InFocus Revue des Affaires Internationales - Issue 8 Emerging Worlds

IN FOCUS

Sciences Po Paris | May 2014 | Issue 7

.

Infocusrevue.com

REVUE DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES

Emerging Worlds

The Crimean Crisis Rise and fall of the BRICS Russia’s ambitions A la conquête de l’Arctique

TEAM

INFOCUS Editor-in-chief Laura Gounon Design Thomas Garabetian Armand Pelloquin Editors François Aze Paulin Barrènes Philipp Dienstbier Thomas Garabetian Charlotte Gardes Adrien Giacchero Andrea Jansson Raphaël Koenig Dario Mangilli Camilla Puglisi Charza Shahabuddin Plamena Solakova A publication by the Asso PSIA 27 Rue Saint Guillaume Paris Cedex 75337

EDITORIAL

« Emerging powers ...

Emerging worlds »

What will tomorrow’s world be like?

It will be the result of various emergences: emerging State powers, emerging regions, emerging social dynamics… Such complex political and social processes that render impossible any predictability of the future world’s organisation.

Many adjectives have been used to describe the repartition of powers in international politics due to economic, cultural and political preeminence shifts: bipolar world, unipolar world, multipolar world… Since the end of the Cold War, there has not been any consensus on the new face of global governance. In parallel to these questions, emergences are not only a State’s business. They are also the consequences of non-State actors’ involvement: NGOs, and civil societies, if not a global civil society. They organize around various issues which raise hopes as well as concerns, but always mobilize. Environment, finance, energy, defense, food security…

What will be tomorrow’s greatest challenges? InFocus will try to give you some insight on the importance of emergences in international relations and the mutations that stem from them.

Our magazine is only the result of the hottest news of the world’s international scene : this is why our first part will be dedicated to the Crimean issue and Turkey’s political situation.

In order to make you travel a little, students have gathered photos from the recent riots in Istanbul, a politically and culturally fascinating city.

We hope you will enjoy this new edition of InFocus: although it may not revolutionize research about international affairs, it may at least give you some new ideas to think about thanks to students’ work. By the time it is published, new debates will obviously have risen, but these will have to be covered by the next InFocus team !

Eventually, if you feel like joining the InFocus’ adventure, do not hesitate to contact us !

Laura Gounon Editor-in-chief / Rédactrice en chef INFOCUS 03

CURRENT AFFAIRS

6

• The Crimean crisis: why gas is a weapon and how Europe should protect itself • Municipales turques : Istanbul, enjeu stratégique et symbolique

DOSSIER 10

• Arctique : à la conquête du Grand Nord • Not your average evil empire : Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood • Tigers and flies : an overview of China’s informal financial system • Is the concept of BRICS still relevant?

• Emission Trading Schemes: toward a CO2 Wall Street?

• L’Indonésie : puissance méconnue et mésestimée • The EU-Africa Summit • Indian food security : the right path?

INFOCUS 04

CONTENT

OPINIONS

30

• Human trafficking in the European Union : the unknown reality • China’s Water Disaster

34

INTERVIEWS

• Ernesto Soria Morales : Policy Coherence for Development • Lionel Champeaud : Airbus à l’épreuve de la Russie

I-WITNESS

38

• Reportage photo : Istanbul • News from the Asso’PSIA

INFOCUS 05

The Crimean crisis: why gas is a weapon and how Europe should protect itself.

The Crimean crisis in Ukraine has underlined how dependent was Europe for its gas supply.

This article argues that Europe is on track for a double danger: increasing dependence on Russia because of depleting resources in Europe, and the increasing willingness of Russia to assert its power, if necessary through territorial expansion and energy blackmail. This article examines fours strategic alternatives that could be pursued to alleviate the threat, or at least mitigate it.

On March 27th, Spain gas industry representatives have positioned themselves as an alternative to Russian gas in the form of imported natural gas. Over the last years, Spanish energy groups and regional governments have invested massively in LNG facilities – hubs that transform liquefied natural gas (LNG) into regular gas that can be pumped in the country’s pipelines – and is now in possession of significant spare capacity, which could be used to plug new gas into its northern neighbours’ grids. Typically, one wouldn’t have thought of Spain as a potential gas transit hub just one year ago, a fresh proposal that underscores the potentially transformational effects of the Crimean crisis.

The gas weapon: invisible but real Energy has been overwhelmingly present in this crisis, even though it has not been used to exert explicit political leverage on Russia’s trading partners so far. Understanding the significance of the gas weapon requires thinking of it as a nuclear weapon: it is not the actual usage of the weapon but the possibility of using it that provokes deterrence. The psychological threat of energy cuts has shaped behaviours, even unconsciously.

This is reflected in part in the approach to sanctions. On the one side, gas-independent US has taken the hard-line in sanctions to Russia. In Europe, where a much more cautious attitude has prevailed, only the UK and France have actively condemned Russian actions and envisaged sanctions, which remain however so far highly symbolic, with the EU and US freezing the assets and imposing travel bans on a dozen of M. Putin’s friends.

France has also evoked blocking the delivery of two Mistral helicopters carriers – a threat that most experts consider highly theoretical given the supplementary harm it could do on the country’s already crisis-weakened industry.

The story is different if one looks at gasdependent European countries. Since the INFOCUS 06

beginning of the crisis, German foreign officials have consistently insisted on maintaining the contact and avoiding too brutal stances.

Security of supply in a context of increasing dependence Somehow, this situation is welcome. Over the last years, many experts have pointed out the danger that an increasing dependence to Russia represented for the security of supply of the continent: the Crimean aggression is the exact argument needed to convince Europeans that the threat is serious. Indeed, domestic resources are slowly depleting, with production expected to decline in the UK, the Netherlands and even Norway, Europe’s energy arteries.

Moreover, although demand has stayed flat or declined in some counties because of the economic downturn, long-term forecasts are unanimous that gas demand will revive all over Europe.

CURRENT AFFAIRS At least three trends drive this outlook. First, several countries have decided to gradually exit nuclear power over the next decade, and much of this capacity will be replaced by a mix of green energy coupled with gas. Second, increasing efforts to boost renewable energy production will result in an increase in flexible power sources to turn on quickly when renewable production falls. Only hydro, storage and gas capacities can meet this specific criterion, but hydro capacities are already saturated and large-scale energy storage has so far proved cost inefficient. Gas is the last option.

Yet, the developments on the CO2 emission market could well alter this prospect. If the low prices of CO2 observed since 2011 prove sustainable, utilities should gradually return to coal, already observed since 2012, in a trend that could become structural. This possibility, if any, would mean the complete failure of the European energy policy, based on the switch of dirty coal-fired power to renewables and natural gas.

What strategic alternatives?

In this context, in what strategic ways should Europe answer? First of all, I believe officials in Europe should now define as a framework hypothesis that Russia is ready to use military force to engage in territorial expansion and that it is willing to use energy supply as a political leverage. Finding alternatives and bringing them to the market efficiently is key. To be acceptable to governments, consumers and companies, these alternatives will need to feature the following characteristics: be reliable, cheap and environmentally friendly. I see at least three possibilities that match these criteria.

Option 1: Develop access to LNG Developing liquefied natural gas (LNG) access to the continent is key. Because of its liquefied form, LNG can be loaded on supertankers and delivered around the world in a cost-efficient manner – most of the cost lies in the liquefaction and re-gasification operations. Consequently, LNG is a formidable market booster: tankers will sail where the prices and profits are highest. Integrating non-Russian gas will require the development of new facilities to make extra LNG supply available in case of crisis.

Paradoxically, on this matter the shortage is more one of supply than one of demand: Middle East producers (Qatar, UAE), world’s top LNG operators, are courted by both East Asia and Europe. As long as gas prices will be much higher in Asia, Middle Eastern LNG will flow there. But other sources can be envisaged, especially in Africa and the Americas.

If the US Congress agrees to release shale gas for exports, American supplies could flow in Europe within two years. However, considering the considerable investment needed to upgrade its facilities, this gas is likely to be only slightly cheaper than Russia’s, if not more expensive. Also, two main risks affect the shiny outlook: a good share of American gas will probably go to East Asia, a region that the Obama administration has defined as strategic and where gas is sold with a premium; there is considerable legal uncertainty because a law needs to be passed in Congress.

Other solutions include West Coast African producers, in particular Nigeria, which for now produces almost exclusively oil and fares the gas that comes out of its wells. Given geographical distances, this LNG is unlikely to be diverted to Asia. Moreover, its exploitation would be both environmentally friendly – for now this gas is simply burnt – and economically rational. European policymakers could push the Nigerian government to exploit its gas, and provide technical and financial assistance to do so.

Option 2: Improve infrastructure and market liquidity Option 1 will work on large-scale only with further integration of the European gas market. There is almost one gas market per country in Europe, and only one has the sufficient liquidity and financial integration to prevent single actors of market-making: the British NBP hub. Financial incentives to join the gas market, both physical and financial, need to be set up to improve liquidity. For now, unfortunately, one can witness the opposite: major financial institutions are exiting energy trading massively. Many banks consider this activity too capital-hungry, and sell off their assets to comply with new capital regulations of Basel III. Last example?

Last week only, JP Morgan sold its energy-trading branch to Swissbased merchant trading house Mercuria.

Much more important are cross-border flows. New investments need to be made in order to transfer more gas from individual European countries, which will provide diversity of supply for gas markets as well as balancing potential for new renewable capacities.

Here again, progress is slow in a context of fiscal tightening, where governments are not keen on undertaking new large infrastructure projects.

Option 3: Develop domestic production of power and gas The nuclear option should also be re-examined. In a bold move following the Fukushima disaster, many countries, notably Germany but also Switzerland, Austria or France, have decided to gradually exit or diminish their exposure to nuclear power. When security of supply was a marginal preoccupation, this may have made sense, but the new geopolitical conditions brought upon by the Ukrainian crisis call for a review of these policies.

Finally, European countries should develop indigenous gas production. Shale gas could do the job. Shale deposits are present in many countries throughout the continent: UK, Germany, Netherlands, more largely France and Poland. Governmental frameworks to provide incentives for exploration and production should be designed to realise this potential.

Overall, there is no doubt that Europe will stay dependent. It should only manage this dependence to avoid adverse effects. And to stay optimistic, Europe is as dependent on Russia for its purchases as Russia is dependent on Europe for its sales.

Paulin Barrènes INFOCUS 07

Municipales turques : Istanbul, enjeu stratégique et symbolique

52,7 millions d’électeurs ont exprimé leur suffrage lors des municipales du 30 mars dernier. Les Turcs sont allés voter de façon massive, ce qui a permis au Premier Ministre de transformer ces élections en un plébiscite de sa personnalité et de son parti l’AKP (Parti pour la Justice et le Développement, formation de centre-droit).

Depuis la première victoire du parti AKP en 2002, jamais des élections ne se sont tenues dans un tel climat de défiance : corruption, fraudes et autoritarisme d’un parti qui domine le paysage politique depuis cette date.

Les candidats de l’AKP arrivent en tête avec 45% des suffrages exprimés contre 28,5% pour les candidats du principal parti d’opposition: le CHP (Parti républicain du peuple). Erdoğan parle d’une “victoire totale” de son parti et trouve en ce “référendum” une justification suffisante quant à sa candidature aux prochaines élections. Suite à la réforme constitutionnelle entreprise par le gouvernement en 2007 les élections présidentielles d’août 2014 se tiendront pour la première fois au suffrage universel direct.

Faut-il voir dans ce succès électoral de l’AKP aux municipales un soutien inconditionnel du peuple turc à l’égard du parti et de ses représentants ?

politologue Ali Çarkoglu le définit comme étant rural, jeune, plutôt féminin et peu éduqué. L’Est de la Turquie par exemple est plus tenté de voter pour un parti conservateur et traditionnel comme l’AKP, une majorité de Kurdent choisissent l’AKP plutôt que le parti kurde, le BDP. Le climat de défiance qui s’est installé avec la guerre fratricide déclenchée entre Erdoğan et la confrérie de l’imam Gülen, la diffusion sur les réseaux sociaux d’un extrait d’une discussion entre le ministre des affaires étrangères, Ahmet Davutoglu, et le chef des services de renseignements évoquant la possibilité d’une opération militaire turque en Syrie, ou encore les affaires téléphoniques mettant en cause le fils du Premier ministre, sont autant d’élements qui présageaient un recul de l’AKP aux municipales. Pourtant, aussi choquant qu’eut été la menace d’interdiction sur Twitter et Youtube, ces préoccupations n’ont eu d’impact que sur une minorité de la population turque. Une minorité qui engloberait les 2,5 millions de manifestants de Gezi face à une “majorité silencieuse” qui n’a pas hésité à reconduire l’AKP dans les principales villes de Turquie.

Il faut cependant nuancer cette allégeance du peuple turc au leadership d’Erdogan. Sans pouvoir mesurer complètement la portée des actions frauduleuses lors des dernières élections, il ne faut pas omettre que l’électricité a été coupée dans plus de 40 villes au moment du décompte. Plusieurs bulletins de votes ont été brûlés ou volés, sans donner lieu à l’annulation des votes, alors que la plupart des recours ont été acceptées. Située à la frontière avec le Kurdistan syrien, la ville stratégique de Ceylanpinar est un exemple révélateur. Après avoir retrouvé plusieurs bulletins de votes brûlés, des heurts avec la police ont commencé. Les résultats de l’élection ont finalement été modifié en faveur de l’AKP, alors même que l’on prévoyait une victoire du BDP.

Il existe un soutien indéniable d’une partie de la population à l’AKP, mais ce vote est largement motivé par des raisons économiques et religieuses. Bien qu’étant un parti qualifié de pro-islamique, l’AKP a effectué des avancées notables en termes de démocratie.

Par exemple, l’âge pour être élu au Parlement a été abaissé de 30 à 25 ans. C’est un parti qui est vu comme étant proche du peuple et flirtant avec l’électorat des catégories les plus défavorisées.

Bien qu’il n’existe pas un profil homogène de l’électeur AKP, le INFOCUS 08

Cependant, il convient de souligner l’avancée du BDP dans une grande partie du pays. Malgré le contrôle des médias et les violentes répressions exercées envers les membres du BDP, le parti semble être sorti plus fort de ces élections. Il arrive en tête dans près de 102 villes, remporte notamment trois nouvelles provinces, et se constituer comme étant la troisième force politique en Turquie.

CURRENT AFFAIRS Un système municipal complexe La première municipalité de l’Empire Ottoman est établie en 1835 à Istanbul. La tradition de gouvernance locale est longue de plus d’un siècle et joue un rôle crucial dans la vie socio-économique et politique du pays. Le système politique turc se divise ainsi entre une gouvernance de type central et des gouvernements locaux. L’article 127 de la Constitution sur la régulation des gouvernements locaux distingue trois types de gouvernements locaux qui incluent les administrations de provinces spéciales.

Pour ce qui est des plus grandes villes – plus de 750 000 habitants – un modèle spécifique de gouvernance métropolitaine a été mis en place. Il établit deux niveaux de compétences pour les municipalités métropolitaines et pour certains districts municipaux. Pour les trois grandes villes, Istanbul, Ankara et Izmir, on parle de « ilçe belediyesi » ou municipalité d’arrondissement. Les décideurs locaux y sont directement élus par les citoyens pour une période de cinq ans. Ainsi, le 30 mars dernier un électeur turc d’une grande ville comme Istanbul a voté cinq fois ; une fois pour l’élection du « muhtar », une fois pour le maire du quartier, une fois pour le conseil municipal, une fois pour le maire de son arrondissement, une fois pour le maire métropolitain et une fois pour le maire de province.

L’autonomie administrative des gouvernements locaux, élus démocratiquement, est assurée par la Constitution. Bien que la Turquie ait réalisé beaucoup de réformes en faveur de la décentralisation sur la dernière décennie, les réserves constitutionnelles relatives à la tutelle n’ont pas pu être amendées. Signe de la prééminence d’une forte culture centralisatrice et bureaucratique dans le pays, héritage sans aucun doute du kémalisme et ses convictions jacobines.

L’AKP à l’épreuve de la gouvernance locale Le parti au pouvoir garde le contrôle des principales métropoles du pays, dont la plus importante : Istanbul. L’AKP doit ainsi répondre à plusieurs défis qui mettent à l’épreuve sa gouvernance et sa légitimité.

Il doit notamment répondre au problème majeur de l’accélération de l’étalement urbain. Ce phénomène apparaît en deux phases entre les années 1940 et les années 1980. La première phase concerne le développement des gecekondu avec l’arrivée massive des migrants – d’origine rurale- sans encadrement des pouvoirs publics. La seconde phase correspond au développement des apartkondu et la mise en place d’habitats informels. Il s’agit davantage d’une réponse de la part de la municipalité stambouliote, qui pose problème au niveau des normes et du non-respect de l’urbanisme.

Le secteur public turc a vite senti qu’il fallait se réapproprier une partie de ce marché, notamment avec l’établissement dès 1986 d’un partenariat public/privé. Le gouvernement actuel a décidé d’investir massivement dans le secteur immobilier et depuis 2003, 90% du montant total des investissements publics du secteur a été alloué à la période 2003-2013. On observe une accélération des investissements sur la dernière phase, ce qui montre bien que l’AKP a fait de l’immobilier une de ses priorités. L’enjeu est de réussir à établir un transfert entre le foncier public sur le secteur privé puisqu’il y a puisqu’il existe encore beaucoup de terrains publics en Turquie.

Un autre point a été de transformer les quartiers historiques, notamment avec le réaménagement des gecekondu et la réappropriation d’un nouveau chantier environnemental, réservé à une classe aisée, avec une externalisation systématique des coûts.

On l’aura compris, l’urbain est la priorité de l’AKP. Il concentre, depuis 2002, tous ses efforts et son budget dans l’amélioration des

conditions du milieu urbain, en particulier dans les trois grandes villes : Istanbul, Ankara et Izmir, au détriment des villes de l’est et du plateau anatolien par exemple.

Des projets d’aménagements urbains de grande envergure ont été annoncés. Le projet d’un canal qui relierait la mer Noire à celle de Marmara a été qualifié de « fou » et son coût est estimé entre 10 et 20 milliards de dollars. Ce projet n’a pas encore réellement abouti et révèle les dysfonctionnements de la gouvernance en termes de transport, car seulement 9 km sur les 71km ont été inaugurés depuis octobre 2013.

Près de ce canal, on prévoit la construction de deux grandes cités satellites, réservées aux élites aisées. Près de ces zones, un troisième aéroport destiné à plus de 100 millions de passagers, devrait-être opérationnel d’ici 2017 afin de désengorger l’affluence de l’aéroport Ataturk et de l’aéroport Sabiha Gökçen sur la rive asiatique.

Or la principale critique faite aux municipalités est liée à leur politique de transports : il n’y a pas de convergence entre la planification urbaine et le réseau des transports. Ce souci de fluidifier les transports - Istanbul étant au bord de la saturation – a été l’un des arguments phares en faveur de la construction d’un troisième pont. Sauf qu’à ce jour, aucune entreprises de conseils en urbanisme n’a été capable de se prononcer sur l’impact réel que peut avoir ce canal sur le désengorgement des flux à Istanbul.

Certains spécialistes pensent même que l’augmentation des voies de circulation ne diminuerait pas le trafic.

Le mouvement Gezi s’est déclenché du fait de la destruction du parc de Gezi, et de la construction de ce troisième pont, qui s’appelle Yavuz Sultan Selim – du nom d’un sultan célèbre pour ses massacres d’alévis - mais égaement pour le projet de construction d’un centre commercial sur Taksim. Qu’il s’agisse de destructions ou de nouvelles constructions, on remarque que ce sont des enjeux d’urbanismes liés à des questions de symboliques religieuse et politique qui soulèvent les foules. Au niveau écologique, le lieu retenu pour la construction de ce troisième point – en cours depuis le 29 mai 2013 – est très dommageable pour l’environnement et ne permettra pas à la « ceinture verte » d’exister.

L’AKP a concentré tous ses investissements dans les grandes métropoles tel que Istanbul. Il faut savoir qu’historiquement, Istanbul est la ville qui a permis à l’AKP de mettre en place son réseau « clientéliste » suite aux municipales de 1994 – à l’époque il ne s’agit pas de l’AKP en tant que tel mais du Refah Partisi -. Erdoğan a longtemps été maire d’Istanbul avant d’accéder aux fonctions de Premier ministre. Istanbul est donc un enjeu symbolique, beaucoup de turcs identifiant la ville à la prise de Constantinople de 1453 et à un imaginaire post-ottoman - imaginaire bien illustré dans le film grand public Mehmet 1453-.

Pour clore le volet municipal, il faut voir qu’il existe une certaine bipolarité entre Ankara, la capitale, et Istanbul. On voit par exemple une entorse dans l’agenda du Premier ministre qui fait installer ses nouveaux bureaux dans le prolongement du Palais de Dolmabahce qui est l’ancien palais impérial Ottoman, doit-on y voir un rapprochement avec cette partie ottomane de l’histoire turque ? Erdogan joue sur la symbolique des monuments historiques.

Ainsi, Istanbul apparaît comme étant au cœur des enjeux politiques de la Turquie car elle constitue un nœud à la fois stratégique et symbolique, sans toutefois envisager qu’elle ne devienne la capitale.

Charza Shahabuddin

INFOCUS 09

DOSSIER Arctique : à la conquête du Grand Nord Not your average evil empire: Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood Tigers and flies: an overview of China’s informal financial system Is the concept of BRICS still relevant?

Emission Trading Schemes: toward a CO2 Wall Street?

L’Indonésie : puissance méconnue et mésestimée The EU-Africa Summit Indian food security: the right path?

INFOCUS 11

Arctique : à la conquête du Grand Nord

Direction le Grand Nord et cap sur l’Arctique pour un tour d’horizon complet des enjeux de cette région de 21 millions de km2.

Arctique et changement climatique Avec une augmentation de température deux fois supérieure à la moyenne planétaire au cours du dernier demi-siècle, il n’est plus possible de douter, l’Arctique se réchauffe. Le changement climatique est une réalité et ses effets sont d’autant plus marqués que l’on se rapproche des pôles.

La hausse du thermostat de 1 ou 2 °C prévue au niveau de l’équateur n’est rien comparée aux +4° à 5°C attendus sur la banquise à horizon 2050. Conséquence logique, la banquise fond à grande vitesse (réduction de la superficie estimée entre 3,3% et 8% chaque année).

Al Gore s’est trompé, affirmant qu’en 2013, l’Arctique aurait disparu. Si cette erreur a pu ravir les climato-sceptiques, cela pour autant, ne laisse rien présager de bon pour le pôle nord.

Les contrecoups du réchauffement climatique sont terribles: chute de la biodiversité, compétition de niches écologiques (renard de l’Arctique), menaces d’extinctions (morses), destruction habitat naturel (ours polaire), perturbation de la chaine alimentaire, augmentation du niveau de la mer…

Pire encore. La dégradation du permafrost et la réduction de l’enneigement entrainent une chute de l’albédo et installent la région dans un « feedback » de réchauffement positif.

L’environnement n’est pas la seule victime du réchauffement anthropogénique mondial. La population locale fait elle aussi les frais du changement climatique. Les risques liés à la sécurité INFOCUS 12

alimentaire ou au recul de la banquise poussent les jeunes générations notamment, vers des contrées australes plus accueillantes. Le mode de vie des 4 millions d’autochtones qui forment les tribus locales s’effrite tout comme leur culture, au profit d’une occidentalisation globale. Les Inuits et consorts n’échappent pas au sort des populations longtemps isolées au sein desquelles, alcoolisme et suicides font des ravages.

Ironie de la situation, le changement climatique apporte son lot de consolation aux populations locales en offrant de meilleures conditions de vie : développement économique lié à l’exploitation des ressources et du tourisme, augmentation des salaires, développement technologique et médicales…

DOSSIER L’arctique c’est l’avenir

L’arctique, un statut politique à part

Résumer l’Arctique à une zone climatique aride, assujettie à un réchauffement serait une énorme méprise. C’est tout l’inverse.

L’Arctique, c’est l’avenir. Les résultats des expertises géologiques sont catégoriques, la région est très riche en hydrocarbures. Le cercle polaire contiendrait l’équivalent de 90 milliards de barils de pétrole, soit 10% des réserves mondiales et 25% des ressources gazières de la planète. Si l’extraction de ces minerais s’annonce délicate, elle n’est pas impossible pour autant, puisque le réchauffement climatique contribue à rendre exploitables 84% des ressources.

Sans aucune surprise, ces chiffres ont réveillé l’intérêt économique des Etats et des compagnies énergétiques du monde entier.

A une époque où le prix du baril peut aisément flirter avec $140, les ressources de l’Arctique apparaissent comme une incroyable aubaine financière. Les premières estimations se chiffrent en plusieurs centaines de milliards de dollars, autrement dit, une véritable bouffée d’air pour des Etats qui se remettent à peine d’une crise économique majeure.

Les nations sont déjà pied d’œuvre puisque la multiplication des recherches pourrait venir allonger la liste des sites déjà exploités dans la région.

A la différence de l’Antarctique, le schéma de gouvernance du pôle nord est sous contrôle de l’Arctic Council et de ses 8 membres permanents (Etats possédant des territoires dans la région) : Canada, Danemark, Finlande, Islande, Norvège, Russie, Suède, Etats-Unis.

Assurant tour à tour la présidence de ce forum intergouvernemental, les membres permanents veillent à la coordination des différents groupes de travail : surveillance et évaluation de risques, protection de la faune et de la flore, programme de gestion des polluants, prévention des urgences et réaction, rapport sur le développement humain…

Bien que leur appel pour une plus grande liberté d’autodétermination soit resté sans réponse ou presque, les populations autochtones bénéficient du statut spécial de participants permanents au travers des associations qui les représentent. Elles ne disposent pas du droit de vote ou d’un droit de véto mais sont associées à chacun des projets de développement de la région. Les Etats de l’Arctique l’ont bien compris : s’ils restent les seuls décideurs, le développement de la région ne pourra se faire sans le soutien et l’approbation des populations locales.

En dehors des ressources en hydrocarbures, l’Arctique peut venir bouleverser la donne économique mondiale en redessinant les routes maritimes internationales. Les quelques navires qui ont pu transiter via les détroits polaires durant l’été pourraient montrer la voix aux cargos et autres containers en tout genre. La révision des flottes de brise-glaces en Russie ou la planification du renforcement de la flotte au Canada vont dans ce sens.

Permettant un accès direct entre l’océan Pacifique et l’océan Atlantique, le « passage du Nord-Est » (Nord-Est de la Sibérie Sevmorput) et « passage du Nord-Ouest » (Canada) offrent des lignes commerciales directes entre l’Orient et Occident. Ces nouveaux axes vont sans aucun doute modifier certains rapports de force économique : réduction de 40% des délais de transports en entre l’Europe et l’Asie, risque lié à la piraterie diminuée, réduction de l’emprise maritime des villes portuaires comme Singapour, Gibraltar, Suez et Panama. Un monde encore plus globalisé en somme.

Cependant, le climat de paix et de coopération qui caractérisait jusque-là le fonctionnement du Conseil de l’Arctique a été récemment ébranlé. Août 2007, le bathyscaphe Akademic Federov plante le drapeau national russe par 4261 mètres de profondeur.

Cet exploit technique et scientifique est en réalité, un message envoyé aux nations polaires et au reste du monde, un message de souveraineté. Un second en réalité puisqu’en décembre 2001, la Russie revendiquait officiellement une large partie du Pôle Nord, stipulant que les dorsales Lomonossov et Mendeleev étaient de même composition géologique que la Russie. La requête, qui est clairement un camouflet pour étendre sa Zone Economique Exclusive et son emprise sur la région et ses ressources, est restée sans réponse de la part de l’ONU. Même résultat pour les revendications danoises et canadiennes.

Les tensions autour de l’Arctique devraient prendre encore de l’ampleur avec la remilitarisation progressive de la région et la pression des nations étrangères : la présence chinoise se fait de plus en plus ressentir dans la région, l’UE à travers la Norvège souhaiterait se protéger du monopole gazier russe…

Nouveau théâtre géopolitique ou exemple d’exploitation durable, le statut de l’Arctique est irrémédiablement en train de changer. Il serait vraiment regrettable que ce bouleversement se fasse au détriment de l’environnement et des populations locales. Mais pour autant, est ce que cela serait surprenant ?

François Aze

Le transport de marchandises n’est plus la seule option à considérer.

L’Arctique doit se préparer à devenir une destination ouverte au tourisme ou encore à la pêche même si la région reste protégée par l’Arctique Fishery Management.

INFOCUS 13

Not your average evil empire: Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood

The West often fails to correctly acknowledge Russia’s strategic ambitions. This article reviews the origins and reasons for Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood.

The stand-off between Russia and the West over Crimea has substantiated a distorted image of Russian in the West. Putin is labelled “delusional” by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and is allegedly “living in another world”, according to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This article will argue that these accusations fail to capture the ambitions and full scope of Russian foreign policy. Putin very much lives in this world, and he shapes it according to a clear set of strategic ambitions.

The ‘near abroad’ Neither Russian actions in Ukraine nor its behavior elsewhere in the region can be understood without putting it in context with the country’s strategic ambitions, whose centerpiece is maintaining influence in a region Russia calls the ‘near abroad’. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has carved out a distinctive geographic zone of influence in the area of the former USSR. Boris Yeltsin’s administration was the first to coin for this zone the term ‘near abroad’. Already in the early 1990s Moscow made clear that it viewed the ex-Soviet countries not like any other foreign country.

INFOCUS 14

Instead, it sought a much more special relation-ship with the ‘near abroad’, maybe remotely comparable to what has been termed ‘Françafrique’ in France. This special relationship has remained a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy to this day.

What does this special relationship imply for Russian ambitions in the region? First, it illustrates that ever since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Russia sought to be the biggest military and economic player in the ‘near abroad’. Yeltsin’s foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev already asserted in 1992 in front of the OSCE that the concept of the ‘near abroad’ entails first and foremost upholding military and economic influence in the region. Second, it shows that Russia has seen itself as a protector of ethnic Russians in the ‘near abroad’ ever since Kozyrev announced at the UN in 1993 that Russia would assume special responsibility for Russian-speaking minorities in ex-Soviet countries. For this purpose, Russia’s military doctrine ex-plicitly allows for deployment of armed forces abroad to “protect citizens of the Russian Federation outside the Russian Federation”.

DOSSIER What is even more important, however, than merely identifying Russia’s ambitions is under-standing where they come from and why they are so essential to the country. After all, Russia’s strive to remain a key military and economic power as well as the protector for Russians in the ‘near abroad’ are not product of some abstruse power fantasies of the Russian political elite. They make good strategic sense and have a lot to do with Russia’s political and strategic position after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First, Russia’s economy in 1991 was closely interlinked with former Soviet countries. Second, several millions of Russian citizens lived outside of the new Russian Federation’s borders after the collapse of the USSR. Third, the Russian Federation was a very instable, heterogeneous political entity in 1991 and retain-ing influence in the ‘near abroad’ was a strategic tool for Moscow to ensure the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation itself.

Challenges to Russian ambitions

Even though things have changed during the past two decades, these three reasons still remain largely intact in 2014 as the main motivations for Russian ambitions. Although only two of Russia’s top five trading partners nowadays are former Soviet republics, according to 2012 WTO figures, economic relations with the ‘near abroad’ remain important. The Russian diaspora in ex-Soviet countries has also been shrinking; in Ukraine for instance, it went down by one third from 12 million to 8 million within only one decade. Nevertheless, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus remain to have large Russian minorities, continuing to create plenty of motivation for Russia to act as a protector-state. Lastly, the Russian Federation, with its 85 republics, oblasts, federal cities and other sub-entities remains a heterogeneous political entity challenged by instability in various regions. Maintaining a firm grip over the ‘near abroad’ is a tool for the Russian leadership to maintain control over several of its own regions that want greater autonomy or secession.

Moscow first tried to respond to these challenges with soft power, or ‘carrots’: it lured President Viktor Yanukovych with $15billion of benefits, gas price reductions, industrial cooperation and others away from the EU association agreement and paved the way towards an integration of Ukraine in a customs union and eventually the Eurasian Economic Union. When Russia lost grip over Ukraine after Yanukovych was ousted, however, this project failed and Moscow switched to hard power, or ‘sticks’. Putin feared that with a pro-European administration in Kiev, Ukraine might eternally move out of Russia’s sphere of influence and that his two worst-case scenarios – EU-integration and NATO membership for Ukraine – might become reality at some point in the future.

Annexing Crimea was kind of an insurance for Moscow that at least one of these worst case scenarios is off the table. ECFR analyst Stefan Meister contends “in the NATO statute it says clearly that a state whose territory is occupied by another state cannot become a NATO-member.” Annexing Crimea, just as occupying Transnistria, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia before, is Russia’s strategy to prevent countries in the ‘near abroad’ to become NATO-members. It is yet another pragmatic strategic step there-fore, to cement Russia’s claim of unchallenged economic and military leadership in the ‘near abroad’.

‘Carrots’ and ‘sticks’ As any regional power, Russia has to use a set of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to achieve the ambitions described before. The ‘carrots’ Putin’s administration has employed comprise a range of (economic) integration projects with ‘near abroad’: in 2000 Russia formed the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec) with five countries of the ‘near abroad’, roughly following the example of the EEC. In 2015 political integration is planned to follow suit with the Eurasian Economic Union, which mirrors the organizational structure of the EU. Putin’s integration projects offer countries in the ‘near abroad’ a common-market with 165 million people and a combined GDP of $2.3trillion and tries strengthen to Russia’s influence over these neighbors thereby.

Russia, however, also readily employs ‘sticks’ in order to achieve its ambitions in the ‘near abroad’. In 2013, for instance, it pressured Armenia to join the customs union with Russia, by threatening to withdraw military assistance. Moscow is also not too shy to resort to armed conflict, as the 2008 invasion of Georgia has clearly proven, in order to save its influence in the ‘near abroad’. Nevertheless, it is important to remember, that it is a mix of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ that Russia employs. Even the fact that Moscow frequently switches to hard power, should not distract from this point.

President Putin’s foreign policy, considered in the larger context of Russia’s ambitions after 1991, is therefore not the foreign policy of a delusional mad-man, who lives in another world.

The recent steps Russia has taken in Crimea can be regarded as a response to challenges to Russia’s larger ambitions in the ‘near abroad’. Two developments, albeit inadvertently, have contested Russia’s claim of exclusive military and economic influence in the ‘near abroad’. On the one hand, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and eventual eastward enlargement of the EU have challenged Russia’s economic and political predominance in the region. The enlargement of NATO, on the other hand, is competing with Russia’s claim to exclusive military leadership in the area of the former USSR. In case of Ukraine, the association agreement the EU offered to Kiev, challenged Russia’s economic integration projects in Eur-asia, to which Ukraine as the second biggest exSoviet country is immensely important.

After Crimea The West will eventually have great troubles challenging Russia’s military and economic ambitions in its ‘near abroad’. Moscow’s strategic interest in the region is far greater than that of Europe or the US, which is why the West will be very unlikely to match Moscow’s resolve in dealing with crises in Russia’s ‘near abroad’.

Furthermore, the Russian leadership faces an increasingly tough political situation on the inside. The 2011/2012 parliamentary and presidential elections were ridden by protest and granted Putin and his United Russia far less legitimization than before – even by official polls. Putin will attempt to boost this declining political legitimization on the inside by taking an increasingly confrontationist stance on the outside. The West is ill-advised to seek this confrontation. Instead, re-assuring Russia at least partly in its military and economic ambitions in the ‘near abroad’ will openup the window for diplomacy. As a case in point, Russia has started re-engaging in direct diplomatic talks with the US last week after President Barack Obama asserted that neither Georgia nor Ukraine “are currently on the path to NATO membership”.

Philipp Dienstbier INFOCUS 15

Tigers and flies : An overview of China’s informal financial system

Tax havens and shadow banking form the keystone of the Chinese economic miracle - for better and for worse. Hidden amid great volumes of cash, money laundering has turned into a child’s play. Charlotte Gardes explains.

A wide array of issues was not discussed- not even in an undertonewhen last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe for the first time since he took office: the disclosure at the end of January, by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, revealing that the wealth of China’s elite was for the greater part held offshore, was one of them.

It was no real surprise though when the documents uncovered information on nearly 22.000 offshore clients with addresses in Hong Kong and mainland China. What the public opinion was the most struck about? The presence of more than a dozen family members of China’s top political and military leaders among the most eminent owners of these offshore companies, mostly based in the British Virgin Islands (BVI). On January 21st 2014, the Guardian did not doubt call it “China’s princelings storing riches in Caribbean offshore haven”.

One information did mostly disturb China’s authorities, and most probably Xi Jinping himself, well known to cultivate an anticorruption campaigner image: his brother-in-law, real-estate investor Deng Jiagui, unmasked as the proud owner of a 50% stake in the BVI-incorporated Excellent Effort Property Development, according to BVI records. It certainly was a thorn in the foot for Xi Jinping who had earlier vowed to fight corrupt officials - “tigers” and “flies”- suspected of financial improprieties. Considering that at least 16 of China’s wealthiest people have been found to take advantage of the BVI’s offshore anonymity, it looks like Xi Jinping is from now on gunning for an ever bigger beast.

Such a great amount of offshore companies disclosed by the ICIJ demonstrates the country’s status as one of the premier buyers of offshore services. China’s rapid economic growth has led to a great degree of internal economic tension within the nation. And the wealth of China’s rich is escaping the mainland – exacerbating conflicts of interest and the covert use of government power.

Financial repression In China, the financial system is the economy’s Achilles’ heel.

Despite the economic reforms of 1978, which brought about – at least on the surface- substantial improvements and the pursuit of a diversified banking system, the latter has lagged behind the rest of the economy in the transition process. Alongside with the Central Bank and the “Big Four” –the four state-owned public banksjoint-stock banks are indirectly controlled by the government: the dominance of state ownership puts it at the highest level of any major economy worldwide.

But one phenomenon puts up with the government’s long-term goal of developing a commercial banking system: financial repression.

The People’s Bank of China controls interest rates, and credit allocation is still heavily influenced more by political factors rather than commercial motives… seriously hindering the development of a fully and efficiently functioning capital market.

What is most significantly exacerbating this phenomenon is undoubtedly the inefficient and unproductive allocation of scarce capital across the country. A large part of the savings goes to stateowned enterprises, whereas private and medium-sized enterprises, which constitute the growth engines of the economy, are deprived of capital. They are intentionally discriminated against in terms of credit access and availability, to the point that, according to the World Bank, domestic private firms in China are among the most financially constrained in the world.

Due to this eminent misallocation of credit by the state, China’s small, entrepreneurial and private companies are forced to rely on informal and even underground credit channels to finance their survival. 90% of small private companies in China do not have access to official credit allocation1. The country’s unconvertible currency and change controls reinforce this trend, which makes China, more than any other country in the world, an economy strongly dependent on financial airlocks.

INFOCUS 16

DOSSIER Round trip investments: a Chinese kind of tax evasion Tax evasion is a major issue worldwide, and China is not an exception to the rule. The hidden financing of its economy is stiffened by a very special kind of company restructuration called “round trip investments”. Worse still, it has tailored the phenomenon to its own economic situation during this past decade, leading to the explosion of this kind of investments within China’s financial elite.

How does it function? Chinese domestic companies are reorganized into an offshore holding company structure in a common law jurisdiction like the BVI or Hong Kong – with an ownership moved to the offshore level- allowing Chinese businessmen to facilitate private equity investments in Chinese companies, prepare companies for offshore listings and consequently seek international financing.

With this type of investments, Chinese shareholders finish up receiving notable shares in the offshore company, indirectly owning shares in the domestic subsidiary company. Round-trip investments are this way used as a springboard for future US listings, as well as a major bridge to foreign investments: international investors are indeed much more familiar to the legal regime in common law jurisdictions (preferred share provisions, corporate governance…), and fear the less developed state of Chinese law to do all of this at the domestic Chinese company level. Round-tripping is so popular among Chinese investors that in an October 2012 report, the Global Financial Integrity NGO castigated China as the worldwide leader of illicit financial flows from 2000-2011, so that the country lost $3.79 trillion.

Shadow banking: the critical hidden financing of China’s economy Shadow banking constitutes the first response to the increasing scarcity of bank credits. As an authentic economic microcosm, with its rules and its specificities, it notably is a true separate actor within the informal Chinese economy. For that matter, whereas parallel banking systems in developed countries are most commonly associated to some sophisticated financial engineering, shadow banking is in China deeply rooted in tradition. Made of a plethora of actors– pawnbrokers, trusts and other financial guarantorssuch a combination makes it even more closely linked to the real economy2. In fact, Fitch rating agency recently described it as a system where the informal sector actors were functioning de facto as the off-balance sheet structures of the official sector – no doubt the agency downgraded China’s sovereign debt from AA+ to AAlast year3.

« In China, the financial system is the economy’s Achilles’ heel »

According to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, shadow banking – specifically all credit operations regulated by different norms than those of classic credit allocation- constituted in 2012 about 15% of China’s GDP. The whole off-balance sheet activity made of credit allocations to high-risk borrowers – real estate developers, local administrations and SMEs- was estimated to form one third of China’s GDP that same year.

Yet, little understanding to where the money is going, who is loaning it or what the credit quality of assets is poses China’s unregulated shadow banking sector as an increasing risk to the country’s financial stability: beyond the volumes of cash which constitute shadow banking, it is more its opacity, its quality and its ability to absorb potential financial losses which make it critical.

So, what is now the looming threat in China? Increasing tensions inside its financial system, following 5 years of an unprecedented credit growth, suggest indeed a rising economic vulnerability and a stronger systemic risk. Market forces and political circumstances have triggered the emergence of a genuine shadow banking and money laundering system, driving the Dragon as a leading market for offshore havens. That is why international financial analysts are pledging for more market access for non-state interests and more transparency, urging the Chinese government for a financial reform in order to lay the conditions of a stable and long-term growth... which could restrain the one financial bubble which is shaking the world in 2014.

Overtime, the Chinese government has thus been increasingly embarrassed with round trip investment structures: it created regulation national agencies and adopted circulars regulate M&A operations by foreign investors, impose registration for equity financing abroad, and require registration of “greenfield” investments by Chinese residents in offshore companies… though political considerations to allow Hong Kong to continue to operate as the main international financial center for China slowed down the attempt to impose a strong regulatory environment in mainland China. Cash, indeed, passes through Hong Kong before landing in tax havens such as the BVI…

Charlottes Gardes

INFOCUS 17

Is the concept of BRICS still relevant ?

The emergence of new State actors on the international scene has for long been summarized in the the acronym of “BRICS”, referring to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Their apparent union for development and economics only minimizes genuine disagreements on larger political alliance. Are the BRICS anything more than a Western-created concept?

BRICS: this name must ring a bell.

Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa: the five countries representing best the emergence of new State actors on the international scene. Numerous are the commentators and media which use the concept of BRICS to refer to the increasing capacity of influence, interference and blockage of States that were for a long time stuck in the “developing countries” category.

The last decades have seen a reassessment of their status: their territories, demographics, and economics make them indispensable elements of today’s world politics.

Nevertheless, to what extent is their merging into the sole concept of BRICS relevant? Do their collective objectives exceed their particular characteristics?

From economic to political alliances…

First, let’s go back to the notion’s birth. It was firstly created out of economic and financial considerations: while Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neil crafted his notion of BRICS in 2001, he mostly referred to emerging markets, whose GDP would greatly increase and form great economic partners and outlets for Western countries.

This is why BRICS firstly refers to numbers: five countries, representing 40% of the world’s population and around 60% INFOCUS 18

of world growth, owing to the IMF. Countries that also greatly benefited from globalization to galvanize their exports and assure their position in global trade.

Politics followed economics, as shown by the formation of the G20 that reinforced their integration within the international community.

As permanent members of the Security Council, China and Russia were of course at the vanguard of this movement. Their discourse as a united developing front was supposed to enable them to keep the strong hand in international negotiations without assuming more responsibilities.

The BRICS are also a union of pragmatic States who oppose the Northern development model, often presented as the only step towards modernization. Defense of the concept of national sovereignty and equality among nations against what they perceive as the arrogance of the West was the core argument. The annual BRICS summits highlight this progressive shift towards politics, even though most decisions taken continue to deal with economics.

This is why emphasis was put on South-South relations more than ever before. The 4th summit that took place in 2012 in New Delhi set the agenda for the creation of a new development bank, separated from the World Bank. New South development discourses spread in Africa and South America, presenting an alternative to the very

DOSSIER of the “Beijing consensus” may eventually marginalize the reference to Human Rights that was progressively imposed in the international rhetoric during the 20th century. … that do not prevent inherent contradictions Nevertheless, the concept of BRICS hides the great diversity of these countries. Discrepancies among them are stunning: their interests and values, political systems, and objectives are substantially diverse. This is why we have to question the relevance of the concept beyond their opposition to the West.

Within these countries, development has been only partial, their Gini indexes being the world’s largest, and underlining (These countries’ development remains incomplete. This is shown by their Gini indexes that, being among the largest in the world, underline a concentration of wealth within the wealthiest 10% of the population.

It is especially true for Brazil, but China’s 10% annual growth can hardly hide its rural-urban, and internal-coastal imbalances either.

Demographic imbalances in Russia’ ageing population, and in India’s rejuvenation to come question their ability to maintain a stable social pact.

« The BRICS are a union of pragmatic States »

Created by the West, while opposing it.

The BRICS concept is relevant in the sense that it translates an impetus that has no precedent in world’s history and has largely been competing Europe and North America’s economic preeminence but also political and ideological ones.

Nonetheless, one should not forget that the concept of BRICS and related emerging state powers issues have been crafted in the West.

It supposes an implicit representation of the international order, in which emerging countries eventually manage to play with the big boys, while others remain at the margin.

As we underlined in our Editorial, the notion of emerging powers is largely an evolving one, new States persistently replacing other in this category, but in the end translates the idea of what Sciences Po Professors Gabas and Losch call “the field of value judgment conveyed by big international media, the academia and major investment banks experts”. Passing from a “developing” status to an “emerging” one is anchored in a modernization theory that focuses on economic terms primarily. Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s rely on indicators on market capitalization, GDP per inhabitant, macroeconomic environments, the size of the markets and its enterprises, and the level of corruption notably to classify the emerging character of a country.

The BRICS notion thus emerges more as an aggregate designed to facilitate debates by reducing different situations into one common economically-growing group, than translating a genuine intention by these countries to unite politically and propose a reversal of the international development conceptual frameworks.

Laura Gounon

Asymmetries among them weaken the idea of a unified BRICS group as well. We should not forget that they are competitors in terms of production, and divided on the subject of the United Nations’ Security Council’s reform.

Russian’s ageing and declining population wouldn’t be comparable to the booming population of the other four. Its legacy of former superpower makes it look more like a “reemerging” country than a real emerging one and questions its presence within this group.

Political rivalries are also on the agenda, notably in the case of India and China, which have been undergoing border disputes since the 1960s.

The concept of BRICS can thus be criticized for its overreliance on economics, and underestimation of politics. It also emphasizes on the opposition to old industrialized countries while hardly proposing positive and constructive alliances.

It is also arbitrary. Other countries may be less important demographically and in terms of GDP but present an extraordinary quick economic development without being part of the BRICS. We can notably think of Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, Turkey and Thailand, but other countries could be added to this.

Source: Forbes

INFOCUS 19

Towards a Wall Street for CO2?

Emission trading Schemes have a great potential in greenhouse gases reductions. Although they spread and achieve reductions they are debated and raise many questions: how do they work?

Why do they fail? How to improve them? What are their benefits?

Shanghai in the smog (Wikimedia)

The main cause for climate change, according to the IPCC is the emission of so-called greenhouse gases emissions in the atmosphere. The most important GHG source is the production of carbon dioxide through the combustion of hydrocarbon. The Global Carbon Project estimates that some 36 Giga tons of CO2 have been emitted in 2013 which the organization considers to go against the possibility to maintain global warning below 2°C. To deal with this issue that has the potential for massive geopolitical disruptions, some governments are setting up climate policies.

Among the several ways to tackle GHG emissions, governments tend to favor emission-trading schemes (ETS). This is mainly because they are supposed to permit a reduction of emissions at the lowest cost with the least intervention of the public power.

Emission trading schemes, often referred to as “carbon markets”, are typically a market-based approach to mitigating climate change: they aim at internalizing the carbon externality by setting a carbon price according to supply and demand. They have the humongous advantage to represent a rather limited political risk. Although carbon taxes are often considered more efficient to reduce GHG emissions, they are much more difficult to install than carbon markets. The fact that the hardly reformable European Union managed to develop a relatively successful scheme attests of it.

To this date the EU ETS is the largest, and yet the most debated, Emission trading scheme. It works on the basis of a ‘cap and trade system’. This means that the total amount of emissions entering INFOCUS 20

within the scope of the scheme is capped at a certain level for a determined period. This cap is then decreased gradually, allowing less carbon to be emitted. The EU ETS works with a EU-wide cap.

Emission permits are allocated by auction in the form of allowances that are then traded between participants. The benefit of trading is that participants who can reduce their emissions at a cost inferior to that of carbon will then sell their now-useless allowances to those who cannot achieve such reductions cost-effectively. These allowances are then traded through exchanges and priced by supply and demand. Of the overall cap of some 38 million allowances, 7.9 billion were traded on exchanges according to the European Commission.

The relatively low level of government intervention in an ETS is often seen as an argument in favor of this form of regulation. It goes alongside the assumption that the best way to tackle climate change is to integrate the social cost of carbon in the price of a good or a service and that a carbon is best suited to determine this cost. The aim of an ETS purely is to eliminate a fossil fuel related negative externality.

Yet, this assumption is misguided. Carbon is a fictive commodity, which means that a carbon market needs to be heavily regulated to be efficient. This kind of exchange is very sensitive to carbon leakage – that is the fact that emission reduction within the market causes an increase outside of it – and to the way allowances are allocated. The EU ETS suffered a great deal from the latter.

DOSSIER

Regulates the price, fixes the rules of trading

Emission Trading Scheme

Trade of allowances

Reports emissions to

Auc:on of allowances

Regulator: Determines the number of allowances circula:ng, monitors emissions

Financial actors (banks, hedge funds, insurance companies…)

Emi<ers entering within the scope of the Scheme (power plants, cement and paper industry, air travel companies…)

How does ETS work in a few blocks Allowances were initially allocated nationally, which means that each time a member country would distribute “emission permits” the market would be destabilized. Moreover, there was little control as to how much a country could allow. Therefore, to guarantee cheap energy prices or to get a competitive advantage against other European countries, national governments distributed freely allowances to major polluters. This led to the odd were coalfired power plants obtained received net benefits from the carbon regulation and is responsible to a large extend of the current level of the carbon price.

In 2013 the carbon price went as low as 3€/tonne of CO2 as a consequence of an excessive number of allowances on the market and the weakness of the European Union’s recovery from the 2008 economic crisis that depressed emissions. While the ETS was expected to allow an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, the current price gives little incentives for the industry to invest in emission reductions: polluting is cheap now! Moreover the crash of the carbon price had the terrible consequence of driving several actors to move away from the market. In November 2013, the Financial Times reported that major banks such as Barclays, the Deutsche Bank or UBS closed or sold some of their “climate trading” assets. According to the FT, only a reform of the scheme to make trading attractive again could bring these actors back in the market.

Despite the apparent failure of the EU ETS, Emission Trading Schemes are covering an increasingly important share of the world’s carbon emissions, and therefore of the world’s economy.

We can expect this form of climate change mitigation action to spread, particularly in the developing world where climate is less and less seen as a “first world problem”. As a matter of fact, because of dramatically high pollution levels in some of its major cities, China installed seven pilot ETS (preceding a nation-wide system). Alongside China, several developing countries are looking at developing nation-wide ETS as part of their climate change policies. This increases the importance of existing ETS as they serve as example for future developments, if not as the basis for a future globalized carbon market.

Source : The Economist Because new systems can learn from the failures of their predecessors new ETS are much more attractive and stable than their European elder. For instance, both the newly adopted UK scheme and the Chinese pilot project in Shenzhen have ways to avoid a price crash. In the UK that takes the form of a price floor.

This is praised by several industry leaders for bringing stability in the carbon price and ease necessary long-term investments in the energy infrastructure. Indeed, energy infrastructures require large capital expenditures that are not consequent with a volatile carbon price. In China however, the design of the scheme relies much more on the state’s intervention: when carbon prices become too low the government intervenes to buy back allowances. Interestingly this ETS also provides ways for the government to deflate the price so that it doesn’t hinder growth of competitiveness.

One can argue that newcomers to the carbon business will favor the Chinese approach. Indeed, concerns with non-GHG issues such as growth and competitiveness make Shenzhen’s ETS less binding.

As such it is more politically attractive to governments, particularly in developing countries that relies heavily on exports and benefit from a precarious social peace. Yet, with the increased pressure of climate change related events on these countries’ economies – such as the 2013 Haiyan typhoon – as well as increased environmental pollution similar to Beijing’s smog, drives these governments toward the adoption of climate policies.

Thomas Garabetian

INFOCUS 21

L’Indonésie, puissance méconnue et mesestimée

En retrait sur la scène internationale, l’Indonésie est pourtant un pays prometteur, trop souvent oublié, qui s’affirme peu à peu comme une puissance d’avenir. Cette année, la tenue des élections présidentielles, avec l’espoir incarné par Jokowi, l’actuel gouverneur de Jakarta, permettra peutêtre de remédier aux problèmes persistants de cette jeune démocratie : corruption et népotisme.

Le regard que nous portons sur l’Asie émergente ne peut être limité à la Chine ou à l’Inde. En effet, derrière ces deux géants économiques et démographiques, se cache un pays trop souvent méconnu et indéniablement mésestimé : l’Indonésie. Forte d’une population de près de 250 millions d’habitants établie dans ce vaste archipel de près de 17 000 îles, avec une superficie d’Ouest en Est couvrant une zone équivalente à celle allant de Brest à Moscou, l’Indonésie apparaît comme une nouvelle frontière prometteuse à quelques encablures de ce nouveau centre de gravité mondial que constitue l’espace asiatique.

L’actuel président Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono lors d’une visite à Bogor (Java). Après deux mandats, la Constitution ne l’autorise pas à se représenter. Ses derniers mois au pouvoir ont été secoués par la révélation de plusieurs scandales de corruption touchant ses proches collaborateurs.

« L’Indonésie a incontestablement le profil d’un géant en devenir » Pourtant, le pays fait face à un certain déficit d’image et peine à s’imposer sur la scène internationale. « L’Indonésie évoque, au mieux, de vagues images d’exotisme lointain, ou bien, tout simplement, un trou noir (…) ; ce grand pays brille par son absence sur la scène internationale » précise Solenn Honorine, journaliste ayant vécu de nombreuses années dans le pays. Avec des ambitions diplomatiques encore timides, l’Indonésie ne fait que peu parler d’elle et ce sont plus les catastrophes naturelles que son identité et étonnante diversité qui attirent l’attention vers elle. Cependant, la situation tend à changer ces dernières années avec la montée en puissance de l’Asie du Sud-Est, l’ASEAN devenant l’objet de toutes les attentions et l’Indonésie commençant enfin à susciter l’intérêt, à raison.

L’Indonésie regorge en effet de qualités qui forgent sa singularité.

Jeune démocratie, l’Indonésie n’en demeure pas moins l’une des plus solides d’Asie du Sud-Est. Depuis la chute du dictateur Suharto en 1998, les progrès sont extraordinaires : augmentation du niveau de vie, réduction de la pauvreté et relative stabilité sociale grâce aux réformes politiques, avec la tenue d’élections libres de très bonne facture. L’Indonésie apparaît même aujourd’hui comme l’un des pays où la liberté d’expression et de la presse est la plus grande, un changement profond après des décennies de censure et de répression. Le processus de démocratisation mené pendant la Reformasi est un succès et rares sont ceux qui auraient prédit un bilan si positif pour la jeune nation indonésienne. Le mandat du président Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, premier président élu par le suffrage universel direct, a permis de continuer ce travail de stabilisation politique, malgré les accusations de corruption au sein de son parti, le Parti Démocrate, qui ternissent sa fin de mandat.

INFOCUS 22

L’actuel président Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono lors d’une visite à Bogor (Java) Source : Flickr.

La troisième plus grande démocratie au monde après l’Inde et les Etats-Unis est aussi le pays comptant le plus grand nombre de musulmans, preuve qu’Islam et démocratie peuvent aller de pair.

Ce « modèle pour l’Islam et l’Occident » salué par Barack Obama lors de sa visite officielle en novembre 2010, est celui d’un Islam ouvert et tolérant qui a su s’adapter aux valeurs démocratiques du pays en rejetant les extrémismes. La grande piété des Indonésiens va paradoxalement de pair avec un échec de l’islamisation des institutions et même un recul des partis islamistes dans les urnes. La démocratie indonésienne est également portée par une société civile active et influente, très mobilisée, en témoigne notamment un taux de participation aux élections de l’ordre de 70-80%, l’un des plus élevés au monde. Internet, dont l’utilisation a explosé ces dernières années – Jakarta est d’ailleurs la ville où l’on « tweete » le plus au monde – est devenu un des vecteurs de cet engagement citoyen des plus actifs. La détermination de sa société civile permet ainsi de stimuler le débat public et d’améliorer de la prise de conscience politique.

DOSSIER L’Indonésie profite également pleinement de son intégration dans l’espace économique asiatique, le plus dynamique du monde. Si certains arguent que son émergence s’est fait attendre, bien en retrait du géant chinois ou de ses voisins malaisien et thaïlandais, c’est que l’Indonésie a longtemps souffert des effets de la crise économicofinancière et politique de 1998 qui ont mis plusieurs années à se dissiper. Cependant, depuis le milieu des années 2000, portée par une stabilité politique nouvelle, le pays a pu véritablement afficher un développement économique bien plus conforme à son potentiel.

Les indicateurs économiques sont aujourd’hui très positifs avec une croissance de l’ordre de 6% par an et un endettement public de moins de 25% du PIB. L’activité économique est portée par des ressources minières et minérales parmi les plus riches au monde mais surtout poussée par l’émergence d’une importante classe moyenne, qui grossit de près de neuf millions de personnes chaque année, attisant les intérêts des investisseurs étrangers.

Cependant, les défis à relever sont nombreux pour que l’Indonésie parvienne à trouver une place de premier ordre dans le siècle asiatique et puisse profiter pleinement de son emplacement stratégique, au carrefour du trafic maritime mondial. Le manque d’infrastructures reste criant, en témoigne la faiblesse des établissements éducatifs ou sanitaires mais aussi la mauvaise qualité des axes routiers, la saturation des aéroports du pays face à l’explosion du trafic aérien, ou encore des ports très en retrait face aux exigences du commerce maritime international. La forte décentralisation, bel effort démocratique, tend cependant trop souvent à renforcer les lourdeurs bureaucratiques, chaque projet devant être approuvé des gouvernements locaux au gouvernement central. Un tel système n’est pas sans renforcer la corruption, véritable démon de la jeune démocratie indonésienne, avec l’émergence de potentats locaux incontournables. Dans son classement de 2012, l’ONG Transparency International plaçait ainsi l’Indonésie à la 118 place sur 176, témoignant de l’importance de ce mal endémique, qui touche de nombreux responsables politiques, locaux ou nationaux, mais aussi, ironiquement, les juges anti-corruption eux-mêmes. Le système oligarchique mis en place par Suharto demeure et symbolise le décalage entre les importantes réformes politiques structurelles et une réalité bien différente.

« La corruption, démon de la jeune démocratie indonésienne » En effet, si la période de transition démocratique semble achevée, l’apprentissage démocratique demeure. Le système judiciaire indonésien apparaît encore aujourd’hui très faible, corrompu et sous-financé, empêchant le plein exercice d’un Etat de droit et l’application concrète des lois et réformes. L’impunité sur les crimes commis pendant l’Ordre Nouveau tend aussi à subsister, en témoigne le récent documentaire The Act of Killing, filmant les bourreaux des massacres de 1965, libres et protégés par le pouvoir. La situation intérieure demeure par ailleurs toujours relativement tendue à Aceh ou en Papouasie et, malgré le démantèlement progressif de la Jemaah Islamiyah et le rejet de l’islam radical violent, la menace terroriste est toujours latente.

méthodes en place, s’attaquant de front aux problèmes tenaces que tous ses prédécesseurs avaient ignorés, notamment la recherche de solutions durables aux inondations annuelles et aux embouteillages qui paralysent la ville.

Son style de leadership inédit, proche de ses administrés, à qui il rend visite régulièrement lors de visites impromptues (blusukan), dans les différents quartiers de la ville fait de lui un dirigeant apprécié, en phase avec les préoccupations quotidiennes de la population. « I go out to the people because the problems aren’t in my office » déclarait-il récemment au magazine Monocle.

Jokowi lors d’un « blusukan », une visite impromptue sur le terrain, à Jakarta.

Source : Flickr

Mais, seul, Jokowi peut-il transformer l’Indonésie ? Il est certain qu’il faut plus d’un homme pour changer l’Indonésie mais Jokowi porte en lui l’espoir d’une nouvelle génération, séduite par la force de sa personnalité et sa réputation d’intégrité et de compétence.

Jouissant d’une popularité très importante, surtout auprès des jeunes, il incarne la volonté de changer le système actuel et d’assurer le renouvellement des élites politiques, encore très souvent issues des rangs de l’armée ou anciens rejetons de l’oligarchie de Suharto.

Son élection ouvrirait incontestablement un nouveau chapitre démocratie indonésienne, qui ferait un pas de plus pour se libérer enfin de ses démons, corruption et népotisme.

Ainsi, au carrefour de la mondialisation, l’Indonésie a incontestablement le profil d’un géant en devenir. Si l’archipel doit encore relever de nombreux défis pour s’affirmer comme une nation démocratique solide et puissante, à même de s’imposer sur la scène internationale, la poursuite de son développement dans les prochaines années apparaît bien engagée. Le Garuda, cet aigle mythique, symbole de l’Indonésie, semble ainsi fin prêt à prendre son plein envol.

Adrien Giacchero

L’année 2014 sera peut-être porteuse de réponses nouvelles à ces maux qui touchent l’Indonésie avec la tenue de l’élection présidentielle, qui pourrait marquer un tournant dans la vie politique de l’archipel. L’actuel gouverneur de Jakarta Joko Widodo, dit « Jokowi », part grand favori des sondages. Arrivé à la tête de la capitale en Octobre 2012, Jokowi a radicalement changé les INFOCUS 23

The EU-Africa Summit

Why the Pan-African Parliament is not the answer to The African Union’s problems of agency and legitimacy.

In spite of ambitious declarations, the Pan-African Parliament remains an under-funded and marginal institution in a regional organisation struggling to assert itself in global politics. As the EU-Africa summit showcased, neither it, nor the African Union, succeeds in addressing the core issues the union was created to solve.

Since its inception in 2004, the hope of bureaucrats and EU resources have been poured into the Pan-African Parliament in the hope that it will provide a partner to the EU Parliament, and add democratic gloss to an institution which struggles to shake off the elitist brand of its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU). Thus, in light of the recent EP-PAP parliamentary summit in preparation for the EU-Africa summit 2-3 April, the Pan-African Parliament experienced what might be perceived as a test of agency and coordination. It was singled out as a bargaining party in bilateral discussions, and would together with the European Parliament formulate a joint position in preparation of the intergovernmental and bilateral negotiations of the EU-Africa summit.

The parliamentary summit was held in Brussels in order to ‘prepare and convey the parliamentary input’ to the upcoming 4th EU-Africa Summit and its two-day programme was primarily aimed at tackling discussion and evaluation of the Joint EUAfrica strategy. Both parliaments and their respective presidents took part in the discussions and surrounding ceremonies, in a session whose official aim was to discuss ‘the most pressing topics of EU-Africa relations’ and ‘improve the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in the near future’ . The activities INFOCUS 24

were supposed to culminate in a joint declaration, adopted at the Parliamentary Summit and presented at the opening session of the EU-Africa Summit on April 2nd. However, in spite of a promising start, it seems that the agenda has been allowed to drop beneath the radar.

However, in the circus of EU-African relations diplomatic hiccups and tensions abound, not least surrounding the pressure exerted by the EU to commit the African countries to sign Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), as well as controversies surrounding the International Criminal Court and the Kenyan leadership. In order to get to grips with the options and limitations of the Pan-African Parliament as a developing actor in the international arena it therefore becomes necessary to remove layers of rubble and rhetoric, making it a somewhat daunting task. This may very well be why scholars seem to have largely shied away from the topic since the first wave of enthusiasm following its institution in 2004.

The summit held this week could have formed an important part in the Pan-African Parliament’s – in a process often pushed by the EU – tentative establishment of itself as an agenda setter to be reckoned with in African politics. Interestingly, the Pan-African

Parliament today in many ways finds itself where the European Parliament was 40 years ago. It is composed of representatives selected by national governments, and its powers remain ‘advisory and consultative’ in spite of the official African Union (AU) agenda that it should ultimately evolve into an institution with ‘full legislative powers’ elected directly by universal suffrage. Indeed, if its ambitions of an integrated civil society, grass root representation, and democratic governance in the AU should be interpreted as genuine desires, much of its legitimacy as an institution depends on its realisation of this status. Simultaneously however, realties and developments force us to be cautious about any predictions as to the creation and streamlining of such an organ in the recent future.

The fact is that the Pan-African parliament remains understaffed, under-funded, and still lacks much of the basis of legitimacy which it was created to maintain. Representing a union consisting of 54 countries, comprising roughly 1 billion people, its Facebook page has a following of roughly 550 followers, and the official calendar has not been updated since 2009. In fact, many of the parliament’s standing committees have no documents uploaded on their websites after 2008, and in some cases 2011.

Former president of the Pan-African Parliament, Getrude Mongella.

Funding remains a permanent issue of the AU. Programme costs for institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament are paid by donors, providing a critical issue of agency. Similarly, it is impossible to ignore the dependency of the Parliament on the Assembly which sets its budget, a budget which was announced to amount to $11 685 390 in 2014 . When compared to a European parliamentary budget of 1 756 billion euros, the disparities in operational capacities are apparent. Indeed, it is difficult to see how this sum of money would allow the parliament to gain any real agency, or even fulfil its objectives as ambitiously stated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The African Union and Parliament remain heavily dependent on outside actors for institutional stability and survival, and support of the European Commission to the AU and its Institutions has come close to EUR 1 bill over the past 10 years.

Regardless of the relative size of the budgets (indeed, many would argue that the EU is both overstaffed and overfunded) we inevitably return to the issue of legitimacy as it becomes a serious question for debate as to who exactly drives the agenda. Besides, can it ever be feasible to expect member states with chronic balance of payments deficits, and severe problems of poverty and living standards, to pour resources into a discussion forum, no matter how valiant

DOSSIER

its ambitions? And how is such a diverse and underdeveloped institution ever supposed to realistically represent the interest of the ‘African’ people, when people struggle to settle on what the very concept of ‘African’ actually is?

That difficulties in creating a united front thus arise should not come as a surprise, and African newspapers covering the event have lamented the lack of leverage the absence of unity creates in relation to the EU bloc. In this context, a preconceived parliamentary agenda could have been a powerful statement, but still appears to be absent, or at least not newsworthy.

Perhaps one of the many roots of the problem is that it the African Union based on a blueprint which is meant to emulate the EU model, a blue-print which is not without problems in its natural setting, and which faces distinct challenges when applied to broad and varied regions and policy aspects. Africa remains an impressively diverse continent culturally, linguistically, economically, and politically.

Thus the composition of the parliament still remains a question of dissent, and the principle of equal numbers has been questioned by larger countries such as Nigeria as they feel underrepresented. It remains a key problem to ensure equitable representation which balances country ambitions. Another aspect of this diversity is clearly displayed in the varying geographical and political outlooks of the member states. In spite of attempts to coordinate foreign policies the respective outlooks of the member countries naturally remain contingent on national interests. Likewise, it remains a region still in many places torn asunder by war and conflict, and political fault lines are often difficult to locate. The transposition of party politics from the national to the regional level and the accompanying difficulty of inducing European MEP’s to identify with their European party groups has proven a paramount task in the development of the European Parliament. In the context of African politics, where ethnic cleavage as well as religion plays a prominent role in affiliation, such problems are enhanced. During its first session the members of parliaments had to be repeatedly reminded of their function as servants of a pan-African parliament as party representatives rather than national delegates. As this propensity to represent national interests combines with a tendency to create alliances based on region, it has not been possible to within the parliament create a deliberative forum based around a stable and common political platform.

Thus, in order to promote pan-African ideals and tackle continental problems members would not only have to unite in their promotion, but even invent them. The struggle against colonialism around which the OAU, AU’s precursor, was created, is losing leverage in the political debate, and common ground needs to be found in other problems and solutions. This is largely the very challenge the AU - and consequently the parliament - was created to solve, and its effectiveness in refocusing the agenda will be key in its future success. Thus, the Pan-African Parliament, if it fulfils its functions, could be instrumental in its survival and development. It is true, as Nkasazana Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, noted in her address to the summit April 2nd, “many more hills to climb” . The question is how to make sure that we are climbing the right ones.

Andrea Jansson

INFOCUS 25

Food security in India : the right path?

In 2012, 870 million people in the world were undernourished, and one third of them lived in India, making the country the world’s hunger capital. Food policy is thus a vital issue and India, as well as for G-33 countries, who are trying to obtain wider flexibility in the WTO rules on agriculture. Nevertheless, the Bali meeting didn’t find any agreement on this subject, rather postponing the problem to the next years.

A bit of background…

From 1950 to 2012, the Indian population dramatically increased from 361 million to 1.2 billion: yet, the country managed to turn from a situation of food deficit to a condition of food surplus. This was possible thanks to a successful agricultural trade policy that guaranteed a rapid and sustained growth of food grain production.

India indeed wanted to achieve self-reliance in basic staples, since the global market wasn’t considered enough reliable, and become independent in ensuring food security to its people. On the other hand, India also increased its agricultural trade: India is today the largest exporter of rice and beef meat in the world.

National Food Security Bill Despite its remarkable economic performance - that allowed availability of food in the country, even creating some surplus for exports - India is facing a big challenge in guaranteeing access to food. Availability is indeed only one dimension of food security, and it has to be followed by access, utilization and stability in order for food security to be real and complete. Indian people are undernourished not because food is unavailable, but because they do not have economic access to it. Given this major concern, the Indian government adopted the National Food Security Ordinance last July, and President Pranab Mukherjee approved the bill in September.

The main idea of the bill is to guarantee the “Rights to Food” to the Indian population, with a transition from a welfare approach to a INFOCUS 26

right-based approach. This means that poor people, who currently spend almost 60% of their income on food, will be legally entitled to receive each month 5 kg of basic staples at very cheap rates. With a previewed annual distribution of 61.2 million tons to 67% of the population, or 800 million people, this will definitely be the world hugest policy intervention to guarantee access to food.

Domestic Policy Implications The NFSB is domestically highly controversial and has stimulated a debate throughout the country, to understand which challenges it will entail and if it will be effective in improving food security. The main issue regards financial sustainability of the project: the annual cost should be equivalent to $20 billion, that correspond to 1,25% of Indian GDP. This comes in a moment when the country fiscal system is already burdened and the national currency is depreciating. The main investments are necessary to ensure sufficient availability of staples, since the government legally obliged to distribute huge quantities of food. On one hand, this requires to boost yield productivity, still below the world average. On the other hand, the administered price will need to rise to stimulate farmers to produce more, in this way further increasing inflation. Anyway, output growth could be particularly difficult to attain, considering that agriculture is growing much slower than the total economy and that climate change is negatively affecting the availability of land and water. Stocking represents another major issue: even if the country will be able to procure all the necessary food to respect the NFSB obligations, existing infrastructure are insufficient and inadequate to preserve such quantities of grains, and are already overused.

DOSSIER Finally, the distribution system is flowed and unreliable in most of the states, due to lack of transparency, corruption and poor accountability. The less developed areas still face problems of fake ration cards and generally 40% of the food does not actually reach those in need, rather “disappearing” in the transport from one location to the other. Some theoretical controversies also exist.

Firstly, under the NFSB, Central and State Government are not considered responsible if they fail to supply food grains in the event of major issues, like droughts, wars or floods. Yet, these events are dramatically increasing due to environmental problems, and it is exactly in those times that people need the biggest help to have access to food. Secondly, malnutrition is a multidimensional problem and needs to be treated from different perspective. Ensuring access to food is a good starting point, but it is not enough to eradicate hunger, if not accompanied by health, water and education policies: even with its NFSB, India is still lacking such a comprehensive strategy to tackle the nutrition problem.

Possible Alternatives to the NFSB The NFSB follows a “price policy” approach to obtain food security in the country, subsidizing food for those in need. Anyway, the price strategy is hugely expensive and incurs in efficiency losses. For these reasons, other developing countries have shifted toward an income approach, entailing Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) to the poor: families will receive this additional income under certain conditions that may vary from enrolling children into schools or ensuring vaccinations. This approach stimulates a more inclusive economic growth in the country: if children are indeed more educated, they are more likely to escape the poverty trap in the future. Moreover, a society where households have a higher human capital level will perform much better as a whole. The largest CCT program is being implemented in Brazil, where the so-called Bolsa Familia shifted 20 million people out of poverty, thanks to their better education and health conditions. India should thus consider to switch from the distribution of subsidized food to the distribution of CCT or food coupons, and then invest the saved resources in policies related to food security, like health improvements, R&D or infrastructure enhancement. Investments are indeed much better than subsidies to boost economic growth and reduce poverty, since they have a marginal return that is 5 to 10 times higher than input support.

A group of children eating a free meal at school - Jammu, India Source: Channi Anand, Ap/Lapresse

International Policy Implications Turning to the international dimension, some critics fear that the NFSB will harm the poor in other parts of the world. If India indeed stocks such huge quantities of food, it can represent a threat to food prices on the international market: firstly, such a huge stocking will push up global prices, since demand will deeply increase. Secondly, if this subsidized grain exited India and invaded the market, foreign farmers would not be able to compete with it and would be forced to face higher volatility and insecurity. The Indian Act has also attracted great attention within the WTO, since some countries fear that India will not respect its international commitments in order to implement the new subsidy program. The issue in WTO negotiations is not that India is stockholding food for food security, which is allowed, but that it is purchasing this food at an administered price.

Nevertheless, there are two unclear points regarding the calculation of Indian subsidies. Firstly, India has not reported to WTO any data regarding its subsidy program since 2003, when the registered support accounted for $15 billion. Secondly, WTO calculates current support using base prices of 25 years ago, when staples were definitely cheaper.

India is today facing a big challenge to guarantee food security to its immense population, and the NFSB is the last attempt to eradicate extreme poverty in the country, distributing 60 million tons of food every year to those in need. Nevertheless, some controversies remain, both domestically and internationally. Under the domestic dimension, the price policy suggested in the new program could not be effective, rather proving extremely costly for the public budget.

Moreover, the NFSB may not be the most suitable policy to improve food security in the country, and India should learn from global best practices, that suggest an income approach rather than a price one. In the international arena, the new subsidy program is looked at suspiciously, especially with regard to the WTO obligations.

WTO members fear that the NFSB will distort the market and that India will exceed the maximum level of support allowed, but some ambiguities exist in the way this support is calculated. As it was predictable, the last Bali conference did not come to an agreement, rather approving a “peace clause” to postpone the issue in four years time. In this period, India will try to implement its ambitious program, and some new evidences are likely to come up.

Camilla Puglisi

INFOCUS 27

Human Trafficking in the European Union The Unknown Reality

The collapse of the USSR has led to large changes in Eastern Europe countries, in parallel to a greater integration within the European Union. Human trafficking has been one of its unexpected consequences.

Trafficking in human beings is a gross violation of human rights as well as a crime against the state breaching migration, labour, residence and economic transparency requirements. With the change in the political structure in various Eastern European states in the early 1990s, westbound migration increased and combined with a number of other internal factors, it facilitated human trafficking in the European Union, with numbers reaching up to 500,000 people being trafficked annually according to the International Labour Organization. How much do we actually know about this phenomenon? Is it equally bad in all regions in the world, or is Europe particularly affected? And what are some of the challenges that the EU is facing in its policy-making efforts to address the problem?

The first internationally accepted definition of trafficking in human beings was introduced at the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, in the year 2000 in Palermo, Italy. It defines Human Trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve consent of a person, having control of another, for the purpose of exploitation”.

hard to estimate the number of people trafficked each year. While in the USA, estimates of victims vary between 40 000 and 50 000 annually, in the case of the European Union, this number reaches disturbing 500, 000 people, showing the larger scale of the problem in Europe. In addition to the shocking numbers for victims, yet more shocking are the estimated profits of this organized crime, which according to UNODC make human trafficking the third most profitable business worldwide for organized crime after drugs and the arms trade. The annual profits of traffickers are estimated at EUR 25 billion. Both on global and European level human trafficking is done mainly for sexual exploitation (75% of all cases), followed by trafficking for forced labour, forced begging, and for domestic servitude. In the European Union, reflecting global trends as well, most of the trafficked victims are women (70%), followed by 17% - men, and 13% girls and boys.

« It is very hard to estimate the number of people trafficked each year » Exploitation is here referred to sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs.

Additionally, it is accepted that the consent of the victim to the exploitation shall be irrelevant whenever any threats, coercion or use of force is concerned. Despite being the first act of governments worldwide to address the problem, the Protocol is widely criticized for overemphasizing on the law enforcement side of the issue while not proposing any concrete measures concerning the protection of human rights of the victims.

Not only the definition, but also the extent of the human trafficking has been widely debated especially since the end of the Cold War and the growing migration to the West. Given the intra- and intercontinental character of the problem, it is very INFOCUS 28

Even though human trafficking is clearly a major problem both globally and especially in the European Union, as demonstrated by the statistics above, not much has been done to understand the so-called “push and pull” factors which facilitate the process.

OPINION The “push” factors are the reasons for which victims often find themselves into trafficking networks. These include most often poverty and high levels of unemployment; as well as low education and awareness levels in origin [as well as destination] countries, and large-scale human rights abuses and civil wars.

Further, additional factors are especially applicable to victims from Eastern European, ex-communist countries: before 1989, prostitution, porn and strip clubs were banned under communist rule; however, with the fall of the regimes, a change in mentality occurred in many states, especially in the attitudes towards sex, resulting in explosion of prostitution. Changes in family structures also occurred, such as higher rate of divorces, more wedlock born children, and the average age of getting married reaching 26 years of age in many Eastern European states in 2005, compared to 22 in 1993. Even in Eastern Europe however, being the major resource region for traffickers operating in the Western EU Member States, poverty still remains the number one push factor for victims: over 70% of young adults in Bulgaria claim that “with the income I have, I cannot live under normal conditions”.

On this note, it is worth mentioning the most common methods of trafficking recruitment, one of the most popular being through acquaintances where the recruiter knows of the difficulties of the victims and makes false promises for employment (or marriages) abroad.

Other methods used include recruitment agencies (often charging too high fees but handing over the employees to traffickers once at the final destination), the Internet (dating websites, ordering brides, etc.), newspaper fake job offers and even family members and love partners selling their loved ones abroad. These also include women selling their children either for financial reasons or in the hope of securing them a “brighter future” with a richer family abroad. Lastly, kidnappings sometimes occur, especially for the purpose of organ removal; this is yet another growing trend in the past decade with black market lungs prices for example reaching as much as $ 250,000 in Italy and Spain.

« Push and pull factors which facilitate the process.»

A number of “pull factors” are of great importance in their way of attracting victims to Europe, as opposed to other geographic regions. The first problem is the popular reputation of the Union as a rich-countries bloc and the often misrepresentation by returning irregular migrants who exaggerate their fortunes in front of their friends and family and thus increase the pull towards Europe.

EU reputation as a stable place, and the changing demographics combined with the misrepresentation of current and past immigrants, all contribute to the pull towards the Union and growing danger of THB in the 21st century.

Lastly, a number of internal developments affect the fight to combat human trafficking on the Union’s territory: for example, under the enlargement of the Schengen area, border controls within the area have been eliminated, while cross-border law enforcement cooperation has not increased much. Neither have legal harmonization and approximation among European States with various laws still differing EU-wide, including laws on prostitution, adoptions or child exploitation. This makes it more difficult for possible investigations and prosecutions to take place. Moreover, the activity of human trafficking is both low-risk and high-profit for traffickers which are great incentives for their continuous work. Eurojust and Europol also admit to finding it very difficult to chase the money trails of traffickers for example, which may be a key to successful law enforcement.

In addition, very often law enforcement bodies lack the relevant language skills and cultural knowledge needed to investigate and prosecute traffickers, as they rarely hire members of the ethnic minorities.It is still not a widely accepted practice for states to cooperate with NGOs to ensure victim protection and reintegration: the assistance programs are often inadequate, short-term and not applicable to the large numbers of victims needing legal, financial and psychological assistance. Adding to this, bureaucratic delays and lack of coordination often result in deportations rather that protection of victims and true reintegration into the European societies. All these issues have been of major concern for the European Commission, Parliament and Council and have been reflected in a number of legislative pieces since 2002.

Despite the policy efforts to address the problem and the need for better law enforcement and higher prosecution rates, there is still urgent need for more work on the grass roots level with better education and employment opportunities for potential victims. Thus, as important as prosecution is, only a combined effort of authorities and NGOs and other civil organizations may prove actually efficient in the fight against human trafficking in the years to come.

Plamena Solakova

Second, as Europe (especially Western Europe) has long been a symbol of stability for those fleeing conflicts and civil wars in their communities, there are often cases of individuals hiring smugglers to move them to countries where they could apply for asylum. Especially at times of high refugee and migration waves, as it is currently from the Middle East (Syria), EU states such as Greece, Bulgaria and Italy face further disruptions and threats to their and the Union’s stability.

Lastly, trafficking in Europe continues because of the current demographic crisis which threatens replacement levels due to insufficient birthrates. Physical labour becomes less and less attractive and added to the absence of native-born population, there will be an ongoing demand for cheap labour from outside the Union. Thus, it can be concluded that both the EU policies themselves, especially economic protection of certain sectors, the INFOCUS 29

China’s Water Disaster

Could China’s high level of pollution challenge its economic and social developments?

In Liang Jiawan, a village along the Yellow River water stream nearby Lanzhou, Zhang, the 50 years old village head, interviewed by a Chinese environmental group, explains what is happening to the water available in the village. The water basin from which the local aqueduct takes the water for the village is located 50 meters away from the waste discharge. Huge amounts of heavily polluting components are thrown into the river by the chemical industries operating few kilometres upstream. “We have to drink the water, we don’t have any other option. It has become normal to find small bugs in it and that our villagers feel queasiness and dizziness” says Zhang. Clean water is scarcer and scarcer because of two decades of uncontrolled economic development.

In another part of China it is easy money for any official who dares to take up the bet launched by a local entrepreneur: he has offered a 200.000 Yuan reward (32.000 US dollar) for whoever will take a 20 minutes dip into a heavily polluted river in the Zhejiang province.

Water pollution is the most severe environmental problem that China has to face. In two decades the Chinese have lost 27000 rivers because of the water pollution and this loss of available water is bringing up the dramatic problem of water scarcity that is radically emerging in China. As water is extremely bad priced, 5 cent per cubic meters compared with 5 dollars per cubic meters in the US, Chinese not only are incentivized to pollute water but also to waste it, feeding up the vicious circle: the more the water is polluted, the less the Chinese are inclined to pay and the more are inclined to waste the tiny water resources. According to World Bank report on water pollution in China, the increasing proportion of water unavailable even for irrigation of agricultural lands has doubled in the last 5 years.

INFOCUS 30

Beijing is an example of how much severe is the water scarcity problem in China. The per capita water availability is far below the UN water scarcity threshold and, according to the most recent data released by the Beijing Water Authority, the Chinese capital is found to be in a much worse situation than many countries in the arid Middle East. The World Bank estimates that the cost of water scarcity linked with water pollution, particularly of nonrechargeable groundwater, is around 147 billion Yuan, which is equivalent to 1% of GDP. Water pollution has dramatic effects also on human health. An article published on the China Daily says that 40% of rivers are seriously polluted and 20% of them are so toxic that it is unsafe to come in contact with the waters. Large part of the available urban water is not only dangerous to drink, but also to touch. According to estimates, the liver and digestive system cancers incidence has exponentially increased in some regions in the north China where the combined impact of water scarcity and water pollution is more striking. t is not an exaggeration to say that China’s water situation is getting desperate, as 90% of Chinese underground water is considered polluted and 60% of it is considered even heavily polluted. The central government’s plan in 2011 to make all ground water safely drinkable by 2020 carries a huge economic burden as the overall estimated cost of the plan stands around 850 billion dollars.

OPINION Furthermore, Chinese poor are touched more intensively by the water pollution. While for air pollution there is a close association between the population exposition and the pollution levels, as the air is the same for everybody, the water pollution affects more deeply those who rely on superficial water as drinking source.

Indeed superficial water is much more vulnerable than underground water and in China the superficial water is the only existing drinking source for at least 115 million inhabitants of rural areas.

It would be oversimplified not to consider the relentless Chinese economic development as the straightforward path to drag millions of Chinese out of poverty, to modernize the country with infrastructures and to prominently impose China as a major player in the international scene, both economically and politically. The Chinese government itself has strenuously defended the economic interest to the detriment of environment and health.

Nonetheless, the costs of this economic development have to be weighted not only from an economic perspective but also from an environmental and health one. If decades of astonishing GDP growth have caused the air to be unbreathable and the water so toxic to be dangerous even to touch in some areas, it would be against any rational behaviour not to deeply reflect upon the overall consequences of the Chinese development. But even if the economic perspective is cynically prioritized with respect to the environment and health, the cost of water pollution has now become an issue even for its economic situation. The hard-earned incomes of the household will increasingly flow into health bills to cure severe and life-threatening diseases due to polluted water absorption.

not priceless and that sooner or later someone will have to pay the costs. Unsurprisingly, the burden of water pollution is heavier on the shoulders on those millions of Chinese who live in rural areas and who have no other option than drinking the health-damaging water. “Wealth exists only for the benefit of mankind. It cannot be measured adequately in yards, nor even as equivalent to so many ounces of gold; its true measure lies only in the contribution it makes to human well-being” said Pigou in 1925 and his words should find resonance in the Chinese’s government effort of combining economic and environmental policies. The magnitude of the water pollution disaster poses a challenge that Chinese policymakers cannot ignore. China has to run the distance that divides a shortsighted economic growth from a far-sighted one; China has to make a bold jump towards a strategy that wants China not to be solely a fast-growing economy but also a fast-progressing country.

Dario Mangilli

A careful analysis of the water pollution consequences on the Chinese society would be enough to shake up the belief in Chinese policymakers’ mind that the economic development is

INFOCUS 31

Interview : Ernesto Soria Morales

The OECD Secretary-General, José Angel Gurría, in a recent speech at the conference on “Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) in a post-2015 Era” underlined that greater coherence is an imperative in today’s world as challenges are becoming more complex.

Ernesto Soria Morales explains what are the issues at stakes. An interview led by Monica Lafon. − (InFocus) Can you tell us what policy coherence for development means and how it can help in addressing today’s more complex development challenges? − Ernesto Soria Morales (ESM) : Policy Coherence for Development is a central concept for our time. It is both an approach to understand the barriers to, and the drivers for, development; and a policy tool for integrating the economic, social, environmental and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of policy making.

At the OECD, we have been working to clarify the concept and update our PCD instruments and tools. As part of our Strategy on Development, we are now taking a more proactive approach to PCD. We see that, today PCD has three main objectives. First, addressing possible negative spillover effects of domestic policies on long-term development prospects. Second, identifying tradeoffs and reconciling domestic objectives with internationally agreed development objectives. And third, fostering synergies between policies across sectors to support sustainable development. − (InFocus) Why PCD instruments and tools require to be updated? What is different? − (ESM) We need to recognise that the world has changed profoundly since the concept of PCD emerged in the early 1990s.

Let me give you three examples: First, many large emerging and developing economies are becoming important actors in international finance, trade, investment, innovation and development cooperation. Five decades ago, emerging and developing economies accounted for about a quarter of world GDP. Today, it is half, and is likely to be two-thirds in twenty years; this is what we call “shifting wealth”.

This means that PCD operates in a multi-polar global economy in which all countries are playing an important role in driving and enabling sustainable development.

Second, we are also in a more interconnected world where policies implemented by advanced and emerging economies can influence the growth and development prospects of lower-income and poor countries. This was clear during the 2007-2008 food price crisis.

INFOCUS 32

According to our analysis, export restrictions were applied by several emerging economies which exacerbated the crisis and placed a particular burden on some developing countries unable to source imports. In this context, it is no longer relevant, given the changing structure of world trade, to view the negative spillover effects of policies exclusively as a developed country issue.

And third, the world is facing more complex and interconnected economic, social and environmental challenges. As highlighted by the Secretary-General Gurría in his speech, these unprecedented challenges are shaped by a number of major global trends such as shifting wealth; new population dynamics; changes in consumption patterns; urbanisation; climate change, growing inequalities; and technological change. These trends are putting pressure on policy makers in all countries to reconcile domestic policy objectives with broader global objectives. Growing populations, for example, increase consumption of natural resources and land use, while changes in wealth and age structure also affect consumption habits and diet. All of these can have consequences for the environment with implications for all.

INTER− (InFocus) Now, how can this approach and tool, called PCD, help policymakers in addressing increasingly complex development challenges? − (ESM) Let’s take food security, which is a key global issue, as an example. Achieving global food security requires a holistic approach and greater coherence between economic, social, and environmental policies. PCD can provide an organising framework for establishing priorities for action at the global, regional and national levels in different policy domains. We can’t address this issue working in silos or just from a sectoral perspective. A more holistic approach and greater coherence would involve, for example, not just eliminating trade distorting subsidies in agriculture policies in advanced economies, which has been the traditional approach to PCD. It also entails taking forward positive measures in various sectors to increase food availability, for example by raising agricultural productivity, using resources more sustainably, eliminating waste, and providing the conditions for a well-functioning trading system.

In the current global context, PCD is about creating the enabling conditions for sustainable development at the local, national, regional and global levels. This requires action by all countries regardless of their level of development, involving key stakeholders from private sector and civil society organisations to: create the necessary conditions for raising the incomes of the poor; improving research and innovation systems; increasing investment by removing barriers; reducing waste; and reconciling increased agricultural productivity with other potentially competing objectives and constraints, such as bioenergy, water scarcity and climate change. − (InFocus) What does PCD have to do with the post-2015 development agenda? In his recent speech the OECD SecretaryGeneral also underlined that PCD should be a central pillar of the post-2015 development agenda and a tool to promote change. How this would work? − (ESM) At the OECD, we have been following and contributing to the UN-led major processes on the Post-2015 Agenda. With respect to PCD, the post-2015 agenda is likely to consist of an international framework of policies to achieve sustainable development and eradicate poverty. It will be a set of goals universal in nature and applicable to all countries, while taking account of differing national circumstances and respecting national policies and priorities. It is expected that the new agenda will contribute to transformational change in how we all live, consume and do business. Taking into account these basic elements, we consider that PCD is a key policy tool to create the processes and enabling environments required by the post-2015 development agenda.

We think that PCD can contribute to the implementation of this agenda at five complementary levels: first, ensuring coherence between global goals and national contexts. This means reconciling national priorities with internationally greed objectives. Second, improving coherence and convergence among international agendas and processes, such as the Rio+20 Sustainable Development Goals, the Climate Change Agenda, the G20 development agenda, and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Third, ensuring coherence between economic, social and environmental policies. This means capitalising on inter-linkages and synergies between these policy areas, in which progress in one area

contributes to progress in another. Fourth, improving coherence between different sources of finance, including public, private, international and domestic. And fifth, fostering coherence between governments, international and regional organisations, Civil Society Organisations, and the private sector. − (InFocus) How PCD can be a policy tool to promote change in the post-2015 setting? − (ESM) Apart from the principle of universality, I think a key difference between the MDGs and the new post-2015 development agenda would be the shift from a focus only on the consequences, towards a greater emphasis on addressing also the causes of development challenges, as well as the drivers for sustainable development. In this context, transformations towards more sustainable development paths will require creating national and global enabling environments.

PCD can play an important role as a tool to guide coherent and collective action. It can help to identify “development enablers”, such as predictable financing for development; access to clean water and energy; a well-functioning trading system. For example, according to OECD analysis, reducing global trade costs by 1% would increase worldwide income by more than USD 40 billion, 65% of which would accrue to developing countries.

PCD can also contribute to generate evidence to identify ways for managing potential “disablers”, which might hinder countries’ capacity to achieve their sustainable development objectives, such as protectionism, conflict and corruption. For example, illicit financial outflows from developing countries far outweigh aid inflows, they strip resources from developing countries that could finance sustainable development. Coherent action in key policy areas such as tax evasion, anti-bribery and money laundering are critical for supporting development. − (In Focus) How OECD is helping to foster coherence for development and what practical policy tools are available for governments? − (ESM) At the OECD we have three main work streams on PCD. First we develop evidence-based analysis to raise awareness and inform policy making. As part of this effort we have an annual flagship publication on PCD which offer recommendations on how to address in a coherent manner key global issues, such as food security, Illicit Financial Flows, and green growth. Second, we have non- binding instruments such as ministerial declarations and recommendations which help us to build commitment at the highest level among our member countries. We also develop methodologies and policy tools to help practitioners in capitals to foster PCD. For example the DAC peer reviews have been, for more than a decade, a mechanism to monitor progress on PCD institutional mechanism and practices in our member countries. We have also developed a self-assessment tool which we call “PCD toolkit” and we are working to develop a monitoring tool to assess progress. Third, we facilitate a more inclusive dialogue with different stakeholders and we work with our members through a network of national focal points for PCD which serves as a mechanism for information and knowledge sharing.

For more information : http://www.oecd.org/pcd/ INFOCUS 33

Interview : Lionel Champeaud, Airbus à l’épreuve de la Russie

Lionel Champeaud est PDG du Groupe Airbus (ex-EADS) en Russie.

Diplômé de l’INALCO et ingénieur de l’Université Paris 7, il a exercé les fonctions de Représentant Général en URSS puis Russie-CEI pour l’Aérospatiale, avant de devenir Directeur Europe Centrale et Orientale du groupe en 1996, fonction qu’il exercera au sein d’Aérospatiale Matra Lagardère, puis d’EADS jusqu’en 2012.

Propos recueillis par Raphaël Koenig.

(InFocus) Quels sont les attraits de la Russie dans le secteur aérospatial ? Ses défauts ?

(InFocus) Quelle est la stratégie d’un groupe comme Airbus sur le marché russe ?

Lionel Champeaud (LC) L’attrait de la Russie est assez terre-àterre : il existe, dans le secteur des avions civils, un gros marché, besoin d’être satisfait. Depuis 23 ans, Airbus a des avions qui volent en Russie, aujourd’hui près de 300.

Il n’y a plus d’industrie aéronautique russe sur les segments qui sont ceux d’Airbus, donc le marché est ouvert d’office, avec une concurrence classique entre Boeing et Airbus. La Russie n’a rien d’attractif dans le sens d’incitations particulières à l’investissement et au développement d’activité, parce que les Russes rêvent de reconstruire leur industrie. Ainsi, ils ont lancé les programmes Sukhoi SSJ100 et MS 21 d’Irkut. Ce dernier serait amené à concurrencer les A320, mais en raison des lenteurs propres à l’industrie russe, il accumule les retards et aujourd’hui l’A320 vole sans concurrence.

(LC) Aujourd’hui, seul le marché civil est ouvert. Airbus Group a donc mis en place une coopération assez forte de sous-traitance, d’achats de matériaux et de matériaux élaborés en produits finis.

La Russie fournit 60% du titane nécessaire à Airbus, il est donc stratégique pour nous d’être présents dans le pays.

Dans le domaine des hélicoptères, nous avons lancé une stratégie pour pénétrer une partie du marché gouvernemental, mais civil uniquement.

Le marché militaire fermé, et quasi impossible à pénétrer. Dans le spatial, il existe un nouveau marché des satellites. Les Russes ont accumulé du retard, notamment au niveau de la qualité des composants. Le principal handicap de leurs produits est leur durée de vie, et aujourd’hui ils sont demandeurs de satellites.

Ce marché s’ouvre, mais cela passe principalement par de la coopération en recherche et développement, et il est plus difficile à accéder que le marché de l’aviation civile.

Le marché hélicoptère est également uniquement civil aujourd’hui, constitué par des opérateurs et clients privés. Sur ce marché, Airbus Hélicoptères est en tête parmi les fournisseurs occidentaux, mais le chiffre d’affaires demeure modeste par rapport à ce que l’on pourrait espérer.

INFOCUS 34

De manière générale, nous avons fait au maximum de nos capacités pour capturer ce qui peut l’être sur les 20 prochaines années. Les attentes des Russes sont différentes des nôtres, différentes et ne correspondent pas à ce que l’on peut leur donner. Ils veulent produire en Russie et exporter sur les projets mondiaux : soit on les intègre dans un programme, soit il n’est pas possible de faire des affaires. Malheureusement, travailler avec eux est difficile : le gap technologique est long à combler chez eux pour des raisons de management et de difficultés à restructurer une industrie gigantesque et la rendre compétitive.

Cela limite la stratégie que l’on pourrait avoir pour en faire un grand partenaire. De plus, nous sommes dans une relation où ils essaient de se positionner comme concurrents à moyen terme, ce qui rend les choses plus difficiles.

(InFocus) V. Poutine a engagé une vaste réforme des forces armées russes, avec notamment un plan d’armement très ambitieux. Quel sera son impact sur l’industrie aérospatiale russe, et pensez-vous que ce plan va aboutir ?

(LC) Sur le segment civil de l’industrie aéronautique, rien ne montre que la réforme va l’aider à progresser. La vraie question est je pense la capacité des Russes à financer ce programme. Cela paraît difficile vu l’état de l’économie russe et son évolution ces dernières années. Je pense que Poutine va avoir beaucoup de difficultés pour soutenir le niveau d’ambition qu’il s’est fixé.

INTER(InFocus) Quels sont les intérêts russes en Ukraine dans le domaine de la défense et de l’aéronautique ?

(LC) Les Russes ont des difficultés avec cette situation. L’industrie aéronautique héritée de l’URSS est assez fortement implantée en Ukraine, notamment Antonov.

Bureau d’étude Antonov à Kiev n’est cependant pas la difficulté principale. Le plus important pour eux sont les motoristes comme Motor Sich, pépite de l’industrie ukrainienne, qui fournit les turbines pour les hélicoptères russes notamment.

Cela dit, la question de l’industrie aéronautique n’a pas l’air de les alarmer plus que cela, leurs intérêts sont donc difficiles à mesurer.

On entend des bruits contradictoires chez nos interlocuteurs. S’il y a une rupture complète des relations avec l’Ukraine, il n’est pas certain que cela constitue un élément qui fasse changer d’avis, d’attitude ou de position les décideurs à Moscou.

Bien entendu, tout le monde dans le secteur regarde ce qu’il se passe, et se demande jusqu’où ils vont pouvoir aller. Les futurs produits, comme le T-50, sont d’une grande ampleur industrielle.

Une des questions est de savoir s’ils vont se tourner vers des fournisseurs étrangers, comme ils l’ont fait sur les blindés (en achetant à l’italien IVECO, ndlr), ou avec le Mistral.

Sur des segments comme les avions de transport ou des hélicoptères rapides, je ne les vois pas aller demander à des fournisseurs étrangers. Ils se satisfont bon gré mal gré de ce qu’ils produisent.

Sergyukov avait lancé une politique d’achat pour « reboucher les trous » dans leurs capacités, mais je ne crois pas qu’ils aillent tellement plus loin. Il y a eu des propositions d’Airbus pour leur vendre des petits avions de transport tactique (de type CASA-295, ndlr). Cela a été refusé malgré l’intérêt que l’avion représentait, ne connaissant pas d’équivalent russe. Nous sommes dans le domaine de la pure posture politique, avec l’intention de montrer qu’on peut y arriver seuls.

Des partenariats parcellaires, pour les aider à achever un produit, peuvent être envisagés, mais cela sera très limité et on ne les voit pas proposer de réaliser tout un programme ensemble. Peut-être dans 20 ans, mais pas aujourd’hui.

(InFocus) Comment la crise avec l’Ukraine est-elle vécue, perçue depuis Moscou ?

(InFocus) Pensez-vous que des sanctions seront efficaces, et quel impact pourraient-elles avoir sur le commerce avec la Russie dans votre secteur ?

(LC) Tout dépend du type de sanction, qu’est-ce qu’on vise, qui est visé et quelles institutions ou individus. On peut perdre des parts de marché, nous comme nos concurrents, notamment dans le domaine de l’espace et des satellites si des sanctions fortes sont mises en application.

La question de l’extension de ces sanctions est centrale : jusqu’où vont-elles aller ? Y aura-t-il une réciprocité ? Cela peut causer des difficultés importantes car la Russie est le principal fournisseur de Titane d’Airbus (et de Boeing). Personne n’a rien à gagner sur le plan économique. De plus, je n’ai pas le sentiment que cette menace ait un véritable impact sur les décideurs à Moscou.

La Russie a besoin des partenariats technologiques et économiques avec l’Ouest, mais ils l’analysent à travers d’autres référentiels.

Ils sont assez mentalisés pour se faire mal et aller assez loin. Cela demande une analyse plus longue, mais simplement les gens qui aujourd’hui prennent les décisions ont connu l’URSS et sont prêts à aller assez loin pour ne pas s’humilier et paraître faibles devant l’Ouest.

Le fait que 90% de l’oligarchie pourrait se retrouver à ne plus pouvoir accéder à ses biens propriétés et capitaux sera sûrement plus efficace qu’interdire par exemple l’exportation de satellites.

Les décideurs seront plus sensibles à leur situation et intérêts personnels qu’à la situation générale de la Russie.

(LC) Politiquement, il y a eu des déclarations de Rogozyn qui a dit en substance « ce n’est pas grave s’il y a des sanctions fortes et un embargo, on est capables de tout faire ». C’est un discours « très soviétique » qui revient. Dans le quotidien, je remarque peu de changement, les choses sont assez calmes.

Cela dit, cette situation va contribuer à ne pas ouvrir les rares possibilités d’affaires qu’il y aurait, comme un avion de transport tactique du style du CASA-295 qui n’existe pas chez eux et dont ils ont besoin pour remplacer leurs moyens obsolètes.

Cela durcit les relations, personne ne sait comment cela va évoluer mais de toutes façons cela ne nous aidera pas.

INFOCUS 35

Photo-reportage Istanbul : une jeunesse contestataire CrĂŠdits photo : Fadma Ed Dahouz et Morgan Marmaro

Les manifestants font face aux gaz lacrymogènes

INFOCUS 36

REPORTAGE PHOTO

La révolte s’approprie les symboles nationaux

Une jeunesse contestataire INFOCUS 37

Se protéger tant bien que mal...

L’assaut de la police se prépare

INFOCUS 38

REPORTAGE PHOTO

Les gaz lacrymogènes omniprésents sur la place Taksim

Sit in de manifestants

Barricade de fortune pour l la jeunesse turque

INFOCUS 39

News from the Assoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;PSIA! This year has been very busy for the Asso PSIA, once again !

Our dynamic team has been struggling to organize breathtaking conferences, interactive workshops, exciting after work drinks, an eye-opening trip to Istanbul and a glamorous Gala.

-Workshops : two workshops were organized by the Careers and Internship team, to facilitate studentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s access to the job market.

Meet the recruiters on March 12 and Meet the Alumni on March 19th gathered professionals in various sectors to give tips to some 150 attending students. Between March 31st and April 4th, the Online Career Fair was organized on the Seekube platform.

INFOCUS 40

Asso’PSIA NEWS

-Trip to Istanbul : During the winter break, the Travelling Committee of Asso’PSIA organized a study trip to Istanbul with a group of 26 PSIA students of 12 different nationalities.

The students had the chance to participate in conferences and meetings with institutions such as the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Agence Française de Developement (AFD).

They were able to exchange with diplomats and experts about Turkey’s political situation since the Gezi events and its growing role on the international scene. At the end of the stay, they all attended a cocktail with Sciences Po Alumni, organized by the Consul of France Ms Muriel Domenach, in the Palais de France.

The students also visited some places steeped in history like the Topkapi Palace and the Hagia Sophia and discovered the art of Arabic calligraphy at the Sakıp Sabancı Museum.

- “How to fight Hunger?” Conference by Asso’PSIA and ACTED: The panel, composed of a diverse range of experts, tried to consolidate an approach to tackle hunger in the post-2015 world, and served as a platform for multilateral and intersectoral discourse on food security.

-And all year long…

Weekly afterworks in Mabillon ! You were very numerous to join us for the weekly afterwork drinks at Eden Park pub, thank you again !

INFOCUS 41

READ OUR PREVIOUS ISSUES ON WWW.INFOCUSREVUE.COM