gesture, language, or music. But there is also an individuated identity that may become topic for my reflexive self-awareness, knowledge of myself as a acting body175. The experiential qualities are by Butler described as “unlocking the groove”;

170

Blacking states that in dance the body and mind are ideally united, quoted in Wulff (2006), p. 125 Fikentscher (2000), pp. 75-76 172 This relation to subjective identity seems even more evidently, when considering the aspects of musical time. This will be further explained in the section “Music and Time”. 173 DeNora (2000), p. 57 and p. 69 174 Cumming (2000), p. 23. Though the notion of the sonic self arises in relation to a discussion of musical performance, I nevertheless find it applicable to other dimensions of the musical experience. 175 Cumming (2000), pp. 10-12 171

Groove promotes multiple interpretations and flexible interactions – An unlocking of the temporal experience into many directions.176

Dancing to music is an unlocking of the groove, or to use a previously discussed notion, dancing is an interpretation of the musical affordances. The music provides a variety of affordances that the dancer pick up in accordance with his or her perceptual skills, the use in which they appear and the context in which they arise. To view music’s affordance laden structure within the dancing domain enables us to understand the multiplicity of the nature of dance. Dance is not just one thing but rather a variety of possibilities, actualized in the response shaped by the performing participant as the music unfolds. But dance is not merely an observable result of an individual’s movement. We use dance to do different things. Some speak of dancing where a transitory step outside the everyday can be enjoyed. Or dance can be used for liberation or as a political statement 177. An important aspect, worthwhile dwelling at for a moment, is the potentiality of creating a personal space through dance. Though dance usually occurs in social settings, dancing nevertheless offers the opportunity for creating a vital subjective space where one’s own territory is demarcated in relation to others178. We are, as mentioned, directed in our experiences, our body define the behavioral space and environment under constraints defined by affordances179. In this sense it seems fair to argue that not only do listeners create the content of their listening experience, they also enact or actively construct the context of their music experience180. Dancing, aesthetically oriented movement, are the means for constructing spaces of the subject 181. I think that it is in this sense that the liberating potential in dance is to be understood. By creating a subjective space, dancing experientially releases a range of possibilities to be explored. Dancing gives us the potential to redefine the social rules of everyday life, to explore gender and sexuality aspects, the 176

Butler (2006), p. 6. Locked grove are the short patterns etched into records that the DJ uses as tools in a performance, ibid. p. 5 177 Fikentscher (2000), pp. 65-66 178 Irigaray (1989), p. 132. 179 Gallagher (2005), p. 32 180 Goguen (2004), p. 121 181 DeNora (2000), p. 78 61

option to step outside restrictions, conventions and norms of the world outside the dance setting182, and thereby to explore our own subjectivity. Dancersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; project their self onto the music, and at the same time explore what is in the music by means of the self183, thereby adding a kind of subjective reciprocity between the music and the perceiving self. This reciprocity is already explored within the listening experience, but returning to it now in the case of dancing inevitably makes it more obvious that an important aspect is missing, namely the relation to other selves;

A listening subject cannot only move through different phases while listening, and with varying degrees of assertoric strength, she can recognize the limitations of the interpretive world within which she operates, and opening up the way of listening available to her, allow others to respond from a position of difference. Listening, then, is not only a matter of musicality, but of hearing other selves. 184

Listening to music in general inescapably is an activity deeply rooted in our everyday social lives, and every kind of analysis of the listening experience must give an account of these social aspects, in order to provide a broadly picture of the experience of listening to music. The second part will be addressing this social dimension.

182

Fikentscher (2000), p. 75 Clarke (2005), p. 149 184 Cumming (2000), p. 71 183

Music as a Social Phenomenon Music is as an active doing, an active participation in the sonic world offered by music on behalf of the perceiving subject. So, is music then a pure private subjective experience? We all certainly have different preferences regarding the type of music, we tend to like. In more extreme scenarios this conflict regarding taste, stretches to the constituting elements and becomes a discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the indication of a piece of music. As mentioned, I do not intend to engage in a discussion of particular types of music. Nevertheless, I find it intuitively problematic to accept that music in general is a private experience. On the contrary, I find it plausible that music essentially is a social phenomenon. I will in the following advance at a justification of the essential social character of our musical experience. Music always takes place within a community and is thus inherently practice-, discourse- or tradition related185. Music, as all other art, is deeply rooted in our practical and everyday life. John Dewey gives a good hint of the importance of our everyday life, when he describes the deficiencies in the theories of art;

My purpose […] is to indicate that theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent in the subjectmatter but arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions. Embedded as they are in institutions and in habits of life, these conditions operate effectively because they work so unconsciously.186

Music and art in general cannot be understood detached from its context. Given our strong involvement in the world, we tend to disregard this foundation, because we are so familiar with our surroundings that they seemingly do not deserve further attention. The context of music consists not only of the place of origin combined with different implications of the constitution and conception of the object, but the context itself in which it appears seems to 185 186

Benson (2003), p. 41 Dewy (1934/2005), p. 9 63

form the very potential of music. Not only is the context in which music appears determined by social factors, even the content of our experience of listening to this particular music, in this particular scenario, is dependent on social aspects. Think of the difference of experiencing a specific piece of music solitarily a cold rainy evening, and the experience of the very same musical piece shared with hundreds, perhaps thousands of like-minded peers at a summer festival event. These two diverse modes of a musical experience are inevitably affected by the social connotations of the particular experience. Taking a look at the history of music reveals different prescriptions, different conditions and conceptions of the phenomenon music. How interesting these historical considerations may be, I do not find it relevant in the given framework to embrace the historical dimension. Worth noticing, though, is a traditional tendency to conceive music (and art in general) as an autonomous entity somehow separated from our everyday world, inhabiting its own domain;

Artistic activity is supposed not to play a part in constituting our sense of reality and therefore it is possible to detach the product from the world in which it takes place and to measure it against a nonworldly, non-temporal standard. By positing a reality existing independently of the artwork, it becomes possible to detach the artwork from the temporal structure of that reality. Classical aesthetics then seeks to naturalize temporal process.187

But recognizing the social nature of music in general is recently becoming an obvious supposition in most approaches to analyzing the phenomenon. Even Adorno, despite his claim of the autonomy of music (and his counterintuitive claim that music, or art in general, only offers pleasure in regard to its amusing character 188), acknowledges the social component of music;

Artâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s essence is twofold: on the one hand it dissociates itself from empirical reality and from the functional complex that is society; and on the other, it belongs to that reality and to that social complex. 187 188

Hodge (1993), p. 256 Hamilton, p. 162. For an elaboration of Adornoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position on music, see Hamilton (2007), pp. 153-191 64

This comes out directly in the particular aesthetic phenomena which are always simultaneously aesthetic and faits sociaux [social facts]. Aesthetic autonomy and art qua social fact are not the same; moreover each calls for a different kind of perception.189

I will in the following investigate these social components of music. This will be done partly from focusing on the nature of music in general 190. Is music at all an autonomous entity and if so, is this autonomy consistent with the essential social nature of the phenomenon? Is it necessary, or even possible, to make such a sharp distinction between art and reality, indicated in the above quote from Adorno? I wish to illustrate the essential social character of music. By doing this I will first of all return to the postponed exploration of the temporal aspects of music. This will supply us with an understanding of the basic shareable nature of the musical phenomenon. Music is potentially a multi-available entity, inevitably situated within the current of our everyday social lives. Analyzing this basic situatedness of the musical experience will form the next step in understanding the social components of music. Afterwards, a further analysis of the social aspects of music is anchored in expanding the notion of musical affordances to entail what we will call social affordances. Understanding musical affordances as social will gain insight into the mutual tuning-in relationship and joint attention, which will supply evidence for the social interrelationships, initiated by a mutual musical experience. Finally, I will move towards the more general social aspects of the musical experience by approaching the social setting of music and the identity-material in music. Such a larger scale strategy calls for an understanding of the basic social connotations within every given musical experience. I will therefore, unlike the first part, focus particular on analyzing the musical experience, first of all by examining the social implications of the individual musical experience, hereafter working my way up, so to speak, illustrating the essential social character of the music experience in general. But initially, we will examine the temporal aspects of music in order to grasp the shareable nature of the musical experience in the first place.

189

Adorno; Aesthetic Theory (1984), p. 358 as quoted in Hodge (1993), p. 257 and partly in Hamilton (2007), p. 167. 190 Though I will not, as mentioned, anticipate in an ontological examination of the phenomenon music. 65

Music and Time I have on several occasions hinted at the importance of time in relation to music. Not to exhaust the act of suspension any longer, I will now take up this perplexing aspect of music. But I must reiterate that this elaboration inevitably is rooted in my intentions of illustrating the social dimension of experiencing music, why the following must be seen as clarifying these particular aspects and therefore not as a thorough elaboration of the subject. Musicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relation to time actualizes the urge for an analysis of this relationship;

Music poses the centrality of time to the artwork itself, with a particular urgency. Time is central not just to the formation of the conventions and the development of the individual artistâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s capacities, required to produce or perform the work in question. A relation to time, to temporal sequence, and to temporal structure is internal to music itself. This disrupts the attempt to set up aesthetic values as timeless and to presume that time and temporality are irrelevant to artworks, and to judgments about them. The function of time within music sets up a contrast to the form of temporality, which predominates in everyday experience.191

Though music arises through everyday time, so to speak, music nevertheless seems to exist in another time span. In everyday experience time is a causal entity, a frame in which tasks are accomplished. In contrast, in the case of music, time is intrinsic to the internal construction of music, not simply a frame in which it occurs192. But what is musical time then? If we argue that musical time is an intrinsic ideal realm of time disconnected from our ordinary everyday world193, we seem to violate the above claim that we actively compose the content of our musical experience. Besides, it seems difficult to claim that music essentially is a social phenomenon, if it at the same time is detached from the social

191

Hodge (1993), p. 256 Hodge (1993), p. 256 193 Susanne Langer and Roger Scruton are examples of such a position, Kivy (2000), pp. 27ff. and Scruton (1997), p. 489 192

domain. In the following I will investigate the character of musical time and argue that it is unnecessary to detach musical time from our everyday world. In illuminating these problems, I will take a closer look at some of Husserl’s observations on the issue of time. I must apologize for this somewhat general approach to Husserl’s account, which in itself is rich enough to form the basis of a separate investigation. But for the sake of simplicity, I will only focus on the general aspects of Husserl’s comprehensive analysis. Husserl distinguishes between objective (cosmic) time and subjective (phenomenological) time194. He focuses on the subjective internal time consciousness by describing the threefold division into past, present and future195. As experiences only occur in the present, the past is experienced in the present in a different mode, which he terms retention (memory196). Retention is a continuous modification of the same beginning point197. By conceptualizing retention he enables us to distinguish past from present, though both are experienced in the Now198. But the flow of time is a continual sinking away into the past;

Truly, however, it pertains to the essence of the intuition of time that in every point of its duration (which, reflectively, we are able to make into an object) it is consciousness of what has just been and not mere consciousness of the now-point of the objective thing appearing as having duration. In this consciousness, we are aware of what has just been in the continuity pertaining to it *…+.199

Every now has its “horizon of Before” just as well as every now has a “horizon of After”200. Our experiences are in this sense a threefold dimension of what has been, what is, and what will come. Protention is the Husserlian term for this forward-looking expectation201. 194

Husserl (1913/1998), p. 192 Husserl (1913/1998), pp. 195-196. See also Goguen (2004), pp. 125-127 196 Husserl (1913/1998), p. 175 197 Husserl (1964), p. 51 198 Husserl’s observations on retention is confirmed by recent research on temporal cognition of music, where a pre-conscious buffer of about 10 seconds is identified, Goguen (2004), p. 126 199 Husserl (1964), pp. 53-54 200 Husserl (1913/1998), p. 195 201 Husserl (1913/1998), p. 175 195

Turning towards another influential character within phenomenology, Schutz elaborates Husserl’s considerations on time202, applying them specifically to the area of music203. Schutz also focus on phenomenological or subjective time, in particular he draws on the notion of Durée, inherited from Bergson204. Durée embraces the inner time of our consciousness differentiated from outer time, in that the durée has no measurable capacity205. Schutz argues that the musical time resemblances the inner subjective time;

As long as a piece of music lasts, and as long as we are listening, we participate in its flux; or more precisely: the flux of music and the flux of the stream of our consciousness are interrelated, are simultaneous; there is a unity between them; we swim, so to speak, in this stream. And music goes on as a unit which is indivisible. Only if we stop this ongoing development, only if we bring the flux to a standstill, only if, so to speak, we step out of the stream and look back: then it seems that what we experience as a unit while it lasted, has been constituted in polythetic steps. 206

We experience music as a unit; we participate in its flux by a simultaneous coexistence between our own stream of consciousness and the musical time. Only through a reflexive glance will we be able to grasp the parts of the musical structure. This reflexive attitude is made possible through the faculty of memory207. Drawing on Husserl, Schutz distinguish between two types of remembrance (recollection), namely retention and reproduction, where the former attach itself immediately to the actual experience, though it sinks into the past. The latter, reproduction, refers to more remote pasts which are reproduced in memory208. But the future is equally important;

202

Husserl’s main focus is on inner time consciousness, whereas Schutz tends to focus more broadly on the temporality of social relationships, but this differentiation will only supply us with a more extensive picture of the temporal phenomenon. 203 Husserl is also speaking of music in his development of his theory on time (see ex. Husserl (1964), p. 23 and Zahavi (2001), p. 121), though not as specifically as Schutz. But another objection must be made regarding Schutz. His work on music consists of posthumous publications, fragmentary in character. 204 The notion of durée seems quite similar to Husserl’s descriptions of the subjective/phenomenological time. 205 Schutz (1996), p. 257 206 Schutz (1996), p. 250 207 Schutz (1996), p. 255 208 Schutz (1996), p. 256 68

By living in our experiences, by being directed towards the objects of our acts and thoughts we are always oriented towards the future, we are always expecting certain occurrences and events. 209

These expectations are, as with recollection, divided into two. Protention portray those expectations attached to actual experience and anticipation is those that refer to events and experiences of the more distant future210. The two types of recollection (retention and reproduction) and the two types of expectations (protention and anticipation) are not only constitutive for the interconnectedness of the stream of consciousness, but they are also constitutive for the experience of music211. Memory and expectations about the future are the interplay in our consciousness that enables us to experience music as a unit. We live in the flux of the ongoing music. Only by bringing the participation in the musical flux to a standstill, only by assuming a reflective attitude will we be able to bring the acts of our listening to objects of reflection212. Music can thus be understood as a twofold temporal event. At one hand it is a unit, an indivisible structure of ongoing movement. At the other hand, the accomplished musical event is divisible into parts. We can scrutinize and analyze the different elements within a particular piece of music, but this division can only be accomplished after bringing the ongoing movement to a standstill. This structure inevitably results in what Schutz refers to as the Eleatic paradox213. The flying arrow of Zeno is used as an analogy to illuminate this paradox;

Consider the flying arrow of Zeno. Regard its flight as an ongoing movement. It is a unit from the instant it was shot from the bow until it reaches its goal. Following this movement with your eyes, you experienced one single event in inner time. Afterwards, in hindsight, when this movement will have been completed, when the arrow has traversed its path, you may consider the movement â&#x20AC;&#x201C; once performed

209

Schutz (1996), p. 256 Schutz (1996), p. 256 211 Schutz (1996), p. 257 212 Schutz (1996), p. 270 213 Schutz (1996), p. 249 210

and accomplished – as identical with the trajectory traversed by the arrow. Then you may break down into pieces the unity of the ongoing motion […] But, then, the arrow does not fly anymore.214

Considering this dual temporal characterization of the musical experience, it not only seems to be a plausible explanation of the temporal aspects involved in music, it also enables us to avoid the autonomous claim of music. Music is not an isolated entity inhabiting its own domain215, but rather deeply rooted and dependent on what we could call real time. This paradoxical nature of musical time questions the very motive of establishing a notion of “musical time”. By using a specific term to describe the musical time, we unavoidably suggest that musical time coins another kind of time that differs from everyday, or real time. Philip Alperson addresses this problem by arguing that musical time is an instance of time in general;

The truth of the matter seems to be that the temporal dimension of musical experience is not fundamentally different from that of any other sort of temporal experience. Rather, as an occurrence, an art whose method of presentation is progressive in time, a piece of music is a piece with all phenomena which occur in time: it has a determinate period of duration; an objective and irreversible time order; it seems to involve the specific mental faculties of attention, memory, expectation, and apperception, and, as such, it seems tied to our sense of personal identity.216

Though musical time is an instance of time in general, it is nevertheless profitable to maintain the phrase “musical time” on a theoretical level as it illustrates the specific temporal aspects of musical experience. It is important to maintain the notion of musical time as it;

[…] underscore the fact that, in drawing our attention to intelligible structures whose patterns develop in time, music does exploit certain features of temporal experience. It exploits the sense we have of movement “through” time, it exploits a sense of movement with or against a regular temporal background, and it exploits the sense of the integration of a flux of events into a single, unified whole. In 214

Schutz (1996), p. 249 Schopenhauer (1969), p. 262, for instance, argues that music is not confined to the phenomenal world. 216 Alperson (1980), p. 414. I will shortly follow up on the identity potential within music. 215

general, it makes duration an object of attention and calls upon the same faculties we employ in all time perception.217

We will therefore continue to use the phrase musical time, memorizing that it is an aspect of time in general. The necessity of maintaining the notion is due to the fact that musical time in particular draws attention to a specific aspect of time. This specific aspect of time is an aspect that escapes the measurable characteristics of ordinary time. Surely a piece of music has these measurable durations. Music unfolds itself in time; it has a specific duration, which is measurable. But by speaking of musical time, I wish to accentuate the above mentioned similarities with subjective time. I wish to emphasize that experiencing music is different from the outer time, so to speak, in that music unfolds itself in the inner time, the durée. The experience of music is differentiated from outer time due to this participation in the listening subject’s stream of consciousness;

The listener lived, while listening, in another dimension of time which cannot be measured by our clocks or other mechanical devices. In the measurable time there are pieces of equal length, there are minutes and hours. There is no such yardstick for the dimension of time the listener lives through; there is no equality between its pieces, if there are pieces at all.218

The experience of music, the participation in the musical event involves participation in the musical time. While experiencing music the listener lives in what appears to be another time span219. But this simultaneity between the musical time and the listener’s stream of consciousness is not merely an individual experience. On the contrary, participating in the musical time entails an opening towards sharing, in vivid present, the others stream of consciousness in immediacy220. Music thus becomes a shared time for those involved. Through manifold participation in a given musical event, we are, in Schutz’s phrase,

217

Alperson (1980), p. 414 Schutz (1996), p. 254 219 Schutz uses an illustrative analogy to explain this incommensurability between the time we are living through versus clock time; The experience of waiting on the surgeon who operated on a person dear to us will inevitably feel quite different than the same amount of time spent chatting with a friend. Schutz (1996), p. 254 220 Friedson (1996), p. 124 218

growing older together; we are tuned-in, living together in the same flux221. We will now explore this tuning-in relationship by first of all investigating the situatedness of the listening experience. Afterwards it will be necessary to examine the nature of the sharable music experience by drawing attention to notions such as mutual tuning-in relationships, joint attention and social affordances.

221

Schutz (1964), p. 175 72

Situatedness of musical experience First of all we will need to turn to the situatedness of the listener, elaborating a conceptual frame in which the temporal and spatial surroundings of the listener are accentuated. This is a necessary move as I wish to investigate the fundamental social connotations of the listening experience. Every kind of listening to music is to some extent situated. Whether I listen to music solitarily with my headphones on, or I am participating a large concert at Roskilde Festival, these two very different modes of listening will inevitably be enfolded with my particular cultural inheritance. I will always approach the music with a pregiven set of expectations222. I will in the following reconcile three different notions illustrating the situatedness of any given musical experience, namely Merleau-Ponty’s “intentional arc”, Schutz’s “scheme of reference” and Bourdieu’s “habitus of listening”223. These three notions each disclose a perspective on this situatedness; Intentional arc seems to reveal the most basic structures orienting us in our world, whereas scheme of reference is operational on the sociocultural level. Habitus of listening is also working on the sociocultural level, though it appears to be of a somewhat more general character, than the scheme of reference. I will subsequently give a short description of each of the notions and hereafter bring them together in an analysis of situated musical actions, which afterwards will function as a collective name of the three notions at stake.

222

Becker (2004), p. 69 Bourdieu does not specifically speak of habitus of listening, but in order to narrow the focus, I have chosen to follow Becker (2004), pp. 70ff in her specification of the habitus. This strategy will be more comprehensible in the paragraph concerning Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus. 223

Intentional Arc I will begin with Merleau-Ponty´s notion of intentional arc as this notion, as mentioned, is operative at the most basic level. Merleau-Ponty gives the following description of the intentional arc;

[…] the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life – is subtended by an “intentional arc” which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects.224

By living and acting within the world, humans inevitably acquire a variety of different skills appropriate to multiple different situations. Dependent on the individual’s respective perspective and equally dependent on the given situation, the individual will respond accordingly. This means that the intentional arc prescribes the way we pick up different affordances in our environment;

The agent sees things from some perspective and sees them as affording certain actions. What the affordances are depends on past experience with that sort of thing in that sort of situation. The idea of an intentional arc is meant to capture the idea that all past experience is projected back into the world. The best representation of the world is thus the world itself.225

It is precisely in this sense that the intentional arc is a basic concept – it is operational preconsciously. It functions on the level at the body schema, which, as we have seen, is responsible for maintaining posture, balance and governing movement. The intentional arc is in this respect an orientation capacity which not only enables adjustment to the environment but equally enables different sorts of interactions with our changing environments. Our bodily adjustments are shaped by environmental features which in turn shape how we engage with these environmental features – we change our environment by

224 225

Merleau-Ponty (1945/2009), p. 157 Dreyfus (1998), in the section “Learning without Representation: Merleau-Ponty’s Intentional Arc” 74

acting in it. This intimate body-world reciprocity is secured by the intentional arc. Thus, the intentional arc shapes our actions and is likewise shaped by them 226.

Scheme of Reference Alfred Schutz was a pioneer within sociological phenomenology and his notion scheme of reference is therefore not surprisingly founded upon that tradition. Interested in clarifying the essential structures of the life-world, and in exposing the role of subjectivity in the construction of the social world227, Schutz maneuvers at the level of our social lives. Scheme of reference captures the sociocultural background against which things are constituted in their meaning. In this context Schutz also speaks of typification. Typification is a type of practical know-how that determines the experience of the life-world; it is a sort of background knowledge that determines how we interpret a given situation;

[â&#x20AC;Ś] In all such cases he can discover within his past experience the context of motivation constituting the partnerâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reaction. This may be specific experience of this particular partner, or it may be knowledge of the typical reactions one can expect when one affects another person in a typical way. We always carry about us the knowledge of rules of this kind. We simply take them for granted, and, since we have no reason to question them, we never even bother to ask where we learned them.228

The typifications that lays the ground for our social interaction is part of our everyday encounter with the world and its inhabitants, and as such, largely unknown to the agent. The typifications are based primarily on our previous experiences, but they are not static rules. Rather, they emerge from the dynamic reciprocal interaction with the other229, which is why they are open for alteration. A simple example can illustrate the issues at stake here. In the western world (roughly speaking) we experience a dog as a domesticated pet, whereas in China, for example, the 226

Ibid. Dreyfus calls the body-world reciprocity a feed-back loop. Overgaard & Zahavi (2009), p. 100 228 Schutz (1932/1967), p. 162 229 Schutz (1932/1967), pp. 154ff 227

status of a dog is infused with another conception, considering its status as a culinary meal (or think of the rank of a cow in India). Applying this to music, listening to a classical piece of music brings about a whole other experience to me as opposed to an African tribe member. I suspect that my cultural heritage supplies connotations reaching beyond my musical experience (an obvious example would be the general presumption that classical music is an high-status form of music), whereas the African tribe member, free of such connotations, on the contrary has another scheme of reference conducting the musical experience of a classical piece of music. One of the great achievements of Schutz’s sociological phenomenology is his understanding of the social world as a manifold of different realms. The social world is not simply one thing but various domains presenting different challenges to the interactive agents;

Just as the world of my actual perception is only a fragment of the whole world of my experience, and this in turn is but a fragment of the world of my possible experience, so likewise the social world (itself a portion of this “whole world”) is only directly experienced by me in fragments as I live from moment to moment.230

This results in an extensive analysis of these different realms but a further investigation into these is beyond the scope of this paper. What will prove profitable in this framework is to notice Schutz’s observations concerning the We-relationship. The We-relationship is defined as “face-to-face relationships in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other’s lives for however a short time”231. When we are living in a We-relationship, we are involved in each other in such an intimate manner, that we share a common stream of consciousness. When we are involved in each other, each of our experiences will be colored by this interpersonal engagement, our experiences will be influenced by this solidarity232. This is previously framed by the notion of mutual tuning-in relationship and will be thoroughly explored in s separate section below.

230

Schutz (1932/1967), p. 142 Schutz (1932/1967), p. 164 232 Schutz (1932/1967), p. 167 231

But let us sum up the scheme of reference. We have a horizon of interpretative schemes of references. These are based upon typifications of previous experiences and our cultural heritage. We enact our social lives in different realms, embracing direct interaction with our surroundings, dissociated knowledge of people outside my environment, previous events (autobiographical as well as pre-personal) and artifacts in the world testifying their human origin233.

Habitus of Listening Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is meant to frame the system of dispositions that enable us to navigate and act within a given social environment. The habitus is;

[…] structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.234

The habitus is not a set of rules but rather inclinations or dispositions, determining the actions of a social agent. But it is important to emphasize that despite the function of the habitus as a source of the agent’s actions, the habitus is not the product of an individual’s strategic intentions235. On the contrary, the habitus is a precondition for social interaction, a sort of immanent law that is endowing the commonsense world with an objectivity secured by a general consensus236. The habitus is thus a basic structured system of dispositions facilitating social interaction. The habitus is not a static system, but a dynamic, 233

Schutz (1932/1967), p. 109. In his analysis of artifacts, Schutz is exceedingly close to Heidegger’s analysis of tools. Both Schutz and Heidegger conceive artifacts/tools as a constant reference to the Other. 234 Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 72 235 Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 73 236 Bourdieu (1972/1977), pp. 80-81 77

or rather dialectical relationship between the objective structures within the habitus and the cognitive and motivating structures, which they produce. The habitus is thereby constantly transformed and reproduced in accordance with historical practices 237. But these structuring structures, the habitus, are only revealed in the object, which they structure238, and, as such, beyond the grasp of consciousness239. Although Bourdieu acknowledges the dialectical relationship between the habitus and the individual, he nevertheless seems to operate on a more general level, so to speak. He does not clarify the role of the individual, besides the fact that he conceives the individual system of dispositions as structural invariants of the habitus in general 240. This combined with the transcendental nature of the habitus, the inconceivable structure of the structuring structures leads me to presume that the notion of habitus is operative on a superior level of abstraction; that it captures the social heritage, we cannot fully grasp. Despite this generality, I would like to stress the importance of conceiving the habitus as a set of dispositions. We will, as mentioned, focus on the habitus of listening. Judith Becker presents such a strategy241;

Our “habitus of listening” is tacit, unexamined, seemingly completely “natural”. We listen in a particular way without thinking about it, and without realizing that it even is a particular way of listening […] A “habitus of listening” suggests, not a necessity nor a rule, but an inclination, a disposition to listen with a particular kind of focus, to expect to experience particular kinds of emotion […] The stance of the listener is not a given, not natural, but necessarily influenced by place, time, the shared context of culture, and the intricate and irreproducible details of one’s personal biography.242

237

Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 83 Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 90 239 Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 94 240 Bourdieu (1972/1977), p. 86 241 Becker (2004), pp. 70 ff 242 Becker (2004), p. 71 238

Becker uses the notion of habitus of listening to express the temporal and spatial situatedness of the listener243. As indicated in this, admittedly perfunctory, elaboration of the notion of habitus, I believe that this notion must be complimented with the notions of intentional arc and scheme of reference. This will be my intention in the subsequently section.

Situated Musical Actions Every kind of musical experience is to some extent situated. Adapting the habitus of listening, we gain knowledge of the social dispositions each individual necessarily and subconsciously implement on the musical experience. We have a disposition to listen to a piece of music with a particular focus, which is determined by our given cultural heritage. But the social agent in question here, inevitably have a solitary set of experiences equally determining the extent of the musical experience. In other words, the agent has a variety of interpretive schemes of references at his disposal, which partly are based on the structures of his given environment, typifications extracted by typical reactions in typical events, but at the same time founded upon the agent’s previous experiences. To oblige the most fundamental level of the individual’s orientation capacities, we will have to turn towards the notion of intentional arc in order to validate the claim that we pick up different affordances. I have chosen to bring the above three notions together, as I believe that they illustrate three different perspectives on the situated musical experience. But this situatedness is inseparable from its actual use. The situatedness of any sort of musical experience is not just a cognitive or embodied matter, but equally enacted 244. It is important to notice that the individual not merely is exposed to a fixed context, in which the musical experience occurs. In contrast, the individual actively shapes the character of the context of the

243

Becker (2004), p. 70. According to Becker, the habitus of listening is the aural equivalent to the visual term “gaze”. 244 Goguen (2004), p. 120 79

musical experience, which is why I think the notion of â&#x20AC;&#x153;situated musical actionsâ&#x20AC;?245 quite well captures the issues at stake. But obviously the creation of the context of the musical experience happens within a given social frame. The social scenery plays a crucial role in shaping the musical experience. We will now study some of these social effects by first of all examining the social affordances.

245

This notion is also used by Goguen (2004) 80

Social Affordances Music inevitably summons the present of the other 246. But how is this so? To explain this we will have to, once again, return to the notion of musical affordances. As explored above, music is an aesthetic technology, socially available to the perceiver with the appropriate skills247. Music offers a sonic space that affords engagement and appropriation of the sonic structures248. But it is not merely the perceiver’s ability to obtain the musical affordances that determines the musical experience. Picking up musical affordances is a dynamic interaction with the music itself – The musical affordances are realized within this dynamic relationship. Music is a material in the world, an intersubjective accessible sonic space that we can manipulate and do different things with. Dependent on the use of the music, the character of the musical experience will be affected. We use music in different scenarios. These will be examined below249. Worth noticing in this regard, is the dramatic change that occurs when listening to music in a social setting, as compared to a solitary listening episode. Again, every kind of musical experience is to some degree socially charged, every musical experience is situated. But the specific experience of sharing the musical experience directly with others alternates the conception of the music at play, just as well as the conscious decision to retreat to a solitary listening experience would influence the musical experience. The social impact on the musical experience can be explained by referring to social affordances. Music is a material situated within the world and offering a variety of affordances, including social resources;

[…] the study of how music is used in daily life helps to illuminate the practical activity of casting ahead and furnishing the social space with material-cultural resources for feeling, being and doing. This is part 246

This claim was made at the end of the section ”Dancing – Illustrating the force of Embodiment” and will now be thoroughly elaborated. 247 Cf. “Musical Affordances”. 248 Cf. “A Sonic World”. 249 Cf. “Setting the Scene”. 81

of how the habitat for social life – its support system – is produced and sustained […] music is a resource for producing social life.250

Music offers social affordances; it is a social resource that presents a shareable sonic space. Just as musical affordances arises in the dynamic interaction between the piece of music and the perceiver, so does social affordances arise during the interaction with the other in a common we-relationship. Exemplifying this in relation to music, let us first turn to the individual listening experience. As explored above, the individual actively engages with the musical piece, to some extent creating the content of the listening experience on the basis of a dynamic interaction with the music. The solitary listening experience (for the sake of simplicity we will disregard the social connotations for a moment) is thus created through a dynamic interplay between the music and the individual. Applying this to the social scenario, listening to music with others entails not merely my own resonance with the musical affordances but equally awareness that others too, respond and react to the music at play. I will be alert to others reactions as I acknowledges the availability of the musical affordances for the other251. This is particularly observable at an electronic dance event, where the dancer responds to the music played and the other dancers’ movements. But the dancing crowd equally influences the music, as the DJ adapts the music in accordance with the dancers’ response. Music in such scenarios can thus be said to communicate a whole range of different relationships. The other can only disclose himself when he is to some degree sense able, but he is, in himself, an important source of affordances252. The task of picking up social affordances from the other requires an explorative human activity to reveal it 253. To understand the extent of the shareable character of music, we will return to Schutz and incorporate his notion of mutual tuning-in to the composition of social affordances.

250

DeNora (2000), p. 129 Schutz (1964), p. 160, speaks of actions as being ”oriented in their course with reference to one another”. Gibson (1979/1986), p. 135, describes the other as an important source of affordances. 252 Gibson (1979/1986), p. 135 253 Good (2007), p. 271 251

Mutual tuning-in Relationship Music affords a social sonic space. This shared accessibility of musical affordances is what establishes the social environment254. Music is an aesthetic technology, a tool for shared action and feeling. In this respect, music affords a mutual tuning-in relationship;

It is the thesis of the present paper that this sharing of the other’s flux of experiences in inner time, this living through a vivid present in common, constitutes what we called in our introductory paragraphs the mutual tuning-in relationship, the experience of the “We”, which is at the foundation of all possible communication.255

In this mutual tuning-in relationship, the “’I’ and the ‘Thou’ are experienced by both participants as a ‘We’ in vivid sense” 256. Recall Schutz’s analysis of the temporal aspects of music. According to Schutz, participating in any given form of musical event involves participation in the inner time, the durée. Experiencing music with others is living together in the same flux – we are, as Schutz puts it, growing older together257. Approaching the social musical experience as a mutual tuning-in relationship is highly applicable to the theory of affordances (both affordances in general, as well as musical/social affordances)258;

If perception is not the having of representations, but the activity of keeping in touch with the environment surrounding one, then it becomes much more likely that two or more individuals will share at least some of their awareness.259

254

Costall (1995), p. 473 Schutz (1964), p. 173. The notion of this mutual tuning-in relationship is founded upon an analysis of “Making Music Together” (the title of the text), and therefore originate in the relation between performer-listener, but given the fact that Schutz also uses this notion elsewhere, I feel confident at applying it to the musical experience in general. 256 Schutz (1964), p. 161 257 Schutz (1964), p. 175 258 Again, my focus will be on the musical/social affordances, but the following considerations are equally relevant to the general theory of affordances. 259 Reed (1992), p. 12 255

Understanding others then, arises from a situation of shared awareness, which is part of intersubjectivity260. We are tuned-in, not merely to the objects existing in the world, but equally in our interaction with the other. We share information specific to environmental situations261. In this sense, one could argue that all affordances are social. James M. M. Good addresses this problem by referring to what he calls the dilemma of social affordances. This dilemma arises from the difficulties of applying the theory of social affordances to a social science investigation;

The more a theory focuses on abstract invariances, the more remote it comes from the flow of interaction, the more it concentrates on the minutiae of meaningful interaction in the flow, and the more one is weighed down by ponderous description.262

But as the dilemma specifically occurs within the social science domain, and as it is concerned with a practical aspect of detecting these social affordances, we will not discuss this dilemma further than recognizing its existence. I find no difficulties in accepting that all affordances are social263. On the contrary, such a claim only seems to support the intimacy of mind, body and world, whereas it gives an opening to the intersubjective world. Besides, as we discovered in analyzing the musical affordances, social affordances are not merely detected, but they are actively created and maintained by the joint action of interacting parties264;

Shared awareness, on this view, is emphatically not the identity of two private experiences, but is instead a joint or mutual experiencing of a particular aspect of the world [â&#x20AC;Ś] Hence, what is shared [â&#x20AC;Ś] is not subjective states, but information specific to environmental situations.265

260

Good (2007), p. 273 Reed (1992), p. 12 262 Good (2007), p. 276 263 Costall (1995) gives some interesting ideas on why Gibson failed to underplay the socio-cultural in the perception of affordances. According to Costall this failure consists in Gibsonâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s concept of literal perception and his concern with the problem of cultural relativism. (p. 475) 264 Good (2007), p. 280 265 Reed (1992), p. 12 261

We will now move on to investigate the character of this joint action, framed by the notion of joint attention.

Joint Attention We are tuned in to our environment and the affordances that are offered by this specific environment. This means that we are tuned in to other people existing within this environment. Joint attention frames the mutual awareness occurring when two or more people are attending to the same object in the environment266. But this mutual awareness is not merely an additional aspect of our perception of a given object. Rather, joint attention result in a shared experience with the other (-s), a fundamental mutual stance affecting the experience of the given object 267. Jointly attending to a given object in the environment is a matter of establishing a framework for attending to the environment, or making use of one already established 268;

The shared framework is a way for the content of our attentional states to be mutually fixed. Yet establishing a framework is also a matter of mutually structuring the activity of attending to the world.269

Returning to the above developed notion of situated musical actions, we will now incorporate this in relation to joint attention, specifically within the musical sphere. Any kind of musical experience is to some degree situated. We experience music with a predispositioned set of expectations dependent on our cultural heritage, individual background and perceptual capacities. We will in this context focus on the social experience of listening to music, but it is important to have in mind, though, that the fundamental level of the social experience nevertheless necessitate the individual 266

Cochrane (2009), p. 59. Joint attention is believed to be established in infants from around nine months, but I will mainly focus on mature joint attention in what follows. 267 Campbell (2002), pp. 174ff 268 Cochrane (2009), p. 61 269 Cochrane (2009), p. 62 85

participants self-awareness270, one needs to be prepared and open towards mutual attending to the music;

Hence joint attention is characterized by an ongoing preparedness to alter the way I attend to something should you direct me to it, as well as being self-consciously aware of the publicly available aspects of my own behavior as they have the potential to lead your attentional focus. This preparedness and openness should be mutual.271

Establishing a mutual frame is one of the main contributes of joint attention. This shared framework applies yet another dimension to the situated musical action, as it modifies the musical experience. As explored above, experiencing music is a matter of actively engaging and creating the content of this very experience. Experiencing music in a jointly attending manner has a vivid impact on the musical experience, because the musical perception is mediated by the other person’s task of perceiving the music272;

Such mutual co-ordination entails that we share the task of perceiving together, filtering our experiences through our awareness of the other, such that the experience is intrinsically altered. Joint attention involves establishing a plural subject of attention, in which a framework for perceiving the world is generated, and in which the actual interactions involved define that state.273

The establishing of this plural subject results in a unifying tendency, where different individuals listen and responds to the music as a group274, i.e. music launches group identity. Think of a large concert, where the crowd seemingly responds as a unit. In such scenarios you will often find yourself swaying back and forth, applauding, dancing, etc. in 270

This self-awareness is at first glance quite similar to Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc. But given that intentional arc is operational at a pre-conscious level, the self-awareness at stake here differentiates itself, as the notion of joint attention operates at a cognitive level. 271 Cochrane (2009), p. 62 272 Cochrane (2009), p. 64 speaks of the task of seeing, but summarizes that it is perception in general. However, he does not justify this shift of focus. The interesting aspect of this observation is that though Cochrane is focusing in musical perception, he nevertheless seems to slip into a focus on visual perception on the default. The tendency to focus on visual perception is thoroughly described during my motivational account and the section “The Phenomenological Listening Experience”. 273 Cochrane (2009), p. 65 274 Cochrane (2009), p. 73 86

synchronization with the others around you. You will commonly respond to the group/community accordingly. Some describes this as a feeling of falling into the music275. We adopt and adapt to the resources within an environment and in a social context this implies that we resonate our responses according to those of others. Music is such a resource. Through music we resonate with our surroundings (including the presence of others) and through music we gain an understanding of our self and of our social identities. In order to further grasp this identity-material within music, we will first off all need to examine the scenery of any musical performance and see how the scene or the setting affects the musical experience.

275

DeNora (2000), p. 124 87

Setting the Scene The physical surroundings of the musical event are an important factor in our musical experience. I will in the following work to show a few indications of these spacial influences. But I must point out that I by no means aim at an exhaustive account but rather wish to call attention to the fact that the social scenery plays a role in the shaping of our musical experience. Examining the scenery of the musical event is to some extent an expansion of the situated musical actions. But whereas the elaboration of the idea of situated musical actions resulted in a conceptual frame in which the solitary musical experience reveals itself as a fundamental orientational capacity, defined by the individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cultural heritage, I now wish to take a closer look at the influences at stake within the social surroundings of the musical event. So, having demonstrated the individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s basic situatedness of any musical experience, I will currently inspect the physical surroundings of the musical event and the impact it has on the musical experience. As indicated above, the musical experience dramatically changes, when sharing the experience with others. Listening to music, for example, with others, alters the experience of music, due to the implications of the above mentioned aspects of social affordances, mutual tuning-in relationships and joint attention. I will not only respond to the musical affordances related to my own situated musical actions but equally react upon others situated musical actions. In this context, the other is to some extent constituent of my musical experience. We will pursue this idea further in the next section on musical identities. The physical environment of the musical event may have a profound impact on the musical experience. The physical space, in which a given musical event occurs, influences the experience;

Performance spaces affect greatly the relationships that are created among those that are inside them.276

Whether a concert hall, a park, stadium, small pub, etc, these physical locations inevitably infect our experience of the musical event as a whole. This is not merely due to the experience of being at the different locations, but also because these different places offer different opportunities for development of the musical performance, and of the experience of listening to the particular music as well. An important factor is, obviously, the technical potential for establishing a good sound. The sound aspect seems more persistent when attending a large concert, than it would be during more intimate musical sessions, such as for example an acoustic live session at a bar. In the first case, we tend to have higher expectations to the technical facilities supporting the sound, probably due to the fact that such a huge musical event inevitably creates a distance between the participants and the performing crew, a distance that is united by the music277. So, if the music reaches the audience distorted, this will infect the experience radically. In the second case, the intimate live session, other factors such as closeness with the performer, intimacy with the rest of the audience or familiarity/atmosphere in the surroundings might make up for the technical facilities. Over and all, it appears that our expectations and level of tolerance vary with the sort of music being played. We seem to be more tolerant during a live rock show, given the many contingencies (i.e. spontaneity of live performing, possibility of mistakes, unpredictable sound equipment, audience reactions, etc.) than would be the case in a live symphonic performance or opera. Revisiting Bourdieuâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s notion of the habitus, we can say that we have a common set of expectations to different musical events, specified by the culture we live in. Attending a large concert of any kind is infused with the participantsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; dispositions to anticipate in the particular event. We all have a habitus of musical event, so to speak, that induces this common set of expectations, depending on our cultural heritage. This means that if I am 276

Small (1998), p. 199 Besides, when attending a large musical event we usually pay an admission fee. This can also have an influence on the expectations prior to the event, as we tend to be more expectant, when having paid for the admission. 277

participating a concert of classical music, I will have certain expectations not only to the music but also to the setting, in which the music is to be experienced. I will expect some degree of formality amongst the other participants and the space we share, I will equally expect to be seated, and will be quite surprised if the surroundings of the event fail to match, to some degree, my previous experiences and my cultural expectations278. Thus, the habitus plays a role in shaping how the music manifests to us, perceptually speaking. On the other hand, music can also be used to support, or even create, scenes in our social world. Music is a resource for establishing an agent’s aesthetic dimension. Music is used for elaborating configured spaces that are hospitable to some types of actions, inhospitable to others. Individuals “orchestrate” their social activity through music279; musical scenes are created in accordance with the particular agency called for. Given the habitus of musical events, we all have expectations to the physical surroundings of specific musical events, ex. the concert hall hosting a classical concert. But the relationship between the music and the setting in which it occurs is of a reciprocal character – the music also strongly infuses the space, in which it unfolds. This theoretical statement is widely manifested in our everyday lives. Think of the soothing music played in a cramped elevator offering reassurance to the passengers. Or think of the jolly Christmas music played in a packed mall, provoking whole different connotations, than those actually manifested 280. Music seemingly plays a crucial role in shaping and guiding our actions in different contexts;

Music is thus part of the cultural material through which “scenes” are constructed, scenes that afford different kinds of agency, different sorts of pleasure and ways of being.281

Music has an ability to drive and organize action. In this sense, music can be a prescription of social order282. Again, we use music to do different things. Music is an active doing, 278

Obviously, breaking such conventions can be a deliberate strategy on the behalf of the organizers or the performing musicians. 279 DeNora (2000), p. 110-111 280 In fact, music is a ubiquitous feature of shopping and the retail sector has undergone a potent development within the musical sphere, emerging still new ways of optimizing our consumption. For more on this interesting aspect of music, see DeNora (2000), pp. 131ff. 281 DeNora (2000), p. 123 90

essentially embedded in our everyday social lives. The physical surrounding of the musical event is an important factor, influencing the musical experience. Music unfolds within a given physical frame, which is shaping the musical experience. Exactly the temporal dimension of music is what makes it a social powerful phenomenon. Music is a way of happening that moves through time283. Participating in the musical event is sharing the temporal dimension. The last section of the social inquiry of music will be examining one of the shared aspects of the musical event, by focusing on musical identities.

282 283

DeNora (2000), p. 125 DeNora (2000), p. 161 91

Musical Identities I have on several occasions hinted at the identity material within music and I now wish to evolve the idea that music can be a resource for establishing identities. The potential for creating identity through music is a well-established field of research, primarily concerned with examining music as a resource for establishing personal identity284. I endorse this interesting field of research, but I nevertheless approach the identity potential from another angle, as I advance the phenomenon from a social perspective. I want to explore the culmination of the above developed argument that we come together in our mutual musical experience. I will, in other words, extend the theoretical fundament for the mutual response to a given musical event 285. This will be done by exemplifying how music is a material of establishing identity within a group of participants. The relationship between music and identity can be approached from two different theoretical perspectives. The first concerns the identity â&#x20AC;&#x153;statusâ&#x20AC;? of an individual, while the other investigates the contribution of social groups in structuring specific musical behavior286. Obviously, such a distinction is mainly theoretical, whereas it is impossible to study an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s identity separated from the social surroundings. The distinction will prove profitable, though, as it enables us to focus on two different, but equally important, perspectives of the identity material within music. I will, as mentioned, approach the phenomenon from the social identity perspective, an approach that has not yet been extensively investigated287.

284

Hargreaves et al. (2002), p. 14 This mutual response is previously examined through the notions of mutual tuning-in relationships and joint attention. 286 Tarrant et al. (2002), p. 134 287 Hargreaves et al. (2002), p. 5 states that the social functions of music have been seriously neglected. Besides, see Tarrant et al. (2002), p. 134 285

We will, nevertheless, have to recognize the innate aspect of musicality 288. This is an inescapable field of research when seeking an understanding of the importance of music in our everyday lives; “Music may be at the source of the ability to be socialized in the human way.”289 We are all musical – every human being has a biological and social guarantee of musicality290. Acknowledging the innate character of musicality supply evidence not merely for the importance of music to human beings, but function in addition as a premise for my investigation of social identity prospects within music. We are all to some degree musical beings and cannot ignore the fact that music is an important factor in shaping identity. Turning towards social identity theory will supply the necessary conceptual framework of the study of social identity. We are all, according to social identity theory, members of different social groups, both large-scale, such as gender and race, and smaller scale groups, for example family, colleagues, etc. Interaction between two or more people are distinguished by whether the behavior primarily is based on individual characteristics or based upon acknowledging one’s own and others group membership. Behavior in the first case is coined by interpersonal behavior; the latter is referred to as intergroup behavior291. I wish to focus on intergroup behavior. The necessity of such a strategy can be illustrated by referring to the importance of the context, in which social behavior occurs;

*…+ attempts to define or describe oneself inevitably proceed from a perspective, and different perspectives have different implications for how a person is treated *…+ Thus, interest in “true identities” and “actual characteristics” of persons can be replaced by concern with the perspectives in which they are constructed.292

288

Communicative musicality is a relative new field of research describing our innate abilities to take in the world, Malloch and Trevarthen (2009), p. 4. The innate aspect of musicality within this field is in line with the statement mentioned during analyzing the phenomenon of dance; We are all born to dance. 289 Trevarthen (2002), p. 22 290 Hargreaves at al. (2002), p. 15 291 Tarrant et al. (2002), p. 137 292 Gergen (1991/2000), p. 146 93

We construct our selves, so to speak, dependent on the situations we encounter. When this construction occurs in an intergroup relationship, the sense of self alters in relation to the other selves. Revisiting the notion of joint attention facilitates an opportunity to grasp this alternation. When jointly attending an object, the experience of the particular object is to some extend constituted by the other. The other is in one sense or another phenomenally present, shaping the character of my experience. Applying this to the area of identityconstruction, we can argue that when joint attention occurs within a specific social group, in which the member’s feels attached, a mutual feeling of community may arise;

Every way we can think of to specify a human being will involve a relationship with others. Our relationships specify us; they change as we change, and we change as they change. Who we are is how we relate. So it is that to affirm and celebrate our relationships through musicking, especially in company with like-feeling people, is to explore and celebrate our sense of who we are, to make us feel more fully ourselves […] we have been allowed to live for a while in the world as it ought to be, in the world of right relationships.293

An obvious approach in exemplifying this in relation to music is to consider the concert scenario once again. Attending a concert with others dramatically alters the musical experience294. This is partly due to the social surroundings and the situated musical actions of me and others. We respond not only to our physical environment but also to the actions of others. But an aspect of the latter is missing, namely that of social identity. When participating in a concert, the individual often find him- or herself so absorbed in the event that the sense of self is defined in relation to the other participants. This is most likely to occur “in company with like-feeling people”295. In such cases, we seem to relate and respond to the music as a group – our reactions are to some degree synchronized. Think for example of a packed dancehall at an electronic dance event. The dancers typically synchronize their movement in relation to each other, the dancer responds to the other 293

Small (1998), p. 142 The concert seems the clearest example of this, but the alteration of the musical experience equally occurs in other scenarios, where the experience is shared between two or more people. Besides, a solitary musical experience is, as mentioned, socially charged. This suggests that the alternation of the musical experience is situation-dependent, rather than merely physical qualified. 295 Cf. above quote 294

dancer, creating a collective synchronized movement reminiscent of a choreographed dance. This synchronicity is a type of simultaneity that goes beyond co-temporal occurrence296. The participants experience a collective energy that facilitates a felt sense of group behavior297 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a sense of being part of a particular environment with the other participants298. Another example of such coordinated group behavior can be found in an enthusiastic crowd at a live rock show, simultaneously waving their hands above their head. The impact on a spectator of these two mentioned examples is in severe contrast to observing a symphonic event, as for example opera. Nevertheless, the participants of an opera are equally synchronized in their participation, though in a passive manner. It would be considered as highly inappropriate to stand up and shout during an opera event (unless of course it is practiced as an act of approval after the event has finished). Every kind of musicking, every kind of participation in a musical event calls for a specific mutual attitude on behalf of each participant. This establishes a community amongst the participants, a mutual frame in which the experience of the music is shared. I have worked to illustrate not only the identity material within music but equally a verification of the claim that we mutually react to a given musical event. When attending a musical event, we may experience the music within a community of attendants. Admittedly, this inspection is insufficient, but it nevertheless serves the purpose by, once again, emphasizing the importance of music in our everyday lives. I will now turn towards a closure of the discussion of the social dimension of music by arguing that the experience of listening to music is a partaking of the musical world.

296

Fikentscher (2000), p. 80 Fikentscher (2000), p. 81 describes this collective energy as vibe. 298 Whether this felt sense of group behavior is initiated by the collective energy or the synchronizing movements is analogue to the chicken vs. egg-discussion and will not be of relevancy in this context. 297

Listening to Music – A partaking of the Musical World. We do things to and with music. Music is a powerful form of art, influencing many people’s everyday lives across the world. I have worked to show the essential social foundation of music through examining the temporal aspects of music, the basic situated musical actions, the mutual sharable experience of music due to the social affordances, the mutually tuningin relationships and joint attention, and finally the influence of the physical surroundings and the social identity potential within music. After gaining this insight into the social dimensions of music, it appears unfeasible to argue that music is an autonomous entity, detached from our everyday social lives. On the contrary, music is a material deeply situated within the current of our everyday world;

As case studies show, music’s effects can be dramatic. It may return language to those for whom it has been lost and restore memory to the amnesiac. It may bring awareness to the torpid and trigger violent seizures in the otherwise calm. This seems extraordinary. Yet music is no miracle but an experience available to everyone.299

Music does seem to have extraordinary powers. I think it is these prevailing aspects of music that persuades some people to speak of music as a mysterious force300, sometimes even of music as an entity inhabiting its own independent world301. Considering these powerful elements of music, it seems profitable to speak of a musical world, albeit on a theoretical level. Music affords a shareable sonic world available to any active perceiver, who is willing to dynamically engage with this sonic world. But the sonic world not merely finds it origin in our everyday world; it is equally maintained, preserved and enacted within this everyday world. It is, in other words, impossible to separate the sonic world from our everyday world. There is, as Gibson emphasizes, only one world;

299

Nonken (2008), p. 290 Small (1998), p. 141 determines that music is “an activity that is always to some degree religious in nature”. 301 Ex. Scruton (1997), p. 489 300

It is a mistake to separate the natural from the artificial as if there were two environments; artifacts have to be manufactured from natural substances. It is also a mistake to separate the cultural environment from the natural environment, as if there were a world of mental products distinct from the world of material products. There is only one world, however diverse, and all animals live in it, although we human animals have altered it to suit ourselves.302

Despite this “one world claim” the purpose of maintaining a conceptual description of the musical world supplies potential for elaborating understanding of the unique character of the musical phenomenon. By employing the notion of a musical world, I wish to emphasize in particular the special nature of the temporal aspects in music. The temporal dimension in music is, as explored above, a twofold entity. Mutual participating in a musical event is a mutual participation in the inner time, the durée. When experiencing music together, we live in the same flux, we share an instant of time with the other (-s);

In that all musical performances evolve over time, the relationships the performance brings into being are also evolving. The relationships at the end of the performance are not the same as those of the beginning. Something has changed between the participants through the fact of having undergone the performance together. Who we are has changed, has evolved a little *…+ Those relationships are all around us as we music, and we are in the midst of them. We need make no effort of will to enter into the world that the performance creates, for it envelopes us, whether we will it or not.303

When experiencing music with others we are, in Schutz’s terminology, growing older together. This is, in my opinion, the ultimate claim of the sharable nature of the musical experience and equally of the essential social character of music in general. Sharing music with others is an explorative activity disclosing knowledge about the self, the surroundings and the other participants involved in the event – we explore the world through our acts of musicking.

302 303

Gibson (1979/1986), p. 130. Also quoted in Costall (1995), p. 471 Small (1998), p. 140 97

But music is not merely a resource for exploring our environment. Music is also a source of profound immersion304. We tend to occasionally have an experience of being caught up in the music, to lose a sense of time and place and submit ourselves to the music;

Rather, music can be seen to place in the foreground of perception an ongoing, physical and material “way of happening” into which actors may slip, fall, acquiesce. This passing over into music, this musical mediation of action, is often observable, often known to self as a feeling or energy state. It is also a local phenomenon, something that occurs in the here and now of action’s flux, as actors interact with music’s presence in an environment or social space. This aspect of music illuminates the body as an entity configured in relation to its material-cultural environment.305

Though music basically is situated within the current of our everyday social lives, it is nevertheless more than a material object, on which to reflect upon306. Music is an innate capacity available to us from the very beginning of our lives. Music is a capacity through which we resonate, adapt and explore our world. Hence, music is a resource for exploring our environment, ourselves and others, a resource for exploring personal identity and social relationships – a resource through which we come to understand our world. It is these potentials of music that I wish to accentuate by conceptualizing the musical world. Thus, when we listen to music, we actively engage with the musical world. We pick up musical affordances according to our perceptual capacities, use and the context in which they arise. Listening to music is an interaction with the music at stake – we engage with the musical piece in a reciprocal manner, meaning that the music to some extent offers the components of the listening experience, which is at the same time to some extent created by ourselves. But every kind of listening experience is somewhat social in character. This is obviously manifested when sharing the experience of listening to music with others. When mutual listening episodes occur, we will not only be able to detect our own picking up of the musical affordances, we will equally be aware of the social availability of the sonic 304

This is particularly investigated within the area of trance applied to cultural studies of how a given culture uses music to achieve a state of trance. See ex. Friedson (1996) for an interesting introduction to the subject. 305 DeNora (2000), p. 160 306 DeNora (2000), p. 160 98

world. This means that we will furthermore be attuned to the other’s response to the music. In this sense, the other will function as a “co-creator” of my listening experience (just as I will equally infect his or hers listening experience). But even when focusing on the solitary listening experience, we will find these social connotations. Every musical action is to some extent situated. This was explored above through the notions of intentional arc, scheme of reference and habitus of listening. Solitary listening episodes have traditionally been the center of focus when discussing the experience of listening to music. Such solitary listening affairs certainly is a noticeable part of our musical experiences in general, but I have worked to show my distance from the traditional tendency to assume that these episodes are the ideal mode of listening to music, and besides their inclination of characterizing the solitary listening episodes as a passive affair. On the contrary, every kind of engagement in the musical world is an active and dynamic event, inevitably situated within the current of our everyday social lives. The solitary retreat to the musical world is socially situated through the individual’s cultural heritage, his or hers background knowledge and previous experiences. I may deliberately choose to shut the world out, so to speak, by indulging to the world of music through a pair of headphones. Or I may, during my years as a teenager, withdraw to my room playing unreasonable loud music, and thereby trying to communicate (or even act out) my anger to my surroundings. The social dimension of music is an inescapable part of any attempt to approach the phenomenon. I cannot image, and have not yet discovered, a comprehensive approach to music, disregarding its social fundament. And why should such one exist? Music is essentially a social activity. We use music in our everyday social lives; our acts of musicking will always to some extent be situated within this social domain. Further investigations into the social domain of music will not merely underline my approach to the musical phenomenon, but will equally be welcomed in understanding the great importance and impact of music that makes it such a powerful tool for humans across the world.

Conclusion Approaching the musical experience is a philosophical rich inquiry. The experience of music is an elusive phenomenon in many ways. I have in the above investigated my approach to the experience of music. My first concern was to establish a conception of the specific mode of attending to the music. By emphasizing the notion of deep listening, I have been able to center my focus on the listening experience, thereby eliminating a discussion of the different musical experiences and the different levels of anticipation in a given musical event. Listening to music, in my usage of the phrase, is a matter of deeply engaging with the music at stake. This was further illustrated by examining the character of aesthetic perception and the specific attention achieved by mindfulness. Leaving music aside for a while, I have developed a theoretical frame in which my claim of music as an active doing has found its basis. Investigating the enactive approach to perception has convinced me of the persuading effects of such an approach and equally of the embodied perspectives of our experiences. Perception, generally speaking, is essentially embodied and situated within the world. This has been of crucial importance to my discovery of the significance of the social dimension. I have repeatedly insisted on putting this dimension aside, though, as I have aspired to complete my discussion of the solitary musical experience, before engaging in the social aspects of the musical experience. This has not been an easy strategy. I have frequently been strained by this decision to divide the investigation of the musical experience into two parts. Especially in applying the theoretical fundament to the analysis of the musical experience has this concern been importunate. Discussing issues such as the emotional affects of music, the musical affordances and music as offering a sonic world have inevitably called for an exploration of the social perspectives of the musical experience. But I have maintained my strategy convinced that it would supply me with a deeper understanding of our musical experience. Besides, in retrospection, it has only provided further evidence for the unavoidably social connotations of our musical experience.

100

The claim of music as an active doing has been bridged with the social dimension of our listening experience through an examination of dance. The case of dancing is one of the best ways to illustrate the active and embodied structures of our musical experience. Dancing is a perfect example of how a participant actively engages in the music being heard, creatively fashioning an observable response. Besides, investigating dance inevitably calls for an analysis of the social dimension of the musical experience. The social aspects have been approached through an examination of the temporal character of music. Music is a temporal form of art, manifesting itself through time. Experiencing music is a matter of participating in the musical time. Every kind of musical action is to some degree situated. The situatedness of our musical experience was investigated by the notions of intentional arc, scheme of reference and habitus of listening. These three notions was coined in the notion of situated musical actions, illustrating how our musical actions always will be influenced by our personal perceptual capacities, our autobiographical history, and cultural heritage. Revisiting the notion of musical affordances, I have illuminated the social connotations of the affordances and thereby established the foundation of understanding music as a social, sharable phenomenon. Music facilitates a mutual-tuning-in relationship, in which the participants share an instance of time together. This mutual-tuning-in relationship is combined with the notion of joint attention in order to grasp the character of shareable aspects of our musical experience. When experiencing music with others the musical experience dramatically alters. This is due to the fact that when attending to music in social contexts, we are aware of the other (-s) attending to the music as well. The social scenery of the musical experience will also influence how the music is experienced. The physical surroundings are an important factor of our musical experience. Finally I round up the investigation of the social dimension of our musical experience by examining the identity aspects within music. Sharing musical experiences with others is an important source of our social identities. Over and all I argue that listening to music is a partaking in the musical world. Emphasizing the theoretical connotations of this musical world, I avoid the persuading claim that music is an autonomous entity, inhabiting its own domain. On the contrary, music is deeply 101

rooted in this world – our everyday world. Conceptualizing music as a musical world is nevertheless a profitable maneuver, as it provides a conceptual frame in which insight into the complex structures of our musical experience can be achieved. When we listen to music, when we deeply engage in listening to a specific piece of music, we take part in the musical world. Listening to music is in this sense a matter of active participation in a mutual available “world” – the world of music. But the level of participation, the act of musicking is inevitably strongly connected to our everyday social lives. In other words, listening to music is an active doing, essentially founded within the current of our everyday lives.

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