Australia’s Essential Contribution to space domain awareness By Duncan Blake

Australia’s Essential Contribution to ‘Space Domain Awareness’

DUNCAN BLAKE, SPECIAL COUNSEL, SPACE LAW, INTERNATIONAL AEROSPACE LAW & POLICY GROUP

“S pace Domain Awareness” (SDA) is knowledge of what space objects are in orbit and what they’re doing, as well as what is happening in the space environment itself. 1

SDA is essential to the safe, secure, sustainable and responsible use of space by all space operators. In spite of several legal uncertainties that arise from SDA activities, Australia is making an increasing contribution to the collection, global sharing and use of SDA data. As at January, 2020, somewhere between 9000 and 10000 satellites have been placed in orbit since the beginning of the space age in 1957. 2

Yet, within the next decade, governments, commercial entities and universities plan to add 20,000 to 50,000 new satellites, some of which are independent satellites, but most of which are parts of ‘mega-constellations’ of satellites acting cooperatively. 3

Some of these are Australian. 4

This is in addition to the approximately 22,000 pieces of space debris currently in orbit and big enough to be tracked, the approximately 1 million pieces of space debris currently in orbit that are not big enough to be tracked but still big enough to destroy a satellite on impact, or least render it inoperative, and the approximately 128 million even smaller pieces of space debris, that would still at least damage a satellite on impact, if not render it inoperative. 5 Collisions between satellites and space debris happen regularly. The International Space Station (ISS), for example, is pitted with impacts from pieces of space debris, and although it has not (yet)

THE BULLETIN March 2020 been hit with debris big enough to do significant damage, the crew have been directed to begin evacuation drills with increasing frequency, and the ISS has been manoeuvred, at enormous cost, around 1.5 times each year to avoid space debris. 6

On average, a satellite operator somewhere receives a warning of a possible collision close to 2,000 times each day. 7 Such warnings can only provide a probability of collision, usually in the order of 1/10000 – the sensors and the data they provide are simply not accurate enough to assert a certainty of collision. 8

So, satellite operators only occasionally respond to such warnings. Many satellites lack propulsion, so they can’t move anyway, and other satellite operators do not wish to waste precious fuel to manoeuvre a satellite in response to something that has only a small chance of happening. The fuel would otherwise be used to do “station-keeping”, to make sure that the satellite maintains an orbit and an altitude that enables it to provide the services for which its customers are paying. Thus, when the operators of an Iridium satellite (part of a constellation that provides global satellite communications, particularly for the maritime market) were given a warning of a collision with a defunct Russian military satellite (Kosmos 2251) on 10 February, 2009, with an anticipated miss distance of 584 metres based on probabilistic calculations, they made a commercial decision not to move the satellite. The two satellites “beat” the odds and actually collided, producing a cloud of around 2000 extra pieces of debris, each of which could subsequently go on to collide with other satellites or pieces of debris. 9

(The phenomenon whereby one collision produces debris that goes on to collide with other things, creating more debris, and so on, in a never-ending “cascade”, is known as the “Kessler Syndrome”, and some experts believe we are already at the point where this is inevitable).

The addition of 20,000 to 50,000 new satellites exacerbates the problem. The biggest of the prospective megaconstellations is the Starlink constellation. Elon Musk – one of the founders of PayPal, the Tesla motor vehicle company and battery producer (including for South Australia), and the SpaceX rocket company – has already launched 180 of an eventual constellation of up to 12,000 satellites and his company recently sought permission to use frequency for 30,000 additional satellites. 10

One of the first batch of Starlink satellites that are already in orbit was recently the subject of a collision warning with a scientific satellite from the European Space Agency (ESA). The warning was given to both organisations in anticipation that they would liaise in order to determine who should move. They had begun liaison, but apparently the Starlink operators were unable to communicate with ESA during the crucial moments, and so ESA made an independent decision to move their satellite, thereby diminishing the future utility of the ESA satellite. 11

This artist's impression shows debris objects in orbit around Earth. Note: The debris field shown in the image is an artist's impression based on actual data. However the image does not show debris items in their actual size or density. Photo: European Space Agency.

The existing Starlink satellites are also the subject of controversy among astronomers due to the highly reflective nature of the satellites. With just 180 of the planned 12,000 satellites in orbit, the astronomers’ view of the night sky has already changed significantly. 12 There have also been deliberate activities to destroy satellites, thereby creating space debris. On 11 January, 2007 the Chinese Army tested an anti-satellite missile against one of their own satellites – a defunct weather satellite. The cloud of over 3000 pieces of debris from that test is expected to present a threat to active satellites for over 100 years. 13

Then on 20 February, 2008 the Americans destroyed one of their own satellites with a missile, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing toxic hydrazine fuel from polluting Earth when the satellite de-orbited. We are assured that the satellite was destroyed at a sufficiently low altitude such that all of the resultant debris de-orbited and burned up in the atmosphere within 40 days. 14

On 27 March, 2019 the Indian Air Force tested their own anti-satellite missile against one of their satellites. Notwithstanding that the missile hit the satellite at a lower altitude than in the Chinese test, some debris was kicked into higher orbits where it will pose a threat for up to two years. 15 It is not just the risk and actuality of collisions that gives rise to legal controversy (putting aside the challenges of proof of attribution, cause and effect), but the competition for use of limited radio frequency bandwidth. For example, manufacturers and operators of small satellites – the size of toasters and smaller – cannot always afford the cost and administrative burden of seeking priority to use a certain frequency from the International Telecommunication Union (through their national regulator), especially in the face of resistance from established satellite manufacturers, so they use frequency on a “no protection, no interference” basis – whereby they undertake not to interfere with any operator who has been granted priority to use a frequency, and accept that they have no protection from interference from other users. 16

This may work if only a small number of operators take this approach, but when, for example, many satellites are dispensed from a single rocket and they’re all trying to use the same frequency in the same volume of space, some are bound to fail. 17 There are also natural threats in the space environment: threats of collisions with natural objects, as well as many high energy particles from our Sun, other stars, blackholes and other sources that can at least interfere with electrical circuits on satellites, and could at most obliterate our solar system. 18 SDA facilitates deconfliction of launches, warnings of collisions, deconfliction of the use of lasers, deconfliction of the use of frequency, support for planned manoeuvres by satellite operators, re-entry warnings and support, effective Space Traffic Management, warning of overflight

by satellites (especially spy satellites), mitigation or denial of an adversary’s access to space, monitoring of debris creation, warning and mitigation of natural risks, resolution of anomalies and attribution of space events, identification of space threats, normalisation of the space environment and spotting of aberrant behaviour.

The US Air Force, now the US Space Force, operates the largest network of sensors for SDA, and maintains and (mostly) shares the data it collects with the global space community. 19

Australia is making an increasing contribution to SDA, through joint US-Australian military capabilities such as the C-band radar and Space Surveillance Telescope, but also through the efforts of Australian space entrepreneurs, such as Electro-Optical Systems, Silentium Defence, Inovor and HEO Robotics. 20 Satellite and rocket operators, and their insurers, are seeking better quality SDA data to manage their exposure to operational, legal and reputational risks. But SDA data providers, including those in Australia and commercial entities, themselves face operational, legal and reputational risks. The data they collect may include orbital parameters for satellites that States would rather not acknowledge. The sensitivity is particularly acute if the SDA data is sufficient to provide a potential adversary with a targeting solution for the satellite. Export control laws may restrict the transfer of data directly, or governments may seek

other ways to assert their export control policies over SDA data providers, such as by contractual means, restrictions on foreign investment, or denial of licences. 21

SDA data providers also need to warn against over-reliance by satellite operators on data that is, ultimately, only a probability – as the 2009 collision between an Iridium and Kosmos satellite demonstrates.

There are other ways in which the use of SDA data may be legally complex – especially where it might be used to actively manage space debris. There is no commonly-accepted definition of “space debris”, and no “right of salvage” (by analogy from maritime law, or otherwise). The State of registration of a space object retains jurisdiction and control over the space object to the exclusion of others, notwithstanding that other States may have responsibilities in respect of ‘active debris management’ activities, and yet other States may be exposed to liability for damage done by the space object in the course of “active debris management”, by virtue of their involvement in the launch of the space object. Furthermore, the community of States generally may be concerned that a capability that is prima facie for the purposes of active debris management, could be used for military or coercive purposes. 22 In spite of the legal and policy complexities, SDA is so essential to safe, secure, sustainable and responsible use of space by all space operators, that Australia must continue to develop its contribution. And the legal profession, for its part, must work to develop clarity and certainty around the application of law to SDA activities. B

Endnotes 1 ‘Space Domain Awareness’ is a new term that the US, Australia and others are using in place of ‘Space Situational Awareness’. Many definitions exist, but the generic description above encompasses the broad elements. For more discussion, see Sandra Erwin, “Air Force: SSA is no more; it’s ’Space Domain Awareness’” in SpaceNews, dated 14 November 2019, see <https://spacenews.com/air-force-ssa-is-nomore-its-space-domain-awareness/>.

2 The Space Debris Office in the European Space Agency provides a summary of ‘Space Debris by the Numbers’ at: https://www.esa.int/ Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_ by_the_numbers. However, this is as at 1 January 2019. There have been many additional satellites launched since then. 3 There is no consolidated list of all proposed satellite constellations. Wikipedia has an incomplete list at its page titled, ‘Satellite constellations’. Significantly, it omits apparent plans for 30000 satellites by SpaceX – see Caleb Henry, ‘SpaceX submits paperwork for 30000 more Starlink satellites’ in SpaceNews, dated 15 October 2019, see <https://spacenews.com/ spacex-submits-paperwork-for-30000-morestarlink-satellites/>. The author is aware of several other, smaller constellations that have been omitted from the list by Wikipedia. 4 The author is aware that Fleet Space Technologies in Adelaide plans a constellation of as many as 100 satellites, see < https://www.fleet.space/ launch>. Canberra-based company ‘Skykraft’ plans a constellation of 200 satellites – UNSW Canberra Press Release, ‘UNSW Canberra spinoff company Skykraft awarded $1 million ACT government grant’ dated 11 September 2019, see <https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/space-research/ news/unsw-canberra-spin-company-skykraftawarded-1-million-act-government-grant>. 5 Space Debris Office, European Space Agency, ‘Space Debris by the Numbers’, dated 1 January 2019, see <https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/ Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers>. 6 No official figures exist, but NASA officials are often asked this question. Some answers are given here: <https://www.quora.com/How-does-theISS-avoid-hitting-space-debris>. 7 Mark Brown, ‘Space Traffic Management and Orbital Debris: A Path Forward to Ensure Safe and Uninterrupted Space Operations’ (2018), Space Traffic Management Conference, see <https:// commons.erau.edu/stm/2018/presentations/15>. 8 Q. Funke et al, ‘Operational Collision Avoidance at ESOC’, 2018, pp 6 – 7, see <https://cddis. nasa.gov/lw21/docs/2018/papers/SessionSD3_ Funke_paper.pdf>. 9 The information is derived from a variety of sources, which are reliably compiled at the Wikipedia page, ‘2009 Satellite Collision’, see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_satellite_ collision>. 10 Caleb Henry, ‘SpaceX submits paperwork for 30000 more Starlink satellites’ in SpaceNews, dated 15 October 2019, see <https://spacenews.com/ spacex-submits-paperwork-for-30000-morestarlink-satellites/>. 11 Mike Wall, ‘European Satellite Dodges Collision with SpaceX Starlink Craft’ in Space.Com, dated 3 September 2019, see <https://www.space.com/ spacex-starlink-esa-satellite-collision-avoidance. html>. 12 Leah Crane, ‘SpaceX Starlink Satellites could be ‘Existential Threat’ to Astronomy, in New Scientist, dated 9 January 2020, see <https:// www.newscientist.com/article/2229643-spacexstarlink-satellites-could-be-existential-threat-toastronomy/>. 13 Celestrak, ‘Chinese ASAT Test’, updated 22 June 2012, see <https://celestrak.com/events/asat. php>. 14 Nicole Petrucci, ‘Reflections on Operation BURNT FROST’, dated 5 March 2017, see <http://www. airpowerstrategy.com/2017/03/05/burnt-frost/>. 15 Marco Langbroek, ‘Why India’s ASAT Test was Reckless’, in The Diplomat, dated 30 April 2019, see <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/why-indiasasat-test-was-reckless/>. 16 Attila Matas, ‘De-mystifying Articles of the RR Related to Small Satellites’, presentation delivered at the ITU Symposium and Workshop on small satellite regulation and communication systems 2 – 4 March 2015, see <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/ space/workshops/2015-prague-small-sat/ Presentations/AM-PHA-ART5.pdf>. 17 Loren Grush, ‘Why the Air Force Still Cannot Identify More Than a Dozen Satellites from one December Launch’, in The Verge, dated 2 April 2019, see <https://www.theverge. com/2019/4/2/18277344/space-situationalawareness-air-force-tracking-sso-a-spaceflightcubesats>. 18 Joseph Pelton, ‘Space Debris and Other Threats from Outer Space’, in Springer Briefs in Space Development, 2013. 19 The US Department of Defense has previously had an official webpage with information about its Space Surveillance Network, but the webpage is not currently active due to the formation of the US Space Force. Information about the US Space Surveillance Network can be found on the Wikipedia page titled, ‘United States Space Surveillance Network’, see <https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/United_States_Space_Surveillance_ Network>. 20 Scott Schneider, ‘Australian Capabilities for Space Situational Awareness’, in Project Asteria 2019 Space Debris, Space Traffic Management & Space Sustainability – A Collaborative Project Between the Air Power Development Centre and the Australia New Zealand Space Law Interest Group (2019, APDC, Canberra), see <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/ Publications/Project-Asteria-2019-Space-Debris,- Space-Traffic-M>. 21 Adelaide Law School and IALPG, ‘Laws Applicable to Space Situational Awareness’, in ANGELS (Australian Navigational Guide Explaining Laws for Space, see <https://spacelaws.com/articles/lawsrelating-to-space-situational-awareness-ssa/>. 22 Ibid.